Constraints to Drought Contingency Planning in Spain: The Hydraulic Paradigm and the Case of Seville

1 MORAL, L. DEL y C. GIANSANTE (2000): “Constraints to Drought Contingency Planning in Spain: the Hydraulic Paradigm and the Case of Seville”. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Special Issue “Contingency Planning for Water Security”, Blackwell, Oxford, Reino Unido, 2000, vol. 8, núm. 2, pp. 93-102 I.S.S.N: 0966-0879 Constraints to Drought Contingency Planning in Spain: the Hydraulic Paradigm and the Case of Seville Abstract Spain is at present equipped with an extensive hydraulic infrastructure, aimed at the correction of the temporal and spatial irregularity in the distribution of water resources. This infrastructure network, mainly focused on surface water, is embedded in a traditional hydraulic paradigm with technical, economic, socio-political and cultural implications. This traditional water management perspective tends to view droughts as a circumstantial expression of a chronic water deficit, resulting from the so called structural deficit between water demand and the current water regulation capacity. This conceptualisation of the risk of drought leads to the predominance of structural responses to this hazard, the lack of consideration of uncertainty in the assessment of the available resources and the neglect of crisis planning. It can therefore be considered as one of the main obstacles to the development of a proactive approach for the management of droughts. However, the water policy arena is currently very dynamic. This dynamism, which encompasses elements of both innovation and persistence of the traditional water paradigm, can be analysed through the example of the Seville water management system, characterised by a high risk of drought and the recent experience of several severe water crises. Introduction A long-standing tradition of water management exists in Spain, traditionally embodied by prestigious institutions such as the Tribunal de las Aguas in Valencia, which has been settling conflicts among irrigation farmers for more than 900 years. However, the present state of water planning in Spain is characterised by difficulties and barriers that obstruct the development and implementation of proactive planning to mitigate the effect of drought. Why is it that Spain, formerly among the pioneers in the development of technological and institutional solutions for adequate management of water resources, has been severely affected by droughts in recent years? Why is Spain involved in a debate on the future of water planning, which never seems to get settled? Changes are taking place, due to both internal and external factors. However, the question is, whether the system is developing beyond conventional planning to incorporate a framework for proactive planning, “which in advance develops a system of increased preparedness through appropriate coping mechanisms … activated by the 2 occurrence of drought and other uncertainties inherent in dry lands” (Bruins & Lithwick, 1998: 5). Is the accumulated experience of previous droughts leading to a process of institutional learning, aimed to reduce the vulnerability of water management systems? If the answer is not completely affirmative then, what are the barriers that constrain the development of a more resilient system? Answering these questions could be the most useful contribution of this study. Drought and the Hydraulic Paradigm in Spain Aridity and drought have historically been a problem of the first order in Spain, due to the characteristics of its climate and hydrology. The Spanish climatologist Martín Vide has summarised these characteristics, as follows (Martín Vide, 1994, quoted in Moral and Sauri, 1999): 1. Modest rainfall amounts: nearly 50 % of Spain receives less than 500 mm of precipitation per year; 2. High inter-annual rainfall variability: coefficients of variation may be as high as 40 % in certain areas; 3. High diversity of seasonal rainfall regimes; 4. High variability of seasonal rainfall patterns: in some years, the rainy season may be the dry season and vice-versa; 5. Occasional climatic anomalies: coincidence of drought periods in the generally wetter north of the Iberian peninsula with heavy rains in the drier south; 6. High daily and hourly rainfall intensities: precipitation of 100 mm in one day has a return period of 10 years or less in many areas; 7. Long rainless periods: Málaga recorded a sequence of 166 days without precipitation in 1953; 8. Existence of multiple ‘rainy areas’ and ‘dry rain-shadow areas’, due to intricate relief patterns The resulting lack of water security led, already more than 100 years ago, to development planning to promote a radical transformation of Spain’s water landscapes by means of hydraulic infrastructures. The ‘war against drought’, the correction of the temporal and spatial irregularity in the distribution of water resources - hydrological imbalances - has been a fundamental objective of the Spanish long lasting hydraulic paradigm water policy for more than a century. The theoretical basis (Regeneracionismo Hidráulico) and practical implementation of this policy, which constitutes a fundamental element in Spanish history, has been analysed on several occasions (see, for example, in English, Lopez-Gunn, 1996, Swyngendouw, 1999, del Moral & Saurí, 1999 and del Moral, 1999). In this context, water scarcity and irregularity are the core issue to be tackled by the water management. In some regions, such water scarcity is considered chronic and is called a structural deficit, result of the imbalance between water demand and available water resources. The latter are that fraction of natural water resources that can be used to satisfy demands, in the moment and place in which water is required. This notion leads to regulation, by which natural water resources (precipitation minus evapotranspiration) are converted into available water resources. In Spanish hydrological planning, the assessment of available water resources is mainly focused on surface water reservoirs, that are supposed to store every year a total 3 average of 39,145 million cubic meter (MCM) of water in the whole country. On the other hand, groundwater only accounts for 12% of the total available water resources in Spain (Table 1). Concerning the Guadalquivir river basin, in which Seville is located, an annual amount of about 2,819 MCM can be stored, which is nearly 85% of the total amount of available resources in this basin (Ministry of Environment, 1998). Table 1. Available Water Resources in Spain and in the Guadalquivir river basin SOURCE Spain (MCM/year) Guadalquivir River basin (MCM/year) Spain % Guadalquivir River basin % Groundwater 5,532 507 12,3 15.2 Reutilised water (*) 230 12 0.5 0.4 Desalinisation 94 -- 0.2 -- Reservoirs 39,175 2,819 87 84.4 TOTAL 45,034 3,338 100 100 (*) Only directly reutilised water. Indirect reuse of return flows is not included Source: Ministry of Environment, 1998:205, quoted in Verges, 1999. The Spanish hydrological assessments, water management reports and planning documents present the figures of reservoir regulation capacity with a deterministic terminology, despite the stochastic nature of surface flow, the limited duration of available hydrometric records (usually less than 50 years) and its lack of accuracy. Accordingly, the risk of drought is supposed to be integrated in the assessment of available resources, not as an uncertain phenomenon, but as a deterministic one, which can be regarded as nonsensical. The assessment of regulated water resources should encompass uncertainty in a more realistic way: “The amount of surface water resources can be calculated, with different degrees of probability, for each scenario of demand, considering the reliability of the hydrometric records utilised, the total reservoir capacity, dam operation rules, priorities policy, levels of guarantee of the different demands, etc. (López Arechavala, 1993:60). This is a key issue for the definition of the level of water security and the technical perception of risk. However, the perception of a water deficit is embedded in Spanish water policy as a more or less permanent situation. The whole water management system could be conceived as a drought management mechanism. But the results are far from satisfactory, due to the lack of accuracy of the deterministic estimates of water availability, in addition to the lack of control of different water users. Spain has experienced the most severe water crises of all European countries in the past few years, notwithstanding the above hydraulic paradigm and the extensive water infrastructure system, which is equivalent to that in California. The drought period (1991-1995) caused problems to more than 11 million people, especially in the Eastern and Southern cities, who suffered from water supply restrictions and water quality problems in urban water supply systems. The agricultural sector also suffered during that period, due to reductions in their unitary water allowance, resulting in yield losses on a considerable part of the 3.4 million hectares of irrigation lands . Some of these lands were simply not irrigated. The economic losses and societal impacts were very high. Losses in the agricultural sector alone were estimated at 726,000 million pesetas (about US$ 4,7 billion) (Consejo Económico y Social, 1996:22). 4 Structural imbalances and the neglect of contingency planning An interpretative hypothesis to explain the reasons for the development of these water crises, or the lack of institutional response and mitigation, can be based on two main contradictory elements: (1) The water management model comprehends the notions of scarcity and irregularity as central. (2) The perception of residual risk – the risk inherent to the system (Handmer & Dover, 1996) - is low, while proactive contingency planning is absent. . In other words, water management is based on the correction of hydrological irregularities, basically through a large-scale water infrastructure network. The estimates of regulated/available surface water resources include the existing historical records of flows - and thus, the repercussions of drought spells - but risk and uncertainty are disguised in average figures, presented in a deterministic manner, which is misleading. Crisis situations are not contemplated as specific issues to be taken into account, but are considered as heightened expressions of general and permanent irregularity, that must be countered by further developing the water infrastructure system. The Spanish water management system does not use, as yet, the kind of drought definition, which, according to Hendrik Bruins, should include frequency and severity indexes and be “precise, regional and even specifically targeted at selected economic activities in order to be useful for proactive planning and government policy” (Bruins, 1997:81). Therefore, the water management system still lacks the basic characteristic of proactive planning that “takes such environmental uncertainties into consideration by preparing plans for ephemeral stochastic events, which become activated when such events (i.e. droughts) occur” (Bruins, 1997: 83). This internal contradiction of the water management model is conditioned by the basic philosophy behind it, widely described in Spain and other countries as the traditional hydraulic paradigm. This water management model is based on water supply augmentation, with little consideration of the efficiency in water use and characterised by a highly subsidised water use. For instance, only 0.2% of the replacement value of publicly funded reservoirs is covered by tariffs (Verges, 1999). Clearly, this model – systematically studied in Spain – is related to many other variables, which have been analysed through different theoretical frameworks. Tony Allan establishes a clear relationship between levels of economic development and different stages of hydraulic development in arid and semi-arid regions (Allan, 1996). Pierpaolo Faggi analyses the link between strategic irrigation projects and their legitimisation functions, especially in developing countries, through the ‘territorial production for State reproduction’ (Faggi, 1996). The Spanish sociologist Pérez Díaz has studied the organisational and institutional dynamics of the traditional engineering-driven supply augmentation approach, applying the concepts of policy community and issue network to the Spanish situation (Pérez Díaz et al., 1996). Recent proposals attempt to integrate the contributions of Mary Douglas’ cultural theory with the New Institutionalism approach, focusing on different cultural paradigms and nature perception patterns, as explanatory devices to understand different ways to cope with risk (O’Riordan & Jordan, 1998). The political dimension of the water issue, i.e. the consideration of those factors linked with struggles and conflicts between the different social groups, should not be overlooked (Kaika, 1999). However, the basic mechanisms of Spanish water planning, which conceive scarcity and irregularity as structural geophysical features and neglect the need for specific contingency planning, enable us to understand the inherent difficulties within 5 the Spanish water administration to cope with droughts. The experience of a water crisis, when it occurs, contributes to the justification and consolidation of the above mentioned water management model, based on the systematic regulating of the hydrological system. The general feeling of security, although conveyed to society in a contradictory way, is strengthened. Processes of water demand expansion are activated and reinforced, which reintroduce a level of vulnerability similar or even higher than the situation preceding the latest water crisis (Nevarez, 1996). Therefore, the emphasis on the expansion of the water resources system contributes to lower the general perception of vulnerability and thus increases the underlying risk, while failing to develop contingency planning and crisis management. The above analysis may suggest a static, self-perpetuating negative state of affairs, but the current situation is in fact becoming very dynamic. Factors determining this dynamism include the surrounding economic and institutional changes, as well as the experience of the last important drought of 1991-95. This crisis initiated a process of reflection and institutional learning, which could develop towards a rationale of proactive planning. Ad hoc or reactive emergency mechanisms emerged at the time of the crisis, which, if maintained and integrated within the general water management, could be converted into proactive instruments, including institutional agreements and drought management programs. How consistently have these new mechanisms been integrated within the general management model and to what extent do they introduce changes in the routine practice of water management? These questions need to be explored. Focusing on the urban water supply sector, many large towns in the country are presently debating the need to expand their sources of supply in order to face future contingencies of water scarcity or inadequate water quality. These urban centres include the two main metropolitan areas of the country, Madrid (4,8 million people) and Barcelona (4,2 million), as well as Saragossa (1,2 million) and Seville (1,3 million). Each city has its own specific system of water supply and ideas for expansion. Madrid proposes the construction of two new reservoirs to be built in “two of the last remaining stretches of river in the central part of the Iberian Peninsula, with clean waters and nonregulated flows” (Heras Hernández, 1998:20). Barcelona has expressed the need for a water transfer from the Rhone river (France) through the Pyrenees, which is being discussed (Barraqué, 1999). Saragossa has proposed the enlargement of an existing reservoir, presently assigned to irrigation purposes. The water supply system of Seville will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. Seville has been severely affected by droughts in the past, while the risk of a new drought is probably the highest, as compared to the other urban centres. Given the frequency of recurrence of the drought crisis and the severity of its impacts, the case of Seville has become emblematic in the context of the debate on drought-coping strategies in Spain. The case of the water supply system of Seville: coping with scarcity or setting the conditions for urban growth? The metropolitan area of Seville has suffered three drought periods in the past three decades (1974-76, 1981-83 and 1991-95). Presently, a new dry year (1998-99) could be the beginning of a new dry spell. The impacts of these past droughts have been very severe in terms of reduced potable water quality and restrictions on supply (Table 1). 6 Table 2. Water supply restrictions during the past three droughts in Seville 1974-76 Drought 1980-83 Drought 1992-95 Drought Date Date Date Date Date I. Declaration of drought (public awareness campaigns) 09/74 11/80 - 02/92 01/95 II. Prohibition of Municipal Uses 10/74 01/81 - 03/92 - III. Water Rationing (< 10 hours of service) 11/75 02/81 02/83 09/92 06/95 IV. Water Rationing (> 10 hours of service) 01/76 03/81 09/83 01/93 11/95 Normalisation 12/76 01/82 01/84 11/93 01/96 Source: Bonneau, 1996; EMASESA, 1997 . Urban water demand has experienced an increase in the past three, due to a still growing population (about 0,7% annual growth), a new typology of urban development and large-scale events, such as the Expo 92, etc. (Table 2). On the other hand, unaccounted for water (UfW) rose from 32% in 1975 to 36% in 1998 (national average 28%, Verges, 1999). In recent years, per capita water use has shown a decreasing trend, dropping from 426 lpd in 1991 to about 300 lpd at present, although the latter figure is still higher than the national average (265 lpd). Table 3. Evolution of the water supply system of Seville Supplied Population Abstracted Volume (MCM) Billed Volume (MCM) Per capita urban raw water use (l/per./day) 1975* 779.000 102,3 69,9 359 1976* 788.900 82,1 59,0 285 1977 810.000 95,1 65,0 321 1978 845.200 115,3 72,3 373 1979 858.300 126,1 78,4 402 1980 869.200 128,4 80,7 404 1981* 880.200 82,2 59,4 255 1982* 891.100 104,8 66,6 322 1983* 908.400 99,2 64,5 299 1984 915.100 109,2 68,5 326 1985 922.900 116,3 75,6 345 1986 925.900 126,9 81,5 375 1987 952.900 137,8 87,9 396 1988 1.023.000 149,0 88,7 399 1989 1.052.200 153,0 93,4 398 1990 1.072.200 162,3 104,1 414 1991 1.117.400 173,8 107,3 426 1992* 1.143.900 167,0 106,7 399 1993* 1.160.800 133,3 87,5 314 1994 1.179.600 138,9 87,3 322 1995* 1.198.900 129,2 82,0 295 1996 1.233.588 134,0 83,3 297 1997 1.295.000 137,0 87,9 290 1998 (**) 143,0 91,3 (**) (*) Years with water supply restrictions. (**) No available data 7 Source: Bonneau, 1996; EMASESA, 1985, 1997, 1998. The sources of the Seville water supply system are the right-bank tributaries of the Guadalquivir river, located in the mountainous area to the north of the city of Seville (see map). The water quality of these rivers is very good, but their regime is, as usual, irregular. The large intra-annual and inter-annual variability, which is synonymous with the prevailing rainfall patterns in the region, has required the development of an extensive water regulation infrastructure. The water supply is mainly dependent on the Rivera de Huelva river, which has an average annual flow of about 325 MCM. The total reservoir capacity - due to five reservoirs already existing in the Rivera de Huelva catchmentis 448 MCM, which is higher by 38% than the average natural water resources of the catchment (325 MCM). This high volume of reservoir capacity is necessary to meet the water demand of Seville, as the average annual regulated flow is only 143 MCM, according to the Guadalquivir River Basin Hydrological Plan (Ministry of Environment, 1999). It is important to emphasise that the mentioned average annual regulated flow does not necessarily represent the actual volume available in the reservoirs each year, as the deterministic manner of data presentation would suggest. Groundwater is currently barely used (less than 1% of total supply) in the water supply system of the metropolitan area of Seville, which makes this system highly dependent on surface water and thus particularly sensitive to climatic irregulatity. It is generally claimed – in official documentsthat the reason for this limited use of groundwater resources in the Seville water supply system is its over-exploitation and contamination. However, according to the recently published Hydrogeological Atlas of Andalusia, there is an important potential for a greater use of groundwater resources, as a strategic source of water in situations of emergency and as a supplement to the water supply of Seville (Spanish Technological Institute for Hydrogeology and Mining, 1999). This issue is of crucial importance in the management of water scarcity and contingencies and, in fact, groundwater specialists, generally excluded from the water policy community, have been harshly criticising the dominant water policy, characterised by the lack of knowledge and neglect of aquifers and the consequent lack of control of their use. The Guadalquivir river, which flows through the city of Seville, has estimated annual available resources of 3,332 MCM (2,819 MCM from reservoirs). With the existing infrastructure, the Guadalquivir river could meet the urban water supply of Seville (143 MCM/year). However, the main limitation to this option comes from the poor water quality of the river. Its treatment and use as potable water entails serious difficulties, even in a scenario of full implementation of the Urban Waste Water Directive (EC 91/271), due - amongst other - to diffuse pollution. At the end of the last drought, in 1995, even this potential source of low-quality water was not available. In 1995 the Guadalquivir basin reservoir system, with a total capacity of more than 6,500 MCM, was not able to supply the water volume required by the Seville water supply system. Because, during 1994, also a drought year, several hundred million cubic meter of water had been released from the reservoirs to irrigate agricultural fields, some cultivated with extensive crops. This is one of the clearest examples of the lack of foresight by the water management system, as well as a clear proof of the successful political pressure that can be applied by the agricultural sector vis-à-vis the water needs of the urban sector. Finally, in the Sierra Morena mountain area, additional high-quality water resources can still be regulated in the Viar river - further away than the Rivera de 8 Huelva river, but still easily accessible from Seville – through the construction of the Melonares dam. However, this potential solution would affect an area of high ecological value, designated as such according to nature protection legislation at the regional, national and European level. A reservoir already exists upstream of the site of the projected dam and supplies annually about 80 MCM of water of pre-potable quality to the agricultural sector to irrigate 11,000 hectares, more than half of it cultivated with extensive herbaceous crops. Some water transfers from agricultural to urban use have been carried out here during past droughts. Current consumers’ water prices do not cover the full cost of provision and sanitation of water. This is due, on the one hand, to the subsidiation of raw water, via funding of the infrastructure for regulation, abstraction and transport of water. On the other hand, the facilities for waste water treatment and sanitation are subsidised. Besides this infrastructure is still insufficient to meet wastewater quality standards. Innovative experiences Changes can be observed in water management practices, which are either derived directly from the experience of previous droughts or from other independent social, political, economic and technological processes. Among these changes, the following are worth mentioning: • Increased awareness of vulnerability. The confident diagnosis that existed before the previous drought contrasts sharply with the present evaluations. The situation of crisis during the 1991-1995 drought was amplified by the rapid growth of consumption in the second half of the 1980s, as can be inferred from Table 2. The situation was further aggravated by the conflicts between different administrations – mainly national and regional - on official acknowledgement of the crisis. At present - during the possible onset of another dry period - a more precautionary attitude can be observed, although annual water use has been allowed to grow from 135 MCM in 1996 to 148 MCM in 1998, which may have been avoided. • The change of collective water meters to individual household water meters could result in considerable savings in water use. This, in addition to the reduction in demand, resulting from an increased public awareness, can provide the basis for a long-term water conservation strategy (EMASESA, 1999, quoted in Kallis and Coccossis, 1999) • Progress has taken place in the institutionalisation of water transfers from the Viar irrigation scheme to the domestic sector. This development is favoured by the intellectual and political atmosphere, as well as by the amendment of the 1985 Water Act, which prepares the ground for transactions between different users, especially in situations of drought. • Current improvement in treatment systems for potable water, with investments of about 6,000 million pesetas (US$ 37 million), would allow the utilisation of water from the Guadalquivir river in situations of drought with lower impacts on the drinking water quality than those experienced during the last drought. • The first steps are taken towards a Drought Emergency Program, which envisages different measures to be adopted during drought. This contrasts with the atmosphere of secrecy, confusion and institutional confrontation, which reigned at the beginning of the last drought, in 1992. 9 Persistence of the basic elements of the traditional strategy The traditional water management discourse persists, despite these interesting innovations, because the above measures are viewed as possible and necessary, but insufficient to provide a solution to the problem of structural deficit. Therefore, the present regulation system must be expanded by the construction of a new reservoir. The emphasis, priority and energy currently devoted by the responsible water managers to the achievement of this strategic objective have important effects for the implementation of alternative solutions. • The substitution of collective water meters by individual household meters is taking place at a very slow pace, despite the well-documented positive effect on the reduction of water use by about 25% per households involved. • The water supply company maintains an ambivalent attitude concerning the wellknown persistence in time of reduced consumption after drought emergencies. In fact, its economic stability is dependent on water sales, which are affected by reduced demand. This reduction has been absorbed so far by water price increases. • The key issue concerning water transfers from the Viar irrigation scheme has not been settled yet, despite some progress on the institutional aspects. The timing and sequence of water transfers must be defined to prevent farmers using all or most of the water before any transfer can be made to the city of Seville. • A high degree of secrecy and confrontation is still maintained between distinct parts of the administration with different political affiliation. This shows the strong political content of water-related issues, due to economic interests, strategic development roles and the high symbolic value of water. • The high subsidies generally available for water infrastructure schemes – mainly reservoirs - favours the persistence of the current water management model. On the one hand, it leads to extremely low raw water prices, which discourage water savings and reduction of leakage levels. On the other hand, it conditions the choice of the water utility concerning the most adequate responses to face water scarcity. • Public relations and communication strategies are strongly influenced by the fact that priority is still assigned to the water infrastructure development model. Emotionally charged images - flooded fields during the rainy season, crackled soils during dry seasons - are systematically transmitted to society. The justification and strengthening of the need to carry out the planned infrastructure development measures derive from these images. Therefore, it can be argued concerning Seville, as has been studied in other cases, that “the introduction of problems such as water scarcity becomes an extremely useful and powerful tool to construct a consensus around the continuation and application of a particular kind of developmental policy” (Kaika, 1999:99). This issue is crucial, because it introduces the following question: Are the root causes of the system’s vulnerability addressed or do situations of drought promote further resource development works and network expansions ? The analysis of the evolution of the Seville water supply system, as in the case of Santa Barbara (California), leads to the conclusion that “this type of planning chiefly provides surplus water for future development while making water users no safer from the threat of drought” (Nevarez, 1996:267). It is clear that the water community, which dominates water policy in the Seville area (Giansante, 1999), is related to the vested interests of urban expansion and