C i ical Disin e es edness and Ideological Commi men : An Impasse?
B ian Cosg o e
Is c i ical disin e es edness possible? O , is i , o ha ma e , e en desi able? These a e he
majo ques ions ha ho e abo e his essay - la ge ques ions which we ace a he ou se . Fo he momen
we need o es ablish, i s , wha migh be mean by 'disin e es edness'. Fo hose whose majo business is
wi h he English li e a y adi ion, he i s name ha will un ailingly come o mind when he e m is
men ioned is ha o Ma hew A nold. The wo d 'disin e es edness' amously occu s in wha emains one
o he mos widely ead o A nold's c i ical essays, 'The Func ion o C i icism a he P esen Time'.
A nold pauses o ask, wha ule ough o condi ion he ac i i y o English c i icism? His answe is as
ollows:
The ule may be summed up in one wo d - disin e es edness. And how is c i icism o show
disin e es edness? By keeping aloo om wha is called ' he p ac ical iew o hings'; by
esolu ely ollowing he law o i s own na u e, which is o be a ee play o he mind on all
subjec s which i ouches.1
This is only he mos explici o hose passages in which A nold deals wi h wha o him is a c ucial
c i ical ideal - which is also, in ac , a li e a y ideal. I is clea om a s a emen in he 'P e ace' o he
1853 edi ion o his poems ha one o he hings he mos alues in he w i e s o he Age o Pe icles
(A nold's cons an ouchs one o cul u al excellence) is wha he calls 'disin e es ed objec i i y'.2
Now he e a e good easons o acknowledging a his poin ha A nold's accep ance o he e y
possibili y o objec i e e alua ion is bound o appea naï e and old- ashioned. One well-known
commen a o on pos mode nism, o example - Pa icia Waugh - dismisses he whole no ion o an
objec i e o e iew o any gi en cul u al si ua ion when she s a es ha 'we can no longe seek
anscendence", and goes on o add: 'The e is no Kan ian " iew om nowhe e", no concep ual space no
al eady implica ed in ha which i seeks o con es '.3 (O - o escape o momen om ha ocabula y o
con es a ion and con lic which so eadily en e s in o s a emen s o mode n c i ical heo y - ' ha which i
seeks o e alua e'). We mus hen e o o A nold ha , e en as he seeks o p omo e he ideal o
disin e es edness, he is s ill ac ing a he behes o his own ideological agenda. O , on a less sophis ica ed
and heo e ical le el, we ind Oli e Sacks simply aking i o g an ed ha objec i e
pe cep ion/e alua ion is a non-s a e . In an a icle published in 2004, he a one poin obse es ha
we decei e ou sel es i we imagine ha we can e e be passi e, impa ial obse e s. E e y
pe cep ion, e e y scene, is shaped by us, whe he we in end i , know i , o no .4
And o cou se i may s ill come as some hing o a shock o ecall ha e en science, ha discipline which
abo e all o he s akes as i s aison d'e e a capaci y o objec i e obse a ion, ound i sel bede illed, in
he new physics o he ea ly wen ie h cen u y, by an una oidable and ob usi e inpu on he pa o he
obse e .
I is clea , hen, ha i is a he mo e di icul o us o endo se he no ion o disin e es ed
objec i i y han i was o A nold. Ye igh ly, and as a ma e o p agma ic necessi y, we con inue o
hope ha some deg ee o objec i ely ounded ag eemen is a e all possible, bo h in ou pe cep ion o
' eali y' and in ou (collec i e) esponse o a -wo ks (including li e a u e). Se e ely hampe ed as we
una oidably a e by a pe asi e mode n scep icism, we ha e o accep how di icul i is o a i e a a
posi ion o disin e es edness; ye , on he o he hand, we do no en i ely abandon all a emp s o a i e a a
consensus based on he a ailable e idence. Disin e es edness, hen, may emain as an impossible ideal o
which, none heless, we may app oxima e.5
Wha engages me mos in A nold's a i ude is he way in which he si ua es 'disin e es edness' a
he hea o bo h cul u e and poli ics. When, in he passage quo ed ea lie om 'The Func ion o
C i icism', A nold ad oca es ha we should ' emain aloo om wha is called he "p ac ical iew o
hings"', he may be said o be opposing his ideal o ' he ee play o he mind' o p axis in gene al,
including, we mus in e , poli ical p axis. Whe he he 'play o he mind' can e e be uly ' ee' - ee, le
us say, o subjec i e and pe haps unacknowledged p ejudice - i migh a leas y o bypass
acknowledged o conscious p ejudice. O , in o he wo ds, e use o commi i sel a p io i o a clea ly
o mula ed ideological posi ion.
*
Wha is pe haps equi ed, howe e , a his poin is a weigh ie philosophical - and indeed li e a y
- indica ion o disin e es edness (in pa icula , aes he ic disin e es edness) han ha p o ided by A nold
(whose epu a ion no longe s ands as high as i did e en some i y yea s ago). I u n, hen, o a
subs an ial and signi ican essay by Diane Collinson, in a collec ion o essays on philosophical aes he ics,
edi ed by Oswald Han ling.
One p ominen conce n in Collinson's accoun o aes he ic expe ience is he no ion o
disin e es ed con empla ion. She de ines disin e es edness as 'an impa ial o unbiassed a i ude in which
one has no pe sonal axe o g ind …'6 Collinson i s o all shows how Aquinas, ollowing A is o le,
cha ac e ises aes he ic pe cep ion as 'con empla i e'; ha is o say, he obse e o ecipien esponds o
he wo k o a in a mood o 'a en i e con empla ion' (p. 118: Collinson's ph ase). She igh ly no es he
in luence o A is o le and Aquinas on he you h ul S ephen Dedalus in Joyce's Po ai , and she ci es
S ephen's aes he ic discussion wi h Lynch in he inal sec ion o he no el. Following A is o le, S ephen
i s speaks o ou esponse o T agedy:
You see I use he wo d a es . I mean ha he agic emo ion is s a ic. O a he he d ama ic
emo ion is. The eelings a oused by imp ope a a e kine ic, desi e o loa hing. Desi e u ges us
o possess, o go o some hing; loa hing u ges us o abandon, o go om some hing. These a e
kine ic emo ions. The a s which exci e hem, po nog aphic o didac ic, a e he e o e imp ope
a s. The es he ic emo ion … is he e o e s a ic. The mind is a es ed and aised abo e desi e and
loa hing.7
La e in he same discussion, dealing wi h Aquinas's no ion o cla i as ( he i id app ehension o he
quali y o an objec ), S ephen speaks o he expe ience in hese e ms:
The ins an whe ein ha sup eme quali y o beau y, he clea adiance o he es he ic image, is
app ehended luminously by he mind which has been a es ed by i s wholeness and ascina ed by
i s ha mony is he luminous silen s asis o es he ic pleasu e, a spi i ual s a e …8
Bo h Joyce and S ephen, as we know, use he e m 'epiphany' o desc ibe his momen o i id
app ehension - epiphany meaning ' e ela ion'. Joyce, howe e , ypically e uses o accep ha he e is
any hing me aphysical o anscenden in such a e ela ion, and he momen o epiphany emains wholly
oo ed in he na u al o de ; i a ises om a happy conjunc ion o he mind's cogni i e po en ial and he
inhe en o mal p ope ies o he objec . Ne e heless, he idea ha he momen o aes he ic pe cep ion
may poin o an o de o dimension beyond he immedia e objec emains a Pla onic emp a ion which
may be di icul o esis . And aes he ic pe cep ion, as S ephen's exposi ion sugges s, and Collinson also
s esses, 'need no be con ined o wo ks o a '. We can, she adds, 'be mo ed in much he same way by
na u al phenomena, hings and beings … and he human ace and o m' (p. 114).
This iew was one sha ed by A hu Schopenhaue ; and, unlike Joyce, Schopenhaue had no
ese a ions abou making use o a Pla onic ocabula y. O he objec s in he wo ld, i is he example o
he ee ha Schopenhaue in okes in o de o illus a e he possibili y o ou pe cep ion o he Idea o he
ee. Inso a as we know he ee as Idea, he pe cei ed ee, as Collinson pu s i , 'is plucked om he
s eam o he wo ld's cou se', and becomes (in he wo ds o Schopenhaue ) 'a ep esen a i e o he whole,
an equi alen o he many in space and ime (Collinson, p. 128 ). The indi idual ee is idealised as he
T ee, o as essen ial ' ee-ness'.
Schopenhaue 's aes he ic heo y de i es om his philosophical iews as a whole, and Collinson
help ully si ua es he aes he ic heo y wi hin ha la ge con ex . Acco ding o Schopenhaue , he wo ld is
o be concei ed as a blind and ecund ene gy which he calls 'Will'; o , as Collinson summa ises i , he
dynamic in he wo ld is 'blind o ce wi hou lucidi y o eason' (p. 126: we could, pe haps, hink o 'Will'
as a kind o elan i al, bu concei ed in he mos nega i e e ms). We a e all a i s me cy9; and one o he
clea es indica ions o ou subjec ion o his blind and i a ional o ce is o be ound, o Schopenhaue , in
he a ea o sexuali y. In he sexual ac , as well as in he choice o sexual ma e, we a e in ac - wha e e
illusions o eedom we may ha e - ac ing a he behes o he blind and i a ional Will.
Ye we a e no wholly doomed o his subjec ion; o al hough we appea o be a he me cy o
he Will, Schopenhaue poin s o he u he possibili y ha 'behind ou exis ence lies some hing else, ha
becomes accessible o us only by ou shaking o he wo ld' (p. 126). This o he eali y is e ealed when,
in Schopenhaue 's ph ase, a 'denial o he will' occu s (ibid.). Thus, o Schopenhaue , he u gen need is
somehow o anscend he blind p omp ings o he Will, and ind some hing ha will aise us (in his own
wo ds) 'ou o he endless s eam o willing' (p. 127). This we can do (as we ha e al eady seen in he
example o he ee) when, in ou dealings wi h he eal wo ld, a momen o con empla i e s asis allows
us o see he objec in i s pu es o m; a such a momen , in Collinson's summa y, ' he pa icula ,
con ingen a ia ions o an objec … all away o e eal i s Idea' (p. 128; Schopenhaue 's mas e wo k
(1819) ca ies he i le The Wo ld as Will and Idea).
I is, howe e , pa icula ly in wo ks o a ha his possibili y o con empla ing he objec -in-
i sel is o e ed; o jus as, happily, he ee may lose, in a momen o con empla i e pe cep ion, i s
pa icula o con ingen p ope ies, so oo in he wo k o a - bu by design om he ou se - he
inessen ial o con ingen is elimina ed, and he essen ial emphasised (p. 129). A , i migh be sugges ed -
whe he i be Michelangelo's s a ue o Da id o Shakespea e's King Lea o a Remb and sel -po ai o
one o Bee ho en's las qua e s - s i es o e eal, in Schopenhaue 's e ms, he essen ial s ipped o he
inessen ial.10 In he momen o aes he ic con empla ion he all-pe asi e ene gy o he elen less Will is
empo a ily placed in abeyance; in he o mula ound in Wo dswo h's Tin e n Abbey, we see (o , as
scep icism he e insis s I should add, hink we see) 'in o he li e o hings'. This is Schopenhaue 's own
accoun o he aes he ic expe ience:
The a en ion is no longe di ec ed o he mo i es o willing, bu comp ehends hings ee om
hei ela ion o he will. Thus i conside s hings wi hou in e es , wi hou subjec i i y, pu ely
objec i ely; i is en i ely gi en up o hem … Then all a once he peace, always sough bu
always escaping us on he i s pa h o willing, comes o us o i s own acco d, and all is well wi h
us … aes he ic pleasu e … is deligh om pu e knowledge and i s ways.
(p. 115)
Ob iously he ph ase 'wi hou in e es ' ecapi ula es he whole no ion o 'disin e es edness', as does
'pu ely objec i ely'; while 'pu e knowledge' is co ela i e wi h A nold's ' ee play o he mind'.
*
In he emainde o he essay, Collinson seeks o alida e he no ion o disin e es edness by
in oking, in e alia, Kan 's C i ique o Judgemen ; and, using Kan as au ho i a i e sou ce, u he
s esses he o malis aspec s o his kind o aes he ic app oach. Fi s , on he ques ion o disin e es edness,
Collinson p o ides his summa y o Kan : 'Tas e is a pe son's capaci y o judge hings by means o a
con empla i e deligh in hei beau y; i is he capaci y o disin e es ed aes he ic expe ience' (p. 136). As
o o malism, he ollowing om Collinson se es as a gloss on Kan 's 'pu posi eness wi hou pu pose':
Acco ding o Kan , beau y in a ep esen a ion is i s o mal p ope ies, i s i s appea ance o being
designed, bu o no speci ic pu pose … When we expe ience beau y we a e ecognizing and
esponding o o mal p ope ies. (p. 139)
And ollowing his Kan ian emphasis on o mal p ope ies Collinson is able o p oceed o a conside a ion
o Cli e Bell's de ini ion o ( isual) a as 'Signi ican Fo m' (p. 145).
Ha ing looked inally a such heo is s as John Dewey, Edwa d Bullough, Mon oe C. Bea dsley
and Geo ge Dickie, Collinson summa ises he indings , seeing a b oad simila i y in all o hese heo ies:
i is ob ious ha mos accoun s o [aes he ic expe ience] ocus on g oups o ea u es o
cha ac e is ics ha a e b oadly simila ; o example, concep s such as s asis, will-lessness,
de achmen , dis ance and disin e es edness ha e a g ea deal in common …
(p. 170)
Such, hen, we may conclude, is he adi ional o mains eam emphasis in heo ies o aes he ic
expe ience. Bu how a es such a concep as disin e es edness in ou own emba led, pos -Foucauldian
con empo a y c i icism? And how a es he ela ed concep o will-lessness (wi h o wi hou e e ence o
Schopenhaue )?
In a wo k signi ican ly i led The Limi s o In e p e a ion (1990), Umbe o Eco complained - in
my iew, igh ly - o 'a gene al endency' in ecen c i ical s udies o legi imise a ' ee eading' which
cedes he ini ia i e o ' he will o he in e p e e s'.11 The li e a y ex , hus manipula ed by he
in e p e a i e will, is o ced o gi e up i s aes he ic au onomy. As an example o his manipula i e will,
Richa d Ro y, appa en ly wi hou disapp o al, e e s o a ype o c i ic who 'asks nei he he au ho no
he ex abou hei in en ions, bu simply bea s he ex in o a shape which will se e his own pu pose'.12
The idiom o iolence he e is s iking: igno ing any possibili y ha he ex may possess a deg ee o
objec i e in iolabili y as objec -in-i sel , he c i ic eels ee o commi ideological ape, mas e ing he
ex and making i se e his/he own agenda. So much o Diane Collinson's cau iona y o mula: ha he
aes he ic objec , as 'some hing ha e eals i sel as comple e and whole in i sel is ecognized as
some hing upon which, in a ce ain sense, one canno and would no wan o in ude' (p. 120). Fa om
no wan ing o in ude, he ideologically d i en c i ic may ample down he lowe -beds, insoucian ly
sca e ing aes he ic blooms in all di ec ions.
Le me conclude his phase o he a gumen by aking pa icula no e o wo quo a ions om
Collinson's essay which se e o e eal how a many con empo a y c i ics ha e mo ed om ea lie ,
adi ional emphases. He e, i s , is Schopenhaue : 'e e yone has o s and be o e a pic u e [o , we migh
add, a poem] as be o e a p ince, wai ing o see whe he i will speak and wha i will say o him … ' (p.
133). Schopenhaue 's symbol o he p ince is no , o cou se, ad en i ious: i is pa o an a gumen which
would delibe a ely empowe he a -wo k, no he powe -hung y c i ic. The second quo a ion is e en
sho e bu is pi hy and s iking in i s b e i y. I comes om C.S. Lewis: 'The i s demand any wo k o
a makes on us is su ende ' (ibid.). To su ende , howe e , is o abju e ideological con ol, ceding he
(p opagandis ?) ini ia i e o he ex ; and his is wha he eminis o pos -colonialis o pos -Ma xian o
simila ly mo i a ed c i ic canno b ing he sel o do.
*
In he i le o his essay, I desc ibe he ension be ween ideological commi men and c i ical
disin e es edness as an impasse; which sugges s ha bo h pa ies o he dispu e ha e such a s ong claim
on ou sympa hy ha we canno , in he in e es s o inding a speedy esolu ion, dismiss one a he expense
o he o he . Fo , e en as I unde ake o ac as de il's ad oca e on behal o disin e es edness, I am
obliged o ecognise ha i is no possible o igno e o ally he claims o ideological eading. No can we
e u n, blindly, o a p e- heo e ical innocence, in which we spon aneously espond o he aes he ic appeal
and emo i e powe o he li e a y wo k (o wo k o a ), igno ing i s inescapable ideological implica ions
( hough in some li e a y wo ks hese will be less cen al han in o he s). I I ha e ac ed as de il's ad oca e
on behal o aes he ic app ecia ion, i is because I ea ha , gi en a numbe o ob ious ends (including
he b oad endency o li e a y s udies o lose i s cen ali y in he English Depa men as i is displaced by
an inc easingly po en cul u al heo y ), we shall decide simply o esol e he impasse by gi ing p io i y
o ideological implica ion abo e all else.
No long ago, in an a icle in The London Re iew o Books, Te y Eagle on use ully eminded us
o F ed ic Jameson's admoni ion (in Ma xism and Fo m) ha 'no heo y o he [li e a y] wo k is likely o
be wo h much i i does no "come o e ms wi h he shape o he sen ences"'.13 Tha p o ides, a leas , a
ges u e o econcilia ion; bu e en he e he emphasis ends o all, s ill, on he ideological, since, au in du
comp e, he 'shape o he sen ences' may be adjudged accep able only inso a as hey a icula e an
ideological con en ha can be o use o he c i ic. We may (alas?) ha e o esign ou sel es o he ac ha
wha A nold ad oca ed as disin e es edness belongs o a o me epoch, and ha i is naï e o hope o an
imme sion in some p o ound aes he ic sa is ac ion.
And ye , and ye … when one s ands in on o ce ain pain ings, by Bo icelli o Renoi o Van
Gogh o whome e ; o lis ens o music by Bach o Schube o B ahms o coun less o he s; o esponds o
he emo i e appeal o some o Geo ge He be 's ly ics o he aes he ic inesse o The Rape o he Lock o
he sublime passages o The P elude; o bea s wi ness o he econcilia ion be ween Lea and Co delia, o
is mo ed beyond wo ds by he s a ue-scene in The Win e 's Tale - i is ha d no obelie e ha he e may
be some minimal alidi y in he case made by Schopenhaue . Bu unde wha -ism, and in wha c i ically
accep able language, is such a subjec i e/in ui i e expe ience o be exp essed?

1 Culle , A. Dwigh , ed.: Poe y and C i icism o Ma hew A nold (Bos on: Hough on Mi lin, 1961), p. 246.
2 Ibid., p. 203. In he same passage in he 1853 'P e ace', such 'objec i i y' is implici ly con as ed wi h he p oblema ic
subjec i ism o mode ni y, which gi es us (in ano he amous ph ase) ' he dialogue o he mind wi h i sel ', as well as
he 'discou agemen ' o Hamle and o Faus .
3 Waugh, Pa icia, ed.:Pos mode nism: A Reade (London: Edwa d A nold, 1992), p. 5.
4 Sacks, Oli e : 'In he Ri e o Consciousness ', in The New Yo k Re iew o Books (Janua y 15, 2004), p. 44.
5 See, o a p agma ic iew on he ma e , James, William: P agma ism in Focus, ed. Do is Olin (London and New
Yo k: Rou ledge, 1992), p. 109: 'The "absolu ely " ue meaning wha no u he expe ience will e e al e , is ha
ideal anishing-poin owa ds which we imagine ha all ou empo a y u hs will some day con e ge …'
6 Collinson, Diane: 'Aes he ic Expe ience', in Han ling, Oswald, ed.: Philosophical Aes he ics (Blackwell/The Open
Uni e si y. 1992; ep . 1997), p. 134. All subsequen e e ences o Collinson's essay a e om his sou ce and a e
gi en in he main ex . - I pause he e o no e, by way o an icipa ion o wha is a gued la e , he o al lack o such
impa iali y in hose ideologically commi ed c i ics ( eminis s, pos colonialis s and o he s) in whom he sound o
g inding axes is qui e dea ening.
7 Joyce, James: A Po ai o he A is as a Young Man, ed. R.B. Ke shne (Bos on/NewYo k: Bed o d Books o S .
Ma in's P ess, 1993), p. 179. In ejec ing he 'didac ic' ole o a S ephen in e ec is implying ha a as p opanda
(a as ideological) is an in e io o m o a .
8 Ibid., p. 185.
9 The pessimism o much o Thomas Ha dy's poe y de i es om an imagina i e applica ion o jus such ideas.
10 I mus in all candou con ess a his poin ha he e ms 'essen ial' and 'inessen ial' s ike me as oo abs ac , e en
ague, and as mo e o do wi h he 'philosophical' han he 'aes he ic'. We would need some indica ion, a leas , as o
wha he 'essence' o a wo k o a is; a philosophical ask ha is beyond he p esen w i e . One can, howe e , accep
ha he e is a pa icula ly in ense ocus in some g ea wo ks o a on human expe ience ha is p o oundly
ep esen a i e; and, in any case, he gene al poin in Schopenhaue , conce ning he di e en o de o pe cep ion we
can expe ience in engaging wi h g ea a , has su icien alidi y o dese e a hea ing.
11 Eco, Umbe o: The Limi s o In e p e a ion (Blooming on: Indiana Uni e si y P ess, 1990), p. 42: i alics added.
12 Ro y, Richa d: 'Nine een h-Cen u y idealism and Twen ie h-Cen u y Tex ualism', in Consequences o P agma ism
(B igh on: Ha es e , 1982), p. 151. - I he e ep ise an a gumen which is gi en in mo e de ailed o m in a lec u e i s
published in 1994; see 'Voicing he Tex : Au ho s/Audi o s, W i e s/Reade s', in Kabdebo, Thomas, ed.: Beyond he
Lib a y Walls: John Paul II Annual Lec u es (Maynoo h: S . Pa ick's College, 1995), pp. 30-43, esp. pp. 35-39.
13 Eagle on, Te y: 'An i-Humanism' (a e iew o a s udy o D.H. Law ence and pos -coloniali y), in The London
Re iew o Books (5 Feb ua y, 2004), p. 16.