Suh, Elisabe h
Resea ch Repo
No h Ko ea's a ms policy as an indi ec secu i y h ea
o Eu ope: How Pyongyang expands i s pa ne ships wi h
Moscow and Teh an
SWP Commen , No. 49/2024
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Ge man Ins i u e o In e na ional and Secu i y A ai s,
Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Suh, Elisabe h (2024) : No h Ko ea's a ms policy as an indi ec secu i y h ea o
Eu ope: How Pyongyang expands i s pa ne ships wi h Moscow and Teh an, SWP Commen , No.
49/2024, S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Be lin,
h ps://doi.o g/10.18449/2024C49
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/305242
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NO.
49
OCTOBER 2024
In oduc ion
No h Ko ea’s A ms Policy as an Indi ec
Secu i y Th ea o Eu ope
How Pyongyang Expands i s Pa ne ships wi h Moscow and Teh an
Elisabe h Suh
A leas since Russia deployed No h Ko ean a ille y and ballis ic missiles agains
Uk aine, i is ob ious ha Pyongyang uels con lic s a beyond No h-Eas Asia. Ye ,
he indi ec h ea s ha No h Ko ea poses o Eu ope’s secu i y and s abili y ha e
de eloped a new quali y: Pyongyang is ac i ely suppo ing Russia’s and I an’s secu i y
policy goals by supplying ammuni ion o igh ing he wa s in Uk aine and he Middle
Eas . No h Ko ea has he eby aised i s s a egic alue o Moscow and Teh an. This
allows Pyongyang o expand and exploi hese pa ne ships in se ice o i s own in e -
es s and o join ly expand and secu e sup a- egional ne wo ks o iola ing sanc ions
and engaging in smuggling. The EU needs mo e in o ma ion and in e na ional coope a-
ion in o de o unde s and Pyongyang’s p ac ices and o iden i y and use oppo u-
ni ies o shape he cu en si ua ion.
Un il ecen ly, No h Ko ea was conside ed
mo e o a egional secu i y h ea , and i s
nuclea p oli e a ion was mainly seen as a
challenge o global no ms. Ins abili y on he
Ko ean peninsula and isks o u he p o-
li e a ion con inue o pose indi ec h ea s
o Eu opean secu i y, bu Pyongyang has
inc eased i s h ea po en ial. I s nuclea
weapons p og amme builds he amewo k
o a signi ican expansion o i s a ms policy
and ela ed pa ne ships. The geopoli ical
si ua ion and egional wa s ha e occu ed
a a a ou able ime o No h Ko ea. Pyong-
yang can use i s success ul missile p o-
g ammes and la ge s ockpiles o a ille y
and ammuni ion o in ensi y pa ne ships
and gain ex e nal esou ces and know-how
o i s nuclea mode nisa ion and u he
de elopmen o i s mili a y capabili ies.
Admi edly, i is ex emely di icul o
analyse he na u e and scope o No h
Ko ea’s a ms deals. The e is ha dly any con-
i med in o ma ion o eliable epo s. In-
s ead, he e is lo s o specula ion. In addi-
ion, Pyongyang i sel is using denials and
p opaganda o uel unce ain ies and wo s -
case ea s.
Ammuni ion o Moscow’s wa o
a i ion agains Kyi
A ille y and missiles a e Moscow’s mos
e ec i e means o wea ing Uk aine down
SWP Commen 49
Oc obe 2024
2
in he long e m. He e, Russia has clea
quan i a i e ad an ages due o i s own
s ocks and p oduc ion as well as hanks
o willing supplie s.
Rega ding a ille y, Pyongyang plays he
ole o a decisi e supplie . Acco ding o
es ima es, No h Ko ea may ha e expo ed
up o 13,000 con aine s wi h 6 million a il-
le y shells o Russia du ing he pas wo
yea s. Combined wi h i s own annual p o-
duc ion capabili ies (almos 3 million
shells), Russia would be able o use 5.5 mil-
lion a ille y shells agains Uk aine each
yea . Moscow’s sel -imposed a ge o launch-
ing 5.5 million shells/yea co esponds o
he ac ual i epowe (based on an a e age
o 15,000 shells/day acco ding o wes e n
calcula ions) ha he Russian mili a y
employed h oughou 2022 o conque and
hold la ge a eas o Uk aine. This is signi i-
can ly highe han he cu en a e age o
10,000 pe day. Uk aine would need a ound
1 million a ille y shells pe yea o i s
de ence – he US and Eu ope cu en ly p o-
duce a ound 1.2 million shells pe yea .
Fo now, No h Ko ea is p obably elying
on i s old a ille y s ockpiles o expo such
olumes – his would also explain he dud
and ailu e a e o up o 50 pe cen ha
Uk aine has documen ed. Acco ding o
Pyongyang’s own s a emen s, howe e , i s
a ms indus y is cu en ly unning a ull
speed. Sou h Ko ean es ima es assume ha
No h Ko ea is capable o p oducing a ound
2 million a ille y shells pe yea .
No h Ko ea has also supplied a leas
50 o i s mos mode n sho - ange missiles
along wi h launch ehicles – signi ican ly
ewe han he 400 missiles ha Moscow
epo edly ecei ed om Teh an. Russia is
using hese addi ional weapons o eplenish
i s missile s ockpiles, p esumably o des oy
Uk aine’s c i ical in as uc u e mo e e ec-
i ely and a a highe cos -e iciency. Un il
now, o a ge c i ical in as uc u e, Mos-
cow has mainly used d ones wi h signi i-
can ly less i epowe and ai -launched c uise
missiles, which a e much mo e expensi e
o p oduce. Using he mass o cheape mis-
siles om I an and No h Ko ea, Russia
could quan i a i ely o e whelm Uk aine’s
some imes e y success ul ai and missile
de ence sys ems.
I is di icul o calcula e how many mis-
siles No h Ko ea will deli e o Russia. The
expo ed missile sys em also se es as a ac-
ical nuclea weapons sys em agains Sou h
Ko ea and is he e o e an impo an ele-
men in Pyongyang’s de e ence pos u e.
No h Ko ea should hus wan o keep i s
deli e ies limi ed. Ye , i is s iking ha
Pyongyang is no expo ing any o i s la ge
s ockpiles o olde sho - ange missiles o
Russia. No h Ko ea is p esumably gi ing
in o Moscow’s pu chasing wishes and in
e u n is lea ning om he employmen o
i s mode n sys ems o i s own plans.
A new win-win a ms deal o
Moscow and Pyongyang
No h Ko ea’s muni ions deli e ies o Rus-
sia a e changing he quali y o hei ela-
ionship. P e iously, i was Moscow ha
indi ec ly suppo ed Pyongyang’s a ms
p og ammes and ela ed expo policy –
now No h Ko ea can o e decisi e weap-
ons i sel and demand signi ican conces-
sions. Agains his backd op, No h Ko ea
has likely succeeded in ensu ing ha he
new pa ne ship ag eemen wi h Russia
once again con ains a clause o mu ual
mili a y assis ance, which Pyongyang uses
as p oo o i s alliance wi h Russia o a
p ojec ion o powe .
The pa ne ship ag eemen also p omises
coope a ion in he a eas o nuclea ech-
nology, sa elli e echnologies, and sa elli e
launch ehicles, which would indeed be
plausible equi alen s o he ammuni ion
deli e ies. Moscow could he eby help
No h Ko ea wi h i s ambi ions o p oduce
mo e issile ma e ial ( o nuclea weapons)
and de elop i s own space-based in elli-
gence, su eillance, and econnaissance
capabili ies. While doing so, Russia could
a gue ha i s ill does no (di ec ly) suppo
Pyongyang’s nuclea weapons and missile
p og ammes.
SWP Commen 49
Oc obe 2024
3
Howe e , he mos impo an win-win
aspec o hei pa ne ship may be he
coo dina ed ci cum en ion o sanc ions
agains hem. Russia’s and No h Ko ea’s
a ms indus ies equi e ex e nal esou ces
like semiconduc o s. Bo h would he e o e
bene i om join ly expanding and secu -
ing hei smuggling businesses and ne -
wo ks. Analyses o No h Ko ean and Rus-
sian missiles deb is in Uk aine show ha
Moscow and Pyongyang a e s ill able
o p ocu e elec onic componen s in e -
na ionally.
A ms deals be ween
Teh an and Pyongyang
Russia is no Pyongyang’s only cus ome .
No h Ko ea and I an ha e long-s anding
de ence ela ions wi h coope a i e ai s.
Howe e , gi en he p og ess and successes
o hei espec i e missile p og ammes, i
is unclea whe he I an and No h Ko ea
con inue o coope a e as ex ensi ely in he
ield o missile echnologies as hey did in
he pas . Ne e heless, o a ce ain ex en ,
bo h sides could s ill bene i om coope a -
ing wi h one ano he .
Rega ding missile echnologies, Pyong-
yang could help Teh an build long- ange
missiles, such as by sha ing he engines
Figu e
SWP Commen 49
Oc obe 2024
4
wi h which No h Ko ea success ully ope -
a es i s la es in e media e and in e con i-
nen al ballis ic missiles and sa elli e launch
ehicles. Howe e , I an decla ed ha i
needs missiles wi h anges o only up o
2,000 kilome es and i al eady owns sa el-
li e launch ehicles. The e a e simila
specula ions ha Pyongyang has supplied
Teh an wi h engines o medium- o in e -
media e- ange missiles.
No ably, Teh an has no employed No h
Ko ean missiles since he I an-I aq wa ,
bu only i s own, as i did ecen ly agains
Is ael. Ye , he e a e isola ed epo s ha
Hamas, Hezbollah, and he Hou hi mili ias
also use missiles and ammuni ion o No h
Ko ean o igin. I would be plausible o
Teh an o ac as a media o and buy addi-
ional ammuni ion o hese mili ias, so
as no o o e bu den i s own s ockpiles.
I is s iking ha he e a e no subs an i e
epo s o Pyongyang and Teh an exchang-
ing in o ma ion o ma e ials in he ield o
nuclea echnology. This lack o e idence
con as s wi h known a emp s o how
No h Ko ea wan ed o p o i om expo -
ing nuclea capabili ies o Libya, Pakis an,
Sy ia, and o he loca ions ia online ma -
ke places. Should I an wish o de elop a
nuclea weapons p og amme, Pyongyang’s
capabili ies could be use ul. Teh an can
al eady p oduce weapons-g ade issile
ma e ial i sel , bu suppo on how o use
his ma e ial o build nuclea wa heads
would be a pa icula show o us by
No h Ko ea.
Con e sely, I anian assis ance in he
a eas o d one echnology and ene gy sup-
ply would be ele an o Pyongyang, bu
he e a e no hin s a such suppo . Ye , I an
could op o ewa d No h Ko ea wi h such
assis ance in e u n o mo e ammuni ion
o Hamas, Hezbollah, and he Hou his.
In he mean ime, i is in bo h coun ies’
immedia e in e es s o ci cum en in e -
na ional sanc ions and p ocu e elec onic
componen s o hei espec i e a ms
indus ies.
Policy op ions o Eu ope
To unde s and he na u e and ex en o
he indi ec h ea s o Eu ope’s secu i y
and s abili y ha No h Ko ea poses, mo e
in ensi e analyses a e equi ed. Howe e ,
his equi es mo e in ensi e in o ma ion
ga he ing and close exchange o in o ma-
ion wi hin NATO and wi h pa ne s in he
Middle Eas , Indo-Paci ic, and Cen al Asia.
The ecen ly es ablished Mul ila e al Sanc-
ions Moni o ing Team is a i s s ep in his
di ec ion, bu i equi es b oade pa ici-
pa ion.
A mo e de ailed analysis o he p oblem
is necessa y so ha he EU and indi idual
s a es in Eu ope can iden i y possible le e s
o in luence. Eu ope can ha dly p e en
No h Ko ea om co-ope a ing wi h Russia
and I an. Howe e , B ussels could c ea e
incen i es o hi d coun ies, banks, and
companies ha – knowingly o no – a e
in ol ed in No h Ko ea’s money launde -
ing, weapons deals, and p ocu emen ac i -
i ies o i s a ms indus y. Public epo ing
abou his can inc ease p essu es o ac , bu
Eu opean s a es and hei pa ne s would
need o c ea e a new, uni e sally accessible,
and sys ema ic in o ma ion basis. Uni ed
Na ions (UN) epo ing on No h Ko ea’s
sanc ions iola ions is no longe possible
since May 2024 gi en Russia’s e o powe
in he UN Secu i y Council. The EU can also
use i s exis ing dialogues, o example wi h
Indo-Paci ic s a es on non-p oli e a ion, o
his end. A mo e di ec le e would be he
expansion o ma i ime domain awa eness
and he in e dic ion o suspicious essels
in in e na ional wa e s, bu such p oac i e
measu es would equi e e en g ea e incen-
i es o dis up No h Ko ea’s a ms ade.
One app oach in his di ec ion would be o
iden i y syne gies be ween ma i ime secu-
i y and non-p oli e a ion and engage in
capaci y building wi h Paci ic pa ne s ha
bene i s bo h, he EU and i s pa ne s.
Elisabe h Suh was a esea che in he In e na ional Secu i y Resea ch Di ision un il he end o Sep embe 2024.
This pape is published as pa o he S a egic Th ea Analysis and Nuclea (Dis-)O de (STAND) p ojec .
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ISSN (P in ) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
DOI: 10.18449/2024C49
(English e sion o
SWP-Ak uell 53/2024)
