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Cosmopolitanism, Populism, and Democracy

Abstract

The topic of my paper is the attack on cosmopolitanism ever since the Great Recession. Since 2008, populist reactions to the ill effects of globalisation have sprung up in many Western countries. Their target is the post-WW II political consensus—at least as far as Europe is concerned—of an ‘ever closer union,’ a policy based on 20th century history and a new cosmopolitan sensibility. This sensibility is now under attack—Brexit being only the most visible sign—and calls for a new nationalism have returned to both sides of the Atlantic. For a West-German citizen born after the war, such a focus on the nation was out of the question for all the well-known reasons. In this paper I engage with the critics of cosmopolitanism, exploring both populist and liberal objections to it. As a result, I arrive at a more nuanced position that takes stock of the negative effects of globalization. I suggest that the road forward—at least for the foreseeable future—might well be a division of labour between the European nation states and a cosmopolitan sensibility.

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Cosmopolitanism, Populism, and Democracy

Author: MICHEL, Andreas
Publisher: CEAA/ESAP-CESAP
Year: 2020
Source: https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstreams/387103cb-548a-4b89-9950-a8a92ea3190c/download
COSMOPOLITANISM, POPULISM, AND DEMOCRACY
And eas Michel
Rose-Hulman Ins i u e o Technology, Te e Hau e, Indiana, USA
Abs ac
The opic o my pape is he a ack on cosmopoli anism e e since he G ea Recession.
Since 2008, populis eac ions o he ill e ec s o globalisa ion ha e sp ung up in many
Wes e n coun ies. Thei a ge is he pos -WW II poli ical consensus—a leas as a as
Eu ope is conce ned—o an ‘e e close union,’ a policy based on 20 h cen u y his o y
and a new cosmopoli an sensibili y. This sensibili y is now unde a ack—B exi being
only he mos isible sign—and calls o a new na ionalism ha e e u ned o bo h sides o
he A lan ic. Fo a Wes -Ge man ci izen bo n a e he wa , such a ocus on he na ion
was ou o he ques ion o all he well-known easons. In his pape I engage wi h he
c i ics o cosmopoli anism, explo ing bo h populis and libe al objec ions o i . As a
esul , I a i e a a mo e nuanced posi ion ha akes s ock o he nega i e e ec s o
globaliza ion. I sugges ha he oad o wa d—a leas o he o eseeable u u e—migh
well be a di ision o labou be ween he Eu opean na ion s a es and a cosmopoli an
sensibili y.
Keywo ds: Cosmopoli anism, Eu opean Union, globalisa ion, na ionalism, populism.
I would like o s a wi h a quo e om A e Eu ope, I an K as e ’s 2017
medi a ion on he u u e o he Eu opean Union. K as e ’s book is no a swan
song o he Eu opean Union. Ra he , he ies o ind an explana ion o he ising
disenchan men wi h his ins i u ion as el in many o i s membe s a es. In he
p ocess, he submi s he ollowing bi u ca ed obse a ion on cosmopoli anism,
which I will use o se he s age o my e lec ions on he challenge ha oday’s
populis mo emen s pose o my own cosmopoli an belie s. The bi u ca ion
alludes o he di e en ways Wes e n and Cen al Eu opeans concei e o
ansna ional, o cosmopoli an, ideas. K as e sugges s ha :
And eas Michel, Cosmopoli anism, Populism, and Democ acy
154
he Ge man d i e o cosmopoli anism was […] a way o escape he
xenophobic legacy o Nazism, while i could be a gued ha Cen al
Eu ope’s an i-cosmopoli anism is pa ially oo ed in an a e sion o a
communis imposed in e na ionalism […] (In Wes e n Eu ope, 1968
symbolizes he endo semen o cosmopoli an alues, while in he Eas i
s ands o he ebi h o na ional sen imen s). (K as e , 2017, p. 57)
Wha I ind so ins uc i e abou his s a emen is ha he mo e owa ds
in e na ionalism o cosmopoli anism—is ei he welcomed o ejec ed on he basis
o a na ion’s his o y. No only do hese diame ically opposed eac ions o a
pos - na ional Eu ope help explain he gap in he Eu opean handling o e ugees
in Wes e n and Cen al Eu ope (Me kel: humbs up; O ban: humbs down); hey
poin , in addi ion, o he cul u al and poli ical oo s o hese di e gen policies.
K as e ’s ema k hus p o ides a i s indica ion ha he populis challenge o
cosmopoli anism needs o be aken se iously a he han o be ejec ed ou o
hand as undemoc a ic in e en ion. In wha ollows I will pass in e iew ecen
challenges o he iew ha cosmopoli anism ep esen s he a ow o his o y. I
will use he e m cosmopoli anism in he way K as e unde s ands i : namely, as
he unde lying d i e o a Eu opean pos -Wo ld Wa II ision o build a uni ed
Eu ope, an ‘e e close union,’ in which, ideally, and e en ually, na ional
so e eign y ge s dissol ed in Eu opean so e eign y.
In no coun y, pe haps, was his d i e o a Eu opean uni ica ion s onge han in
Wes Ge many. The bu den o he Nazi c imes commi ed in he name and wi h
he suppo o he Ge man people, p ohibi ed, a e 1945, a pa io ic ocus on
he na ion. In he Wes Ge many I g ew up in, no all, o be su e, bu a la ge
majo i y o poli icians and ci izens ejec ed exp essions o na ionalis sen imen
in any shape o o m. In i s s ead, hey espoused a Eu opean cosmopoli anism
o , a he e y leas , mul ila e alism. Led by he ision o a uni ed Eu ope ha
would see no mo e wa s, cosmopoli an-minded Ge mans, e en a e he all o
he Wall, we e Eu opeans long be o e hey ecei ed Eu opean passpo s. Looking
back om oday’s an age, he decision in a o o cosmopoli anism as a
bulwa k agains na ionalism was a e y success ul unde aking.
NOTES ON EUROPE. The Dogma ic Sleep
P oceedings. Po o, Oc obe 29-31 2019
155
Wha we a e lea ning he ha d way oday, howe e , is ha , along wi h
na ionalism, cosmopoli ans ejec ed he na ion s a e in gene al. No in eali y, o
cou se, bu po en ially. Fo , as is qui e plain o see, no only do he Eu opean
na ion s a es s ill exis bu hey also wield poli ical powe commensu a e wi h
hei economic s eng h. In o he wo ds, na ion s a es con inue o exis
alongside he cosmopoli an p ojec o he Eu opean Union. Ye , in heo y, he
goal o a uly cosmopoli an ision is o s ep by s ep me ge hese na ion s a es
in o one so e eign Eu opean s a e—whose ci izens would e en ually ag ee wi h
Emmanuel Mac on’s exclama ion “B ussels is us”—made du ing his Ini ia i e o
Eu ope speech a he So bonne in Sep embe 2017. Today’s populis
mo emen s, howe e , mos a den ly he suppo e s o B exi , a e opposed
p ecisely o his endgame o cosmopoli anism.
As a Ge man, bo n in 1955, i was “na u al” o be a de ende o cosmopoli anism
and o Eu opean in eg a ion. Bu gi en he ecen populis a acks on
cosmopoli an eli es as well as he claim o a democ a ic de ici in he go e nance
o he EU, I eel he need o e- examine my own p emises. In a i s s ep, I will
pass in e iew he poli ical objec ions ha ecen populis mo emen s ha e
le eled agains Eu ope’s cosmopoli an aspi a ions. In a second s ep, I will
in e oga e he heo e ical a gumen s le eled agains cosmopoli an democ acy
e en by some de ende s o cosmopoli anism. I will hen sugges ha a e-
concep ualized cosmopoli anism is ne e heless indispensable o Eu opean
in eg a ion and a peace ul wo ld.
I. The Populis Challenge
Populism i sel is no an ideology, i by ideology we mean o designa e a
pa icula se o belie s as hey a e o example ensh ined in eligious doc ines
o pa y pla o ms. Populis s, a he , in he wo ds o E nes o Laclau, ‘cons uc a
poli ical on ie di iding socie y in o wo camps and calling o he mobiliza ion
o he “unde dog” agains “ hose in powe ”’ (quo ed in Mou e, 2018, pp. 10-11).
Populis s he e o e display an ‘us’ s. ‘ hem’ men ali y, wi h ‘us’ being he
people, while ‘ hem’ e e s o a pe cei ed eli e. This o malis concep ion o
And eas Michel, Cosmopoli anism, Populism, and Democ acy
156
populism does no exclude ha , a any pa icula poin in his o y, a populis
e ol has a p ecise poli ical con en , pu pose, o agenda when i e up s. All we
need o do is look o B exi o con i ma ion. Bu because he populis momen
has no co e se o belie s, is no a ached o any pa y pla o m, he e ol o he
unde dogs o ‘le -behinds’ (Goodha , 2017) is mo e easily co-op ed, e en high-
jacked, by demagogues who ill he populis ou age wi h an i- libe al and an i-
democ a ic con en .
In he ecen li e a u e on populism, i we zoom ou a enough, we can disce n
wo schools o hough when i comes o he legi imacy o populism as a
democ a ic ool. Fo some, populism is seen as a poli ical means o p o es an
eli e’s neglec o hei i al in e es s: Goodha (2017), Judis (2016), Koppe sch
(2019), Manow (2018), and Mou e (2019) a e in his camp. Fo o he s,
howe e , populism poses a di ec dange o libe al democ acy because o i s
an i-plu alis s ance: see Gals on (2018), K as e (2017), Mudde (2017), and
Mülle (2016).
Fo he i s g oup, populism eme ges as a legi ima e poli ical eac ion o eal
exis ing inequali ies ha a e no on he ada o uling eli es. Populism he e
ep esen s he p essu e om below wi hou which impo an changes o he
poli ical landscape will ne e happen. I is he e o e seen as a democ a ic
coun e weigh . I handled wi hou gi ing in o au ho i a ian, na ionalis , o
na i is seduc ion, such a o m o democ a ic populism could e en be help ul in
s abilizing he poli ical sys em. The ield o hose who see populism as a
legi ima e ac i i y includes de ende s o na ional populism (Ea well and Goodwin,
2019) as well as le is populism (Mou e, 2018). Bo h camps see populis
in e en ions as he hones exp ession o a disad an aged sec ion o he
popula ion oicing legi ima e complain s agains an eli e, while s aying wi hin he
bounds o libe al democ acy.
The second school o hough conside s populism an undemoc a ic, and he e o e
illegi ima e, ool o poli ical change—in spi e o he ac ha i s ep esen a i es
also ecognize he alidi y o he populis complain s agains he eli es. Howe e ,
hey conside he populis s’ poli ical demands as bu a smokesc een. Fo hem,
NOTES ON EUROPE. The Dogma ic Sleep
P oceedings. Po o, Oc obe 29-31 2019
157
populis he o ic is an i-plu alis in o ien a ion and he eal dange comes o ligh
once populis s a e in powe (as in Cen al Eu opean coun ies oday), o hen
hey s a o e ode libe al ins i u ions. This is because populis s assume hei
oice is he au hen ic oice o he people, which makes all o he poli ical
posi ions no jus di e en bu inau hen ic. Thei au hen ici y, hey a gue, gi es
hem he igh o cu ail o abolish undamen al ins i u ions o libe al democ acy,
such as he s a e o law (Rech ss aa ), he di ision o powe s, and he eedom
o he p ess. In he wo ds o I an K as e :
Wha cha ac e izes populis s in powe a e hei cons an a emp s o
disman le he sys em o checks and balances and o b ing independen
ins i u ions like cou s, cen al banks, media ou le s, and ci il socie y
o ganiza ions unde hei con ol.
Populis s and adical pa ies a en’ jus pa ies; hey a e cons i u ional
mo emen s. They p omise o e s wha libe al democ acy canno : a sense
o ic o y whe e majo i ies—no jus poli ical majo i ies, bu e hnic and
eligious ones, oo—can do wha hey please.
The ise o hese pa ies is symp oma ic o he explosion o h ea ened
majo i ies as a o ce in Eu opean poli ics. They blame he loss o con ol
o e hei li es, eal o imagined, on a conspi acy be ween cosmopoli an-
minded eli es and ibal-minded immig an s. They blame libe al ideas and
ins i u ions o weakening he na ional will and e oding na ional uni y.
They end o see comp omise as co up ion and zealousness as con ic ion.
(K as e , 2017, pp. 75-6)
Thus, while bo h schools o hough ag ee ha he populis e ol s ems om
opposi ion o eli es, i is he second o whom he ue na u e o populism
su aces in he an i-democ a ic slippage ha occu s when legi ima e complain s
o a loss in poli ical solida i y ake he o m o an i- libe al, au ho i a ian poli ics.
Fo he dange is ha , o he loss o solida i y o be egained, populis s o en
make use o e hnic o eligious na ionalism.

And eas Michel, Cosmopoli anism, Populism, and Democ acy
158
Thus, while populism o he i s kind looks o es ablish poli ical solida i y in
democ a ic ashion, he second—po en ially—concei es solida i y on he p e-
poli ical le el o he na ion as e hnic o eligious communi y whe e, a leas
po en ially, non-na ional o he s may be pe secu ed. John B. Judis (2016) e e s
o he i s kind o populism as dyadic (people/eli e) and o he second as a
iadic (people/eli e/o he o blame]. This deba e abou he ue na u e o
populism is in ull swing and bo h sides ha e se ious a gumen s on hei side.
Wha is in e es ing o my pu poses is ha , in bo h cases, whe he as animus
agains he eigning eli e o as h ea o he ins i u ions o plu alis democ acy,
cosmopoli anism inds i sel in populism’s line o i e. This is so because
cosmopoli ans a e seen as lacking, e en as challenging he kind o solida i y
populis s wan o eclaim.
II. Cosmopoli anism, Globaliza ion, and he P oblem o Solida i y
In o de o see i his assessmen o cosmopoli anism is jus i ied, we need o dig
deepe . Since he mid-1990s, a g ea numbe o books and essay collec ions on
cosmopoli anism ha e appea ed, among hem A chibugi (2003), B ock and
B ighouse (2005), B own and Held (2010), B ecken idge (2002), Cheah and
Robbins (1998), Robbins and Lemon Ho a (2017), and Ve o ec and Cohen
(2002). These di e en collec ions in e oga e cosmopoli anism om all poin s o
iew: sys ema ic, his o ical, philosophical, e hical, poli ical, sociological, and
Eu ocen ic.
One o he easons o his busy publishing ac i i y is he challenge o which he
idea o cosmopoli anism has been pu in he wake o wha Dani Rod ik (2019)
has called hype -globaliza ion—an economic end which i sel is he esul o
d as ically changed poli ical ci cums ances since he ea ly 1990s. A e he all o
communism, he economic and poli ical al e na i es o Wes e n-s yle libe alism
and capi alism seemed exhaus ed. Some e en sugges ed ha His o y,
unde s ood as he sequence o economic and poli ical o ma ions, had come o
an end. Buoyed by his sen imen , laissez- ai e capi alism and neolibe alism
NOTES ON EUROPE. The Dogma ic Sleep
P oceedings. Po o, Oc obe 29-31 2019
159
unde w o e he libe aliza ion o wo ld ma ke s including he ee low o people,
p oduc s, and capi al ac oss in e na ional bo de s.
As i u ns ou , hype -globaliza ion while i con ibu ed o economic g ow h
du ing he las 25 yea s, has also b ough abou immense inequali ies. The
eason o he ailu e o hype -globaliza ion, as Rod ik sees i , is wo- old: a i s
ailu e consis s in he ac ha since ade will p oduce compa a i e ad an ages
o some and disad an ages o o he s, he in e na ional communi y should ha e
aken ca e o he lose s o he libe aliza ion o ma ke s. Tha did no happen.
Ra he , a b oad sec ion o he middle classes in he US and Eu ope we e le
behind; blaming he eli es o hei a e, hey ha e los all us in he sys em. A
second ailu e o hype -globaliza ion is o be seen in he ac ha mul i-na ional
companies and in e na ional o ganiza ion we e allowed o dic a e ules and
egula ions ac oss in e na ional bo de s ha clashed wi h deeply held alues
abou egula o y di e si y o na ional au onomy. Fo Rod ik, he ouble s a ed
when hype -globaliza ion, a he han se ing he b oad economic in e es s o
he wo ld communi y, came o be seen as an end in i sel .
The low o people ac oss bo de s— his is whe e cosmopoli anism comes in. Fo
he globaliza ion o ade included he ise o a new class o p o essionals and
echnoc a s wi hou na ional oo s, whose alues, in e es s, connec ions, and
iden i ica ion a e no wi h hei immedia e en i onmen , bu a he wi h
“ oo less” people like hemsel es, be hey in a away places o in he
neighbo hood. Da id Goodha (2017) who esea ched his phenomenon in he
case o B exi , labeled his new class he Anywhe es. Wha uni es hem is ha
hei alues and iden i ica ions a e no oo ed in he na ion. On he con a y,
hey p ide hemsel es on ha ing a b oade iew because hey a e no longe
a ached o a na ional communi y. They a e he new cosmopoli ans, he winne s
o globaliza ion, who a e a luen , able o mo e o a di e en place when imes
ge ha d. The Somewhe es on he o he hand, a e he locals, hose who canno
and do no wan o lea e hei local a achmen s. Many o hem ha e been lose s
o globaliza ion who eel ha hei li elihood, hei adi ions, hei coun y, and
hei na ion is in dange o being ans o med by policies and ideologies designed
by a a -o Eu opean Union o he bene i o he oo less Anywhe es. In
And eas Michel, Cosmopoli anism, Populism, and Democ acy
160
Goodha ’s iew his is he eason why he Somewhe es o ed o lea e he
Eu opean Union. Thus, he e ec s o globaliza ion a e he e iden i ied as he
culp i ha ueled he populis explosion leading o a na ionalis backlash in
England as well as in o he libe al democ acies.
This is he i s poin I concede o he populis challenge. I ind i ha d no o
ag ee wi h his c i ique o an economic cosmopoli anism ha as a esul o
hype -globaliza ion has led o economic ha dship o hose who canno compe e
wi h he new cosmopoli an eali ies. I am con inced ha globaliza ion
con ibu ed o his s a e o a ai s, and he lack o na ional and EU a en ion o
he a e o ce ain segmen s o B i ish socie y has led o a loss o a sense o
solida i y ha ge s exp essed in populis ange .
Ye he c i ique o cosmopoli anism does no only come om he populis s. A
simila c i ique o cosmopoli an democ acy comes om he discipline o poli ical
sociology ha , on a mo e heo e ical le el, sha es some o populism’s p incipal
complain s. I am hinking in pa icula o he wo k o C aig Calhoun. As i u ns
ou , he c ux he e, as in populism is he no ion o solida i y.
III. Cosmopoli anism, Na ionalism, and he Na ion S a e
“Na ionalism is no a mo al mis ake” (Calhoun, 2007, p. 1). This i s sen ence o
C aig Calhoun’s collec ion o essays published in 2007 unde he i le Na ions
Ma e eally hi me when I i s ead i . I hi me because—as a p oponen o
cosmopoli anism— his is p ecisely how I hough abou na ionalism—as a mo al
mis ake. Since his is he i s sen ence o he book, I assume I was no he only
one o hink so.
The sen ence is wo h epea ing along wi h he pa ag aph ha ollows:
Na ionalism is no a mo al mis ake. Ce ainly i is oo o en implica ed in
a oci ies, and in mo e banal bu s ill unjus p ejudices and disc imina o y
p ac ices. I oo o en makes people hink a bi a y bounda ies a e na u al
and con empo a y global di isions ancien and ine i able. Bu i is also a
NOTES ON EUROPE. The Dogma ic Sleep
P oceedings. Po o, Oc obe 29-31 2019
161
o m o social solida i y and one o he backg ound condi ions on which
mode n democ acy has been based. I has helped secu e domes ic
inclusion and edis ibu i e policies e en while i has inhibi ed
cosmopoli an a en ion o he needs o non-na ionals. Na ionalism helps
loca e an expe ience o belonging in a wo ld o global lows and ea s.
Some imes i unde w i es s uggle agains he an as ically unequal and
exploi a i e e ms on which global in eg a ion is being achie ed.
We should app oach na ionalism wi h c i ical a en ion o i s limi s,
illusions, and po en ial o abuse, bu we should no dismiss i . E en
whe e we a e deeply c i ical o he na ionalism we see, we should
ecognize he con inued impo ance o na ional solida i ies. E en i we
wish o a mo e cosmopoli an wo ld o de , we should be ealis ic enough
no o ac on me e wishes. (Calhoun, 2017, p. 1)
A e much soul sea ching, and in spi e o my pe sonal con ic ions, I end o
ag ee wi h Calhoun ha abs ac cosmopoli anism, as in he case o my “na u al”
suppo o he EU, has a ha d ime p o iding a sense o belonging as long as
na ional popula ions in i s membe s a es do no eel ha hei in e es s a e
ep esen ed. As long as ha is he case, hey will— igh ly— all back on he
na ional solida i ies hey a e used o and eel suppo ed by.
I am also in ag eemen wi h Calhoun’s poin ha na ional solida i ies a e
p o iding he backg ound condi ions o libe al democ acy o unc ion. His main
poin is ha , his o ically speaking, democ acy does bes when i is linked o a
na ion s a e ha p o ides he amewo k o he g ow h o social solida i y as
well as a sense o belonging. Th ough sha ed adi ion, eligion, and cul u e, he
na ion gua an ees and os e s meaning ul iden i ica ions. He e laws a e c ea ed
and enac ed, policies a e made, and he balance be ween he ee ma ke and
he wel a e s a e is wo ked ou . As John B. Judis ema ks in The Na ionalis
Re i al: ‘Democ acy needs a “We.”’ People make sac i ices (e.g., pay axes, go
o wa ) only i hey iden i y wi h he communi y ha demands hem. Tha is o
say, people ac his way only i hey eel hey ha e a oice in he communi y;
hence he link be ween democ acy and na ionalism.