A behavioural approach to judicial independence

Bu cha d , Dana
A icle — Published Ve sion
A beha iou al app oach o judicial independence
Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
WZB Be lin Social Science Cen e
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Bu cha d , Dana (2025) : A beha iou al app oach o judicial independence,
Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law, ISSN 2399-5548, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA,
Vol. 32, Iss. 5-6, pp. 552-579,
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A beha iou al app oach o
judicial independence
Dana Bu cha d *
,
**
Abs ac
This a icle de elops a beha iou al app oach o he p inciple o judicial independence. I a gues
ha implemen ing he p oposed app oach can help o sa egua d judicial independence mo e
e ec i ely. I add esses he ques ion o wha a beha iou - ela ed concep o judicial independence
should look like and wha s a e obliga ions a ise om his. I akes in o accoun empi ical findings
which we e no ye a ailable when he legal p inciple was ini ially shaped by cons i u ional and
egional human igh s ju isp udence. Fi s , he a icle ou lines ce ain basic p emises o a beha -
iou al concep o judicial independence. I hen akes a close look a he ac o s ha de e mine
he beha iou o judges and o such hi d ac o s ha migh a emp o unduly influence judges. In
addi ion, he a icle engages wi h he objec i e o he p inciple o judicial independence o inspi e
us in he judicia y and ou lines po en ial beha iou al e ec s ele an o his us dimension.
Finally, i discusses whe he ce ain beha iou al e ec s ha can shape judicial decision-making
should be ega ded as no ma i ely undesi able in he con ex o judicial independence.
Keywo ds
Judicial independence, beha iou al concep , psychological ac o s, obse e pe spec i e, social
pe spec i es
1. In oduc ion
1
Judicial independence is a beha iou al concep . This is a ac ha is no always adequa ely eflec ed
in he way he legal p inciple o judicial independence is add essed on he domes ic and egional
*
Uni e si y o B emen, B emen, Ge many
**
WZB Be lin Social Science Cen e , Be lin, Ge many
Co esponding au ho :
Dana Bu cha d , Uni e si y o B emen, B emen, Ge many; WZB Be lin Social Science Cen e , Be lin, Ge many.
Email: [email p o ec ed]
1. This a icle is based, in pa , on he au ho ’s ollowing a icle in Ge man: D. Bu cha d , ‘De G undsa z ich e liche
Unabhängigkei : eine e hal ensbezogene Pe spek i e’,70Jah buch des ö en lichen Rech s de Gegenwa . Neue
Folge (JöR) (2022) © Moh Siebeck Tübingen.
A icle
Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and
Compa a i e Law
2025, Vol. 32(5-6) 552–579
© The Au ho (s) 2025
A icle euse guidelines:
sagepub.com/jou nals-pe missions
DOI: 10.1177/1023263X251363881
maas ich jou nal.sagepub.com
le el. I is in ui i e ha judicial independence a ec s he beha iou o bo h judges and hi d ac o s
who seek o influence he o me in no ma i ely undesi able ways. Howe e , he legal p inciple is
o en no su ficien ly shaped in ligh o his beha iou al dimension. In ac , he p inciple o judicial
independence finds i sel in a concep ual ension be ween a legal o malis and a legal ealis unde -
s anding o judicial decision-making. This has esul ed in he p inciple o judicial independence
being somewha disconnec ed om he eali y o judicial beha iou . Howe e , his disconnec
makes i di ficul o implemen his p inciple in a p ac ically e ec i e manne .
Fo he p inciple o judicial independence o be shaped in a con incing manne and, on his basis,
o be implemen ed e ec i ely, he beha iou al na u e o judicial independence mus be examined
mo e closely. One mus conside whom his p inciple aims o p o ec ; wha de e mines he beha -
iou o judges and hi d ac o s; how hese beha iou al ac o s can be influenced o p omo e inde-
pendence; and wha should cons i u e no ma i ely desi able o undesi able beha iou in he
con ex o judicial independence.
A close look a hese ques ions e eals he complexi y o judicial independence, which is a sig-
nifican challenge o concep ualizing his p inciple. This becomes pa icula ly clea when one akes
in o accoun ecen empi ical findings, which we e no ye a ailable when he legal p inciple was
ini ially shaped especially by cons i u ional and egional human igh s ju isp udence. Such de el-
opmen s conce n insigh s in o he ac o s ha con ibu e o no ma i ely undesi able beha iou as
well as in o human cogni ion in gene al. I also ela es o he pe cep ion o judicial decision-making
by he add essees o judicial decision-making. An unde s anding o he p inciple o judicial inde-
pendence ha is based on an o e simplified idea o judicial decision-making does no do jus ice o
his complexi y. E ec i e implemen a ion equi es ancho ing his p inciple in he ac ual beha iou
o he ac o s in ol ed.
Agains his backg ound, his a icle de elops a beha iou al app oach o he p inciple o judicial
independence. I add esses he ques ion o wha a beha iou - ela ed concep o judicial independ-
ence should look like and wha s a e obliga ions a ise om his.
Fi s , he a icle ou lines ce ain basic p emises o a beha iou al concep o judicial independence
(sec ion 2) I hen akes a close look a he ac o s ha de e mine he beha iou o judges and o
such hi d ac o s ha migh a emp o unduly influence judges, highligh ing he beha iou al
e ec o ac o s ha ha e adi ionally been add essed as ele an o judicial independence as
well as o he beha iou al aspec s such as psychological amewo k condi ions ha go beyond
hese ac o s (sec ion 3). In addi ion, he a icle engages wi h he objec i e o he p inciple o judi-
cial independence o inspi e us in he judicia y. This us dimension o judicial independence
add esses ac o s ha a e ex e nal o he judicia y such as hose seeking jus ice and he gene al
public. The a icle ou lines po en ial beha iou al e ec s ele an o his us dimension (sec ion
4). Finally, he a icle discusses whe he ce ain beha iou al e ec s ha can shape judicial decision-
making should be ega ded as no ma i ely undesi able in he con ex o judicial independence
(sec ion 5).
2. Judicial independence as a beha iou al concep : P elimina y ema ks
Be o e del ing in o he beha iou al na u e o judicial independence, a p elimina y ema k is in
o de . The e m judicial independence is unde s ood in his a icle in a b oad manne . I includes,
on he one hand, he ela ionship be ween judges and ac o s in he execu i e, legisla i e and judicial
b anch o go e nmen : judges a e expec ed o be independen om hese public ac o s. On he o he
hand, i also includes he ela ionship be ween judges and pa ies o he dispu e: judges a e expec ed
Bu cha d 553
o be independen om he pa ies in he case a hand o be decided by he judge. This impa iali y
dimension is in eg a ed in o he b oad concep o judicial independence e e ed o in his a icle,
a he han being sepa a ed om he no ion o judicial independence.
2
This b oad unde s anding
makes sense o he p esen con ex because he beha iou al ac o o judges and hi d ac o s
a e simila in all o hese se ings.
On his e minological basis, his sec ion now u ns o judicial independence as a beha iou al
concep . The sec ion fi s ou lines ce ain e minological sho comings ha con ibu e o blu ing
he beha iou al dimension o judicial independence (a). This is ollowed by a model o judicial
decision-making ha helps si ua ing he a ious beha iou al ac o s ele an o judicial independ-
ence (b).
A. Beha iou al dimension and e minological sho comings
The beha iou al dimension o judicial independence is o en no su ficien ly eflec ed in he doc i-
nal and ju isp uden ial engagemen wi h his opic. This is pa icula ly appa en in he no ion o
‘gua an ee’, which is e y widely used in cons i u ional and human igh s law and ju isp udence
in ela ion o judicial independence.
3
The ollowing wo aspec s will highligh he sho comings
o his e minology in ela ion o judicial independence as a beha iou al no ion.
Fi s , he e m ‘gua an ee’o judicial independence con ibu es o obscu ing he beha iou al
dimension o judicial independence as i does no app op ia ely eflec he ole o he s a e wi h
ega d o judicial independence. In ac , he s a e canno ‘gua an ee’ ha judges will beha e in
line wi h judicial independence. In o he wo ds, he s a e canno gua an ee de ac o independence.
The s a e can only influence he ac o s ha de e mine he beha iou o judges and hi d ac o s.
These ac o s can only influence he p obabili y o he espec i e beha iou .
4
Howe e , he p ob-
abili y can be maximized by designing he ac o s ha de e mine beha iou . Acco dingly, he
legal obliga ion o he s a e ha is a he co e o he p inciple o judicial independence should be
p ima ily unde s ood as a s uc u al obliga ion o maximize his posi i e beha iou al se ing. The
s a e can design he s uc u al amewo k in such a way ha i makes i mo e likely ha he
judge will beha e acco ding o he expec a ions o judicial independence.
When we alk abou ‘gua an ees’in he con ex o judicial independence, his e minology does
no make sense o de ac o independence as such. I can only be concei able wi h ega d o ce ain
ac o s ha influence judicial beha iou . The exis ence o some o hese ac o s can be legally and
2. This b oad unde s anding o judicial independen is also used by some cou s in hei ju isp udence on judicial independ-
ence. See e.g. he app oach aken by he CJEU: Case C-192/18 Commission . Poland, EU:C:2019:924, pa a. 108–110;
Case C-274/14 Banco de San ande , EU:C:2019:802, pa a. 61.
3. See o a small selec ion on he use o he e m ‘gua an ee’e.g.: EC HR, Mu u and Pechs ein . Swi ze land, Judgmen o 2
Oc obe 2018, Applica ions nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10; EC HR, Guðmundu And i Ás áðsson . Iceland, Judgmen o
1 Decembe 2020 [GC], Applica ion No. 26374/18); CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A. K. and
O he s Sąd Najwyższy, CP Sąd Najwyższy and DO Sąd Najwyższy, EU:C:2019:982; Case C-791/19 Eu opean
Commission . Republic o Poland, EU:C:2021:596; Ge man Fede al Cons i u ional Cou , 22 Ma ch 2018, 2 B R
780/16; F ench Conseil Cons i u ionnel, 1 Ma ch 2007, 2007-551 DC; Canadian Sup eme Cou , [1985] 2 SCR 673;
Swiss Fede al Cou , 10 June 2010, 4A_458/2009. See also UN Basic P inciples on he Independence o he Judicia y
(6 Sep embe 1985); UN Special Rappo eu on he Independence o Judges and Lawye s, M Leand o Despouy, UN
Human Righ s Council, documen A/HRC/11/41 o 24 Ma ch 2009; Venice Commission, Repo on he Independence
o he Judicial Sys em Pa I: The Independence o Judges, CDL-AD(2010)004 (16 Ma ch 2010).
4. See also C. Schü z, De Ökonomisie e Rich e (Duncke & Humblo , 2005), p. 220.
554 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
ac ually gua an eed. Fo example, he o ganiza ional and pe sonal sepa a ion o he judicia y
and execu i e, and ce ain legal equi emen s ega ding elec ions, appoin men s and p omo-
ions, leng h o o fice, i emo abili y and emune a ion o judges can be gua an eed by he
s a e. These legal equi emen s con ibu e o de ju e independence. Howe e , o he s uc u al
ac o s canno be gua an eed. Fo example, i canno be gua an eed ha he legal equi emen s
ega ding judicial s a us (elec ion, appoin men , e c.) a e implemen ed in p ac ice in all
ins ances. Fu he , i is no possible o gua an ee ha he e is no influence on judges by hi d
ac o s, including he indi ec and o en psychological influence ha egional cou s, in e -
na ional ins umen s as well as domes ic cons i u ional cou s conside o be pa o he judicial
independence concep .
5
In sum, his means ha nei he de ac o independence no all he ac o s
ha de e mine beha iou can be gua an eed. To speak o a ‘gua an ee’o judicial independence
is hus misleading in se e al espec s.
Second, using he ‘gua an ee’ e minology comes wi h he idea ha he p inciple o judicial
independence aims (only) o p o ec he judge om no ma i ely undesi able influence by hi d
ac o s.
6
Ye his unde s anding is no in line wi h he beha iou al dimension o judicial inde-
pendence. I one hinks o judges as subjec s ha a e p o ec ed by he p inciple o judicial inde-
pendence, his leads o ocusing on he beha iou o hi d ac o s ha po en ially could unduly
influence judges. The idea is ha hese ac o s’beha iou is a dange om which judges mus be
p o ec ed.
7
The p ima y objec i e is hen o p e en his no ma i ely undesi able beha iou by
hi d ac o s.
8
Howe e , his app oach leads o no add essing su ficien ly he beha iou o
judges as a poin o e e ence. Ins ead o p ima ily ocusing on he beha iou o hi d ac o s,
he concep o judicial independence mus aim a ensu ing ha judges beha e in a no ma i ely
desi able manne (see sec ion 3). The judges’beha iou should be he p ima y poin o e e -
ence. The beha iou o hi d ac o s o cou se also plays a ole in his espec , bu i only
ma e s alongside he beha iou o he judge. Bo h g oups o subjec s and hei espec i e
beha iou mus be conside ed sepa a ely wi h ega d o he ac o s ha de e mine his
beha iou .
I should also be kep in mind ha he p inciple o judicial independence ul ima ely aims o
p o ec socie al in e es s and ela ed cons i u ional alues. The cons i u ional alues ha a e imple-
men ed h ough judicial independence and se e he in e es s o he add essees o he espec i e
legal sys em include, in pa icula , sepa a ion o powe s, he binding e ec o law and p ocedu al
ai ness. The b oade socie al in e es s ha ha e been shown o co ela e wi h judicial independence
include long- e m economic g ow h,
9
high p o ec ion o poli ical and economic eedoms,
10
5. E.g. Case C-619/18 Commission . Poland, EU:C:2019:531, pa a. 112; IAC HR, Case o he Sup eme Cou o Jus ice,
Quin ana Coello e al. . Ecuado , decision o 23 Augus 2013, pa a. 146; UN Basic P inciples on he Independence o
he Judicia y, 6 Sep embe 1985. Fo an example o domes ic ju isp udence, see e.g. Ge man FCC, decision o 22 Ma ch
2018, 2 B R 780/16, pa a. 57; FCC, decision o 22 June 2006, 2 B R 957/05.
6. On his ‘p o ec ion’ e minology in Ge man cons i u ional law, e.g. C. Schü z, De Ökonomisie e Rich e , p. 117 e seq.
7. See e.g. W. Meye , in I. on Münch, P. Kunig, J.A. Kämme e and M. Ko zu (eds), G undgese z Kommen a , ol. 2
(CH Beck, 7 h edn., 2021), A . 97 GG, pa a. 101.
8. Speaking o a ‘p ohibi ion’add essed o hi d ac o s, C.D. Classen, in H. on Mangold , F. Klein and C. S a ck (eds.),
G undgese z Kommen a , ol 3I (CH Beck, 7 h ed., 2018), A . 97, pa a. 7.
9. L.P. Feld and S. Voig , ‘Economic G ow h and Judicial Independence: C oss-Coun y E idence Using a New Se o
Indica o s’,19Eu opean Jou nal o Poli ical Economy (2003).
10. R. La Po a, F. López de Silanes, C. Pop-Eleches and A. Shlei e , ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’, 112 Jou nal o
Poli ical Economy (2004).
Bu cha d 555

esilience o democ a ic sys ems agains au oc a ic endencies,
11
he accep ance o he esul s o
democ a ic elec ions
12
as well as a ela ed sys em-s abilizing e ec .
13
This makes he add essees
o a legal sys em he ul ima e subjec s o p o ec ion o he p inciple o judicial independence.
As a esul o his objec i e, he p inciple o judicial independence aims a de ac o independence and
no me ely de ju e independence.
14
Only ac ually independen beha iou by judges se es he cons i u-
ional alues men ioned. I is hus necessa y o induce no ma i ely desi able beha iou by judges in p ac-
ice a he han me ely c ea ing o mal legal equi emen s. In o de o do so e ec i ely, i is c ucial o
unde s and he beha iou al ac o s ha con ibu e o judges ac ing in an independen manne (see
sec ion 3). Secondly, i is impo an ha he add essees o a legal sys em pe cei e he judges’beha iou
as independen in p ac ice. These add essees should ha e eason o us ha judges a e e y likely o
beha e in line wi h judicial independence. This la e objec i e, i s implica ions o he concep o judicial
independence as well as po en ial beha iou al e ec s ela ed o i a e ou lined in mo e de ail in sec ion 4.
B. Judicial decision-making p ocess and beha iou al ac o s
As a e e ence poin o he analysis in sec ions 3 o 5 and as a amewo k o be e unde s anding
and concep ualizing he ac o s ha shape independen judicial beha iou , a close look a he
p ocess o judicial decision-making is in o de . This makes i possible o classi y he ac o s ha
de e mine judicial beha iou and hus c ea e a basis o assessing hese ac o s no ma i ely as
well as o assessing how e ec i ely ce ain s uc u al condi ions p omo e independen decision-
making. The ollowing o e iew hus aims o si ua e he a ious beha iou al influences a he
le els o judicial decision-making. I shows ha beha iou al ac o s ha p omo e o hinde judicial
independence can be ele an on wo dis inc le els o judicial decision-making.
A he fi s le el, he in en ional le el, judges in en ionally decide whe he hey wan o ac
acco ding o he no ma i e s anda ds se o h by he p inciple o judicial independence and hei
legal obliga ion ha ollows om his p inciple. Fo example, hey decide whe he o gi e in o
a hi d ac o ’s a emp o exe undue influence on hem. Judges hus in en ionally choose
be ween beha iou al al e na i es ha a e in line wi h judicial independence o no . I hey esis
an a emp by a hi d ac o o exe cise undue influence on hem, hey decide o ac in line wi h judi-
cial independence; i , in con as , hey decide o gi e in, hey decide o ac in a no ma i ely undesi -
able manne om he pe spec i e o judicial independence. Which al e na i e judges choose a his
11. D.M. Gible and K.A. Randazzo, ‘Tes ing he E ec s o Independen Judicia ies on he Likelihood o Democ a ic
Backsliding’,55Ame ican Jou nal o Poli ical Science (2011). See also C. Reenock, J.K. S a on and M. Radean,
‘Legal Ins i u ions and he Democ a ic Su i al’,75Jou nal o Poli ics (2013).
12. S. Che nykh, ‘When Do Poli ical Pa ies P o es Elec ion Resul s?’,47Compa a i e Poli ical S udies (2014).
13. See also C.M. Came on, ‘Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell I When You See I ? And, Who Ca es?’, in S.B.
Bu bank and B. F iedman (eds), Judicial Independence a he C oss oads: An In e disciplina y App oach (Sage, 2002),
p. 134.
14. In he schola ly li e a u e, he no ions o de ju e independence and de ac o independence a e o en used (unlike in he
p esen con ex ) as indica o s o empi ical measu emen s, see e.g. L.P. Feld and S. Voig , 19 Eu opean Jou nal o
Poli ical Economy (2003); G. Dimi opoulos, ‘Measu ing Judicial Independence in In e na ional Law: Pu ing
Toge he he Pieces o he Puzzle’,24Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law (2017);
J. Rios-Figue oa and J.K. S a on, ‘An E alua ion o C oss-Na ional Measu es o Judicial Independence’,30Jou nal
o Law, Economics & O ganiza ion (2013). Fo a no ma i e a he han empi ical use o hese e ms, see R. Spano,
‘The Rule o Law as he Lodes a o he Eu opean Con en ion on Human Righ s: The S asbou g Cou and he
Independence o he Judicia y’,27Eu opean Law Jou nal (2021), p. 217–219.
556 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
fi s le el depends on a a ie y o beha iou al ac o s. These ac o s can conce n he cos -benefi
assessmen o beha iou ha is in line wi h judicial independence o no ; and i can also include
o he ac o s such as e hos and ai ness pe cep ions o g oup p ac ice. The de ails o hese
ac o s a e add essed in sec ion 3. Fo he p esen o e iew, i su fices o poin o he ac ha
he o ali y o hese ac o s c ea e a beha iou al se ing, which, depending on how i is designed,
makes i mo e o less likely ha judges in end o beha e in a manne ha is in line wi h judicial
independence. The classical ( heo e ical and cons i u ional) concep o judicial independence
ocuses on his fi s le el and he ac o s ele an o i . The aim is o design s uc u al condi ions
ha minimize he isk o beha iou ha is no in line wi h judicial independence.
This fi s le el is, howe e , no he only phase o he judicial beha iou ha should be aken in o
accoun o judicial independence. On a second le el, he implemen a ion le el, judges ansla e hei
in en ion om le el 1, ha is, he in en ion o ac in line wi h he p inciple o judicial independence,
in o conc e e ac ion. This is done by aking he ac ual judicial decision in he legal sense. These can
be judgmen s, p ocedu al decisions, decisions ega ding in e im measu es, e c. A le el 2, he judicial
decision can be de e mined by a ious ac o s. Fi s and o emos , o cou se, he legal no ms applied
by he judge shape he conc e e con en o he judicial decision. Howe e , in addi ion o law as de e min-
ing ac o , o he beha iou al ac o s can play a ole as well. These can be ac o s ha judges do no con-
side no ma i ely undesi able, ha judges a e no awa e o and/o ha a e, a leas in he judges’
pe cep ion, no unde hei con ol. Such ac o s include, in e alia, cogni i e e ec s such as ‘heu is ics
and biases’and beha iou al ac o s ela ed o he social pe spec i e o he judges. An example o heu -
is ics and biases in judicial decision-making
15
is he ‘ancho ing e ec ’which can influence nume ic deci-
sions by judges on damages, fines, leng h o p ison sen ences e c.
16
Examples o he social pe spec i e
include cogni i e e ec s ela ed o gende o e hnic backg ound o judges.
17
The ac ha such ac o s
influence he con en o judicial decision-making has been widely demons a ed by empi ical esea ch
on judicial beha iou . So a , such beha iou al ac o s a e howe e a ely discussed as an aspec o judi-
cial independence. Whe he such ac o s should be included in he concep o judicial independence is
discussedinsec ion5 o ac o s ela ed o social pe spec i i y.
The in e ac ion o he wo decision-making le els is shown in Figu e 1.
The beha iou o hi d ac o s is ele an a bo h decision-making le els. On he one hand, hi d
ac o s can influence he decision o o agains an independen beha iou a le el 1. Fo example,
hi d ac o s can influence he judge’s in e es s by p omising ad an ages o h ea ening judges wi h
disad an ages. On he o he hand, hi d ac o s can also influence beha iou al e ec s ha ake place
on le el 2 o he decision-making p ocess. This would p ima ily conce n beha iou al ac o s ha
ake place ou side he judge’s con ol and/o pe cep ion. On his le el, hi d ac o s can influence
15. Fo an o e iew in he con ex o judicial decision-making: D. Teichman and E. Zami , Beha iou al Law and Economics
(OUP, 2018), chap e 15; C. Gu h ie, J.J. Rachlinski and A.J. Wis ich, ‘Inside he Judicial Mind’,86Co nell Law
Re iew (2000); E. Pee and E. Gamliel, ‘Heu is ics and Biases in Judicial Decisions’,49Cou Re iew (2013).
16. On he ancho ing e ec in judicial decision-making, see e.g. J.J. Rachlinski, A.J. Wis ich and C. Gu h ie, ‘Can Judges
Make Reliable Nume ic Judgmen s? Dis o ed Damages and Skewed Sen ences’,90Indiana Law Jou nal (2015);
B. Englich, T. Mussweile and F. S ack, ‘Playing Dice Wi h C iminal Sen ences: The Influence o I ele an
Ancho s on Expe s’Judicial Decision Making’,32Pe sonali y and Social Psychology Bulle in (2006). On he ques ion
o whe he he ancho ing e ec should be conside ed p oblema ic in ela ion o judicial independence, see D. Bu cha d ,
‘De G undsa z ich e liche Unabhängigkei : eine e hal ensbezogene Pe spek i e’,70Jah buch des ö en lichen
Rech s de Gegenwa . Neue Folge (JöR) (2022), p. 502–506.
17. Fo an o e iew, see S. Basabe-Se ano, L. Eps ein and K. Weinshall, ‘Backg ounds, A ibu es, and Iden i ies’,in
L. Eps ein e al (eds), The Ox o d Handbook o Compa a i e Judicial Beha iou (OUP, 2024).
Bu cha d 557
judges by aking ad an age o , o e en igge ing, ce ain cogni i e e ec s such as he ancho ing
e ec men ioned abo e.
Whe he hi d ac o s y o influence judges also depends on beha iou al ac o s. These may be
pa ly cong uen wi h he ac o s ha de e mine judicial beha iou bu hey can also include specific
ac o s. Sec ion 3 ou lines hese ac o s. The link be ween he ac o s ha de e mine he beha iou
o hi d ac o s and he ac o s ha de e mine judicial beha iou can lead o a chain-like in e ac ion.
This in e play o beha iou al ac o s is shown in Figu e 2.
3. Beha iou o judges and hi d ac o s: Beha iou al ac o s o judicial
independence
A e he p elimina y ema ks on he beha iou al dimension o judicial independence, his sec ion
u ns o he ac o s and ela ed measu es ha p omo e beha iou ha is in line wi h judicial
Figu e 1. Le els o decision-making.
Figu e 2. In e play be ween he beha iou al ac o s o judges and hi d ac o s.
558 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
independence. I shows how he s a e can gene a e s uc u al condi ions ha a e conduci e o beha -
iou o judges and hi d ac o s ha is in line wi h judicial independence. The ac o s add essed he e
a e only hose ha can be influenced by he s a e and ha a e he e o e ele an o he s a e obliga-
ion ensuing om he p inciple o judicial independence.
This o e iew engages wi h he fi s le el o judicial decision-making as ou lined in sec ion 2.B.
I highligh s h ee poin s. Fi s , he elemen s o he beha iou al se ing influence he beha iou o
judges and hi d ac o s in di e en ways. An elemen can ha e se e al, some imes e en con adic-
o y, e ec s. To maximize a beha iou al se ing ha is a ou able o judicial independence, i is
impo an o unde s and he beha iou al unc ioning o he espec i e elemen s. Second, in addi ion
o he aspec s ha a e egula ly men ioned in he con ex o judicial independence, o he ac o s –in
pa icula psychological amewo k condi ions –a e also ele an o whe he judges and hi d
ac o s beha e in line wi h judicial independence. Some o hese ac o s a e discussed below.
Thi d, i is c ucial o ake in o accoun he in e ac ion o he a ious beha iou al ac o s. Ins ead
o looking a indi idual ac o s in isola ion, he o e all beha iou al se ing mus be kep in mind
when i comes o assessing and p omo ing he likelihood o no ma i ely desi able beha iou .
A. Beha iou o judges
The ac o s ha shape judicial beha iou and ha can con ibu e o p omo ing independence a e
mani old. The ollowing o e iew s a s wi h a fi s se o ac o s ha ollows om a a ionalis
accoun o human beha iou ; a second se o beha iou al ac o s complemen s his app oach.
These se s o ac o s in e ac and, oge he , o m he o e all beha iou al amewo k by which judi-
cial beha iou is de e mined.
To s a wi h, a a ionalis accoun o human beha iou ocuses on he ela ionship be ween he
expec ed benefi s and possible cos s o no ma i ely undesi able beha iou . Judges a e add essed as
a ional ac o s who beha e in a way ha maximizes u ili y. F om his pe spec i e, judges a e
expec ed o beha e independen ly i he expec ed benefi s o his beha iou a e g ea e han he pos-
sible cos s associa ed wi h i , aking in o accoun he p obabili y wi h which hese cos s occu .
18
Using his u ili y-based lens, he s a e can influence he beha iou al se ing o judicial independ-
ence by a ge ing he benefi s and cos s o beha iou ha is no in line wi h judicial independence
as well as he p obabili y wi h which, acco ding o he expec a ion o he ele an ac o , benefi s and
cos s will ma e ialize.
To p omo e judicial independence, he expec ed benefi s o no ma i ely undesi able beha iou
can be minimized. The design o judicial ca ee oppo uni ies is pa icula ly ele an in his ega d.
The ollowing o e iew shows how ca ee benefi s ac as beha iou al ac o s ele an o judicial
independence. This o e iew aims o highligh how ca ee - ela ed measu es ha s a es use o os e
judicial independence ope a e om a beha iou al pe spec i e.
Afi s c ucial in e es is he judges’in e es in keeping hei p o essional posi ion. This in e es is
a ec ed by he legal p o ision on he i emo abili y o judges om hei o fice. When judges can be
(easily) emo ed om o fice, he e is a isk ha he judges’cu en p o essional exis ence de e -
mines he cos -benefi analysis wi h ega d o no ma i ely desi able o undesi able beha iou . In
a se ing in which ac o s can emo e judges om o fice as a (de ac o) sanc ion o decisions
18. On hese elemen s o he cos -benefi analysis, A. Mish a, ‘Co up ion, Hie a chies and Bu eauc a ic S uc u e’,in
S. Rose-Acke man (ed.), In e na ional Handbook on he Economics o Co up ion (Edwa d Elga , 2006), p. 192.
Bu cha d 559
The s a e obliga ion esul ing om he p inciple o judicial independence is no only aimed a
p omo ing beha iou on he pa o judges and hi d ac o s ha is in line wi h judicial independence.
I also aims o es ablish and main ain he us in he independence o he judicia y (sec ion 4.A).
This objec i e b ings an addi ional beha iou al dimension o he p inciple o judicial independence.
I ela es o he g oup o ac o s who pe cei e and e alua e he beha iou o judges and hi d ac o s
who migh a emp o influence hese judges. This pe cep ion and e alua ion a e influenced by
beha iou al ac o s. These ac o s and hei implica ions o he p inciple o judicial independence
a e ou lined in sec ion 4.B.
A. Objec i e: T us o hose subjec o he law
Unde he p inciple o judicial independence, he s a e mus aim a c ea ing s uc u al condi ions in
which hose subjec o he law can expec he judicia y o decide he cases b ough be o e i in an
independen manne . Obse ing ac o s wi hin a legal o de should be able o us ha judges will
beha e in line wi h judicial independence. This includes he expec a ion ha hi d ac o s do no seek
o unduly influence judges. Obse ing ac o s a e bo h hose in ol ed in cou p oceedings and he
gene al public.
P omo ing he us o hese ac o s is a equi emen o he p inciple o judicial independence. The
EC HR has epea edly emphasized he impo ance o us in he cou s. Acco ding o he EC HR,
judicial independence is abou ‘confidence which he cou s mus inspi e in a democ a ic socie y’.
43
This o mula ion, which was mo e ecen ly also adop ed by he CJEU,
44
e e s o he unc ion o an
independen judicia y o he p inciple o democ acy.
The no ma i e equi emen o us as se ou by he abo e cou s is g ounded on empi -
ical findings. In ac , he social ele ance o he us ha ac o s ha e in he independence o
judges is empi ically unde pinned. This includes findings ega ding he influence o p oced-
u al ai ness on how pe sons pe cei e judicial decisions and how his shapes hei subsequen
beha iou . A la ge numbe o s udies ha e in es iga ed he ques ion o how p ocedu al
jus ice a ec s how bo h pa ies o p oceedings and membe s o a wide audience assess deci-
sions; and how his assessmen can influence he u u e beha iou o hese ac o s owa ds he
decision-make s.
45
P ocedu al ai ness has been shown o be a c ucial ac o ha can lead o
a a ou able e alua ion o he decision make e en i he con en o a decision is nega i ely
43. EC HR, S amek . Aus ia, Judgmen o 22 Oc obe 1984, Applica ion No. 8790/79, pa a. 42. The e e ence o he
impo ance o us o a democ a ic socie y is a egula componen o he EC HR’s ju isp udence on judicial independ-
ence, see e.g. EC HR, Ramos Nunes de Ca alho e Sá . Po ugal, Judgmen o 6 No embe 2018, Applica ion Nos.
55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13, pa a. 149; EC HR, Sacilo Lo mines . F ance, Judgmen o 9 No embe 2006,
Applica ion No. 65411/01, pa a. 60; EC HR, Kleyn and O he s . he Ne he lands, Judgmen o 6 May 2003,
Applica ion Nos. 9343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, pa a. 191.
44. Case C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K. (Independence o he Disciplina y Chambe o he Sup eme Cou ), pa a.
153.
45. See e.g. T.R. Tyle and Y.J. Huo, T us in he Law: Encou aging Public Coope a ion wi h he Police and Cou s
(Russell Sage Founda ion, 2002); T.R. Tyle , J.D. Caspe and B. Fishe , ‘Main aining Allegiance owa d Poli ical
Au ho i ies: The Role o P io A i udes and he Use o Fai P ocedu es’,33Ame ican Jou nal o Poli ical Science
(1989); J. Jackson e al, ‘Why Do People Comply Wi h The Law? Legi imacy and he Influence o Legal
Ins i u ions’,52B i ish Jou nal o C iminology (2012); M.D. Rami ez, ‘P ocedu al Pe cep ions and Suppo o he
U.S. Sup eme Cou ’,29Poli ical Psychology (2008); S.C. Benesh, ‘Unde s anding Public Confidence in Ame ican
Cou s’,68The Jou nal o Poli ics (2006).
566 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)

e alua ed.
46
Bo h o hose in ol ed in he p oceedings who we e unsuccess ul in a legal
dispu e and o ex e nal ac o s whose p e e ences an coun e o a cou decision, i is sig-
nifican o e en decisi e whe he he p ocedu e ha led o his decision was pe cei ed as
ai . And wi h ega d o he u u e beha iou o hese ac o s, a decision ha is pe cei ed
as ai seems o inc ease he willingness o coope a e wi h judicial au ho i ies o o he ins i-
u ional ac o s.
47
In ligh o hese empi ical findings, he objec i e o gua an eeing us in cou s mus he e o e be
conside ed key o he p inciple o judicial independence.
48
Based on his unde s anding, he s a e
has an obliga ion o maximize his us . This is an obliga ion ha some cou s ha e explici ly ecog-
nized as being pa o he p inciple o judicial independence.
49
This obliga ion should gene ally be
aken in o accoun when applying he p inciple o judicial independence in he legal con ex . The
ollowing sec ion explains his us dimension o judicial independence and how po en ial beha -
iou al e ec s play a ole in his ega d.
B. T us and he obse e pe spec i e
Al hough he e is no s anda dized defini ion o us ,
50
he e a e se e al basic ea u es o us ha
a e ele an o us in he con ex o judicial independence.
Fi s , us is o be unde s ood as a ela ionship be ween a us o and a us ee.
51
In his ela ion-
ship, us can be unila e al o mu ual. And us ela es o a specific beha iou o he us ee. T us
does no exis abs ac ly be ween wo ac o s, bu ac o A us s in a ce ain beha iou o ac o B. The
poin o e e ence he e is an expec ed (desi ed) u u e beha iou o he la e .
52
T us is he e o e
defined by h ee elemen s: ac o A ( he us o ), ac o B ( he us ee) and he la e ’s beha iou
x.
53
In he judicial independence con ex : he subjec s o he law (A) should us ha judges and
indi ec ly also hi d ac o s (B) beha e in line wi h judicial independence (x).
46. T.R. Tyle and Y.J. Huo, T us in he Law: Encou aging Public Coope a ion wi h he Police and Cou s; J. B ockne and
B.M. Wiesen eld, ‘An In eg a i e F amewo k o Explaining Reac ions o Decisions: In e ac i e E ec s o Ou comes
and P ocedu es’,20Psychological Bulle in (1996); T. S ahl, J.-W. Van P ooijen and R. Ve mun , ‘On he
Psychology o P ocedu al Jus ice: Reac ions o P ocedu es o Ing oup s. Ou g oup Au ho i ies’,34Eu opean
Jou nal o Social Psychology (2004); P.C. Magalhães and L. Aguia -Con a ia, ‘P ocedu al Fai ness, he Economy,
and Suppo o Poli ical Au ho i ies’,40Poli ical Psychology (2019).
47. See in pa icula T.R. Tyle and Y.J. Huo, T us in he Law: Encou aging Public Coope a ion wi h he Police and
Cou s.
48. This unc ion o secu ing us and accep ance is also emphasized in legal schola ship, see e.g. F. an Dijk, Pe cep ions
o he Independence o Judges in Eu ope (Palg a e, 2021); J. Fe lemann, ‘Vo übe gehend unabhängig? –Rich e au
Zei zwischen Unabhängigkei und Flexibili ä ’, in M. Mülde e al. (eds), Rich e liche Abhängigkei –Rech sfindung
im Ö en lichen Rech (Nomos, 2018), p. 49, 65.
49. See on his obliga ion unde domes ic cons i u ional law, e.g. Ge man FCC, decision o 14 Janua y 2020, 2 B R 1333/
17, pa a. 91.
50. Fo an o e iew o he discussion on he concep o us , see e.g. L.M. Py likZillig and C.D. Kimb ough, ‘Consensus on
Concep ualiza ions and Defini ions o T us : A e We The e Ye ?’, in E. Shockley e al. (eds), In e disciplina y
Pe spec i es on T us (Sp inge , 2016).
51. Ibid.
52. On his dimension o expec a ion, G. Mölle ing, T us : Reason, Rou ine, Reflexi i y (Eme ald G oup Publishing, 2006),
p. 7.
53. R. Ha din, ‘Concep ions and Explana ions o T us ’, in K.S. Cook (ed.), T us in Socie y (Russell Sage Founda ion,
2001).
Bu cha d 567
Second, us is o be unde s ood as a eac ion o unce ain y.
54
The beha iou o ac o B canno
be de e mina i ely p edic ed. The e is a isk o a nega i e ou come, i.e., ha ac o B does no beha e
as ac o A would like hem o beha e. I he e we e no unce ain y in his espec , us would be
i ele an because he p obabili y o nega i e beha iou on he pa o he us ee is ze o.
55
In
he con ex o judicial independence, his unce ain y consis s in he ac ha i canno be uled
ou ha he decision-making o judges is de e mined by no ma i ely undesi able ac o s and ha
he e is no ma i ely undesi able influence by hi d ac o s. Obse e s can hus me ely make a p og-
nosis ega ding he beha iou o judges and hi d ac o s.
Thi d, us is subjec i e in na u e. I is no an objec i e isk assessmen .
56
To s a wi h, he
knowledge base is subjec i e in a us se ing. T us o s will mos likely only ha e knowledge o
some o he a ailable in o ma ion, so ha hey do no know he objec i e p obabili y o he us ee’s
beha iou .
57
In addi ion, he a ailable in o ma ion may be (pa ially) gene a ed by he us o s
hemsel es, o example because i is based on pe sonal expe ience. Mo eo e , he isk assessmen
as such is subjec i e. Fac o s ha a e specific o he us o can influence his assessmen . Such
ac o s can be o a cogni i e na u e, including cogni i e dis o ions –as will be ou lined
below.
58
In addi ion, ac o s can link he specific isk assessmen o a la ge pe sonalized us
con ex , o example i a bina y us ela ionship is embedded in a ne wo k o o e lapping
social ela ionships
59
o is pa o an ins i u ional s uc u e.
60
In addi ion o cogni i e and a ec i e
ac o s,
61
a gene al inclina ion o us as a pe sonali y ai can also play a ole in he de elopmen
o us .
62
This subjec i e na u e o us is also cha ac e is ic o us in he con ex o judicial independ-
ence. The pe cep ion o he beha iou o judges and o hi d ac o s is subjec i e, as is he isk assess-
men ega ding independen beha iou . In ac , he subjec i e na u e o us is o pa icula
impo ance o he legal concep o judicial independence. I his is no aken se iously, he objec i e
o ‘inspi e us ’in cou s canno be ealized. In he ollowing, he emainde o his sec ion hus
shows how he legal p inciple o judicial independence should in eg a e he subjec i e na u e o
us , aking in o accoun he po en ial beha iou al e ec s ela ed o i .
54. L.M. Py likZillig and C.D. Kimb ough, in E. Shockley e al. (eds), In e disciplina y Pe spec i es on T us ; D.M.
Rousseau, S.B. Si kin, R.S. Bu and C. Came e , ‘No So Di e en a e All: A C oss-discipline View o T us ’,23
Academy o Managemen Re iew (1998), p. 395.
55. J. Jackson and J. Gau, ‘Ca ing Up Concep s? Di e en ia ing Be ween T us and Legi imacy in Public A i udes
Towa ds Legal Au ho i y’, in E. Shockley e al. (eds), In e disciplina y Pe spec i es on T us (Sp inge , 2016), p. 53.
56. G. Mölle ing, T us : Reason, Rou ine, Reflexi i y,p.8.
57. J. Jackson and J. Gau, in E. Shockley e al. (eds), In e disciplina y Pe spec i es on T us , p. 53.
58. On cogni i e heu is ics as a ac o o us , M.D. Bae and J.A. Colqui , ‘Why Do People T us ? Mo ing owa d a Mo e
Comp ehensi e Conside a ion o he An eceden s o T us ’, in R.H. Sea le, A.-M.I. Nienabe and S.B. Si kin (eds), The
Rou ledge Companion o T us (Rou ledge, 2018), p. 174–177.
59. G. Mölle ing, T us : Reason, Rou ine, Reflexi i y,p.9.
60. R. Bachmann, ‘Ins i u ions and T us ’, in R.H. Sea le, A.-M.I. Nienabe and S.B. Si kin (eds), The Rou ledge Companion
o T us (Rou ledge, 2018). See also on he concep o us in a sys em, N. Luhmann, Ve auen –Ein Mechanismus zu
Reduk ion soziale Komplexi ä (F. Enke Ve lag, 1968).
61. E.g. D. Lewis and A. Weige , ‘T us as a Social Reali y’,63Social Fo ces (1985); D. Dunning, D. Fe chenhaue and
T. Schlösse, ‘Why People T us : Sol ed Puzzles and Open Mys e ies’,28Cu en Di ec ions in Psychological Science
(2019); D. Dunning and D. Fe chenhaue , ‘Unde s anding he Psychology o T us ’, in D. Dunning (ed.), Social
Mo i a ion (Taylo & F ancis, 2010).
62. R.C. Maye , J.H. Da is and F.D. Schoo man, ‘An In eg a i e Model o o ganiza ional T us ’,20The Academy o
Managemen Re iew (1995).
568 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
No all cou s ha adjudica e abou ques ions o judicial independence ake he subjec i e na u e
o us su ficien ly se ious. Fo example, he Ge man cons i u ional cou , al hough ecognizing in
p inciple ha us in he independence o cou s is an impo an elemen , only engages in an objec -
i e assessmen o isks o judicial independence. I does no ake in o accoun he subjec i e pe -
spec i e o he ex e nal obse e s wi hin he Ge man legal o de by asking, o example, how he
gene al public would pe cei e ce ain si ua ions such as public se an s ac ing as empo a y
judges.
63
In compa ison, he CJEU and he ECHR e e mo e in ensely o us and he subjec i e pe spec-
i e o he us ees. The CJEU explici ly examines whe he he e a e legi ima e doub s abou judicial
independence on he pa o he gene al public. Acco ding o he CJEU, he judicia y mus be s uc-
u ed in a way ‘ o dispel any easonable doub in he minds o indi iduals as o he impe iousness
o ha body o ex e nal ac o s and i s neu ali y wi h espec o he in e es s be o e i ’.
64
The EC HR
also examines whe he he e is a legi ima e ea o doub s by a pa y o a dispu e.
65
This s anda d is
used o assessing bo h judicial independence in he na owe sense and impa iali y.
66
Fo he
EC HR, he ‘appea ance o independence’is a c i e ion when assessing whe he he e has been a
iola ion o A icle 6 ECHR.
67
I bases his on he legal p inciple ‘jus ice mus no only be done;
i mus also be seen o be done’, which has been pa o he EC HR’s ju isp udence o a long
ime.
68
In his ju isp udence, he EC HR akes a wo-s ep app oach o assessing judicial independ-
ence –an app oach ha is also eflec ed in he p esen a icle. An objec i e s anda d o e iew (s ep
one) is supplemen ed by a subjec i e dimension ha eflec s he pe spec i e o he ex e nal obse -
e s (s ep wo). Fo example, in Belilos . Swi ze land, he EC HR a fi med ha , wi h ega d o
ce ain elemen s o judicial independence such as he appoin men o judges, hei i emo abili y
and eedom om ins uc ions, he e was no objec i e isk bu i ne e heless ejec ed he independ-
ence o he cou in ques ion, e e ing o how an ‘o dina y ci izen’pe cei es he judges.
69
This
example also highligh s ha he subjec i e e iew s anda d is no abou he subjec i e pe spec i e
o an indi idual bu a he abou he subjec i e pe spec i e o a g oup o ac o s.
An aspec ha me i s pa icula a en ion due o i s po en ial beha iou al implica ions is he di -
e ence be ween in e nal and ex e nal pe spec i es. The in e nal pe spec i e e e s o si ua ions in
which judges assess he independence o o he judges. Judges a e pa o he judicia y and he e o e
assess he ele an beha iou o o he judges om a pa icula pe spec i e. This pe spec i e no
63. FCC, decision o 22 Ma ch 2018, 2 B R 780/16, pa a. 61.
64. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and O he s Sąd Najwyższy, CP Sąd Najwyższy and DO Sąd
Najwyższy, pa a. 123; Case C-192/18 Commission . Poland, pa a. 111; Case C-619/18 Commission . Poland, pa a.
74. See also Case C-274/14 Banco de San ande , pa a. 63; Case C-272/19 VQ Land Hessen, EU:C:2020:535, pa a. 52.
65. EC HR, Sacilo Lo mines . F ance, Judgmen o 9 No embe 2006, Applica ion No. 65411/01, pa a. 63.
66. Fo he la e o mally only in he con ex o objec i e and no subjec i e impa iali y, bu subjec i e impa iali y only
plays a mino ole in he ju isp udence o he EC HR. On he ela ionship be ween hese wo elemen s, see also L.F.
Mülle , Rich e liche Unabhängigkei und Unpa eilichkei nach A . 6 EMRK, p. 116–117.
67. EC HR, Campbell and Fell . he Uni ed Kingdom, Judgmen o 28 June 1984, Applica ion Nos. 7819/77, 7878/77, pa a.
78.
68. Ibid., pa a. 81. See also simila ly in EC HR, Delcou . Belgium, Judgmen o 17 Janua y 1970, Applica ion No. 2689/
65, pa a. 31.
69. Namely as a membe o he police and no as an independen membe o he police cou , see EC HR, Belilos
. Swi ze land, Judgmen o 29 Ap il 1988, Applica ion No. 10328/83, pa a. 67. A u he example o his app oach
is a case in which he EC HR conside ed he me e p esence o a pe son du ing cou delibe a ions as a su ficien
ac o o po en ial influence: EC HR, Ma inie . F ance, Judgmen o 12 Ap il 2006, Applica ion No. 58675/00,
pa a. 53–55.
Bu cha d 569
only comes wi h specific knowledge ha is no di ec ly a ailable o he pa ies o p oceedings o o
he gene al public, bu i also can gene a e ce ain cogni i e e ec s, as ou lined below. In e sely, he
pa ies o p oceedings o he gene al public ha e an ex e nal pe spec i e on he judicia y –a pe -
spec i e ha comes wi h less knowledge abou in e nal s uc u es and p ac ices as well as wi h cog-
ni i e e ec s ela ed o he ex e nal s andpoin .
This di e ence in pe spec i es is impo an when judges –including he judges a cons i u ional
and sup eme cou s as well as egional cou s –mus decide whe he judicial independence is
a ec ed in a case a hand. Fo such a decision, judges mus assess he isk o no ma i ely undesi -
able beha iou by o he judges. I one does no ake in o accoun he di e ence in pe spec i es, i is
likely ha hese cou s’assessmen will be influenced by cogni i e e ec s ela ed o he in e nal
pe spec i e o he judges who make he assessmen . To do jus ice o he us dimension o judicial
independence, he pe spec i e o ex e nal obse e s should be conside ed.
Di e ences be ween in e nal and ex e nal pe spec i es can mani es hemsel es in a ious ways.
One impo an aspec is he g oup a filia ion o he e alua ing ac o . Beha iou al science esea ch
has shown ha people assess si ua ions di e en ly depending on whe he hey belong o a ce ain
g oup o no and whe he a ques ion conce ns hei own g oup o ano he g oup. Fo example, he e
is a endency o e alua e a pe son’s beha iou mo e posi i ely i his pe son belongs o one’s own
g oup han i he pe son belongs o a di e en g oup.
70
I judges a e asked o assess o he judges in
e ms o judicial independence, his phenomenon can ha e an impac on he assessmen .
71
The
e ec may be ha judges e alua e he independence o judges as membe s o hei own g oup
mo e a ou ably han hey would ha e done o non-g oup membe s unde he same ci cums ances.
Ano he ele an cogni i e e ec ela es o he way in which people assess hemsel es. The pe -
cep ion ha one has o one’s own decision-making p ocesses can be influenced by cogni i e biases.
When people assess hemsel es, hey end o see hemsel es as less suscep ible o unconscious
beha iou al ac o s han o he people.
72
In addi ion, he e is a gene al endency o e alua e one’s
own ac ions mo e a ou ably han he ac ions o o he s. This e ec has been shown o be pa o
a so-called sel -se ing bias. This bias can a ec he assessmen o bo h p ac ical skills, which
end o be a ed as abo e a e age,
73
and no ma i e ques ions such as e hical o ai beha iou .
74
The no ma i ely desi able beha iou s wi h ega d o judicial independence conce n bo h p ac ical
and no ma i e aspec s so ha hese wo dimensions o he sel -se ing bias can po en ially be
engaged when assessing judicial independence. Mo eo e , when he s anda d used o assessmen
a e a he ague, his seems o cause an e en mo e posi i e sel -assessmen .
75
This e ec may also
70. See e.g. M. Hews one, M. Rubin and H. Willis, ‘In e g oup Bias’,53Annual Re iew o Psychology (2002); M.B. B ewe
and J.G. Webe , ‘Sel -E alua ion E ec s o In e pe sonal e sus In e g oup Social Compa ison’,66Jou nal o
Pe sonali y and Social Psychology (1994); B. Mullen, R. B own and C. Smi h, ‘In G oup Bias as a Func ion o
Salience, Rele ance, and S a us: An In eg a ion’,22Eu opean Jou nal o Social Psychology (1992), p. 103.
71. See also A. Higgins and I. Le y, ‘Judicial Policy, Public Pe cep ion, and he Science o Decision Making: A New
F amewo k o he Law o App ehended Bias’,38Ci il Jus ice Qua e ly (2019), p. 390.
72. See e.g. E. P onin, D.Y. Lin and L. Ross, ‘The Bias Blind Spo : Pe cep ions o Bias in Sel Ve sus O he s’,28
Pe sonali y and Social Psychology Bulle in (2002); E. P onin, T. Gilo ich and L. Ross, ‘Objec i i y in he Eye o
he Beholde : Di e gen Pe cep ions o Bias in Sel e sus O he s’, 111 Psychological Re iew (2004).
73. O. S enson, ‘A e We All Less Risky and Mo e Skill ul Than Ou Fellow D i e s?’,47Ac a Psychologica (1981).
74. See e.g. L. Babcock e al, ‘Biased Judgmen s o Fai ness in Ba gaining’,85Ame ican Economic Re iew (1995);
R. Baumha , An Hones P ofi : Wha Businessmen Say Abou E hics in Business (Hol , Rineha and Wins on, 1968).
75. D. Dunning, J.A. Meye owi z and A.D. Holzbe g, ‘Ambigui y and Sel -E alua ion: The Role o Idiosync a ic T ai
Defini ions in Sel -Se ing Assessmen s o Abili y’,57Jou nal o Pe sonali y and Social Psychology (1989).
570 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
be significan in he con ex o judicial independence because ac o s can pe cei e he s anda d o
‘independen beha iou ’as ela i ely ague.
As a esul o such e ec s, he e is a isk ha judges ha e a di e en iew o judicial inde-
pendence han ex e nal ac o s. In e nal and ex e nal pe spec i es a e no cong uen . In ac , such
di e ging pe spec i es on judicial independence appea o mani es hemsel es in wo su eys
conduc ed by he Eu opean Ne wo k o Councils o he Judicia y in 2019.
76
In hese
su eys, bo h judges and lawye s om 25 Eu opean coun ies we e asked abou se e al
aspec s o judicial independence.
77
When one compa es he answe s ha bo h g oups o
pe sons ha e gi en o iden ically o mula ed ques ions, i is appa en ha he in e nal pe spec i e
o he judges and he ex e nal pe spec i e o legal p o essionals ou side he judicia y o en di e
significan ly. The ex e nal pe spec i e o en is mo e c i ical han ha o he judges hemsel es.
Table 1 con ains an ex ac om his su ey. I shows he esul s o he judicia y in Ge many,
he Ne he lands, he Czech Republic and G eece. Fo hese coun ies, his e ec is e y p o-
nounced. Al hough no all coun ies in he su ey show such a clea pa e n o all he ele an
ques ions, he lis ed esul s a e none heless indica i e o an e ec o he in e nal and ex e nal
pe spec i e.
O cou se, one canno di ec ly in e om his da a se which o he possible cogni i e e ec s and
knowledge- ela ed di e ences has led o he di e ging e alua ion o he abo e ques ions. Howe e ,
his da a se shows ha he e alua ion ends o di e ge in he same manne : ex e nal obse e s a e
o en mo e c i ical han judges om he in e nal pe spec i e.
Ye he su ey does p o ide an indica ion as o he e ec s ha migh ha e caused hese di e gen
e alua ions. I one also conside s u he da a collec ed as pa o he su ey, his da a indica es he
ele ance o he abo e-men ioned cogni i e e ec s ela ing o a posi i e sel -assessmen .
78
I is
no iceable ha he judges in almos all o he 25 pa icipa ing coun ies in 2019 a e hei own pe -
sonal independence highe han he independence o he judicia y in hei espec i e coun y as a
whole.
79
This is also he case o he 27 coun ies assessed in he 2022 ENCJ su ey o
judges.
80
These esul s –which a e shown in Table 2 –emphasize he ele ance o he subjec i e
pe spec i e on judicial independence.
I , in addi ion, one akes in o accoun su eys on he assessmen o judicial independence by he
gene al popula ion, he endency owa ds a mo e c i ical assessmen om an ex e nal pe spec i e
compa ed o an in e nal pe spec i e is also e iden . Fo example, while he Ge man judges in
he abo e-men ioned ENCJ su ey a e he independence o he Ge man judicia y gene ally as
high, wi h only 0.87% o he judges su eyed a ing his independence as less han 5 poin s (on
76. ENCJ Su ey on he independence o Judges 2019 –Independence and Accoun abili y o he Judicia y, h ps://pgw k-
websi emedia.s3.eu-wes -1.amazonaws.com/p oduc ion/pwk-web-encj2017p/Repo s/Da a%20ENCJ%202019%
20Su ey%20on%20 he%20Independence%20o %20judges.pd and ENCJ/CCBE Su ey among lawye s on he inde-
pendence o Judges 2018–2019, h ps://pgw kwebsi emedia.s3.eu-wes -1.amazonaws.com/p oduc ion/pwk-web-
encj2017p/Repo s/ENCJ%20Su ey%20on%20Independence%20Accoun abili y%20o %20 he%20Judicia y%
20among%20lawye s%20%202019.pd .
77. The mo e ecen su ey o 2022 only included judges; a su ey among lawye s was no conduc ed a his occasion. A
di ec compa ison is hus no possible o 2022.
78. See also F. an Dijk, Pe cep ions o he Independence o Judges in Eu ope, p. 34.
79. Excep ions: Denma k wi h iden ical sco es; and UK judges in England, Sco land and Wales wi h sligh ly mo e a ou -
able o e all sco es compa ed o sel -assessmen .
80. ENCJ Su ey on he independence o Judges 2022, h ps://pgw k-websi emedia.s3.eu-wes -1.amazonaws.com/
p oduc ion/pwk-web-encj2017-p/GA%2022/Repo %20ENCJ%20Su ey%202022.pd .
Bu cha d 571

a scale o 0–10), he assessmen by he gene al public is mo e di e en ia ed. The EU Jus ice
Sco eboa d o he same yea 2019 showed ha a o al o 18% o he esponden s in Ge many
a ed i as ‘ ai ly poo ’o ‘ e y poo ’.
82
Simila ly, while only 0,16% o he Du ch judges in he
ENCJ su ey a ed he independence in he Ne he lands as less han 5 poin s, he gene al pe cep ion
in he Ne he lands acco ding o he EU Jus ice Sco eboa d was 15% o ‘ ai ly poo ’o ‘ e y poo ’.
While only 1.24% o he Czech judges a ed he independence in he Czech Republic as less han 5
poin s, he gene al pe cep ion acco ding o he EU Jus ice Sco eboa d was 36% o ‘ ai ly poo ’o
‘ e y poo ’. And while 2.46% o he G eek judges a ed he independence in G eece as less han 5
poin s, he gene al pe cep ion acco ding o he EU Jus ice Sco eboa d was 34% o ‘ ai ly poo ’o
‘ e y poo ’.
83
Table 1. Compa ison ENCJ Su ey 2019 esul s: judges s lawye s
81
Ques ion
Judge (% o
app o al)
Lawye s (% o
app o al)
Fi s appoin men as a judge no only on he basis o abili y and
expe ience
GE: 8% GE: 31%
NL: 2% NL: 23%
CZ: 15% CZ: 48%
GR: 17 GR: 48%
Appoin men o he Sup eme Cou no only on he basis o abili y
and expe ience
GE: 34% GE: 61%
NL: 1% NL: 19%
CZ: 16% CZ: 44%
GR: 27% GR: 65%
P omo ion no only based on skills and expe ience GE: 28% GE: 38%
NL: 8% NL: 27%
CZ: 23% CZ: 45%
GR: 23% GR: 62%
Case alloca ions no acco ding o es ablished ules o p ocedu es GE: 2% GE: 18%
NL: 1% NL: 13%
CZ: 3% CZ: 38%
GR: 15% GR: 57%
Judgmen s ha wen agains he in e es s o he go e nmen we e
no implemen ed/en o ced
GE: 13% GE: 23%
NL: 8% NL: 23,5%
CZ: 10% CZ: 32%
GR: 31% GR: 29%
Decisions o ac ions o indi idual judges inapp op ia ely/di ec ly
influenced by he media
GE: 14% GE: 48%
NL: 3,5% NL: 27%
CZ: 16% CZ: 55%
GR: 35% GR: 68%
81. Only he esul s o ques ions ha we e o mula ed iden ically o bo h g oups o ac o s a e lis ed he e.
82. The da a o e iew o he EU Jus ice Ba ome e 2019 is a ailable a h ps://ec.eu opa.eu/in o/si es/de aul /files/jus ice_
sco eboa d_2019_quan a i e_da a_ ac shee _en.pd . The specific ques ion was: ‘F om wha you know, how would you
a e he jus ice sys em in (ou coun y) in e ms o he independence o cou s and judges? Would you say i is e y good,
ai ly good, ai ly bad o e y bad?’
83. Fo an in-dep h assessmen o u he coun ies, see also F. an Dijk, Pe cep ions o he Independence o Judges in
Eu ope, p. 36.
572 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
Wi h ega d o he us o ex e nal ac o s, i is he e o e no possible o e e solely o he in e nal
pe spec i e o judges. As he abo e examples show, i is e y likely ha he e alua ion o independ-
ence issues om an in e nal pe spec i e does no ully eflec ha o ex e nal obse e s. I is no
Table 2. Compa ison o he assessmen by judges o he o e all independence in hei coun y s hei own
independence.
Coun y
O e all independence
in he coun y 2019
Own
independence
2019
O e all independence
in he coun y 2022
Own
independence
2022
Aus ia 8.9 9.3 8.8 9.3
Belgium 8.4 9.1 8.7 9.3
Bosnia and
He zego ina
7.1 8.4 7.0 8.6
Bulga ia 6.8 8.5 7.2 8.9
C oa ia 6.6 8.1 7.4 8.8
Cyp us n/a n/a 9.5 9.8
Czech Republic 8.8 9.4 9.1 9.5
Denma k 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.9
Es onia n/a n/a 8.8 9.2
Finland 9.2 9.4 9.3 9.5
F ance n/a n/a 8.3 9.0
Ge many 8.6 8.9 8.9 9.1
G eece 8.0 8.9 8.2 9.1
Hunga y 7.3 8.8 8.1 9.1
I eland 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.7
I aly 8.4 9.3 8.2 9.1
La ia 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.8
Li huania 7.7 8.3 7.5 8.0
Mon eneg o 8.4 9.3 7.8 8.8
Ne he lands 9.0 9.2 9.2 9.4
No way 9.2 9.5 9.3 9.5
Po ugal 7.5 8.2 8.3 9.0
Romania 7.9 8.9 n/a n/a
Slo akia 8.1 9.1 7.1 8.3
Slo enia 7.6 8.4 7.5 8.3
Spain 7.8 9.0 8.0 9.1
Sweden 8.6 9.1 8.8 9.4
Uni ed Kingdom:
England and
Wales
9.4 9.3 9.5 9.6
Uni ed Kingdom:
No he n
I eland
9.3 9.4 9.7 9.6
Uni ed Kingdom:
Sco land
9.5 9.3 9.4 9.5
To al 8.3 8.3 9.0 8.5 9.1
Bu cha d 573
possible o equa e he judges’pe spec i e wi h he pe spec i e o he ex e nal ac o s. The di e -
ences in pe spec i e make an e alua ion om he in e nal pe spec i e alone an inadequa e subs i-
u e. I is hus p oblema ic when judges assess issues o judicial independence based solely on hei
own pe spec i e as his pe spec i e alone canno do jus ice o he pa icula i ies o he ex e nal pe -
spec i e. This p oblem exis s bo h wi h ega d o assessmen s o judicial independence in he na -
owe sense and wi h ega d o impa iali y.
84
In iew o he objec i e o ensu ing us o hose seeking jus ice and o he gene al public in
judicial independence, he legal assessmen o issues ela ing o judicial independence should
ake in o accoun he pe spec i e o his a ge ed g oup. In pa icula , his means conside ing a
mo e c i ical s ance han he one aken om an in e nal pe spec i e. This would lead o a s ic e
applica ion o he p inciple o judicial independence. Mo eo e , when aking in o accoun he ex e -
nal pe spec i e, he e m ‘doub ’mus be used as a ya ds ick. Taking in o accoun he mo e c i ical
endency and he limi ed knowledge ha is s uc u ally linked o he ex e nal pe spec i e, doub s
mus su fice in his espec . In line wi h his obse a ion, he CJEU has emphasized ha e en
‘appea ances may be o a ce ain impo ance’.
85
O he cou s should also emb ace his app oach
when assessing independence issues.
To ake he ex e nal pe spec i e in o accoun , empi ical findings can be inco po a ed in o he
legal assessmen o judicial independence issues. I is possible o e e , whe e applicable, o
s udies on how ex e nal ac o s assess specific o ganiza ional ea u es ele an o judicial independ-
ence.
86
This applies bo h o cou s when examining possible iola ions o he p inciple o judicial
independence and o he legisla o when designing beha iou al se ings ha p omo e judicial inde-
pendence in he fi s place.
87
In sum, a beha iou - ela ed unde s anding o he p inciple o judicial independence equi es a
‘double’empi ical basis: on he one hand –as se ou in sec ion 3 –wi h ega d o he ac o s
ha p omo e no ma i ely desi able beha iou by judges and hi d ac o s; and on he o he hand
wi h ega d o he subjec i e assessmen o hese ac o s om he pe spec i e o ex e nal obse e s.
In his way, he beha iou o all ac o s in ol ed can be aken in o accoun when implemen ing he
objec i es o he p inciple o judicial independence.
5. Ex ending he beha iou conside ed no ma i ely undesi able unde
he s anda d o judicial independence?
This final sec ion ela es back o he wo le els o judicial decision-making ou lined in sec ion 2,
ocusing on he second le el. As men ioned abo e, he e a e se e al beha iou al ac o s ha can
influence he conc e e con en o a judicial decision such as heu is ics and biases and e ec s
84. On his issue in connec ion wi h impa iali y and he s anda d o e iew in English law: A. Higgins and I. Le y, 38 Ci il
Jus ice Qua e ly (2019).
85. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and O he s Sąd Najwyższy, CP Sąd Najwyższy and DO Sąd
Najwyższy, pa a. 128.
86. Fo example, J. Gu mann and S. Voig , ‘Judicial Independence in he EU: A Puzzle’,49Eu opean Jou nal o Law and
Economics (2020). The EU Eu oba ome e also con ains da a on he ac o s ha he popula ion akes in o accoun when
assessing he independence o he judicia y, such as he s a us o he judge, influence by ac o s wi h economic in e es s
and influence by he go e nmen and poli icians.
87. A guing ha , due o he necessa y empi ical basis, hese ques ions a e be e deal wi h a he le el o legal policy han by
judges, because judges ‘ha e no special insigh s in o public pe cep ion o aining in he ele an science on human deci-
sion making’, A. Higgins and I. Le y, 38 Ci il Jus ice Qua e ly (2019), p. 394.
574 Maas ich Jou nal o Eu opean and Compa a i e Law 32(5-6)
linked o he judges’social pe spec i e. O en, hese a e ac o s ha judges a e no awa e o and/o
ha a e no unde hei con ol. Despi e hei well-es ablished impac on judicial beha iou , such
ac o s ha e so a a ely been linked o he concep o judicial independence. This sec ion discusses
whe he and, i so, o wha ex en such ac o s should o m pa o his concep , ha is, whe he hey
should be conside ed as no ma i ely undesi able wi h ega d o judicial independence.
This sec ion ocuses, by way o example, on one selec ed beha iou al ac o o judicial
decision-making: he di e en social pe spec i es ha judges b ing o he decision-making
p ocess depending on he social g oup(s) o which hey belong. This is a beha iou al dimension
o judicial decision-making ha has been empi ically esea ched o decades.
88
I bea s men ioning
ha he influence o he judges’social pe spec i e as discussed he e is no abou in e es -based o
ideology-d i en decision-making.
89
I is no a gued ha judges consciously p omo e he in e es s o
he social g oup o which hey hemsel es belong and he e o e decide acco dingly. Ra he , he
ocus is on mo e sub le phenomena ha a e usually no consciously pe cei ed by he judges as deci-
sion ac o s. These may, o example, be ela ed o he judges’pe sonal expe iences o o he uncon-
scious e ec s o g oup iden i y. These ypes o e ec s will be add essed he e.
This e e ence o social pe spec i es also co esponds o an app oach in he gene al di e si y
deba e.
90
This app oach is abou in eg a ing di e en social pe spec i es in o social and poli ical
discou se and decision-making p ocesses. The unde lying assump ion is ha he ac ha di e en
social g oups ha e di e en expe iences leads o specific social pe spec i es ha can, in e alia,
con ibu e o be e unde s anding he expe iences and posi ions o ellow g oup membe s. This
is also ele an ega ding di e si y (o lack he eo ) in he judicia y. Fo example, he Sou h
A ican Cons i u ional Cou has emphasized he impo ance o di e se social pe spec i es in he
judicia y: ‘ he sound belie behind he encou agemen o g ea e di e si y in judicial appoin men s
was ha women and isible mino i ies would b ing an impo an pe spec i e o he di ficul ask o
judging’.
91
Fu he , schola s also emphasize he special pe spec i e o ce ain g oups ha judges
can b ing o he ask o judicial decision-making o judges in specialized cou s such as comme cial
cou s and o hono a y judges who o en ha e he unc ion o b inging ele an non-legal pe spec-
i es o he cou .
92
S udies ha e p o ided empi ical e idence o he ele ance o social pe spec i es o judicial
decision-making. To s a wi h, gende is a po en ial ac o o such di e ging social pe spec i es.
Resea ch on he decision-making beha iou o emale and male judges has shown di e ences, a
leas in ce ain a eas. Fo example, a s udy on he gende composi ion o he bench has shown
ha decisions in sexual ha assmen p oceedings di e depending on whe he o no he e we e
emale judges on he bench.
93
Di e en decision-making pa e ns we e also iden ified o decisions
88. See S. Basabe-Se ano, L. Eps ein and K. Weinshall, in L. Eps ein e al. (eds), The Ox o d Handbook o Compa a i e
Judicial Beha iou .
89. Fo an o e iew on such ac o s: R. Solbe g and E.N. Wal enbu g, ‘A i udinal Judging: Pa isanship and Ideology’,in
L. Eps ein e al (eds), The Ox o d Handbook o Compa a i e Judicial Beha iou (OUP, 2024).
90. See e.g. I.M. Young, Inclusion and Democ acy (OUP, 2002); C. Röhne , ‘Von Rep äsen a ion zu demok a ische
Gleichhei –Poli ische Teilhabe und gesellscha liche Ungleichhei ’,59De S aa (2020).
91. Cons i u ional Cou o Sou h A ica, decision o 4 June 1999 (P esiden o he Republic o Sou h A ica and O he s
. Sou h A ican Rugby Foo ball Union and O he s), CCT16/98) [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147; 1999 (7) BCLR
725, pa a. 42 (emphasis added).
92. E.g. W. Meye , in I. on Münch, P. Kunig, J.A. Kämme e and M. Ko zu (eds), G undgese z Kommen a , pa a. 44.
93. J.L. Pe esie, ‘Female Judges Ma e : Gende and Collegial Decision Making in he Fede al Appella e Cou s’, 114 Yale
Law Jou nal (2005).
Bu cha d 575