Go wa, Robe ; Lechowski, G zego z; Schneiß, Daniel
A icle
Pla o m lobbying: Policy in luence s a egies and he EU's
Digi al Se ices Ac
In e ne Policy Re iew
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Alexande on Humbold Ins i u e o In e ne and Socie y (HIIG), Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Go wa, Robe ; Lechowski, G zego z; Schneiß, Daniel (2024) : Pla o m lobbying:
Policy in luence s a egies and he EU's Digi al Se ices Ac , In e ne Policy Re iew, ISSN 2197-6775,
Alexande on Humbold Ins i u e o In e ne and Socie y, Be lin, Vol. 13, Iss. 2, pp. 1-26,
h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2024.2.1782
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/300743
S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen
Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den.
Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle
Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich
machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen.
So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen
(insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en,
gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do
genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e.
Te ms o use:
Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal
and schola ly pu poses.
You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o
exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he
in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public.
I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en
Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise
u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence.
h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/3.0/de/legalcode
Volume 13 |
Pla o m lobbying: Policy in luence
s a egies and he EU's Digi al Se ices Ac
Robe Go wa Be lin Social Science Cen e (WZB)
G zego z Lechowski F eie Uni e si ä Be lin
Daniel Schneiß Kiel Uni e si y
DOI: h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2024.2.1782
Published: 26 June 2024
Recei ed: 17 No embe 2023 Accep ed: 9 Feb ua y 2024
Compe ing In e es s: The au ho has decla ed ha no compe ing in e es s exis ha
ha e in luenced he ex .
Licence: This is an open-access a icle dis ibu ed unde he e ms o he C ea i e
Commons A ibu ion 3.0 License (Ge many) which pe mi s un es ic ed use,
dis ibu ion, and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly
ci ed. h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/3.0/de/deed.en
Copy igh emains wi h he au ho (s).
Ci a ion: Go wa, R. & Lechowski, G. & Schneiß, D. (2024). Pla o m lobbying: Policy
in luence s a egies and he EU's Digi al Se ices Ac . In e ne Policy Re iew, 13(2).
h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2024.2.1782
Keywo ds: Pla o m powe , Lobbying, Business powe , Policy in luence, Pla o m
go e nance
Abs ac : This pape examines how pla o m companies seek o lobby and o he wise in luence
policymake s du ing hea ed egula o y episodes. While he e has been some aluable ecen wo k
on di e en policy in luence s a egies deployed by pla o m i ms, in pa icula he eme ging use
o “use - acing” ac ics o consume mobilisa ion, cu en esea ch ends o neglec he ole o
speci ic ins i u ional con ex s and ela ed powe s uc u es in e media ing he exe ion o business
powe . De eloping an ins i u ionally si ua ed app oach, we o e an analysis o pla o m policy
in luence du ing he Digi al Se ices Ac (DSA) nego ia ions in he EU om 2019-2022. Th ough an
analysis o poli ical science li e a u e on business powe and in e es g oup poli ics, we ou line i e
s a egies o co po a e policy in luence (access lobbying, coali ion building, s akeholde
mobilisa ion, public ela ions, and unding). D awing on eedom o in o ma ion eques s, he EU
T anspa ency egis e , and ci il socie y wa chdog epo ing, we hen p o ide an analysis o how
pla o m i ms sough o in luence EU policymake s h ough hese s a egies a ound he DSA.
Issue 2
This pape is pa o Loca ing and heo ising pla o m powe , a special issue o In e ne
Policy Re iew gues -edi ed by Da id Niebo g, Thomas Poell, Robyn Caplan and José an
Dijck.
In oduc ion
Amids g owing public, policy, and schola ly conce n abou he inc easing socie al
in luence o p i a ely-ope a ed pla o ms, an in e disciplina y body o wo k has be-
gun mapping how echnology i ms wi h a ange o business models can exe so-
cial, economic, in as uc u al, and poli ical powe (Cohen, 2019; Cio i e al., 2022;
Van Dijck e al., 2019). Recen yea s ha e seen an inc ease in e o s o b oaden,
his o icise, and con ex ualise he a ying dimensions o pla o m powe (Culpeppe
& Thelen, 2020; Lau e & Seidl, 2021), and o si ua e i wi hin b oade global and
poli ical economic s uc u es (Rikap, 2021; P ei e , 2022; S aab, 2019).
The e is an unde s andable endency in esea ch on pla o m powe , as his special
issue demons a es, o ocus on he new and dis inc i e cha ac e is ics o oday’s
digi al ma ke s and in as uc u es and he ole ha majo pla o m i ms play
wi hin hem. Ne e heless, his ocus has a guably led ex an schola ship o unde -
emphasise how pla o m i ms wield classic o ms o co po a e in luence ha ha e
long been he subjec o esea ch in poli ical science, public policy, and ansna-
ional egula ion schola ship. Pla o m companies may be some o he mos p o -
i able and weal hies co po a e ac o s in his o y (Vaidhyana han, 2018), bu hey
should s ill be unde s ood as co po a ions ac i e wi hin he amewo k o he
global economic and poli ical sys em (Go wa, 2019; Dola a & Sch ape, 2022).
A co e componen o he poli ical powe o global co po a ions is hei abili y o
engage in “lobbying”: echniques ha exploi hei access o policymake s and eg-
ula o s o minimise he impac and cos s o new egula o y amewo ks, and shape
hem owa ds hei p e e ences and pe haps, away om ou comes ha bes adhe e
o he public in e es (Klü e e al., 2015). A small body o wo k has es ablished
how echnology i ms engage in hese ac i i ies in he US con ex (Popiel, 2018; Li,
2023). I has examined co po a e lobbying a ce ain con es ed ansna ional ech
policy junc u es, such as he nego ia ion o he Gene al Da a P o ec ion Regula-
ion, o GDPR, in he EU (A ikcan & Chalme s, 2019; Kalyanpu & Newman, 2019;
Ch is ou & Rashid, 2021). The e has also been some no able wo k add essing how
pla o m i ms a e inc easingly deploying c ea i e s a egies o echnologically- a-
cili a ed consume mobilisa ion ha go beyond classic unde s andings o lobbying
(Culpeppe & Thelen, 2020). The ques ion is: how do hese di e en s a egies i ,
2 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
concep ually and empi ically, wi hin ou unde s anding o he poli ical powe o
pla o m companies?
The goal o his a icle is o con ibu e o he deba e on he powe o pla o m
i ms h ough an explo a o y analysis o pla o m policy in luence du ing he Digi-
al Se ices Ac (DSA) nego ia ions. The DSA, ini ially p oposed in he Eu opean
Union (EU) in 2019 and signed in o law in 2022, is he EU’s majo e o m o i s
legacy in e media y liabili y egime, and is a egula o y amewo k in ended o se
new anspa ency, due p ocess, and accoun abili y ules shaping how la ge pla -
o ms mode a e he con en sha ed o hose pla o ms by hei use s (Ba helemy
& Pen a , 2020; an Hoboken e al., 2023). Th ough a syn hesis o exis ing in e -
disciplina y wo k on business powe , co po a e lobbying, and lobbying by he ech
indus y, we heo ise policy in luence as an impo an componen o poli ical pla -
o m powe . In he i s pa o he pape , we de elop a i e-pa ypology o co po-
a e policy in luence s a egies ha can be applied o he pla o m domain — ac-
cess lobbying, coali ion building, s akeholde mobilisa ion, public ela ions, and
unding. We hen d aw upon eedom o in o ma ion eques s, he EU T anspa ency
Regis e , and esea ch om co po a e in luence wa chdog o ganisa ions o explo e
how he di e se mechanisms and s a egies o policy in luence discussed in he
public policy li e a u e unc ioned wi hin he speci ic con ex o he EU’s poli ical
ins i u ions and pla o m egula ion landscape du ing he DSA nego ia ions. In he
concluding discussion, we use he case s udy insigh s o de elop some o wa d-
looking hypo heses ega ding pla o m powe and policy in luence in he unique
egula o y se ing o he Eu opean Union.
Concep ualising s a egies o policy in luence by
pla o m companies
Di ec
In poli ical science, he classic esponse om companies acing po en ially cos ly
new ules is “ oice” — unde s ood as e o s o in luence decision-make s and p e-
en new egula ions om going in o e ec (Fuchs, 2007; D ezne , 2007). Exis ing
esea ch indica es ha , in ecen yea s, pla o m companies ha e indeed unde ak-
en a ange o simila e o s a policy in luence when aced wi h disad an ageous
egula o y p oposals (Popiel, 2018, 2022). In he agenda-se ing ma ke s o he
Uni ed S a es and he Eu opean Union, he echnology sec o has ecen ly become
he bigges lobbyis o e all — spending mo e money han classic co po a e in lu-
ence sec o s like he ossil uel, obacco, pha maceu ical, and de ence indus ies
(Bank e al., 2021; Public Ci izen, 2021; Co po a e Eu ope Obse a o y, 2023a).
3 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
The key lobbying s a egy highligh ed in he li e a u e on business powe is “in-
side” o “access”-o ien ed lobbying. This kind o di ec policy in luence seeks o ob-
ain di ec con ac wi h decision-make s o shape policy ou comes (Beye s, 2004;
Weile & B ändli, 2015). He e, a i m’s employees (o specially hi ed lobbying con-
sul an s, o indus y associa ion ep esen a i es) mee di ec ly wi h policy s a ,
discussing ei he mac o le el policy s a egy o a he mic o le el, he de ails o
o ing on ce ain legisla i e e o s (Dü & Ma eo, 2013). The goal o lobbyis s is
o shape he p e e ences o key indi iduals in ol ed in he policy p ocess, ideally
ying o u n hei pe cep ion o he public in e es so ha i is aligned wi h in-
dus y posi ions (Li, 2023). Fi ms can o e “ca o s” o policymake s, such as in-
c eased in es men and jobs in he cons i uencies ha hey ep esen ; hey can al-
so make h ea s, such as pa ial o o al exi om a ju isdic ion i cos ly new ules
migh p omp a i m o eloca e o o cu o access o i s p oduc s (De B uycke &
Beye s, 2019; B ad o d, 2019).
Seemingly c ucial o he s a egy o inside lobbying a e he pe sonal connec ions
and ne wo ks ha acili a e he kinds o close access ha could change policymak-
e p e e ences and beha iou . T adi ional co po a e “inside” s a egies include
“wining and dining” policymake s and hei s a , o e ing campaign con ibu ions
o elec ed o icials, engaging in ace- o- ace policy mee ings, w i ing d a legisla-
ion, and engaging s a wi h di ec communica ion and policy eedback (Klü e ,
2013; Coen e al., 2021). To help acili a e hese e o s, he wo ld’s la ges co po-
a ions ha e long sough o employ o me poli icians and egula o s wi h bo h
knowledge o , and close con ac s o, he people and sys ems ha migh be engag-
ing in policy (Blanes i Vidal e al., 2012). The ech indus y is no excep ion, and
majo i ms p o iding pla o ms o use -gene a ed con en ha e, om India (Pe i-
go, 2020) o I eland (Fi zge ald & McDe mo , 2022), ac i ely acqui ed key o me
policy s a e s and poli icians o he ju isdic ions hey a e ac i e in. These exam-
ples go beyond jus he classic no ion o he “ e ol ing doo ” be ween ce ain in-
dus ies and go e nmen s: leading pla o m i ms a e pulling in key egula o s and
policymake s in o hei o bi no jus in he US, bu also in he global con ex .
A he same ime, poli ical science li e a u e has emphasised ha in many cases —
including in pa icula policy issues wi h high deg ees o egula o y o echnical
complexi y — policymake s may delega e policy de elopmen o indus y expe s,
allowing hem o di ec ly in luence egula ions ha bind hei own comme cial ac-
i i y (Culpeppe , 2010). Howe e , when policy issues become mo e poli icised and
publicly isible ( ha is, poli ically salien ), he s a egy o ‘quie poli ics’ and back-
oom dealings be ween indus y and go e nmen may be di icul o uphold. In
4 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
such cases, he me e in ol emen o indus y ac o s may ende a gi en policy ini-
ia i e illegi ima e in he eyes o obse e s (Kalyanpu & Newman, 2019). In he
echnology space, some indus y ac o s, knowing ha hei in luence e o s migh
be pe cei ed poo ly in he public eye, ha e sough o channel hei p e e ences
h ough hi d-pa y indus y associa ions, and o he in e media ies, allowing
g ea e anonymi y in poli ical in luence. In he Uni ed S a es, o ins ance, g oups
like Ne Choice ha e ecei ed la ge amoun s o ech unding o engage in li iga ion
agains s a e-le el pla o m egula ion (Po i z e al., 2024).
Ano he c ucial aspec o p i a e business policy in luence in ol es he o ma ion
o in e es coali ions by i ms and associa ions. One bene i de i ed om his ap-
p oach is he pooling o esou ces and expe ise among i ms (Hojnacki, 1998;
Weile & Reißmann, 2019). Fu he mo e, his s a egy helps i ms o indica e ha a
wide ange o he business and socie al ac o s a e uni ed in hei issue p e e -
ences, which may inc ease legi imacy o hei posi ions in he eyes o policymak-
e s. Some imes, coali ions can be sec e , ins ead seeking o pose as non-co po a e
a ilia ed “g ass oo s” ci il socie y ac o s ha can bols e indus y posi ions unde
a enee o independence (Walke , 2012). One classic co po a e ac ic (pa icula ly
no ewo hy o i s co e ole in he playbook o he na u al esou ce ex ac ion and
obacco indus ies) in ol es he c ea ion o “ on g oups”, which a e sponso ed by
business ac o s bu ne e heless appea as independen , ha can be used o p o-
ide addi ional channel h ough which indus y can access policymake s (Apollo-
nio & Be o, 2007).
Indi ec
In he li e a u e on business powe , all hese “inside” o ms o in luence, di ec ly
a ge ing policymake s, a e o en complemen ed by “ou side” s a egies (Beye s,
2004), which aim o in luence policy p ocesses in a mo e indi ec manne . Ou side
s a egies seek o engage a b oade ange o socie al s akeholde s and hei in e -
es s (e.g. he public a la ge, bu also mo e speci ically academics, p o essional
g oups, o jou nalis s). These s a egies o unding, agenda-se ing, issue aming,
and public ela ions seek o a ec policy agendas, shi public opinion, and sculp
he bounda ies o public deba e in a sub le manne (Beye s & De B uycke , 2013).
Co po a e ac o s pu sue hese ac ics o ga he public a en ion and make hei
p e e ences seem mo e popula and legi ima e wi h key public s akeholde g oups
(Binde k an z & Rasmussen, 2015).
One impo an example o such “ou side” s a egy o policy in luence in he pla -
o m sec o in ol es business ac o s ac i ely engaging wi h schola s and academic
5 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
o ganisa ions — and, in doing so, a ge ing esea ch ha could impac hei com-
me cial in e es s. O e all, exis ing li e a u e p o ides ich e idence o business ac-
o s sponso ing academic con e ences and p o esso ial chai s, commissioning e-
sea ch p ojec s, o engaging in di e se no ma i e, discu si e, and epis emic ac i i-
ies shaping academic wo k (Binde k an z & K oye , 2012; Da idson, 2022). Speci -
ically, pla o m i ms ha e in ce ain ci cles become in amous o e o s o shape
public pe cep ions o hei ole in poli ics and socie y (Golden ein & Mann, 2023).
One ecen example o his is academic wo k in he a ea o machine lea ning and
a i icial in elligence (Abdalla & Abdalla, 2021). A he same ime, i is impo an
o no e ha he poli ical in luence exe ed by business ac o s in such cases can be
sub le. Th ough dona ions (many o which may be “un es ic ed gi s” whe e he
i m does no di ec ly ha e con ol o e inal esea ch ou pu s o esea ch ac i i-
ies conduc ed wi h he indus y money), pla o ms ha e been said o in luence he
scope o c i iques ha leading ins i u ions, academics, and o ganisa ions a e will-
ing o ad ance publicly (Glase , 2018; Young e al., 2022), and pe haps e en os e
ela ionships o dependency be ween hem and hose o ganisa ions ha can be
exploi ed s a egically down he line (Bank e al., 2021). On op o his, pla o m
i ms ely on mo e adi ional public- acing s a egies (Walke , 2012), including ad-
e ising campaigns in p in , ele ision, and o he kinds o es ablished media.
Ano he and mo e no el “ou side” s a egy ha has been highligh ed in he ecen
pla o m li e a u e in ol es consume mobilisa ion. Culpeppe and Thelen (2020)
ha e a gued ha poli ical pla o m powe is undamen ally abou he abili y o
majo echnology companies o di ec ly each hei consume s in a so o use -
cen ic o m o ou each and policy mobilisa ion. Since many pla o m companies
ha e se ices ha si in he pocke s o billions o use s, po en ially jus a “push no-
i ica ion” away, pla o ms may choose o mobilise use s o build poli ical suppo .
This includes ac ics like “call you lawmake o oppose his law”, click- h ough
sc eens in o hei apps, o sending no i ica ions ha in o m ci izens abou a p o-
posed egula ion di ec ly (Ya es, 2023). As wi h mo e classic o ms o ou side lob-
bying, he goal he e is o wo k h ough consume s o dep ess policymake demand
o policy in e en ion. In his case, howe e , pla o ms use hei echnically-medi-
a ed linkages o cus ome s o mobilise hem poli ically as ci izens and o e s
(Culpeppe & Thelen, 2020). Locally e he ed pla o m i ms which can exploi
speci ic kinds o pla o m “complemen o s” — such as applica ion de elope s, sell-
e s, wo ke s, and o he s wi h inancial incen i es o keep using he pla o m —
ha e been pa icula ly e ec i e a using pla o m-o ien ed mobilisa ion ech-
niques du ing key policy episodes ( an Doo n, 2020).
6 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
The impac o lobbying and o he policy in luence e o s
Ac oss he wo b oad ca ego ies o di ec (policymake ocused) and indi ec (o he
s akeholde -o ien ed) policy in luence e o s we can say ha he e a e a leas
i e ideal ypical s a egies ha pla o m i ms may be expec ed o deploy when
aced wi h po en ially cos ly new ules du ing a new egula o y episode (Table 1).
TABLE 1: Typology o 5 undamen al pla o m policy in luence s a egies
GENERAL TYPE SPECIFIC
STRATEGY GOALS
Di ec - a ge ed
a policymake s
Access
lobbying
Le e age access o policymake s a a ious le els o nego ia e o /agains ce ain
policy posi ions
Coali ion
building
Build legi imacy and au ho i y o i m policy posi ions; use coali ions o inc ease
access o policymake s
Indi ec - a ge ed
a o he
s akeholde s
Mobilisa ion Le e age access o consume s and/o complemen o s o pe suade hem o engage
policymake s on a i m’s behal
Public
ela ions
Use media ed channels o communica ion o each public o segmen s o he public
o make he o ical a gumen s abou legi imacy o company and bene i s o p oduc s
Funding
C ea e inancial incen i es o o ganisa ions o ad oca e simila posi ions o i ms;
inance esea ch, e en s, and o he public- acing ou pu s ha bols e indus y
a gumen s
Bu he ques ion o how o explain he ac ual impac and e icacy o lobbying and
ela ed policy in luence s a egies is a less se led. While ci il socie y, especially
wa chdogs o co po a e lobbying ac i i y a e inclined o be pa icula ly c i ical o
co po a e e o s o ge exe hei p e e ences when new policies a e being de el-
oped, he wo k o hese g oups unde s andably has a so o selec ion bias: hei
epo s and publica ions ocus on con o e sial momen s whe e co po a ions seem
o ha e go en hei in e es s ac oss, a he han on momen s whe e hese lobby-
ing e o s ail o a e ebu ed by policymake s. We should no expec i ms o al-
ways be success ul in hei policy in luence campaigns, as no all egula o y
episodes a e he same. Ra he han concei ing o indus y as always all-powe ul,
we should expec some in luence s a egies o wo k be e in ce ain con ex s and
unde ce ain condi ions. Pla o m i ms a e no all he same: hey can be la ge o
smalle , less o mo e embedded wi hin domes ic economies, and ha e di e en
business models and p e e ences on di e en policy issues (S nicek, 2016; Tallbe g
e al., 2024).
The poli ical science li e a u e in pa icula o e s a ange o insigh s ega ding he
po en ial success o business lobbying in di e en ins i u ional con ex s and unde
a ying local and issue-o ien ed condi ions. Fi s ly, poli ical economis s ha e a -
7 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
gued ha he impac o co po a e policy in luence e o s will be media ed by
s uc u al ac o s ela ing o he speci ic i m, including cha ac e is ics such as
weal h, size, and speci ic exposu e o egula o y amewo ks (Be nhagen &
Mi chell, 2009). Na u ally, a e y la ge company wi h subs an ial inancial e-
sou ces will be able o spend mo e on bo h inside and ou side lobbying (Blanes i
Vidal e al., 2012). Financial esou ces can be used o ge p i ileged access o eg-
ula o s and lawmake s, “cap u e” hem h ough poli ical dona ions, o pull hem
ou o public se ice in o lobbying. Weal hy companies can also launch expensi e
PR campaigns, commission esea ch, and engage in o he e o s o shape public
deba e (Du & Ma eo, 2013).
Bu he esou ces o business ac o s a e no he sole ac o . Schola ship on busi-
ness powe has long emphasised he impo ance o he speci ic ins i u ional and
poli ical-economic con ex on lobbying success. Fo ins ance, i ms wi h a la ge
domes ic economic p esence (con ibu ing signi ican ly o domes ic economic ac-
i i y h ough employmen and o he means) can o en le e age his as an asse in
accessing in luen ial policymake s (D ezne , 2007; Mikle , 2018). In he case o he
EU’s poli ical sys em, hese kinds o powe esou ces o i ms will ne e heless be
media ed by he complexi ies o he bloc’s mul i-le el go e nance sys em (Klü e ,
2013); in gene al, some EU lobbying schola ship has a gued ha he EU’s s uc u e
ends i sel owa ds comp omises be ween business and go e nmen posi ions,
a he han he “winne - ake-all” ou comes in he US (Mahoney, 2008). Fu he -
mo e, gi en ha mos la ge pla o m i ms a e mul ina ional companies wi h hei
global headqua e s ou side o he EU, hey may ace a disad an age as “ o eign”
i ms wi h less s uc u al embeddedness (con ibu ions o domes ic GDP, o em-
ploymen ) in domes ic Eu opean economies han ei he Eu opean ech playe s o
compe ing i ms in adjacen sec o s (e.g. he adi ional media ecosys em) ha see
pla o ms as po en ial h ea s o hei business model (Flew e al., 2021; Nielsen &
Gan e , 2022).
Finally, impo an is also a speci ic con igu a ion o in e es s a play on a pa icula
policy issue. This includes bo h speci ic policymake p e e ences a he a ying
le els o lawmaking (Pe a naud, 2021; Hee man, 2023) as well as he a ying con-
igu a ions o indus y in e es s. Ra he han ea ing “big ech” and he pla o m
indus y as a monoli h, we mus conside he a ying po en ial ways in which pla -
o m in e es s di e ge ac oss i ms, including due o di e en business models,
g ow h s a egies, and po en ially e en headqua e s/na ional allegiances. Mo e
en e p ise-o ien ed i ms like Mic oso o en ha e di e en posi ions on ech poli-
cy issues han consume -o ien ed (and use -gene a ed con en o ien ed) i ms like
8 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
Because hese ypes o o ganisa ions do no need o publicly disclose hei inanc-
ing, anspa ency g oups exp essed conce n ha his on g oup s a egy was ex-
ploi ing a loophole in he EU’s lobbying anspa ency ules. Allied o S a ups was
only one o se e al p o-s a up o ganisa ions ha would become ac i e on he
DSA and DMA, and he “SMEs agains he DSA” s a egy was also being le e aged
by la ge indus y associa ions in mee ings wi h he Commission and he Eu opean
Pa liamen . Du ing he Pa liamen ’s consul a ions on he DSA ex , se e al MEPs
wen o he media complaining ha mul iple indus y associa ions we e ‘‘impe -
sona ing SMEs while ailing o be open abou he big ech i ms ha led o
bank olled hei o ganisa ions’’ (Rankin, 2023, n.p.).
An analysis o he DSA nego ia ion p ocess shows ha a ew o he ansna ional
coali ions became ac i e in e ms o di ec ou each o policymake s. Fo ins ance,
in No embe 2020 Spo i y policy s a eached ou o he on de Leyen cabine o
sha e a new o ganisa ion hey had launched called he “Coali ion o App Fai ness”,
an in e na ional se o ade associa ions and businesses ha ely on app s o es o
each consume s (“wi h a ocus on Apple”).12 The coali ion b ough oge he some
no able Eu opean ech i ms (P o onmail, Deeze ) wi h he legacy powe o he Eu-
opean publishe s (Eu opean Publishe s Council, News Media Eu ope), as well as
some no able Apple-c i ical playe s om he US (like Epic Games). These smalle
playe s p o ide an example o al e na i e, medium ech coali ions ac i ely lobby-
ing he Commission o s onge ules ha would imp o e hei posi ions is-à- is
he la ge ga ekeepe s, a he han seeking o wa e down ules o head o ce ain
p o isions in he DSA package.
Shaping public opinion
In e es ingly, al hough he pla o m indus y sough o cul i a e ies o policymak-
e s and build coali ions ha could push back agains ce ain a gumen s a ound he
DSA Package, i did no a emp o in luence his key policy deba e h ough s a e-
gies ha sough o le e age consume -o ien ed aspec s o pla o m powe . In con-
as o wha migh be expec ed ollowing he eme ging li e a u e on use -o ien -
ed mobilisa ion e o s (Culpeppe & Thelen, 2020; Ya es, 2023), Me a, Google,
Amazon, TikTok, Apple, X, and o he i ms did no send push no i ica ions o Eu o-
pean consume s, display banne s o o he menus declaiming he po en ial ha ms
o impending Eu opean egula ion o hei use s in he EU, o o he wise seek o
channel hei connec ion o he public o in luence he eli e policy deba e on he
12. Email om Spo i y o An hony Whelan, da ed No embe 28 2020, a ailable a Ask heEU, (Spo i y,
2020).
15 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
DSA/DMA.
Ins ead, he indus y sp ead i s a gumen ha he DSA would c ea e economic
ha ms o he Eu opean economy in he ime-honou ed way: h ough public ela-
ions campaigns di ec ed a he public, unde aken h ough adi ional media
channels. Fo example, Amazon was busy du ing he DSA and DMA nego ia ions
seeking o manage i s public image, seeking in pa icula o push back agains
moun ing public epo s as well as egula o y inqui ies in o poo wo king condi-
ions in he company’s logis ics ope a ions, and allega ions ha i s pla o m down
anked hi d-pa y selle s and copied hei mos popula p oduc s ia i s in-house
AmazonBasics b and ( an Do pe, 2019). The company spen mo e han 8 million
Eu o o a p in campaign in Ge man newspape s in 2021 alone — mo e han dou-
ble i s inside lobbying expendi u es in B ussels o ha yea (see Du y, 2022; Lob-
byFac s, 2024c).
Simila ly, Facebook an almos 7 million Eu o o newspape ads ela ed o he DSA
package in Ge many in he i s 9 mon hs o 2021, an es ima ed 2.5 million o
which emphasised how small businesses elied on Facebook pages o each hei
cus ome s (Co po a e Eu ope Obse a o y, 2022). Google appea s o ha e also un
a small media campaign in Ge many on “Zukun Handel” ( he u u e o e ail), a -
guing ha he i m’s p oduc s help, a he han hu , small e ail shops in he dying
ci y cen e high s ee s.13
Some o he mos in ensi e public ela ions campaigns seemed o ha e no a ge -
ed he gene al public, howe e , bu a he speci ic cons i uencies o ech policy ex-
pe s ac i ely in ol ed in he DSA deba e. Me a and Amazon appea o ha e un
a ge ed ads on Facebook and Twi e ha would be se ed o lookalike audiences
buil om he ollowings o he c i ical Poli ico jou nalis s Lau a Kayali and Ma k
Sco (Co po a e Eu ope Obse a o y, 2022), as well as indi iduals in Belgium p o-
iled by he pla o ms o ha e “in e es s” in “poli ics and cu en e en s” and “go -
e nmen policy”.14 Ra he han seeking o pe suade hese audiences mo e gene al-
ly ha he pla o m company in ques ion was a gene ally posi i e poli ical ac o ,
ins ead he companies appea o ha e made na owe a gumen s ha bols e ed
some o hei co e lines o a gumen agains he DSA — o ins ance, ha “mo e
han 50% o small businesses su eyed ha used Facebook apps said doing so
helped hem a ac new cus ome s in he pandemic”, o ha “Amazon has helped
13. See some in o ma ion abou he campaign p o ided by Google, unde Google (n.d.).
14. See he wee h ead om a s a e in he Eu opean Pa liamen who was se ed some o hese ads
unde Oos hoek (2021).
16 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
many small businesses p ospe ”.15
To s eng hen hei epis emic posi ion and make a gumen s abou he po en ial
nega i e implica ions o ce ain p o isions in he DSA Package, indus y also de-
ployed he classic lobbying echnique o di ec ly unding esea ch and o ganising
e en s ela ing o he p oposal. A p ominen example can be seen in he Google-
unded s udy published in mid-2020 by he Eu opean Cen e o In e na ional Po-
li ical Economy (ECIPE), which sough o model he economic impac s o he (a
ha poin specula i e) DSA. Al hough he ac ual d a ex o he DSA had no ye
been published by he Commission, he pape specula ed ha he DSA migh lead
o ‘‘a loss o abou 85 billion EUR in GDP and 101 billion Eu o in los consume
wel a e’’ (Na ayanan & Lee-Makyiama, 2020, p. 2). This igu e, and a gumen o
p ospec i e economic ha m ha was echoed consis en ly in 2020, as ep esen a-
i es om many o he majo pla o ms spoke on panels in B ussels discussing he
new digi al policy’s ou look (Co po a e Eu ope Obse a o y, 2020).
Discussion
The Digi al Se ices Ac is a high-s akes egula ion which p omises no only o
ha e a signi ican impac on he ope a ions o he la ges pla o m businesses, bu
which may also po en ially se e as a so o empla e o o he ju isdic ions like
he GDPR has done (B ad o d, 2023). As subs an ial epo ing and ci il socie y ob-
se a ions ha e shown, pla o m companies om all ju isdic ions ha e been in-
ol ed o a ying deg ees in ying o shape he egula ion and minimise he e en-
ual impac ha i has on hei business models.
Empi ically esea ching lobbying and o he policy in luence ac i i ies p esen s sig-
ni ican challenges. Pa o his ela es o he issue o obse abili y: much ac i i y
happens ou side he public domain, wi h lobbying happening “inside” policymake
o ices in closed-doo mee ings. When lobbying egis e s exis , as hey do in he
EU, he e a e o en weak en o cemen mechanisms ensu ing ha i ms ac ually
disclose all o hei ele an mee ings p omp ly and accu a ely (Al e -EU, 2009), so
esea che s and ci il socie y inhe en ly a e wo king wi hin ce ain s uc u al limi s
o wha hey can know. E en he use o c ea i e echniques, iling eedom o in o -
ma ion access eques s, is inhe en ly limi ed by he abili y o bu eauc acies o
edac he mos sensi i e (and po en ially in e es ing!) in o ma ion (Walby &
La sen, 2012).
15. Ibid.
17 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
A second challenge ela es o measu ing he impac and ou comes o policy in lu-
ence e o s. To pa aph ase a s a emen o en ci ed in ad e ising ci cles, i is pos-
sible ha “hal he money spen on policy in luence by pla o ms is was ed — bu
do hey know which hal ?” In his esea ch, we ha e no a emp ed o empi ically
assess he po en ial e ec s o a ious a ge ed digi al ad e ising o p in PR cam-
paigns un by speci ic pla o m i ms on he o e all p e e ences o he eli e o pub-
lic a ge s in ques ion, o ied o documen whe he hese indi iduals may hen
ha e con ibu ed o he DSA nego ia ions in some angible way. The e is a s agge -
ing po en ial ange o di e en ac o p e e ences on a policy like he DSA ac oss
di e en i ms in di e en sec o s, di e en ypes o ci il socie y o ganisa ions, di -
e en pa s o he Eu opean Commission, Pa liamen , Council, and membe s a es,
all o whom a e ac i ely seeking o shape he inal ex . We ha e no sough o
sys ema ically map hese p e e ences and causally isola e how hey, and hus he
DSA’s inal o m, we e shaped h ough con ac wi h pla o ms, indus y coali ions,
o o he (po en ially ech-media ed o ech- unded) ac o s.
Such esea ch p ojec s may p o e o be impossible: he poli ics and social phe-
nomena a play he e a e inc edibly complex, and he de il ega ding he eal “e -
ec s” o indus y lobbying will likely be in he de ails o implemen a ion and en-
o cemen . We ha e p o ided an explo a ion o s a egies ha some majo pla -
o m companies deployed when seeking o in luence he DSA Package, o e ing an
o e iew o hese di e en ac ics and an a gumen ha hese s a egies need o
be examined h ough an eye owa ds he local ins i u ional con ex .
As a as we can ell, consume - acing in luence has no been a majo pa o he
poli ical playbook deployed by leading pla o m i ms seeking o shape he DSA.
This obse a ion con as s wi h he expec a ions o some ecen wo k ha has
highligh ed his s a egy as he cen al ac ic ha he pla o m indus y uses o
bu ess hei powe (Culpeppe & Thelen, 2020). The e do no appea o ha e
been push no i ica ions sen o Eu opean ci izens ia Ins ag am, Facebook, o
Wha sapp declaiming he DSA; we did no ind epo s o display banne s o o he
o ms o a ge ed use ou each p oclaiming he ad an ages o he web- acking
business model and o se ices hese i ms p o ide o consume s. Ins ead, we see a
mo e classic business powe oolki , wi h access lobbying and coali ion building
appea ing o be he co e o Amazon, Me a, Google, Spo i y, and o he i ms’ e o s,
wi h some ailo ed ou side s a egies sp inkled in on op.
Why migh his be he case? E iden ly, he Eu opean con ex p o ides in e es ing
s uc u al w inkles ha make i a di e en poli ical ba leg ound han he US con-
ex . Fi s ly, he e could be a ma e ial explana ion: do pla o ms hink — o pe -
18 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
haps expec , due o in e nal polling o o he ypes o esea ch — ha hei p e e -
ences a e no ully aligned wi h hei gene al consume s in Eu ope? Eu opean con-
sume s may easibly be mo e p o-p i acy, p o-labou , and (pe haps) mo e an i-pla -
o m han hose in he US (see e.g. Fa ell & Newman, 2019). Ha e EU ci izens
been p imed agains ech a gumen s by a Eu opean policy discou se su used wi h
o he coun e ailing na a i es, such as s a egic, economic, and (geo)poli ical a -
gumen s ha po ay “big ech” i ms as unaccoun able o eign ac o s, a he han
consume allies (Pohle & Theil, 2020; Lechowski & K zywdzinski, 2022)?
The e could also be an ins i u ional eason why pla o ms chose no o wo k
h ough consume s on he DSA Package, ins ead op ing o y o le e age small
and medium en e p ises as hei key allies ha could be mobilised agains policy-
make p e e ences. The Eu opean sys em is a complex mul ile el one, and key pol-
icymake s a he Eu opean Commission a e no di ec ly linked o elec o al con-
s i uencies in he way ha na ional le el elec ed o icials a e. Did pla o ms hink
ha consume s would no be as e ec i e allies on he DSA package? O pe haps
ha hey wouldn’ be able o claim he suppo o Eu opean consume s in he
same way as hey can in o he ju isdic ions, gi en o he ac o s like he p esence
o Eu opean consume igh s o ganisa ions ha we e ac i ely mobilising agains
hem? Mo e wo k will be equi ed o help us be e unde s and how di e en ins i-
u ional playing ields condi ion indus y in e es s, hei abili y o success ully de-
ploy ce ain policy na a i es, and meaning ully build coali ions wi h consume s
and o he policy s akeholde s (Seidl, 2020). We hope ha u he esea ch will
con inue o build on he eme ging li e a u e on pla o m in luence, and p esen us
wi h mo e empi ical insigh in o he condi ions unde which hese s a egies a e
mo e o less e ec i e a helping pla o ms achie e hei poli ical goals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Au ho o de was de e mined andomly excep he i s au ho , who coo dina ed
he p ojec . Au ho con ibu ions: Robe Go wa: p ima y concep ualiza ion,
esea ch design and in es iga ion, w i ing and e iewing, edi ing. G zego z
Lechowski: p ima y concep ualiza ion, esea ch design and in es iga ion, w i ing
and e iewing; Daniel Schneiß: p ima y empi ical in es iga ion, concep ualiza ion,
w i ing and e iewing.
We’d like o hank he special issue edi o s o hei guidance and eedback on his
pape and ex end special hanks o Thomas Poell, Niels an Doo n, and Pawel
Popiel o hei hough ul commen s on a ious s ages o his pape . Thanks as
well o Janine de Ve a o esea ch assis ance and addi ional da a collec ion
19 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
suppo a he WZB.
Re e ences
Abdalla, M., & Abdalla, M. (2021). The g ey hoodie p ojec : Big Tobacco, Big Tech, and he h ea on
academic in eg i y. P oceedings o he 2021 AAAI/ACM Con e ence on AI, E hics, and Socie y, 287–297.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1145/3461702.3462563
Alliance o Lobbying T anspa ency and E hics Regula ion. (2009). The Commission’s lobby egis e
one yea on: Success o ailu e? [Repo ]. Al e -EU. h ps://www.al e -eu.o g/si es/de aul / iles/docum
en s/ egis e -assessmen -a e -one-yea .pd
Allied Fo S a ups. (n.d.). P ess eleases. h ps://allied o s a ups.o g/p ess- elease/
Amazon Public Rela ions Team. (2021, June 25). Digi al Se ices Ac expe panel – Eu opean
Pa liamen Commi ee on In e nal Ma ke and Consume P o ec ion (IMCO). Amazon News. h ps://w
ww.abou amazon.eu/news/policy/digi al-se ices-ac -expe -panel-eu opean-pa liamen -commi e
e-on-in e nal-ma ke -and-consume -p o ec ion-imco
Apollonio, D. E., & Be o, L. A. (2007). The c ea ion o indus y on g oups: The obacco indus y
and “ge go e nmen o ou back”. Ame ican Jou nal o Public Heal h, 97(3), 419–427. h ps://doi.o g/
10.2105/AJPH.2005.081117
A ikcan, E. Ö., & Chalme s, A. W. (2019). Choosing lobbying sides: The Gene al Da a P o ec ion
Regula ion o he Eu opean Union. Jou nal o Public Policy, 39(4), 543–564. h ps://doi.o g/10.1017/
S0143814X18000223
Bank, M., Du y, F., Leyendecke , V., & Sil a, M. (2021). The lobby ne wo k: Big Tech’s web o in luence
in he EU [Repo ]. Co po a e Eu ope Obse a o y and LobbyCon ol e.V. h ps://co po a eeu ope.o
g/en/2021/08/lobby-ne wo k-big- echs-web-in luence-eu
Be nhagen, P., & Mi chell, N. J. (2009). The de e minan s o di ec co po a e lobbying in he
Eu opean Union. Eu opean Union Poli ics, 10(2), 155–176.
Be e a, E., & G alle , G. (2020, Oc obe 28). Commen Google eu ai e plie B uxelles [How
Google in ends o make B ussels bend]. Le Poin .
Be hélémy, C., & Pen a , J. (2020). Pla o m egula ion done igh : EDRi posi ion pape on he EU
Digi al Se ices Ac [Posi ion pape ]. Eu opean Digi al Righ s. h ps://ed i.o g/wp-con en /uploads/2
020/04/DSA_EDRiPosi ionPape .pd
Beye s, J. (2004). Voice and access: Poli ical p ac ices o Eu opean in e es associa ions. Eu opean
Union Poli ics, 5(2), 211–240.
Binde k an z, A. S., & K øye , S. (2012). Cus omizing s a egy: Policy goals and in e es g oup
s a egies. In e es G oups & Ad ocacy, 1, 115–138. h ps://doi.o g/10.1057/iga.2012.6
Binde k an z, A. S., & Rasmussen, A. (2015). Compa ing he domes ic and he EU lobbying con ex :
Pe cei ed agenda-se ing in luence in he mul i-le el sys em o he Eu opean Union. Jou nal o
Eu opean Public Policy, 22(4), 552–569. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008553
20 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
Blanes i Vidal, J., D aca, M., & Fons-Rosen, C. (2012). Re ol ing doo lobbyis s. Ame ican Economic
Re iew, 102(7), 3731–3748.
Bobie , J.-F., Coulin, A.-D., Po incaso, M., & Leg is, A. (2022). Can Eu ope c ea e i s own deep- ech
gian s? [Repo ]. Bos on Consul ing G oup. h ps://www.bcg.com/publica ions/2022/how-can-eu op
e-build-deep- ech-leade s
B ad o d, A. (2019). The B ussels e ec : How he Eu opean Union ules he wo ld. Ox o d Uni e si y
P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780190088583.001.0001
B ad o d, A. (2023). Digi al empi es: The global ba le o egula e echnology. Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001
Cabine o Execu i e Vice-P esiden Ma g e he Ves age & HERE echnologies. (2020). Follow up on
ou discussion om Wednesday Ma ch 18, 2020. h ps://www.ask heeu.o g/de/ eques /8731/ espons
e/29479/a ach/5/16%201%20ARES%202020%201971428%20HERE%20Technologies%20 hank%2
0you%20and%20con ibu ion%20pape %20on%20digi al%20skills%20gap%20email%20Redac e
d.pd .
Ch is ou, G., & Rashid, I. (2021). In e es g oup lobbying in he Eu opean Union: P i acy, da a
p o ec ion and he igh o be o go en. Compa a i e Eu opean Poli ics, 19(3), 380–400. h ps://doi.o
g/10.1057/s41295-021-00238-5
Cio i, J. W., Kenney, M. F., & Zysman, J. (2022). Pla o m powe and egula o y poli ics: Polanyi o
he wen y- i s cen u y. New Poli ical Economy, 27(5), 820–836. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/13563467.2
022.2027355
Coen, D., Ka sai is, A., & Vannoni, M. (2021). Business lobbying in he Eu opean Union. Ox o d
Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780199589753.001.0001
Cohen, J. E. (2019). Be ween u h and powe : The legal cons uc ions o in o ma ional capi alism.
Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780190246693.001.0001
Culpeppe , P. D. (2010). Quie poli ics and business powe : Co po a e con ol in Eu ope and Japan.
Camb idge Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1017/CBO9780511760716
Culpeppe , P. D., & Thelen, K. (2020). A e we all Amazon p imed? Consume s and he poli ics o
pla o m powe . Compa a i e Poli ical S udies, 53(2), 288–318. h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/0010414019
852687
Da idson, S. (2022). Public a ai s and lobbying. Public ela ions and he unequal con es s o
cons uc he public in e es . In D. Pomppe , K. R. Place, & K. C. Wea e (Eds.), The Rou ledge
companion o public ela ions (1s ed.). Rou ledge. h ps://doi.o g/10.4324/9781003131700
de B uycke , I., & Beye s, J. (2019). Lobbying s a egies and success: Inside and ou side lobbying in
Eu opean Union legisla i e poli ics. Eu opean Poli ical Science Re iew, 11(1), 57–74. h ps://doi.o g/1
0.1017/S1755773918000218
Dola a, U., & Sch ape, J.-F. (2022). Pla o m a chi ec u es. The s uc u a ion o pla o m companies on
he in e ne (Resea ch Con ibu ions o O ganiza ional Sociology and Inno a ion S udies)
[Discussion pape ]. h p://dx.doi.o g/10.2139/ss n.4018396
D ezne , D. W. (2007). All poli ics is global: Explaining in e na ional egula o y egimes. P ince on
Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.2307/j.c 7s 6p
Du y, F. (2022, No embe 30). Schlech e A bei sbedingungen: Millionenschwe e Imagekampagne
21 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
on Amazon [Poo wo king condi ions: Amazon’s image campaign wo h millions]. Lobby Con ol. h
ps://www.lobbycon ol.de/mach -de -digi alkonze ne/millionenschwe e-imagekampagne- on-amaz
on-104995/
Dü , A., & Ma eo, G. (2013). Gaining access o going public? In e es g oup s a egies in i e
Eu opean coun ies. Eu opean Jou nal o Poli ical Resea ch, 52(5), 660–686. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/1
475-6765.12012
Eu opean Commission. (2023). Summa y Repo on he open public consul a ion on he Digi al Se ices
Ac Package [Consul a ion esul s]. h ps://digi al-s a egy.ec.eu opa.eu/en/lib a y/summa y- epo -
open-public-consul a ion-digi al-se ices-ac -package
Eu opean Union. (2020). EVP Ves age mee ing wi h Facebook [B ie ing]. Eu opean Commission. h p
s://www.ask heeu.o g/en/ eques /8731/ esponse/29479/a ach/64/8%204%20A es%202020%2016
63393%20B ie ing%20EP%20Ves age %20M g%20wi h%20Facebook%2017%20Feb ua y%20202
0%20Scene%20se e %20REV1%20Redac ed.pd .
Eu opean Union. (2024b). T anspa ency Regis e —Apple. h ps:// anspa ency- egis e .eu opa.eu/sea
ch egis e -o -upda e/o ganisa ion-de ail_en?id=588327811384-96
Eu opean Union. (2024a). T anspa ency Regis e —Google. h ps:// anspa ency- egis e .eu opa.eu/sea
ch egis e -o -upda e/o ganisa ion-de ail_en?id=03181945560-59
Facebook. (2020). Facebook esponse o EC public consul a ion on he Digi al Se ices Ac (DSA)
[Consul a ion documen ]. h ps://abou . b.com/de/wp-con en /uploads/si es/10/2020/09/FINAL-FB-
Response- o-DSA-Consul a ions.pd
Fa ell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). O p i acy and powe : The ansa lan ic s uggle o e eedom and
secu i y. P ince on Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.2307/j.c c77d1
Fi zge ald, C., & McDe mo , S. (2022, No embe 11). Re ol ing doo : Re ealing he ela ionship
be ween go e nmen o icials and lobbyis s. The Jou nal. h ps://www. hejou nal.ie/ e ol ing-doo -l
obbyis s-5898070-No 2022/
Flew, T., & Gille , R. (2021). Pla o m policy: E alua ing di e en esponses o he challenges o
pla o m powe . Jou nal o Digi al Media & Policy, 12(2), 231–246. h ps://doi.o g/10.1386/jdmp_000
61_1
Fuchs, D. (2007). Business powe in global go e nance. Lynne Rienne Publishe s. h ps://doi.o g/10.1
515/9781685853716
Giblin, R., & Doc o ow, C. (2022). Chokepoin capi alism: How o bea big ech, ame big con en , and
ge a is s paid. Beacon P ess.
Glase , A. (2018, Ap il 19). The wa chdogs ha didn’ ba k. Sla e Magazine. h ps://web.a chi e.o g/
web/20180420031706/h ps://sla e.com/ echnology/2018/04/why-a en -p i acy-g oups- igh ing-
o- egula e- acebook.h ml
Golden ein, J., & Mann, M. (2023). Tech money in ci il socie y: Whose in e es s do digi al igh s
o ganisa ions ep esen ? Cul u al S udies, 37(1), 88–122. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/09502386.2022.20
42582
Google. (n.d.). Fü unse e S äd e und die Viel al : Google und de Handels e band un e s ü zen den
Einzelhandel [Fo ou ci ies and di e si y: Google and he ade associa ion suppo he e ail sec o ]. h
ps://abou .google/in l/de_ZZ/s o ies/googlehde/
22 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
Go wa, R. (2019). The pla o m go e nance iangle: Concep ualising he in o mal egula ion o
online con en . In e ne Policy Re iew, 8(2), A icle 2. h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2019.2.1407
Go wa, R. (2024). The poli ics o pla o m egula ion: How go e nmen s shape online con en
mode a ion. Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780197692851.001.0001
Go wa, R., & Peez, A. (2020). Big ech hi s he diploma ic ci cui : No m en ep eneu ship, policy
ad ocacy, and Mic oso ’s Cybe secu i y Tech Acco d. In D. B oede s & B. an den Be g (Eds.),
Go e ning cybe space: Beha iou , powe , and diplomacy (pp. 263–284). Rowman & Li le ield. h p
s://doi.o g/10.31235/os .io/g56c9
Hee mann, M. (2024). Ci il libe ies o economic eedom? The poli ical space o In e ne policy in
he Eu opean Pa liamen , 1999–2014. Jou nal o Eu opean Public Policy, 31(5), 1368–1395. h ps://d
oi.o g/10.1080/13501763.2023.2175019
Hojnacki, M. (1998). O ganized in e es s’ ad ocacy beha io in alliances. Poli ical Resea ch Qua e ly,
51(2), 437–459. h ps://doi.o g/10.2307/449085
Kalyanpu , N., & Newman, A. L. (2019). The MNC-Coali ion pa adox: Issue salience, o eign i ms
and he Gene al Da a P o ec ion Regula ion. JCMS: Jou nal o Common Ma ke S udies, 57(3),
448–467. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/jcms.12810
Kemme ling, M., & T ampusch, C. (2022). Digi al powe esou ces (DPR): The poli ical economy o
s uc u al and in as uc u al business powe in digi al(ized) capi alism. Socio-Economic Re iew,
21(4), 1851–1876. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/se /mwac059
Klü e , H. (2013). Lobbying in he Eu opean Union: In e es g oups, lobbying coali ions, and policy
change. Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/acp o :oso/9780199657445.001.0001
Klü e , H., B aun, C., & Beye s, J. (2015). Legisla i e lobbying in con ex : Towa ds a concep ual
amewo k o in e es g oup lobbying in he Eu opean Union. Jou nal o Eu opean Public Policy,
22(4), 447–461. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008792
Lau e , M., & Seidl, T. (2021). Regula ing he Eu opean da a-d i en economy: A case s udy on he
Gene al Da a P o ec ion Regula ion. Policy & In e ne , 13(2), 257–277. h ps://doi.o g/10.1002/poi
3.246
Lechowski, G., & Go wa, R. (2022). EU pla o m egula ion and indus y lobbying: Explo ing he
s uc u es o in e es o ganiza ion in he con es ed policy ield. SASE — F ac ious connec ions: Ana chy,
ac i ism, coo dina ion, and con ol, Ams e dam.
Lechowski, G., & K zywdzinski, M. (2022). Eme ging posi ions o Ge man i ms in he indus ial
in e ne o hings: A global echnological ecosys em pe spec i e. Global Ne wo ks, 22(4), 666–683. h
ps://doi.o g/10.1111/glob.12380
Leyendecke , V., & Du y, F. (2023, July 10). Amazon Deu schland: Ein mäch ige Lobbyak eu bleib
un e dem Rada [Amazon Ge many: A powe ul lobbyis emains unde he ada ]. Lobby Con ol. h
ps://www.lobbycon ol.de/mach -de -digi alkonze ne/amazon-deu schland-ein-maech ige -lobbya
k eu -bleib -un e -dem- ada -109913/
Li, W. Y. (2023). Regula o y cap u e’s hi d ace o powe . Socio-Economic Re iew, 21(2), 1217–1245.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/se /mwad002
LobbyFac s. (2024c). Amazon Eu ope Co e SARL [Da aca d]. h ps://www.lobby ac s.eu/da aca d/ama
zon-eu-sa l? id=366117914426-10
23 Go wa, Lechowski, Schneiß
LobbyFac s. (2024a). Google [Da aca d]. h ps://www.lobby ac s.eu/da aca d/google? id=031819455
60-59
LobbyFac s. (2024b). Me a Pla o ms I eland Limi ed and i s a ious subsidia ies [Da aca d]. h ps://w
ww.lobby ac s.eu/da aca d/ acebook-i eland-limi ed? id=28666427835-74
LobbyFac s. (n.d.). Welcome o LobbyFac s—Exposing lobbying in he Eu opean ins i u ions. h ps://ww
w.lobby ac s.eu
Lomas, N. (2023, No embe 3). Me a’s la es p i acy ip-o will es he EU’s me le o eining in
Big Tech. TechC unch. h ps:// echc unch.com/2023/11/03/me a-ad- ee-subsc ip ion- s-eu-dma-ds
a/
Mahoney, C. (2008). B ussels s. The Bel way: Ad ocacy in he Uni ed S a es and he Eu opean Union.
Geo ge own Uni e si y P ess. h ps://www.js o .o g/s able/j.c 2 58
Me a News oom. (2023). Facebook and Ins ag am o o e subsc ip ion o no ads in Eu ope [P ess
elease]. h ps://abou . b.com/news/2023/10/ acebook-and-ins ag am- o-o e -subsc ip ion- o -no-
ads-in-eu ope/
Mikle , J. (2018). The poli ical powe o global co po a ions. Poli y P ess.
Na ayan, B., & Lee-Makiyama, H. (2020). Economic cos s o ex an e egula ions (Occasional Pape
07–2020). Eu opean Cen e o In e na ional Poli ical Economy.
Nielsen, R. K., & Gan e , S. (2022). The powe o pla o ms: Shaping media and socie y. Ox o d
Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780190908850.001.0001
Oos hoek, A. [@a_oos hoek]. (2021, No embe 23). Jus ook a close look a my Twi e a chi e.
Re eals well why I’m ge ing ons o ad e s om big ech [X pos ]. X. h ps://x.com/a_oos hoek/s a u
s/1463183388219559938/pho o/3
Pe a naud, C. (2021). A s ep back o look ahead: Mapping coali ions on da a lows and pla o m
egula ion in he Council o he EU (2016-2019). In e ne Policy Re iew, 10(2), 1–21. h ps://doi.o g/
10.14763/2021.2.1566
Pe igo, B. (2020, Augus 28). Facebook’s ies o India’s uling pa y complica e i s igh agains ha e
speech. Time. h ps:// ime.com/5883993/india- acebook-ha e-speech-bjp/
P ei e , S. (2022). Digi al capi alism and dis ibu i e o ces. ansc ip Ve lag. h ps://www. ansc ip -
e lag.de/978-3-8376-5893-4/digi al-capi alism-and-dis ibu i e- o ces/
Philip, U. (2023). Sch i liche F agen an die Bundes egie ung im Mona Feb ua . F age N . 2/505
[W i en ques ions o he Fede al Go e nmen in Feb ua y 2023. Ques ion no. 2/505] [Le e o P.
Meise ]. h ps://www.bmwk.de/Redak ion/DE/Pa lamen a ische-An agen/2023/02/2-505.pd ?__blo
b=publica ionFile& =4
Pohle, J., & Thiel, T. (2020). Digi al so e eign y. In e ne Policy Re iew, 9(4). h ps://doi.o g/10.1476
3/2020.4.1532
Popiel, P. (2018). The ech lobby: T acing he con ou s o new media eli e lobbying powe .
Communica ion, Cul u e and C i ique, 11(4), 566–585. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/ccc/ cy027
Popiel, P. (2022). Digi al pla o ms as policy ac o s. In T. Flew & F. R. Ma in (Eds.), Digi al pla o m
egula ion (pp. 131–150). Palg a e Macmillan. h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/978-3-030-95220-4_7
Po i z, I., Riley, T., & Bi nbaum, E. (2024, Feb ua y 22). B ash ech lobby d i es social media ba les
24 In e ne Policy Re iew 13(2) | 2024
