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Banks’ Leverage in Foreign Exchange Derivatives in Times of Crises: A Tale of Two Countries

Abstract

Before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis, on May 6, 2007, the Colombian central bank imposed a cap on the Gross Leverage Position in Foreign Exchange Derivatives of financial intermediaries. It was the only country in the world in implementing this prudential policy. By leveraging insights from synthetic control literature we construct counterfactual scenarios and show that this policy intervention, while costly in financial stability terms in the pre-GFC period, was effective in reducing Colombia’s financial stability risks during the crisis. A trade-off between “calm” and “turbulent” periods emerges from our results, which should be taken into account when deciding on the right policy tools to use before a crisis breaks out.

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Banks’ Leverage in Foreign Exchange Derivatives in Times of Crises: A Tale of Two Countries

Author: Giraldo, Carlos,Giraldo, Iader,Gomez-Gonzalez, Jose E.,Uribe, Jorge M.
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2023.101028
Source: https://openaccess.uoc.edu/bitstream/10609/150916/1/Banks-Leverage.pdf
Wo king pape
No embe 2022
Ca los Gi aldo
Iade Gi aldo
Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez
Jo ge M. U ibe
Banks’ Le e age in Fo eign
Exchange De i a i es in Times
o C ises: A Tale o Two Coun ies
Ca los Gi aldo
Iade Gi aldo
Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez
Jo ge M. U ibe
No embe 2022
*
**
***
****
Abs ac
Be o e he ou b eak o he Global Financial C isis, on May 6, 2007, he Colombian cen al bank imposed
a cap on he G oss Le e age Posi ion in Fo eign Exchange De i a i es o inancial in e media ies. I was
he only coun y in he wo ld in implemen ing his p uden ial policy. By le e aging insigh s om syn he ic
con ol li e a u e we cons uc coun e ac ual scena ios and show ha his policy in e en ion, while cos ly
in inancial s abili y e ms in he p e-GFC pe iod, was e ec i e in educing Colombia’s inancial s abili y
isks du ing he c isis. A ade-o be ween “calm” and “ u bulen ” pe iods eme ges om ou esul s, which
should be aken in o accoun when deciding on he igh policy ools o use be o e a c isis b eaks ou .
Keywo ds: PBA, syn he ic-con ol, mac op uden ial policy.
JEL: E58, E63, F38
Banks’ Le e age in Fo eign
Exchange De i a i es in Times o
C ises: A Tale o Two Coun ies
* La in Ame ican Rese e Fund | cgi aldo@ la .ne
** La in Ame ican Rese e Fund | igi aldo@ la .ne
*** Lehman College, Ci y Uni e si y o New Yo k; and, Visi ing P o esso (Summe School), Uni e sidad de La Sabana
[email p o ec ed].edu
**** Open Uni e si y o Ca alonia | [email p o ec ed]
Table o con en s
I. In oduc ion 4
II. Me hodology 6
III. Da a 8
IV. Resul s 8
V. Conclusions 14
Re e ences 16
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I. In oduc ion1
We examine he e ec s o he implemen a ion o a mac op uden ial policy in Colombia on May 6, 2007, con-
sis ing o a cap on he banks’ a io o g oss exchange a e de i a i es o capi al (PBA o i s name in Spanish)
o inancial in e media ies. We analyze he e olu ion o Colombia’s inancial s abili y index cons uc ed by
UNCTAD (Bouhia e al., 2022) a e he implemen a ion o he policy, and compa e i wi h he e olu ion o a
“syn he ic Colombia” in which he PBA was no implemen ed. Compa ing he esul s wi h hose o a “placebo”
es o Mexico, in he spi i o he syn he ic con ol li e a u e (Abadie e al., 2010), we conclude ha he e ec s
o he policy can be di ided in o wo pa s: i) be ween i s implemen a ion and be o e he ou b eak o he Global
Financial C isis (GFC) in Sep embe 2008, in which he policy esul ed in a wo sening o he coun y’s inancial
s abili y condi ions and, ii) a e he c isis s a ed, in which he policy ac ed as a shield ha gene a ed a no a-
ble inc ease in e ms o s abili y compa ed o he coun e ac ual o no policy implemen a ion. In e - empo al
agg ega e gains om he policy a e posi i e om he second qua e o 2007 o he las qua e o 2010.
The GFC was a powe ul eminde ha economic agili y can de elop benea h he su ace o appa en ly
s able mac oeconomic condi ions. Ex e nal and inancial imbalances can silen ly de elop du ing pe iods o
sus ained g ow h dynamics, calling in o ques ion he adequacy o con en ional ools o moni o economic isks
and assess longe - e m inancial s abili y. While majo global c ises a e in equen , he se e e ecessions hey
gene a e en ail signi ican cos s in e ms o o egone income and pe sis en ly high unemploymen , jus i ying
e o s o de eloping be e ools and policies o assessing and gua an eeing economic esilience.
One impo an sou ce o mac oeconomic ulne abili y, especially in eme ging ma ke economies, ela es o
he ola ili y o la ge capi al lows. While hey can deli e subs an ial bene i s o coun ies, hey also ha e
he po en ial o con ibu e o he buildup o la ge imbalances and sys emic inancial isk. The ecen li e a u e
has shown ha he bene i s o capi al lows a e g ea e in coun ies in which ins i u ional a angemen s, and
inancial, mac oeconomic, and iscal policies enable hem o in e media e capi al lows sa ely (e.g., Igan e al.,
2016; Sch o h, 2016).
Many coun ies ha e ecen ly implemen ed e o ms, including he de elopmen o mac op uden ial policies,
ha a e helping o s eng hen he esilience o inancial sys ems o shocks, including hose eme ging om
he ola ili y o in e na ional capi al lows. Mac op uden ial policies, in suppo o sound mac oeconomic pol-
icies and s ong inancial supe ision and egula ion, can play an impo an ole in helping coun ies ha ness
1 The opinions in his pape a e hose o he au ho s and do no commi FLAR o i s di ec o y boa d.
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he bene i s o capi al lows, while educing he nega i e e ec s ela ed o hei ola ili y. This is pa icula ly
meaning ul in commodi y-dependen economies in which hese lows a e s ongly ela ed o in e na ional
commodi y p ice cycles, such as La in Ame ica and Ca ibbean coun ies.
Cen al banks ha e played a special ole in building mac op uden ial policy ools o enhancing coun y esil-
ience, especially h ough he implemen a ion o p uden ial in e na ional capi al con ol and he accumula ion o
in e na ional ese es. Howe e , while necessa y, policies o “ha ing he house in o de ” a e clea ly no enough
o s eng hening economic esilience and educing he ulne abili y o small open economies o la ge ex e nal
shocks and high capi al low ola ili y. The inc easing le el o inancial globaliza ion, which comes in hand wi h
a la ge ola ili y o economic and inancial cycles (Rod ik, 1997; Sche e and Slaugh e , 2001), demands he
de elopmen o be e insu ance mechanisms agains in e na ional shocks.
In he mids o a pe iod o massi e po olio capi al in lows, he cen al bank o Colombia implemen ed in May
2007 a hea edly deba ed p uden ial policy ool wi h he objec i e o educing he coun y’s ulne abili y o a
capi al lows sudden s op. The policy ool, called he G oss Le e age Posi ion in Fo eign Exchange De i a i es,
imposed a cap on a bank’s a io o g oss exchange a e de i a i es o capi al. The Banking Associa ion o he
coun y p o es ed he PBA, as hey conside ed i an ex eme measu e ha would no e ec i ely con ol c edi
and coun e pa y isk in he banking sec o and could ins ead limi he capaci y banks had o o e i ms and
households eliable inancial ins umen s o hedge agains exchange a e isk.
The cen al bank, a guing ha he PBA would limi he c edi isk exposu e o Colombian banks sa egua ding
he s abili y o he inancial sys em, imposed a 500% limi o he PBA e ec i e on May 6, 2007. In b ie , he
in en ion o his policy was o mode a e he c edi g ow h a e in Colombia, which acco ding o cen al bank
o icials was oo high and could lead o he de elopmen o undesi able inancial sec o imbalances and house
p ice bubbles. While economic au ho i ies in Colombia had al eady imposed a ax o o eign deb and o po olio
in es men in he coun y one yea be o e, hese measu es we e no unique o he coun y as B azil and Chile
had unde aken simila policies a oughly he same ime. The PBA, howe e , was implemen ed by Colombia
alone. In ac , such a policy had ne e been implemen ed be o e in any o he coun y. Ou esul s show, howe e ,
ha simila p uden ial policies can be success ully implemen ed in o he small open economies when sudden
capi al in low upsu ges may h ea en he s abili y o he inancial sec o .
While in a ious issues o he Financial S abili y Repo and in hei epo o Cong ess he cen al bank o
Colombia assu ed his p uden ial policy ool ul illed he pu pose o which i was c ea ed, no o mal policy
e alua ion was conduc ed o show he alidi y o hei conclusion. To he bes o ou knowledge, he e is only
one pape o mally s udying he e ec i eness o he mac op uden ial policy measu es unde aken by he cen al

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bank o Colombia be ween 2006 and 2007 (Gomez e al., 2020). Howe e , hey ocus on wo mac op uden ial
policies, ma ginal ese e equi emen s and dynamic p o isions. Thei esul s sugges ha dynamic p o isions,
he coun e cyclical ese e equi emen , and an agg ega e measu e o he mac op uden ial policy s ance had a
nega i e e ec on c edi g ow h, which a ies acco ding o bank and deb o -speci ic cha ac e is ics. Howe e ,
hei esul s canno be in e p e ed as causal because hey do no use an adequa e coun e ac ual analysis.
We e alua e he causal e ec o he PBA implemen a ion on he s abili y o he inancial sys em o a ep esen-
a i e medium-sized eme ging ma ke economy, Colombia. We use syn he ic con ol me hods ollowing he
seminal pape s o Abadie and Ga deazabal (2003) and Abadie e al. (2010). These me hods, which ha e been
ecen ly used in he li e a u e o e alua e he e ec s o se e al economic policies, such as igh - o-ca y laws
(Donohue e al., 2019), immig a ion policy (Bohn e al., 2014), axa ion (Kle en e al., 2013), and pay-equi y laws
(McDonald and Tho n on, 2015), a e use ul when e alua ing he causal e ec s o agg ega e in e en ions. They
a e ools o disen angling causal e ec when in e en ions a e implemen ed a an agg ega e le el a ec ing
a small numbe o la ge uni s (like coun ies), on some agg ega e ou come o in e es .
II. Me hodology
Le Yi be he ou come ha would be obse ed in he inancial s abili y index o he coun y i a ime in he
absence o PBA, o coun ies i = 1, …, J + 1, and ime pe iods = 1,… T. Le T0 deno e he numbe o pe iods
be o e he PBA in e en ion, which sa is ies 1 ≤ T0 < T. Le Yi be he ou come ha would be obse ed om
coun y i a ime i coun y i is exposed o he in e en ion om T0 + 1 o T. We assume ha he PBA did no
ha e e ec s be o e Ma ch 31, 2007, which ma ks he las day o he qua e be o e he ac ual implemen a ion
o he policy on May 6, 2007. Tha is, be o e he i s qua e we assumed he e we e no any “an icipa ion
e ec s” on he policy.
Le ai = Yi - Yi be he e ec o he PBA in coun y i a ime , and Di deno e and indica o ha akes alue one
i coun y i is exposed o he PBA a ime , and ze o o he wise. Thus, he obse ed ou come o coun y i is
gi en by:
(1)
I only he i s coun y is exposed o he in e en ion and only a e pe iod T0, i ollows ha :
N
N
I
I
N
Yi = Yi + ai Di
Di = 1 i i=1 and > T0
0 o he wise (2)
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Ou goal is o es ima e (a1T + 1 ,…, a1T ). Fo > T0 ,
(3)
Due o he ac ha Y1 is obse ed, o assess a1 we jus need o es ima e Y1 . Following Abadie e al. (2010)
we can assume ha Yi dynamics is d i en by a ac o model in he ollowing way:
(4)
whe e d is an unobse able common ac o , wi h cons an ac o loadings ac oss coun ies, Zi is a ( x 1) ec o
o obse ed co a ia es (una ec ed by he PBA implemen a ion), q is a ( x 1) ec o o unknown pa ame e s,
l is a (F x 1) ec o o unobse ed ac o loads, and ei a e andom noise a he coun y le el.
Abadie e al. (2010) show ha , gi en a (J x 1) ec o o weigh s W = (w2 ,…, wJ+1 )’ such ha wj ≥ 0 o j=1,…,J
+ 1 and all weigh s sum up o uni y, we ha e ha each pa icula ec o W ep esen s a po en ial syn he ic
con ol, o in o he wo ds, a pa icula weigh ed a e age o con ol coun ies in he “dono pool”. In his case,
he ou come o he inancial s abili y indica o o each syn he ic con ol indexed by W is gi en by:
(5)
Suppose ha he e exis (w2 ,…, wJ+1) which a e op imal, in he sense ha hey a e se as o minimize he dis ance
be ween he ou come p e- ea men se ies and he syn he ic con ol se ies be o e he policy in e en ion, and
minimize ∑J+1 wj Zj - Z1. In cases whe e he numbe o p e-in e en ion pe iods is la ge compa ed o he scale
o he coun y e o s we can use a1 as an es ima o o a1 . Such ha :
(6)
o ∈ {T0 +1,…,T}. These equa ions na u ally do no hold exac ly in p ac ice, as none con ex combina ion o
he con ol coun ies can pe ec ly eplica e he p e-in e en ion dynamics o he ea ed coun y. Thus, op imal
weigh s o bo h con ol uni s and p edic o s a e simul aneously se such ha hese equa ions hold app oxi-
ma ely. We use he “syn h” package in R, o es ima e bo h se s o weigh s.
0
a1 = Y1 -Y1 = Y1 - Y1
NI N
N
N
I
Yi = d + q Zi + l mi + ei ,
N
∑J+1 wj Yj = d + q ∑J+1 wj Zj + l ∑J+1 wj mj + ∑J+1 wj ej
j=2 j=2 j=2 j=2
* *
j=2
*
ˆ
a1 = Y1 - ∑J+1 wj Yj ,
*
ˆj=2
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III. Da a
We acknowledge he ca ea s o syn he ic con ol me hods. Namely ha e en i he e exis s a syn he ic con ol
ha o e s a good i o Colombia (see Table 1), in e pola ion biases may be signi ican i he ac o model
ep esen ed by Equa ion 4 does no hold ela i ely well o e he en i e se o coun ies in ou sample. In his
case, esea che s aiming o minimize he biases caused by in e pola ing ac oss many he e ogeneous coun ies
wi h la gely dissimila cha ac e is ics should es ic he dono pool o coun ies wi h simila cha ac e is ics
o he coun y exposed o he policy in e en ion.
In ou case, his means ha we op ed o keeping a educed numbe o con ol uni s ollowing wo economic
easons: i s , he mac oeconomics li e a u e emphasizes on he undamen al ole o egional cha ac e is ics o
explain in e na ional capi al lows o coun ies (e.g. Kaminsky, 2005). The e o e, ou con ol uni s mus belong
o La in Ame ica. Second, he e is a g ea he e ogenei y o coun ies wi hin La in Ame ican coun ies, including
dolla ized economies (i.e., Ecuado , El Sal ado ), and economies ha a e pe cei ed as likely de aul e s om
hei in e na ional deb obliga ions (e.g., A gen ina, Venezuela). Ou selec ion o con ols is es ic ed o hose
coun ies ha possibly esemble Colombia mos , economically and in e ms o egula ion. In Table 1 we p es-
en he summa y s a is ics o ou a iables o Colombia and he con ol coun ies: B azil, Chile, Mexico, Pe u.
In ou se o p edic o a iables o he model in equa ion 4 we include: eal ou pu g ow h ( eal.g ow h), he
in es men o GDP a io (in es men . o.gdp), he unemploymen a e (unemploymen ), in la ion a e (in la ion),
he g ow h o eal es a e p ices ( eal.es a e.p ices), he mone a y base (mone a y.base), he cen al bank policy
a e ( a e), o eign ese es as pe cen age o GDP ( o eign. ese es), and he ollowing balances: iscal ( iscal.
balance), ade ( ade.balance), cu en accoun (cu en , balance), inancial accoun (capi al.balance), o al
di ec in es men (di ec .in es men .balance), o al po olio (po olio.balance), he o he in es men s (o he .
balance), all o hem as pe cen age o GDP. We also include he index o mul ila e al eal exchange a e ( eal.
exchange. a e). The sample mean o hese s a is ics is shown in he ou h column o Table 1.
IV. Resul s
1. Policy e alua ion in Colombia
Table 1 p esen s summa y s a is ics on ele an a iables o Colombia ( ea ed) and o he syn he ic con ol.
No ably, mean da a o he syn he ic a e close o obse ed mean da a o Colombia han (unweigh ed) sample
means o he coun ies included o building he con ol. This is especially ue o a iables which a e usually
conside ed as highly ela ed o inancial s abili y and s ill una ec ed by he policy, like eal es a e p ices.
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Banks’ Le e age in Fo eign Exchange De i a i es in Times o C ises: A Tale o Two Coun ies
Ca los Gi aldo | Iade Gi aldo | Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez | Jo ge M. U ibe
Table 2 shows he op imal weigh s used o cons uc ing he syn he ic. Bo h p edic o weigh s (Panel A) and
coun y weigh s (Panel B) a e epo ed. Va iables co esponding o he ex e nal sec o , such as he cu en
accoun balance and he capi al balance, a iables ela ed o capi al lows, such as he eal exchange a e and
o eign di ec in es men , a e among he a iables wi h highes weigh s in building he syn he ic. Impo an o
no e, syn he ic Colombia is basically a con ex combina ion o Mexico and Chile.
Figu e 1 shows he e ec o he PBA implemen a ion on he Financial S abili y Index. Bo h he ac ual and
coun e ac ual alues o his index a e depic ed. The con inuous line ep esen s he beha io o e ime o
he index o Colombia ( ea ed). The do ed line ep esen s he beha io o he index o syn he ic Colombia
(con ol). Two momen s in ime a e highligh ed, namely he da e in which he PBA was implemen ed (qua e
co esponding o May 6, 2007) and he da e o he Lehman B o he s de aul in Sep embe 2008. Recall ha
highe (lowe ) alues o he index co espond o si ua ions o highe (lowe ) inancial s abili y. Acco ding o ou
esul s, he PBA had an impac on inancial s abili y in Colombia. Howe e , he impac was no homogeneous
o e ime. In e es ingly, when he policy measu e was unde aken, be o e he beginning o he Global Financial
C isis, he PBA was de imen al o he o e all inancial s abili y o he Colombian inancial sec o . This appa -
en ly coun e in ui i e esul may be explained by he ac ha his mac op uden ial policy cons ains he abili y
Table 1. Summa y s a is ics o ele an a iables: Colombia, syn he ic Colombia, and sample
a e ages
Va iable T ea ed Syn he ic Sample.Mean
eal.g ow h 6.2 4.0 4.8
in es men . o.gdp 22.1 22.2 20.2
unemploymen 11.7 4.8 8.1
in la ion 4.7 3.7 3.4
eal.es a e.p ices 11.5 3.3 2.0
mone a y.base 6.2 3.7 4.0
a e 6.7 7.3 8.5
o eign. ese es 10.1 9.2 11.6
iscal.balance -4.0 1.2 0.9
ade.balance 0.6 3.0 5.2
cu en .balance -1.4 0.3 1.3
capi al.balance 1.3 -0.2 -1.1
di ec .in es men e.balance 3.4 2.8 2.8
po olio.balance -0.9 -1.7 -0.9
o he . lows -0.1 -0.4 -1.6
eal.exchange. a e 110,334 93,314 92,121
No e: he able shows he sample means o he ea ed Colombia (column 2), syn he ic Colombia (column 3), and he unweigh ed sample
mean o con ol uni s (colum 4).
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