Be nholz, Pe e
A icle
On he Reasons o he In luence o In e es G oups on
Poli ical Decision-Making
Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en (ZWS) - Vie eljah essch i de
Gesellscha ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en, Ve ein ü Socialpoli ik
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Duncke & Humblo , Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Be nholz, Pe e (1974) : On he Reasons o he In luence o In e es G oups
on Poli ical Decision-Making, Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en (ZWS) -
Vie eljah essch i de Gesellscha ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en, Ve ein ü
Socialpoli ik, ISSN 0342-1783, Duncke & Humblo , Be lin, Vol. 94, Iss. 1, pp. 45-63,
h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45
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Oil he Reasons o he In luence
o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making
By Pe e Be nholz
1. Some Recen De elopmen s o he Theo y o In e es G oups
a) Olson's Theo y and Wagne 's Commen
A decisi e s ep o de elop a gene al heo y o he in luence o in-
e es g oups has been aken by Olson in his wo k "The Logic o Col-
lec i e Ac ion" (1965). Olson's s a ing poin is he ac ha poli ical
bene i s p o ided by in e es g oups o hei membe s a e public goods.
This implies ha he indi idual membe has no eason o sac i ice
money and ime o ge he collec i e good which is ei he p o ided in
any case o on he p o ision o which he has no in luence. The e o e
indi iduals a e no in e es ed o become o o emain membe s o big
po en ial p essu e g oups. As a consequence o his Olson concludes
ha big la en g oups o classes o he popula ion can only be o gan-
ized in in e es g oups, i hese in e es g oups p o ide, besides in-
di isible collec i e goods, p i a e goods o i hey can en o ce he
membe ship o he people in ques ion. Things a e di e en , howe e ,
wi h small g oups ha ing simila in e es s. In his case indi idual
beha iou has mo e o less in luence on he p o ision o he collec i e
poli ical ad an age. In small g oups, mo eo e , all he ac o s may be
a wo k which ha e been s essed by he sociology o small g oups1.
I his heo y is co ec — and he e a e many empi ical obse a ions
speaking in i s a ou 2 — hen he heo y o a gene al poli ical
equilib ium b ough abou by he p essu e o in e es g oups is w ong.
1 See e. g. G. C. Homans (1950).
2 Olson: see e. g. chap . Ill and VI, whe e a numbe o empi ical obse -
a ions in Ame ica a e men ioned. Rega ding he Ge man si ua ion we ind
many ac s suppo ing Olson's heo y in E. Buchholz (1969). The p o ision o
membe s wi h p i a e goods is e ec ed e. g. 'by ade unions in he o m o
social bene i s (p. 222), by ag icul u al in e es g oups in o m o en e ainmen s
and ec ea ion, especially o young membe s (pp. 54—55 and 192—193). E -
o s o en o ce pa icipa ion in he o ganisa ion (pp. 63 e seq.) and con i-
bu ions o non-membe s a e also o be ound wi h ade unions (pp. 64—65).
Finally Buchholz poin s o he equen dominance o la ge business en e -
p ises in economic in e es g oups (pp. 104 and 109—110), hus p o iding
e idence how in e es g oups a e suppo ed by a small numbe o membe s.
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46 Pe e Be nholz
Fo his heo y, which has especially been wo ked ou by Ben ly (1949)
and T uman (1958), is alid only i all g oups and classes o he popula-
ion ha ing simila in e es s can be easily o ganized. Acco ding o
Olson, howe e , i is always impossible o o ganize big la en g oups,
i no p i a e goods a e p o ided o i people canno be o ced o be-
come membe s.
Inspi e o he ad an ages o Olson's heo y compa ed o i s p edeces-
so s, his heo y, oo, is no adequa e o explain why and o wha
deg ee in e es g oups a e able o in luence poli ical decisions in de-
moc acies. The undispu able ac ha se e al in e es s, which a e o -
ganized, a e aken ca e o by public decisions is no p oo o he suc-
cess o in e es g oups. Fo he espec i e poli ical decisions can be a
consequence o he ac ha poli icians and pa ies a e in e es ed o
win he nex elec ion and canno neglec , he e o e, he wishes o
g oups o o e s. Thus — and his ac has been igh ly s essed by
Wagne (1966) — i is possible ha he decisions would ha e led o
he same esul s, i he e had been no p essu e g oups a all. This
analysis can be suppo ed by poin ing o he ac ha in eali y many
poli ical decisions ha e been made in a ou o uno ganized g oups
and classes o he popula ion8.
b) P ima y Reasons o he In luence
o P essu e-G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making
I Wagne 's a gumen is accep ed, any heo y which wan s o show
ha he e is an in luence o in e es g oups on poli ical decision p oces-
ses has o demons a e ha his in luence is g ea e han he in luence
b ough abou by he weigh o he o es o hei membe s. Thus one
has o show, ha in e es g oups a e able o con ince poli icians and
pa ies, ha hey ha e he powe o ge o hem o o wi hd aw om
hem he suppo o a bigge numbe o o e s han hey ha e mem-
be s. I ha e ied o poin ou in wo ea lie pape s4 ha in e es
g oups can succeed in doing so, because hey o hei membe s ha e
ma ke powe and a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion in he economic
o o he ields o hei ac i i ies. This is, e. g., ue i a p essu e g oup
o i s membe s a e in luen ial as monopolies o oligopolies on ce ain
ma ke s. In his case he in e es g oup o i s membe s can in luence
ou side g oups o o e s like wo ke s, capi al owne s and consume s
by educing p oduc ion by s ikes, by i ing wo ke s, by boyko s e c.
» Wagne (1966, pp. 165—166) men ions some Ame ican examples.
4 P. Be nholz (1969) and (1973). In he la e pape some o he poli ical
consequences o ma ke powe and o a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion by
in e es g oups a e de i ed o he case o wo p essu e g oups.
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In luence o In e es G oups
on
Poli ical Decision-Making 47
I he go e nmen is conside ed o be esponsible o he disad an ages
esul ing om hese measu es i is possible o mobilize an addi ional
numbe o o e s agains he go e ning pa y. As a consequence i will
be e y o en su icien , i an in e es g oup is only h ea ening o use
i s ma ke powe o ge a a ou able public decision.
Ad an ages in ge ing in o ma ion a e, besides ma ke powe , he
o he impo an eason o he in luence o p essu e g oups. I in o ma-
ions a e incomple e and cos ly o ge , o e s, pa ies and go e nmen s
ha e o ake decisions unde unce ain y. The membe s o in e es
g oups, on he o he hand, ge ce ain in o ma ions in hei ields o
in luence as a consequence o hei daily ac i i ies. These in o ma ions
can be passed on o hei in e es g oup wi h a minimum o cos s. Thus
he la e a e able o p o ide o poli icians, wi h li le addi ional cos s,
in o ma ion abou he si ua ion in ce ain indus ies, abou he p obable
consequences o go e nmen al decisions and o o he e en s, and, mo e-
o e , abou he eac ions o be expec ed o ce ain g oups o o e s.
Pa ies and go e nmen , on he o he hand, can usually ge he espec-
i e knowledge only by incu ing sizeable cos s. Thus hey a e in-
e es ed o ge cheap in o ma ion om in e es g oups o sa e esou -
ces, which can be used o win addi ional o es by a ou ing o he
g oups o o e s.
In e es g oups, howe e , will only be p epa ed o sell hei know-
ledge o ce ain poli ical ad an ages. They a e, mo eo e , no eady
o gi e in o ma ions e e ing o nega i e consequences o poli ical
measu es a ou ed by hem.
I ollows om hese ema ks ha , besides ma ke powe , a quasi-
monopoly o in o ma ion in hei special ields o ac i i ies is espon-
sible o he powe o p essu e g oups o in luence go e nmen s and
poli ical pa ies and hus o b ing abou a change in poli ical p ocesses5.
I should be no ed ha , s a ing om ma ke powe and om a quasi-
monopoly o in o ma ion, in e es g oups a e able o build up many
seconda y bases o in luence poli ical decision-p ocesses. I is su icien
o men ion some well-known ac s like in luencing pa ies by inancial
suppo and by delega ing membe s in o pa liamen a y commi ees o
in o he go e nmen al bu eauc acy.
5 Compa e A.
Downs
(1957) pp.94—95 and pp.247—259. The g ea im-
po ance o he supply o in o ma ion o he in luence o in e es g oups
on poli ical decision-making has been clea ly poin ed ou by E. G une (1956,
pp. 108—113). See also K. . Beyme (1971), who concludes: „An impo an pa
o he con ac s be ween go e nmen depa men s and in e es g oups is in-
s i u ionalized in his manne ( h ough hei ac i i ies in councils and com-
missions). Bo h sides a e in e es ed, as bo h a e in wan o in o ma ions and
suppo ," (p. 171 e seq.)
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48 Pe e Be nholz
In he ollowing sec ions o his pape we neglec quasi-monopolies o
in o ma ion as well as seconda y easons o he in luence o p essu e
g oups on poli ical decisions. Ins ead, we will analyze, how he powe
o in luence addi ional o e s besides membe s can be u ned in o
powe o e poli icians and pa ies. We will analyze, mo eo e , wha
changes will be b ough abou in he in luence o p essu e g oups by
he possibili y o compe i ion among hem.
2. Basic Assump ions o he Model
Le us suppose a wo pa y sys em, in which he only in e es s o
pa ies a e o win elec ions, and in which o e s will gi e hei o es
o he pa y, whose p og am is he mos a ou able o hem. Le us
assume, u he mo e, ha each pa y, ha ing won an elec ion and hus
go e nmen al powe , will ealize i s p og am. Pa ies and o e s ha e
pe ec in o ma ion abou he p e e ences o all o e s conce ning he
measu es p oposed and ca ied ou by pa ies and go e nmen , and
abou he consequences o hese measu es.
Because o economic g ow h ax eceip s in each pe iod inc ease wi h
unchanged ax a es, go e nmen and opposi ion ha e, he e o e, o
decide how o use hese addi ional eceip s in o de o win he g ea es
possible numbe o o e s. I is, mo eo e , assumed ha a educ ion
o axes a ou ing e e ybody is ou o ques ion, because indi idual
o e s would no ealize he sligh ad an ages and he e o e no change
hei decisions. The same is supposed o be ue o expendi u es a-
ou ing all ci izens in abou he same way and which a e made, e. g.,
o a speci ic public good.
On he o he hand, le us assume ha he se o all o e s
M
is com-
posed o h ee g oups o o e s, whose p e e ences, hough di e ing,
a e simila wi hin each g oup. By spending all addi ional eceip s on
app op ia e bundles o measu es, go e nmen and opposi ion a e able
o in luence posi i ely he o e s o one, bu no o se e al g oups,
since he aims o di e en g oups exclude each o he . Subsequen ly
we shall also assume ha a i s one, la e wo g oups o o e s a e
o ganized in in e es g oups. These g oups ha e he powe o b ing
uno ganized o e s in o a posi ion which is less ad an ageous han he
ini ial one.
To gi e mo e p ecision o ou assump ions we now o malize hem.
The symbols used a e as ollows:
V? is an uno ganized g oup o o e s (i = 1,2,3);
Vk is a g oup o o e s o ganized in an in e es g oup (k = 1,2,3);
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In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 49
bQQ is he ini ial posi ion;
bi0 he si ua ion wi hin each o he go e nmen , conside ing he
gi en addi ional means, i a bundle o measu es G{ in a ou
o o e s' g oup i is ealized (i = 1,2,
3) ;
k ( c = 1,2, 3) indica es he si ua ion esul ing om he ini ial
posi ion, i one o he h ee g oups o o e s is o ganized in
a p essu e g oup Vk and akes measu es Pk acco ding o i s
ma ke powe ;
&04 esul s om he ini ial si ua ion i wo g oups o o e s Vk
and Vj a e o ganized and a e bo h aking measu es Pk and
Pj (K j = 1,2, 3; k
4=
Ï) espec i ely;
bik desc ibes he si ua ion which esul s, i he go e nmen has
aken s eps o a ou o e s' g oup V" o V^ (i = 1, 2, 3), and
i o e 's g oup Vk (k = 1,2,3; k 4= i) — which is o ganized in
an in e es g oup — has aken measu es o in luence he si u-
a ion o non-membe s;
bi4 acco dingly indica es he si ua ion a ising i he go e nmen
has in e ened in a ou o o e s4 g oup V" (i = 1, 2, 3) and
i bo h in e es g oups Vk and ha e aken measu es Pk and
Pj (k, j = 1, 2, 3; k
4=
j; k, j4= i) in luencing non-membe s;
M indica es he se and
N he numbe o all o e s;
uh (bik) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) and (k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) deno es he u ili y o o e
h (h £ M), gi en si ua ion bik;
Mik g indica es he se and
Nik g he numbe o o e s, o which
uh
( >ik)
> Uh Çb g); whe e
h € Mik g;
i, = 0, 1, 2, 3;
k, g =
0,
1, 2, 3, 4;
i
4= /
and (o ) k
= = 9-
M'ik g is he symbol o he se and
N'iic,
g o he numbe o o e s, o which
Uh(bik)=Uh (b g).
Ou assump ions may now be o mula ed as ollows:
Al. In he nex pe iod he go e nmen will ha e a i s disposal ad-
di ional eceip s a cons an ax a es because o economic g ow h.
These eceip s may be spen by using h ee di e en bundles o
measu es G* which exclude each o he and b ing abou , wi hou
in e e ence by in e es g oups Vk, si ua ions bio (i = 1, 2, 3).
4 Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- u. Sozialwissenscha en 1974/1
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50 Pe e Be nholz
A2. The o e s ha e o dinal u ili y unc ions which a e ansi i e and
de ined o e al e na i es
bik
(i = 0,1, 2, 3; k = 0,1, 2, 3, 4).
A3. The e a e h ee se s o o e s M*o,oo; (i = 1, 2, 3) such ha
a) Uh (b 0) > Uh (b^,
&
€ M^oo i
b) Uh(bO0)^Uh(bio) h(iMiO OO ;
He e Mjo.oo deno es he complemen a y se o M*o,oo.
Assump ion A3 hus indica es ha o e s o g oup V? o V p e e
si ua ion b^ esul ing om go e nmen al measu es Gi, o he ini ial
si ua ion, whe eas all o he o e s ei he p e e he ini ial si ua ion
o a e indi e en among bio and he ini ial si ua ion. I he go e nmen
does no ake any measu es, his will be symbolized by Go.
A4. One o wo g oups o o e s a e o ganized in in e es g oups. Such
an o ganized g oup Vk (k = 1,2,3) can, because o i s ma ke
powe , ake measu es P*. I i does so and i go e nmen al ac ions
Gi (i = 0,1, 2, 3) a e aken, oo, si ua ion bik, and no si ua ion b*o,
will esul . I bo h g oups o o ganized o e s Vk and Vj (k, j = 1,
2, 3;
7c= =
j) a e aking measu es P* and Pj, espec i ely, and i he
go e nmen execu es Gi, hen si ua ion ba will be ealized. Com-
pa ing he o iginal si ua ion boo wi h bik, he ollowing consequen-
ces a e possible o di e en o e s:
a) Uh (b^ > Uh (biA), h 6 M^ ;
b) Uh(bm) = Uh{bik),h£M'00iik ;
c) Uh(bik)>Uh(b00)h£MikM 6)
(i = 0,1,
2, 3;
k =
1, 2, 3, 4)
.
A5. Vo e s gi e hei o es o he pa y whose elec ion pla o m o e s
hem he g ea es u ili y. I he u ili ies o hese elec ion pla o ms
a e equal, hey will e ain om o ing. Vo ing akes place a he
end o he nex pe iod.
A6. The e a e wo pa ies. These pa ies selec elec ion pla o ms in
a way o win he o es o a majo i y o o e s in he nex elec ion
in o de o ake o e go e nmen al powe . The elec ion pla o m
o he winning pa y will be ealized as soon as he go e nmen
has been aken o e .
6 We no e ha he se s M^ ^, M $ and Mik0Q a e disjoin and ha hei
union is he se o all o e s.' I is, mo eo e , impo an o ealize ha he
si ua ion o many membe s o Vk o Vj may ge wo se, ¡i Pk o (and) Pj a e
aken.
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In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 51
A7. Pa ies and in e es g oups a e pe ec ly in o med abou he u ili y
unc ions o all o e s. They as well as o e s ha e pe ec in o -
ma ion abou he consequences esul ing om measu es aken by
he go e nmen , o p oposed by pa ies o in e es g oups, e-
spec i ely.
3. Consequences o he Fo ma ion o an In e es G oup
Le us i s assume ha no o e s a e o ganized in in e es g oups.
Assump ion 4 is no alid. As a consequence, only si ua ions bio can
occu . Acco ding o assump ion A6, go e nmen and opposi ion will
p esen p og ams which a e in ended o assu e hem a majo i y o
o e s in con o mi y wi h A5. Each pa y ha ing o p esume, ha he
o he one is pe suing he same aim, and gi en pe ec in o ma ion (A7),
an elec ion de ea can only be a oided, i he pa ies y o maximize
o es in hei a ou 7.
Acco ding o assump ions A2, A3, A5 and A7, Nio.oo o e s will coun
upon a be e and NQOJO o e s upon a wo se si ua ion han he ini ial
one, i an elec ion p og am p omising he ealiza ion o b^o is p esen ed.
N' o.oo o e s will expec no change o hei u ili ies. F om his i is
e iden , ha elec ion p og ams will only p opose o change he ini ial
si ua ion, i :
(1) Wa.oo -
oo.«>
> 0
o a leas one i (i = 1, 2, 3). Fu he mo e i becomes ob ious ha
pa ies will p opose a bundle o measu es G o which
(2) NMO - NQQJQ = max! (i = 1, 2, 3) ,
i (1) is alid. Choosing he indices o in such a way ha
(3) WlO.00
—
W<HU0> ^20.00
—
^00.20 > ^30,00 ~ ^00,30
holds, i is e iden , ha he pa ies will p opose he ealiza ion o bio-
I should be no ed ha he alidi y o (3) does no imply ha
has he g ea es numbe o membe s (i. e. i is no necessa y ha
7 F om he assump ion o pe ec in o ma ion a ises he di icul y ha
bo h pa ies will p esen iden ical p og ams. The ques ion he e o e is, which
pa y will inally gain go e nmen al powe . In ou discussion his p oblem
is, howe e , no e y ele an , as pe ec in o ma ion (A7) is an un ealis ic
idealiza ion. In eali y, he e o e, he esul s de i ed o pe ec in o ma ion
will only wo k as one ac o among o he s. Thus a clea majo i y o one
o he pa ies will esul , since he pa y p og ams di e as a consequence
o a di e en e alu ion o he si ua ion.
4*
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52 Pe e Be nholz
Nio.oo
>
W*),oo
(i = 2, 3)). O simila impo ance is he numbe o o e s,
o whom he p oposed measu es will be un a ou able.
Le us assume now ha (1) and (3) a e alid and ha only he hi d
g oup o o e s is o ganized in an in e es g oup V3. This in e es g oup
has he powe o h ea en wi h he ealiza ion o si ua ions bo3, bis o
b23 (A4), i he pa ies, in hei p og ams, should p opose he ealiza ion
o boo, bio o bao. I e e ybody belie es in his h ea , hen he pa ies,
when discussing hei elec ion p og ams, ha e o s a om he ac ,
ha only si ua ions b^o, bo3, bi3 and b23 can be ealized. Acco ding o
assump ion A3a) we ha e:
(4) Uh (b^) > Uh (b^; k € M^oo)
which means ha he membe s o V3 p e e b3o o he ini ial si ua ion.
The g oup will he e o e h ea en o ake measu es P3 by using i s
ma ke powe , i he pa ies do no p opose a change o he s a us quo
in hei elec ion p og ams. The e o e, he pa ies ha e o examine,
which o he ou si ua ions b3o, b<03, bi3 o b23 will be p e e ed by mos
o e s. We know al eady ha p og am b3o will b ing ad an ages (o
disad an ages, i (5) is nega i e) o
(5) ^30.00 ~ ^00.30
o e s. Wha will be he si ua ion, i we ha e o expec si ua ion b$
(i = 0,1, 2)? Acco ding o assump ion A4
(6) W«.00 - Woo.i3
(*
= 0,1» 2) .
mo e o e s will be a ou ed han dis a ou ed (o ice e sa, i his
exp ession is nega i e)8.
I pa ies belie e ha he h ea would be execu ed, hey will p o-
pose he ealiza ion o b3o in hei elec ion p og ams, i
(7) n30.00 - ^00.30 > max (^¿3,00 ~
Noo.is)
is alid (i = 0,1, 2).
%
This inequali y can be e o mula ed:
(8) W30.00 ~ ^00.30 > max K 8,00 - JW + ( yo.oo
%
- JW + (Woo.io -
oo. i>]
•
8 A en ion has o be paid o he ac , ( ha among hose, whose si ua ion
is ge ing wo se, he e may be membe s o V3, so ha possibly M00
¿3 n MSO oo
=j= 0 (i = 1, 2). We ha e e en o p esume ha mos membe s o he g oup
will belong o his se , since cos s a e usually incu ed by he ealiza ion
o a h ea .
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In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 59
We i s conside a si ua ion in which inequali ies
(1) ^10.00 - 00.10 > 0 »
(3)
io.oo
—
^00.10 > N20,00 — N00,20 > ^30.00 ~ N00,03 and
(7) NQQ.OO - ^00.30 > m?x (Ni3.00 - Ni0,i3)> (* = 1. 2) •
a e alid. Wi hou exis ence o a p essu e g oup, Vj would he e o e
be a ou ed by go e nmen al decision. The same would be ue o V3,
i i we e he only o ganized p essu e g oup. Gi en hese ac s, wha
will be he consequences o he o ganiza ion o a second p essu e g oup
Ve? I he pa ies e use o a ou he membe s o V2 by p oposing G2
in hei elec ion p og ams (see A3), hen he second in e es g oup V2
can h ea en o ake ac ions P2 damaging o o he o e s (see A4). Since
p essu e g oup V3 also ies o execu e i s h ea s, he ollowing si ua-
ions ha e o be compa ed: bo4, £>14, &23 anc* (see A4). will only
a ain i s aim o make pa ies accep go e nmen al measu e G2 in hei
p og am, i inequali ies
(18) 3.00 - ^00.23 > ^04,00
" nOOM
(19) 3,00 "" ^00.23 > ^14,00
- N00,U
(20) 3.00 — N00,2S > ^32,00
— -^00,32
a e alid. These condi ions, howe e , a e no always su icien . Fo le
us assume ha he numbe o membe s o Vq belonging o
Mao.oo H Mjo.20 (j = 0 o 1), is bigge han ha co esponding o M3o,oo
H Mgo,;o (j = 0 o 1). The p essu e g oup V3 will hen p e e o ealize
bio o boo ins ead o b2o (see A8), since bso canno be ealized. I will,
he e o e, decide no o use p essu e, i (20) is alid, and i he eby he
selec ion o go e nmen al measu es Gi, o o no go e nmen al measu es
can be ob ained. Consequen ly, i enough membe s o VQ ha e p e-
e ences such ha he numbe o o e s belonging o Mzo oo n Mjom is
bigge han he numbe o o e s belonging o Mso.oo n Maojo (j = 0
o 1), hen p essu e g oup V2 will only succeed, i
(21) N23 00 - #00
23
> N 2 00 - N00./2 0 = 0 o 1)
is alid. Then he ealiza ion o P3 by V3 is useless and b2o will, he e-
o e, be b ough abou . I mus be no ed, mo eo e , ha , because o
(18), espec i ely (19), his addi ional condi ion is only a necessa y
condi ion, i
(22) Njgjoo - NW 2 > NM 00 - Nm4
(NOOJ4 - NOOJ2) - (%,00 - %.00) > 0 (j = 0 o 1),
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60 Pe e Be nholz
i. e. i he numbe o hose who a e dis a ou ed on balance, compa ed
o he ini ial si ua ion, is bigge , i bo h h ea s will be ealized han
i his is only case o he h ea o V2. In case (22) is no alid, (21) is
implied by (18) o (19).
The abo e esul s may be summa ized as ollows:
57. The o ma ion o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2 may elimina e
he in luence exe ed by ano he g oup V3, i (18) o (21), (7) and
(3) hold. In his case he go e nmen will akes measu es G2 in
a ou o V2, i he execu ion o h ea P2 is c edible.
Le us now u n o he case, in which (21) is no ul illed, bu in
which
(21 a) N2S 00 - N00)23 < N ijoo - Noo,/2 0' = 0 o 1)
holds. As abo e, we assume u he ha a majo i y o he membe s o
V3 p e e s
b>o
o b2o- Then, i inequali y (22) is ue, i will be ewa ding
o he g oup o o e s V3 no o use h ea s agains a decision in
a ou o he s a us quo o agains go e nmen al measu es Gi, i
inequali ies (18) o (20) a e alid. The go e nmen will hen ealize
boo, o bio, espec i ely. A h ea by Vg o use measu es P2 would no
p e en his, since (21a) holds. I would hus no be ealized.
The same consequences ollow, i (22) is no alid, and i condi ions
(18) and/o (19) a e no ul illed and i < akes he place o > in (18)
and/o (19). The e ec o a new p essu e g oup V2 will be, co espond-
ingly, ha ei he boo o bio will appea in he elec ion p og ams o he
pa ies. A h ea by V2 o use P2 would be unsuccess ul, since V3 could
success ully use P3, i (18) and/o (19) a e no alid. Nei he P2 no P3
will, h e o e, be ealized. Le us summa ize:
58. I he e is no coope a ion among p essu e g oups V2 and V3, since
he e is a ce ain complemen a i y o in e es s wi h uno ganized
o e s among a majo i y o he membe s o V3, and i (3) and (7) a e
ue, bu ei he (21) o (18), (19) and (22) a e no alid, hen he
go e nmen will ealize si ua ions boo o bio. Thus he appea ance
o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2 may ha e he e ec , ha bo h
p essu e g oups ha e no mo e in luence on poli ical decision-making
han i hese o ganiza ions did no exis , whe eas he opposi e is
ue, i only one in e es g oup is p esen .
Finally, we ha e o discuss he case in which (18), (19) and possibly
(21), bu no (20) a e alid. G oup V2 will hen no be able o ge bg0
agains he opposi ion o he o he g oups. I , unde hese condi ions,
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In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 61
(23) #23,00 ~ ^00,28 < ^32,00 ~ #00,82'
is ue hen inequali ies analogous o (18), (19), (20) and (21) ha e o
be examined. Fu he mo e, conside a ions like hose abo e ha e o be
made, in o de o ge he condi ions o a success o V312. He e, oo,
we ind si ua ions, whe e no b3o, bu ei he bio o boo will be ealized.
Up o now he alidi y o inequali y (7) has been assumed. I his is
no ue, and i , mo eo e ,
(24) ^20.00 - ^00.20 > max ( i2,00 ~ N00,i2>» (* = 1» 3>
i
is no ul illed, hen no p essu e g oup will succeed by using only i s
own h ea s. Fo e en i ei he measu es P2 o P3 would be ealized
agains Go o Gi, he pa ies would win no less o e s by p oposing
hem han by aking G2 o G3. Wi hou a collabo a ion on he pa o
bo h in e es g oups ei he si ua ion bio would be ealized, o he
ini ial si ua ion boo would be p ese ed. We he e o e ge he ollowing
conclusion:
S9. I he wo p essu e g oups Vg and V3 do no coope a e and i
nei he (7) no (24) is ue, hen he pa ies will p opose measu es
Gi a ou ing in hei pla o ms. In his case he exis ence o
in e es g oups has no in luence on poli ical decisions.
Le us assume, now, ha a majo i y o he membe s o V2 ei he
belong o M^o.oo n M3040, o o Mgo.oo n Mso,oo espec i ely. The leade -
ships will hen ag ee o a combined h ea by bo h p essu e g oups, in
case G3 should no be p oposed by he pa ies. I
(25) 00 - Nmjo > NU 00 - Nqqm' (* = 0, 1) ,
hen he common h ea will be success ul and b3o be ealized. Vice
e sa, he go e nmen al measu e Gs can also be en o ced i a majo i y
o V3 ei he belongs o Mso.oo n M2040, o o M3o,oo H Mgo.oo espec i ely,
and i
(26) #20.00 - ^00,20 > ^14,00 - #00,14' (* = 0,1) ,
is alid. Should majo i ies o such g oups exis in bo h p essu e g oups,
and should inequali ies (25) and (26) be bo h ue, i is unce ain, which
12 Su icien condi ions o a ealiza ion o b^ a e besides (23):
N22,00 ~ ^00,32 > #04,00 ~ #00,04'
^32,00 — ^00,32 > #14,00 ~ ^00,14'
#32.00 - Woo.32 > Nj3 00 ~ #OOJ3 (j = 0 O 1) .
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62 Pe e Be nholz
o he wo go e nmen al measu es G e o G3 will be en o eced, since
he membe s o bo h o ganiza ions ha e, o cou se, di e en p e e en-
ces. Gi en long- e m planning by in e es g oups, i would be ewa d-
ing o he p essu e g oups o en o ce in he i s elec ion pe iod he
al e na i es p e e ed by, say, Vg and in he ollowing pe iod hose
p e e ed by V3. We would hus ge some hing like in e empo al
log olling among p essu e g oups.
The esul s o he abo e analysis may be summa ized as ollows:
S10. Gi en a ce ain complemen a i y o he aims o he membe s o
bo h g oups, he appea ance o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2
may s eng hen he in luence o an al eady exis ing in e es g oup
V3. This, howe e , will only be ue i nei he he old, no he
new p essu e g oup can succeed by i sel , i. e. i nei he (7) no
(24) holds, and i (25) and/o (26) is alid.
Summa y
Two p ima y easons o he poli ical in luence o p essu e g oups a e
economic powe and a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion. The p oblem, how
he in luence o in e es g oups on o e s o he han membe s is u ned in o
poli ical powe is analyzed in a o mal way o a DOWNSian wo-pa y
sys em. I is shown ha he possibili y o ans o m ma ke -powe in o poli-
ical powe is de e mined by he numbe o membe s o in e es g oups and
o ou side o e s in luenced by hei ac ions, he deg ee o compe i ion
among hei ends, and he c edibili y o hei h ea s, depending on he
his o y o he sys em.
Zusammen assung
P imä e G ünde ü den Ein luß on In e essen e bänden au poli ische
En scheidungen sind ökonomische Mach und ein Quasi-In o ma ionsmono-
pol. Hie wi d das P oblem, wie die Einwi kung diese Ve bände au Nich -
mi gliede un e den Wähle n in poli ische Mach umgewandel we den
kann, o mal ü ein DOWNSsches Zweipa eiensys em un e such . Es wi d
gezeig , daß die Umwandlung on Ma k mach in poli ischen Ein luß on
de Zahl de Mi gliede de In e essen e bände, de Zahl de on ihnen
beein lußba en Nich mi gliede , dem G ad de Übe eins immung zwischen
den Zielen e schiedene Ve bände und de Glaubwü digkei ih e D ohun-
gen abhäng . Diese wi d wiede on de Ve gangenhei des Sys em und de
G össe de möglichen Vo eile ü die Mi gliede bes imm .
Re e ences
Ben ley, A hu F., The P ocess o Go e nmen , E ans on (III.) 1949.
Be nholz, Pe e , Einige Beme kungen zu Theo ie des Ein lusses de Ve -
bände au die poli ische Willensbildung in de Demok a ie, in: Kyklos (22)
1969, pp. 276—288.
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In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 63
Be nholz, Pe e , De Mach we bewe b de Ve bände im poli ischen Sys em,
in: Ch. Wa in (Ed.), Mach und ökonomisches Gese z, Sch i en des Ve -
eins ü Socialpoli ik, N. F. Bd. 74/11, Be lin 1973, pp. 859—881.
Beyme, Klaus on, In e esseng uppen in de Demok a ie, München 1971.
Buchholz, Edwin, Die Wi scha s e bände in de Wi scha sgesellscha ,
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Downs, An hony, An Economic Theo y o Democ acy, New Yo k 1957.
G une , E ich, Die Wi scha s e bände in de Demok a ie. Vom Wachs um
de Wi scha so ganisa ionen im schweize ischen S aa , E lenbach-Zü ich
und S u ga , 1956.
Homans, Geo ge C., The Human G oup, New Yo k 1950.
Olson, Mancu , The Logic o Collec i e Ac ion, Camb idge (Mass.) 1965.
T uman, Da id BThe Go e nmen al P ocess, New Yo k 1958.
Wagne , Richa d E., P essu e G oups and Poli ical En ep eneu s, in: Pape s
on Non-Ma ke Decision Making, Cha lo es ille 1966, pp. 161—170.
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