‒ 923 ‒
CAPÍTULO 54
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HOBBES
AND LOCKE IN THEIR PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS
DANIEL HEREDIA
Uni e sidad de Se illa
1. INTRODUCTION
I we ake he philosophy o he 17 h cen u y, i is ine i able o b ing in
names like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The heo ies o his wo
philosophe s in he ield o Poli ical Philosophy a e indeb ed o he a-
di ion ha is ma ked by he wo k o Machia elli, al hough, o cou se,
wi h hei pe inen di e ences.
In his wo k we will see how Hobbes and Locke unde s and he s a e o
na u e o he human being and how he s a e and ci il go e nmen a e
c ea ed, being able o see ha he pe spec i es o bo h a e no oo a apa .
The wo k is di ided in o se e al sec ions. Sec ion 1 will be he in oduc-
ion. Sec ion 2 con ains he me hodology. Sec ion 3 conce ns he goal,
ha is, he s a e o na u e o he human being. Sec ion 4 is dedica ed o
he deba e, he c ea ion o he s a e and ci il go e nmen . Sec ion 5 co -
esponds o mo e aspec s o he deba e, in his case abou he concen a-
ion o di ision o powe . And sec ion 6 con ains he conclusions.
2. METHODOLOGY
This s udy employs a compa a i e app oach o analyze he poli ical phi-
losophies o Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, wo in luen ial igu es in
he his o y o poli ical hough . The me hodology in ol es a sys ema ic
examina ion o hei espec i e wo ks, p ima ily ocusing on Hobbes'
"Le ia han" and Locke's "Second T ea ise o Go e nmen ."
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A comp ehensi e e iew o seconda y sou ces is conduc ed o ga he
insigh s in o he his o ical con ex , in ellec ual backg ounds, and key
a gumen s o bo h philosophe s. This e iew se es as a ounda ion o
unde s anding he nuances o hei hough and iden i ying a eas o con-
e gence and di e gence.
Close ex ual analysis is employed o dissec Hobbes' and Locke's p i-
ma y ex s, wi h a pa icula emphasis on hei heo ies o he s a e o
na u e, social con ac , na u al igh s, and he ole o go e nmen . This
analy ical app oach enables a de ailed examina ion o he philosophical
amewo ks p esen ed by each hinke .
A compa a i e amewo k is de eloped o sys ema ically compa e and
con as he poli ical heo ies o Hobbes and Locke. This amewo k
encompasses hema ic ca ego iza ion, iden i ying common hemes and
di e gen iewpoin s ac oss hei wo ks.
C i ical e alua ion is applied h oughou he s udy o assess he
s eng hs and weaknesses o Hobbes' and Locke's a gumen s. This e al-
ua ion in ol es sc u iny o logical cohe ence, empi ical e idence, and
philosophical implica ions, aiming o p o ide a balanced assessmen o
hei con ibu ions o poli ical heo y.
Finally, he indings om he compa a i e analysis a e syn hesized o
elucida e o e a ching pa e ns, philosophical ensions, and implica ions
o con empo a y poli ical discou se. This syn hesis aims o con ibu e
o a deepe unde s anding o he philosophical ounda ions o mode n
poli ical hough .
Th ough his me hodology, he s udy aims o p o ide a nuanced com-
pa a i e iew o Hobbes' and Locke's poli ical philosophies, shedding
ligh on hei endu ing ele ance and implica ions o con empo a y po-
li ical heo y and p ac ice.
3. GOAL: STATE OF NATURE
De ining he human being a poli ical animal in he A is o elian way
makes pe ec sense o se e al easons. One o hem is he social s a us
ha belongs o us. When li ing in socie y, i is no mal o con lic s o
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a ise, and o de mus be es ablished so ha li e as a whole is as ole able
as possible. On he o he hand, he consciousness o an indi idual exis s
in us, since we can iden i y ou sel es as some hing (o a he someone)
ou side ha social g oup.
Be ween hese wo posi ions a e Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.
Hobbes unde s ands ha i is ue ha we li e [and coexis ] in socie y,
bu ha his is no because human beings a e social by na u e. Acco d-
ing o Hobbes, he idea o he human being as a poli ical animal does
no eally e lec he human condi ion. His posi ion is based on he be-
lie ha he eason o li ing in socie y is none o he han o a oid de-
s oying one's own species. On he o he hand, Locke does de end he
social and poli ical condi ion o he human being, and ha i his has
occu ed i has no been as a despe a e measu e wi h which one can
escape om human na u e i sel .
While Hobbes chooses o suppo an indi idual and “an isocial” na u e
o he human being, in which we ha e o c ea e poli ics o a oid ou
own des uc ion; Locke does no unde s and i in he same way, since
he de ends a na u e o he human being in which we know ou sel es
wi hin a g oup in which we li e and le li e.
One o he ideas ha we can s op a o be e obse e bo h posi ions is
ha o he s a e o na u e. The s a e o na u e in Hobbes is unde s ood
as ha his o ical (o p ehis o ic) momen in which he e is no socie y as
we know i , bu a he he wo ld is composed o indi iduals wi hou a
concep ion o he whole, wi h an in ini e hunge o desi es (Hobbes,
1962: 20). In his s a e e e y hing is allowed o sa is y hese desi es.
This necessa ily leads o a dead end: con lic be ween hose who wan
he same hing.
How is his si ua ion esol ed? In a wo ld wi hou limi s and in which
we ind ou sel es a he c oss oads whe e he same desi es be ween in-
di iduals a e a ma e o dispu e, hei li es a e in se ious dange . One
li es, hus, among wol es. Bu i has no ye been clea wha i is ha
allows he ealiza ion o desi es.
Hobbes is e y clea : powe . Powe is e iden in he scena io in which
wo (o mo e) indi iduals ind hemsel es in he middle o a con lic o
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in e es s when i comes o sa is ying such desi es, in he sense ha -
al hough in ha s a e o na u e we all ha e he igh o sa is y hem -
no e e yone has he same capaci y o be able o ace ce ain s onge
indi iduals (Hobbes, 1962: 94). Tha is, s eng h is shown as one o he
exp essions o powe , bu i will no be he only one. Pe suasion ca ied
ou h ough men al p ocedu es also plays a undamen al ole when i
comes o ha ing powe .
Powe is he only hing ha human beings need o sa is y hei desi es
in he s a e o na u e. And we ha e o ask ou sel es, wha is w ong wi h
ha ? Is no his way o ac ing ano he (mo e o less sub le) o m o
na u al selec ion? The answe canno be educed o a yes o a no.
Hobbes would no unde s and he concep o na u al selec ion as we do,
so he would da e say ha his a gumen could no con ince him enough.
On he o he hand, i he knew his concep , he could coun e a gue ha
in na u al selec ion animals do no adap and elimina e each o he o
he me e mo i a ion o ob aining powe o sa is y desi es as humans do.
The e o e, because i is di e en , na u al selec ion can s ill make sense
i we decide o elimina e he s a e o na u e, as Hobbes in ends. Wha
conce ns Hobbes is no he e en s o na u e i sel , bu how humans can
dis o i and u n i in o a e i ying s a e.
Fea begins o sp ead and in his scena io wha sol es he p oblem is
he c ea ion o some hing ha is abo e he human being: he S a e.
Le 's mo e on o he s a e o na u e acco ding o John Locke. Locke
also ecognizes he eedom o ac as one wishes indi idually, bu wi h
he di e ence ha o Locke he human being is no subjec o passions
and desi es, bu main ains ha he human being is a a ional being (a
a ional animal ha A is o le would say). I is no ha he denies ha
human beings can be passiona e, bu ha he does no g an he o al
p edominance o human na u e o he passions, as i may seem in
Hobbes. Wi h Locke we see a mo e a ional human being, who is no
in aded by he powe o passions. To a ce ain ex en , bo h ecognize
ha , i passions go e n human li e, i can be se iously ha med.
In he Lockean s a e o na u e, he human being is ee wi hin ame-
wo ks es ablished h ough laws ha , because hey a e “ a ionally
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co ec ,” a e necessa ily complied wi h, and hese a e na u al laws.
The e is eedom o ac indi idually, bu he e is also a kind o “limi a-
ion” ha is hese na u al laws. Na u al laws se e o make all humans
equal. While in Hobbes' s a e o na u e he human being could ac in
any way o sa is y hei desi es, in Locke's his has no place. Locke
de ends ha he human being in i s na u e unde s ands o he ellow hu-
mans as equals, and, he e o e, unde s ands ha hey canno ha m hem
simply because hey wan o do so in o de o sa is y hei desi es. Con-
cei ing onesel and o he s as such necessa ily leads human beings o
ac aking in o accoun he undamen al igh s g an ed o hem h ough
na u al laws. This ac , he e o e, does no allow o a s a e o na u e in
which he human being mus ea o hei li es, jus as hey did in he
Hobbesian s a e o na u e (Locke, 2006: 12).
The eedom a ailable o he human being in he Lockean s a e o na-
u e is concen a ed in he eedom ha one has o e onesel and one's
possessions and no o e o he s. Locke s ips he human being o ha
license, since he concei es ha i belongs o no one excep he Di ine
C ea o . I is ue ha Locke ecognizes he human being's eedom o
ac , bu unde s ood as a low wi h he en i onmen and no as a way o
ac ing by imposing i s will h ough he possible powe ha he human
could ob ain by ac ing eely. Locke shows less ea o he way humans
beha e in hei na u al s a e. Bu gi en his pe ec ly ma ched scena io,
why did human beings end up in oducing a highe o de o supe ise
e e y hing? In Hobbes we saw ha he mo i e was o a oid ou sel -
des uc ion, bu wha abou Locke?
In he Lockean s a e o na u e he igh o a ack he eedom o ano he ,
al hough as long as his o he has ansg essed he na u al law. The one
who a acks he peace ha na u al laws p o ide us can be subjec ed o
wha e e punishmen he pe son who wan s o condemn him (he ) con-
side s, because he (she) is gi en he igh o judge whoe e wan s [who
ob iously complies wi h na u al laws] o esol e he con lic ha he has
c ea ed. who has iola ed na u al law. Bu he way o judge i mus al-
ways obey eason. Passions should no be allowed o en e in o his si -
ua ion, bu should be punished “acco ding o he dic a es o se ene ea-
son and conscience, assigning penal ies ha a e p opo ional o he

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ansg ession and ha se e o enable he c iminal o epai he damage
he has done and abs ain om doing so.” o epea ing his o ense”
(Locke, 2006: 14). In Locke we a e wi nessing he passage om an in-
di idual s a e o na u e o socie y almos wi hou ealizing i . The e a e
aspec s o ha bene olen human being ha a e wis ed owa ds he
mo e human side, o , we could say, he mo e impe ec side. Locke
himsel ealizes ha we can be biased in ou judgmen . I is no he same
o punish an o ende who is no known as ano he who is known. Con-
lic en e s he Lockean scena io o pe ec coexis ence be ween indi-
iduals. The con lic con e ges owa ds an ill-ad ised loca ion, which
is he s a e o wa (Locke, 2006: 22). I should be said be o e con inuing
ha he s a e o na u e is no dis inguished om he s a e o wa . The
s a e o wa occu s when con lic occu s in he s a e o na u e.
Once his is cla i ied, we can see ha Locke in eg a es in o eason
some hing ha seemed o ha e no hing o do wi h i s na u e, e il.
Hobbes loca ed e il in he passions, and some hing o he same calibe
could be deduced in Locke. Wha ga e he secu i y o main ain an al-
mos lo ing ela ionship wi h each o he can also be he eason why one
en e s a s a e o wa . The Hobbesian and Lockean scena ios o he s a e
o na u e begin o mee . The s a e o wa is, o Locke, some hing o
a oid, and, he e o e, he also sees necessa y he c ea ion o ha some-
hing ha is abo e he human being ha helps him p ese e o de : he
s a e o socie y.
I we look closely a his sys em we can see ha bo h Hobbes and Locke,
a he end o he day, g an human beings he same goal o aspi e o:
peace. And peace seems o be a s a e ha canno occu unless i is con-
sensual. Being social seems o be necessa y in bo h o peace o exis
and pe sis . Ac ing oge he owa ds he common good is wha seems
o lead us o peace. And his “ag eemen o he common good” mus
ollow he u elage o eason. Which leads us o he ac ha in eali y
bo h hinke s do no say e y di e en hings. In he s a es o na u e,
bo h Hobbesian and Lockean, he e is he “dange ” o someone appea -
ing who h ea ens peace (in Hobbes i occu s as a esul o an excessi e
use o he passions; in Locke i occu s when one – o se e al – hey
iola e he na u al law and ha necessa ily leads owa ds he s a e o
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wa ), and his i sel causes bo h o aspi e o he opposi e, ha is, o
achie e ha s a e o peace. The en y in o he scene o he con lic , o
ha which ine i ably leads us o wa , makes he pa hs o bo h au ho s'
hough s di ec owa ds a poin o con e gence. Tha poin o con e -
gence is he consensus o he c ea ion o a S a e (Hobbes) o Ci il
Go e nmen (Locke) ha ensu es he secu i y o each indi idual.
4. DEBATE: CREATION OF THE STATE AND THE CIVIL
GOVERNMENT
Un il now i has been seen ha he human being in Hobbesian hough
showed ha he had an e il na u e om which he had o escape because,
i no , he an he isk o endange ing his exis ence. Fo his e y eason,
he c ea ion o he S a e was necessa y. The way in which i is possible
o human beings o see such a s ep as necessa y equi es a consensus
be ween hose same indi iduals who compe e wi h each o he . Sud-
denly, we can ealize ha hese human beings, who we e wol es o each
o he , s op o hink abou wha would be bes so ha he si ua ion ine -
i ably goes owa ds ca as ophe. Being consis en , we ealize ha he
na u e o he human being is no so “wol like”. Socie y, he idea o be-
longing o some hing in common, u ns ou o be comple ely necessa y
o begin he pa h ha leads human beings owa ds hei sal a ion. So,
as we saw abo e, while in Locke a i s he pa icipa ed in a de ense o
a bene olen and social na u e o he human being, bu ha li le by
li le i was “depu i ied”; in Hobbes we a e seeing he opposi e e ec .
Tha human being who is insa iable when i comes o sa is ying hei
desi es and who will do e e y hing in hei powe o ob ain powe o
con inue sa is ying hei desi es now need hei ellow human beings o
b ing peace o his en i e ho izon.
The c ea ion o he S a e is ag eed. Bu wha s uc u e should i ha e?
Wha o m o ac ion should be ca ied ou ? Wha ole do indi iduals
play now, once he S a e is c ea ed? Ob iously he unc ioning o he
S a e mus be di e en om wha occu ed in he s a e o na u e, since
wha was sough wi h he c ea ion o his was a di e en way o li ing.
Bu i is also ue ha impo an ea u es o he s a e o na u e would be
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p ese ed. And ha is he alue o powe . The S a e mus monopolize
e e y hing, in o de o subdue ha na u e domina ed by passions. And
in he hands o how many should powe all? Hobbes is a de ende o
only one (Hobbes, 1962: 168), which would be he so e eign, which is
he name ha powe acqui es in he S a e (so e eign y).
We see ha in he p ocess o concen a ing powe solely and exclu-
si ely in he so e eign, he e mus be a g ea common awa eness ha
he c ea ion o he S a e is he solu ion o human p oblems. The e o e,
he S a e is made up o all hose indi iduals who ag ee o i s c ea ion.
I is one hing o he so e eign, once he ob ains powe , o be he sole
holde o he p i ilege o doing and undoing. Bu i is no less ue ha
his au ho i y has been g an ed a he expense o gua an eeing he sa e y
o e e yone. This is possible because e e yone esponds o a common
idea, ha is, no one ac s on hei own. E e yone wan s o li e in peace.
And no only ha , hey wan o li e in peace o e e .
Ne e heless, wha s ands as he solu ion o human p oblems also
b ings wi h i consequences ha con ain e en mo e p oblems. To begin
wi h, he e is he p oblem o ac ing acco ding o powe , and he espon-
sibili y ha his en ails. Acco ding o Hobbes, by g an ing powe o he
so e eign one is, on he one hand, enouncing ha powe on he pa o
he indi iduals, hus emaining subo dina e o he will o he so e eign;
and on he o he hand, he esponsibili y o wha he so e eign does
alls on hose who ha e au ho ized him o do i . This second aspec is,
o say he leas , s iking. The so e eign has ull powe o do and undo
as he pleases, bu he esponsibili y o such ac s alls on hose who
allow such a ci cums ance. The ep esen a i e o powe has such a ole
because, acco ding o Hobbes, he does no en e in o ha pac ha e e-
yone has eached indi idually, bu a he he limi s himsel o ul illing
wha he has been en us ed wi h. The pac is, as we ha e seen abo e,
i e ocable. This condi ion applies o all pa ies, ha is, indi iduals
canno seek o change he o m o go e nmen ha has been ag eed
upon, no can he so e eign, since wha legi imizes him o ac wi h
comple e eedom is he will o all, and his was unique and common.
The e o e, he so e eign ac s acco ding o he powe ha has been
g an ed o him and no acco ding o his own will.
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In Hobbes i can be pe cei ed ha he akes in o accoun ha pe ec ion
does no exis and, he e o e, wha is in ended o be c ea ed has (and
will ha e) de ec s, as all his leads us almos ine i ably o absolu is
sys ems. Bu ano he hing ha is qui e clea is ha Hobbes de ends
ha , al hough hese “de ec s” can be an e il, i is o a lesse calibe .
Le 's look a he c ea ion o Locke's Ci il Go e nmen .
We ha e seen ha , o Hobbes, human beings begin o know and de-
elop hei da k side once hey begin o compe e wi h o he s o powe ,
which is wha makes i possible o sa is y desi es, once hese become a
eason o con lic .
Acco ding o Locke, he ull igh o judge o he s can become wha
makes he good na u e o human beings co up , because his can lead
o being enge ul and pa ial, doing “good” o iends and e il o ene-
mies. I all s a s because an indi idual may be b eaking na u al law, so
he (she) becomes unde he con ol o whoe e wan s o judge him
(he ). I human beings we e o ally a ional, hese ypes o con lic s
would no p esen any p oblem; bu we ha e passions, and hese can
become so powe ul ha hey can e en al e he unc ion o eason,
which becomes used o do e il ins ead o good. Le us emembe ha
Locke knows pe ec ly well ha e enge is no some hing o ally pas-
siona e, i equi es eason o ca y i ou . The simila i y wi h Hobbes
lies in he ac ha ob aining ha powe o e ano he b ings ou he
mos pe e se side o he human being. The e o e, he c ea ion o a
Ci il Go e nmen is he solu ion.
Like in he Hobbesian S a e, he c ea ion o such au ho i y mus be a con-
sequence o a consensus on he pa o all indi iduals (Locke, 2006: 97),
ha is, he c ea ion o he S a e is no a o ced solu ion, bu some hing
ha e e yone wan s o achie e, hus, he peace ha is so longed o .
This ag eemen mus include each o he indi iduals who allow such a
decision o be made. We mus submi o he posi i e laws ha a e de-
cided among all and ully. This mus be concei ed in such a way, ha
is, as a common ac , wi h a single di ec ion. The opposi e canno be
expec ed. No unde s anding he pac as some hing ully common, says
Locke, is like no lea ing he s a e o na u e, in which each one ac ed
‒ 938 ‒
Lockean s a e o na u e is no simila o he Hobbesian s a e o na u e,
bu o he S a e. In he Hobbesian s a e o na u e one was no esponsi-
ble o any hing o he ac ions o indi iduals, while in Locke's, one
was subjec o he na u al laws imposed by God. F eedom o Locke
does no ha e a e y di e en meaning om ha de ended by Hobbes.
Fo Locke, wha should be mos moni o ed is powe in poli ics, hence
he main ains i s di ision.
Simila o di e en , i is undeniable ha bo h occupy a anscenden al
place in philosophy in gene al. And no only ha , bu also in he way
poli ical sys ems ope a e. Ways o unde s anding poli ics, as powe -
hoa ding as enligh ened despo ism; as well as i s opposi es, such as po-
li ical libe alism, ind hei sou ce o inspi a ion in hese hinke s,
which shows how ich hei sys ems a e.
7. ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS
This wo k has been unded by Nex Gene a ionEU wi hin he “Ma ga-
i a Salas” pos doc o al p og am o young doc o s.
8. REFERENCES
Hobbes, T. (1962) Le ia han, Chicago, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
Locke, J. (2006) Segundo T a ado sob e el Gobie no Ci il, ad. po Ca los
Mellizo, Mad id, Tecnos.