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Empirical Estimates of Fiscal Visibility in some OECD Countries

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Empirical Estimates of Fiscal Visibility in some OECD Countries

Author: Roig Alonso, Miguel
Publisher: Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Teoría Económica y Economía Política
Year: 1996
Source: https://idus.us.es/bitstreams/311c7919-4d90-4183-bf76-f464042510b6/download
P.4.2/9-2-96
I
I I
ENCUENTRO
DE
ECONOMIA
PUBLICA
Depa amen o
de
Teo ía Económica
y
Economía Polí ica
Uni e sidad
de
Se illa
Se illa
9, 10 de eb e o de 1995
PONENCIA
Empi ical
Es ima es
o
Fiscal
Visibili y
in some
OECD
Coun ies.
Miguel
ROIG
ALONSO
Depa amen o
de
Economía Aplicada. Uni e sidad
de
Valencia.
EMPIRICAL
ESTIMATES
OF
FISCAL
VISIBILITY
IN
SOME
OECD
COUNTRIES
Miguel
Roig-Alonso
Public
Finance and
Public
Sec o
Economics
Resea ch
Uni
Uni e si y
o
Valencia,
Spain
L-
INTRODUCTION:
Imp o emen s in he e icien alloca ion o esou ces be ween he
p í a e
and public
sec o s o an economy - as
well
as among i s se e al public sub-sec o s - can be eached inso a
as bo h public e enue and expendi u e ha e
isibili y,
his
is,
he
bu den
o public e enue and
he
bene i
o public expendi u e should be
ully
no iceable by
indi iduáis1.
Conce ning
public e enue, i s
isibili y
has changed
in
he cou se o
his o y,
depending
on
bo h economic (as he de elopmen
le el
o a coun y) and
poli ical
(as mechanisms o
iscal
¡Ilusión
used by
poli icians,
bu eauc a s, and in e es g oups o
o e eóme
axpaye s' esis ance)
ac o s
(Wagne , 1976; Bo che ding, 1977; Buchanan and Wagne , 1977;
Fio ina
and
Noli,
1978;
Pomme ehne and Schneide ,
1978;
B ennan
and
Buchanan,
1980;
F ey
and Pomme ehne,
1982;
Tullock,
1989;
Tabellini
and
Alesina,
1990;
Dunlea y,
1991;
Muelle ,
1993).
In a
simila
way,
he compliance
wi h
such equi ed p ope y by
iscal
sys ems now in
o cé
migh
di e
ema kably
among coun ies.
Wi h
ega d o public expendi u e, he
inal
o
in e medía e,
he public o
p í a e
na u e, he spacial e ee s o dimensions, he cos s necessa y o ob ain consump ion, and o he
inhe en cha ac e is ics o
pubiicly
p o ided
goods
and se ices ep esen majo ac o s
de e mining hei bene i
isibili y
(Weingas , Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Solano, 1983;
Hamil on,
1983;
Becke ,
1983, 1985; Muelle and
Mu eU,
1985, 1986; W igh , 1986; Muelle ,
1987;
Wol ,
1987;
Wildasin,
1990; Hen ekson,
1992).
In
any case, i is necessa y o dispose o
logical
and gene al indica o s pe mi ing o
quan i y,
as exac ly as possible, o wha ex en he equi ed p ope y o
isibili y
is eached a
e e y
momen by
local,
s a e, ede al o con ede al, sup ana ional, and gene al
iscal
sub-
sys ems and sys ems o coun ies, since
"... he
sys ema ic mispe cep ion o
key
iscal
pa ame e s
may
signi ican ly
dis o
iscal
choices by he elec o a e"2. Al hough some au ho s
(Pu iani,
1903;
Buchanan,
1967)
ha e
analyzed
se e al
elemen s o he ax s uc u e la gely hidden so
ha
o e s do no pe cei e he en i e cos o p o iding public goods,
e y
ew
a emp s
ha e been
pe o med
ill
now o measu e
iscal
¡Ilusión
o
iscal
isibili y
in
a
sys ema ic,
gene al and di ec
way.
Howe e , many con ibu ions ha e ied o
de ec
and measu e di e en mani es a ions o
ypes (deb
¡Ilusión,
lypape e ec , income
elas ici y
o he ax s uc u e, complexi y o he ax
sys em,
e c.) o his cha ac e is ic o empi ical applica ions ying o
expiain
he absolu e o
ela i e
sizes o public
budge
and biases in budge a y decisions.
'By
e enue isibili y we mean isibili y o
di ec
bu den
o public e enue. Some
ypes
o public e enue ( o ins ance, e enue om public p ope y) migh no in ol e
any
bu den in he
sense
he e ese ed o his e m. Symme ically, by public
expendi u e isibili y, isibili y o di ec
bene i
o public expendi u e mus be
unde s ood. Again,
some
ypes
o
public
expendi u e ( o example, public pu chases o
p í a e
inancial
asse s
a ma ke p ices) migh no
ca y
any bene i wi h hem.
2(Oa es,
1991,
page
431).
i
Wagne
(1976)
unde ook a He indahl
índex
as a p oxy a iable o cap u e he
complexi y
o public e enue sys ems. Bu his app oach su e ed, as acknowledged by himsel ,
om
se ious de iciencies, since he
isibili y
o he se e al classes o public e enue is
likely
o
a y
g ea ly, and his cha ac e is ic is no cap u ed by his index. Fo his eason, i is no
su p ising
ha
subsequen
econome ic
wo k
based on he He indahl index has yielded con use
and
con adic o y esul s (see: Munley and G eene, 1978; Clo el e , 1976; Pomme ehne and
Schneide ,
1978;
Bake ,
1983; B eeden and Hun e ,
1985).
When measu ing
iscal
illusion
o
iscal
isibili y,
many ac o s,
like
he ela i e size and he in e nal s uc u e o ypes o e enue
and
public expendi u e, he ins i u ional amewo k, e c., a e o be aken in o accoun . So, in
spi e o he
c ucial
impo ance o he
isibili y
a iable,
i s measu emen is no
done
ill
now in
a
sys ema ic, gene al and di ec way because o i s unde lying complexi y.
This
con ibu ion, e e ing o he se e al
le éis
o
e i o ial
public adminis a ions o
any
coun y, p esen s:
A)
Indica o s pe mi ing o make, in an ope a i e way, ime and space
iscal
isibili y
measu emen s and compa isons, in o de o assess he quali y o sub-sys ems and sys ems o
public
e enue and expendi u e as ins umen s o
e icien iy
e-alloca ing economic esou ces.
B)
Sys ema ic and di ec es ima es on
iscal
isibili y
o sub-sys ems and sys ems o public
e enue now in
o cé
in he membe coun ies o wen y signi ican
OECD
coun ies, showing
a)
he low
alúes
o e enue
isibili y
o all
hese
coun ies and b) he high di e gences now
exis ing
among hem.
Policy
implica ions
om
hese
es ima es seem s aigh o wa d o
such
OECD
coun ies:
alloca ion
imp o emen s could be ob ained by implemen ing changes and e o ms aiming a) o
aise
alúes
o public e enue
isibili y
and b) o make domes ic
iscal
sub-sys ems and sys ems
con e ge o
OECD
coun ies eco ding he highes
alúes.
H.-
INDEX
OF
BURDEN
VISIBILITY
/
INVISIBELITY
OF
TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE:
In
gene al, o e e y
le el,
L, o e i o ial public adminis a ions o an economy, a
isibili y
/
in isibili y
index o i s o al public e enue,
VLT,
can be de ined in such a way
ha
0
<, Vj <, 1
based on he
ollowing
o mula:
,T
^ T T
VL
=22 xn
y>L
whe e:
a)
n = numbe o ypes o public e enue o
le el
L o e i o ial public adminis a ions;
b)
Xg = ela i e
inancia]
weigh o public e enue o ype i o
le el
L o e i o ial public
adminis a ions,
wi h
i = 1, 2, n; his is:
2
E
« í
1=1
wi h
GFa
= absolu e quan i y o pubiic e enue o ype i o
le el
L o e i o ial public
adminis a ions;
c)
y¡J =
isibili y
o pe cep ibili y ( o he policy in ended - o legal - e enue-p o ide ) ac o
o
bu den o public e enue o ype i, o
which
le el
L o e i o ial public adminis a ions is
en i led,
wi h
0
< yj < 1
l.-
BURDEN
VISIBILITY
/
INVISIBILITY
OF A
SPECIFIC
PUBLIC
REVENUE:
An
objec i e es ima ion o
ya.7
- ac o o pe cep ibili y o he di ec bu den by a policy
in ended - o legal - e enue-p o ide o a public e enue o ype i o
le el
L o e i o ial
public
adminis a ions - can be de ined acco ding o he ollowing c i e ia:
T
T T T
T
•
T
Ya.
=
V¡L
Pa. mi Ra. la.
whe e:
a)
V¡LT
= olun a y ( a,7 = 0) o coe ci e ( ^ = 1)
na u e
o public e enue o ype í o i s
policy
in ended - o legal - e enue-p o ide (coe ci eness pa ame e ),
wi h
0
< -J < 1
b)
p¡J =
ull
(p¡LT = 0) o
nuil
(pa,7 = 1) p opo ionali y o he amoun o public e enue o
ype i - he bu den o
which
is
bo ne
by a policy in ended - o legal - e enue-p o ide - o he
cos o
e ícien ly
p oducing he good o se ice
speci ically
ecei ed by him in e u n o his
bu den (p opo ionali y pa ame e ),
wi h
0
< j< 1
c)
m¡LT
=
ull
(nía.7
= 1) o
nuil
(m^7 = 0) in o ma ion o he policy in ended - o legal -
e enue-p o ide on he concep o he di ec bu den he is bea ing when p o iding public
e enue o ype i (concep -in o ma ion pa ame e ),
wi h
0
<> ma7 < 1
d)
qjL7
=
ull
(q¡L7
= 1) o
nuil
(q¡L7
= 0) in o ma ion o he policy in ended - o legal - e enue-
p o ide on he amoun o he di ec bu den he is bea ing when p o iding public e enue o
ype i (amoun -in o ma ion pa ame e ),
wi h
0
^ qj <; 1
e)
¡a,7 =
in e medía e
(¡a,7 = 0) o
inal
(¡a.7 = 1) posi ion o he policy in ended - o legal -
e enue-p o ide in ela ion o his di ec bu den (bu den-shi ing pa ame e ),
wi h
3
O
<ij:£
1
IV.-
INDEX
OF
BENEFIT
VISIBILITY
/
INVISEMLITY
OF
TOTAL PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE:
Simila ly
o he case o public e enue, o e e y
le el
o e i o ial public
adminis a ions, L, an index o bene i
isibili y
/
in isibili y
o o al public expendi u e, VLE,
can
be de ined in such a way
ha
0
< VLE < 1
based on he ollowing o mula:
T E
E E
VL
=Lx L
y/L
M
whe e:
a)
q = numbe o ypes o public expendi u e pe o med by
le el
L o e i o ial public
adminis a ions;
b)
X,LE
= ela i e
Financial
weigh o public expendi u e o ype pe o med by
le el
L o
e i o ial
public adminis a ions,
wi h
= 1, 2, q; his is:
2£
1
wi h
GFn.E
= absolu e quan i y o public expendi u e o ype pe o med by
le el
L o
e i o ial
pubiic adminis a ions;
c)
y„ =
isibili y
o pe cep ibili y (by he policy in ended - o legal - consume ) ac o o
bene i o public expendi u e o ype pe o med by
le el
L o
e i o ial
public adminis a ions,
whe e
0
^ yj < 1
V.-
BENEFIT
VISIBILITY
/
INVISIBILITY
OF A
SPECIFIC PUBLIC EXPENDITURE:
An
objec i e es ima ion o y^ ( ac o o pe cep ibili y by a policy in ended - o legal -
consume o he di ec bene i o a public expendi u e o ype pe o med by
le el
L o
e i o ial
public adminis a ions) can be de ined acco ding o he ollowing c i e ia:
„
E „
E
„
E
_
E
_ E¡ E
whe e:
a)
V,LE
=
nuil
( „,E = 0) o
ull
( n,E
= 1) consump ion o a pubiicly supplied good o ype by
4

.
. 8.
¡ s
policy in ended - o legal - use o bene icia y (consump ion pa ame e ),
wi h
0
á jí
1
b)
p„,E *
ull
(pn.E =
O)
o
nuil
(p„,E = 1) p opo ionali y o cos o e icien p oduc ion o he
publicly
supplied good o ype o a
speci ically
equi ed
mone a y
bu den bo ne by he policy
in ended - o legal - use o bene icia y (p opo ionali y pa ame e ),
wi h
0
< p„.E < 1
c)
=
ull
( O d
= 1) o
nuil
(m^ = 0) in o ma ion o he policy in ended - o legal -
consume o use on he concep o he di ec bene i he is ecei ing when public expendi u e
o
ype is being pe o med (concep -in o ma ion pa ame e ),
wi h
0
< < 1
d)
q1LE =
ull
(q, - = 1) o
nuil
(q„.E = 0) in o ma ion o he policy in ended - o legal -
consume o use on he amoun o be di ec bene i he is ecei ing when public expendi u e
o
ype is pe o med (amoun -in o ma ion pa ame e ),
wi h
0
:£
« a*
£ 1
e)
i„ =
in e medía e
(i^*
= 0) o
inal
(i^
= 1) posi ion o he policy in ended - o
legal
- use
o bene icia y o he publicly supplied good o ype in ela ion o his di ec bene i (bene i -
shi ing
pa ame e ),
wi h
o =s <; i
VL-
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES ON BURDEN
VISIBILITY
OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE:
The
ollowing
able p esen s weigh ed es ima es on bu den
isibili y
o public e enue
and g an s o wen y signi ican
OECD
coun ies, ob ained by applying index
n
VL
= ¿2xn y a.
de ined in sec ions II and DI o his
pape ,
o
iscal
sys ems and sub-sys ems now in
o cé
in
hese
coun ies.
Such
alúes
ha e been calcuia ed mainly om in o ma ion and p ima y da a
on public cash
lows
p o ided by bo h he Commission o he Eu opean Communi ies3,
e lec ing
ax s uc u es o - and ins i u ional si ua ion in - e e y membe coun y on Janua y
1,
1992, and he In e na ional Mone a y Fund4. Fo b e i y easons. in e media e wo king
ables a e he e omi ed.
3In en o y
o
Taxes
Le ied in he
Membe
S a es
o he
Eu opean
Communi ies.
15 h
edi ion,
Commission
o he
Eu opean
Communi ies,
Luxembou g,
1993.
4A
Manual
on
Go e nmen
Finance
S a is ics.
In e na ional
Mone a y
Fund,
Washing on,
1986, and
Go e nmen
Finance
S a is ics
Yea book
1994.
Volume
XVIII,
In e na ional
Mone a y
Fund,
Washing on,
1994.
5
Th ee
hypo heses on
mínimum,
plausible, and
máximum
shi ing o ax bu den ha e
been assumed, gi ing ise o he co esponding se ies o
máximum,
VM, plausible, Vp, and
mínimum,
Vm,
alúes
o
weigh ed- isibili y
es ima es o e enue bu den o he policy in ended -
o legal - e enue-p o ide s.
Acco díng
o he VM -
máximum
weigh ed -
isibili y
es ima es o public e enue and
g an s:
A)
Aus alia,
wi h
a
alué
o 21,36%, has he mos
isible
cen al sub-sys em, Po ugal ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
5,53%.
B)
Swi ze land,
wi h
a
alué
o
18,98%,
has he mos
isible
in e medía e
sub-sys em, and Spain
he leas one,
wi h
1,15%.
Belgium,
Denma k,
Finland,
F ance, G eece, I eland,
I aly,
Luxembou g,
Ne he lands, No way, Po ugal, Sweden, and Uni ed Kingdom lacked
s a e,
egión,
o p o ince go e nmen
le el
o he yea s espec i ely conside ed.
C)
Sweden,
wi h
a
alué
o
48,92%,
has he mos
isible
local
sub-sys em, Ne he lands ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
0,40% only. Es ima ions o G eece we e no possible because o non-
a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
D)
Luxembou g,
wi h
a
alué
o 43,50%, has he mos
isible
sup ana ional sub-sys em, and
G eece
he leas one,
wi h
1,03%5. Es ima es we e no possible:
a)
Fo
I aly
because o
non-a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
b)
Fo
Aus ia,
Finland,
and Sweden because
hese
coun ies we e no
s ill
membe s o be
Eu opean
Union
o he yea s conside ed.
E)
Sweden,
wi h
a
alué
o 33,36%, has he mos
isible
gene al sys em, Po ugal ha ing he
leas one,
wi h
6,29%. Es ima es o G eece and
I aly
we e no possible because o non-
a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
Acco ding
o he Vp - plausible weigh ed -
isibili y
es ima es:
A)
Again
Aus alia,
wi h
a
alué
o 15,58%, has he mos
isible
cen al sub-sys em, Po ugal
ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
3,88%.
B)
Swi ze land,
wi h
a
alué
o
14,26%,
has he mos
isible
in e medía e
sub-sys em, and Spain
he leas one,
wi h
0,89% only.
C)
Sweden,
wi h
a
alué
o
30,58%,
has he mos
isible
local
sub-sys em, Ne he lands ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
0,23%. An
es íma e
o G eece was no possible because o
non-a ailabili y
o
p ima y da a.
D)
Luxembou g,
wi h
a
alué
o
37,95%,
has he mos
isible
sup ana ional sub-sys em, G eece
ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
0,87%. Es ima ions we e no possible:
a)
Fo
I aly
because o
non-a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
b)
Fo
Aus ia,
Finland,
and Sweden because
hese
coun ies we e no
s ill
membe s o he
Eu opean
Union
o he yea s conside ed.
5No ice
ha
Aus alia,
Canadá,
No way, Swi ze land and
U.S.A.
do no ha e
sup ana ional
go e nmen le el.
6
E)
Sweden,
wi h
a
alué
o
20,22%,
again has he mos
isible
gene al sys em, Po ugal ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
4,33%. Es ima es o G eece and
I aly
we e no possible because o non-
a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
Acco ding
o he m -
mínimum
weigh ed -
isibili y
es ima es:
A)
Aus alia,
wi h
a
alué
o
9,81%,
has he mos
isible
cen al sub-sys em, Sweden ha ing he
leas one,
wi h
2,02%.
B)
Swi ze land,
wi h
a
alué
o
9,53%,
again has he mos
isible
in e medía e
sub-sys em, and
Aus alia
he leas one,
wi h
0,42% only.
C)
Sweden,
wi h
a
alué
o
12,23%,
has he mos
isible
local
sub-sys em,
Finland
and Uni ed
Kingdom
ha ing he leas one,
wi h
p ac ically 0,00%. An
es íma e
o G eece was no possible
because o
non-a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
D)
Luxembou g,
wi h
a
alué
o
32,40%,
has he mos
isible
sup ana ional subsys em, Po ugal
ha ing
he leas one,
wi h
p ac ically 0,00%. Es ima ions we e no possible:
a)
Fo
I aly
because o
non-a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
b)
Fo
Aus ia,
Finland,
and Sweden because
hese
coun ies we e no membe s
o
he Eu opean
Union
o he yea s conside ed.
E)
Denma k,
wi h
a
alué
o
12,63%,
has he mos
isible
gene al
iscal
sys em, and Po ugal
he leas one,
wi h
2,36%. Es ima es o G eece and
I aly
we e no possible because o non-
a ailabili y
o p ima y da a.
VIL-
CONCLUSIONS:
The
quali y o public e enue and expendi u e sub-sys ems and sys ems as policy
ins umen ó
o
e icien ly
alloca ing economic esou ces among
p í a e
and public sec o s and
sub-sec o s
a íes
in ime and space as a esul o economic,
poli ical,
and
social
ac o s.
The
índices
o
iscal
isibili y
/
in isibili y
de ined in he p e ious sec ions o his
pape
b ing
o wa d a gene al measu emen me hod
which
can be used o make ele an quan i ied
compa isons among membe coun ies o he In e na ional Mone a y
Fund
p o ided
ha
de ailed s a is ic igu es on execu ion o
public
budge ó
as
well
as in o ma ion
abou
he s uc u e
o
he di e en ypes o public adminis a ions' e enue and expendi u e p og ammes a e
a ailable
o esea che s.
Es ima es
ob ained om di e en assump ions on ax shi ing by applying
hese
Índices
o measu e he bu den
isibili y
o e enue sub-sys ems and sys ems now in
o cé
in wen y
signi ican
OECD
coun ies show:
Fi s .-
Low plausible
alúes
o bu den
isibili y
o all
hese
coun ies, specially o :
a)
No way
(4,39%),
G eece
(4,38%),
Luxembou g
(4,21%)
and Po ugal
(3,88%)
a a cen al
le el
o go e nmen .
b)
Aus alia
(1,74%)
and Spain
(0,89%)
a an
in e medía e
(s a e,
egión
o p o ince)
le el
o
go e nmen .
c)
I aly
(0,69%),
Uni ed
Kingdom
(0,63%),
I eland
(0,36%)
and Ne he lands
(0,23%)
a a
local
le el
o go e nmen .
d)
Po ugal
(1,67%)
and G eece
(0,87%)
- among Eu opean
Union
membe coun ies - a a
sup ana ional
le el
o go e nmen .
7
e)
Ge many
(6,86%),
Aus ia
(6,58%),
Luxembou g
(6,06%)
and Po ugal
(4,33%)
a he gene al
go e nmen
le el.
These low
alúes
o e enue
isibili y
s em om he concu ence o se e al ac o s such
as non-coe ci eness, exis ence o
speci íc
equi als, lack o in o ma ion on
concep s
and
quan i ies, pa ial shi ing o
bu den
by ax-paye s, in e go e nmen al
g an s,
e c.
Second.- Signi ican di e gences
be ween
plausible
alúes
eco ded by he
h ee
mos
isible
gene al
go e nmen s
(Sweden, 20,22%; Denma k, 18,40%; Finland, 16,11%) and he
h ee
leas
ones
(Aus ia, 6,58%; Luxembou g, 6,06%; and Po ugal, 4,33%).
Policy
implica ions o
hese
es ima es
seem s aigh o wa d o coun ies becoming
economicaily
mo e
e icien and
in eg a ed:
p esen
e enue
isibili y
alúes
a e low in gene al,
and alloca ion imp o emen s could be
ob ained
by implemen ing
changes
and e o ms a) o aise
alúes
o public e enue
isibili y
and b) o make domes ic
iscal
sub-sys ems and sys ems
con e ge o
OECD
coun ies eco ding he highes
alúes.
BIBLIOGRAP lCAL REFERENCES
-
Bake , S.H. (1983): "The
de e minan s
o median o e ax
liabili y:
an empi ical
es
o he
iscal
illusion hypo hesis", Public Finance Oua e ly, 11,
pages
95-108.
-
Ba o,
R.J.
(1974): "A e
go e nmen
bonds
ne weal h?", Jou nal o
Poli ical
Econom . 82,
pages
1095-117.
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Becke , G.S. (1983):
"A
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g oups
o poli ical in luence",
Oua e ly Jou nal o Economics, 98,
pages
163-77.
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Becke , G.S. (1985): "Public policies,
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Bo che ding,
T.E.,
ed.
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Budge s and Bu eauc a s: The Sou ces o Go e nmen G ow h.
Duke
Uni e si y P ess, Du ham.
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B eeden, C.H., and Hun e , W.J. (1985): "Tax e enue and ax s uc u e", Public Finance
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B ennan, G., and Buchanan, J.M. (1980): The Powe o Tax:
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Cons i u ion, Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, Camb idge.
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Public Finance in Democ a ic P ocess, Uni e si y o No h Ca olina
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Buchanan,
J.M.,
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Democ ac in
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The
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iscal
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Public Choice, 39,
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(1982): "The impac o pa ies on public expendi u e", in Cas les,
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Be e ly
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8
91
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AUSTRIA, 1992
SWITZERLAND,
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LUXEMBOURG,
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