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Obstructive warfare: Applications and risks for AI in future military operations

Author: Fox, Amos C.
Publisher: Waterloo (Ontario): Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Year: 2024
Source: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/306703/1/1907097368.pdf
Fox, Amos C.
Wo king Pape
Obs uc i e wa a e: Applica ions and isks o AI in u u e
mili a y ope a ions
CIGI Pape s, No. 307
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Cen e o In e na ional Go e nance Inno a ion (CIGI), Wa e loo, On a io
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Fox, Amos C. (2024) : Obs uc i e wa a e: Applica ions and isks o AI in u u e
mili a y ope a ions, CIGI Pape s, No. 307, Cen e o In e na ional Go e nance Inno a ion (CIGI),
Wa e loo (On a io)
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CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024
Obs uc i e Wa a e
Applica ions and Risks o AI
in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
Amos C. Fox
CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024
Obs uc i e Wa a e
Applica ions and Risks o AI
in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
Amos C. Fox
Abou CIGI
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C edi s
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Di ec o , P og am Managemen Dianna English
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Publica ions Edi o Ch is ine Robe son
Publica ions Edi o Susan Bubak
G aphic Designe Sami Chouhda y

Table o Con en s
i Abou he Au ho
1 Execu i e Summa y
1 In oduc ion
3 S and-O Wa a e and he Limi a ions o Technology
6 Re lec ions on S and-O Wa a e in he Russia-Uk aine Wa
8 The Logic o Land Wa
10 The Po en ial Impac s o AI on Mili a y Ope a ions
15 Policy and In e ope abili y
16 Conclusion: Policy Recommenda ions
18 Wo ks Ci ed
i CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
Abou he Au ho
Amos C. Fox is a e i ed US A my o ice wi h
mul iple comba deploymen s o I aq. Amos
has a Ph.D. in in e na ional ela ions om he
Uni e si y o Reading and he is a lec u e in
poli ical science a he Uni e si y o Hous on
and a con ibu ing edi o a Wa on he Rocks.
He also hos s he Re olu ion in Mili a y A ai s
podcas and Wa on he Rocks’ Soldie Pulse and
Wa Cas podcas s. Amos is he au ho o Con lic
Realism: Unde s anding he Causal Logic o Mode n
Wa and Wa a e (2024, Howga e Publishing).
1Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
Execu i e Summa y
A i icial in elligence (AI) p o ides seemingly
limi less po en ial o applica ions in con empo a y
and u u e a med con lic . Op imis ic u u is s
claim ha AI migh ans o m wa in o a
sani ized si ua ion in which ci ilian casual ies
and colla e al damage can be almos ze oed ou
om he ba le ield. These u u is s also posi
ha AI can ampli y he speed a which mili a y
leade s and policy make s can gain si ua ional
unde s anding and make p uden decisions a
he pace o in o ma ion. In doing so, u u is
heo y p edic s ha mili a ies, using dual-use
cybe and spaced-based emo e and deep-
sensing capabili ies, will make “kill chains”
ha p o ide an asymme ic ad an age o e
po en ial ad e sa ies; hus, whoe e mas e s he
kill chain concep will domina e u u e wa s.
Mo e conse a i e es ima es sugges ha AI
can open new ho izons in wa and wa a e,
bu no o he ex en ad oca ed by many
op imis ic u u is s. This pape sides wi h his
mo e conse a i e pe spec i e by asse ing ha
AI’s ans o ma i e impac on he u u e o wa
will all sho o he p edic ions o u u is s. The
u u is s’ ision o u u e wa , and hei ad ocacy
o s and-o wa a e, is incompa ible wi h he
undamen al and inhe en challenges o land wa .
Coupled wi h he inc easing numbe o ne wo k,
global and geospa ial senso s, AI will p o ide
policy make s and mili a y leade s wi h massi e
amoun s o in o ma ion. Bu his excess o
in o ma ion, while seemingly a aluable asse , is
equally a ulne abili y. S a egic ac o s unde s and
ha inc eased ba le ield and global sensing will
also wo k o decei e sensing and injec inco ec
da a in o an ad e sa y’s in o ma ion ne wo k.
Mo eo e , AI’s con ibu ions o ba le ield and
global sensing will make mo emen s on u u e
ba le ields inc easingly deadly o a med o ces;
as a esul , mili a y o ces will likely emb ace
posi ional wa a e and e e o ope a ing
in and a ound u ban a eas, whe e bo h s a e
and non-s a e o ces will cause mo e ci ilian
casual ies and colla e al damage in u u e wa s.
The e o e, policy make s, mili a y leade s and
schola s should an icipa e AI inc easingly
con ibu ing o da a pa hway wa a e, in which
comba an s use in o ma ion in inno a i e ways
o o e come emo e, deep and ba le ield sensing
capabili ies. AI’s abili y o make he ba le ield
mo e anspa en o policy make s and mili a y
leade s migh esul in bo h mili a y and non-s a e
mili a y o ces adop ing posi ional wa a e o o se
he ad an ages ha AI-enabled sensing p o ides
o comba an s. Policy make s, mili a y leade s and
schola s should also an icipa e an inc ease in u ban
wa a e as comba an s — bo h s a e and non-
s a e — seek o o se he po en ial speed ha AI
migh b ing o senso - o-shoo e kill chains. When
iewed collec i ely, hese ans o ma i e aspec s
o AI will po en ially esul in longe con lic s;
a i ional wa s, wi h inc eased ci ilian casual ies
and colla e al damage; and muni ions sho ages,
i indus ial bases a e no e ooled o keep pace
wi h he po en ial speed o u u e kill chains.
In oduc ion
This pape in oduces a new heo y o wa a e—
obs uc i e wa a e — o sides ep he wide- anging
sensa ionalism associa ed wi h oday’s new and
eme ging echnology and ins ead p o ide an
al e na i e assessmen , based in causal logic,
o how AI can be used in mili a y ope a ions.
Obs uc i e wa a e is ancho ed in he belie
ha all land wa s ca y wi h hem a se o nea ly
una oidable challenges, which a e ou lined la e in
his pape . Mili a y o ces canno o e come hese
challenges solely wi h “a acks om abo e,” no can
ba le ield anspa ency p e en hese challenges
om ma e ializing. The challenges o land wa o en
cause s a es o igh wa s posi ionally, o h ough
he pu pose ul use o mo emen in combina ion
wi h loca ion(s) o disloca e an ad e sa y’s
s eng h, accen ua e one’s own powe and gene a e
a ou able si ua ional wa igh ing asymme ies
o de ea o des oy he ad e sa y (Fox 2017, 18).
Conside ing posi ional wa a e’s p ocli i y o o ce-
o ien ed mili a y ope a ions ha use mo emen ,
loca ion and he applica ion o powe (i.e., mili a y
i epowe ), i is easy o unde s and how his ype o
wa a e accele a es wa s o an a i ional cha ac e .
The goal o obs uc i e wa a e is o a oid he
nea ly una oidable: ha is, i seeks o deny an
ad e sa y’s abili y o use “a acks om abo e.”
This is accomplished by assailing he opponen as
o wa d as possible and ope a ing so p ominen ly
2CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
wi hin he ad e sa y’s da a ne wo ks ha he
opposing mili a y o ce spends i s ime ying o
make sense o da a and add ess command decision-
making challenges. The o wa d- acing a acks a e
no jus adi ional shaping — o p epa a o y—
ac i i ies, bu delibe a e, planned ope a ions
o ien ed on con ounding he ad e sa y’s da a-
p ocessing capabili y and dis up ing he speed a
which he ad e sa y wan s o ope a e. Mo eo e ,
mobile au onomous sys ems, which a e discussed
la e , execu e hese da a and empo ope a ions in
conjunc ion wi h delibe a e kine ic (i.e., mili a y
i epowe ) a acks. Viewed collec i ely, h ee
pa hways — da a, empo and kine ic — anima e
obs uc i e wa a e: i uses he h ee pa hways o
de ea an ad e sa y well be o e hey can engage
in close comba wi h land o ces. Pu ano he way,
he goal is o obs uc a mili a y o ce’s capaci y o
ope a e posi ionally, o o a leas cause hem o
igh posi ionally in e ain ha p o ides no ac ical,
ope a ional o s a egic alue, and a g ea cos .
Obs uc i e wa a e is a heo y in which s a es
can ha ness he ans o ma i e po en ial o AI o
mili a y ope a ions and subsequen ly a oid he
pe ils o posi ional wa a e, a i ion and long and
cos ly wa s. I ocuses on he unc ionali y o new
echnology, and no ha echnology’s nomencla u e
o axonomy; he pu pose is o iden i y whe e he
echnology’s unc ion i s wi hin applied a med
con lic . As a esul , obs uc i e wa a e is based
on he assessmen ha sys ems such as d ones,
long- ange i es, associa ed senso s and o he
like-minded echnology e lec mode n upda es
o he ools and echnology ha acili a e a acks
om abo e. The ph ase “a acks om abo e” is
used h oughou his pape as a noun o bypass he
nomencla u e o new and eme ging echnology and
ins ead ocus on ha echnology’s unc ionali y.
Depending on how one classi ies a acks om
abo e and ba le ield anspa ency, hese
app oaches ha e been a cons an in wa since
he Fi s Wo ld Wa , wi h he ools and me hods
e ol ing o e ime (Owen 2023, 26; F on line
Podcas 2022; Isbell 1993, 147). A acks om abo e
and ba le ield anspa ency a e ela i e o he
echnology o he day, and no a measu e agains
u u e echnology. This is why obs uc i e wa a e
ocuses on amalgama ed-sys em unc ionali y
ins ead o echnologies in isola ion om one
ano he , o he eupho ia o i illa ing d one-
s ike ideos on social media (Roge s 2023, 73).
The a acks om abo e s a egy, howe e , aligns
wi h how policy make s and senio mili a y
leade s wan o use o ce oday, which is o limi
he commi men o hei own land o ces, ye
be able o s ike ad e sa y mili a y o ces in
dis ibu ed loca ions ac oss he globe (Sko e 2024).
As US Gene al O ice s James Rainey and Lau a
Po e w i e, “A mili a y o ce able o immedia ely
link hese senso s o ex ended- ange weapons
capable o p ecisely hi ing mo ing a ge s will
ha e a dis inc ad an age o e any ad e sa y”
(Rainey and Po e 2023). Mo eo e , Rainey and
Po e , among many o he s, insis ha u ilizing
small, dispe sed o ces wi h limi ed p esence on
he ba le ield is he way o coun e a acks om
abo e (ibid.). This me hod o ope a ing — u ilizing
a acks om abo e in conjunc ion wi h capping
he commi men o one’s own o ces — is e e ed
o elsewhe e and in his pape as s and-o wa a e
(Fox 2024a; McDe mo and Midge 2021, 38–39).
Dan W igh (quo ed in Koslo 2024), Ch is ian
B ose (2019), John An al (2023a) and o he leading
p oponen s o s and-o wa a e asse ha an AI
e olu ion is coming. The combina ion o s and-
o wa a e and AI will allow mili a ies o ope a e
wi h global isual anspa ency and a speeds ha
exceed human comp ehension, s iking emo ely
om almos anywhe e in he wo ld. Somewha
i onically, Rainey echoes his supposi ion and
(inad e en ly) sugges s ha posi ional wa a e
and s and-o wa a e a e he answe s o
ba le ield anspa ency, s a ing ha “when you’ e
maneu e ing, i ’s going o be o emplace i es…
i i ’s an A my o ma ion, hei big ad an age is
going o be i es: ocke s, cannons, join i es, a ack
helicop e s” (Sko e 2024). Mul idomain ope a ions
doc ine, p ojec con e gence as well as he slew
o o he senso , p ecision and long- ange s ike-
cen ic concep s domina ing mili a y, academic
and policy discussions, clea ly demons a e
s and-o wa a e’s s anglehold on he opic.
None heless, he wa s o he wen y- i s cen u y
demons a e an al e na i e eali y, and pe haps
one ha is mo e ealis ic han s and-o wa a e’s
ision o he u u e. Wa s o he u u e will emain
igh s o e e i o y. These con es s o con ol o
land will con inue o be ough by a mies, o a
leas amalgama ed o ces igh ing on land. When
a acked om he sky, mili a y o ces will seek
e uge in he land — whe he ha be in bunke s,
enches o u ban a eas. A acks om he sky a e
empi ically p o en o be less e ec i e agains land
9Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
signi ican land ope a ion o clea he occupying
o ces. A mies — whe he hey be s a e o non-s a e
o ces — igh land wa s, ega dless o how hey
ha e o ge o he land wa . And a mies igh o he
a mies in land wa s, ega dless o he p esence
o deg ee o combined a ms o join capabili ies
one comba an migh possess o e he o he .
In conside ing he logic ou lined abo e, coupled
wi h he ideas on s and-o wa a e ou lined in
his pape , a hand ul o endu ing challenges o
land wa a e eme ge. These challenges anscend
he hea e o con lic and he manne in
which a mies a el o he land wa ; ha is, he
challenges o land wa a e a e ele an in bo h
a Russo-Uk ainian- ype scena io o a China-
Taiwan scena io. Fu he , hese challenges a e
ele an ega dless o whe he he a mies ha e
o conduc amphibious landings om ship o
sho e, ai bo ne d ops om a a ie y o ai c a o
a acks on he g ound in b oad-a mou ed h us s
ac oss in e na ional bounda ies. These challenges,
p ima ily iden i ied in he Russo-Uk ainian con lic ,
bu salien in all land wa s, a e lis ed below. The
lis below is no p esen ed in o de o p io i y, bu
ins ead as a gene al g ouping o ensu e ha policy
make s, mili a y p ac i ione s and schola s emain
g ounded in he p inciples o wa when s a e o
non-s a e ac o s igh con lic s o he physical
con ol o e i o y. AI helps bo h sides o he coin
as i pe ains o he challenges o land wa , which
is why i is impo an o mili a y o ces o p e en
posi ional wa a e om aking hold. These ac ions
can be hough o as he ac i i ies o land wa :
→ A mies mus be capable o aking and/o e aking
e i o y.
– A mies mus no culmina e (i.e., exhaus
hei comba powe ) while aking o e aking
e i o y.
– Culmina ion du ing his phase makes he
a my p one o:
• e ec i e enemy coun e a ack; and
• he inabili y o conduc e ec i e
exploi a ion and pu sui (s).
→ A mies mus be capable o clea ing enemy
a mies om e i o y. Clea ing, in his ins ance,
means physically emo ing a ecalci an and
hos ile mili a y o ce om occupied e i o y.
→ A mies mus be capable o holding e i o y.
Taking, e aking and clea ing e i o y o hos ile
o ces o en exac s a high oll on an a my,
lea ing i in a weakened s a e. A mies wi h
small, agile o ce s uc u es expe ience he
highes oll, and a e e en less likely o be able
o hold on o cos ly gains. Resilien land o ces
a e c i ical o ensu ing ha mili a y o ces can
uphold e i o ial gains, whe eas he ools and
echniques o s and-o wa a e p o ide only
ma ginal e u ns on in es men when i comes
o holding e i o y.
→ A mies mus be capable o p o ec ing
popula ions.
→ A mies mus be capable o enci cling a hos ile
o ce. This is he bes way o an a my o
maximize he e ec s o join i epowe .
→ A mies mus be capable o sealing bounda ies. I
a mies canno e ec i ely seal bounda ies, hen
hey will always be p one o in asion by hos ile
neighbou s. Resilien land o ces, no missiles
and d ones, a e he i s line o de ence o
ensu ing p ope bo de secu i y.
In land wa , e bs such as ake, e ake, clea , hold
and enci cle ep esen he ac ions one mili a y o ce
mus ake in ea nes agains ano he o ce, pu suan
o hei espec i e poli ical-mili a y objec i es.
Taking, e aking and clea ing, o ins ance, in ol e
conce ed comba ope a ions agains ano he
mili a y o ce. These ac ions ep esen he di ec
clash o o ces in a s uggle be ween na ional wills,
indus ial bases, in e nal and ex e nal bases o
powe and he g i ha each s a e’s a med o ces
can b ing o bea . Simila ly, holding e i o y and
sealing bounda ies a e no uly e ain-o ien ed
ac ions, bu a he ones ocused on de ini i ely
de ea ing a hos ile o ce in en on emo ing
he holding o ce om an impo an piece o
e ain. While he e ain is he objec i e, he
hos ile o ce is he mechanism h ough which
si ua ional success is de e mined. Thus, he same
a iables ou lined abo e a e c i ical — na ional
wills, indus ial bases, in e nal and ex e nal bases
o powe and he g i o one’s mili a y o ce.
P o ec ing popula ions is also an ac ion o ien ed
owa d hos ile mili a y o ces, which can
include ha ing su icien mili a y o ce on he
g ound o in e dic a acks on ci ilians and
ci ilian in as uc u e. P o ec ing popula ions
can also include ac ions such as p o iding ai

10 CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
de ence and ai co e o p e en , in e dic and
coun e a ack hos ile a acks om abo e. Whe eas
he ac ions lis ed in he p eceding pa ag aph
a e o ce-o ien ed, p o ec ing popula ions is
mo e sys em-o ien ed; ha is, many o he
ac ions in his ca ego y can include elimina ing
indi idual missiles, d ones o hos ile ac o s.
Land wa s, which will emain he mos impo an
ype o wa in he u u e, p o ide many a eas
in which AI can be used o maximize gains and
o se losses. The po en ial impac o AI in mili a y
ope a ions, p ima ily iewed h ough he lens
o he logic o land wa s and coun e ing a acks
om abo e, is explo ed in he ollowing sec ions.
The Po en ial Impac s o
AI on Mili a y Ope a ions
(DOTMLPF-P)
Due o i s ans o ma i e po en ial, AI can be used
o help mili a ies h i e in land wa s and o e come
many o he challenges o a acks om abo e.
Ope a ing unde he assump ion ha mili a y
o ces in he u u e will be equi ed o ake, e ake,
clea and hold e i o y, seal bounda ies, enci cle
hos ile o ces and p o ec ci ilian popula ions,
i is impo an o explo e AI’s ans o ma i e
po en ial ega ding how i can assis , o e en ake
he lead, in mili a y ope a ions pe aining o land
wa . Because mos Wes e n mili a ies ely on
DOTMLPF-P as a ame o design adminis a i e
and acquisi i e needs in o de o accomplish
mili a y missions, i is a use ul model o illus a e
AI’s impac on u u e mili a y ope a ions. NATO,
which is conce ned wi h he in e ope abili y
o i s membe s a es, uses DOTMLPF-I. As
such, his sec ion examines AI’s u ili y ac oss
he DOTMLPF-P and DOTMLPF-I spec a.
Doc ine
Conside ing he Uni ed S a es’ leading ole in
Wes e n mili a y hough , as well as he base upon
which NATO doc ine was buil , mul idomain
ope a ions (MDO) is cu en ly he ounda ion o
con empo a y Wes e n mili a y doc ine. As a
esul , many Wes e n s a es and NATO membe s
a e cu en ly econ igu ing hei doc ines o align
wi h he ene s o MDO. MDO is undamen ally
a i es-cen ic philosophy ha seeks o ope a e
in he “a acks om abo e” spec um, using
long- ange s ike, p ecision i es and a ne wo k
o senso s and d ones o gene a e con e gence.
Con e gence is he syne gis ic e ec o mili a y
ope a ions h ough he ne wo king o senso s
o de ec h ea s, iden i y a ge loca ions and
push he esul ing da a h ough he ne wo k o
allow mili a y commande s o employ he bes
weapon sys em agains he a ge o gene a e a
ca as ophic impac on he a ge ed h ea (Uni ed
S a es A my 2022, 3–4). AI p o ides many a eas in
which MDO can be enhanced, all o which a e he
ocus oday o concep and doc ine de elope s
looking a AI’s ole in u u e mili a y ope a ions.
In e ec , MDO is he o mal a icula ion o a
s and-o wa a e doc ine. Howe e , i is hea ily
ocused on a acks om abo e, while ailing o
accoun o he logic o land wa s and he posi ional
app oach i inspi es in esponse (Fox 2020, 8–10).
This sho coming in con empo a y mili a y
hough mus be add essed. While con inuing
o de elop AI’s ole in ad ancing con e gence,
Wes e n mili a ies and NATO mus de elop
s a egies, concep s and doc ine ha in eg a e AI
in o he ac i i ies o land wa .2 Mo eo e , Wes e n
mili a ies and NATO mus e ol e he way in which
hey isualize and ame he conduc o mili a y
ope a ions. To be su e, he “deep, close and ea ”
a ea cons uc will no be use ul, no con ibu e
o he p e en ion o posi ional wa a e, i s a es
in end o unlock he po en ial bene i s o AI.3
Wes e n mili a ies and NATO mus de elop
a doc ine ha de ines de ea by illus a ing
clea causal mechanisms and links be ween
mili a y ac i i ies and how hose ac i i ies
cause de ea . Fu he mo e, Wes e n mili a ies
and NATO mus s uc u e ope a ions and o ces
o gene a e de ea ’s associa ed end s a es. Fo
ins ance, de ea can be gene ally de ined by h ee
condi ions: when engagemen wi h a hos ile
mili a y o ce and denying o p e en ing ha
o ce om aking a posi ional wa a e posi ion;
when one mili a y o ce causes he opposing
o ce o qui he igh ; and when an opposing
poli ical leade decides o end hos ili ies.
2 No e: “s a egies, concep s and doc ine” will be e e ed o simply as
“doc ine” hence o h.
3 See he Uni ed S a es a my (2022) ield manual o de ini ions o he
“deep, close and ea a ea” cons uc .
11Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
Looking o he u u e, in which esilien AI
and ne wo ks will eplace inc easingly agile
human-cen ic ope a ions, Wes e n mili a ies
and NATO mus app ecia e ha h ea s will
be adap i e, wi h lea ning ac o s’ i s in en
on su i al, and second on winning (Fox 2023,
5–6). Th ea s in an AI-domina ed u u e will be
ne wo ked and ope a ing om in en , no di ec
guidance. Mili a ies will likely maximize he use
o au onomous sys ems, and hese sys ems will
inc ease he speed a which mili a ies can ope a e
in u n. Thus, ime will become an inc easingly
impo an mili a y a iable, as he in e al be ween
a senso ’s iden i ica ion o a a ge — whe he
ha be a command pos , mili a y o ma ion o
indi idual comba an — and he impac o a s ike
on ha a ge will likely occu a a much as e
speed han in he pas . And i one comba an is
ope a ing in his u u e AI-domina ed en i onmen ,
i is sa e o assume ha he o he comba an is
oo. The e o e, i is impo an o es uc u e he
ba lespace and c ea e mili a y o ma ions o
accommoda e his new ope a ing en i onmen .
Wes e n mili a ies and NATO mus u he de elop
doc ines ha accoun o au onomous sys ems,
human-machine in eg a ed o ma ions and
adi ional mili a y o ces (i.e., human-cen ic
o ma ions). Au onomous sys ems will make
hei bigges con ibu ion o mili a y ope a ions i
hey a e p o ided space o ope a e independen ly
o adi ional mili a y o ces. Fo ins ance, AI-
d i en senso s and obo ic o ma ions should
be a o ded ba lespace ahead o human-based
o ces o collec in o ma ion pe aining o he
enemy (bo h ac i ely and passi ely); ansmi
o p esen in o ma ion o he ad e sa y o he
pu pose o decep ion; in luence he enemy owa d
disposi ions welcoming o one’s own o ce; and
manipula e he empo o an opponen ’s ope a ions
o suppo he commande ’s scheme o ope a ions.
In he abs ac , AI’s ans o ma i e po en ial
exis s in apping in o he hi he o unde explo ed
ulc um o da a, empo and wa igh ing as a
uni ied me hod o wa a e. Doing so will o se
some o he isk (and ea ) associa ed wi h he
employmen o AI-d i en au onomous and semi-
au onomous sys ems wi h human-cen ic o ces
by clea ly delinea ing whe e each ype o o ce
will be loca ed on he ba le ield and how hei
ope a ions will mu ually suppo one ano he .
F om a isk pe spec i e, howe e , AI’s
ans o ma i e po en ial dec eases in wha
mili a ies call he “close igh ,” o he a ea in which
di ec con ac be ween land o ces occu s. A a
dis ance, mili a y commande s and hei s a ha e
ime o si h ough in o ma ion, make in o med
decisions and mo e la ge o ma ions o esou ces
om one place o he nex . AI is use ul in his space
because i can assis he machines ha collec and
analyze ba le ield da a, while augmen ing he s a
ha gene a e p oposed plans and ecommenda ions
o a commande ’s app o al. The goal he e is o
c ea e sepa a ion on he ba le ield be ween one’s
close comba o ces and an a acking ad e sa y
o igge he enemy’s culmina ion be o e close
comba can occu and posi ional wa a e se s in.
In close a eas, o ba lespaces ha lack signi ican
amoun s o geog aphical space be ween
bellige en s, mili a y commande s and hei
s a possess e y li le ime o make c i ical
decisions. Tha lack o ime may cause an ac o o
ins inc i ely espond o ac conce ning a speci ic
si ua ion. In doing so, he commande and hei
s a o go he bene i s a o ded by geog aphic
dis ance and ime and end up gene ally in a
posi ional slugging ma ch in which he blun o ce
o men, ma e iel and i epowe poin he su es
pa h o ba le ield ic o y. I he e o e ollows
ha in he close a ea, AI does no likely ca y
much ans o ma i e po en ial (see Figu e 1).
This does no mean ha AI has no place in close
comba . AI will likely be ha nessed o con inue
o expedi e he speed o ac ical ac i i y and will
( heo e ically) imp o e he ac ical e iciency
upon which AI-in used mili a ies ope a e. Bu
imp o ed speed and enhanced e iciency may no
necessa ily equa e o ans o ma i e quali y, bu
may ins ead esul in only ma ginal imp o emen s
on con empo a y me hods. Mo eo e , i
emains o be seen how as e and mo e
e icien ac ical ac i i y will impac he gene al
cha ac e o wa : he e is a dis inc possibili y
ha i migh con ibu e o wa s o a i ion.
In e ms o doc ine, AI’s mos ans o ma i e
po en ial lies in i s abili y o p o ide mili a y
commande s and hei s a wi h mo e ime —
ime o mobilize bases o powe ; alloca e esou ces
o p io i ized o ma ions; mo e pe sonnel,
equipmen and weapons in o ad an ageous
posi ions; and p epa e he ba lespace o
close-a ea comba . AI can help ans o m
his mode o wa a e by conduc ing da a and
empo ope a ions, linked wi h a commande ’s
enemy o ce-o ien ed de ea pa hway.
12 CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
In his way, da a, empo and de ea - ocused
ope a ions should be seen as a collec i e ha is
ocused on c ea ing ime and geog aphical space
o a commande , enabling hem o b ing hei
sophis ica ed long- ange i e s and au onomous
and semi-au onomous comba sys ems o
bea on he ba le ield. Wi hin his model, AI’s
ans o ma i e po en ial lies in unde w i ing he
da a and empo pa hways, and subsequen ly
c ea ing he in o ma ion o imp o e he de ea
pa hway (see Figu e 2). Taking his logic a
s ep u he , i app op ia ely in eg a ed ac oss
DOTMLPF-P(I), and in used ac oss he da a, empo
and de ea pa hways, AI migh well gene a e a
uly no el way o wa a e in he wen y- i s
cen u y. The no el y he e is in he in oduc ion
o a holis ic iew o wa a e ha econ igu es he
ba lespace’s a ayal o suppo he da a, empo
and de ea pa hways, while inco po a ing new
o ma ions ha can unlock hese pa hways.
Mo eo e , add essing AI-in used doc ine in
his manne allows he policy make , s a egis
and p ac i ione o ecuse hemsel es o he
hype bole o p esen ism ela ing o hings such
as d ones, long- ange s ike and o he pe cei ed
no el ies o mode n wa . In doing so, doc ine
de elopmen can a oid becoming ixa ed on
ac ical inno a ion, whe e AI’s ans o ma i e
impac is limi ed, and ins ead ocus on a eas
whe e AI migh uly achie e ans o ma ional
impac s. In addi ion, in eg a ing AI-d i en
o ma ions, doc ine and ope a ions in o adi ional
mili a y con ac zones migh unde cu a s a egic
ad e sa y’s abili y o e ec i ely implemen s and-
o wa a e and be e posi ion mili a y o ces o
app op ia ely add ess he challenges o land wa .
Figu e 1: AI Ba lespace U ili y
Time
Close
Deep
Fa
G ea Li le
E olu iona y AI
AI Leas Use ul
AI Use ul
T ans o ma i e AI
AI Mos Use ul
T ans o ma i e AI
P oximi y
Sou ce: Au ho .
13Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
O ganiza ion
New o ganiza ions (i.e., mili a y o ma ions) a e
c i ical o unlocking he ans o ma i e po en ial
o he doc ine ou lined abo e. Inno a ing mili a y
o ganiza ions o capi alize on AI’s ans o ma i e
po en ial equi es mo e han pai ing AI-enabled
unmanned comba pla o ms wi h o he
AI-enabled unmanned comba sys ems, c ea ing
AI-majo gene als o p oli e a ing d one swa ms.
Inno a ion mus ocus on how o c ea e ime
and geog aphical sepa a ion on he ba lespace
h ough da a, empo and comba ope a ions a
o wa d o one’s mili a y o ce wi h he goal o
p o iding mili a y commande s wi h op ions,
including c ea ing oppo uni ies o success and
p o ec ing hei o ces om hos ile a ack. I
p ope ly implemen ed and adminis e ed, AI-cen ic
mili a y o ganiza ions and doc ine ha e he
po en ial o c ipple a s a egic compe i o ’s abili y
o use mili a y o ce o accomplish hei policy
goals, while o e ing new me hods o p o ec ion o
one’s own mili a y o ces and ci ilian popula ion.
To ha end, s a es mus de elop o ganiza ions ha
ha ness AI’s powe o collec in o ma ion pe aining
o he enemy and he ope a ing en i onmen ;
ansmi da a o pic u es o eali y o he ad e sa y
o he pu pose o decep ion; in luence he enemy
owa d a welcoming disposi ion; and manipula e
he empo o an opponen ’s ope a ions. As no ed in
his pape ’s sec ion on doc ine, his philosophy o
wa a e mus no be applied o he exis ing deep,
close and ea a ea amewo k. Robo ic o ma ions
need geog aphical space o ope a e in a manne
unencumbe ed by iendly human-based mili a y
o ma ions. In his si ua ion, au onomous and
semi-au onomous sys ems and o ma ions can
ope a e independen ly o ga he in o ma ion abou
a h ea , pu pose ully p esen c a ed in o ma ion
o ha h ea and use a mix o le hal i es and non-
le hal a acks o in luence he empo o ope a ions
and weaken he cons i u ion o he enemy o ce.
Figu e 2: Theo y o T ans o ma i e AI
Tempo Pa hway De ea Pa hway
Da a Pa hway
T ans o ma i e AI
1. Doc ine
2. Ba lespace a angemen
3. Mili a y o ganiza ions
4. Policy
Sou ce: Au ho .
14 CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
In addi ion, AI can con ibu e o he condi ions ha
p eemp close comba . In an AI- ich ba lespace,
a mili a y’s ocus should be on a oiding close
comba ; in ac , mili a y o ces should a emp o
de ea an opponen well ahead o close con ac
wi h land o ces. Why he shi away om he
adi ional close a ea? Elimina ing an ad e sa y
be o e hey ha e he oppo uni y o ully deploy
hei o ces and wa igh ing capabili ies has
se e al bene i s. Fi s , i p ese es one’s o ces,
helping suppo hei abili y o a i e a an
objec i e ela i ely esh and no on he cusp o
culmina ion. Second, by obs uc ing an ad e sa y’s
abili y o occupy he physical ba lespace, a
o ce p o ides i sel wi h g ea e eedom o
ac ion and eac ion ime, which subsequen ly
gi es i a wide ange o op ions o add ess
poli ical-mili a y ma e s. Finally, elimina ing an
ad e sa y well ahead o he ba le egion using
AI-d i en obo ic o ma ions minimizes he
ine i able dea h, des uc ion, colla e al damage
and ci ilian casual ies caused by close comba .
This migh be achie able by applying a econ igu ed
ba lespace and new, AI-in used mili a y
o ganiza ions ope a ing o wa d o adi ional
close and deep a eas. Re hinking he ba le ield as
sepa a e egions migh help in his p ocess. Figu e
3 shows ou egions: he ba le egion, p epa a ion
egion, empo egion and da a egion. T adi ional
mili a y o ma ions, semi-au onomous sys ems
and human-machine in eg a ed o ma ions all
ope a e in he ba le egion, which can be hough
o as he adi ional close a ea. AI in his space will
likely be e olu iona y as i will add inc emen al
imp o emen s o how land o ces and join o ces
pa icipa e in ac ical mili a y ope a ions.
The p epa a ion egion is somewha like he
adi ional deep a ea, bu as wi h he ba le egion,
mili a y o ces he e will also consis o semi-
au onomous sys ems, human-machine in eg a ed
o ma ions and human-cen ic uni s. I will be
used o unc ionally, posi ionally and empo ally
disloca e an ad e sa y, and lu e an ad e sa y in o
un a ou able posi ions o ela i e weakness on he
physical e ain u ilizing ploys, ac ics and s ikes.
This would be done i a mili a y is no success ul
in de ea ing an ad e sa y in he empo egion. In
he empo egion, mili a ies a emp o win an
eme ging con lic o ba le be o e i can expand
in o some hing a mo e signi ican o deadly.
Mili a y commande s migh ely p edominan ly on
au onomous and semi-au onomous sys ems and
human-machine in eg a ed obo ic o ma ions o
ul ill hei commande ’s in en in he empo egion.
Figu e 3: Theo y o T ans o ma i e AI
Ba le Region E olu iona y AISAS, HMI Sys ems and Human-Cen ic Fo ma ion
No e: AS = Au onomous Sys em; SAS = Semi-Au onomous Sys em; HMI = Human-Machine In eg a ed
T ans o ma i e AIAS, SAS and HMI Sys ems
T ans o ma i e AIAu onomous Sys ems
P ep Region
Tempo Region
Da a Region
Sou ce: Au ho .

15Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
The goal o AI-in used mili a y ope a ions should
be o de ea an ad e sa y s a e’s mili a y wi hou
ha ing o use one’s own close comba o ces,
killing an enemy a ack in he p o e bial c ib
wi h he app op ia e doc ine, o ganiza ions and
sus ainmen backbone. Doing so will lessen he
po en ial numbe o challenges o land wa in
which one migh ha e o encoun e a hos ile o ce.
This is accomplished by nega ing ha hos ile o ce’s
abili y o a ack by de ea ing o des oying ou key
ea u es: hei abili y o unde s and; hei means
o ad ance; hei abili y o ope a e e icien ly; and
hei abili y o win. P o ec ing hose same ea u es
o one’s own o ces is he o he side o he coin
and o equal impo ance. The goal is o a oid doing
his in he s a us quo manne by engaging in his
igh wi hin he ba le egion wi h close comba
o ces, esul ing in he a i ional oll o posi ional
wa a e. Agg essi e, AI-go e ned au onomous and
a i able machines, as well as au onomous and
semi-au onomous o ma ions ope a ing a ahead
o close comba o ces, can blun he o ensi e
and shi he balance away om he necessi y o
igh ing la ge-scale posi ional ba les o a i ion.
I le e aged co ec ly, AI-enabled mili a y
o ma ions should be used o de ea ad e sa ies
in he empo egion o sides ep he opponen ’s
abili y o mass (whe he p ac ically o heo e ically)
o pe ilous comba in he p epa a ion o ba le
egion. AI-enabled obo ic o ma ions should
be p og ammed wi h he in en o des oying
an opposing enemy’s land o join o ce
whe e he da a and empo egions in e sec .
These obo ic o ma ions, ee om he ea
o human casual ies, will allow mili a ies o
agg essi ely iden i y and elimina e a s a egic
compe i o ’s wa igh ing capabili ies, while
simul aneously p o ec ing one’s own o ces.
Fo wa d- hinking s a es and hei mili a ies
should in es in mobile obo ic s ike g oups,
mobile obo ic empo g oups and mobile obo ic
da a g oups o accomplish his new doc ine.
To blun hos ile o ces, hese o ma ions can be
illed wi h au onomous and semi-au onomous
sys ems, senso s, ai de ence sys ems, da a
ansmission, o ma ion acsimiles, gene a i e
sus ainmen , sel -su icien powe gene a ion
and s ike capabili ies ha ope a e un e he ed
by human-based o ces and a a as e pace,
gi ing policy make s and senio mili a y leade s
s uggling wi h how o win a speci ic con lic
he bene i o addi ional ime and in o ma ion.
Policy make s, senio mili a y leade s and science
and echnology expe s should also be well-
g ounded in s and-o wa a e, pa icula ly in e ms
o how i con ibu es o posi ional wa a e and
accele a es wa s o an a i ional s a us as a esul .
These indi iduals do no need o be expe s in he
mili a y a s and sciences, bu hey should possess
a leas a wo king amilia i y o he causali y
be ween hese a ious o ms o wa a e. In his
way, hey will be able o maximize he po en ial
o AI in mili a y ope a ions o p e en s a egic
compe i ion om d i ing in o wa s o a i ion.
Policy and In e ope abili y
As i cu en ly s ands, mos Wes e n s a es, led by
he Uni ed S a es, lack a cohe en and comple e
policy o how o use AI on he ba le ield. Many
a e al eady wo king on his, as exempli ied by
he US go e nmen ’s Execu i e O de on he Sa e,
Secu e, and T us wo hy De elopmen and Use o
A i icial In elligence (2023), and he US DoD’s Da a,
Analy ics, and A i icial In elligence Adop ion S a egy:
Accele a ing Decision Ad an age (2023). The US DoD
is pa icula ly ocused on he e hical use o AI; in
2020, i a icula ed i e p inciples o i s e hical
mili a y use. Those p inciples a e: esponsible use;
equi able use (i.e., he mi iga ion o unin ended
bias); aceabili y; eliabili y; and go e nabili y
(The Join A i icial In elligence Cen e 2020).
None heless, addi ional wo k is equi ed. S a es
and hei de ence depa men s o minis ies
need o codi y au ho i y o use and esponsible
ac o s. Au ho i y o use should clea ly a icula e
whe e he decision au ho i y esides o using he
a ious ypes o AI-d i en au onomous sys ems
and whe e humans mus be di ec ly in ol ed in
hei ope a ion as opposed o simply o e seeing
i . Simila ly, de ence depa men s and minis ies
mus also iden i y he esponsible au ho i y in he
e en ha AI-d i en au onomous sys ems conduc
mili a y ac i i ies ha a e immo al, une hical o
illegal, o ha iola e he no ms o in e na ional
humani a ian law and he law o a med con lic .
I Wes e n s a es and NATO a emp o wai un il
hose sys ems a e ully ielded be o e pu ing hese
measu es in place, hey will ha e wai ed oo long.
Fu he mo e, in e ope abili y canno be o e looked.
Na ional ca ea s mus be conside ed now,
16 CIGI Pape No. 307 — Oc obe 2024 • Amos C. Fox
be o e au onomous sys ems a e ully ielded.
AI- ela ed policy mus ocus on he nexus o
allies and pa ne s a es in ela ion o laws
go e ning he use o AI, in o ma ion sys ems
and ne wo ks. The d a ing o po en ial ca ea s
mus be done wi h allies and pa ne s a es
now o p e en some s a es om bowing ou o
suppo ing mili a y ope a ions a a u u e da e.
In e ope abili y also implies ha all allies and
pa ne s possess he command and con ol
o ne wo k sys ems o ope a e and manage
au onomous sys ems in o de o mili a y
ope a ions o be uly mul ina ional. The e o e,
as s a es look o indus y o de elop AI-enabled
au onomous sys ems, hose sys ems mus come
wi h he equisi e ools o allow all alliance
membe s and pa ne s o employ, moni o and
con ol hose sys ems. O he wise, wa ime
command s uc u es will no uly e lec he powe
o a mul ina ional alliance, bu a he only ha o
hose s a es mos in es ed in au onomous sys ems.
Conclusion: Policy
Recommenda ions
In closing, he Russo-Uk ainian Wa p o ides a
se o use ul conside a ions o Wes e n s a es
and NATO. These conside a ions a e no speci ic
o Russia o Eu ope, bu apply o any con lic in
which a igh o e i o y is he goal. I China we e
o in ade Taiwan, o ins ance, and NATO we e
equi ed o assis Taiwan in ex ica ing Chinese
o ces om he island, he challenges o land
wa a e ou lined abo e would emain ge mane,
ega dless o he na al, ai o con es ed logis ics
challenges also associa ed wi h ha si ua ion.
None heless, NATO and i s membe s mus no
become blinke ed by he sensa ionalism o
s and-o wa a e. D ones, long- ange s ikes and
p ecision wa a e all ep esen he con inued
challenges o “a acks om abo e,” which soldie s
ha e add essed since he Fi s Wo ld Wa . When
s ikes om abo e domina e he ba le ield, soldie s
go below g ound; when soldie s go below g ound,
s a ic ba le ields de elop. Posi ional wa a e and
a i ion a e whe e he cos s moun in wa , whe he
ha be in he o m o dead and wounded soldie s,
los esou ces, ci ilian casual ies, colla e al damage
o e en na ional p es ige. When s a ic ba le ields
de elop, posi ional wa a e eplaces manoeu es
and con lic s d i in o wa s o a i ion.
NATO should conside his hypo hesis: While
s and-o wa a e pa adoxically accele a es wa s
o a i ion, a mo e weigh ed land campaign
ligh ly suppo ed by join elemen s be e enables
mobile wa a e, hus unlocking a quicke and
less des uc i e wa . I he e o e ollows ha i
NATO membe s wan o a oid wa s o a i ion,
hey should u he examine his line o logic
h ough expe imen a ion. Wa games and able op
exe cises migh sugges ha s and-o wa a e
and “a acks om abo e” a e he solu ions o he
challenges o u u e wa a e, bu hey a e ac ually
causing mo e p oblems han hey a e sol ing.
NATO should also ake pause and examine he
ela ionship be ween ba le ield anspa ency,
a ge ing, o ce design, dispe sed ope a ions and
u u e mili a y ope a ions. One o he majo alking
poin s o eme ge om he Russo-Uk ainian Wa ,
which is a con inua ion o he discou se om he
2020 Nago no-Ka abakh Wa , is ha senso s and
d one echnology a e ob ia ing la ge land o ces,
making hese new implemen s jus as slow and
unwieldy as anks (McFa e 2019, 231) and owed
a ille y (Roque 2024), bo h elics o a bygone
e a o a med con lic . O he expe s who a e
an icipa ing a po en ial u u e con lic wi h China
ha e made simila a gumen s (Unde wood 2022).
To add ess his challenge, change ad oca es asse
ha NATO o ces mus become smalle and ligh e
and ope a e wi h dispe sed ope a ions o de ea
ba le ield anspa ency, enemy d ones, and h ea
missile and a ille y a ge ing, among o he high-
echnology h ea s in he u u e (Judson 2023).
As analys F ank Ho man (2024) con ends, mili a y
ope a o s only hink h ough he p oblem o
being seen by hei enemy, and ail o conside he
challenges ha a mies ha e o add ess once hey
ha e eached hei objec i e. Thus, i would be
p uden o NATO policy make s, mili a y leade s
and pundi s o hink h ough mili a y ope a ions
om beginning o end, a he han excluding
he la e a he expense o he o me , which
con ibu ed o he US mili a y’s ailu es in bo h
A ghanis an and I aq. NATO policy make s mus
app ecia e ha his app oach equi es esilien
and obus — no ligh , small and dispe se — land
o ces. NATO equi es land o ces ha can make
hei way h ough he igou s o a anspa en
ba le ield and a ay eady o ces wi h su icien
17Obs uc i e Wa a e: Applica ions and Risks o AI in Fu u e Mili a y Ope a ions
comba powe o mee he challenges o land
wa a e. Ligh , small and dispe sed land o ces
igh ing in s and-o wa a e will no be able o
de ea an ensconced challenge in en on e aining
con isca ed o annexed land. S ikes om he sky,
ega dless o how p ecise o de ly adjudica ed,
will no e ec i ely elimina e hose land o ces.
Ruggedized, esilien land o ces — human, human-
machine in eg a ed, obo ic o o he wise— a e
needed o accomplish ha ask. Thus, NATO policy
make s, mili a y leade s and o he suppo e s
should ad oca e o he de elopmen o la ge ,
mo e a mou ed land o ces, while a he same
ime making i clea o policy make s why
la ge , no smalle , land o ces a e needed.
In o e coming he challenges o land wa a e —
including any u u e wa wi h Russia, China o
e en I an o No h Ko ea — s and-o wa a e,
p ecision s ikes and long- ange i es would
only play small suppo ing oles. The majo i y
o comba would occu on he g ound be ween
land o ces, which means ha he ic o would
ha e o be capable o su moun ing he se en
challenges o land wa a e ou lined wi hin his
pape . In achie ing a clea ic o y using he
me hods ou lined abo e, he winning o ces would
simpli y diplomacy o NATO policy make s.
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