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How many deaths? Auto-bio-graphy as death-writing

Abstract

The article concerns various aspects of autobiography as they have been introduced by Jacques Derrida, who himself used the term “autobiographical” to refer to his philosophical writing. Unlike most scholars who stress the link between autobiography and philosophy in Derrida’s writing the article attempts to link it primarily to the “literary”. In this endeavour, most attention is paid to the numerous metamorphoses in which “death” structures and haunts (auto)biographies and our thinking about the genre. Here, the greatest influence, apart from Derrida, was Maurice Blanchot. “Death” and negativity figure at many levels of autobiography, where, unlike in a fictional narrative, they cannot be suspended easily: they can be found in the question about the very usage of language and its relation to the autobiographer, in the construction of the “I”, and in the medial situation of the literary. The article concludes by suggesting a potential transformation of the autobiographical practice brought about by techno-cultural changes and developments regarding both the “archive” and “media”, which are transforming the status of memory, legacy, and the past.

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How many deaths? Auto-bio-graphy as death-writing

Author: Kotásek, Miroslav
Publisher: Institute of World Literature, Slovak Academy od Sciences
Year: 2024
DOI: 10.31577/WLS.2024.16.1.8
Source: https://dspace.vut.cz/bitstreams/a408545c-f656-44dc-99a5-2492225f9bbc/download
109
ŠTÚDIE / ARTICLES
MIROSLAV KOTÁSEK
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
DOI: 10.31577/WLS.2024.16.1.8
© Ins i u e o Wo ld Li e a u e
Slo ak Academy o Sciences
© Mi osla Ko ásek 2024
Licensed unde CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
ŠTÚDIE / ARTICLES
Wo ld Li e a u e S udies 1  ol. 16  2024 (109 – 119)
Mi osla Ko ásek
Depa men o Czech Li e a u e
Facul y o A s
Masa yk Uni e si y
B no
Czech Republic
ko [email protected]
ORCID: 0000-0002-0784-3153
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
Au obiog aphy. Dea h. Jacques De ida. Media. Spec ali y.
This a icle conce ns a ious aspec s o au obiog aphy as hey ha e been in o-
duced by Jacques De ida, who himsel used he e m “au obiog aphical” o e e
o his philosophical w i ing. Unlike mos schola s who s ess he link be ween
au obiog aphy and philosophy in De ida’s w i ing he a icle a emp s o link i
p ima ily o he “li e a y”. In his endea ou , mos a en ion is paid o he nume -
ous me amo phoses in which “dea h” s uc u es and haun s (au o)biog aphies
and ou hinking abou he gen e. He e, he g ea es in luence, apa om De -
ida, was Mau ice Blancho . “Dea h” and nega i i y igu e a many le els o au o-
biog aphy, whe e, unlike in a ic ional na a i e, hey canno be suspended easily:
hey can be ound in he ques ion abou he e y usage o language and i s ela ion
o he au obiog aphe , in he cons uc ion o he “I”, and in he medial si ua ion
o he li e a y. The a icle concludes by sugges ing a po en ial ans o ma ion
o he au obiog aphical p ac ice b ough abou by echno-cul u al changes and
de elopmen s ega ding bo h he “a chi e” and “media”, which a e ans o ming
he s a us o memo y, legacy, and he pas .
Depa men o Fo eign Languages
Facul y o Elec ical Enginee ing
and Communica ion
B no Uni e si y o Technology
Czech Republic
[email p o ec ed]
110 MIROSLAV KOTÁSEK
[…] we a e held, o e e , be ween li e and dea h,
inas a e o non-exis ence and non-dea h, om
which ou whole li e pe haps akes i s meaning
and i s eali y.
Mau ice Blancho ([1947] 1995a, 252)
I emembe . I hink. I w i e. I w i e o emembe . Iw i e o( e)in en some los o
non-exis ing memo ies. AsI emembe , as Iin en my memo ies, I hink. The e o e
Iam. The e o e Idie. Ibecome amemo y.
Th ough hese (mainly linguis ic) ac s which a e anindispensable pa o e e y au-
obiog aphy, Iam going oou line hedis inc i eness o ace ain ou look on his ype
o w i ing (na a i e) ac ha was mos impo an ly inspi ed by hewo k o Jacques
De ida. Theopening sen ences should indica e, among o he hings, ha wha is
ques ioned bylooking a au obiog aphy om his poin o  iew is he e y possi-
bili y o subsuming au obiog aphy unde heca ego y o a“li e a y gen e”, while si-
mul aneously ques ioning heca ego ies bo h o “li e a u e” and “gen e”. “Li e a u e”
ge s p oblema ized inau obiog aphy bymaking i impossible osuspend he ension
be ween “ ic ion” and “ eali y” (“na a i e” and “wha eally happened”), no e en
in heac o  eading. Theon ology o au obiog aphy is uns able, osay heleas . The e
a e ob iously di e en p ima y impulses ha ins iga e heau obiog aphical na a i e
ac , which a e de ined by hei ela ion owa ds language ingene al and hep e-ex-
is ing “biog aphy” ma e ial. A  hesame ime hey p e-de ine hena a i e p oce-
du es used in hew i ing ac i sel : ona a e anau obiog aphy Ican use exclusi ely
hose pa icula e en s I emembe , because Ijus passi ely desc ibe wha Iknow
(assume oknow) has al eady happened; he e can be anexcess o in o ma ion and
Iwan ochoose only he ele an ones, hus gi ing my pe sonal a chi e adis inc
s uc u e; o Ican be pu ing oge he hena a i e because Ido no know wha hap-
pened, so Ineed o ab ica e amemo y o“make sense” o  hepas (and hep esen )
– he e is alack o in o ma ion and/o unde s anding and hena a i e is supposed
o ill hese lacunae. Thein en io (na a i e in en ion) o  he“I” ( he ealm o “au o”
inau o-bio-g aphy) is a  hesame ime hein en io o  heo he ( he ex ). Thebody
o  he ex is co-ex ensi e wi h hebody o  heau obiog aphe ; he ab ic o  heau o-
biog aphe ’s “I”is co-ex ensi e wi h he ab ic o  hena a i e. As o “gen e”, heun-
ce ain y abou genealogy (Who amI? Whe e do Icome om?) no only e ymolog-
ically, bu also p ac ically comp omises genology (Am Iusing heau obiog aphical
gen e? Am Iusing i jus ly?).
Unlike Robe Smi h (1995), who concen a es onDe ida dealing wi h and com-
men ing on“philosophical” au obiog aphies, Iam in e es ed mo e in he ela ionship
o au obiog aphical w i ing wi h he“li e a y”. I is inmany ways adelica e and dan-
ge ous liaison – au obiog aphical w i ing is capable o  es ing hemu ual in e ela-
ions o li e a u e, ic ion, u h, na a i e, and Sel . AsDe ida sugges s, o his lim-
inal sphe e he e m “au obiog aphy” is “pe haps heleas inadequa e name” (De ida
is e e ing he e ohis w i ing occupying hespace somewhe e be ween philosophy
and li e a u e) “because i  emains o me hemos enigma ic, hemos open” (De -
ida and A idge 1992, 34). “Philosophy” he e is no obe unde s ood p ima ily
111
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
as heacademic ield o “his o y o philosophy”, bu ini s ela ion o“au o-bio-g a-
phy” i mani es s i sel speci ically as he“a ” oli e and die p ope ly: “Lea ning
oli e should mean lea ning odie […]. Tha ’s been heold philosophical injunc ion
since Pla o: ophilosophize is olea n odie” (De ida [2005] 2007a, 24). Ip opose
his “p oblem o li e and dea h” ( he ealm o “bio” inau o-bio-g aphy) obe cen al
oau obiog aphy as well.
He e he s a egic posi ion o au obiog aphy in ela ion o li e a u e can
beglimpsed, as i he e y g ounds o li e a y heo y come obe dispu ed and laid ba e
byau obiog aphy. One eason migh be ha au obiog aphy does no le he eade
o ge “s a egically” abou heau ho and w i e o anau obiog aphical ex ( oa oid
heli e a y- heo e ical he esy o psychologizing in e p e a ion), bu on hecon a y
highligh s heposi ion o  hew i e and hesi ua ion o w i ing (na a ing), includ-
ing hepsychological, cogni i e, sociological, o unconscious se up o  hew i e as
hep i ileged s a ing poin o any in e p e a ion. Consequen ly, heques ion abou
hes a us o  hew i ing subjec appea s undamen al since au obiog aphy is capa-
ble o  e ealing hep eca iousness o  his posi ion as i always al eady inds i sel
in he ension be ween he( ue) li e-s o y (li e ingene al) as opposed o“ ic ion” (o
phan asm) o wha is obe o mula ed bylinguis ic means. Th ough heac o w i ing
( he ealm o “g aph” inau o-bio-g aphy) ha ension is supplemen ed by hein e -
dependence o  hew i ing subjec and he esul ing ex ( hewo k). Tha is heway
Iunde s and heinsigh o Paul de Man:
The specula momen ha is pa o all unde s anding e eals he opological s uc u e
ha unde lies all cogni ions, including knowledge o sel . Thein e es o au obiog aphy,
hen, is no ha i  e eals eliable sel -knowledge – i does no – bu ha i demons a es
ins iking way heimpossibili y o closu e and o  o aliza ion ( ha is heimpossibili y
o coming in o being) o all ex ual sys ems made up o  opological subs i u ions. (1979,
922)
E en hough I end o ag ee wi h de Man, i has obe poin ed ou ha especially
au obiog aphical w i ing p ac ice (bu hesubsequen eading ac s as well) is subjec
o hepsychic, exis en ial, and ma e ial (biological) economy o human li e, which
means ha no all sel -knowledge has obe opological: cogni ion migh be unde -
lain by opology bu his opology s ems om and inhabi s hema e ial co po eal
being. Meaning is opological and embodied a  hesame ime. Thepsychic economy
can also po en ially suspend hedis inc ion be ween an asy and eali y ( ic ion and
knowledge), which become indis inguishable, depending on heac ion o  hepsy-
chic appa a us (Sigmund F eud s esses ha i is no hegoal o psychoanaly ic p ac-
ice o ein oduce hedis inc ion; see [1916] 1924, 382–383).
In ying o answe he ques ion o he ela ionship be ween w i e and wo k (al-
bei inmo e gene al e ms, no limi ed by“au obiog aphy”), Mau ice Blancho iews
i as one ha is buil upon aspeci ic nega i i y (Blancho is making epea ed e e -
ences oHegel): “be o e his wo k exis s, no only does he [ hew i e ] no know who
heis, bu heis no hing. Heexis s only as a unc ion o  hewo k” ([1948] 1995b,
303). Acco ding oBlancho he“w i e ” acqui es his/he s a us only h ough w i ing
he ex . Upon inishing hewo k, he/she as aw i e ceases oexis . Thesugges -
112 MIROSLAV KOTÁSEK
ed dependence o  heau ho ial being upon hew i ing p ocess is close o heou -
look onau obiog aphy Iam p oposing. Bu au obiog aphical wo k no only lea es
hew i e dead behind, i also allows him/he o“li e on” o “su i e”. O cou se,
inau obiog aphy i is no so much hep oblem o “w i e ” and “wo k”, bu o  he“I”
and “myli e s o y”. Ye , as au obiog aphical w i ing ne e le s me (bo h as eade
and au obiog aphe ) o ge abou his subs an ial link, unlike ic ional li e a u e,
“ hebiog aphical, inso a as i is au obiog aphical, cu s ac oss bo h ields inques ion:
hebody o  hewo k and hebody o  he eal subjec . Thebiog aphical is hus ha
in e nal bo de o wo k and li e, abo de onwhich ex s a e engende ed. Thes a us
o  he ex – i i has one – is such ha i de i es om nei he heone no heo he ,
om nei he heinside no heou side” (Gasché [1982] 1985, 41). (Au o)biog aphi-
cal ex hen decons uc s heinside–ou side/subjec –objec dicho omies as i cons i-
u es hew i e who is simul aneously p oducing he ex .
The ine i abili y o “dea h” (in he o m o a“na u al law” posing alimi o“li e”
and any “li e-s o y”) posi ions heau obiog aphical endea ou , which “isno obe
inany way con used wi h heso-called li e o  heau ho , wi h heco pus o empi -
ical acciden s making up heli e o anempi ically eal pe son” (41) wi hin aho i-
zon ha , pa adoxically, can ne e acqui e hes a us o ap ope “ho izon”, being
a  hesame ime ine i able and inaccessible, ollowing hesame decons uc i e log-
ic Gasché inds in heinside – ou side dicho omy. I au obiog aphy na a es ali e
s o y, hen e en be o e Ibegin ow i e, dea h lu ks in hedis ance, because “ oli e,
byde ini ion, is no some hing one lea ns. No om onesel , i is no lea ned om
li e, augh byli e. Only om heo he and bydea h. Inany case om heo he
a  heedge o li e. A  hein e nal bo de o heex e nal bo de , i is ahe e odi-
dac ics be ween li e and dea h” (De ida [1993] 2006, x ii). Inanau obiog aphy,
mo e impo an ly, his he e ology p oblema izes hes a us o  he“I” and he“o h-
e ”, because au obiog aphical w i ing is buil upon anin e nalized ans o ma ion
o  he“I” in o he“o he ”: heobjec obe desc ibed, unde s ood, analyzed, and
emembe ed. Hence, hehe e ological si ua ion o au obiog aphy makes unsu e no
only hedi ision be ween ic ion and eali y, inside and ou side, bu also be ween
heau ho ial con ol and ha which can becalled “mysel ”, poin ing ou hena a-
i e p ocedu es p esen in hecons uc ion o  he“I” and hei in insically p ob-
lema ic na u e.
Re u ning o Gasché’s ema k on he body o  he ex and hebody o  hew i e
and hei ela ionship o(au o)biog aphy, some hing needs obe added. Wewill
eadily accep heaxiom o claim ha e e y human (and animal) li e is singula , de-
spi e i s seemingly uni e sal g ounding in hebiological ha isinsc ibed in he“uni-
e sal” language o DNA code. This common g ound could hen be e e ed oas
bio-g aphical. InLi e Dea h De ida ies op oblema ize his seemingly unp ob-
lema ic sphe e o mode n na u al sciences, “ his g aphics o li e, his non-phone ic
w i ing ha [Geo ges Canguilhem and F ançois Jacob] claim obe ‘wi hou w i ing’
and ha hey a e eady o ein es wi h all he alues linked ologos ini s mos
endu ing Pla onic-A is o elian-Hegelian adi ion” ([2019] 2020, 23]). The e m
“au o” does no necessa ily e e o ha which is mine, i.e. “singula ”, as his chance
113
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
o singula i y is gua an eed exclusi ely byi s g ounding in epea abili y (hence:
uni e sali y), ha which can beiden i ied, looked back upon, u ned in o signs:
“Theiden i y o  hesame […] known as heau o, is gene a ed by he e y hing
– i e abili y, hepowe - o-be- epea ed – which p ohibi s i s s abili y and au ono-
my” (Smi h 1995, 100). The“p ohibi ion” Smi h men ions is no so much anac ion
o legal au ho i y (like ha o aposi i e “na u al law”). Ra he , heguiding p inciple
ecognized he e bySmi h is hedi e en ial s uc u e o  heau o. I s imp isonmen
wi hin helinguis ic s uc u es employed leads o he eeling o en apmen in his
di e en ial s uc u e ha does no belong olanguage (as ha which is “ou side”) bu
spli ing he “I” as ha which gi es i i s/his/he iden i y. He e s ems heu ge (and
possibili y) one e s op na a ing while simul aneously deepening hegap be ween
he ime o na a ing and hena a ed ime ( heexample o T is am Shandy is illus-
a i e he e). The“I”, as heau ho o “mysel ” iscon on ed wi h hep o isionali y
o  heexis ing linguis ic cons uc ion, amoun ing o hep o isionali y o i s “li e”,
i s inabili y o ind i s dwelling wi hin heal eady exis ing na a i e and linguis ic
s uc u es. “I”is hen no obe iden i ied wi h “ipsei y”, as De ida clea ly s a es, “bu
in heuniqueness o singula i y o aga he ing oge he o i s di e ence oi sel ”
(De ida [1996] 1998, 68). Ra he han p ohibi ing, i e abili y gua an ees iden i y
as ha which is changing (because i always mani es s i sel anew h ough singula
e en s: ha which canno becalcula ed), opened owa ds hepas ho izon o mem-
o y and he u u e ho izon o dea h, “De ida pe cei es au obiog aphy as ap ac ice
aligned wi h w i ing indi é ance, heno -he e and no -now. […] Simul aneously
gazing obo h pas and u u e, De ida loca es heau obiog aphe ina empo al
en anglemen ha suspends hebo de s be ween li e and dea h” (E gin 2017, 347).
Thep oblem is, o cou se, wi h Meliz E gin using he isual me apho o “gazing”,
as human ision is unidi ec ional (unlike hea ing). Inme apho ical e ms, Iwould
say ha he“p esence” o human being, as modelled byau obiog aphical p ac ice, is
leaning ou owa ds hepas and he u u e.
Mo e p oduc i e han iden i ying he “uni e sali y” o  hehuman si ua ion wi h
hebio-g aphy o DNA coding would beanalyzing he(biological) body in ol ed
inw i ing, hebody in es ed in he ex , and hebody as ama e ial ca ie o li e.
Tha is why De ida showed such ap o ound in e es inAn onin A aud, who inhis
poe y, ic ion, dia ies, and le e s, as well as inhis “ heo e ical” wo k (TheThea e
and i s Double, 1938) was es ing p ecisely his co po eal sphe e o iden i y ini s
ela ion o“li e” and “language” (see De ida [1969] 1978). De ida “s ips naked”
heco po eal dimension om adi e en poin o  iew inThe Animal Tha The e o e
IAm. Wha especially should no bea oided is he“a ec i e” body oge he wi h
heques ion o wha he(physiological) a ec is able o ell. A hu W.F ank s a es
ha “ hebody is no mu e, bu i is ina icula e; i does no use speech, ye bege si ”
(1995, 27). Inau obiog aphies hemos acu e memo ies (i  hey a e no ep essed)
a e o en hose ha a e ina icula e and/o ina iculable because hey a e connec ed
oaspeci ic, o en auma ic si ua ion, whe e heonly a ailable esponse migh be
hep ima ily bodily a ec ha is no , as De ida sugges s, necessa ily unde s and-
able o meaning ul:

114 MIROSLAV KOTÁSEK
We would need o make new in oads in o hinking conce ning hebody […] ino de
oone day come close owha makes us emble o wha makes us c y, o ha cause which
is no he inal cause ha can becalled God o dea h […]. Wha does hebody mean osay
by embling o c ying, p esuming one can speak he e o  hebody, o o saying, o mean-
ing, and o  he o ic? ([1992] 1995, 55)
My mu e body alks o me, e.g. h ough “bu e lies inmy s omach”, as i is punc-
u ed by hea ec i e “punc um”. Ye hea ec is no necessa ily an“e ec ” o wha
has happened, no necessa ily a “ e-ac ion”, i  can also be o ien ed owa ds ha
which is abou ohappen inhowe e dis an a u u e. The embling De ida alks
abou does no ha e obe connec ed oapa icula e en in heau obiog aphe ’s li e
( o he“sou ce” o “o igin” o  hea ec ). Thea ec can speak also o  ha which is no
ye he e, inan icipa ion o  he u u e De ida calls l’a eni (as opposed ole u u ):
ha which a i es unannounced, canno be calcula ed, o p edic ed using causali y,
he u u e which bea s wi ness o heabsence o any s uc u e o  he u u e. Ano he
name i can me onymically bea is, o cou se, “dea h”:
We emble in ha s ange epe i ion ha ies ani e u able pas (ashock has been el ,
a auma ism has al eady a ec ed us) oa u u e ha canno bean icipa ed; an icipa ed
bu unp edic able; app ehended, bu , and his is why he e is a u u e, app ehended p e-
cisely as un o eseeable, unp edic able; app oached as unapp oachable. (54)
Re u ning o he pa adox o he ( epea able) so e eign au o, and o  cou se
o hemu eness, and inaccessibili y o  he(biological, physiological body): au obiog-
aphy p omises o u n his uni e sali y in o singula i y by heusage o (byp inciple
epea able, gene al, di e en ial) signs o alinguis ic code. De ida desc ibes hepa -
adox common oall g aphic signs illus a i ely:
To be a ma k and o ma k i s ma king e ec , ama k mus becapable o being iden i ied,
ecognized as hesame, being p ecisely e-ma kable o m one con ex oano he . I mus
becapable o being epea ed, e-ma ked ini s essen ial ai as hesame. […] Theideal i -
e abili y ha o ms hes uc u e o all ma ks is ha which undoub edly allows hem obe
eleased om any con ex , obe eed om all de e mined bonds oi s o igin, i s meaning,
o i s e e en . (1984, 16)
In au obiog aphy (and in e e yday discou se as well) Ican speak o w i e abou
wha happened ome in hepas , Ican commen on hep esen and e en specu-
la e abou he u u e o “in en ” i . I  he e was only posi i e meaning inlanguage
and i ha posi i e meaning was wha ge s epea ed, hen ou li es would no be
dis inguishable. Ra he , so ha language can wo k as heca ie o indi idualized
meaning, he e a e always al eady ce ain o ms o nega i i y a play. The e is li le
posi i e inlanguage, heposi i e a ises despi e language and no hanks oi . Saying
“I” does no amoun oancho ing my whole being a ound a i m cen e o cogni ion.
The e is p obably no e en an“I” be o e i ge s p onounced: i is heac o u e ing
(inau obiog aphy, a apsychoanaly ic si ing, inasoliloquy) ha makes heabsen
(in isible, unhea d) language simul aneously wi h heabsen “I”appa en h ough
pa ole, h ough anu e ance. Thew i en u e ance and heusage o  oice isibly/
audibly ma ks language (langage) as absen , as nega i e:
115
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
The Voice, as he sup eme shi e ha allows us og asp he aking place o language, ap-
pea s hus as henega i e g ound onwhich all on ology es s, heo igina y nega i i y sus-
aining e e y nega ion. Fo his eason, hedisclosu e o  hedimension o being is always
al eady h ea ened bynulli y: […] he ield o meaning o being is o iginally disclosed only
in hepu ely nega i e a icula ion o aVoice. (Agamben [1982] 2006, 36)
The s uc u e o he p esen in which Iuse my oice is no anunp oblema ic (phe-
nomenological) “now”, bu i is di e en ially and de e en ially cons i u ed by hepas
and he u u e. I is g ounded in henulli y Gio gio Agamben e e s o( ha gua an-
ees i e abili y). I is no ha Ican speak despi e his no hingness, i is his nulli y ha
allows me ospeak. As hemu e body eaches me olis en onon-linguis ic signs, as
Ispeak hanks o heabsence o  helanguage, my p esen sel is a ec ed byi s u u e
dea h ha ma ks i “ali e”.
In au obiog aphy “ he Voice” is mos p ominen ly ep esen ed by hep onoun“I”.
Thea icula ion o  hep onominal shi e no only g ounds meaning in hep esen
(pe o ms he“p esence” o meaning), bu i is also hespace- ime whe e henega-
i i y o language makes i sel audible/ isible: anyone can e e ohimsel o he sel
h ough hepe sonal p onoun“I”, ye by he e y u e ance his possibili y anishes:
I o ce helinguis ic means. I iola e hem omean only “me”:
he “I” is always posed au obiog aphically. I  e e s oi sel . […] Theau o-biog aphical
does no ha e ooccu oan“I,” li ing o dead, ha would come ospeak o i sel . Theau-
o-bio-g aphical de i es om he ac ha hesimple ins ance o  he“I” o o  heau os can
beposed as such only o heex en ha i is asign o li e, o li e inp esence, hemani es-
a ion o li e inp esence, e en i hewha , o who, male o emale, ha he eby gi es his
sign o li e inds i sel oha e passed o e o heside o dea h. (De ida [2006] 2008, 56)
I can be obse ed ha he ela ionship Blancho asc ibed o he“w i e ” and
“wo k” mi o s he ela ion be ween“I” and i s “u e ance”. I  his ela ion condi ions
he“au obiog aphical”, as De ida sugges s, i means ha i canno be o go en, un-
like ina ic ional na a i e, hus p esen ing ap oblem as oi s “li e a y” s a us. Ye
hings do no s op he e. I Ipoin my u e ance a  hewo ld, a objec s in hewo ld,
ano he side o  his nega ing powe o language mani es s i sel . Blancho s a es inhis
“Li e a u e and heRigh oDea h”:
when I say “This woman,” eal dea h has been announced and is al eady p esen inmy
language; my language means ha his pe son, who is he e igh now, can bede ached
om he sel , emo ed om he exis ence and he p esence, and suddenly plunged in o
no hingness inwhich he e is no exis ence o p esence; […] ha de e ed assassina ion
which […] my language is. ([1948] 1995b, 323)
This is he p ice ha ough o be paid o he “ideal i e abili y” o linguis ic signs and
he eason De ida is so a ac ed oBlancho . Blancho asc ibes ablood-sucking,
ampi e-like quali y owo ds. They seem op o ide us wi h aphan asm o “e e nal
li e”, o p o iding hepowe ospeak oina icula e mu e objec s, bu hey do i
a  hecos o deadening heobjec s hey aim hei powe a : “Thewo d gi es me
hebeing, bu i gi es i ome dep i ed o being. Thewo d is heabsence o  ha
being, i s no hingness” (322). I is he e, in heseemingly unp oblema ic e e yday
116 MIROSLAV KOTÁSEK
language use, ha hee hical dimension o being opens up. Inau obiog aphy, e-
ga ding my a emp ou e my “being”, my “li e”, heconsequences a e simila :
in me, he powe o speak is also linked o my absence om being. Isay my name, and i is
as hough Iwe e chan ing my own di ge: Isepa a e mysel om mysel , Iam no longe my
p esence o my eali y, bu anobjec i e, impe sonal p esence, hep esence o my name,
which goes beyond me and whose s onelike immobili y pe o ms hesame unc ion o
me as a ombs one weighing on he oid. When Ispeak, Ideny heexis ence o wha Iam
saying, bu Ialso deny heexis ence o  hepe son who is saying i . (324)
In au obiog aphy I make mysel asepulche inside my Sel , inexac ly hemanne
F eud alks abou hewo k o mou ning. Imake mysel in o aninanima e objec ha
can be desc ibed and an asized abou , so ha Ican see mysel and alk abou mysel
as abou “ ha man”. Iam no ac ing as anunde s anding, compassiona e subjec e en
hough Ikilled, bu ied, and mo i ied mysel , bu hanks o ha e y ac . I is in his
sense ha Iunde s and Joseph K onick’s ema k ha “E e y ime ‘I’begin ow i e
( heli e o ) mysel , dea h in e poses. E e y au obiog aphy is anallego y o  hew i -
e ’s dea h, anau obio hana og aphy” (2000, 1014). The undamen al spli (which is
no only “au obiog aphical”, bu also “psychoanaly ic”) be ween hena a ing/ elling
“I”and heobjec i ied, immobile “I”as ap o agonis o “my” s o y in oduces in o my
unde s anding hespli be ween henon- ic ional (me elling hes o y) and he ic-
ional (me as heone being na a ed). Au obiog aphy ins uc s me abou hepsycho-
logical basis o my unde s anding o “ ic ion”. I makes i  isible inasel - e e en ial,
specula manne , whe e “ hepossibili y o  ic ion has s uc u ed – bu wi h a ac u e
– wha is called expe ience. This cons i u ing s uc u e is des uc u ing ac u e. I is
hecondi ion ha is common oli e a u e and non-li e a u e, o hepassion o li e -
a u e as well as o his passion ou cou owhich li e a u e canno no e e . He e,
inany case, hebo de be ween li e a u e and i s o he becomes undecidable” (De -
ida [1996] 2000, 92). And again, i is also he e, in his p ima ily na cissis ic iden-
i ica ion, whe e hee hical dimension o  he“o he ” akes i s o m, opening hedi-
mensions o  esponsibili y owa ds heo he and owa ds s o ies. And i , as De ida
claims, his is hesphe e o  heundecidabili y be ween li e a u e and non-li e a u e,
hen i is also he e whe e hepoli ical dimension o  esponsibili y and deb ins iga ed
by hepossibili y o“say any hing” opens:
A pa o us is wounded and i is wi h ou sel es ha we a e con e sing in hewo k
o mou ning and o E inne ung. E en i his me onymy o  heo he inou sel es al eady
cons i u ed he u h and hepossibili y o ou ela ion o heli ing o he , dea h b ings
i ou in o mo e abundan ligh . […] Thena cissis ic wound enla ges in ini ely o wan
o being able obe na cissis ic any longe , o no longe e en inding appeasemen in ha
E inne ung we call hewo k o mou ning. Beyond in e nalizing memo y, i is hen neces-
sa y o hink, which is ano he way o  emembe ing. (De ida [1987] 2007b, 9)
In au obiog aphy I u n he opposi ions on hei heads: Ican make “mysel ” in o
asubjec by u ning “mysel ” in o anobjec obe s udied, desc ibed, analyzed, and
dissec ed. Based on his e e sal Ican emembe ( hose pas , dead memo ies), Ican
hink, Ican w i e o( e)in en los o non-exis ing memo ies ( o him/i ). This ai ,
his ace, his b each announces inme heimpossibili y o he ace o w i ing obe
117
How many dea hs? Au o-bio-g aphy as dea h-w i ing
posi i e: i announces heimpossibili y o  ace, o w i ing. And so, heau obiog aph-
ical ac ( hana og aphical ac ) becomes hemodel o “unde s anding” sel . Bybu y-
ing mysel , I ee mysel om genealogy: “Li e, as s uc u ally indis inguishable om
dea h, may be conside ed ou side o genealogy and gene a ion. Ino he wo ds, li e
dea h can pass wi hou ela ion, wi hou ap io i submission oalaw o genealogical
belonging” (Smi h 1995, 150). Li e becomes s ill li e.
Ye wha happens o his “s ill li e”, his pic u e, his memo y o me? Is he e an-
o he dea h ela ing o his ma e iali y o “mediali y” o  he “I”? De ida does no
hesi a e: “Ilea e apiece o pape behind, Igo away, Idie: i is impossible oescape
his s uc u e, i is heunchanging o m o my li e. Each ime Ile some hing go, each
ime some ace lea es me, ‘p oceeds’ om me, unable obe eapp op ia ed, Ili e my
dea h inw i ing” (2007a, 32–33). I is his dea h inw i ing, his o e ing ha allows
heDe idean ace/ ace o De ida/De ida’s ace o“li e on”, o“su i e”. This
answe is made possible byunde s anding w i ing as alinguis ic pe o ma i e ac
(pe o ming simul aneously he“sel ” and “ u h”) esul ing inasingula ex , ex
conside ed as ane en . Ido no hink we can s ess his way o looking a w i ing (as
sugges ed by Culle 2008) wi hou placing i wi hin hemo e gene al logic o media.
P eceding hepassage Iha e jus quo ed you can ead: “A  hemomen Ilea e ‘my’
book […] Ibecome, appea ing-disappea ing, like ha uneducable spec e who will
ha e ne e lea ned how oli e. The ace Ilea e signi ies a once my dea h, ei he
ocome o al eady come upon me, and hehope ha his ace su i es me” (De ida
2007a, 32). De ida accep s hespec al logic o e ed ohim by hemedium i sel ,
hespec al logic ha is no exclusi e ow i ing o li e a u e bu applies omemo y
media ingene al.
Thespec al logic is de ac o adecons uc i e logic. I is in heelemen o haun ing ha
decons uc ion inds heplace mos hospi able oi , a  hehea o  heli ing p esen ,
in hequickes hea bea o  hephilosophical. Like hewo k o mou ning, inasense,
which p oduces spec ali y, and like all wo k p oduces spec ali y. (De ida and S iegle
[1996] 2002, 117)
A “s ill li e” can be hung inagalle y, placed inabank sa e, o hung onawall
in hein e io o in heex e io . Ino he wo ds, i  equi es aplace o“s o e” i and
make i accessible (in his espec “bank sa e” is no hemos app op ia e place).
Thep oblem o  hea chi e, i s accessibili y and changes ins iga ed bydigi iza ion and
digi aliza ion o a chi ed con en ans o m hedu a ion and ele ance o  he“su -
i ing ace”:
The echnical s uc u e o  hea chi ing a chi e also de e mines hes uc u e o  hea -
chi able con en e en ini s e y coming in o exis ence and ini s ela ionship o he u u e.
Thea chi iza ion p oduces as much as i  eco ds hee en . This is also ou poli ical expe-
ience o  heso-called news media. (De ida [1995] 1996, 17)
Today he e is he possibili y o eco d, simul aneously s eam, and s o e “e e y-
hing” down o hemos edious de ails. And he e hep oblem a ises: i no hing
can be o go en, as i is s o ed jus aclick away, hen no hing mus be emem-
be ed. The heo e ical possibili y o eco d e e y hing is, o cou se, p oblema ic,