Aoyama, Yuko; Song, Eunyeong; Wang, Shan-yu
A icle
Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies: The ise o
egula o y supply chain con ols o semiconduc o GPN in
Japan, Sou h Ko ea and Taiwan
ZFW - Ad ances in Economic Geog aphy
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
De G uy e B ill
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Aoyama, Yuko; Song, Eunyeong; Wang, Shan-yu (2024) : Geopoli ics and
geospa ial s a egies: The ise o egula o y supply chain con ols o semiconduc o GPN in Japan,
Sou h Ko ea and Taiwan, ZFW - Ad ances in Economic Geog aphy, ISSN 2748-1964, De G uy e ,
Be lin, Vol. 68, Iss. 3/4, pp. 167-181,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1515/z w-2024-0046
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ZFW - Ad . in Econ. Geog . 2024; 68(3–4): 167–181
Yuko Aoyama*, Eunyeong Song and Shan-yu Wang
Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies: he ise
o egula o y supply chain con ols o
semiconduc o GPN in Japan, Sou h Ko ea and
Taiwan
h ps://doi.o g/10.1515/z w-2024-0046
Recei ed Janua y 22, 2024; accep ed Augus 20, 2024;
published online Sep embe 11, 2024
Abs ac :In his a icle, we p esen an analysis o how Eas
Asian s a es (specifically, Japan, Sou h Ko ea and Taiwan)
a e adap ing o he eme ging geopoli ical con ex s o he
‘g ea powe s compe i ion’ be ween he Uni ed S a es and
China. To he ex en ha he p e ious li e a u e on GPN/GVC
go e nance included he s a e as one o he ex a-fi m
ac o s, geopoli ics has no been explici ly deal wi h in i s
ole in shaping GPN/GVC go e nance. We build on he exis -
ing esea ch on GPN/GVC go e nance and p opose a shi
in pe spec i e, om one o cos -d i en o diplomacy-d i en
go e nance. Taking he case o he semiconduc o indus-
y, we conduc an analysis o na i e language sou ces and
examine how egula o y supply chain con ols a e shap-
ing Eas Asian indus ial and ade policies. Specifically, we
ocus on how Eas Asian s a es a e nego ia ing hei depen-
dence on he wo ld’s wo la ges ma ke s, he Uni ed S a es
and China, and de eloping new policy s a egies in o de o
na iga e hedualhegemony.Theanalysis e eals ha ,while
a ying s a egies a e adop ed, mul ila e al alliances o he
s a es a e gaining p ominence in GPN/GVC go e nance. We
conclude ha a mo e s a e-cen ic analysis o GPN/GVC is in
o de .
Keywo ds: ole o he s a e; semiconduc o indus y; global
supply chain; Eas Asia
1 In oduc ion
Global p oduc ion ne wo ks/global alue chains (hence-
o h, GPN/GVC) in Eas Asia ha e been in eg al o he pos -
Wo ld Wa II economic globaliza ion (B own e al. 2005;
*Co esponding au ho : Yuko Aoyama, G adua e School o Geog aphy,
Cla k Uni e si y, Wo ces e , MA, USA, E-mail: [email p o ec ed]
Eunyeong Song and Shan-yu Wang, G adua e School o Geog aphy,
Cla k Uni e si y, Wo ces e , MA, USA, E-mail: [email p o ec ed] (E. Song),
[email p o ec ed] (S.-y. Wang)
Yeung 2022). Howe e , he ecen ise in egula o y sup-
ply chain con ols, much o i a ibu ed o he ensions
be ween he wo ‘g ea powe s’ and hei hegemonic ac ions
(Pa n ei e 2018), challenges he basic geog aphical assump-
ions o fi m-cen ic, cos -d i en GPN/GVC go e nance. In
his a icle, we examine how geopoli ics is al e ing he ole
o he s a e in he GPN/GVC go e nance. We ake he cases
o h ee Eas Asian s a es – Japan, Sou h Ko ea and Tai-
wan – as hey na iga e he ise o egula o y supply chain
con ols o e he semiconduc o indus y. As socie ies wi h
s ong adi ions o s a e-d i en, in e en ionis app oach,
one ha combines indus ial policy and s a egic ade pol-
icy, he Eas Asian s a es se e as use ul case examples o
GPN/GVC go e nance ha demons a e a unique ideolog-
ical hyb idi y o s a e capi alism, ope a ing unde libe al
in e na ional o de . As we shall show, e idence om hese
Eas Asian ‘middle powe s’ e eals ha powe asymme ies
be ween coun ies a e a mo e complex and laye ed han
wha is being cha ac e ized in he g ea -powe s compe i ion
be ween China and he U.S.
Semiconduc o s a e he 4 h mos aded p oduc in he
wo ld a e c ude oil, mo o ehicles/pa s and efined oil,
and hei supply chains ha e disp opo iona e geopoli i-
cal significance as hey cons i u es ups eam segmen s o
mul iple indus ial sec o s – including mobile phones, IT
in as uc u e, PCs, indus ial equipmen , consume elec-
onics, au omobiles, and mili a y applica ions. Today, h ee
qua e s o global chip manu ac u ing capaci y is loca ed
in Eas Asia, and 40 % o he global logic chip p oduc ion
is loca ed in Taiwan alone.1Japanwas hefi s ochal-
lenge he U.S. dominance in he 1980s; subsequen ly, Sou h
Ko ea and Taiwan eme ged as cen e s o manu ac u ing in
1On he one hand, gi en he complexi y o p oduc ion ha equi es
o e 50 sophis ical specialized equipmen as well as specialized ma e-
ials and chemicals, no single fi m o na ion monopolizes he en i e
supply chain o he global semiconduc o indus y. On he o he hand,
while a supply chain pa alysis can be caused by a single poin o ailu e,
which may be caused by na u al disas e s, cybe a acks, in as uc u e
ailu es o sanc ions, Eas Asia se e as significan choke poin s o his
indus y.
Open Access. ©2024 he au ho (s), published by De G uy e . This wo k is licensed unde he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion 4.0 In e na ional License.
168 —Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies
memo y and logic chips, espec i ely. The concen a ion o
manu ac u ing in Eas Asia in ol es bo h on -end (wa e
ab ica ion) and back-end (assembly, packaging and es ing)
s ages, wi h a ecen g ow h in Sou heas Asia (Malaysia,
Vie nam and he Philippines). The U.S. con inues o play a
significan ole in he indus y, by aking he lion’s sha e
o he indus y’s alue-added; as much as hal o he alue
added o he semiconduc o supply chain is in he s age
be o e manu ac u ing – he design s age – and nea ly h ee
qua e s o design in his indus y s ill akes place in he
U.S.2
Since he U.S. and China cons i u e a hal o he
global semiconduc o ma ke , he use o egula o y sup-
ply chain con ols – as one mani es a ion o he g owing
U.S.–China ensions – has significan impac s on he Eas
Asian economies. The h ee Eas Asian s a es examined
in his a icle e y much all unde he economic sphe e
a ound China, and ye hey a e among he s onges U.S. mil-
i a y allies as well as he membe s o he “Chips 4 Alliance”,
a p oposed wo king g oup led by he U.S., which is aimed a
coope a ing on he semiconduc o supply chain egula o y
con ols in he name o secu i y in e es s.
Ou cen al esea ch ques ion o his a icle is as ol-
lows; how do con empo a y s a es na iga e he complexi ies
o geopoli ics in go e ning GVC/GPN? To be e unde s and
how Eas Asian s a es a e esponding o new geopoli ical
ensions, we will fi s demons a e how s a e capi alism,
oo ed in he de elopmen al s a e, is being ein igo a ed in
Eas Asian s a es in he con ex o he eme ging ‘economy-
secu i y nexus’ (Pempel 2013), whe eby in e na ional secu-
i y conce ns inc easingly dic a e he economy (Al enbu g
and Leininge 2008). We hen discuss he need o a con-
cep ual shi in GPN/GVC esea ch as geopoli ical p essu es
esul in economic coe cions. By examining indus ial and
ade policies o Eas Asian s a es o e he semiconduc o
indus y, we show how s a es e-cons i u e na ional p io i-
ies, how hey e-align diploma ic s a egies, and how hey
jus i y policy di ec i es.
2 Geopoli ics and he ole
o he s a e in Eas Asia
The ques ion o he ole o geopoli ics in al e ing GVC/GPN
go e nance is inhe en ly geo-specific. In he case o Eas
2The U.S. domina es in EDA & Co e IP segmen (74 %) as well as
LOGIC segmen s (67 %), whe eas Sou h Ko ea domina es in memo y
p oduc ion (59 %), and China (38 %) and Taiwan (27 %) domina e in
assembly, packaging and es ing. The U.S. (41 %) and Japan (32 %) dom-
ina e in equipmen manu ac u ing (Va as e al. 2021).
Asian s a es, geopoli ics has been en angled wi h he ole
o he s a e in a pa icula manne in he pos -Wo ld Wa
II pe iod, which se es as a c ucial con ex o in e p e he
p esen . Fi s and o emos , he legacy o highly in e en-
ionis ‘de elopmen al s a e’ (Amsden 1992;Johnson 1982;
Wang 2022) has been a ibu ed as one o he key ac o s
o pos -Wo ld Wa II economic g ow h in Eas Asia. E en
hough he de elopmen al s a e in p inciple con adic s he
p e ailing libe al o hodoxy o he U.S., he de elopmen al
s a e has no only co-exis ed in he libe al in e na ional
o de , bu also h i ed because o i , by le e aging global
ade libe aliza ion and encou aging expo -led indus ial-
iza ion (Wade 2007).
The demise o he de elopmen al s a e model is p in-
cipally a ibu ed o he ise o mul ina ional fi ms and
hei inc easingly globalized GPN/GVC, allegedly diminish-
ing he powe o he s a e (Campbell and Pede sen 2001).
The de elopmen al s a e has also come o be seen as
inc easingly ine ec i e in ‘picking winne s’ o spu inno-
a ion and en ep eneu ship (Wong 2011). Ye , i is c ucial
o ake in o accoun he pa icula geopoli ical con ex in
Eas Asia, unde which he highly in e en ionis s a es
we e enabled unde he libe al in e na ional o de ; he
U.S. geopoli ical secu i y in e es s in he egion ensu ed
he Anglo-Ame ican-cen ic globaliza ion benefi ed Japan,
Sou h Ko ea and Taiwan in building s ong economies
(Van Wol e en 1986). I could be a gued ha , in spi e o
he con adic ions ha s a e capi alism b ings o he libe al
in e na ional o de , he Eas Asian de elopmen al s a e was
ole a ed o co-exis as long as i suppo ed he U.S. na ional
secu i y in e es s. By con as , he Chinese a ie y o ‘new
s a e capi alism’, in which he s a e se es as he p omo e ,
supe iso and owne o capi al (Alami e al. 2022), is ea ed
wi h a significan ly g ea e suspicion, leading some o claim
ha ‘ he openness has become a liabili y o libe al ma ke
economies’, as he illibe al s a es’ can ope a e eely ‘in he
uni e salis ins i u ions o he libe al in e na ional o de ’
while simul aneously ‘cons uc ing an ecosys em o al e na-
i e o de ing ins i u ions’ (Cooley and Nexon 2022, p. 109).
Geopoli ics is he e o e al e ing how s a e in e en-
ions a e si ua ed, in e p e ed, and jus ified. In he U.S.,
Biden Adminis a ion’s Inno a ion and Compe i ion Ac
(2021) is b oadly unde s ood as a shi om one unde he
Washing on consensus o ano he which o mally emb aces
na ional indus ial policy. Ye , i is impo an o acknowl-
edge ha some indus ial sec o s ha e ne e been ee o
s a e suppo , and his is pa icula ly he case o he semi-
conduc o indus y. A he heigh o Japan–U.S. ade ic-
ion, he U.S. go e nmen es ablished a join go e nmen -
indus y R & D conso ium SEMATECH, emula ing he model
Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies —169
o Japan’s R & D acili y ha de eloped supe LSI chips in
he 1970s. Va ious o he coun ies also es ablished s a e-
sponso ed R & D acili ies, including Belgium, F ance and
Singapo e, jus o name a ew.
To jus i y s a e in e en ions, na ional secu i y has
been in oked o p e en economic compe i ion agains
hose pe cei ed o d i e cos ad an ages o compe i o s and
c ea e unequal playing-fields, which, in u n, h ea ens he
model o open, libe alized economies. Decades be o e he
U.S. sanc ions agains Huawei (2019), he U.S. imposed a
numbe o sanc ions agains Japan’s semiconduc o indus-
y, s a ing wi h olun a y impo es ic ions in 1982,
ollowed by a se ies o dumping judgmen s by In e na-
ional T ade Commission (ITC) in 1985. The Plaza Acco d
(1985) d ama ically aised p oduc ion cos s in Japan, and he
US–Japan Semiconduc o Ag eemen (1986) in oduced a
p ice floo o he Japanese-made chips, and simul aneously
equi ed inc easing consump ion o o eign-made chips in
Japan (Kuwa a 1990). The Japanese go e nmen nego ia ed
he Ag eemen o cease a decade la e , du ing which In el
(USA) eco e ed i s leade ship posi ion on PC p ocesso s.
The U.S. Cong essional Budge O ice s a ed a he ime ha
“ he conce n o mili a y planne s is ha de e io a ion o U.S.
semiconduc o p oduce s could soon lead ei he o depen-
dence on o eign sou ces o componen s o sophis ica ed
weapons sys ems, o o a decline in he echnological base
needed o de elop and use hese componen s” (Dallmeye
1988).
The de elopmen al s a e model oday is acing a shi -
ing geopoli ical en i onmen , om one ha suppo ed eco-
nomic g ow h in Eas Asia o one ha inc easingly p io i-
izes he U.S. secu i y in e es s. As we shall demons a e in
he subsequen sec ions, Eas Asian s a es a e called on o
balance he U.S. secu i y in e es s wi h hei own na ional
economic in e es s. As such, he a ying s a egies o Eas
Asian s a es eflec hei need o pe o m ‘balancing ac s’
and ‘dual- oo ing.’ In he ollowing sec ion, we na ow he
scope o geopoli ics o ocus specifically on i s impac s on
GPN/GVC go e nance, by aking he case o he egula o y
supply chain con ols, which, as a o m o economic coe -
cions d i en by na ional secu i y in e es s, a e inc easingly
shaping he geo-spa ial s a egies o Eas Asian s a es.
3 F om i m-cen ic o s a e-cen ic
GPN/GVC go e nance
Since he 1990s, a ious o ms o economic coe cions – such
as ade sanc ions, a i ba ie s, and egula o y supply
chain con ols – ha e been deployed by s a es o in e ene
in he geog aphy o in e na ional ade. Pa icula ly unde
he con ex o inc easingly densely ne wo ked global sup-
ply chain, egula o y supply chain con ols ha e eme ged
as a powe ul geo-poli ical ins umen . Regula o y supply
chain con ols combine bila e al and mul ila e al alliances
o p omo e in e na ional ade, while sanc ioning agains
economic compe i o s.
To da e, geopoli ics has no been cen al o he global
supply chain analysis, howe e . The li e a u es on sup-
ply chain managemen (SCM), GPN and GVC all emphasize
globalin e -connec edness h oughanalyseso indus ialo
commodi y chains/ne wo ks. Since he ocus on SCM li e a-
u e has been on he p ofi abili y and pe o mance o global
economic ac i i ies, i is by na u e fi m-cen ic. Simila ly,
he GVC li e a u e, wi h i s heo e ical unde pinning o he
wo ld sys ems heo y, ocuses on he asymme ical powe
be ween he lead fi ms and hei supplie s (Ge e i e al.
2005) wi h he s a e se ing p ima ily as a passi e ac o
(Maye and Phillips 2017).
The li e a u e on GPN p o ides a concep ual ounda-
ion o analyze geog aphic in e ac ions among global lead
fi ms, ins i u ions, and embedded egional asse s (Hende -
son e al. 2002). Wi h i s majo ocus on “s a egic coupling,”
he fi m- egion nexus se es as an essen ial ins i u ional
con ex o GPN/GVC (Coe and Yeung 2015). Howe e , i s
emphasis on he ‘cos -capabili y s uc u e’ sugges s ha he
pa adigm is inhe en ly fi m-cen ic (Ho ne 2017;Lim 2018;
McG ego and Coe 2023), and fi m s a egies – in deploy-
ing egional asse s (e.g., echnical labo o ce) – con inue
o be he p ima y conce n. Yeung o example (2022, p.
3) conceded ha (geo)poli ics, economies, and space a e
inc easingly mu ually cons i u ed in he global economy in
he 2020s, and he exis ing app oaches “can be inadequa e
because o hei ela i e neglec o he s a e and i s a iable
geopoli ical in e en ions.”
Wi h he ise o egula o y supply chain con ols, he
s a e plays a a g ea e ole han p e iously concep ual-
ized in GPN/GVC go e nance li e a u e. Fo one, an exclu-
si e ocus on fi m s a egies – wi hou coun ing s a e sup-
po – would no accu a ely eflec he ue ‘cos -capabili y
s uc u e’ calcula ions. E en i p i a e in es men dwa s
s a e suppo , s a e suppo p o ides a ca aly ic ole in he
cos capabili y s uc u e in he long un. Fo ano he , cos
pa ame e s expand beyond wha has long been p ima ily
labo cos -d i en analysis o o sho ing, o one ha inco -
po a es geopoli ical isks. The inc easing ole o he go e n-
men incen i es ele a es he ole o he s a e in GPN/GVC
go e nance, and challenges he p e ailing fi m-cen ic iew
in unde s anding he geog aphy o global supply chain.
170 —Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies
We he e o e con end ha i is i al o de elop a new
pa adigm ha shi s GPN/GVC go e nance om one ha is
concep ualized p ima ily cos -d i en o ano he ha inco -
po a es secu i y, isks, and diplomacy. Wi h he supply
chain being weaponized by he s a e (Fa ell and New-
man, 2019), geog aphy o p oduc ion is d i en by mul i-
la e al s a e s a egies. Bo h coupling and decoupling a e
being coe ced by s a es h ough o ma ions o geopoli ical
alliances, which in ol es edi ec ing o sho ing, p omo ing
on/ esho ing, and nego ia ing o iend sho ing. F iend-
sho ing in pa icula is an ins umen o long- e m, mul ila -
e al alliance-building, wi h which he s a es and fi ms nego-
ia e and ensu e access o c ucial manu ac u ing ma e ials
and equipmen . As such, alliance-d i en GVC go e nance
(see Bi ch 2008) needs o be econcep ualized om a fi m-
cen ic o s a e-cen ic pa adigm.
Unde he mul i-la e al s a e s a egy-d i en GPN/GVC,
decoupling gains an en i ely new meaning. P e iously,
bo h ‘s a egic coupling’ (Yeung 2016) and decoupling ha e
been he aspec s o ‘fi m- egion nexus’ (MacKinnon 2012),
whe eby fi m asse s and egional asse s (such as ech-
nological clus e s and labo a ailabili y) a e s a egically
pai ed/unpai ed, wi h he egions se ing as ex a-fi m
agen s. Today, decoupling has become synonymous o s a e
s a egies a he na ional le el in ol ing ade sanc ions,
wi h a goal o no only educing dependency on he global
supply chain, bu also unde mining compe i o s om gain-
ing global ma ke sha e. Fo example, China began he man-
da e in he ea ly 2000s o decouple om he U.S. fi ms and
de elop domes ic capabili y o educe i s dependence in mil-
i a y equipmen p oduc ion (Mille 2023). Concep s such as
‘geopoli ical decoupling’ as a esul o he ho wa in Uk aine
(Pa línek 2023) and ‘de ensi e decoupling’ which p epa es
an economy o po en ial geopoli ical conflic s (Ando e al.,
2024) place he s a e a he cen e o GVC/GPN go e nance.
Decoupling oday in ol es geo-spa ial s a egies, inclu-
ding disengagemen (di es men o o sho ing), e-sho ing
o iend-sho ing; bo h esho ing and iend-sho ing may
sa is y secu i y in e es s o he s a e bu may con adic
economic in e es s o fi ms pa icula ly in he sho un,
hus equi ing significan s a e suppo , in ensi e public-
p i a e collabo a ions, as well as mul ila e al nego ia ions.
Due o he cos and complexi ies o making decoupling a
eali y, compounded by diploma ic challenges o e he na -
a i e, he language o ‘decoupling’ in he U.S. has shi ed
o ‘de- isking’ (Fa ell and Newman 2023), which signals an
in en ion o s all echnological de elopmen o he compe i-
o , and educe ‘undue dependence’ on coun ies ha may
exe cise e alia ions.
P e iously, de- isking has been ea ed wi h a fi m-
cen ic pe spec i e in he GPN/GVC li e a u e, wi h p ima y
ocus on business isk educ ions. Bo h “geopoli ical isks”
and “ egula o y isks” a e ega ded as exogenous ac o s
(CoeandYeung2015), and so as “policy isks” (quo a, sanc-
ions, a i s, and o he egula o y con ols) in he sup-
ply chain managemen li e a u e (Manuj e al. 2014). Since
cos s and capabili ies a e shaped by loca ions ha a e
inc easingly de e mined by geopoli ical conside a ions and
diploma ic alliances, policy deba es a ound de- isking also
equi ea econcep ualiza iono isks ha goesbeyondbusi-
ness isk educ ion (including hose h ough subsidy).
As we shall show in he subsequen sec ion, Eas
Asian s a es wi h in eg a ed GPN/GVC linkages o he Chi-
nese economy bu all unde he U.S. mili a y umb ella
ace complex challenges in balancing economic and secu-
i y in e es s. As he wo g ea powe s seek o achie e
‘asymme ic in e dependence’ (E ns 2021), he U.S.-d i en
egula o y supply chain con ols a e esul ing in ‘coe ci e
coupling/decoupling’, whe eby Eas Asian s a es a e being
subjec o align hei egula o y supply chain con ols wi h
ha o he U.S. secu i y in e es s. Coe ci e coupling may
ake he o m o echnological alliances combined wi h
decoupling om fi ms in he non-aligned s a es, and/o spe-
cific geo-spa ial s a egies (e.g., on/ e-sho ing and iend-
sho ing) ha ensu e supply chain isks a e minimized om
he U.S. pe spec i e. In esponse, he Eas Asian s a es a e
e-a icula ing hei own economy-secu i y nexus by signal-
ing s ong alliance wi h he U.S. while minimizing he cos
o decoupling om China in a ying manne , esul ing in
complex diploma ic nego ia ions o e e ms o ade and
hei own geospa ial s a egies.
4 Me hodology
The me hodology adop ed in his pape in ol es conduc -
ing na i e-language su ey o media epo s (economic
and indus y jou nals/magazines/newspape s), go e nmen
documen s, and academic li e a u e a ailable in Japanese,
Ko ean and Manda in (see Appendix) and co e s he de el-
opmen s wi h emphasis on he las 5 yea s (2019–2023). By
combining he na i e language p oficiency o he au ho s,
we ocused on ma e ials on he poli ical, economic and
geog aphic s a egies as being a icula ed by he s a e and
epo ed domes ically. Due o he challenges in conduc -
ing mul ilingual discou se analysis, o which he me hod-
ology is ha dly es ablished (see, o example, Taylo and
del Fan e 2020), we conduc ed case s udies o h ee Eas
Asian s a es, by sys ema ically analyzing he abo e men-
ioned ma e ials on he discou se a ound he semiconduc-
o indus y. Fi s , we iden ified epo ing o analysis o he
semiconduc o indus y by majo sou ces, and conduc ed
Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies —171
snowballed sea ches beyond he majo sou ces. We hen
sea ched o s a emen s ha illus a ed how he s a es and
majo fi ms a icula ed hei posi ions in economic and/o
secu i y e ms. Mo e specifically, we iden ified sou ces ha
discuss how egula o y supply chain con ols by he g ea
powe s a e shaping Eas Asian indus ial and ade policies,
and wha s a egies a e being deployed o manage hei own
egula o y supply chain con ols ha main ain compa ibil-
i y wi h hose by he g ea powe s. All ansla ions om he
o iginal languages o English ha e been pe o med by he
au ho s.
This me hodology was used as a way o o e come
he cons ain s o English language media analysis on Eas
Asian s a es. Such analysis is undamen ally limi ed in
scope, as i would inhe en ly in ol e bias in in e p e -
ing and ep esen ing issues as a icula ed by Fai clough
(2009). Language has long been unde s ood as a poli ical
weapon (Dunmi e 2012), and discou se o e policy issues
a e inhe en ly poli ical. In conduc ing his esea ch, au ho s
obse ed ha while he English language media may p o-
ide a summa y o key poin s, hey o en did no cap u e
he di e si y o iews ep esen ed in each o ou espec-
i e coun ies. Fu he mo e, as we shall demons a e, he
domes ic media sou ces communica e a significan ly mo e
palpable sense o dilemma o Eas Asian s a es, whose
economic-secu i y nexus a e dis inc om ha dic a ed by
he U.S.
5 Geospa ial s a egies o he Eas
Asian s a es
In he ollowing sec ion we demons a e how he Japanese,
Sou h Ko ean and Taiwanese s a es adap hei geospa ial
s a egies, e-a icula e hei own economy-secu i y nexus,
and use diploma ic s a egies in he e a o weaponized in e -
dependence. Thei s a e ac ions would ha e conside able
economic impac s on Asia and beyond, and may become
he basis o a significan e o mula ion o he geog a-
phy and go e nance o he global supply chain. The case
s udies also demons a e he complexi ies o coe ci e cou-
pling/decoupling, pa icula ly in ins ances whe e he U.S.
secu i y in e es s do no align wi h domes ic p io i ies o
Eas Asian s a es. Mos o all, i showcases he challenges
o GVC/GPN go e nance which is inc easingly mul i-s a e
alliance based.
5.1 Japan
Subsequen ly o he U.S. sanc ions ha began in he 1980s,
Japan’s global sha e o he semiconduc o chip p oduc ion
declined om o e 50 % in 1988 o 10 % by 2019 (Nikkei BP
Special 2023). Indus y inside s in Japan commen ed, “we
we e bea en by he U.S. o a o al su ende ” and umed
o e he weakness o he Japanese go e nmen ’s nego ia-
ion posi ion, wi h some e en ponde ing “a e we a uly
independen s a e? Wha kind o business is possible when
p ices a e de e mined by a o eign go e nmen ?” (Tanaka
and Na abe 2024). The loss o Japan’s compe i i eness is no
a ibu ed exclusi ely o he U.S. sanc ions, howe e . While
he Japanese media blamed poo diplomacy, s a ing ha he
go e nmen “comp omised oo quickly” (Toyo Keizai 2012)
and “succumbed o he p essu e om he U.S.” (Tanaka
and Na abe 2024), indus y inside s placed blame on bo h
s a e and fi m s a egies. On he fi s , he go e nmen ailed
in making swi changes o he axa ion sys em o encou -
age capi al in es men s (Inoue 2012). Subsequen se e al
s a e-sponso ed p ojec s, such as Semiconduc o Indus y
Resea ch Ins i u e Japan (SIRIJ) (1994), Elpida Memo y Inc.
(1999), Asuka (2001), Halca (2001), as well as ASPLA (2001),
ne e achie ed success. SIRIJ delibe a ely a oided o use
he e m “s a egy” in i s name o a e d awing conce ns
om he U.S. go e nmen (Na abe 2024). On he second,
Japan’s chipmake s, wi h hei o igin as a di ision wi hin
e ically in eg a ed elec onics conglome a es, p ima ily
se ed hei own in e nal demand, did no coope a e ully
in he s a e-sponso ed p ojec s no shi hei ope a ions
o b oade indus y ends (such as shi ing om DRAM
chips o small-lo , logic LSI chips (Nikkei Elec onics 2008)),
and ailed o compe e agains he business model based
on he di ision o labo be ween abless design fi ms and
con ac ound ies. The loss o s ong domes ic cus ome s
in pe sonal compu e s and sma phones also con ibu ed o
hei demise.
Today, Japan is in oking i s own ‘na ional secu i y’ o
e-jumps a he indus y (Noha a 2023). P ime Minis e
Kishida’s opening speech a SEMICON JAPAN 2022 s a ed
“Semiconduc o s a e key echnologies ha a e impo an
o digi iza ion, deca boniza ion, and economic secu i y,
and he go e nmen will de ice an agg essi e plan o
in es men expansion” (Mu ao 2022), and pledged 2 illion
yen (USD$13 billion) wi h a goal o ipling domes ic sales
by 2030. These e o s would ha e been highly con o e sial
as a sou ce o ‘un ai compe i ion’ a he heigh o he U.S.-
Japan compe i ion. The Japanese go e nmen also a icu-
la ed Semiconduc o /Digi al Indus y S a egy (June 2021) o
build manu ac u ing capaci y o IoT applica ions, and o
s eng hen echnological ounda ions o he nex gene a-
ion semiconduc o s. I s p ima y s a egy is o: 1) on-/ e-
sho e manu ac u ing and R & D, including inwa d iend-
sho ing (p omo ing inwa d o eign di ec in es men ), 2)
172 —Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies
main ains ongalliancewi h heU.S.,and 3) de elopi sown
mul i-la e al diplomacy o suppo he indus y.
Fi s , he s a e has p o ided subsidies o build TSMC
(Taiwan) plan s in Kumamo o, and es ablished Rapidus,
a join public-p i a e en u e (2022) wi h a goal o man-
u ac u ing highly ad anced 2 nano logic semiconduc o s
wi h coope a ion wi h IBM. The e ised na ional s a egy
(2023) includes capaci y building o AI-semiconduc o chip
de elopmen , designed o sa is y domes ic demand in he
au omobile sec o and da a cen e s. In o al, o e USD$1
illion will be alloca ed o e 10 yea s h ough bo h pub-
lic and p i a e in es men s. I is unlikely, howe e , ha
he ull esho ing o p e iously o sho ed ope a ions will
e e ake place due o bo h alen and cos cons ain s
(Kamaku a 2022). Wi h espec o iend-sho ing, since
TSMC’s Kumamo o plan s a e no designa ed o p oduce he
cu ing-edge semiconduc o chips, hey a e umo ed o be
economically iable o TSMC only a e s a e subsidy and
Sony’s mul i-yea commi men o pu chase hei chips.
Second, upon he eques o he US go e nmen , Japan
ollowed he U.S. sanc ions agains China and imposed
expo con ol o 23 i ems o ake e ec in July 2023.
Since China’s sha e o Japan’s expo is conside able (a
29 % o o al semiconduc o equipmen expo s), egula-
o y con ols would nega i e impac he Japanese econ-
omy and o ce a u he econfigu a ion. Aside om he
US-o ches a ed ade es ic ions, howe e , Japan has no
a icula ed a specific policy o China, excep o o icially
ending O icial De elopmen Assis ance (ODA) ha began in
1972. The e o e, Japan’s o icial posi ion has been somewha
opaque, emphasizing he ‘balancing ac ’ and alliances wi h
‘like-minded coun ies’ un il he Biden-Kishida join s a e-
men in Ap il 2024, in which Japan ea i med i s alliance
wi h he U.S. Wi h he conce ns ha he U.S. in e es in
Asia emains ‘episodic’ (Fio i and Passe i 2015), he join
s a emen is in ended no only o ensu e he con inued U.S.
engagemen bu also o gua d agains endencies owa d
U.S. isola ionism as a esul o ising populism.
Thi d, Japan’s economic diplomacy ook a u n o lead-
ing mul ila e al nego ia ions such as he Quad (Japan–
Aus alia–India–US alliance). Japan’s policy s a egy does
no aim a localizing end- o-end supply chain, as acknowl-
edged by P ime Minis e Kishida who, ins ead, emphasized
he impo ance o s eng hening global alliances (Mu ao
2022). A pa liamen a ian also echoed he need o “... lea n
om he mis akes o pas in a emp ing o in e nalize p o-
duc ion. An in e na ional alliance ha akes ad an age o
pa ne s’ s eng hs is he key.” Samsung’s plan o open
a R & D acili y in Yokohama o p o o ype de elopmen
and collabo a i e esea ch wi h Japanese fi ms eflec s his
s a egy.
In sum, Japan’s s a egy is o cul i a e new oppo uni-
ies o egain indus ial leade ship h ough e i ing s a e
subsidy, which has long been de-emphasized as a esul
o U.S.-Japan ensions since he 1980s. Geopoli ical ma e s
a e also spoken mo e salien ly – a Japanese pa liamen-
a ian exp essed s ong conce ns o “an unlikely secu i y
e en su ounding Taiwan” which would esul in “a clo-
su e o Taiwan S aigh s and s oppage o h ee qua e s
o global semiconduc o supply.” As such, “in e na ional
alliance mus ake place wi h pa ne s who sha e com-
mon alues, such as he U.S. and he EU, and no China”
(Mu ao 2022). Simul aneously, i was s a ed ha “gi en new
echnologies such as 3D chips and chiple s in in eg a ed
ci cui s, his means ha he s a -line o compe i ion is
being ed awn. We should absolu ely no squande his
oppo uni y.”
5.2 Sou h Ko ea
Sou h Ko ea’s semiconduc o indus y achie ed a 18 % glo-
bal ma ke sha e in 2020 (Pa k 2022). The indus y has
g own a ound memo y chips, led by in eg a ed de ice
manu ac u e s (IDMs) such as Samsung Elec onics and SK
Hynix, which ha e hal o he global ma ke sha e o NAND
flash memo y chips and 70 % o he global ma ke sha e o
DRAM memo y chips (S anga one 2023). Semiconduc o s
a e among he mos impo an expo s; i accoun ed o
16 % o o al expo s in 2023 (Minis y o T ade, Indus y,
and Ene gy, Republic o Ko ea, 2024). The ‘K-Semiconduc o
S a egy o Realize a Comp ehensi e Semiconduc o
Powe house’ was announced in 2021, which also e e s
o semiconduc o s as ‘ he backbone o ou economy’ and
desc ibes hem as he ‘ ice ( ounda ion) o all indus ies’ as
well as ‘a s a egic weapon.’
In Sou h Ko ea, he sense o c isis was al eady palpable
p io o he U.S.–China conflic , due o he on-going ensions
wi h Japan. Japan sanc ioned agains Sou h Ko ea in 2019
by emo ing Sou h Ko ea om i s a o ed na ion s a us,
he eby impac ing Japan’s expo s o h ee chemicals nec-
essa y o semiconduc o manu ac u ing.3This p omp ed
he Sou h Ko ean go e nmen o iden i y s uc u al weak-
nesses, and implemen new policies o s abilize he supply
chain (Lim and Cho 2023;Song 2022). Compounded by he
pandemic, he supply chain c isis has led he go e nmen o
3Japan a ibu ed i s ac ion o egula o y deficiencies in Sou h Ko ea,
while Sou h Ko ea iewed his as a e alia ion agains a cou uling
in 2018 which equi ed Japanese fi ms o compensa e o o ced labo
du ing Wo ld Wa II.
Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies —173
ecognize semiconduc o s in he con ex o i s own na ional
secu i y. P esiden Yoon (2023a) s a ed, “ he semiconduc o
indus y is he ounda ion o he economy ... and a na ional
secu i y asse . ... Compe i o coun ies a e using all means,
including expo egula ions, subsidies, and ax c edi s, o
h ea en and des oy ou indus y.” Yoon also likened he
figh o semiconduc o s as a wa , s a ing “semiconduc o
compe i ion is a isky, indus ial wa ... an all-ou na ional
wa . The public and p i a e sec o s mus wo k oge he as a
eam o o e come his challenge” (P esiden Yoon Seok-yeol
2023b).
To main ain i s global ma ke sha e, Sou h Ko ea is
adop ing wo majo s a egies: 1) on-sho ing – es ablishing a
semiconduc o ecosys em inside Sou h Ko ea and 2) deploy-
ing p agma ic diplomacy. The go e nmen iden ified Sou h
Ko ea’s compe i i e weaknesses (including logic semicon-
duc o s, ma e ials and componen s, design and packaging),
and enac ed ‘The Na ional High-Tech S a egic Indus y Ac ’
in 2022 (Moon Adminis a ion), allowing he go e nmen o
p o ide unding o he c ea ion o specialized complexes,
in as uc u e de elopmen , and R & D suppo (Pa k 2022).4
This was ollowed in 2023 by he Na ional Assembly passing
he ‘K-Chips Ac ’ (Yoon Adminis a ion) which included a
e ision o he ‘Res ic ion o Special Taxa ion Ac ’, allowing
significan inc eases o ax c edi s o acili y in es men s.
The go e nmen also announced suppo o a new
K-Bel ’ (Moon adminis a ion) ollowed by ‘Mega Clus e ’
(Yoon adminis a ion) ha encompass building o he
wo ld’s la ges clus e wi h end- o-end supply chains. As
a specialized indus ial complex ha link ma e ials and
equipmen , hese spa ial s a egies in ol e a high- ech
equipmen join en u e, a high- ech packaging pla o m,
and an es ablishmen o a ‘ abless alley’. Wi hin 2 mon hs
o aking o ice, he Yoon Adminis a ion announced he
‘S a egy o Achie e a Semiconduc o Supe powe by com-
bining he capabili ies o he public and p i a e sec o s’ wi h
he goal o expanding logic semiconduc o s p oduc ion, and
buildinganecosys emo ma e ialsandcomponen sp oduc-
ion oachie e50 %sel -su iciencyby2030.InJanua y 2024,
he go e nmen announced he ‘Semiconduc o Mega Clus-
e C ea ion Plan.’ Unde his plan, he go e nmen plans o
c ea e he wo ld’s la ges semiconduc o clus e (21 million
m2) in he sou he n Gyeonggi egion by os e ing p i a e
in es men wo h 622 illion won by 2047. In pa allel wi h
he go e nmen ’s plan, mo e han fi e semiconduc o ac-
o ies a e planned o be buil by 2042, including Samsung’s
4Unlike he case o Taiwan, egime changes a e an icipa ed o ha e
ewimpac son hese policies, as he wo majo pa iesa einopposi ion
wi h espec o hei policy on Japan, no China and he U.S.
300 illion won (USD$228 billion) in es men o e he nex
20 yea s o build a logic chip clus e in Yongin nea Seoul.
SK Hynix also plans o in es 120 illion won in Yongin o
build ou ac o ies. SK Chai man Choi Tae-won s a ed, “The
YonginClus e is hemos planned and s a egicallypu sued
p ojec in he his o y o SK Hynix” (SKhynix 2023).
Bo h Samsung and SK Hynix employ e-sho ing s a -
egy by aking pa in he de elopmen o he Mega Clus e
and in es ing in a local R & D-manu ac u ing complex (Pa k
2023).Theyalsoemploy iend-sho ing,al houghsomeplans
p eda e he U.S.–China conflic escala ion. In addi ion o a
plan in Aus in, Texas, Samsung is al eady in es ing USD$17
billion o a new plan being buil in Taylo , Texas (Lee and
Do 2023). Samsung’s long- e m goal is o build up o nine
new plan s in he U.S., and SK Hynix also plans o es ablish
a back-end p ocessing plan in he U.S.
The U.S. sanc ions agains China a e making significan
impac s on he Sou h Ko ea’s semiconduc o indus y, as
he majo po ions o i s capaci y has been o sho ed o
China (Yoon 2023).5China cons i u ed a hal o Sou h Ko ea’s
semiconduc o expo s in 2023 (Jung 2024),6 he highes
sha e among he ading pa ne s including Chip 4 Alliance
coun ies and he EU. The Democ a ic Pa y ( he opposi ion
pa y) u ged he Yoon adminis a ion o “s ep o wa d and
pe suade he U.S.” agains he U.S. sanc ions on made-in-
China semiconduc o chips, s a ing, “i his con inues, he
eno mous amoun o ou in es men s in China could u n
in o a pile o sc ap me al. Ou semiconduc o indus y is
caugh in he hegemonic wa be ween he U.S. and China ...
ou indus y is a ‘ he sh imp’s back abou o explode in he
figh among whales’ (a colla e al damage). We canno jus
si back and wa ch hese companies ake a massi e hi .” In
esponse, he People Powe Pa y ( he uling pa y) is exe -
cising ‘p agma ic diplomacy’ h ough le e aging i s ech-
nological capabili ies (Pa k 2022;Yoon 2023). Ra he han
choosing sides, he pa y will “p o ec ou na ional in e es s
in he semiconduc o hegemony wa ,” gi en i s “di ec link
o na ional secu i y” and “le e age his s a egic asse in
diplomacy and ensu e main aining a significan lead o e
ou compe i o s.”
Wi h China exp essing conce ns o e Sou h Ko ea’s
pa icipa ion in he Chip 4 Alliance (Choi 2022;Kim 2022),
‘p agma ic diplomacy’ is in ended o appease bo h China
5Samsung p oduces 39 % o i s NAND chips a i s plan in Xi’an, and
SK Hynix p oduces hal o i s DRAM chips and 20 % o i s NAND chips
a i s plan s in Wuxi and Dalian (Lee and Do 2023).
6China’s sha e o Sou h Ko ea’s semiconduc o expo s was 36 %, and
Hong Kong’s sha e was 14 %. Since mos expo s o Hong Kong a e e-
expo ed o China, in o al, hal o Sou h Ko ea’s semiconduc o expo s
in 2023 has gone o China (Jung 2024).
174 —Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies
and he U.S. The Minis y o Fo eign A ai s o example
jus ified a endance a he Chip 4 Alliance plena y session
in Feb ua y 2023 as o conduc a e iew o he p emise o
he alliance and i s alue based on na ional in e es s, a he
han o discuss expo con ols wi h allies (Seong and Jo
2023), and emphasized ha i is no in ended o exclude
China bu a he o ensu e he indus y’s supply chain s a-
bili y h ough accessing echnologies and equipmen om
he U.S. (Lee and Choi 2022). Sou h Ko ea is also seeking
o he alliances o s abilize he supply chain; i sponso ed
a Ko ea–Ne he lands summi in Decembe 2023 in which
a semiconduc o alliance was announced wi h join s a e-
men s by P esiden Yoon and Du ch P ime Minis e Ru e
(Ko 2023). The ‘Semiconduc o Mega Clus e C ea ion Plan’
is also a plan o s abilize he supply chain by es ablishing
a coope a ion sys em wi h he US, Japan, Ne he lands (EU),
and UK h ough summi diplomacy, men ioning hose coun-
ies as a semiconduc o alliance.
P agma ic diplomacy wi h he U.S. has esul ed in ini-
ially one-yea , and subsequen ly an indefini e wai e on
Sou h Ko ea’s majo manu ac u ing plan s in Oc obe 2023,
by designa ing Samsung and SK Hynix as Valida ed End-
Use (VEU) which allow impo s o U.S.-made equipmen in
hei ac o ies in China. A Samsung o icial was quo ed by
s a ing, “ h ough close consul a ions be ween go e nmen s
o each coun y, much o he unce ain y abou he Chinese
p oduc ion line has been esol ed,” and a SK Hynix o icial
also s a ed, “we a e deeply g a e ul o he e o s o he
Ko ean and U.S. go e nmen s” (Pa k and Lee 2023).
5.3 Taiwan
Taiwan’s semiconduc o indus y has 22 % global ma -
ke sha e (2021 da a) (NDC 2023a). Specialized in man-
u ac u ing, Taiwanese fi ms a e leade s in IC design
(19 %, especially MediaTek), chip ound y (63 %, especially
TSMC), and IC assembly and es ing (56 %, especially ASE
G oup) (NDC 2023a). The Taiwanese semiconduc o indus y
eme ged wi h a combined ou come o i s indus ial policy
(Amsden and Chu 2003) and echnological lea ning ha
ook place in he Taiwan–U.S. ela ionship since he 1980s
(Hsu 2017;Hsu and Saxenian 2000). Mos no ably, Taiwan
Semiconduc o Manu ac u ing Company (TSMC) de eloped
a new business model as a con ac ound y, which, along
wi h he eme gence o sma phones, c ea ed he di ision
o labo be ween manu ac u ing and abless design fi ms
(e.g., Apple, Qualcomm, N idia and Ad anced Mic o De ices
[AMD]). Subsequen ly, Taiwanese fi ms gained global ma -
ke sha e no only by main aining i s ela ionship wi h Sili-
con Valley bu also by es ablishing new ac o ies in China,
o ming he US–Taiwan–China semiconduc o ne wo ks
(Poon e al. 2006). Howe e , he eme ging geopoli ical isks
including US–China ade wa and supply chain dis up ions
caused by COVID-19 pandemic ha e p omp ed Taiwanese
fi ms o adjus hei s a egies.
Today, he Taiwanese semiconduc o indus y adop s
a combina ion o esho ing, o sho ing and iend-sho ing
s a egies. The go e nmen is ini ia ing indus ial upg ad-
ing s a egies o a ac esho ing, di ec ing fi ms o ocus
on high alue-added p oduc ion, and p omo ing R & D o
nu u e alen in i s inno a ion clus e s (CTCI 2021). I is
also ec ui ing o eign ma e ials and equipmen supplie s
o open acili ies in Taiwan (CNA 2023a;MOEA 2023). The
“Th eeMajo P og ams o In es inginTaiwan” on s a egic
indus ies (sma echnologies, 5G and AIoT) a ac ed 1,244
fi ms wi h a o al in es men o USD $59 billion (2022). The
go e nmen also sponso s R & D in ad anced semiconduc-
o s; “Ångs om semiconduc o ini ia i e” suppo s de ec-
ion echnology, new ma e ials, and sub-nanome e semi-
conduc o componen s and wa e s (NDC 2023b). I should
be no ed, howe e , ha unlike he case o Japan and Sou h
Ko ea, Taiwan’s esho ing s a egy in ol es a isk in i sel
in he e en o mili a y ac ions by China.
Simila o Sou h Ko ea, he semiconduc o indus y
is inc easingly iewed as a le e age o Taiwan’s na ional
secu i y. The e m “silicon shield” o igina ed in he media in
2001, whe eby he p esence o TSMC was hough o e ec-
i ely mobilize he U.S.-led UN oops he way oil supply
o Kuwai allegedly did in 1990. A mo e commonly used
local e m is “ he gua dian moun ain,” o iginally e e ing
o Taiwan’s cen al moun ain ange ha p o ec s ci ies om
yphoon winds and ain (Luo 2021). Today, Taiwan’s semi-
conduc o indus y is iewed o se e as a double-shield
o Taiwan’s secu i y, fi s by ensu ing he in e es s o he
U.S. and i s allies in p o ec ing he supply chain, and second
by de e ing China’s mili a y agg ession h ough China’s
dependence on Taiwan’s semiconduc o s.
F om his pe spec i e, bo h o sho ing and ou wa d
iend-sho ing con adic Taiwan’s in e es s, as hey mo e
he indus y away om Taiwan. O sho ing, howe e , is
in eg al o Taiwan’s semiconduc o indus y o easons
beyond ensu ing access o low cos labo . Because Taiwan
is excluded om in e na ional o ganiza ions and egional
ag eemen s such as Regional Comp ehensi e Economic
Pa ne ship (RCEP), hei un ecognized s a us p ecludes
Taiwan om signing mul ila e al ade ag eemen s. In such
con ex , o sho ing is a s a egy o ci cum en highe a -
i ba ie s aced by Taiwanese fi ms is-à- is hei com-
pe i o s. In pa p omp ed by a se ies o economic sanc-
ions China ini ia ed on Taiwan a e he 2016 elec ion ic-
o y by p o-independence Democ a ic P og essi e Pa y, he
Y. Aoyama e al.: Geopoli ics and geospa ial s a egies —181
Yoon Seok-yeol, P esiden (2023a). “Semiconduc o s, economic suppo and
secu i y asse ... suppo o p oac i e in es men companies” (Ko ean
in O iginal) [WWW Documen ]. Repub. Ko ea Policy B ie , A ailable a :
h ps://www.ko ea.k /b ie ing/speechView.do?newsId=132035028/
(Accessed 14 Dec 2023).
Yoon Seok-yeol, P esiden (2023b). “The semiconduc o indus y is a
na ional e o ... we mus o e come i as a public-p i a e eam.”
(Ko ean in O iginal) [WWW Documen ]. Repub. Ko ea Policy B ie ,
A ailable a : h ps://www.ko ea.k /b ie ing/speechView.do?
newsId=132035306/ (Accessed 14 Dec 2023).
