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Intention and responsibility in speech acts

Abstract

I have argued elsewhere (Navarro-Reyes 2010) that the kind of excuses that appeal to a lack of intention in the performance of a speech act do not, in general, try to deny that the deed itself took place (i.e., in cases where we say that the act is performed unintentionally, we would not imply that the act was not performed at all, but that it was performed in a particular way). If this is correct, speech acts token performances ought to be defined independently of the speaker’s putative illocutionary intentions. In this paper I will pursue this idea by discussing the views of Alston (2000), a prominent champion of the intentionalistic account, who defines speech acts in terms of the notion of “taking responsibility”. Unlike Alston, I will claim that ‘unheard speech acts’ are not a legitimate category within speech acts, whereas cases of ‘unintended speech acts’ might be correctly considered as legitimate cases of speech acts, since they do effectively change the normative context.

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Intention and responsibility in speech acts

Author: Navarro Reyes, Jesús
Publisher: Peter Lang
Year: 2014
Source: https://idus.us.es/bitstreams/435aa370-1c7b-49a2-b0e1-996c2535d386/download
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
Jesús Na a o-Reyes, Uni e si y o Se ille
Abs ac
I ha e a gued elsewhe e (Na a o-Reyes 2010) ha he kind o excuses ha appeal o a lack o
in en ion in he pe o mance o a speech ac do no , in gene al, y o deny ha he deed i sel ook
place (i.e., in cases whe e we say ha he ac is pe o med unin en ionally, we would no imply
ha he ac was no pe o med a all, bu ha i was pe o med in a pa icula way). I his is co -
ec , speech ac s oken pe o mances ough o be de ined independen ly o he speake ’s pu a i e
illocu iona y in en ions. In his pape I will pu sue his idea by discussing he iews o Als on
(2000), a p ominen champion o he in en ionalis ic accoun , who de ines speech ac s in e ms o
he no ion o “ aking esponsibili y”. Unlike Als on, I will claim ha ‘unhea d speech ac s’ a e no
a legi ima e ca ego y wi hin speech ac s, whe eas cases o ‘unin ended speech ac s’ migh be co -
ec ly conside ed as legi ima e cases o speech ac s, since hey do e ec i ely change he no ma-
i e con ex .
Keywo ds
speech ac s heo y, in en ional ac ion, esponsibili y, second pe son pe spec i e
In oduc ion
Should speech ac s be de ined as in en ional ac ions, i.e. as ac ions essen ially pe -
o med wi h pa icula in en ions? Tha seems o be ou o ques ion in speech ac s
heo y, a leas in Aus in’s (1962) and Sea le’s (1969) adi ion. I do no hesi a e
ha speech ac s, as a social p ac ice, mus be de ined in e ms o in en ions and, in
pa icula , o illocu iona y in en ions. Wi h no appeal o hose in en ions he e is no
way o unde s and wha he p ac ice is, and no way o dis inguish di e en ypes o
illocu iona y ac s. Bu I would like o cas some doub s he e abou he need o de-
ine oken speech ac s pe o mances in e ms o he pu a i e in en ions o speake s.
In my opinion, i could be legi ima e o asse ha someone pe o med a pa icula
speech ac , e en i in ac she did no ha e he illocu iona y in en ions ha a e usu-
ally conside ed as cons i u i e o ha speech ac .
My c i icism will ocus on Als on’s (2000) ea men o wo so s o bounda y
cases in speech ac s heo y: unhea d speech ac s and unin ended speech ac s. Wi h
espec o he o me , Als on conside s ha hey a e a legi ima e ca ego y wi hin
speech ac s. In his opinion, an illocu iona y ac does ake place despi e being un-
hea d by anybody. Fo ins ance, acco ding o Als on, an u e ance ha was pe -
o med wi h he in en ion o make a p omise would s ill be a p omise, despi e i
was no hea d by he in ended audience, o e en by anybody. I will explain he ea-
sons why I hink his is w ong, since i implies ha Als on’s iew is oo ocussed
on wha has been called ‘inne ’ condi ions.
Na a o-Reyes, J. (2014) "In en ion and Responsibili y in
Speech Ac s. A no e on Als on", in Cogni i e and P agma ic
Aspec s o Speech Ac ions, edi ed by Iwona Wi czak-
Plisiecka, Pe e Lang Ed., F ank u /New Yo k, 187–206.
188
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
Wi h espec o he la e , unin ended speech ac s, Als on’s posi ion is he e-
e se: he ends o assume ha , in so a as he u e ance was no pe o med by he
speake wi h some speci ic illocu iona y in en ion, he alleged speech ac did no
ake place a all. In his iew, he unin ended speech ac would only be an appa en
speech ac : some hing w ongly conside ed as a speech ac by he audience, bu ha ,
in so a as i was unin ended, would no ha e aken place a all. I will also disag ee
wi h Als on on his poin , and I will de end ha unin ended speech ac s a e a legi -
ima e ca ego y o speech ac s: a c ucial possibili y ha mus be conside ed in he
de ini ion o oken—o indi idual—illocu iona y ac s. The u h is ha Als on’s
posi ion in his espec is no e y clea : in he i s place, he doub s ha unin ended
speech ac s a e e en possible a all. In his iew, illocu iona y ac s a e essen ially
in en ional ac ions. Howe e , in case unin ended speech ac s we e e e possible,
Als on conside s hem as so inge and ma ginal possibili ies ha he does no ind
hem ele an enough o modi y he co e o his heo y. In en ion, o Als on —as
o mos speech ac s heo is s—, is cons i u i e o each and e e y illocu iona y ac
pe o mance. In con as o his, I will de end ha in en ions a e cons i u i e o he
p ac ice o speech ac s, bu no necessa ily o each and e e y pe o mance wi hin
ha p ac ice. We need o in oduce in en ions in o ou accoun i we wan o de ine
illocu iona y ac s ypes, bu we should no in oduce hem as necessa y condi ions
o iden i y illocu iona y ac okens. In o he wo ds: in en ions do no ha e o be
necessa ily pa o he scene, in o de o ha e a case o ully commi ing illocu ion-
a y ac pe o mance.
The poin o iew ha I will de end, as we shall see in he end, denies ha he
i s pe son poin o iew should ha e he las wo d in de e mining he occu ence
o speech ac s. On he con a y, I will de end ha i is he second pe son poin o
iew—i.e., he poin o iew o he hea e — ha should ha e ha las wo d, despi e
i is—and mus be—epis emically limi ed. F om he hea e ’s limi ed pe spec i e,
she migh ha e he igh o asse ha a pa icula illocu iona y ac ook place dis-
ega ding he e ec i e occu ence o in en ions by he pa o he speake . The key
o guess i a pa icula speech ac did e ec i ely ake place is no o be ound in he
speake ’s mind, bu in he legi ima e expec a ions ha he u e ance c ea ed in he
hea e ’s mind. These expec a ions a e linked o he a ibu ion o in en ions o he
speake bu , in he las eso , wha makes he u e ance coun as a speech ac is no
he e ec i e occu ence o hose in en ions, bu he legi imacy o he hea e ’s a -
ibu ion o hose in en ions.
In o de o show he ele ance o his discussion, I will b ie ly ske ch he ise
o he p oblem in Aus in’s and Sea le’s accoun s, be o e ge ing o Als on.
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
189
App oaching he p oblem
Aus in’s Hippoly us and he isks o he i s pe son pe spec i e
I hink we ha e o hank Gazda (1981: 68) o he one ha migh be he simples
and clea es o maliza ion o wha a speech ac is: “a unc ion om con ex s in o
con ex s”. By u e ing some wo ds, he speake changes he social con ex and, in
pa icula , she changes i s no ma i e condi ions. E.g.: a
1
, be o e I made my
daugh e he p omise o b ing he o he pa k, I was no obliged o b ing he o he
pa k. A
2
I u e he wo ds “I p omise o b ing you o he pa k”, which she hea s
and unde s ands. Because o ha , a
3
, I am obliged o b ing he o he pa k. Why
did he no ma i e si ua ion change be ween
1
and
3
? Why do we say ha I ha e a
no ma i e eason o do some hing a
3
, which I did no ha e a
1
? Gazda ’s de ini-
ion is a good desc ip ion o wha happened, bu i is no an explana ion. The ques-
ion is: why does he con ex change a all, jus because I u e ed some wo ds?
Aus in was clea ly igh when he claimed ha making a speech ac is some-
hing mo e han jus u e ing some wo ds. Disag eemen a i es when we y o de-
ine wha his ‘some hing mo e’ is: i.e. he kind o condi ions ha u n he me e
u e ance o some wo ds in o ully ledged—and mo ally commi ing—speech ac s.
I seems o be ou o ques ion ha he e mus be some kind o ex e nal condi ions
abou he su ounding con ex o he u e ance: wo ds ough o be u e ed in a ce -
ain way, in on o a pe inen audience, maybe acco ding o some p e-es ablished
con en ions, o a leas some sha ed linguis ic knowledge.
1
Fu he mo e, mos
schola s ag ee on he need o include some so o in e nal o cogni i e equi e-
men s, such as ha he ac had been done wi h speci ic illocu iona y in en ions—
he in en ion o p omise, o h ea , o o make a s a emen —, o ha he speake was
awa e o a leas some o he consequences o he own wo ds. I seems ha he u -
e ance mus ha e been done olun a ily, consciously, and in en ionally, o on pu -
pose, and i is usually alleged in a ou o his ha he lack o hose in e nal condi-
ions gi es ise o di e en kinds o excuses, which could inally no make i sensi-
ble o equi e om he speake o be commi ed o he wo ds. E.g., by claiming ha
i was no my in en ion o p omise, I would y o show ha I am no commi ed o
my own wo ds —i.e. I would y o show ha my wo ds did no e ec i ely change
he no ma i e si ua ion. F om his poin o iew, unin en ional p omises would no
be eal p omises, bu jus some so o misleading si ua ion: some hing ha looked
like a p omise, so o speak, om he ou side. P omises made wi hou he in en ion
1 I will mos ly use he concep o “con ex ” as e e ing o a se o ex e nal and in e nal condi-
ions o he u e ance, no in Spe be & Wilson’s limi ed sense, as “a psychological cons uc ,
a subse o he hea e ’s assump ions abou he wo ld” (1986: 15). The way I will use he
e m—which coincides, I hink, wi h Ha nish’s ecen discussion on he condi ions o speech
ac s (2009: 10)—will be wide , since i does no only include hose assump ions, bu also
many o he ea u es.
190
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
o p omise would no be a kind o p omise; in ac hey would no be p omises a
all.
Howe e , Aus in was qui e e icen o in oduce in e nal condi ions in his ac-
coun because he conside ed ha his would show speech ac s as a so o inne pe -
o mances ha would only indi ec ly ake place in he public scene. I we accep ed
ha he e a e some so o in e nal o men al necessa y condi ions o he pe o -
mance o a speech ac , we would seem o buy oo ha he e is some hing in he
mind o he speake , hidden o he hea e , which p ecludes us om ce ainly know
wea he he speech ac did e ec i ely ake place o no . In Aus in’s iews, speech
ac s a e social ac s: hey ake place in he social en i onmen . The p oblem is ha ,
i hei pe o mance depends cons i u i ely on he exis ence o inne hidden men al
s a es, which a e only accessible o he speake he sel , hen we seem o loose ha
social cha ac e . Speech ac s would un he isk o become some hing he speake
makes inside his mind, whe e he ex e nal mani es a ions would only be con ingen
and accesso y symp oms o ha ‘spi i ual’ p i a e ac ion.
Aus in’s ea s a e pe sonalised in he cha ac e o Hippoly us, who denied o be
bounded o his wo ds because hey had allegedly no been u e ed wi h he in en ion
o pe o m a commi ing speech ac . We ind Hippoly us a
3
, a e he occu ence
o an u e ance ha he audience had conside ed as a p omise, claiming ha ha
u e ance had no been made wi h he in en ion o bind: “An oa h my mou h made,
bu no my hea ”. I his escape we e possible a all, hen he whole sys em o
speech ac s would mel away like snow unde he sun. I wo ds could no bind un-
less hey we e accompanied by inne commi men s, and inne commi men s a e
ne e p esen in he public scene, hen hey loose he impo an ole ha hey ha e
in he wo king o social, s able sys ems o collabo a i e ac ions. I is hus a c ucial
ask o speech ac s heo y o gi e an accoun ha would p e en bad ai h use s o
language om escaping hei du ies. This is no jus a ma e o inge o ma ginal
cases, bu p obably he mo e undamen al mission ha speech ac s heo y could
e e ha e.
On he o he side, Aus in is awa e ha in en ions mus somehow be pa o he
s o y: i p omises we e ne e done wi h he in en ion o be commi ed o wo ds, he
p ac ice o p omising would loose i s poin . I seems ha I made a p omise because
I in ended o be bound by my wo ds—i.e., I in ended o change he no ma i e con-
ex , in o de o g an he hea e a ce ain igh o e my u u e ac ions. By he same
oken, whene e I o de some hing, I in end he hea e o be o ced o do wha I
say. Whene e I apologise o some hing, I in end o show my eg e abou wha I
did. Wha could be he poin o speech ac s, i hey did no exp ess hose illocu ion-
a y in en ions?
So we seem o be di ided be ween wo incompa ible equi emen s, and bo h o
hem seem o be qui e sensible: on he one hand, we ha e o de ine illocu iona y
ac s h ough ex e nal condi ions, since hey would o he wise be de ached om he
social en i onmen whe e public du ies a e es ablished. I hose ex e nal condi ions
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
191
we e no ully de e minan , we would be blind when ying o asc ibe du ies and
commi men s o o he s, and ha would always lea e an open doo o Hippoly us
and hose o his kind. On he o he hand, we need o de ine illocu iona y ac s
h ough in e nal condi ions, since hei e y pe o mance seems o be non con in-
gen ly linked o he e ec i e in e en ion o ou men al s a es. I hose men al
s a es we e no in ol ed, speech ac s would seem o be emp y. Speech ac s wi hou
eal in en ions do no e en seem o be speech ac s, bu jus some hing ha esem-
bles hem ‘ om he ou side’. I some necessa y condi ions we e pu ely in e nal, we
would be blind in he adsc ip ion o illocu iona y ac s o o he s; i all necessa y
condi ions we e ex e nal, speech ac s would be emp y, and he p ac ice would be
dep i ed o meaning.
2
Sea le and his disdain o me ely epis emological p oblems
Dealing wi h his ension is a mus o speech ac s heo e icians. In gene al, hey y
o so i ou by combining in e nal and ex e nal condi ions in hei accoun s.
Sea le’s (1969) classic heo y migh be he bes example. He de ines wha a p om-
ise is desc ibing bo h wha happens on he inside and on he ou side o he minds o
he speake s. In his iew, speech ac s mus be pe o med wi h pa icula in en ions,
which a e cons i u i e o wha hose ac s a e—i.e., hose ac s would no be wha
hey a e i hose in en ions we e no in hei o igin. And, a he same ime, i is he
ex e nal cha ac e o he u e ance wha makes i coun as a speech ac in he con-
ex whe e i akes place. This is possible because speech ac s a e go e ned by wha
Sea le calls “cons i u i e ules”, which always ha e he s uc u e: x coun s as y in C
—i.e., an u e ance o a ce ain kind coun s as he pe o mance o a pa icula illo-
cu iona y ac in i s con ex .
3
I he speake is awa e o his cons i u i e ule, and he
2 Al hough his ension is impo an in Aus in’s wo k, his amous doc ine o he in elici ies
does no con on i a all (1962: 14). The si ua ions ha he conside s as inge o ma ginal
a e always cases whe e he speake pe o ms he u e ance wi h he in en ion o make he
speech ac , bu some condi ions a e no me up o he poin ha he ac was pu po ed bu
oid (mis i es) o p o essed bu hollow (abuses). Bu wha would Aus in ha e o say abou
cases in which a speake did no in end o pe o m a speech ac , bu he audience was well
jus i ied o conside ha she had pe o med i ? Would ha be a kind o ‘in elici y’? I ha in-
e nal condi ion was no me , did he e y ac e e happen a all? Wha would be, acco ding
o Aus in, he s a us o unin ended speech ac s?
3 The way his accoun elies on p e-es ablished con en ions has been c i icised in some a-
mous occasions—such as in (S awson 1964) o (Spe be & Wilson 1986: 244). Those ac-
coun s ely on in e en ial p ocesses o do wi hou con en ions—beyond basic linguis ic ones.
Bu I do no belie e ha his makes any essen ial di e ence wi h espec o he poin ha I
would like o make. In any case, e en i cons i u i e ules depended on in e en ial p ocesses,
i would s ill seem ha hose p ocesses would somehow ha e o be ex e nally jus i ied. In
o he wo ds: he in e en ial basis mus be publicly accessible, since i is wha makes i legi-
ima e o a hea e o ake x as coun ing as y in C.

192
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
ac ion is in en ional and e ec i e, she in ends o make x coun as y in C. Bo h in-
e nal and ex e nal condi ions a e me he e, in ideal condi ions.
The ques ion we could add ess o Sea le would hen be: wha happens when
only one o hose wo so s o condi ions is me ? In pa icula , wha happens when
x does coun as y in C, bu x was no pe o med wi h ha in en ion? Would we s ill
ha e he e a case o an illocu iona y ac o no ? E.g.: would an unin ended p omise
be a so o p omise—in olun a y made, bu s ill ully commi ing—, o would i
no be a p omise a all?
4
And, al e na i ely, we would also ha e o ask wha hap-
pens in cases whe e he in en ion is no ul illed h ough he pe o mance: cases in
which he speake in ends x o coun as y in C, bu she is, o ins ance, unhea d by
he in ended audience.
Sea le would p obably claim ha hose a e me ely epis emological ques ions.
We know ha bo h in e nal and ex e nal condi ions a e me in ‘no mal’ speech ac s.
And he co e o his heo y is abou hose no mal condi ions. Ex ao dina y si ua-
ions should no a ec he co e o he heo y, since we all know wha an o dina y
p omise is, and i is his in ui ion wha is de eloped h ough he sys ema ic s udy o
‘linguis ic cha ac e iza ions’ (1969: 4). In eal li e, we migh don’ know, in pa ic-
ula cases, i some o hose condi ions a e me : maybe x does coun as y in C, al -
hough he speake did no in end i o be so. Bu om he ac ha we migh no be
su e i in pa icula cases, acco ding o Sea le, no hing in e es ing ollows abou he
na u e o he p ac ice, which necessa ily in ol es bo h aspec s. In his opinion,
speech ac s heo y should be made om he poin o iew o God, whe e all he
aspec s o he con ex would be anspa en ly p esen , including he minds o he
speake s.
Howe e , I would like o discuss he con enience o hose claims. The u h is
ha , in eal li e, speech ac s should hold up e en in God’s absence, o a leas in
God’s silence: wha shall we hen say om ou poin o iew, which is—and will
always be—epis emically limi ed? In pa icula , i could be alleged ha , om he
poin o iew o human speake s, he in e nal cogni i e s a es o o he s a e ne e
pa o he sha ed con ex . A leas ha is wha Hippoly us seems o claim: ha we
only saw his wo ds, u e ed by his ongue, bu no his hea o his soul, which had
qui e di e en in en ions. In cases like his, we ha e wo inconsis en candida es o
de e mine he e ec i e occu ence o he ac : he alleged in en ions o he speake
on he one hand and he ex e nal cons i u i e ules on he o he . We ind bo h ha x
coun s as y in C, and ha he speake claims ha he did no in end x o coun as y in
4 I migh be impo an o poin ou ha I am no e e ing he e o cases o insince e speech
ac s—such as insince e p omises, whe e he p omiso would no ha e he in en ion o ul ill
he p omise. E en in cases like his, as Sea le’s discussion co ec ly shows (1969: 62), i
seems ha he speake should somehow ha e he in en ion ha he u e ance will make he
esponsible o in ending o pe o m he p omised ac ion. I is he lack o his second o de
in en ion wha bad ai h use s o language, such as Hippoly us, could always deny o ha e
had.
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
193
C. In cases like his, Sea le’s heo y eludes he p oblem, conside ing i as me ely
epis emological. Bu i could ha dly be igno ed, unless we a e happy o lea e ou
heo y ou o he ealm o eal li e.
Als on and he ac o aking esponsibili y
In con as o Sea le, who seems o a oid he p oblem, William P. Als on (2000)
has ied o gi e i an answe . In his iew, an illocu iona y ac is necessa ily he e -
ec o an in ended ac ion. This in ended ac ion is wha he calls “R’ing”, which
s ands o “ aking esponsibili y o he sa is ac ion o a condi ion” (2000: 54). Ac-
co ding o Als on, R’ing is some hing ha he speake does: no jus some hing she
ealises o assumes, o some hing ha happens o he , bu an ac ion ha mus be
conscious and in en ional, in o de o be he so o ac ion ha i is.
5
The ac i e
cha ac e o his in en ional ac ion in ol es he u e e ’s ins i u ing a s a e o a ai s,
a he han jus being a ma e o he u e e 's ecognizing an al eady exis ing s a e
o a ai s, o assuming i .
Tha would mean ha , i a speake (S) p omised a hea e (H) ha he would
b ing he o he pa k, hen S ook esponsibili y (R’d) o b inging H o he pa k.
And i S was no aking esponsibili y o b inging H o he pa k, S did no p omise
H o b ing he o he pa k. Wha e e he u e ed, wi hou he in en ion o ake ha
esponsibili y he e would be no illocu iona y ac . This in en ion would be cons i u-
i e o he ac up o he poin ha , in i s absence, he e would be no such ac . P om-
ising would no jus be u e ing some wo ds, bu R’ing in u e ing hem. The speak-
e ’s in en ional ac ion o R’ing would be he eason why Gazda ’s unc ion applies,
and no ma i e con ex s change wi h he occu ence o speech pe o mances.
Acco ding o Als on, we ely on he ex e nal condi ions in o de o ecognise
hose in e nal in en ions. I x coun s as y in C, i is because we know ha , by u e -
ing x, S was R’ing. Looking o he speake ’s in en ion o R is looking o he e y
occu ence o he illocu iona y ac . P o iding conclusi e e idence ha S did no
in end o R would eo ipso mean ha S did no pe o m any illocu iona y ac a all.
This is he iew ha I would like o con on . In wha ollows, I will y o
show ha his accoun does no wo k because wha makes a communi y conside an
u e ance as a commi ing speech ac is no he p esence o absence o ha ac o
R’ing by he pa o he speake in he momen o he u e ance, bu he way he
u e ance i sel was pe o med wi h ega ds o he se o expec a ions ha we e jus -
ly gene a ed by i in he audience. In my iew, i is he up ake o hea e s—a leas
he one ha is legi ima e, acco ding o he ci cums ances—wha would be cons i u-
5 Moya (1990: 38-48) seems o de end a simila poin om he philosophy o ac ion. He does
no alk abou speech o illocu iona y ac s, bu abou “symbolic ac s”, which he de ines as
necessa ily implying he in en ion om he pa o he agen . I belie e ha mos o wha is
said he e abou Als on migh also be applied, mu a is mu andi, o Moya’s accoun o symbol-
ic ac s.
194
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
i e o he ac i sel . I I am igh , he ac would s ill be in o de e en i we didn’
know i he speake had he in en ion o R. Wha is mo e: he illocu iona y ac
would s ill be such an ac e en i we inally knew ha he speake was no in end-
ing o R. Recognising he in en ion o R would hen no be he same as iden i ying
he e ec i e occu ence o he illocu iona y ac .
I hink ha Als on is igh in conside ing esponsibili y as he key concep in
he de ini ion o illocu iona y ac s, bu I don’ hink ha he speake ’s ake o e-
sponsibili y is he c ucial poin . I would say ha he key is no in he assump ion o
esponsibili y om he i s pe son poin o iew —i.e. he poin o iew o he
speake — bu he a ibu ion o esponsibili y om he second pe son poin o iew
—i.e. he poin o iew o he hea e . The necessa y condi ions o he iden i ica-
ion o a speech ac a e no o be ound in he i s pe son poin o iew o he
speake , who allegedly made he sel esponsible o he wo ds, bu om he second
pe son poin o iew o he hea e , who legi ima ely made he speake esponsible
o he u e ance. I will hus y o de end ha oken speech ac s do no hold up be-
cause we make ou sel es esponsible o wha we say when we say i , bu because
we a e made esponsible o wha we ha e said, once we ha e said i .
Con on ing he p oblem in Als on’s accoun
I migh be easie o unde s and he di e ence be ween Als on’s iews and he ones
ha I am p oposing by conside ing how could we pa aph ase he ollowing ques-
ion: did he speech ac ake place? Acco ding o Als on, we could eplace his by
he ques ion: did he speake R? In my iew, he co ec pa aph ase would be: was
he hea e su icien ly jus i ied o a ibu e he in en ion o R o he speake ? The
di e ence is impo an because he hea e could be jus i ied, bu w ong. I.e. he
could ha e e y good easons o a ibu e o he speake an illocu iona y in en ion,
e en i he speake did no ha e i a all.
6
I ha is co ec , we could ind si ua ions
in which he speech ac ook place, despi e he absence o illocu iona y in en ion by
he pa o he speake . Those would be cases o unin ended speech ac s, and I will
y o show ha hey a e genuine a ibu ions o speech ac s. Al e na i ely, e en i
he speake R’d in en ionally, in my iew he speech ac did no ake place i he
hea e did no ha e —o was no awa e— o good easons o a ibu e o he speak-
e he in en ion o R. Those would be cases o unhea d speech ac s, and I will claim
ha hey a e no genuine a ibu ions o speech ac s. The di e ence be ween Al-
s on’s iews and he ones ha I p opose can hus be es ed in hese wo so s o
ma ginal, inge cases.
6 I am assuming he e a poin ha is gene ally accep ed in epis emology: ha somebody could
be jus i ied in belie ing p, e en i she could be w ong. “S is jus i ied o belie e p” does no
imply ha p is necessa ily ue.
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
195
A e he e unhea d illocu iona y ac s?
In con as o bo h Aus in and Sea le, Als on conside s ha he illocu iona y ac
does ake place dis ega ding he audience up ake, unde s anding, o e en hea ing o
he u e ance. This is his eason o e use Sea le’s equi emen o “no mal condi-
ions o inpu and ou pu ” in he pe o mance o p omises. Acco ding o Als on,
e.g.:
i is no necessa y o p omising [a hea e ] H ha I will do [an ac ion] A […] ha H un-
de s and wha I said. To be su e, i H did no unde s and me, she didn' ealize ha I
made ha p omise, bu I could s ill ha e done i . Suppose ha I mis akenly hink ha H
hea d and unde s ood me. I show up o ake H o he mee ing, and H is su p ised a his.
I migh well say “Didn’ you hea me when I p omised o ake you?”, he eby p esup-
posing ha I did p omise his e en i H didn' ealize i (Als on 2000: 53).
The e o e, acco ding o Als on, an unhea d p omise is a p omise, as a as he ac o
R’ing ook place, unbeknowns o he hea e . Als on is awa e ha his is a ho ny
poin , since i could seem ha he is u ning he speech ac in o some hing ha akes
place in absence o any social ame. He hus has o quali y la e his posi ion, along
he ollowing e ms:
he possibili y o a no ma i e s a e o a ai s being ini ia ed by [ he u e e ’s] U’s R’ing
ha C depends on he exis ence o a sys em o ules ha is in o ce wi hin a communi y
ha includes U. […] When U R's ha C in pe o ming an illocu iona y ac , ha is no a
pu ely p i a e pe o mance ha could be wha i is ega dless o how i engages he su -
ounding communi y. Fo R'ing consis s in making ce ain kinds o eac ions by o he s
app op ia e (Als on 2000: 58).
Howe e , as I will y o show, his cla i ica ion does no seem o be enough o ex-
one a e Als on om he accusa ion o conside ing speech ac s as p i a e pe o -
mances, which only acciden ally ake place in he social scene.
Bu le ’s ollow his a gumen o a momen . We a e dealing wi h a si ua ion in
which S belie es ha he made a p omise o H, bu H did no hea i . S belie es ha
a p omise was made, bu H does no . Who would be w ong he e? Acco ding o
Als on, i is H who is mis aken, since S did ake he esponsibili y o he wo ds,
whe he H hea d hem o no , and whe he H ecognised he in en ions o no . In
Als on’s opinion, he p omise was pe o med, despi e he ac ha nobody no iced
i , because S would ha e succeeded in making ce ain kinds o eac ions app op i-
a e—dis ega ding he ac ha hose who could ha e bene i ed om his no ma i e
change knew i o no . I S had no shown up o ake H o he mee ing, hen H
would ha e been in a good si ua ion o ec imina e his o S, whe he she knew o
no ha she was in such a posi ion. And S would s ill be exposed o such c i icism,
acco ding o Als on, because she did pe o m he speech ac , al hough i was no
hea d by anybody.
Pace Als on, I would say ha i is S who would be w ong in his imagined
case. No he unhea ing p omisee, bu he unhea d p omiso . In my iew, he p om-
ise would ha e no aken place, since i was unhea d by anybody. In my opinion,
202
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
know whe he he ac ook place o no is in his second pe son pe spec i e— he
one o hea e s—no in he i s pe son pe spec i e— he one o he speake . I he
in e en ial basis o he audience is s ong enough, ha is, i i co ec ly jus i ies he
a ibu ion o he in en ion—some hing ha could happen e en i ha a ibu ion
we e w ong— he ac ac ually happened— ha is, Gazda ’s unc ion would apply,
and he no ma i e con ex would ha e e ec i ely changed. In his espec , he i s
pe son pe spec i e is no de e minan o know i he ac ook place o no —
al hough i migh be de e minan o know i i was an in en ional ac o no .
Als on would disag ee on his poin . In his iew, somebody “p i y o his sec e
in en ions” would ha e o assume ha he speech ac did no ake place a all—e.g.,
because he g oom hough ha he had aken ime o . Bu I would eply ha e en
somebody p i y o hose hidden men al s a es would ha e o accep ha he b oom
was ge ing ma ied, e en i he was no awa e o ha ac . The eason is ha he
pe o mance o he ac — he ‘ou e ’ u e ance—was done in such a way ha i was
co ec o he audience o assume i as an illocu iona y ac , p ecisely because hey
had no clue a all abou he speake ’s de ian in en ions. I is ue ha he hea e s’
pe spec i e was epis emically limi ed—i.e. hey didn’ know abou he sec e in en-
ions o he speake —; howe e , i is om his epis emically limi ed pe spec i e
whe e illocu iona y adsc ip ions mus always be made. The key o know i he ac
e ec i ely ook place is no o be ound in ha “p i y” ealm o he mind o he
speake , bu in he public ealm o social in e ac ion. The pe o mance o an illocu-
iona y ac s is no cons i u i ely connec ed o he p i a e and sec e in en ions o
he speake —as a se o s a es ha we could only hypo he ically in e om his be-
ha iou —bu o he se o c i e ia ha a e, and mus be, sha ed by he use s o lan-
guage.
Those socially es ablished c i e ia—an idea aken om Wi gens ein’s la e
philosophy (see Na a o-Reyes 2010)—a e logically good easons o he a ibu-
ion o in en ions. By ac ing in a ce ain way—e.g., by u e ing some pa icula
wo ds in a speci ic con ex —you gi e you audience a good eason o belie e ha
you had some in en ion in pe o ming hose ac ions. And ha eason is somehow
good ‘by de ini ion’: ac ing in such a way means ha you ha e such and such in-
en ions. Howe e , e en i hei alidi y is a p io i, c i e ia a e de easible. They a e
no in allible, and he e migh be an impo an ambigui y in hei applica ion; in
hose cases, we would p obably gi e he speake he bene i o he doub abou he
own in en ions. Bu i c i e ia a e ul illed up o a ce ain poin , as hey a e in he
si ua ion Als on inally concei es, hen he s o y lea es no oom o ambigui y, and
wha e e he speake la e says abou his own p i a e s a es, his claims would jus
be ou o o de .
This is wha happens in he inal e sion o he s o y: an ex emely odd and
wis ed case, a e all he quali ica ions ha Als on imposes on i —excluding anc-
es o dazzling si ua ions, ime o aken by he g oom, and so on. We a e asked o
en isage a pe son who ealizes ha , in his si ua ion, i he u e s 'I do' wi hou any

In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
203
indica ion o a nons anda d use, he will be aken o ha e unde aken o ma y he
p ospec i e b ide. Realizing his, he says 'I do' wi hou gi ing any indica ion o a
nons anda d use, e en hough his in en ion is no o make he ma i al p omise:
I ind his incohe en as a desc ip ion o a pe son in possession o his senses. I can make
no sense o he idea ha a pe son in ull possession o his acul ies, ealizing ha u e -
ing S will place him in a ce ain posi ion, p oceeds o u e S in ull awa eness o wha
he is doing bu wi hou in ending o place himsel in ha posi ion. I would say ha such
a pe son has in en ionally en e ed in o he con ac , wha e e he may say la e . Wi h he
cons ain s speci ied I don' know how o gi e a cohe en desc ip ion o he case excep
in hose e ms. […] [This] is a he like jumping ou o a se en ie h-s o y window in ull
knowledge o wha ha means, bu no be in ending o kill onesel (Als on 2000: 141).
I hink ha wha is pe plexing o Als on is no ha he imagined g oom is i a ion-
al o inconsis en , bu ha he s o y i sel is pe ec ly cohe en wi h his own ac-
coun . I he pe o mance o he illocu iona y ac is s ic ly dependen on he causal
ole accomplished by he men al s a e o he speake —his “p i y” in en ion—, and
his men al s a e is de e mined independen ly o any social c i e ia, his imagined
G oom is pe ec ly concei able: a pe son who would ac acco ding o social c i e ia
up o poin ha would lea e no doub s wha soe e abou his own in en ions... bu
would no ha e hose in en ions a all. Wha is odd in Als on’s inal case is ha he
g oom has simply no public excuse o any kind bu , in Als on’s accoun , his si ua-
ion does no p e en him om ha ing he inal and c ucial excuse: ha he simply
did no in end o R, and he hus did no pe o m he illocu iona y ac a all.
The possibili y o an unin ended g oom is an e ec o Als on’s eliance on p i-
a e in en ions, as a cons i u i e ea u e o illocu iona y ac s. And he way he ies
o escape om his undesi ed consequence o his accoun is ex emely disconce -
ing:
(2) We mus also no iden i y he ques ion o wha illocu iona y ac , i any, he pe -
o med wi h he ques ion o wha con en ional e ec was gene a ed. I is concei able
ha he law should be such ha when ce ain wo ds a e u e ed (in he absence o ce ain
kinds o de ea e s such as coe cion o men al incapaci y) he u e e has aken on ce ain
obliga ions and his consequence migh hold ega dless o wha is he co ec illocu ion-
a y desc ip ion o his ac i i y (Als on 2000: 139).
By elling illocu iona y ac s apa om hei con en ional consequences, Als on
assumes a cos ha is much highe han he is willing o accep . Gazda ’s ini ial de-
sc ip ion o wha a speech ac is, o ins ance, would no wo k, since i could be he
case ha we had he unc ion om one no ma i e con ex o ano he jus wi h he
u e ance. I Als on we e igh , we would be o ced o say some hing like ha he
b oom is ma ied, e en i he ne e go ma ied; o ha he p omise was made, e en
i he speake did no make any p omise; o ha he ull English b eak as was o -
de ed, e en i nobody o de ed i . Wha we ind he e is he phan om ha haun ed
Aus in: a iew in which he pe o mance o he speech ac would ake place in he
hidden and p i a e space o he soul o he u e e , whe e he wo ds he u e ed ex-
204
Jesús Na a o-Reyes
e nally would be no hing bu allible and con ingen symp oms o a so o spi i u-
al, inne e en . Als on’s imagined b oom is inally no one else bu Hippoly us.
Once he has ejec ed hose cases o unin en ional speech ac s as ma ginal, un-
impo an , and p obably e en con adic o y, Als on conside s he possibili y o
ans o ming his own accoun in such a way ha e en hose cases would ha e hei
place:
Bu i we do ecognize unin en ional illocu iona y ac s, how could hey be ea ed in my
heo y? [...]
We can de ine a a ian o ‘R’; call i ‘R-U’ (‘U’ o ‘unin en ional’). I R’ing ha
p is delibe a ely pu ing onesel in such a posi ion ha one is subjec o co ec ion in
case o no -p, hen R-U’ing ha p is being in such a posi ion by i ue o one's u e ance,
hough no by delibe a ely pu ing onesel in ha posi ion. By subs i u ing ‘R-U’ o ‘R’
h oughou we can ans o m any analysis o an illocu iona y ac concep in o an analy-
sis o a concep ha applies indi e en ly o in en ional and unin en ional pe o mances.
The concep o being in he ele an no ma i e posi ion by i ue o u e ing S will be
he concep o , o example, p omising o do D, whe he in en ionally o unin en ional-
ly.[...]
I could ew i e all he analysis schema a in his o m, and i I el ha unin en ional
illocu iona y ac s we e o su icien impo ance I would do so. Bu since hey a e a
wo s nonexis en and a bes o ma ginal impo ance, I do no choose o p oceed in his
way (Als on 2000: 141-2).
The p oblem wi h his las wis in he a gumen is ha changing R o R-U in he
whole analysis would no jus be a modi ica ion o he o iginal e sion, bu a sim-
ple ejec ion o i , since he change would a ec Als on’s o iginal de ini ion o illo-
cu iona y ac . He had said ha an illocu iona y ac essen ially is a so o in en ional
ac —no a ma e o he u e e 's ecognizing an al eady exis ing s a e o a ai s, o
assuming i —whe eas a he end we would ha e he possibili y o a genuine speech
ac , wi h legi ima e no ma i e implica ions, ha is no in en ional a all. This s ep
would no jus in oduce a mino change in he heo y, as Als on seems o belie e.
On he con a y, he whole house o ca ds was s anding on his single claim: ha
he illocu iona y ac is wha i is because he speake in ends i o be so.
Als on e usal o in oduce his inal change in his analysis is explained by his
disdain o hose ma ginal cases—unin en ional illocu iona y ac s—whose unim-
po ance would no make i sensible o al e he whole sys em. Bu i is no laziness
wha p e en s Als on om aking ha s ep: i is a chi ec u al p udence. I we ook
his las idea se iously, we would ha e o ell he speake ’s in en ion o R apa
om he co ec illocu iona y desc ip ion o his ac ion; and, as we saw be o e, we
would also ha e o ell he co ec illocu iona y desc ip ion o he ac ion apa om
he social no ma i e e ec s ha i would ha e. In o he wo ds: we would ha e o
assume he whole collapse o Als on’s heo y.
In en ion and Responsibili y in Speech Ac s
205
Conclusion: he second pe son pe spec i e
Wi h his long discussion o Als on’s iews I ha e ied o a gue in a ou o wo
hesis ha a e opposed o he ones ha he de ends:
a) The discussion abou unhea d speech ac s showed us ha illocu iona y e -
ec s—and hus he e y pe o mance o he illocu iona y ac —is cons i u-
i ely dependen on he audience’s up ake. An unhea d speech ac would no
be a kind o speech ac —since hose u e ances would no p oduce any
change in he no ma i e con ex .
b) The discussion abou unin ended speech ac s p o ed ha wha makes he u -
e ance coun as a speech ac is he legi ima e a ibu ion o in en ions o he
speake by he pa o he hea e s. This legi imacy could ail, since i has o
be done om a pe spec i e which is always epis emically limi ed— he one
o he audience. Tha makes i is pe ec ly possible o concei e unin ended
speech ac s as a legi ima e cases o speech ac s—i.e., as e ec i e changes in
he no ma i e con ex . F om his poin o iew, unin ended speech ac s
would be a legi ima e ca ego y wi hin speech ac s ou cou .
In o he wo ds: by claiming ha a speech ac was unhea d we would imply ha i
ne e ook place as a speech ac ; whe eas by claiming ha a speech ac was unin-
en ional we would be quali ying he kind o speech ac ha did e ec i ely ake
place.
I ag ee wi h Als on on he idea ha he e is no way o unde s and he wo king
o speech ac s wi hou aking he idea o esponsibili y as a key poin . Bu wha is
needed is no Als on’s concep ion o R’ing, as he in en ional ac by which he
speake makes he sel esponsible o he wo ds. I would say ha esponsibili y
shows up la e : wi h he up ake. I am no esponsible o wha I mean , o o wha I
in ended o do wi h my wo ds, bu o wha ac ually I did, and o he se o legi i-
ma e expec a ions ha my wo ds p oduced in hose who ecei ed hem. Wha I
ha e o answe o a e my wo ds, no my p i y in en ions.
I ha e no been ying o p o e ha illocu iona y in en ions a e supe luous in
an accoun o speech ac s. On he con a y: he legi imacy o he hea e ’s de ec ion
o speech ac s pe o mance ely on c i e ia ha a e abou hese in en ions. I we
ook in en ions simply ou o he s o y we would be h owing he baby away, o-
ge he wi h he ba h wa e . I is c ucial o ou illocu iona y p ac ices ha u e anc-
es ul il c i e ia o he a ibu ion in en ional s a es, and i hey did no , hen he
p ac ice would loose i s meaning. Bu wha is ue o he p ac ice does no ha e o
be ue o each and e e y pe o mance wi hin ha p ac ice. I is ue ha p omises
canno be de ined as a ype o speech ac unless we ake in o accoun wha he
no mal in en ions o p omiso s a e. Bu he de ini ion o a oken p omise, ha is,
ou unde s anding o wha he e y occu ence o each and e e y p omise is, canno
depend on he exis ence o hose in en ions in he p i y ealms o p omiso s, since
o he wise we would be blind in he adsc ip ion o illocu iona y ac s o o he s.
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Jesús Na a o-Reyes
I inally esul s ha he only way o o ce Hippoly us o keep his wo d is by
appealing o his wo ds hemsel es, no o his p i y in en ions, o o his pu a i e as-
sump ion o esponsibili y o hem. Illocu iona y ac s do no hold up because we
make ou sel es esponsible o wha we do while we a e doing i , bu because o h-
e s make us esponsible o wha we ha e done, once we ha e done i . The au ho i-
y o say i an ac was in en ional o no migh be ound in he i s pe son pe spec-
i e; bu he au ho i y o say i he ac i sel ook place—whe he in en ionally o
no —mus ely somewhe e else: in he pe spec i e o he second pe son, p ecisely
because i is epis emically limi ed.
Re e ences
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P ess.
Aus in, John L. (1962). How o do hings wi h wo ds. Ed. J. O U mson. Ox o d: Cla endon P ess.
Gazda , Ge ald (1981). “Speech ac assignmen ”. In A. K. Joshi, B. L. Webbe & I. A. Sag (eds.),
Elemen s o Discou se Unde s anding (64-83). Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess.
Ha nish, Robe M. (2009). “In e nalism and Ex e nalism in Speech Ac Theo y”. Lodz Pape s in
P agma ics, 5:1, 9-31.
Moya, Ca los J. (1990). The Philosophy o Ac ion: an In oduc ion. Ox o d: Poli y-Blackwell.
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6:1, 145-170.
Sea le, John R. (1969). Speech Ac s: an Essay in he Philosophy o Language. Camb idge: Cam-
b idge Uni e si y P ess.
Spe be , Dan & Wilson, Dei d e (1986). Rele ance: Communica ion and Cogni ion. Ox o d:
Blackwell.
S awson, Pe e F. (1964). “In en ion and Con en ion in Speech Ac s”. The Philosophical Re iew,
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