Locally-rooted directors

Kind, Axel; Volon é, Ch is ophe
A icle — Published Ve sion
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
Re iew o Quan i a i e Finance and Accoun ing
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Sp inge Na u e
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Kind, Axel; Volon é, Ch is ophe (2024) : Locally- oo ed di ec o s, Re iew o
Quan i a i e Finance and Accoun ing, ISSN 1573-7179, Sp inge US, New Yo k, NY, Vol. 63, Iss. 2, pp.
633-678,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s11156-024-01266-4
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1 3
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Locally‑ oo ed di ec o s
AxelKind1· Ch is opheVolon é2
Accep ed: 8 Ma ch 2024 / Published online: 14 Ap il 2024
© The Au ho (s) 2024
Abs ac
We s udy he in luence o locally- oo ed di ec o s (LRDs)—boa d membe s wi h pe sonal
ies o a company’s geog aphic loca ion—on i m pe o mance. On he one hand, LRDs
may p o ide aluable local know-how and access o local ne wo ks. On he o he hand,
as hei appoin men s may go back o social ies wi h inside s (e.g., co po a e di ec o s,
op execu i es, o la ge sha eholde s), LRDs may be used o ex ac en s and lack el-
e an expe ience, business skills, and independence. Using he di ec o s’ alma ma e as a
p oxy o local oo s, LRDs u n ou o be hea ily o e ep esen ed, making up 30% o all
di ec o s in ou sample. We show ha LRDs a e nega i ely ela ed o Tobin’s Q. Howe e ,
his inding does no apply o domes ically-o ien ed companies, i.e., i ms wi hou ma e ial
o eign sales, and i ms in egula ed indus ies. Thus, while he esul s indica e ha LRDs
ha m i m pe o mance on a e age, hei p esence may be op imal in some cases.
Keywo ds Co po a e go e nance· Boa d o di ec o s· Social ies· Fi m alue
JEL Classi ica ion G30· G34
1 In oduc ion
Bad co po a e pe o mance is o en asc ibed o weaknesses in co po a e go e nance in
gene al and poo boa d composi ion in pa icula (see, e.g., Shlei e and Vishny 1997;
Daily e al. 2003). The lack o boa d di ec o s’ independence and business skills may lead
o weak moni o ing, poo manage ial ad ice, and subop imal s a egic decisions (see, e.g.,
Adams e al. 2010, and Johnson e al. 2013, o wo su eys on he impo ance o he boa d
o di ec o s). In his pape , we s udy he di ec o s’ local oo s as an addi ional dimension
in he composi ion o co po a e boa ds. We conside di ec o s o be locally oo ed i hey
possess pe sonal ies—gained ia ele an li e expe ience— o he egion whe e a i m is
headqua e ed.
* Ch is ophe Volon é
ch is ophe. [email p o ec ed]
Axel Kind
ax[email p o ec ed]
1 Uni e si y o Kons anz, Uni e si ä ss asse 10, 78457Kons anz, Ge many
2 Uni e si y o Basel, Pe e Me ian-Weg 6, 4002Basel, Swi ze land
634
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
Local oo s may ha e wo opposing e ec s on i m pe o mance. On he one hand,
acco ding o Resou ce Dependence Theo y (P e e and Salancik 1978), locally- oo ed
di ec o s (LRDs) may p o ide access o impo an local know-how and expe ience, as well
as aluable links o he company’s ex e nal en i onmen , such as municipal au ho i ies,
supplie s, inancing ins i u ions, and o he local s akeholde s, making hem pa icula ly
e ec i e and aluable boa d membe s. On he o he hand, acco ding o Agency Theo y
(Jensen and Meckling 1976); Fama and Jensen 1983), LRDs may be appoin ed because o
hei pe sonal ela ionships wi h co po a e inside s, such as he CEO, boa d membe s, o
con olling sha eholde s (see e.g., Cheung e al. 2013). These social ies may p e en hem
om being uly independen and ac ing as e ec i e moni o s. Gi en hese coun e ailing
hypo heses, he ele ance and he ac ual in luence o LRDs on i m pe o mance is a ma e
o empi ical esea ch.
The pape con ibu es in se e al ways o he g owing li e a u e on (op imal) boa d cha -
ac e is ics. Fi s , we add o his li e a u e by p oposing di ec o s’ local oo s as an addi-
ional dis inc i e dimension in he a ay o ea u es ha de e mine he con ibu ion o
co po a e boa ds and hei membe s o i m ou pu s. Fo ins ance, ecen esea ch has high-
ligh ed he in luence o boa d di e si y (e.g., Chen e al. 2023a; Xie e al. 2024), di ec-
o s’ co-op ion (e.g., Chen e  al. 2023b), boa d o e con idence (Twa dawski and Kind
2023), and di ec o s’ mili a y expe ience (e.g., Nawaz and Nawaz 2024) on i m ou pu s.
The e ec s o local oo s on i m pe o mance ela e bo h o Resou ce Dependence Theo y
(posi i e e ec s due o local know-how and access o powe ul local ne wo ks) and Agency
Theo y (nega i e e ec s due o lack o independence, commi men o local communi ies,
and lack o moni o ing skills), which ep esen he wo mos p ominen and success ul he-
o ies o explaining he pe o mance o co po a e boa ds (see, e.g., Johnson e al. 2013).
Impo an ly, LRDs (and he easons o choosing hem) signi ican ly di e bo h om (non-
locally- oo ed) domes ic di ec o s and om o eign di ec o s. In pa icula , he la e a e
known o be selec ed o hei coun y-speci ic know-how by i ms wi h subs an ial o -
eign ope a ions, an in e na ional sha eholde base, and c oss-bo de acquisi ion in en ions
(Masulis e al. 2012; Mile ko e al. 2017; Xiang e al. 2023). In con as o bo h domes-
ic di ec o s and o eign di ec o s, LRDs may p o ide speci ic local know-how and be e
access o in o ma ion and esou ces in he local communi y. Howe e , due o hei pe sonal
ela ions and hei commi men o local communi ies, LRDs may gi e mo e a en ion o
he in e es s o local s akeholde s han o hose o sha eholde s (e.g., in decisions on he
eloca ion o p oduc ion si es ha in ol e lay-o s o he local wo k o ce). This con lic o
in e es does no exis in ha o m wi h he o he wo ypes o di ec o s.
Second, we p o ide a simple way o measu ing di ec o s’ local oo s by ocusing on he
ma ch be ween he headqua e s’ loca ion and a di ec o ’s alma ma e . The use o educa-
ional ins i u ions as a p oxy o cul u al p oximi y is inspi ed by he wo k o Cohen e al.
(2008), Nguyen (2012), F acassi and Ta e (2012), Ishii and Xuan (2014), and Schmid
(2015) who use he common educa ional ins i u ion as a p oxy o social ies among indi-
iduals (indi idual-indi idual ela ions). In his pape , we acknowledge he impo ance o
he alma ma e in he pe sonal de elopmen o indi iduals bu use i o cap u e he linkages
o a di ec o o he i m’s headqua e s egion (indi idual-headqua e s’ loca ion ela ions).
Thi d, we con ibu e o a s and o esea ch ha emphasizes ha boa ds a e endoge-
nously o med ins i u ions designed o deal wi h i m-speci ic challenges (He malin and
Weisbach 2003; Pa han and Skully 2010). Simila o s udies ha ques ion he idea ha
“one size i s all” (see, e.g., Coles e al. 2008; Lehn e al. 2009) and a gue ha ce ain
boa d cha ac e is ics a e alue-inc easing o some i ms bu no o o he s, we in es iga e
whe he he e ec o locally- oo ed di ec o s on i m alua ion a ies in he c oss-sec ion,
635
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
depending on i m cha ac e is ics ela ed o he heo e ically-g ounded e ec s o local
oo s.
To in es iga e he phenomenon o locally- oo ed di ec o s (LRDs) and hei in luence
on i m alua ion, we ca y ou ou esea ch in Swi ze land—a coun y ha o e s se e al
unique and a o able ea u es o he pu poses o ou s udy. Fi s , Swi ze land is cha ac e -
ized by a pa icula ly p onounced cul u al di e si y and s ong local peculia i ies (o en
e e ed o as “Kan önligeis ”, i.e., “can onal spi i ”). Second, due o i s ede al s uc u e,
decisions a e o en made on low hie a chical le els, which makes local oo s (and hus
amilia i y wi h he local en i onmen ) a aluable asse . Thi d, i s compa a i ely small
geog aphic ex ension le s a el ime likely play a mino ole in he choice o di ec o s:
he dis ance be ween S . Gallen on he eas e n bo de and Gene a on he wes e n bo de
amoun s o only 360km, o 224 miles, less han ou hou s by ei he ca o ain. Finally,
he dis ibu ion o companies’ headqua e s ac oss i s main egions is ema kably e en (see
Sec .3.1: Sample). The cul u al he e ogenei y o Swi ze land can be aced back o i s 26
ede al s a es (can ons), i s ou o icial languages,1 he mul i ude o local dialec s,2 and he
eligious spli in Ca holicism and P o es an ism.3 Hence, especially in Swi ze land local
oo s o co po a e di ec o s a e dis inc i e and well measu able while a el ime and geo-
g aphic dis ances may unlikely es ic he pool o po en ial co po a e di ec o s and play a
majo ole in choosing hem.
Ou esul s indica e ha LRDs a e highly o e ep esen ed in co po a e boa ds, mak-
ing up almos 30% o boa d membe s. Fo example, in Hügli Holding, an in e na ional
ood company based in S einach, 15km om S . Gallen, i e ou o se en di ec o s g adu-
a ed om he Uni e si y o S . Gallen: one wi h a deg ee in banking, one wi h a deg ee in
economics, one wi h a Ph.D. deg ee in s a egic managemen , and wo wi h a law deg ee.
Second, and mos impo an ly, he ac ion o LRDs is nega i ely ela ed o i m pe o -
mance as measu ed by Tobin’s Q. The esul is pa icula ly s ong o expo -o ien ed
i ms, sugges ing ha LRDs gene a e ne cos s in i ms whe e he local business is o mino
impo ance. On he con a y, he e is no signi ican ela ionship be ween LRDs and i m
pe o mance o companies wi hou ele an o eign sales and o companies in egula ed
indus ies, sugges ing ha boa ds wi h an o e ep esen a ion o LRDs may ma ch he needs
o hose i ms. The esul s hold e en a e accoun ing o a la ge se o common con ols
and using he Uni e si y loca ions as ins umen s o he pe cen age o LRDs.
The emainde o he pape is s uc u ed as ollows. Sec ion2 p o ides a e iew o he
ela ed li e a u e and de elops he esea ch hypo heses o be es ed. Sec ion3 desc ibes he
da a and p esen s he esul s. Sec ion4 concludes wi h a summa y.
1 The ou o icial languages in Swi ze land a e (in dec easing o de o dispe sion): Ge man, F ench, I al-
ian, and Romansh.
2 The e a e abou 1800 Ge man local dialec s in Swi ze land (see Lameli e al. 2020).
3 The las ci il wa in Swi ze land ook place in 1847 and eme ged om a con lic be ween he mo e u al,
conse a i e, Roman Ca holic can ons and he mo e u ban, libe al, and mos ly P o es an , can ons and
ended in he Swiss Fede al Cons i u ion o 1848. Today, 36% o he Swiss a e Roman Ca holic and 24% a e
P o es an (Sou ce: CIA––The Wo ld Fac book: h ps:// www. cia. go / lib a y/ publi ca io ns/ he- wo ld- ac b
ook/ index. h ml).
636
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
2 Rela ed li e a u e andhypo heses
In his s udy, we ocus on he impo ance o LRDs and hei link o i m pe o mance.
Boa ds o di ec o s ha e di e en du ies—mos no ably moni o ing, ad ising managemen ,
and se ing he s a egy—in ela ion o which hei compe encies, skills, and cha ac e is ics
mus be de ined and assessed. The e o e, sha eholde s should spend conside able ime and
esou ces e alua ing, selec ing, and ( e-)elec ing boa d di ec o s a annual gene al mee -
ings. In p ac ice, howe e , di ec o s a e o en p oposed and elec ed on he boa d o o he
easons, including hei ela ionship wi h he CEO, boa d membe s, and con olling sha e-
holde s, o because o hei s a us and epu a ion (see, e.g., Cohen e al. 2012).
Local oo s may be pa o he speci ic se o skills ha ma e o he ideal p o ile o
boa d membe s. Fo example, locally- oo ed di ec o s may ha e access o aluable local
ne wo ks. Al e na i ely, LRDs may be elec ed jus because o hei local acquain ance-
ships, which would educe hei social independence and, consequen ly, hei moni o ing
e o s. A p io i, LRDs may, he e o e, ha e ei he a posi i e o a nega i e (ne ) in luence
on i m pe o mance.
2.1 Posi i e aspec s o local oo s
As sugges ed by he Resou ce Dependence Theo y (P e e and Salancik 1978), LRDs may
be bene icial o i ms o se e al easons. Fi s , an impo an ea u e o co po a e di ec-
o s is hei access o ne wo ks, i.e., he numbe , impo ance, and s eng h o hei linkages
o he i m’s ex e nal en i onmen and s akeholde s (e.g., cus ome s, supplie s, inancing
ins i u ions, o go e nmen al and egula o y ins i u ions). As a gued by Koenig and Gogel
(1981), locally- oo ed boa d membe s may ha e be e access o in o ma ion and esou ces
in he local communi y whe e he company is headqua e ed. In his espec , LRDs may
p o ide added alue o he boa d by o e ing highe -quali y ad iso y se ices o manage-
men . Fo example, hey a e likely be e lobbyis because o hei p i ileged ela ions wi h
local au ho i ies and ins i u ions. This can be bene icial in a a ie y o si ua ions, such as
public ende calls, nego ia ions ela ed o he expansion o plan s, es uc u ings o ope a-
ions, he ag eemen on se e ance schemes in he a e ma h o layo s, and in ob aining
a o able ax ea men s (Hillman e  al. 1999; Faccio e  al. 2006; Duchin and Sosyu a
2012). In compliance wi h his iew, Goldman e al. (2013) show ha poli ically connec ed
di ec o s inc ease p ocu emen con ac s (see also Guo e al. 2021). Such p i ileged ela-
ionships may well exis hanks o LRDs. LRDs may also p o ide ne wo ks o local sup-
plie s, he chambe s o comme ce, o e en impo an local celeb i ies. Fu he , as legal
dispu es a e usually esol ed by local cou s, knowing locally-acc edi ed p osecu o s and
lawye s can be ad an ageous. This is especially c i ical in ede a ed coun ies whe e many
decisions a e made a he local le el. Local oo s may help build up social capi al wi hin
a i m and he eby posi i ely a ec i m pe o mance. Along hese lines, La Po a e al.
(1997) a gue ha social capi al con ibu es o i m alue and a ises om ne wo ks, no ms,
and mu ual ecogni ion. LRDs a e also mo e awa e o he coun y-speci ic expec a ions,
du ies, and esponsibili ies o boa d membe s (Fi oozi e al. 2019).
Second, an addi ional posi i e aspec o LRDs may lay in he ac ha hey inc ease
mu ual us bo h inside and ou side he boa d, i.e., be ween he i m and s akeholde s (e.g.,
employees, s a e, and NGOs) (see, e.g., Wes phal 1999). Mu ual us inside he boa d is
likely o educe moni o ing cos s (see Zak and Knack 2001). T us among people who a e

637
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
cul u ally simila is also highe han amongs cul u ally dissimila people (see, e.g., Guiso
e  al. 2009). In his espec , common local oo s dec ease unce ain y and in o ma ion
asymme y among boa d membe s and be ween he boa d and he CEO, he eby lowe ing
coo dina ion cos s (Cai e al. 2017).
Thi d, geog aphical closeness is ano he posi i e ea u e o LRDs. LRDs a e likely o
li e close o he headqua e s. Alam e al. (2014) ind ha he dis ance be ween he di ec-
o s’ esiden ial add ess and he headqua e s in luences hei in o ma ion ga he ing cos s,
leading o a ade-o be ween di ec o expe ise and in o ma ion-ga he ing cos s. Masulis
e al. (2012) show ha o eign independen di ec o s a e nega i ely ela ed o bo h i m
pe o mance and he in ensi y o moni o ing as measu ed by he a endance o boa d mee -
ings, CEO compensa ion, and he equency o CEO u no e . They eason ha he dis-
ance o o eign di ec o s o he headqua e s gene a es o e sigh cos s. Fo such di ec-
o s, ga he ing in o ma ion abou he i m, a coun y’s economy and business p ac ices,
he legal en i onmen , and he ins i u ional en i onmen in gene al is mo e cos ly. Mazu
and Salganik-Shoshan (2017) show ha he geog aphic p oximi y o ins i u ional in es-
o s acili a es in e pe sonal connec ions and p i a e communica ion among hem, which
in u n induces i ms o inc ease incen i e-based compensa ion. Di ec o s wi h local oo s
may also be mo e accessible o inpu s om coo dina ing ins i u ional in es o s. Acco d-
ingly, Le ne (1995) shows ha en u e capi alis s a e less likely o si on boa ds o dis an
i ms as moni o ing in ensi y is especially high in s a -ups.
Finally, ela ed o he S ewa dship Theo y (Donaldson and Da is 1991), LRDs may also
ac al uis ically and in he i m’s bes in e es because hei mo i a ion inc eases wi h hei
iden i ica ion wi h he egion and i s s akeholde s. As LRDs iden i y hemsel es wi h he
company and he local communi y and likely eel obliged o help os e hei egion’s eco-
nomic de elopmen , hey should be pa icula ly commi ed o he i m’s success and in in-
sically mo i a ed o exe e o in his di ec ion. In ac , such in insic mo i es may also
in luence a di ec o ’s decision o join he boa d in he i s place (De Jong e al. 2014). As
poin ed ou by Masulis and Mobbs (2014), epu a ional issues may play an impo an ole
in explaining why g adua es o a local uni e si y a e mo e likely o se e on he boa d o a
closely loca ed i m han on mo e p es igious boa ds.
2.2 Nega i e aspec s o local oo s
While he posi i e ea u es o locally- oo ed di ec o s a e mos ly ela ed o hei ad ising
ole, he majo i y o aspec s ha may ha e an ad e se e ec on i m alue a e associa ed
wi h hei moni o ing ask. Fi s , om an Agency Theo y pe spec i e, he boa d’s o e-
mos ask consis s in moni o ing he managemen in he sha eholde s’ bes in e es s. Fo
an unbiased con ol o he i m’s esou ces, di ec o s’ independence is c ucial (see Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Agency cos s a ise om he con lic o in e -
es be ween manage s and sha eholde s. Sel -in e es ed manage s may engage in a long
lis o ac i i ies ha bene i hemsel es, bu ha m sha eholde s: building empi es (Jensen
1986), en o cing excessi e pay packages (Be and and Mullaina han 2001), en enching
hemsel es (Shlei e and Vishny 1989), shi king (Be and and Mullaina han 2003), o
using co po a e esou ces o p i a e consump ion (Ye mack 2006). The adi ional iew
o di ec o s’ independence ocuses on he ma e ial ela ionships wi h he i m. I de ines
638
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
di ec o s as ei he inside s o ou side s (independen di ec o s). Non-independen ou sid-
e s a e o en denomina ed as “g ay” o “a ilia ed” di ec o s. Independen boa ds a e gen-
e ally conside ed o be be e moni o s and he eby imp o e i m pe o mance. Howe e ,
e en con en ionally de ined independen di ec o s can lack ue independence by ha ing
close ela ionships o iendships wi h key execu i es. As a consequence o weake moni-
o ing, execu i es may be eplaced oo la e o paid oo much, which may ha m sha ehold-
e s (Adams and Fe ei a 2007). The p oblem o dependen , o cap u ed, boa d membe s
is pa icula ly se e e i he CEO has a s ong powe in he di ec o s’ nomina ion p ocess
(Shi dasani and Ye mack 1999). Resea che s ha e s a ed o in es iga e he p esence o
e en mo e sub le social ies among co po a e di ec o s o wi h CEOs (see, e.g., Da is e al.
2003; Conyon and Muldoon 2006; Hwang and Kim 2009; Cohen e al. 2012; Tan e al.
2021). Fo example, Hwang and Kim (2009) measu e he di ec o s’ (in)dependence om
he CEO by conside ing hei social ies a ising om he same alma ma e , sha ed mili-
a y se ice, egional o igin, discipline o s udy, and indus y expe ience and a e able o
link hem o he s eng h o hei moni o ing ac i i y. Nguyen (2012) shows ha social ies
be ween CEOs and di ec o s dec ease he p obabili y o CEOs being dismissed a e poo
pe o mance. The ele ance o social ies be ween business ac o s has also been examined
in o he ci cums ances. Fo ins ance, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show ha social ies be ween
acqui e s and a ge s ha e an ad e se e ec on he pe o mance o me ge s. Because LRDs
may ha e social ies o o he (local) boa d membe s, con olling sha eholde s, o he CEO,
hey may es ain boa d independence and may, he e o e, ha m i m pe o mance. In pa -
icula , social ies be ween con olling sha eholde s and di ec o s may c ea e a ce ain
dependency ha induces he la e o help he o me o ex ac p i a e bene i s o con ol.
Fo example, di ec o s may decide ha a company shall inancially suppo pe p ojec s
o con olling sha eholde s (e.g., a s o spo s). In his espec , LRDs may be nomina ed
because o hei social ies a he han hei capabili y o moni o op execu i es.
Second, locally- oo ed di ec o s may be mo e commi ed o local s akeholde s han o
hei iducia y du ies as di ec o s (see Böhle e al. 2010). Fo example, hey may e ain
om closing an unp o i able plan o om swi ching o a be e supplie . Fu he mo e,
LRDs may lack ele an indus y-speci ic and in e na ional expe ience, access o global
ne wo ks, and gene al business skills compa ed o o he candida es in he b oade sup a-
egional pool o po en ial co po a e di ec o s (see, e.g., Masulis e al. 2012; Oxelheim e al.
2013; D obe z e al. 2018).
Thi d, in he spi i o his pape , Knyaze a e al. (2013) use he size o he pool o local
di ec o s (measu ed as he numbe o U.S. non inancial i ms headqua e ed nea a gi en
i m) as an ins umen o boa d independence. Boa d independence is shown o be highe
when he pool o po en ial di ec o s is la ge . Thus, i ms ha ely on he a he na ow
local ma ke o di ec o s may miss he oppo uni y o ind uly independen di ec o s.
Finally, om a social psychological pe spec i e, he Simila i y-A ac ion Theo y pos-
i s ha indi iduals and g oups ha e p e e ences o people who esemble hemsel es (By ne
and G i i 1973). Simila i y can e e o psychological cha ac e is ics (e.g., sha ed alues o
mindse s) o demog aphic ai s (e.g., gende o educa ional backg ound). Top managemen
eams a e inclined o ep oduce hemsel es (Zajac and Wes phal 1996; Nielsen 2009). In
ac , while new di ec o s a e ul ima ely elec ed by sha eholde s a gene al mee ings, candi-
da es a e nomina ed by he incumben boa d membe s. C onyism and “homophily” wi hin he
boa d may hampe i s e ec i eness (McPhe son e al. 2001). In his con ex , LRDs may be an
impo an ac o o boos ing ep oduc ion endencies wi hin boa ds. Di ec o s selec ed on he
639
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
boa d because o hei simila i y will no aise po en ially con o e sial opinions ha a e no in
line wi h he expec ed iew o he g oup. Such uni o mi y could ha m i m pe o mance and
is an a gumen agains he so-called “old boys ne wo k” (see, e.g., Adams and Fe ei a 2009).
In such si ua ions, di ec o s may lowe hei e o s, ecei e highe compensa ion, enjoy inge
bene i s (e.g., by o ganizing boa d mee ings in luxu ious su oundings), and p o ec each o he
om c i ical assessmen s and (po en ial) liabili y claims.
2.3 Hypo heses
As a gued in Sec .2.1, LRDs may p o ide impo an linkages o he i m’s (local) ex e nal
en i onmen and know-how in he local economy. These posi i e ea u es can lead o a high
ep esen a ion o LRDs on he boa d o di ec o s. Howe e , as elabo a ed in Sec .2.2, hei
appoin men s may also e lec , a leas in some ci cums ances, he manage ial in en o educe
boa ds’ moni o ing and ex ac p i a e bene i s. No wi hs anding he mo i es o appoin ing
LRDs, we expec hem o be in high demand. We he e o e o mula e he i s hypo hesis as
ollows:
H1 Locally- oo ed di ec o s a e o e ep esen ed in co po a e boa ds.
On a e age, we expec he bene i s o LRDs (enhanced ad iso y skills due o local know-
how and links o local poli ical, economic, and egula o y ins i u ions) o ou weigh hei
po en ial cos s (weake moni o ing due o lowe independence). Thus, we hypo hesize he
ollowing:
H2 Locally- oo ed di ec o s a e posi i ely ela ed o i m pe o mance.
The boa d o di ec o s has been a gued o be an “endogenously de e mined ins i u ion”
(He malin and Weisbach 2003, p. 9). The e o e, he op imal composi ion o he boa d depends
on he i m cha ac e is ics and he business en i onmen . In pa icula , in an in e na ional busi-
ness domain, he bene i s o local know-how and local linkages should become compa a i ely
less ele an , while in e na ional expe ience and access o global ne wo ks—cha ac e is ics
ha LRDs a e likely o lack—should become mo e impo an (Masulis e al. 2012; Oxelheim
e al. 2013). Fo ins ance, as in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms end o be la ge and, he e o e,
end o ely mo e hea ily on non-local sou ces o inancing, he alue con ibu ion o LRDs
in his ype o i ms should be lowe . Thus, as a subse o companies in ou sample a e highly
ac i e in in e na ional ma ke s, LRDs in hose companies may c ea e cos s ha exceed he
bene i s o hei local oo s. We, he e o e, o mula e he ollowing hypo hesis.
H3 In in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms, locally- oo ed di ec o s a e nega i ely ela ed o i m
pe o mance.
On he con a y, he bene i s o local know-how and local linkages should become com-
pa a i ely mo e impo an in egula ed indus ies, whe e LRDs can ully exploi hei p i i-
leged access o local ne wo ks o in luence he decisions o local au ho i ies. Due o he s ong
dependence on egula ing au ho i ies, he supe io lobbying skills o well-connec ed, locally-
oo ed di ec o s should be o pa icula use in egula ed indus ies. In ac , Helland and Syku a
(2004) ind ha egula ed i ms ha e mo e di ec o s wi h a poli ical backg ound. Fu he ,
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A.Kind, C.Volon é
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Goldman e al. (2009) show ha poli ically-connec ed di ec o s ha e a posi i e impac on i m
alue. We, he e o e, o mula e he ollowing hypo hesis.
H4 In egula ed indus ies, he con ibu ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s o i m pe o -
mance is pa icula ly la ge.
3 Da a and a iables
3.1 Sample
In his s udy, we analyze he e ec o locally- oo ed di ec o s on i m pe o mance. We
de i e di ec o s’ local oo s om hei educa ional backg ound. The app oach is simila o
he one used by se e al schola s o measu ing social ies ia mu ual educa ional ins i u-
ions (see, e.g., Cohen e al. 2010; Nguyen 2012; F acassi and Ta e 2012; Ishii and Xuan
2014; Schmid 2015). In ou case, we conside a di ec o as locally oo ed i he g adu-
a ed om he uni e si y closes o he company’s headqua e s. I is no ewo hy ha o
Swiss companies wi h mul iple p oduc ion si es, he o icial headqua e s o en se es as
he p ima y physical locus o hei business ope a ions. This is he place whe e op man-
agemen mee s, majo decisions a e made, and he co po a e cul u e de elops. Mo eo e , i
is common p ac ice o annual mee ings o be held in p oximi y o hese headqua e s. The
loca ion o he co po a e headqua e s ypically e lec s he company’s his o ical oo s, e-
quen ly aligning wi h he si e o he company’s ounding and occasionally e en he bi h-
place o i s ounde s. These headqua e s ha e o en emained he company’s cen al hubs
since hei incep ion.4 Consequen ly, he headqua e s no only symbolizes he iden i y o
a ci y o own bu also embodies deep- oo ed adi ional ies wi h he local communi y.
This connec ion is mani es ed in a ious o ms, such as sponso ship ac i i ies and lobbying
e o s.
Ou de ini ion o local oo s o e s se e al ad an ages. Fi s , i is easily a ailable as i
can be collec ed om he di ec o s’ esumes published in annual epo s. Second, i ep e-
sen s an objec i e and measu able c i e ion. Thi d, while i does no conside all possibili-
ies o build up local oo s, i ensu es ha a di ec o classi ied as locally oo ed has been
exposed o a ce ain local en i onmen o a leas h ee yea s in an age cha ac e ized by a
s eep lea ning cu e.
4 In ou da ase o 2035 i m-yea obse a ions, we obse ed 13 ins ances o headqua e s eloca ions,
including one case whe e a company e u ned o i s o iginal headqua e s. In se en o hese eloca ion
e en s, he change o headqua e s loca ion did no a ec hei p oximi y o uni e si y egions, as he new
loca ions we e s ill nea he same uni e si ies. O he six emaining eloca ions, h ee occu ed due o me g-
e s. Typically, such me ge s esul in signi ican adap ions in boa d composi ion due o changes in owne -
ship. In wo o he o he h ee ins ances, he e we e no locally- oo ed di ec o s on he boa d ei he be o e
o a e he eloca ion. The only case whe e a eloca ion ma e ially impac ed ou ocus a iable was wi h
Valo a Holding L d. In 2008, he sha eholde s decided o mo e he egis e ed o ice o he ope a ional si e.
This a ypical si ua ion, whe e he his o ical egis e ed o ice was di e en om he p oduc ion si e, led o an
inc ease in he p opo ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s om 20 o 40%.
647
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
4 Empi ical esul s
4.1 O e ep esen a ion o locally‑ oo ed di ec o s
We s a he empi ical analysis by measu ing he o e ep esen a ion o locally- oo ed
di ec o s who g adua ed om any o he se en uni e si ies and he wo ede al echnical
uni e si ies in Swi ze land loca ed in one o he se en main uni e si y egions we conside
in his s udy. Following G inbla and Keloha ju (2001), we calcula e o e ep esen a ion by
di iding o all Swiss companies in a gi en egion (e.g., Basel) he a e age numbe o local
g adua es on he boa d (e.g., o he boa d o Roche Holding AG, g adua es om Uni-
e si y o Basel) by he a e age numbe o di ec o s who g adua ed om his uni e si y.
Table3 shows ha in all egions he di ec o s wi h a local uni e si y deg ee a e hea ily
20 %
22 %
24 %
26 %
28 %
30 %
32 %
34 %
Locally oo ed di ec o s
Fig. 2 De elopmen o locally- oo ed di ec o s
Table 3 Summa y s a is ics documen ing o e ep esen a ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s (H1)
The able p esen s he o e ep esen a ion o 9 Swiss uni e si y g adua es and hei ep esen a ion on
boa ds in di e en egions in Swi ze land. The igu es ep esen he di e ence be ween he numbe o g ad-
ua es in he egions and he Swiss a e age
Numbe o
i m-yea s
Uni e si y Fede al
Technical
Uni e si y
Region Basel Be n F ibou g Gene a Lausanne S . Gallen Zu ich ETH EPF
Basel 315 4.1 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.5
Be n 189 0.8 2.4 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.2
F ibou g 36 1.5 0.0 8.8 2.6 1.6 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0
Gene a 121 0.5 0.4 0.7 5.5 1.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.6
Lausanne 191 0.0 0.5 1.8 2.2 6.2 0.6 0.5 0.8 7.0
S . Gallen 184 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.2 2.6 1.3 1.0 0.0
Zu ich 999 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.2

648
A.Kind, C.Volon é
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o e ep esen ed (in bold). The esul s suppo Hypo hesis 1, acco ding o which locally-
oo ed di ec o s a e o e ep esen ed in co po a e boa ds. Simila ly o he “home bias” in
s ock owne ship, which depends on amilia i y, dis ance, language, and cul u e (see, e.g.,
Co al and Moskowi z 1999; G inbla and Keloha ju 2001), he e is, po en ially, also a
local bias in he selec ion o boa d membe s. Al hough Swi ze land is a compa a i ely
small coun y and dis ances should likely play a mino ole in di ec o selec ions, he ma -
ke o boa d di ec o s seems o be subjec o a s ong cul u al segmen a ion. In ou sample,
almos 30% o all di ec o s can be de ined as locally- oo ed di ec o s.
As indica ed in Fig.2, he p opo ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s on boa ds dec eased
in he las en yea s. By accep ing he iew ha boa ds o di ec o s a e endogenous and
op imally de e mined (He malin and Weisbach 2003), his d op sugges s ha he alue o
locally- oo ed di ec o s has diminished o e he yea s.
Table 4 Tobin’s Q and locally- oo ed di ec o s (H2)
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea
obse a ions. Clus e - obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and
10% le els is indica ed by ***, **, *, espec i ely
Independen Va iables Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II)
(In e cep ) 1.45949 (***) 1.62315 (***)
(0.395) (0.407)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s −0.40381 (***)
(0.118)
Size −0.02539 −0.03317 (*)
(0.019) (0.019)
Sales g ow h 0.10134 0.12886
(0.191) (0.192)
Fi m age −0.01253 0.00127
(0.034) (0.033)
P o i abili y 3.75637 (***) 3.80576 (***)
(0.526) (0.510)
Liquidi y 0.72868 (***) 0.73495 (***)
(0.234) (0.229)
In es men s 3.33021 (***) 3.07806 (***)
(1.014) (0.979)
Tangibili y −1.11394 (***) −1.02349 (***)
(0.174) (0.176)
R&D 1.64828 (***) 1.65490 (***)
(0.454) (0.435)
Le e age 0.20420 0.14189
(0.195) (0.188)
Fixed e ec s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s
Adjus ed R251.77% 52.92%
649
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
4.2 Locally‑ oo ed di ec o s and i m pe o mance: baseline model
Table 4 p esen s eg ession esul s on he ela ionship be ween Tobin’s Q and locally-
oo ed di ec o s using clus e - obus Hube /Whi e s anda d e o s. Con olling o indus y
e ec s, ime ends, and a ba e y o con ols, he esul s sugges ha locally- oo ed di ec-
o s a e nega i ely ela ed wi h i m pe o mance. In pa icula , all else being equal, boa ds
wi h a en pe cen age poin s la ge ac ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s a e associa ed wi h
lowe Tobin’s Q by 4.04 (Model III) o 5.55 (Model IV) pe cen age poin s. Pu di e en ly,
mo ing om a ac ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s equal o he i s qua ile (11%) o he
hi d qua ile (43%) lowe s he p edic ed Tobin’s Q by 12.82 pe cen age poin s (based on
Model III) o 17,61 pe cen age poin s (based on Model IV). Thus, he ela ion be ween
locally- oo ed di ec o s and Tobin’s Q is signi ican bo h in s a is ical and in economic
e ms. The e o e, we ha e o ejec Hypo hesis 2, which is ha locally- oo ed di ec o s
a e posi i ely ela ed o i m pe o mance. Thus, despi e he nume ous good easons o
appoin ing LRDs o co po a e boa ds (see Sec .2.1), he empi ical indings sugges ha in
he a e age i m, he nega i e aspec s o LRDs (mos likely ela ed o hei weake moni-
o ing and lack o skills and expe ience, see Sec .2.2) domina e on he ma gin.
4.3 Locally‑ oo ed di ec o s and i m pe o mance: ins umen al a iables
app oach
Alongside he omi ed- a iable bias, e e se causa ion is ano he po en ial sou ce o endo-
genei y. Highe i m pe o mance may induce i ms o seek di ec o s om mo e dis an
egions (e en om ab oad) ins ead o locally- oo ed di ec o s, because he o me may
possess ele an expe ience and specialis know-how ha he la e likely lack. To add ess
his issue, we use he se en uni e si y loca ions in Swi ze land as ins umen s o LRDs
and es ima e ou model using 2SLS. We belie e ha Uni e si y loca ions in Swi ze land
a e alid ins umen s as hey likely comply wi h he IV’s ele ance condi ion and exclusion
condi ion.
Acco ding o he ele ance condi ion, he chosen ins umen —in ou case he uni e -
si y egions—mus be s ongly co ela ed wi h he endogenous explana o y a iable, in ou
case he ac ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s. O he wise, he IV es ima es become biased
and ine icien , and he esul ing in e ence may be un eliable. On heo e ical g ounds, we
expec he ac ion o LRDs in a i m o be in luenced by he egional en i onmen o he
companies’ headqua e s o se e al easons. In ac , he egions conside ed in he pape
a e cha ac e ized by dis inc i e cul u al and geog aphic ea u es ha a ec bo h he local
demand and he local supply o di e en ypes o di ec o s. On he one hand, language
and eligion (Maye 1951), as well as o he local peculia i ies, e.g., he deg ee o u baniza-
ion and poli ical o ien a ion (S eenbe gen 2010), likely in luence he le el o people’s us
and hei openness o di ec o s who a e no amilia wi h he headqua e s’ en i onmen
(see, e.g., Guiso e al. 2009). In some egions, he o e lap o people in ol ed in economic
and non-economic ac i i ies is highe han in o he s, which explains he egional a ia-
ions in he ele ance o local oo s o boa d appoin men s. On he o he hand, he p es-
ence o impo an in e na ional ai po s in some o he egions conside ed (Basel, Gene a,
and Zu ich) bu no in o he s, and he di e en le els o agglome a ions (highes in Basel,
Be n, Gene a, Lausanne, and Zu ich wi h one- hi d o he o e all Swiss popula ion) likely
in luence he ele an supply o di e en ypes o di ec o s. Fo una ely, he ele ance con-
di ion can be es ed empi ically, and his is usually done h ough app op ia e es s in he
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A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
i s -s age eg ession. In ou se ing, he F-s a is ics o he join signi icance o he excluded
ins umen s (i.e., dummy a iables o uni e si y loca ions) in he i s -s age eg ession is
12.02. Acco ding o S aige and S ock (1997), a alue o o e 10 indica es he ele ance
o he ins umen s. Second, wi h espec o he exclusion condi ion, he di ec o mal es
o whe he he ins umen is unco ela ed wi h he e o e m in he ou come equa ion is
no easible because he e o e m is unobse able. The e o e, heo e ical jus i ica ions a e
pa icula ly impo an . Fi s , he cha ac e is ics o he egions a e de e mined ou side he
model and a e, he e o e, a leas o he pu poses o his s udy, exogenous. In pa icula ,
i is unlikely ha he sho - e m success (o he lack o i ) o he i ms in a egion in lu-
ences he social, cul u al, and geog aphic cha ac e is ics o ha egion. Second, hese geo-
g aphic egions a e no likely o ha e di ec e ec s on i m pe o mance o easons we do
no accoun o in he eg essions, e.g., indus y a ilia ion. In pa icula , none o he lis ed
companies in ou sample is dependen on he egions’ economic condi ions because hey
all sell hei goods ei he in he o he Swiss egions o in e na ionally. Finally, as al eady
a gued, eloca ions a e e y a e, and he majo i y o companies a e well- oo ed in hei
egion.
The esul s in Table5 show ha e en when using he uni e si y egions as ins umen-
al a iables, LRDs a e nega i ely ela ed o Tobin’s Q in he second-s age IV eg ession,
which suppo s a causal in e p e a ion o he esul s.
4.4 Locally‑ oo ed di ec o s inin e na ionally‑o ien ed i ms and i ms
in egula ed indus ies
The op imali y o boa d composi ion depends on a i m’s ex e nal en i onmen (He malin
and Weisbach 2003). As he alue o LRDs di e s ac oss companies ha ope a e in di e -
en en i onmen s, in Table6, we e- un ou baseline model on a numbe o subsamples: (i)
in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms s. domes ically-o ien ed i ms (Model I s. Model II) and
(ii) companies in egula ed s. non- egula ed indus ies (Model III s. Model IV).
The las wo ows o Table6 show ha he p opo ion o LRDs is signi ican ly highe
in companies wi hou o eign sales (31.1% s. 27.9%) and in egula ed indus ies (31.6%
s. 27.8%). These desc ip i e indings comply wi h he conjec u e ha LRDs a e gene -
ally less aluable and less demanded in in e na ionally-o ien ed and non- egula ed i ms.
The eg essions in Table6 analyze he ela ion o LRDs wi h i m pe o mance ac oss ou
ele an subsamples. S ikingly, LRDs a e no signi ican ly ela ed o i m pe o mance in
domes ically-o ien ed companies (no o eign sales, Model II) and egula ed i ms (Model
III). Based on hese esul s and ollowing he iew o He malin and Weisbach (2003) ha
“boa ds a e endogenously d i en ins i u ions”, he highe p opo ion o LRDs chosen by
i ms in domes ically-o ien ed sec o s and egula ed indus ies may be op imal. Con e sely,
he nega i e and signi ican coe icien s o LRDs in in e na ionally-o ien ed companies
(Model I) and in i ms in non- egula ed indus ies (Model IV)—i.e., p ecisely hose i ms
in which he bene i s o LRDs a e expec ed o be lowe —show ha he use o LRDs in
hose i ms is excessi e, despi e being al eady signi ican ly lowe han in he o he i ms.
Acco ding o Hypo hesis 3, LRDs may ha m i m alue i a i m is in e na ionally o i-
en ed. Ou model, he e o e, accoun s o a i m’s in e na ionaliza ion p o ile. To exam-
ine he impac o LRDs in in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms, we include he in e ac ion e ms
Locally- oo ed di ec o s × Fo eign sales (dummy) and Locally- oo ed di ec o s × Numbe
o geog aphic segmen s. Fo eign sales (dummy) is a dummy a iable and equals one i he
company has posi i e sales ab oad (and ze o o he wise). Numbe o geog aphic segmen s
651
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
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Table 5 Ins umen al a iables app oach: Uni e si y loca ions
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea
obse a ions. Dummy a iables indica e he name o he closes uni e si y o he company’s headqua e s
(e.g., Basel). The Uni e si y o Gene a (i.e., Gene a) se es as he e e ence g oup and is se o ze o. Clus-
e - obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and 10% le els is
indica ed by ***, **, *, espec i ely
Independen a iables Dependen a iables
Fi s s age
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
(I)
Second s age
Tobin’s Q
(II)
(In e cep ) 0.29414 (*) 2.03317 (***)
(0.152) (0.490)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s −1.41544 (**)
(0.707)
Basel 0.10166
(0.066)
Be n 0.07889
(0.075)
F ibou g −0.00056
(0.143)
Lausanne 0.08166
(0.072)
S . Gallen 0.20246 (***)
(0.077)
Zu ich 0.10874 (*)
(0.058)
Size −0.01777 (**) −0.05266 (**)
(0.008) (0.023)
Sales g ow h 0.04456 0.19779
(0.093) (0.236)
Fi m age 0.03164 (**) 0.03585
(0.015) (0.046)
P o i abili y 0.11483 3.92950 (***)
(0.124) (0.505)
Liquidi y 0.02455 0.75066 (***)
(0.075) (0.234)
In es men s −0.66283 (***) 2.44639 (**)
(0.206) (1.026)
Tangibili y 0.20568 (**) −0.79690 (***)
(0.088) (0.271)
R&D 0.02623 1.67150 (***)
(0.151) (0.424)
Le e age −0.14855 (*) −0.01421
(0.078) (0.225)
Fixed e ec s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s
Adjus ed R217.25% 48.01%
F-s a is ics o join -signi icance o ins u-
men s (Uni e si y loca ions)
12.02 (***)
652
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
is he loga i hm o he numbe o geog aphic segmen s as indica ed by he segmen in o -
ma ion in he annual epo . T adi ionally, Swiss i ms ha e a la ge sha e o expo sales.
Simila ly, Hypo hesis 4 s a es ha in egula ed indus ies, he con ibu ion o locally- oo ed
di ec o s o i m pe o mance is pa icula ly la ge. We, he e o e, include he in e ac ion
e m Locally- oo ed di ec o s × Regula ed indus ies (dummy) o in es iga e his channel.
Regula ed indus ies comp ise banks, insu ance companies, inancial se ices, and u ili ies.
In Table7, Model II, he coe icien o he in e ac ion e m o locally- oo ed di ec o s
wi h o eign sales (o , al e na i ely, wi h he numbe o geog aphic segmen s in Model IV)
is nega i e and signi ican , while he coe icien o locally- oo ed di ec o s as a s and-alone
a iable ceases o be s a is ically signi ican .
We canno , he e o e, ejec Hypo hesis 3, which posi s ha Locally- oo ed Di ec o s
(LRDs) a e nega i ely ela ed o i m pe o mance in in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms. Con-
a ily, Model VI demons a es ha he impac o LRDs in egula ed indus ies is signi i-
can ly mo e subs an ial han in he es o he sample, hus suppo ing Hypo hesis 4. How-
e e , i ’s impo an o no e ha his e ec on Tobin’s Q in egula ed indus ies is de i ed by
summing he coe icien s o Locally- oo ed di ec o s (−0.49674) and he in e ac ion e m
Locally- oo ed di ec o s × Regula ed indus ies (0.51080). Consis en wi h he indings o
Table6, Model III, his calcula ion sugges s ha he in luence o LRDs on Tobin’s Q in
egula ed indus ies is negligible and no s a is ically signi ican .
4.5 Channels o  henega i e e ec o locally‑ oo ed di ec o s on i m pe o mance
In o de o be e unde s and he unde lying mechanisms o he con ibu ion o LRDs on
i ms’ alua ions, we adop he ollowing p ocedu e. Fi s , we es whe he , in ou sample,
LRDs and non-LRDs di e along selec ed p o essional cha ac e is ics ha , acco ding o
pas esea ch (Agency Theo y and Resou ce Dependence Theo y), a e ela ed o he pe o -
mance o boa d di ec o s. Second, we es whe he any o hose ea u es media e he e ec s
o LRDs on Tobin’s Q. Thi d, we ocus on al e na i e explana ions o he esul s by un-
ning addi ional eg ession models wi h app op ia e in e ac ion e ms.
Fo his pu pose, we epo in Table8 he di e ences in boa d di ec o s’ ea u es. Panel
A e e s o cha ac e is ics ela ed o he di ec o s’ (lack o ) independence, e.g., boa d inde-
pendence (Knyaze a e  al. 2013) and enu e (Huang and Hila y 2018). Panel B epo s
in o ma ion on di ec o s’ ac i i ies ha may educe hei a en ion o he ma e s o he
ocal i m bu may also p o ide access o aluable esou ces, e.g., he numbe o ex e -
nal ac i i ies (Cashman e al. 2012), busy di ec o s (Fich and Shi dasani 2006), ex e nal
CEO posi ions (Fahlenb ach e al. 2010), and di ec o s wi h poli ical connec ions (Gold-
man e al. 2009). Finally, Panel C epo s addi ional in o ma ion on boa d di ec o s ha
ha e a ac ed conside able a en ion in pas esea ch as d i e s o di ec o s’ pe o mance,
e.g., indus y know how, CEO expe ience, inancial know how, and in e na ional expe i-
ence (e.g., Oxelheim e  al. 2013; Volon é and Gan enbein 2016) and gende (Bennou i
e al. 2018; Chen e al. 2023a).
S ikingly, Table8 shows se e al signi ican di e ences be ween LRDs and non-LRDs,
which may help explain he esul s p esen ed in he p e ious sec ion. Speci ically, LRDs
a e mo e o en o me company execu i es, ha e mo e o en business ela ionships wi h
he company, and ha e longe enu e, on a e age. Howe e , Panel A also indica es ha
LRDs’ s onge lack o independence is no due o hei ole as execu i e di ec o s. Panel B
shows ha LRDs pu sue ewe ex e nal ac i i ies, especially conce ning high-le el ex e nal
posi ions as CEO and boa d chai man, which may indica e ha hey a e less quali ied. On

653
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 6 Tobin’s Q and locally- oo ed di ec o s in di e en subsamples
Independen Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
a iables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
(In e cep ) 1.47931 (***) 3.27376 (***) 0.99189 (***) 1.66688 (***)
(0.466) (1.030) (0.121) (0.477)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s −0.47686 (***) 0.10497 0.02100 −0.48568 (***)
(0.143) (0.113) (0.046) (0.141)
Size −0.02516 −0.09612 (***) −0.00775 −0.03787
(0.022) (0.034) (0.005) (0.024)
Sales g ow h 0.32881 −0.47402 0.26422 (***) 0.11202
(0.242) (0.315) (0.097) (0.241)
Fi m age 0.02167 −0.02267 0.00810 −0.00699
(0.039) (0.032) (0.011) (0.042)
P o i abili y 3.66733 (***) 3.25806 (***) 2.52730 (***) 3.90743 (***)
(0.503) (0.971) (0.506) (0.528)
Liquidi y 1.00057 (***) 0.08235 0.30747 (**) 0.82327 (***)
(0.268) (0.254) (0.125) (0.257)
In es men s 4.69335 (***) 0.46282 −0.11533 3.24397 (***)
(1.219) (0.601) (0.442) (1.047)
Tangibili y −1.33605 (***) −1.20271 (***) −0.14690 −1.02080 (***)
(0.305) (0.355) (0.183) (0.192)
R&D 1.14664 1.32604 (***) 0.24309 (**) 1.59649 (***)
(0.826) (0.332) (0.114) (0.443)
Le e age −0.01485 0.84937 (***) 0.84937 (***) 0.14605
(0.225) (0.259) (0.259) (0.206)
Subse Fo eign sales No o eign sales Regula ed indus ies Non egula ed indus ies
Obse a ions 1,535 500 479 1,556
Fixed e ec s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s
654
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea obse a ions. Fo eign sales is a dummy a iable and equals one i he
company has posi i e sales ab oad (and ze o o he wise). Regula ed indus ies is a dummy a iable and equals one i he indus y is egula ed (and ze o o he wise). Clus e -
obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and 10% le els is indica ed by ***, **, and *, espec i ely
Table 6 (con inued)
Independen Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
a iables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Adjus ed R251.18% 63.62% 49.20% 47.36%
LRDs in he subsamples 27.9% 31.1% 31.6% 27.8%
Di e ence in LRDs
( - es )
3.19 p. p
(2.74) (***)
3.87 p. p
(3.43) (***)
655
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 7 Tobin’s Q and locally- oo ed di ec o s in in e na ionally-o ien ed i ms (H3) and egula ed indus ies (H4)
Independen a i-
ables
Dependen Va iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
(In e cep ) 1.61874 (***) 1.56839 (***) 1.62676 (***) 1.58390 (***) 1.62315 (***) 1.62807 (***)
(0.406) (0.407) (0.411) (0.406) (0.407) (0.409)
Locally- oo ed
di ec o s
−0.40312 (***) −0.04633 −0.40717 (***) 0.00912 −0.40381 (***) −0.49674 (***)
(0.118) (0.112) (0.119) (0.117) (0.118) (0.140)
Fo eign sales
(dummy)
0.01693 0.15420 (*)
(0.059) (0.085)
Numbe o geog aphic
segmen s (log)
0.01673 0.13529
(0.059) (0.083)
Regula ed indus ies
(dummy)
−0.24722 −0.34605 (*)
(0.203) (0.203)
Locally- oo ed
di ec o s × Fo eign
sales (dummy)
−0.45826 (***)
(0.171)
Locally- oo ed
di ec o s × Num-
be o geog aphic
segmen s (log)
−0.40246 (***)
(0.133)
Locally- oo ed
di ec o s × Regu-
la ed indus ies
(dummy)
0.51080 (***)
656
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea obse a ions. Fo eign sales is a dummy a iable and equals one i he
company has posi i e sales ab oad (and ze o o he wise). Numbe o geog aphic segmen s is he numbe o geog aphic segmen s as indica ed by he segmen in o ma ion in he
annual epo . Regula ed indus ies is a dummy a iable and equals one i he indus y is egula ed (and ze o o he wise). Clus e - obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en-
heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and 10% le els is indica ed by ***, **, *, espec i ely
Table 7 (con inued)
Independen a i-
ables
Dependen Va iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
(0.153)
Size −0.03417 (*) −0.03894 (*) −0.03501 −0.04210 (*) −0.03317 (*) −0.03299 (*)
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Sales g ow h 0.12872 0.13518 0.13150 0.14067 0.12886 0.13342
(0.192) (0.194) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.193)
Fi m age 0.00088 0.00366 0.00140 0.01183 0.00127 −0.00185
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
P o i abili y 3.80726 (***) 3.81245 (***) 3.80922 (***) 3.82460 (***) 3.80576 (***) 3.81411 (***)
(0.509) (0.506) (0.508) (0.504) (0.510) (0.507)
Liquidi y 0.74139 (***) 0.73388 (***) 0.74184 (***) 0.75953 (***) 0.73495 (***) 0.72290 (***)
(0.227) (0.225) (0.227) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228)
In es men s 3.05931 (***) 3.08101 (***) 3.05412 (***) 3.04401 (***) 3.07806 (***) 3.05358 (***)
(0.991) (0.980) (0.988) (0.983) (0.979) (0.971)
Tangibili y −1.01228 (***) −1.01321 (***) −1.01082 (***) −1.00263 (***) −1.02349 (***) −0.99561 (***)
(0.187) (0.184) (0.181) (0.179) (0.176) (0.178)
R&D 1.65650 (***) 1.72663 (***) 1.64881 (***) 1.65264 (***) 1.65490 (***) 1.66629 (***)
(0.434) (0.434) (0.437) (0.441) (0.435) (0.431)
Le e age 0.14378 0.14053 0.14033 0.12110 0.14189 0.13750
(0.187) (0.185) (0.188) (0.185) (0.188) (0.187)
Fixed e ec s Indus ies,
Yea s
Indus ies,
Yea s
Indus ies,
Yea s
Indus ies,
Yea s
Indus ies,
Yea s
Indus ies,
Yea s
Adjus ed R252.90% 53.14% 52.91% 53.31% 52.92% 53.20%
663
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 11 Channel: In e ela ionship wi h local sha eholde s
Independen a iables Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(In e cep ) 1.60866 (***) 1.68664 (***) 1.68680 (***) 2.08781 (***)
(0.401) (0.420) (0.420) (0.486)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s −0.33778 (**) −0.47795 (***) −0.47724 (***) −0.48762 (***)
(0.166) (0.149) (0.148) (0.147)
Locally-con olled i m 0.01115
(0.100)
Long e m locally-con olled i m −0.17315 (*) −0.17482 (*) −0.18158 (*)
(0.104) (0.102) (0.104)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s × −0.09397
Locally-con olled i m (0.228)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s × 0.27616 0.27386 0.29006
Long e m locally-con olled i m (0.225) (0.230) (0.231)
Dual class 0.00743 0.00844
(0.081) (0.084)
Sha eholding di ec o s 0.00215
(0.117)
Size −0.03334 (*) −0.03211 (*) −0.03212 (*) −0.03240 (*)
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Sales g ow h 0.12456 0.11695 0.11832 0.10806
(0.192) (0.192) (0.189) (0.190)
Fi m age 0.00257 0.00427 0.00404 0.00126
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
P o i abili y 3.79975 (***) 3.83691 (***) 3.83660 (***) 3.86198 (***)
(0.509) (0.506) (0.507) (0.515)
Liquidi y 0.74132 (***) 0.75346 (***) 0.75321 (***) 0.75119 (***)

664
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea obse a ions. Locally-con olled i m is a dummy a iable and equals
one i he company is con olled by a Swiss sha eholde wi h mo e han 20% o o ing igh s (and ze o o he wise). Long e m locally-con olled i m is a dummy a iable
and equals one i he company has been con olled by he same Swiss sha eholde wi h mo e han 20% o o ing igh s o e he ull pe iod (and ze o o he wise). Dual class
is a dummy a iable and equals one i he company has wo o mo e classes o equi y issued (and ze o o he wise). Sha eholding di ec o s is he p opo ion o di ec o s wi h
signi ican sha eholding o who ep esen signi ican sha eholde s. Clus e - obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and 10% le els is
indica ed by ***, **, *, espec i ely
Table 11 (con inued)
Independen a iables Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
In es men s 3.08309 (***) 3.03299 (***) 3.03045 (***) 3.03123 (***)
(0.984) (0.998) (0.996) (0.998)
Tangibili y −1.01980 (***) −1.01943 (***) −1.01790 (***) −1.01847 (***)
(0.181) (0.175) (0.175) (0.174)
R&D 1.63957 (***) 1.60226 (***) 1.60107 (***) 1.62119 (***)
(0.438) (0.436) (0.435) (0.432)
Le e age 0.14908 0.11743 0.11818 0.11369
(0.189) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186)
Fixed e ec s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s
Adjus ed R252.90% 53.22% 53.19% 53.39%
665
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 12 Al e na i e speci ica ions o locally- oo ed di ec o s
Independen a iables Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(In e cep ) 1.99702 (***) 1.99236 (***) 1.96789 (***) 1.90453 (***)
(0.449) (0.442) (0.461) (0.455)
Locally- oo ed non-execu i e di ec o s −0.45225 (***)
(0.120)
Locally- oo ed independen di ec o s −0.47413 (***)
(0.127)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s (wi hou wo ede al echnical uni e si ies) −0.29311 (**)
(0.141)
Locally- oo ed di ec o s’ o e ep esen a ion −0.00871 (**)
(0.004)
Size −0.02952 −0.02786 −0.02875 −0.02540
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Sales g ow h 0.10321 0.06304 0.10046 0.08242
(0.194) (0.196) (0.193) (0.192)
Fi m age 0.00133 −0.00432 −0.01079 −0.01364
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
P o i abili y 3.82493 (***) 3.84101 (***) 3.79624 (***) 3.78393 (***)
(0.512) (0.515) (0.524) (0.527)
Liquidi y 0.73164 (***) 0.72958 (***) 0.72339 (***) 0.72929 (***)
(0.227) (0.227) (0.233) (0.233)
In es men s 3.11832 (***) 3.20760 (***) 3.20465 (***) 3.23320 (***)
(0.986) (0.977) (0.990) (1.017)
Tangibili y −1.01284 (***) −1.03527 (***) −1.05671 (***) −1.07355 (***)
(0.174) (0.173) (0.178) (0.174)
R&D 1.69260 (***) 1.68635 (***) 1.66853 (***) 1.68418 (***)
666
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
The able p esen s eg ession coe icien es ima es o Tobin’s Q. The sample consis s o 2035 i m-yea obse a ions. Locally- oo ed non-execu i e di ec o s is he p opo -
ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s who a e non-execu i e on he boa d. Locally- oo ed independen di ec o s is he p opo ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s who a e independen on
he boa d. Locally- oo ed di ec o s (wi hou wo ede al echnical uni e si ies) is he p opo ion o locally- oo ed di ec o s on he boa d wi hou conside ing he wo ede al
echnical uni e si ies. Locally- oo ed di ec o s’ o e ep esen a ion is he a io o he numbe o locally- oo ed di ec o s o he a e age numbe o locally- oo ed di ec o s
wi hin he company’s headqua e s egion. Clus e - obus s anda d e o s a e epo ed in pa en heses, and signi icance a he 1%, 5%, and 10% le els is indica ed by ***, **, *,
espec i ely
Table 12 (con inued)
Independen a iables Dependen a iable: Tobin’s Q
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(0.431) (0.438) (0.440) (0.445)
Le e age 0.13019 0.13883 0.20486 0.19402
(0.189) (0.190) (0.191) (0.193)
Fixed e ec s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s Indus ies, Yea s
Adjus ed R253.29% 53.12% 52.32% 52.12%
667
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
pa icula in domes ically-o ien ed companies and i ms in egula ed indus ies— hei
p esence on boa ds is no associa ed wi h lowe alua ions and may hus be alue-enhanc-
ing and op imal.
Appendix
See Table 13, 14, 15 and 16.
Funding Open access unding p o ided by Uni e si y o Basel.
Table 13 Uni e si ies in Swi ze land
The able p esen s igu es abou Swiss uni e si ies and hei g adua es’ ep esen a ion on co po a e boa ds
o di ec o s in SPI i ms
Sou ce: www. swiss uni e si i es. ch (access on 04.08.2015) and own da a base
Sample uni e si ies Uni e si y igu es Sample igu es S and-
a d
de ia-
ion
Numbe o
s uden s
Yea o
ounda ion
F ac ion o
di ec o s
(%)
Maximum o
di ec o s (%)
Uni e si y o Basel (BS) 12,982 1460 5.08 90.00 0.118
Uni e si y o Be n (BE) 15,406 1834 3.35 66.67 0.080
Uni e si y o F ibou g (FR) 10,084 1889 1.42 66.67 0.059
Uni e si y o Gene a (GE) 15,514 1559 2.79 75.00 0.083
Uni e si y o Lausanne (LS) 12,947 1537 3.41 66.67 0.093
Uni e si y o S . Gallen (SG) 7809 1898 10.33 85.71 0.150
Uni e si y o Zu ich (ZH) 26,351 1833 10.80 75.00 0.147
EPF Lausanne (EPF) 9395 1969 1.16 42.86 0.048
ETH Zu ich (ETH) 17,309 1855 13.65 80.00 0.177
Excluded uni e si ies
Uni e si y o Swiss I alian Region
(–)
2918 1995 0.00 0.00 0.000
Uni e si y o Luce ne (–) 2654 1848 0.00 0.00 0.000
Uni e si y o Neucha el (–) 4345 1838 0.28 20.00 0.020
S udy sample s a is ics
All uni e si y g adua es (incl.
o eign uni e si ies)
76.60 100.00 0.205
668
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
Table 14 Home can ons om s uden s and g adua ions om Swiss uni e si ies in 1981
U BS (%) U BE (%) U FR (%) U GE (%) U LS (%) U LU (%) U NE (%) U SG (%) U ZH (%) U SI (%) EPFL (%) ETHZ (%) 1981 G adua es
pe To al Popu-
la ion (%)
Zü ich 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 363 0028 0.07
Be n 1 63 2 4 2 0 4 3 4 01 16 0.05
Luze n 13 16 11 1 1 2 1 9 24 00 22 0.07
U i 4 26 19 0 0 7 0 4 22 00 19 0.08
Schwyz 8 15 25 3 0 0 0 10 15 00 25 0.04
Obwalden 0 26 11 0 0 0 0 11 26 00 26 0.07
Nidwalden 22 39 17 0 0 0 0 0 11 00 11 0.06
Gla us 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 12 65 00 12 0.05
Zug 2 6 0 2 0 0 0 11 66 00 13 0.06
F ibou g 1 9 47 11 12 0 1 1 2 07 9 0.09
Solo hu n 23 30 4 1 0 2 0 6 12 00 23 0.07
Basel-S ad 80 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 4 00 9 0.13
Basel-Land-
scha
73 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 5 00 15 0.10
Scha hausen 0 5 0 7 0 0 2 5 34 00 48 0.06
Appenzell A 10 7 3 3 0 0 3 14 28 00 31 0.06
Appenzell I 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 29 57 00 0 0.05
S . Gallen 5 13 7 2 0 0 1 14 33 00 24 0.07
G aubünden 6 12 6 4 2 0 0 4 45 01 21 0.07
Aa gau 14 8 1 1 1 0 0 6 41 00 27 0.06
Thu gau 2 13 3 2 1 0 0 12 39 00 28 0.05
Ticino 2 9 14 21 10 0 1 3 15 03 22 0.09
Vaud 0 2 0 16 62 0 1 0 1 014 4 0.08
Valais 1 9 19 34 22 1 1 1 1 04 8 0.09
Neuchâ el 0 4 1 20 15 0 48 1 0 03 7 0.09

669
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 14 (con inued)
U BS (%) U BE (%) U FR (%) U GE (%) U LS (%) U LU (%) U NE (%) U SG (%) U ZH (%) U SI (%) EPFL (%) ETHZ (%) 1981 G adua es
pe To al Popu-
la ion (%)
Genè e 0 1 0 87 10 0 0 1 07 2 0.15
Ju a 2 2 6 29 25 0 21 2 0 04 10 0.08
A e age 10 12 5 16 9 0 2 4 22 03 17 0.08
The able shows he p opo ion o g adua es in each can on g adua ing om he a ious uni e si ies in Swi ze land
Bold indica es g adua es om can ons ha ha e a uni e si y and who g adua ed om hese uni e si ies (i.e., can on o Basel-S ad and Uni e si y o Basel, U BS)
I alic indica es he h ee uni e si ies (Neucha el, Luze n, and Lugano) o an insigni ican numbe o g adua es in ou sample
670
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
Table 15 Fi ms’ headqua e s and hei closes uni e si y
Headqua e s Pos code Can on Region Closes
Uni e -
si y
T a el
ime by
ca
Dis ance in km
Aigle 1860 VD Lausanne LS 36 44
Allschwil 4123 BL Basel BS 13 6
Al do 6460 UR O he egion ZH 57 76
A bon 9320 TG S . Gallen SG 17 16
Baa 6340 ZG Cen al Swi ze land ZH 29 34
Bad Ragaz 7310 SG O he egion SG 54 83
Baden 5400 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 28 25
Basel 4000 BS Basel BS 0 0
Be n 3000 BE Be n BE 0 0
Biel/Bienne 2500 BE Be n BE 33 41
Boud y 2017 NE O he egion LS 45 65
B usio 7743 GR O he egion SG 3h01 237
Bubendo 4416 BL Basel BS 26 23
Bubikon 8608 ZH Zu ich ZH 32 28
Buchs (AG) 5033 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 26 15
Bu gdo 3400 BE Be n BE 27 25
Cham 6330 ZG Cen al Swi ze land ZH 27 31
Cheseaux-su -Lausanne 1033 VD Lausanne LS 12 9
Chése ex 1275 VD Gene a GE 32 29
Chu 7000 GR O he egion SG 1h05 103
Die ikon 6036 LU Cen al Swi ze land ZH 37 45
Die likon 8305 ZH Zu ich ZH 18 13
Doma /Ems 7013 GR O he egion SG 1h10 109
Do nach 4143 SO Basel BS 17 14
Do ikon 5605 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 36 36
Düdingen 3186 FR O he egion FR 15 11
Eglisau 8193 ZH Zu ich ZH 28 28
Emmen 6032 LU Cen al Swi ze land ZH 40 50
Flama 3175 FR O he egion BE 19 18
F auen eld 8500 TG O he egion SG 36 48
F ibou g/F eibu g 1700 FR O he egion FR 0 0
Apples 1143 VD Lausanne LS 27 22
Genè e 1200 GE Gene a GE 0 0
Ge la ingen 4563 SO Swiss Pla eau BE 28 32
Gland 1196 VD Lausanne LS 32 36
Gla us 8750 GL O he egion ZH 51 70
G anges-Ma nand 1523 VD O he egion FR 31 24
G änichen 5722 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 46 48
He giswil 6052 NW Cen al Swi ze land ZH 41 58
He isau 9100 AR S . Gallen SG 13 11
Hinwil 8340 ZH Zu ich ZH 31 29
Hochdo 6280 LU Swiss Pla eau ZH 45 49
Ho gen 8810 ZH Zu ich ZH 20 21
671
Locally- oo ed di ec o s
1 3
Table 15 (con inued)
Headqua e s Pos code Can on Region Closes
Uni e -
si y
T a el
ime by
ca
Dis ance in km
Ho w 6048 LU Cen al Swi ze land ZH 43 55
In e laken 3800 BE O he egion BE 44 58
I igen 3063 BE Be n BE 11 6
Jona 8645 SG Zu ich ZH 31 40
Kilchbe g (ZH) 8802 ZH Zu ich ZH 12 6
Klo en 8302 ZH Zu ich ZH 17 13
Küsnach (ZH) 8700 ZH Zu ich ZH 13 7
Lau enbu g 5080 AG O he egion BS 33 40
Lausanne 1000 VD Lausanne LS 0 0
Lenzbu g 5600 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 39 38
Lies al 4410 BL Basel BS 22 19
Loca no 6600 TI Ticino ZH 2h28 200
Lup ig 5242 AG Swiss Pla eau ZH 33 32
Lu e bach 4542 SO Swiss Pla eau BE 35 36
Luze n 6000 LU Cen al Swi ze land ZH 42 52
Lyss 3250 BE Be n BE 26 29
Männedo 8708 ZH Zu ich ZH 29 20
Mo ges 1110 VD Lausanne LS 16 14
Mou ie 2740 BE O he egion BS 56 54
Mu enz 4132 BL Basel BS 15 7
Neuhausen 8212 SH O he egion ZH 46 52
Niede wangen 3172 BE Be n BE 10 8
Niede weningen 8166 ZH Zu ich ZH 35 24
Obe do (BL) 4436 BL Basel BS 32 30
Obe ki ch 6208 LU Swiss Pla eau ZH 53 71
Ol en 4600 SO Swiss Pla eau BS 45 54
Pe len 6035 LU Cen al Swi ze land ZH 36 44
P ä ikon (SZ) 8808 SZ Zu ich ZH 26 36
Plan-les-Oua es 1228 GE Gene a GE 13 5
Po en uy 2900 JU O he egion BS 1h04 69
P illy 1008 VD Lausanne LS 6 3
Qua ino 6572 TI Ticino ZH 2h25 193
Regensdo 8105 ZH Zu ich ZH 20 12
Reinach (BL) 4153 BL Basel BS 17 9
Ro schache be g 9404 SG S . Gallen SG 19 15
Rümlang 8153 ZH Zu ich ZH 19 14
S. An onino 6592 TI Ticino ZH 2h11 184
Scha hausen 8200 SH O he egion ZH 43 52
Schindellegi 8834 SZ Zu ich ZH 27 31
Schlie en 8952 ZH Zu ich ZH 19 9
Sion 1950 VS O he egion LS 1h05 94
S . Gallen 9000 SG S . Gallen SG 0 0
S ä a 8712 ZH Zu ich ZH 32 23
672
A.Kind, C.Volon é
1 3
Table 15 (con inued)
Headqua e s Pos code Can on Region Closes
Uni e -
si y
T a el
ime by
ca
Dis ance in km
S ans 6370 NW Cen al Swi ze land ZH 46 64
S ein am Rhein 8260 SH O he egion ZH 57 56
S einach 9323 SG S . Gallen SG 16 15
S einhausen 6312 ZG Cen al Swi ze land ZH 28 30
S -P ex 1162 VD Lausanne LS 21 18
Täge wilen 8274 TG O he egion SG 52 43
Thalwil 8800 ZH Zu ich ZH 15 12
Us e 8610 ZH Zu ich ZH 24 24
Uznach 8730 SG O he egion ZH 39 55
Vaduz 9490 FL O he egion SG 45 68
Vaz 7082 GR O he egion SG 1h26 125
Ve nie 1214 GE Gene a GE 17 7
Ve ey 1800 VD Lausanne LS 25 19
Waldenbu g 4437 BL Basel BS 32 31
Wa wil 9630 SG O he egion SG 40 37
Solo hu n 4500 SO Swiss Pla eau BE 35 40
We zikon 8620 ZH Zu ich ZH 29 29
Win e hu 8400 ZH Zu ich ZH 31 27
Wol enschiessen 6386 NW Cen al Swi ze land ZH 1h02 76
Y e don 1400 VD O he egion LS 33 39
Ze ma 3920 VS O he egion LS 2h23 172
Zo ingen 4800 AG Swiss Pla eau BS 42 53
Zug 6300 ZG Cen al Swi ze land ZH 31 34
Zü ich 8000 ZH Zu ich ZH 0 0
The able p esen s he i ms’ headqua e s loca ion, i s pos code, he i ms’ egion and i s closes uni e si y,
as well as he a el ime and dis ance om he headqua e s o his uni e si y