On the Reasons of the Influence of Interest Groups on Political Decision-Making

Be nholz, Pe e A icle On he Reasons o he In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en (ZWS) - Vie eljah essch i de Gesellscha ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en, Ve ein ü Socialpoli ik P o ided in Coope a ion wi h: Duncke & Humblo , Be lin Sugges ed Ci a ion: Be nholz, Pe e (1974) : On he Reasons o he In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making, Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en (ZWS) - Vie eljah essch i de Gesellscha ü Wi scha s- und Sozialwissenscha en, Ve ein ü Socialpoli ik, ISSN 0342-1783, Duncke & Humblo , Be lin, Vol. 94, Iss. 1, pp. 45-63, h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 This Ve sion is a ailable a : h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/291333 S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen: Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den. Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen. So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen (insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en, gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e. Te ms o use: Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal and schola ly pu poses. You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public. I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence. h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/ Oil he Reasons o he In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making By Pe e Be nholz 1. Some Recen De elopmen s o he Theo y o In e es G oups a) Olson's Theo y and Wagne 's Commen A decisi e s ep o de elop a gene al heo y o he in luence o in- e es g oups has been aken by Olson in his wo k "The Logic o Col- lec i e Ac ion" (1965). Olson's s a ing poin is he ac ha poli ical bene i s p o ided by in e es g oups o hei membe s a e public goods. This implies ha he indi idual membe has no eason o sac i ice money and ime o ge he collec i e good which is ei he p o ided in any case o on he p o ision o which he has no in luence. The e o e indi iduals a e no in e es ed o become o o emain membe s o big po en ial p essu e g oups. As a consequence o his Olson concludes ha big la en g oups o classes o he popula ion can only be o gan- ized in in e es g oups, i hese in e es g oups p o ide, besides in- di isible collec i e goods, p i a e goods o i hey can en o ce he membe ship o he people in ques ion. Things a e di e en , howe e , wi h small g oups ha ing simila in e es s. In his case indi idual beha iou has mo e o less in luence on he p o ision o he collec i e poli ical ad an age. In small g oups, mo eo e , all he ac o s may be a wo k which ha e been s essed by he sociology o small g oups1. I his heo y is co ec — and he e a e many empi ical obse a ions speaking in i s a ou 2 — hen he heo y o a gene al poli ical equilib ium b ough abou by he p essu e o in e es g oups is w ong. 1 See e. g. G. C. Homans (1950). 2 Olson: see e. g. chap . Ill and VI, whe e a numbe o empi ical obse - a ions in Ame ica a e men ioned. Rega ding he Ge man si ua ion we ind many ac s suppo ing Olson's heo y in E. Buchholz (1969). The p o ision o membe s wi h p i a e goods is e ec ed e. g. 'by ade unions in he o m o social bene i s (p. 222), by ag icul u al in e es g oups in o m o en e ainmen s and ec ea ion, especially o young membe s (pp. 54—55 and 192—193). E - o s o en o ce pa icipa ion in he o ganisa ion (pp. 63 e seq.) and con i- bu ions o non-membe s a e also o be ound wi h ade unions (pp. 64—65). Finally Buchholz poin s o he equen dominance o la ge business en e - p ises in economic in e es g oups (pp. 104 and 109—110), hus p o iding e idence how in e es g oups a e suppo ed by a small numbe o membe s. OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 46 Pe e Be nholz Fo his heo y, which has especially been wo ked ou by Ben ly (1949) and T uman (1958), is alid only i all g oups and classes o he popula- ion ha ing simila in e es s can be easily o ganized. Acco ding o Olson, howe e , i is always impossible o o ganize big la en g oups, i no p i a e goods a e p o ided o i people canno be o ced o be- come membe s. Inspi e o he ad an ages o Olson's heo y compa ed o i s p edeces- so s, his heo y, oo, is no adequa e o explain why and o wha deg ee in e es g oups a e able o in luence poli ical decisions in de- moc acies. The undispu able ac ha se e al in e es s, which a e o - ganized, a e aken ca e o by public decisions is no p oo o he suc- cess o in e es g oups. Fo he espec i e poli ical decisions can be a consequence o he ac ha poli icians and pa ies a e in e es ed o win he nex elec ion and canno neglec , he e o e, he wishes o g oups o o e s. Thus — and his ac has been igh ly s essed by Wagne (1966) — i is possible ha he decisions would ha e led o he same esul s, i he e had been no p essu e g oups a all. This analysis can be suppo ed by poin ing o he ac ha in eali y many poli ical decisions ha e been made in a ou o uno ganized g oups and classes o he popula ion8. b) P ima y Reasons o he In luence o P essu e-G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making I Wagne 's a gumen is accep ed, any heo y which wan s o show ha he e is an in luence o in e es g oups on poli ical decision p oces- ses has o demons a e ha his in luence is g ea e han he in luence b ough abou by he weigh o he o es o hei membe s. Thus one has o show, ha in e es g oups a e able o con ince poli icians and pa ies, ha hey ha e he powe o ge o hem o o wi hd aw om hem he suppo o a bigge numbe o o e s han hey ha e mem- be s. I ha e ied o poin ou in wo ea lie pape s4 ha in e es g oups can succeed in doing so, because hey o hei membe s ha e ma ke powe and a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion in he economic o o he ields o hei ac i i ies. This is, e. g., ue i a p essu e g oup o i s membe s a e in luen ial as monopolies o oligopolies on ce ain ma ke s. In his case he in e es g oup o i s membe s can in luence ou side g oups o o e s like wo ke s, capi al owne s and consume s by educing p oduc ion by s ikes, by i ing wo ke s, by boyko s e c. » Wagne (1966, pp. 165—166) men ions some Ame ican examples. 4 P. Be nholz (1969) and (1973). In he la e pape some o he poli ical consequences o ma ke powe and o a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion by in e es g oups a e de i ed o he case o wo p essu e g oups. OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 47 I he go e nmen is conside ed o be esponsible o he disad an ages esul ing om hese measu es i is possible o mobilize an addi ional numbe o o e s agains he go e ning pa y. As a consequence i will be e y o en su icien , i an in e es g oup is only h ea ening o use i s ma ke powe o ge a a ou able public decision. Ad an ages in ge ing in o ma ion a e, besides ma ke powe , he o he impo an eason o he in luence o p essu e g oups. I in o ma- ions a e incomple e and cos ly o ge , o e s, pa ies and go e nmen s ha e o ake decisions unde unce ain y. The membe s o in e es g oups, on he o he hand, ge ce ain in o ma ions in hei ields o in luence as a consequence o hei daily ac i i ies. These in o ma ions can be passed on o hei in e es g oup wi h a minimum o cos s. Thus he la e a e able o p o ide o poli icians, wi h li le addi ional cos s, in o ma ion abou he si ua ion in ce ain indus ies, abou he p obable consequences o go e nmen al decisions and o o he e en s, and, mo e- o e , abou he eac ions o be expec ed o ce ain g oups o o e s. Pa ies and go e nmen , on he o he hand, can usually ge he espec- i e knowledge only by incu ing sizeable cos s. Thus hey a e in- e es ed o ge cheap in o ma ion om in e es g oups o sa e esou - ces, which can be used o win addi ional o es by a ou ing o he g oups o o e s. In e es g oups, howe e , will only be p epa ed o sell hei know- ledge o ce ain poli ical ad an ages. They a e, mo eo e , no eady o gi e in o ma ions e e ing o nega i e consequences o poli ical measu es a ou ed by hem. I ollows om hese ema ks ha , besides ma ke powe , a quasi- monopoly o in o ma ion in hei special ields o ac i i ies is espon- sible o he powe o p essu e g oups o in luence go e nmen s and poli ical pa ies and hus o b ing abou a change in poli ical p ocesses5. I should be no ed ha , s a ing om ma ke powe and om a quasi- monopoly o in o ma ion, in e es g oups a e able o build up many seconda y bases o in luence poli ical decision-p ocesses. I is su icien o men ion some well-known ac s like in luencing pa ies by inancial suppo and by delega ing membe s in o pa liamen a y commi ees o in o he go e nmen al bu eauc acy. 5 Compa e A. Downs (1957) pp.94—95 and pp.247—259. The g ea im- po ance o he supply o in o ma ion o he in luence o in e es g oups on poli ical decision-making has been clea ly poin ed ou by E. G une (1956, pp. 108—113). See also K. . Beyme (1971), who concludes: „An impo an pa o he con ac s be ween go e nmen depa men s and in e es g oups is in- s i u ionalized in his manne ( h ough hei ac i i ies in councils and com- missions). Bo h sides a e in e es ed, as bo h a e in wan o in o ma ions and suppo ," (p. 171 e seq.) OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 48 Pe e Be nholz In he ollowing sec ions o his pape we neglec quasi-monopolies o in o ma ion as well as seconda y easons o he in luence o p essu e g oups on poli ical decisions. Ins ead, we will analyze, how he powe o in luence addi ional o e s besides membe s can be u ned in o powe o e poli icians and pa ies. We will analyze, mo eo e , wha changes will be b ough abou in he in luence o p essu e g oups by he possibili y o compe i ion among hem. 2. Basic Assump ions o he Model Le us suppose a wo pa y sys em, in which he only in e es s o pa ies a e o win elec ions, and in which o e s will gi e hei o es o he pa y, whose p og am is he mos a ou able o hem. Le us assume, u he mo e, ha each pa y, ha ing won an elec ion and hus go e nmen al powe , will ealize i s p og am. Pa ies and o e s ha e pe ec in o ma ion abou he p e e ences o all o e s conce ning he measu es p oposed and ca ied ou by pa ies and go e nmen , and abou he consequences o hese measu es. Because o economic g ow h ax eceip s in each pe iod inc ease wi h unchanged ax a es, go e nmen and opposi ion ha e, he e o e, o decide how o use hese addi ional eceip s in o de o win he g ea es possible numbe o o e s. I is, mo eo e , assumed ha a educ ion o axes a ou ing e e ybody is ou o ques ion, because indi idual o e s would no ealize he sligh ad an ages and he e o e no change hei decisions. The same is supposed o be ue o expendi u es a- ou ing all ci izens in abou he same way and which a e made, e. g., o a speci ic public good. On he o he hand, le us assume ha he se o all o e s M is com- posed o h ee g oups o o e s, whose p e e ences, hough di e ing, a e simila wi hin each g oup. By spending all addi ional eceip s on app op ia e bundles o measu es, go e nmen and opposi ion a e able o in luence posi i ely he o e s o one, bu no o se e al g oups, since he aims o di e en g oups exclude each o he . Subsequen ly we shall also assume ha a i s one, la e wo g oups o o e s a e o ganized in in e es g oups. These g oups ha e he powe o b ing uno ganized o e s in o a posi ion which is less ad an ageous han he ini ial one. To gi e mo e p ecision o ou assump ions we now o malize hem. The symbols used a e as ollows: V? is an uno ganized g oup o o e s (i = 1,2,3); Vk is a g oup o o e s o ganized in an in e es g oup (k = 1,2,3); OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 49 bQQ is he ini ial posi ion; bi0 he si ua ion wi hin each o he go e nmen , conside ing he gi en addi ional means, i a bundle o measu es G{ in a ou o o e s' g oup i is ealized (i = 1,2, 3) ; k ( c = 1,2, 3) indica es he si ua ion esul ing om he ini ial posi ion, i one o he h ee g oups o o e s is o ganized in a p essu e g oup Vk and akes measu es Pk acco ding o i s ma ke powe ; &04 esul s om he ini ial si ua ion i wo g oups o o e s Vk and Vj a e o ganized and a e bo h aking measu es Pk and Pj (K j = 1,2, 3; k 4= Ï) espec i ely; bik desc ibes he si ua ion which esul s, i he go e nmen has aken s eps o a ou o e s' g oup V" o V^ (i = 1, 2, 3), and i o e 's g oup Vk (k = 1,2,3; k 4= i) — which is o ganized in an in e es g oup — has aken measu es o in luence he si u- a ion o non-membe s; bi4 acco dingly indica es he si ua ion a ising i he go e nmen has in e ened in a ou o o e s4 g oup V" (i = 1, 2, 3) and i bo h in e es g oups Vk and ha e aken measu es Pk and Pj (k, j = 1, 2, 3; k 4= j; k, j4= i) in luencing non-membe s; M indica es he se and N he numbe o all o e s; uh (bik) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) and (k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) deno es he u ili y o o e h (h £ M), gi en si ua ion bik; Mik g indica es he se and Nik g he numbe o o e s, o which uh ( >ik) > Uh Çb g); whe e h € Mik g; i, = 0, 1, 2, 3; k, g = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4; i 4= / and (o ) k = = 9- M'ik g is he symbol o he se and N'iic, g o he numbe o o e s, o which Uh(bik)=Uh (b g). Ou assump ions may now be o mula ed as ollows: Al. In he nex pe iod he go e nmen will ha e a i s disposal ad- di ional eceip s a cons an ax a es because o economic g ow h. These eceip s may be spen by using h ee di e en bundles o measu es G* which exclude each o he and b ing abou , wi hou in e e ence by in e es g oups Vk, si ua ions bio (i = 1, 2, 3). 4 Zei sch i ü Wi scha s- u. Sozialwissenscha en 1974/1 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 50 Pe e Be nholz A2. The o e s ha e o dinal u ili y unc ions which a e ansi i e and de ined o e al e na i es bik (i = 0,1, 2, 3; k = 0,1, 2, 3, 4). A3. The e a e h ee se s o o e s M*o,oo; (i = 1, 2, 3) such ha a) Uh (b 0) > Uh (b^, & € M^oo i b) Uh(bO0)^Uh(bio) h(iMiO OO ; He e Mjo.oo deno es he complemen a y se o M*o,oo. Assump ion A3 hus indica es ha o e s o g oup V? o V p e e si ua ion b^ esul ing om go e nmen al measu es Gi, o he ini ial si ua ion, whe eas all o he o e s ei he p e e he ini ial si ua ion o a e indi e en among bio and he ini ial si ua ion. I he go e nmen does no ake any measu es, his will be symbolized by Go. A4. One o wo g oups o o e s a e o ganized in in e es g oups. Such an o ganized g oup Vk (k = 1,2,3) can, because o i s ma ke powe , ake measu es P*. I i does so and i go e nmen al ac ions Gi (i = 0,1, 2, 3) a e aken, oo, si ua ion bik, and no si ua ion b*o, will esul . I bo h g oups o o ganized o e s Vk and Vj (k, j = 1, 2, 3; 7c= = j) a e aking measu es P* and Pj, espec i ely, and i he go e nmen execu es Gi, hen si ua ion ba will be ealized. Com- pa ing he o iginal si ua ion boo wi h bik, he ollowing consequen- ces a e possible o di e en o e s: a) Uh (b^ > Uh (biA), h 6 M^ ; b) Uh(bm) = Uh{bik),h£M'00iik ; c) Uh(bik)>Uh(b00)h£MikM 6) (i = 0,1, 2, 3; k = 1, 2, 3, 4) . A5. Vo e s gi e hei o es o he pa y whose elec ion pla o m o e s hem he g ea es u ili y. I he u ili ies o hese elec ion pla o ms a e equal, hey will e ain om o ing. Vo ing akes place a he end o he nex pe iod. A6. The e a e wo pa ies. These pa ies selec elec ion pla o ms in a way o win he o es o a majo i y o o e s in he nex elec ion in o de o ake o e go e nmen al powe . The elec ion pla o m o he winning pa y will be ealized as soon as he go e nmen has been aken o e . 6 We no e ha he se s M^ ^, M $ and Mik0Q a e disjoin and ha hei union is he se o all o e s.' I is, mo eo e , impo an o ealize ha he si ua ion o many membe s o Vk o Vj may ge wo se, ¡i Pk o (and) Pj a e aken. OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 51 A7. Pa ies and in e es g oups a e pe ec ly in o med abou he u ili y unc ions o all o e s. They as well as o e s ha e pe ec in o - ma ion abou he consequences esul ing om measu es aken by he go e nmen , o p oposed by pa ies o in e es g oups, e- spec i ely. 3. Consequences o he Fo ma ion o an In e es G oup Le us i s assume ha no o e s a e o ganized in in e es g oups. Assump ion 4 is no alid. As a consequence, only si ua ions bio can occu . Acco ding o assump ion A6, go e nmen and opposi ion will p esen p og ams which a e in ended o assu e hem a majo i y o o e s in con o mi y wi h A5. Each pa y ha ing o p esume, ha he o he one is pe suing he same aim, and gi en pe ec in o ma ion (A7), an elec ion de ea can only be a oided, i he pa ies y o maximize o es in hei a ou 7. Acco ding o assump ions A2, A3, A5 and A7, Nio.oo o e s will coun upon a be e and NQOJO o e s upon a wo se si ua ion han he ini ial one, i an elec ion p og am p omising he ealiza ion o b^o is p esen ed. N' o.oo o e s will expec no change o hei u ili ies. F om his i is e iden , ha elec ion p og ams will only p opose o change he ini ial si ua ion, i : (1) Wa.oo - oo.«> > 0 o a leas one i (i = 1, 2, 3). Fu he mo e i becomes ob ious ha pa ies will p opose a bundle o measu es G o which (2) NMO - NQQJQ = max! (i = 1, 2, 3) , i (1) is alid. Choosing he indices o in such a way ha (3) WlO.00 — W<HU0> ^20.00 — ^00.20 > ^30,00 ~ ^00,30 holds, i is e iden , ha he pa ies will p opose he ealiza ion o bio- I should be no ed ha he alidi y o (3) does no imply ha has he g ea es numbe o membe s (i. e. i is no necessa y ha 7 F om he assump ion o pe ec in o ma ion a ises he di icul y ha bo h pa ies will p esen iden ical p og ams. The ques ion he e o e is, which pa y will inally gain go e nmen al powe . In ou discussion his p oblem is, howe e , no e y ele an , as pe ec in o ma ion (A7) is an un ealis ic idealiza ion. In eali y, he e o e, he esul s de i ed o pe ec in o ma ion will only wo k as one ac o among o he s. Thus a clea majo i y o one o he pa ies will esul , since he pa y p og ams di e as a consequence o a di e en e alu ion o he si ua ion. 4* OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 52 Pe e Be nholz Nio.oo > W*),oo (i = 2, 3)). O simila impo ance is he numbe o o e s, o whom he p oposed measu es will be un a ou able. Le us assume now ha (1) and (3) a e alid and ha only he hi d g oup o o e s is o ganized in an in e es g oup V3. This in e es g oup has he powe o h ea en wi h he ealiza ion o si ua ions bo3, bis o b23 (A4), i he pa ies, in hei p og ams, should p opose he ealiza ion o boo, bio o bao. I e e ybody belie es in his h ea , hen he pa ies, when discussing hei elec ion p og ams, ha e o s a om he ac , ha only si ua ions b^o, bo3, bi3 and b23 can be ealized. Acco ding o assump ion A3a) we ha e: (4) Uh (b^) > Uh (b^; k € M^oo) which means ha he membe s o V3 p e e b3o o he ini ial si ua ion. The g oup will he e o e h ea en o ake measu es P3 by using i s ma ke powe , i he pa ies do no p opose a change o he s a us quo in hei elec ion p og ams. The e o e, he pa ies ha e o examine, which o he ou si ua ions b3o, b<03, bi3 o b23 will be p e e ed by mos o e s. We know al eady ha p og am b3o will b ing ad an ages (o disad an ages, i (5) is nega i e) o (5) ^30.00 ~ ^00.30 o e s. Wha will be he si ua ion, i we ha e o expec si ua ion b$ (i = 0,1, 2)? Acco ding o assump ion A4 (6) W«.00 - Woo.i3 (* = 0,1» 2) . mo e o e s will be a ou ed han dis a ou ed (o ice e sa, i his exp ession is nega i e)8. I pa ies belie e ha he h ea would be execu ed, hey will p o- pose he ealiza ion o b3o in hei elec ion p og ams, i (7) n30.00 - ^00.30 > max (^¿3,00 ~ Noo.is) is alid (i = 0,1, 2). % This inequali y can be e o mula ed: (8) W30.00 ~ ^00.30 > max K 8,00 - JW + ( yo.oo % - JW + (Woo.io - oo. i>] • 8 A en ion has o be paid o he ac , ( ha among hose, whose si ua ion is ge ing wo se, he e may be membe s o V3, so ha possibly M00 ¿3 n MSO oo =j= 0 (i = 1, 2). We ha e e en o p esume ha mos membe s o he g oup will belong o his se , since cos s a e usually incu ed by he ealiza ion o a h ea . OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 59 We i s conside a si ua ion in which inequali ies (1) ^10.00 - 00.10 > 0 » (3) io.oo — ^00.10 > N20,00 — N00,20 > ^30.00 ~ N00,03 and (7) NQQ.OO - ^00.30 > m?x (Ni3.00 - Ni0,i3)> (* = 1. 2) • a e alid. Wi hou exis ence o a p essu e g oup, Vj would he e o e be a ou ed by go e nmen al decision. The same would be ue o V3, i i we e he only o ganized p essu e g oup. Gi en hese ac s, wha will be he consequences o he o ganiza ion o a second p essu e g oup Ve? I he pa ies e use o a ou he membe s o V2 by p oposing G2 in hei elec ion p og ams (see A3), hen he second in e es g oup V2 can h ea en o ake ac ions P2 damaging o o he o e s (see A4). Since p essu e g oup V3 also ies o execu e i s h ea s, he ollowing si ua- ions ha e o be compa ed: bo4, £>14, &23 anc* (see A4). will only a ain i s aim o make pa ies accep go e nmen al measu e G2 in hei p og am, i inequali ies (18) 3.00 - ^00.23 > ^04,00 " nOOM (19) 3,00 "" ^00.23 > ^14,00 - N00,U (20) 3.00 — N00,2S > ^32,00 — -^00,32 a e alid. These condi ions, howe e , a e no always su icien . Fo le us assume ha he numbe o membe s o Vq belonging o Mao.oo H Mjo.20 (j = 0 o 1), is bigge han ha co esponding o M3o,oo H Mgo,;o (j = 0 o 1). The p essu e g oup V3 will hen p e e o ealize bio o boo ins ead o b2o (see A8), since bso canno be ealized. I will, he e o e, decide no o use p essu e, i (20) is alid, and i he eby he selec ion o go e nmen al measu es Gi, o o no go e nmen al measu es can be ob ained. Consequen ly, i enough membe s o VQ ha e p e- e ences such ha he numbe o o e s belonging o Mzo oo n Mjom is bigge han he numbe o o e s belonging o Mso.oo n Maojo (j = 0 o 1), hen p essu e g oup V2 will only succeed, i (21) N23 00 - #00 23 > N 2 00 - N00./2 0 = 0 o 1) is alid. Then he ealiza ion o P3 by V3 is useless and b2o will, he e- o e, be b ough abou . I mus be no ed, mo eo e , ha , because o (18), espec i ely (19), his addi ional condi ion is only a necessa y condi ion, i (22) Njgjoo - NW 2 > NM 00 - Nm4 (NOOJ4 - NOOJ2) - (%,00 - %.00) > 0 (j = 0 o 1), OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 60 Pe e Be nholz i. e. i he numbe o hose who a e dis a ou ed on balance, compa ed o he ini ial si ua ion, is bigge , i bo h h ea s will be ealized han i his is only case o he h ea o V2. In case (22) is no alid, (21) is implied by (18) o (19). The abo e esul s may be summa ized as ollows: 57. The o ma ion o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2 may elimina e he in luence exe ed by ano he g oup V3, i (18) o (21), (7) and (3) hold. In his case he go e nmen will akes measu es G2 in a ou o V2, i he execu ion o h ea P2 is c edible. Le us now u n o he case, in which (21) is no ul illed, bu in which (21 a) N2S 00 - N00)23 < N ijoo - Noo,/2 0' = 0 o 1) holds. As abo e, we assume u he ha a majo i y o he membe s o V3 p e e s b>o o b2o- Then, i inequali y (22) is ue, i will be ewa ding o he g oup o o e s V3 no o use h ea s agains a decision in a ou o he s a us quo o agains go e nmen al measu es Gi, i inequali ies (18) o (20) a e alid. The go e nmen will hen ealize boo, o bio, espec i ely. A h ea by Vg o use measu es P2 would no p e en his, since (21a) holds. I would hus no be ealized. The same consequences ollow, i (22) is no alid, and i condi ions (18) and/o (19) a e no ul illed and i < akes he place o > in (18) and/o (19). The e ec o a new p essu e g oup V2 will be, co espond- ingly, ha ei he boo o bio will appea in he elec ion p og ams o he pa ies. A h ea by V2 o use P2 would be unsuccess ul, since V3 could success ully use P3, i (18) and/o (19) a e no alid. Nei he P2 no P3 will, h e o e, be ealized. Le us summa ize: 58. I he e is no coope a ion among p essu e g oups V2 and V3, since he e is a ce ain complemen a i y o in e es s wi h uno ganized o e s among a majo i y o he membe s o V3, and i (3) and (7) a e ue, bu ei he (21) o (18), (19) and (22) a e no alid, hen he go e nmen will ealize si ua ions boo o bio. Thus he appea ance o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2 may ha e he e ec , ha bo h p essu e g oups ha e no mo e in luence on poli ical decision-making han i hese o ganiza ions did no exis , whe eas he opposi e is ue, i only one in e es g oup is p esen . Finally, we ha e o discuss he case in which (18), (19) and possibly (21), bu no (20) a e alid. G oup V2 will hen no be able o ge bg0 agains he opposi ion o he o he g oups. I , unde hese condi ions, OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 61 (23) #23,00 ~ ^00,28 < ^32,00 ~ #00,82' is ue hen inequali ies analogous o (18), (19), (20) and (21) ha e o be examined. Fu he mo e, conside a ions like hose abo e ha e o be made, in o de o ge he condi ions o a success o V312. He e, oo, we ind si ua ions, whe e no b3o, bu ei he bio o boo will be ealized. Up o now he alidi y o inequali y (7) has been assumed. I his is no ue, and i , mo eo e , (24) ^20.00 - ^00.20 > max ( i2,00 ~ N00,i2>» (* = 1» 3> i is no ul illed, hen no p essu e g oup will succeed by using only i s own h ea s. Fo e en i ei he measu es P2 o P3 would be ealized agains Go o Gi, he pa ies would win no less o e s by p oposing hem han by aking G2 o G3. Wi hou a collabo a ion on he pa o bo h in e es g oups ei he si ua ion bio would be ealized, o he ini ial si ua ion boo would be p ese ed. We he e o e ge he ollowing conclusion: S9. I he wo p essu e g oups Vg and V3 do no coope a e and i nei he (7) no (24) is ue, hen he pa ies will p opose measu es Gi a ou ing in hei pla o ms. In his case he exis ence o in e es g oups has no in luence on poli ical decisions. Le us assume, now, ha a majo i y o he membe s o V2 ei he belong o M^o.oo n M3040, o o Mgo.oo n Mso,oo espec i ely. The leade - ships will hen ag ee o a combined h ea by bo h p essu e g oups, in case G3 should no be p oposed by he pa ies. I (25) 00 - Nmjo > NU 00 - Nqqm' (* = 0, 1) , hen he common h ea will be success ul and b3o be ealized. Vice e sa, he go e nmen al measu e Gs can also be en o ced i a majo i y o V3 ei he belongs o Mso.oo n M2040, o o M3o,oo H Mgo.oo espec i ely, and i (26) #20.00 - ^00,20 > ^14,00 - #00,14' (* = 0,1) , is alid. Should majo i ies o such g oups exis in bo h p essu e g oups, and should inequali ies (25) and (26) be bo h ue, i is unce ain, which 12 Su icien condi ions o a ealiza ion o b^ a e besides (23): N22,00 ~ ^00,32 > #04,00 ~ #00,04' ^32,00 — ^00,32 > #14,00 ~ ^00,14' #32.00 - Woo.32 > Nj3 00 ~ #OOJ3 (j = 0 O 1) . OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 62 Pe e Be nholz o he wo go e nmen al measu es G e o G3 will be en o eced, since he membe s o bo h o ganiza ions ha e, o cou se, di e en p e e en- ces. Gi en long- e m planning by in e es g oups, i would be ewa d- ing o he p essu e g oups o en o ce in he i s elec ion pe iod he al e na i es p e e ed by, say, Vg and in he ollowing pe iod hose p e e ed by V3. We would hus ge some hing like in e empo al log olling among p essu e g oups. The esul s o he abo e analysis may be summa ized as ollows: S10. Gi en a ce ain complemen a i y o he aims o he membe s o bo h g oups, he appea ance o an addi ional p essu e g oup V2 may s eng hen he in luence o an al eady exis ing in e es g oup V3. This, howe e , will only be ue i nei he he old, no he new p essu e g oup can succeed by i sel , i. e. i nei he (7) no (24) holds, and i (25) and/o (26) is alid. Summa y Two p ima y easons o he poli ical in luence o p essu e g oups a e economic powe and a quasi-monopoly o in o ma ion. The p oblem, how he in luence o in e es g oups on o e s o he han membe s is u ned in o poli ical powe is analyzed in a o mal way o a DOWNSian wo-pa y sys em. I is shown ha he possibili y o ans o m ma ke -powe in o poli- ical powe is de e mined by he numbe o membe s o in e es g oups and o ou side o e s in luenced by hei ac ions, he deg ee o compe i ion among hei ends, and he c edibili y o hei h ea s, depending on he his o y o he sys em. Zusammen assung P imä e G ünde ü den Ein luß on In e essen e bänden au poli ische En scheidungen sind ökonomische Mach und ein Quasi-In o ma ionsmono- pol. Hie wi d das P oblem, wie die Einwi kung diese Ve bände au Nich - mi gliede un e den Wähle n in poli ische Mach umgewandel we den kann, o mal ü ein DOWNSsches Zweipa eiensys em un e such . Es wi d gezeig , daß die Umwandlung on Ma k mach in poli ischen Ein luß on de Zahl de Mi gliede de In e essen e bände, de Zahl de on ihnen beein lußba en Nich mi gliede , dem G ad de Übe eins immung zwischen den Zielen e schiedene Ve bände und de Glaubwü digkei ih e D ohun- gen abhäng . Diese wi d wiede on de Ve gangenhei des Sys em und de G össe de möglichen Vo eile ü die Mi gliede bes imm . Re e ences Ben ley, A hu F., The P ocess o Go e nmen , E ans on (III.) 1949. Be nholz, Pe e , Einige Beme kungen zu Theo ie des Ein lusses de Ve - bände au die poli ische Willensbildung in de Demok a ie, in: Kyklos (22) 1969, pp. 276—288. OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24 In luence o In e es G oups on Poli ical Decision-Making 63 Be nholz, Pe e , De Mach we bewe b de Ve bände im poli ischen Sys em, in: Ch. Wa in (Ed.), Mach und ökonomisches Gese z, Sch i en des Ve - eins ü Socialpoli ik, N. F. Bd. 74/11, Be lin 1973, pp. 859—881. Beyme, Klaus on, In e esseng uppen in de Demok a ie, München 1971. Buchholz, Edwin, Die Wi scha s e bände in de Wi scha sgesellscha , Tübingen 1969. Downs, An hony, An Economic Theo y o Democ acy, New Yo k 1957. G une , E ich, Die Wi scha s e bände in de Demok a ie. Vom Wachs um de Wi scha so ganisa ionen im schweize ischen S aa , E lenbach-Zü ich und S u ga , 1956. Homans, Geo ge C., The Human G oup, New Yo k 1950. Olson, Mancu , The Logic o Collec i e Ac ion, Camb idge (Mass.) 1965. T uman, Da id BThe Go e nmen al P ocess, New Yo k 1958. Wagne , Richa d E., P essu e G oups and Poli ical En ep eneu s, in: Pape s on Non-Ma ke Decision Making, Cha lo es ille 1966, pp. 161—170. OPEN ACCESS | Licensed unde CC BY 4.0 | h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/abou /cclicenses/ DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.3790/schm.94.1.45 | Gene a ed on 2023-04-04 11:51:24