Citations refer to the original publication, not to a Scieee localized version.
Jiang, S. (2023). Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games. International Journal of Game Theory, 53(1), 43–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5
Jiang, Shaofei. “Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games.” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 53, no. 1, 2023, pp. 43–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5.
Jiang, Shaofei. “Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games.” International Journal of Game Theory 53, no. 1 (2023): 43–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5.
Jiang, S. (2023) ‘Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games’, International Journal of Game Theory, 53(1), pp. 43–70. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5.
S. Jiang, “Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 43–70, 2023, doi: 10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5.
@article{jiang2023equilibrium,
author = {Jiang, Shaofei},
title = {Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2023},
volume = {53},
number = {1},
pages = {43--70},
publisher = {Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer,Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5}
}