Sea ch o Pa ne ship: Ge man-So ie
Poli ical Rela ions on he E e
o he Second Wo ld Wa
klá a Fabianko á
The aim o he essay is o analyse he mos impo an ci cums ances which could a -
ec ed he inal S alin’s decision leading o he a i ica ion o So ie -Ge man poli ical
ela ions a he end o he hi ies. Among o he s o e i y he a i ma ion ha i was
a calcula ed deal wi h exac objec i es in he case o Ribben op-Molo o ’s Pac . To
p o e ha bo h egimes shielded he ideological di e ences by common na ional in-
e es s, which based o example in he sepa a ion o Poland. A pa o he esea ch is
also he analysis o impo ance and di ec consequences o he Ge man-So ie Pac .
PURSUIT OF THE POLITICAL RAPPROCHEMENT
BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION
In he second hal o he hi ies S alin had se e al possibili ies o o eign-poli ical
o ien a ion. Fi s ly o coope a e wi h G ea B i ain and F ance. Secondly he could as-
se he isola ionis ic policy, hi dly in ensi y he e y limi ed economical-poli ical
ela ions wi h he Thi d Reich in ha ime pe iod.1 In las wo p ewa yea s he So ie
go e nance asse ed all he h ee a ia ions. The colla e al nego ia ions we e p e-
ceded. In June 1938 F. on Schulenbu g posi i ely commen ed he s a emen o So ie
commissione M. Li ino who p esen ed he possibili y including e en he o ien a-
ion on Ge many.2 M. Li ino didn’ exclude nei he a deepe coope a ion wi h G ea
B i ain and mainly wi h F ance in ha ime. 3
By he end o 1938 i was e iden ha inc easing a e o Ge man a mamen ex-
penses is sus ainable only jus in he sho - e m ime pe iod. Nazi a mamen ex-
1 S. TUMIS, The So ie Sea ch o Pa ne ship: Some Rema ks on So ie Fo eign Policy on he E e
o he Second Wo ld Wa , in: P ague Pape s on His o y o In e na ional Rela ions, No. 1,
2010, p. 117.
2 See Bo scha e am AA on 27. 6. 1938, in: Ak en zu deu schen auswä igen Poli ik 1918–1945
( u he only ADAP): Von Neu a h zu Ribben op: Sep embe 1937 bis Sep embe 1938, Se ie D
(1937–1945), Bd. 1, Baden-Baden 1950, Dok. N . 627.
3 TUMIS, p. 117.
OPEN ACCESS
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 103
penses mo e han ipled since he hal o he hi ies. 4 Second ou -yea plan es-
ablished he p og amme o ex ensi e impo subs i u ion in he o m o domes ic
p ojec s o syn he ic p oduc ion o key ma e ials and aw-ma e ials h ough which
helped enla ge he indus ial p oduc ion. I placed high demands on esou ces which
we e due o high mili a y cos s in sho age anyhow. The p ojec s o syn he ic p oduc-
ion o pe ol and caou chouc, coal, i on o e and indus ial chemicals we e s a ed,
he e we e in es ed in o manu ac u ing o ships and inc easing o powe supplies.
Au a chic a angemen o Nazi go e nmen in he ield o ag icul u al p oduc ion
didn’ achie e a sel -su iciency a a majo i y o chosen oods u , e en i in compa i-
son o he wen ies, he e was an inc ease in olume o co n, po a oes, mea , o suga .5
The e wasn’ ensu ed he su icien s ock o s a egical aw ma e ials; pa icula ly
ch omium o p oduc ion o a mou ed s eel, nickel o p oduc ion o ammuni ion,
coppe o elec o echnical equipmen o caou chouc used in anspo . Al hough he
Nazi economy was dependen on impo , he e didn’ exis a unc ioning ins i u ional
amewo k which would e ec i ely coo dina e he impo o s a egic aw ma e ials
and hei di iding be ween pa icula economic g oups.6
One o he ways how o inc ease Ge man esou ces and minimize consequences o
nea ly ze o ade exchange wi h he So ie Union a ha ime, was conque ing and o e -
unning o o he a eas. The e ec i e way was shown by annexa ion o Aus ia which
e en in he p e ious yea p o ided he necessa y quali ied labou o ce, aw ma e ials,
o eign exchange including he p oduc ion capaci ies. In he hal o Ma ch 1939 Ge many
s eng hened economic posi ions e en by economic complex o Bohemia and Mo a ia.
Hi le could u ilize he Polish a eas and a ack he So ie Union a e he occu-
pa ion o Bohemia and Mo a ia. Al hough i is e y p obable ha none o he pa -
icipan s o So ie -B i ish-F ench nego ia ion wasn’ willing o gua an ee a help o
he Czechoslo ak, he Munich Pac and i s consequences en o ced S alin’s dis us in
he p inciples o bo h collec i e secu i y and c edibili y o he B i ish-F ench bloc
as he po en ial ally.7 I con i med he eluc ance o Wes e n wo ld powe s o ake
s ong ac ion agains Hi le ’s agg ession. The eluc ance was enhanced by mu ual
suspicion. So ie poli icians pe cei ed he G ea B i ain and F ance as he hos ile
capi alis coun ies; on he o he hand Wes e n Eu opean agen s c i icized he So ie
economic sys em, mili a y pu ges and ideology.8 The So ie posi ion o wo ld powe
4 The o al expenses on a mamen including Me o-d a s inc eased om 5.5 billion o Impe-
ial Ma ks (IM) o 17.3 billion o IM. See W. A. BOELCKE, Die Finanzpoli ik des D i en Reiches:
Eine Da s ellung in G undzügen, in: K. H. BRACHER — M. FUNKE — H. A. JACOBSEN (h sg.),
Deu schland 1933–1945: Neue S udien zu na ionalsozialis ischen He scha , Bonn 1992, p. 103.
5 D. PETZINA, Au a kiepoli ik im D i en Reich: De na ionalsozialis ische Vie jah esplan, S u -
ga 1968, p. 95.
6 See K. FABIANKOVÁ, So ě ské su o ino é dodá ky a jejich ýznam p o německou álečnou eko-
nomiku le ech 1939–1941, in: P. CHALUPECKÝ (Ed.), Meziná odní hospodářské z ahy zemí
s řední E opy p ní polo ině 20. s ole í, P aha 2015, pp. 87–93.
7 TUMIS, pp. 118–119.
8 Z. STEINER, The So ie Commissa ia o Fo eign A ai s and he Czechoslo akian C isis in
1938: New Ma e ial om he So ie A chi es, in: The His o ical Jou nal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1999,
pp. 752–753.
104 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
was nega ed, and an exi o isola ion was caused om which he So ie Union b oke
ou success ully o in he hal o he hi ies.9
Acco ding o Se gej Sluc, S alin e u ned o he s a egy o u ilizing dispu es be-
ween pa icula Wes e n Eu opean coun ies and en o cing his own in e es s and ob-
jec i es.10 Acco ding o Thie y Wol on he Munich Pac se ed o So ie p opaganda
as a p e ence o apology o pa icipa ion a he pac , howe e , i doesn‘ explain
a speed wi h which bo h dic a o s come o he coope a ion. He assumes ha S alin
was mo i a ed o coope a e wi h Ge many no hanks o F ench-B i ish comp omises
owa ds Hi le ’s Munich equi emen s, bu hanks o he will poin ed agains peace
which was asse ed co-ope a i ely.11 The esul o Munich c isis was also he ac ha
So ie go e nmen s a ed o look o al e na i es o he sys em o collec i e secu i y
and i s o eign policy s a ed o become unp edic able and uns able. The K emlin
ep esen a i es become awa e o he ac ha isola ionism s a egy wi hou eliable
associa e is e y disad an ageous.12 Geo ey Robe s men ions in connec ion wi h
a Munich Pac he in e iew be ween So ie depu y o Fo eign A ai s‘ Commissione
and F ench ambassado in Moscow, in which V. Po emkin claims sho ly a e he
documen ’s signa u e: “I canno see else way han ou h di iding o Poland.”13
The e ision in a So ie app oach appea ed a he celeb a ion o he New Yea ’s Day
1939 when Hi le alked publicly o he So ie ambassado Alexej Me eklo o i s ly
since he hal o he hi ies; he e en had a lunch wi h him wo mon hs la e . Diplo-
macy agen s in Moscow couldn’ o e look such ges u e and he London jou nal called
“News Ch onicle“ p in ed an a icle o Moscow co esponden V. Ba le and a close
iend, he So ie ambassado I. Majsky a he end o Janua y 1939 in which he d a ed
he possible deal be ween he So ie Union and Ge many.14 S alin le he whole non-
commen ed ansla ion published in he o icial pa y’s jou nal, howe e Hi le didn’
espond. He p obably didn’ wan o call a en ion o he possible Ge man-so ie deal
in he pe iod when nego ia ion wi h Poland was p oceeded. J. on Ribben op deal
wi h Polish ep esen a i es abou hando e o Danzing, igh s o passage h ough he
Polish Co ido and connec ing Poland o he an i-Comin e n Pac , whose ailu e led
Hi le o p epa e an a ack on Poland.15
His o ians a en’ able o ag ee on he in e p e a ion o easons o he S alin’s u n
and accu a e iming. The objec o discussion is a ques ion since when he So ie
9 W. BENECKE, Die En esselung des K ieges: Von München zum Hi le -S alin-Pak , in: Os eu o-
pa, Bd. 59, N . 7–8, 2009, pp. 33–36.
10 S. SLUC, De Weg in die Sackgasse: Die UdSSR und de Molo o -Ribben op-Pak , in: Os eu o-
pa, Bd. 59, N . 7–8, 2009, pp. 75–76.
11 T. WOLTON, Rudohnědá nemoc 20. s ole í, P aha 2003, p. 21.
12 TUMIS, p. 119.
13 G. ROBERTS, The So ie Decision o a Pac wi h Nazi Ge many, in: So ie S udies, Vol. 44, No.
1, 1992, pp. 58–59.
14 See D. C. WATT, How Wa Came: The Immedia e O igins o he Second Wo ld Wa : 1938–1939,
New Yo k 1989, pp. 122–123.
15 See H. KISSINGER, Diplomacy, New Yo k 1994, p. 338; Y. SANTAMARIA, 1939: Německo-
so ě ský pak , P aha 2001, p. 21; J. ZARUSKY, Hi le bedeu e K ieg: De deu sche Weg zum Hi -
le -S alin-Pak , in: Os eu opa, Bd. 59, N . 7–8, 2009, pp. 106–107; A. ZUBOV, Dějiny Ruska
20. s ole í: 1939–2007, Vol. 2, P aha 2015, p. 3.
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 105
go e nmen s a ed o hink whe he o con inue in nego ia ion abou alliance wi h
Wes e n wo ld powe s, o o se le wi h Nazi Ge many. Di e en opinions could be
no iced e en in a ques ion whe he i was eally he u n in o eign policy, o only he
use o di e en means o en o cemen o he same objec i es.16 While R. C. Raack as-
se s he opinion ha S alin ied o ge o he wa con lic o he coun ies, including
Wes e n Eu ope and hen ex ac he maximum o such si ua ion, G. Robe s says ha
S alin was o ced o coope a e wi h Hi le and de ines he opinion s eams dealing
wi h a ques ion since when Moscow s a ed he nego ia ion leading o he signa u e
o Ge man-So ie poli ical pac .17 Acco ding o his opinion, i could be conside ed as
he one o possible signals abou simila decision making also he S alin’s speech om
Ma ch 193918 a he pa y’s cong ess and mainly his wo ds “no o bu n inge s”19 con-
nec ed wi h a c i icism o B i ish-F ench appeasemen policy, when ad ised no o
ush, main ain igilance and no o d aw he coun y in o wa be o e being de ea ed
by Wes e n Eu opean democ acy.20 To he S alin’s wo ds esponded mos quickly
a Ge man o eign minis e J. on Ribben op who ound in i an indi ec encou age-
men o imp o emen o So ie -Ge man coope a ion.
Bo h speeches gi e e idence o unce ain y p e ailing in he wo ld in his ime
pe iod. The So ie leade nega ed s ill mo e common ea s abou he des iny o Za-
ka pa ska Uk aine21 and p e e ed a coun e -wes e n Pac concep ion agains Co-
min e n, in ac . Acco ding o E. H. Ca ha was exceedingly ingenious he o ical
exe cise whe eo wasn’ possible o deduce any eliable conclusions because only one
six h o he speech was de o ed o o eign-poli ical opics.22 Howe e , his could be
deduced ha a new So ie o eign policy s opped o make di e ences be ween coun-
ies; i didn’ eel o be es ic ed o mally by any obliga ions. I didn’ eally oppose
any possibili y. F. on Schulenbu g p e e ed he S alin’s easemen o a ack he o ic
agains o ali a ian coun ies and e o o s onge c i icism o he o eign policy o
democ a ic coun ies, a an assessmen o he speeches. 23
16 ROBERTS, The So ie Decision…, pp. 58–77; G. ROBERTS, The So ie union and he O igins o he
Second Wo ld Wa : Russo-Ge man Rela ions and he Road o Wa : 1933–1941, New Yo k 1995;
R. C. RAACK, S alin’s D i e o he Wes : 1938–1945: The O igins o he Cold Wa , S an o d 1995.
17 ROBERTS, The So ie Decision…, pp. 58–59.
18 The ex o S alin’s speech om XVIII. Cong ess see in: J. V. STALIN, O ázky leninismu, P a-
ha 1950, pp. 560–570; ADAP: Die le z en Mona e o K iegsausb uch: 9. Augus bis 3. Sep em-
be 1939, Se ie D (1937–1945), Bd. VII, Baden-Baden 1956, Dok. N . 213, pp. 189–191.
19 This colloca ion is o en ansla ed “no o pick ho ches nu s om he i e ins ead o o he s”
which could be e iden ly conside ed as an allusion o he o me accusa ion o he Uni ed
S a es o Ame ica owa ds G ea B i ain.
20 ZUBOV, p. 4.
21 A he beginning o 1939 he So ie leade ship was a aid o ha Hi le wan o cap u e
Zaka pa ska Uk aine in o de o gain p e e able posi ion o he wa con lic wi h he So-
ie Union. In he hal o Ma ch, howe e , Hi le dispensed publicly wi h hese e i o i-
al equi emen s.
22 E. H. CARR, Be lin-Moskau: Deu schland und Russland zwischen den beiden Wel k iegen, S u -
ga 1954, pp. 162–164.
23 ADAP: Die le z en Mona e o K iegsausb uch: Mä z bis Augus 1939, Se ie D (1937–1945), Bd. VI,
Baden-Baden 1956, Dok. N . 1, pp. 1–3.
106 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
Al hough mos o Ge man his o ians24 conside he Ma ch speech o be a So ie
s ep owa ds he u u e poli ical coope a ion wi h Ge many, i doesn’ mean ha S a-
lin would decide in a ou o such policy jus now. So ie leade himsel had in ended
o choose he ime and condi ions unde which he en y in o he wa . Nego ia ions
wi h he Wes e n powe s used as a means o exe ing p essu e on Hi le .25 He was
a he scep ical, ca e ul and didn’ be ash needlessly, a e he epea ed unsuccess-
ul a emp s a nego ia ions wi h G ea B i ain and F ance. The Moscow au ho i ies
wai ed p obably o any p oposal. I depended on who will sugges mo e. Acco ding
o W. Mase , Hi le was much mo e p uden and indulgen o he deduc ions decla ed
by Ribben op, al hough s ill ega ded he possible deal wi h G ea B i ain.26
Hi le didn’ con empla e o espec he possible allies and es ic his expansi e
plans. A he same ime he wan ed o a oid he o ensi e a wo on s. A e ailu e
o he las Ge man-Polish nego ia ion abou Gdansk and co ido ’s ex e i o iali y
om he end o Ma ch 1939, he p ime minis e N. Chambe lain decla ed he B i -
ish gua an ee o Polish bo de s which gua an eed ha i Ge many and Poland en e
he wa , G ea B i ain won‘ s ay neu al bu ake he Poland side. These gua an ees
c ossed he Hi le ʼs in en ions and a ec ed e en he subsequen in e na ional e en s.
Since ha ime he Ge man leade didn’ conside an unde s anding wi h he Poles o
be ealis ic and pe cei ed ha he won’ en o ce his equi emen s o he han by he
mili a y way. A he same ime he us London ill he beginning o Augus ha won’
in e ene mili a ily.27 I ’s wi hou ques ion ha e e yone wan ed o a oid he epe i-
ion o Wo ld Wa I, whe eas he Uni ed Kingdom hoped ha ila e al alliance will
disallow Hi le o make a longe - ange con lic . The Nazi economy as well as a my
we en’ p epa ed o he Eu opean wa ye ; mo eo e i couldn’ e en coun wi h
e ec i e suppo om ab oad. In addi ion, Wes e n Eu opean go e nmen s didn’
unde s and ha he balance o s eng hs isn’ well-disposed o he ad an age o Ge -
many.28 When conside ing mo e u he , i eme ges ha in he i s hal -yea o 1939
Weh mach ein o ced much mo e han B i ish and F ench a mies oge he . Whe eas
in 1938 Wes e n powe s could conside he So ie Union o be a possible ally, S alin
was a Hi le ’s ally in he ollowing yea .
Acco ding o he Ge man documen a ion p ese ed, he So ie Ambassado Me -
eklo discussed wi h Ge man assis an sec e a y E ns on Weizsäcke on 17 Ap il
1939.29 The o icial eason o he isi ega ded a ul ilmen o a anged supplies o wa
ma e ial om Pilsne Skoda o he So ie Union. Howe e , Me eklo ampli ied he
24 This opinion was con i med by W. Mase , A. Hillg ube , W. Ho e , F. A. K ummbache ,
H.Lange, J. W. B ügel. On he con a y D. C. Wa , E. H. Ca o G. Robe s impeach his as-
sump ion. See W. MASER, De Wo b uch: Hi le , S alin und de Zwei e Wel k ieg, München
1994, p. 5; CARR, p. 164; ROBERTS, The So ie Decision…, p. 59.
25 ZUBOV, p. 4.
26 MASER, p. 5.
27 ZARUSKY, pp. 105–108.
28 N. FERGUSON, The Wa o he Wo ld: Twen ie h-Cen u y Con lic and he Descen o he Wes ,
New Yo k 2006, pp. 361–367.
29 The o icial eco d made by Weizsäcke see in: see ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 215,
pp. 221–222.

kLáRA FAbIANkO á 107
possibili y o mu ual poli ical ela ionsʼ imp o emen .30 The claimed wo ds by Me ek-
lo abou a di ec ness o he So ie o eign policy wasn’ ai h ul because since he hal
o Ma ch he e we e nego ia ions p oceeded be ween So ie and B i ish diploma s in
an e o o make longe - ange con ac s abou mu ual help in he case o agg ession.
M. Li ino submi ed an eigh -poin p oposal o he ila e al pac in he same
Ap il day which should in case o an a ack gua an ee a help o he Eas Eu opean
coun ies lying be ween he Bal ic See and he Black Sea and neighbou ing wi h he
So ie Union a he same ime.31
The sugges ion esul ed om a ea o Lening ad’s occupa ion by Ge man a my
which in espec o he impe ial ma ine p edominance wasn’ un ealis ic. Acco ding
o D. C. Wa , E. H. Ca o G. H. Go nig, he Me eklo o ’s poli ically mo i a ed speech
could be conside ed as he i s se iously mean signal om he So ie side agains
Be lin leading o Augus pac . A he same ime i ’s an e idence o duali y o So ie
o eign-poli ical ac ics.32
A he beginning o he nine ies he e we e he So ie o icial documen s
declassi ied,33 which exempli y somewha di e en Me eklo o ’s w i en eco d
om he nego ia ion p ocess. An au ho o he wise doesn’ deny he claimed mee -
ing’s business pu pose bu all he ini ia i e including poli ical no es and commen s
o he abo e-men ioned impo ance a ibu es o he Ge man side. Acco ding o G.
Robe s e en he hi d e sion o a w i en epo su i ed whose au ho is G. As a-
cho who accompanied he So ie Ambassado .34 The So ie side always in e p e ed
he enden iously exagge a ed Weizsäcke ’s Ge man e sion as ague and imp ob-
able; i poin ed a Hi le ’s speech om he end o Ap il 193935 abou upcoming a ack
on Poland whe eo we en’ hea d any an i-So ie hin s, no communism’s c i icism.
In Ap il 1939 he Japanese we en’ p epa ed o a mili a y coope a ion wi h Ge -
many agains G ea B i ain; howe e no one om he London diplomacy could ely on
ha . Hi le , acco ding o N. Fe guson, expec ed B i ish appeasemen in exchange o
a pos ponemen o mili a y con lic which conside ed o be nea ly una oidable since
30 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 215, p. 221.
31 A. J. P. TAYLOR, The O igins o he Second Wo ld Wa , London 1964, p. 287.
32 See G. ROBERTS, In amous Encoun e ? The Me ekalo Weizsäcke Mee ing o 17 Ap il 1939,
in: The His o ical Jou nal, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1992, pp. 921–923; ROBERTS, The So ie Deci-
sion…, pp. 59–60; CARR, p. 166; G. H. GORNIG, De Hi le -S alin-Pak : Eine ölke ech liche
S udie, F ank u am Main 1990, pp. 4–5.
33 L. F. IĽJIČEV ( ed.), God k izisa 1938–1939: dokumen y i ma e ialy d uch omach ( u he
only GK): 2 ijunja 1939 g. — 4 sen jab ja 1939 g., Tom II, Mosk a 1990, pp. 256–271.
34 ROBERTS, In amous Encoun e …, pp. 922–923.
35 The speech demons a ing he sudden u n in a Ge man policy owa ds Poland and G ea
B i ain was inspi ed by he Roose el ’s message in which he Ame ican p esiden was
ala med by he Hi le ’s in asion in o he Czechoslo akia and called upon Hi le o abandon
he a ack on abou hi y mainly Eu opean coun ies, as a compensa ion he will ensu e
him he app oach o aw ma e ials necessa y o Ge many in he wo ld ma ke s. The Nazi
leade jus p oclaimed cynically ha “in each coun y men ioned by him he p obes we e
ca ied ou , bu none o he coun ies eels o be h ea ened by Ge many“. See J.RIBBEN-
TROP, 100 dokumen ů o zniku álky: Výbo z úřední německé Bílé knihy, P aha 1940, dok.N .
49, pp. 87–93.
108 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
Ma ch.36 Howe e , Hi le didn’ con empla e o p o oke his igh ea lie han in Sep-
embe in he same yea . Fo he maximum objec i e depic ion o he si ua ion i ’s nec-
essa y o say ha a pe iod o ac i i ies in which he p ope ly acc edi ed diploma s as
well as empowe ed emissa ies and he Sec e Se ice, s a ed oughly in his momen .
An alliance wi h he So ie Union should ha e become “exclusi eness” which his o
ha pa y should ha e i s ly dese ed, hus o e a su icien p ice o i . Each pu -
sued his own aim and ag eed wi h he ini ia i e in case i was use ul o him, and a he
same ime was conce ned hones ly in a double alk o eali y and doub ’s deepening.
The impo ance o Hi le ’s Ap il neglec came ou se e al days la e when he answe
om So ie embassy ollowed. Maxim Li ino esigned in olun a ily om he unc-
ion o o eign a ai s minis e on he hi d day in May.37 Al hough he had a Jewish o i-
gin he was ma ied wi h a daugh e o an English his o ian, p e e ed coope a ion wi h
G ea B i ain and F ance and was closely bundled wi h a policy o collec i e secu i y
which could ha e made an obs uc ion du ing nego ia ions wi h Hi le , in such pe sonal
exchange couldn’ be seen any o icial u n in he So ie policy. Acco ding o W. Mase
and A. J. P. Taylo couldn’ be e idenced ha i was a consequence o he Hi le ’s Ap il
speech.38 Acco ding o V. Sme ana he policy o collec i e secu i y could be a p oo o
S alin’s dualism and hid his eal poli ical aims.39 Ge man pa y saw in he Li ino ’s es-
igna ion a “ges u e o good will” which made easy a decision making in he si ua ion
when i couldn’ in he planned con lic wi h G ea B i ain ely on Japanese mili a ily in-
ol ed in China and Mongolia. Ge man his o ian R. Ahmann men ions ha esigna ion
o M. Li ino aised a en ion o Hi le because he go knowledge abou he con en o
S alin’s Ma ch speech as la ely as in a hal o May.40 On he o he hand, W. Mase a gues
ha J. on Ribben op immedia ely ho oughly handed o e he S alin’s speech o Hi le .41
No one should le be c adled by obliga o y o mula ion ha Li ino ’s exchange
was ca ied ou “a own eques ”,42 especially i So ie go e nmen didn’ s opped he
alks wi h Wes e n Eu opean powe s. Some expe s udies signi y ha Vjacesla M.
Molo o a e his coming e en u he exhibi ed e o o ind he deal wi h Wes e n
powe s and pe sonally denied a change in So ie o eign policy.43
36 FERGUSON, p. 378.
37 A. RESIS, The Fall o Li ino : Ha binge o he Ge man-So ie Non-agg ession Pac , in: Eu ope-
Asia S udies, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2000, p. 50.
38 MASER, p. 10, 22; TAYLOR, pp. 284–285.
39 Ví Sme ana a gues wi h he wo ds o Wal e K i icky ha S alin ne e los he us in he
coope a ion wi h Ge many and always called a en ion o he possible app ochemen in
he se ies o a icles p in ed in he in e na ional jou nals. Also he explana ion is o e ed
ha he could be inspi ed by he domes ic policy. See V. SMETANA, Ví ězs í geopoli iky nad
ideologií, so ě sko-německý pak 1939, in: Dějiny a současnos , Vol. 21, No. 4, 1999, p. 26.
40 R. AHMANN, De Hi le -S alin-Pak : Nich ang i s- und Ang i s e ag?, in: E. OBERLÄNDER
(h sg.), Hi le -S alin-Pak 1939: Das Ende Os mi eleu opas?, F ank u am Main 1989, p. 33.
41 MASER, p. 4.
42 The ou -lined message in o med abou he esigna ion p in ed in he back side whe e was
li e ally men ioned: “The P esidium o he Highes So ie eleased M . Li ino om his unc ion
on own eques .” See RESIS, p. 51.
43 See M. J. CARLEY, End o he “Low, Dishones Decade”: Failu e o he Anglo-F anco-So ie Alli-
ance in 1939, in: Eu ope-Asia S udies, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1993, p. 320; D. WATSON, Molo o ʼs Ap-
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 109
The p omp nomina ion o V. M. Molo o , a sel -con iden man and wi h a ce ain
in luence on S alin, imp o ed diploma ic ela ions o Moscow wi h Be lin. The e we e
he alks ca ied ou in May44 mainly be ween Geo gij As acho and Ka l Schnu e
in which bo h commen ed he desi e o deepen sluggish ela ions and pick up on
he Rapallo pe iod which has been welcome mainly by ep esen a i es o Ge man
economic sphe e in compa ison wi h an opinion o he old pa y eli e. Elabo a ed
expe s udies 45 s ill esul ed om he hesis ha So ie union all wi hin a g oup o
enemy coun ies bu a he same ime con i med ha Ge man need o aw ma e ials
and oods u will be ensu ed by impo only om 25 %, and p o ided ha Ge man
i ms don’ b eak he business con ac s wi h Sou h Eas e n Eu ope. The e should be
missing oughly wo millions o ons o c ude oil he mos , and he demand should
ye aise in he wa condi ions. Full- alue aw ma e ials could be ensu ed only by
S alin’s So ie Union in case o mili a y-economical blockade. The e we e no iced
ano he decline o impo om So ie Union a he inal olume o 6 millions o impe-
ial ma ks du ing he i s qua e o 1939.46
The au ho i y o ou -yea plan and Weh mach leade ship deduced inal conclu-
sions om ha . In o de he sho - e m wa needs we e ensu ed, hey calcula ed
wi h an implemen a ion o So ie economical po en ial in o impe ial p oduc ion ca-
paci ies. The Ge man side o e ed o Bal ic and Scandina ian coun ies he non-ag-
g ession ag eemen s in o de o ensu e he neu al zone in he no h-eas o Eu ope
and so assu e indi ec ly i s ood and aw ma e ials’ ese es. A he same ime he e
was planned he con ac ion o Ge man-I alian-Japanese alliance which should ha e
discou aged Wes e n coun ies and e en So ie Union om possible a ack. Acco d-
ing o Rol Ahmann, Hi le elied on he ac ha S alin won’ ha e an in e es in deal
wi h he Wes wi hou his alliance.47
As ea ly as 20 May 1939 he Moscow ambassado F. on Schulenbu g ins uc ed
o sugges ollow-up openings o alks abou economic opics a he isi o V. M. Mo-
lo o . A e longe han hou -long mu ually cau ious and dis us ul discussion hey
come o an ambiguous conclusion ha mainly “So ie a my conside s he business ne-
go ia ions o be unhelp ul un il necessa y poli ical condi ions will be made o hem”.48 The
Ge man ep esen a i e e en ied o lea n he mys e ious sense o Molo o ‘s wo ds,
howe e hei hos was decided no o e eal mo e; he had no choice bu o wai ac i-
p en iceship in Fo eign Policy: The T iple Alliance Nego ia ions in 1939, in: Eu ope-Asia S ud-
ies, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, pp. 695–722.
44 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Au zeichnung Schnu e, Dok. N . 332, p. 355; ibidem, Dok. N . 351, p. 381;
GK: 29 sen jab ja 1938 g. — 31 maja 1939 g., Tom I, Mosk a 1990, N . 349.
45 The e a e analyses submi ed a he end o Ap il 1939 by Ka l K auch, di ec o I. G. Fa -
ben and Gö ingʼs gene al ep esen a i e o special eques s o chemical p oduc ion, and
he Reich au ho i y o he mili a y-economical planning. See R. D. MÜLLER, Das To zu
Wel mach : Die Bedeu ung de Sowje union ü deu sche Wi scha s- und Rüs engspoli ik zwisch-
en den Wel k iegen, Boppa d am Rhein 1984, pp. 317, 329.
46 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 530, p. 608.
47 AHMANN, p. 34.
48 J. on Ribben op al eady equi ed he alks abou di ision o Poland ha ime which was,
howe e , ejec ed by Hi le sho ly be o e. ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 414, p. 454; ibi-
dem, Dok. N . 424, p. 456; GK, Tom I, N . 363.
110 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
cally un il he So ie diploma s will be mo e communica i e. Howe e , i was e iden
al eady soon ha Molo o ’s disc e ion was only he beginning o So ie wai ing game.
Moscow ep esen a i es s ill wai ed pa ien ly o he B i ish-F ench p oposals.
They wan ed o make sa e he Bal ic coun ies in which Ge many successi ely ac-
qui ed he impac .49 The Molo o ’s p io i y in e es was o pe suade a B i ish and
F ench go e nmen abou con ac ion o a mili a y deal wi h clea ly de ined condi-
ions based on solida i y and equali y o du ies, mainly wi h he espec o p o id-
ing o gua an ees o Es onia, La ia, Finland and Li huania.50 Molo o esponded o
wes e n p oposal by sending o amended a ia ion o he esolu ion a he begin-
ning o June which gua an eed he help in case o any agg ession and conce ned he
namely men ioned coun ies. B i ish poli icians despi e o s ipula ions ag eed and
p omised delega ing o a diploma ic delega ion. Howe e , he pe sonal cons i u ion
didn’ con o m o Moscow imagina ions.51 Mainly William S ang, a membe o he
B i ish Fo eign A ai s Minis y, was pe cei ed by Molo o as a ep esen a i e o he
“second league” o he B i ish diplomacy.52 Du ing he ila e al nego ia ion in a hal
o June, Molo o c i icized u he he agueness and lack o ecip oci y in du ies o
B i ish-F ench p oposals and e en hei e o o ex end he alks unp opo ionally.53
I ’s e iden ha So ie in e es o make a con ac wi h G ea B i ain and F ance
was s ill ac ual in his ime pe iod. Acco ding o T. Wol on and R. Ahmann, S alin
was a aid o a Ge man a ack h ough Bal ic coun ies o Romanian a ea, and ha is
why he u u e economic coope a ion wi h Ge many was condi ioned by he poli ical
non-agg ession ag eemen . The success ul a i ica ion o such concei ed ag eemen
would hen mo i a e a So ie dic a o o abandonmen o nego ia ions wi h F ance
and G ea B i ain, acco ding o hei opinion.54
The e we e p oceeded e en he So ie -Ge many nego ia ions, in pa allel. A he
beginning o June 1939 Anas as I. Mikoyan, a coun y commissione , appealed o Gus-
a Hilge , a legacy councillo , wi h a ques ion wha “modus p ocedendi” he Ge man
empi e imagines in he ques ion o possible business nego ia ions.55 By his Mikoyan
con i med he So ie wish o s a he common nego ia ions as soon as possible, and
implied a he same ime ha pa allel ila e al alks a en’ p oceeded sa is ac o ily.
On he basis o in e depa men al alks a new schedule o business nego ia ions
was o mula ed by K. Schnu e. The lis 56 o mu ual equi emen s ma kedly exceeded
he amewo k o Janua y de e mined objec i es, namely by he So ie wo-yea obli-
ga ion o aw ma e ials’ impo in he alue o 300 million o impe ial ma ks. Excep
he supplies o wa ma e ial, i on o e, phospha es, na u al gas and co on, Moscow
49 Occupa ion o Memel in Ma ch 1939. See TUMIS, p. 120.
50 WATSON, pp. 699–702.
51 Ibidem, pp. 705–706.
52 GK, Tom II, N . 570, p. 270.
53 SSSR should help Poland, Romania, Belgium, G eece and e en Tu key, bu G ea B i ain
and F ance didnʼ ha e he same du y owa ds La ia, Es onia and Finland in he case o
an agg ession. WATSON, pp. 706–710.
54 AHMANN, p. 35; WOLTON, pp. 22–23.
55 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 491, p. 551.
56 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VI, Dok. N . 530, pp. 608–609.
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 117
anspo was s opped.97 This e en was assessed e y posi i ely by he majo i y o
ep esen a i es o impe ial en e p ise sphe e and e en So ie p ess. I welcomed he
business eco e y as well as sales possibili ies in he eas ma ke . I was conside ed
bila e ally as he signal o s a ing o he i s phase o poli ical con e gency.98 Fo
Hi le i ep esen ed a pleasan easemen because he didn’ need o wo y abou an
a ack o F ance and G ea B i ain in he pe iod o Ge man-Polish con lic planned.
Ge many e u ned o he posi ion o he bigges business pa ne o SSSR. The e y
impo ance o an ag eemen could be app ecia ed a e unde s anding o poli ical
ci cums ances, including he e en s o he ollowing pe iod.
IMPORTANCE OF THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV PACT
AND ITS IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES
When in e p e ing his ag eemen he e s ill exis ex ensi e disp opo ions up o he
p esen day. They a e also in luenced by he ideologisa ion o a whole opic, mainly
in case o communis his o ians. Un il he beginning o he eigh ies o he Twen i-
e h Cen u y he e we en’ any discussions on he opic o backg ound and conse-
quences o Ge man-So ie pac p e e ed o icially in coun ies o he So ie bloc.99
Also he opinion was p e ailing he e un il he Go baco ʼs e o ms ha ag eemen s
helped S alin ge ime, a ce ain y o neu ali y necessa y o a mamen . The non-ag-
g ession pac was in B ezhne ’s epoch conside ed by Roj Med ede as con ibu i e
and easonable.100 A declassi ica ion o he a chi al ma e ials and c isis o he com-
munis sys em which su i ed se e al ens o yea s longe unlike Nazism, helped
unde s and mo e he essence o alliance.101 The cu en his o iog aphy s ill jus i ies
he S alin’s decision. Among he mos equen a gumen s belong a i ma ions ha
he decision was o ced indi ec ly o So ie leade ship by he mode a ion o Wes e n
powe s, espec i ely was in luenced by secu i y in e es s102 by which hey ma gin-
alize he S alin’s pa in he c ea ion o Wo ld Wa II. I. K. Koblyako a gues ha he
subsequen Ge man-So ie coope a ion didn’ ha e a la ge impo ance o he eco-
97 See MÜLLER, p. 334.
98 Abou which e en he wo ds o K. Schnu e es i y: “I we look back om he economical im-
po ance o he ag eemen , i s signi icance lies in he ac ha nego ia ions helped o he e-es ab-
lishmen o mu ual h ead wi h he So ie Union and is assessed om bo h sides as he i s decisi e
s ep o he enewal o poli ical ela ions.” See J. H. PERREY, De Rußlandausschuß de deu schen
Wi scha - die deu schsowje ischen Wi scha sbeziehungen de Zwischenk iegszei : Ein Bei ag
zu Geschich e des Os -Wes Handels, München 1985, p. 296.
99 ZARUSKY, p. 98.
100 R. Med ede mode a ed his decla a ion a e 1989. See R. BUCHNER, Tod einde: Kompli-
zen: K iegsb ands i e : De Hi le -S alin-Pak und die Folgen, Leipzig 2009, p. 62.
101 The newes and mos complex analysis o causes, signi icance, consequence o he pac s
in he Eu ope-wide con ex see in: A. KAMINSKY — D. MÜLLER — S. TROEBST, De Hi -
le -S alin-Pak 1939 in den E inne ungskul u en de Eu opäe , Gö ingen 2011.
102 See B. PIADYSHEV, We De ended Whole Wo ld: Now We Will Take Ca e o Ou sel es, in: In e -
na ional A ai s, Vol. 3, 2005, pp. 18–21.

118 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
nomical g ow h o bo h economies.103 S. Sluc has such opinion ha a mu ual coope a-
ion b ough economical ad an ages mainly o he Nazi sys em.104
Augus e en s could be in e p e ed in many ways. The suppo e s o an “o ensi e
s eam” among which V. Su o o and W. Mase could be anked hing ha Wo ld
Wa II was p o oked consciously by S alin wi h he aim o weaken Ge many and
e en he Wes e n Eu opean coun ies. The economical-poli ical alliance should ha e
been used acco ding o hei opinions o inc easing o mili a y po en ial o So ie
a my. F ench his o ian Y. San ama ia poin s ou in his con ex on he incomple-
ion o Ge man and So ie a chi es which p obably b ough abou ha suppo e s
o he o ensi e s eam acc edi ed a huge impo ance o he NKVD ma e ials which
di ec ly o indi ec ly p o ed he S alin’s agg essi e plans.105 Ano he opinion s eam
is Ame ican “ e isionis school” ep esen ed by Geo ey Robe s and Alan J. P. Tay-
lo .106 I s ep esen a i es acc edi he main guil o S alin who acco ding o hem
didn’ es ima e he a e o s ong-mindedness o he Wes o oppose Hi le and ied
p ima ily o assu e own secu i y and neu ali y. On he o he hand we could s a e he
heo y o “ wo handcu s in he i e” ep esen ed by G. L. Weinbe g and Da id C.Wa .
This in e p e s he So ie leade o be a minis e o dualism and disguise who always
ended subconsciously o he Ge man empi e. Ge many his o ian G. L.Weinbe g
hinks ha Hi le would a ack he Poland e en i he e wasn’ eached he con ac-
ion o Ge man-So ie pac because he wasn’ a aid o wa bu peace.107 Al hough
he p o-Ge man o ien a ion couldn’ be denied, his concep ion a ibu es oo la ge
impo ance o a sec e diplomacy compa ed o he o icial line and doesn’ ake in o
accoun he genuine S alin’s aims.
Acco ding o a cu en Es onian his o ian Hein A umäe,108 a la ge c i ic o he
Russian o icial s eam, he e we e an opinion widesp ead in he coun ies o o me
So ie bloc ha he pac was an una oidable de ensi e a angemen because So ie
Union would become al eady in 1939 a ic im o Nazi agg ession on he one hand and
on he o he hand i was endange ed e en by capi alis coun ies a e he ailu e o
ila e al nego ia ions.109
Was his opinion jus i ied? Hi le didn’ s op o seek he “li ing space” in he eas
and he mu ual con lic due o ideological easons was una oidable in he long e m.
Howe e , he leade on a sho - e m basis didn’ wish a mu ual wa ea lie han e-
103 I. K. KOBLYAKOV, We ha den Zwei en Wel k ieg en ach , Moskau 1982, p. 338.
104 S. SLUC, 17. Sep embe 1939: De Ein i de Sowje union in den Zwei en Wel k ieg: Eine his-
o ische ölke ech liche Bewe ung, in: Vie eljah she e ü Zei geschich e, Bd. 48, H . 2,
2000, pp. 219–254.
105 SANTAMARIA, pp. 101–102.
106 See o example ROBERTS, The So ie Decision…, pp. 58–77.
107 G. L. WEINBERG, O ene F agen und kon o e se Punk e, in: R. MÖLLER — A. ČUBAR’JAN
(h sg.), Mi eilungen de Gemeinsamen Kommission ü die E o schung de jünge en Geschich e
de deu sch- ussischen Beziehungen, Bd. 1, München 2002, p. 82.
108 Heino A umäe ac ed a he Academy o Sciences in Tallinn and as he i s one ansla ed
and published in he Bal ic he Ge man wo ding o he Augus ag eemen e en wi h he
sec e supplemen which has al eady p e iously been p in ed in he Wes .
109 H. ARUMÄE, Noch einmal zum sowje isch-deu schen Nich ang i spak , in: E. OBERLÄNDER
(h sg.), Hi le -S alin-Pak 1939: Das Ende Os mi eleu opas, F ank u am Main, 1990, p. 115.
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 119
sol e he “Polish issue” and emo e he h ea o B i ish-F ench in e en ion. Ola
G oehle men ions ha al eady in he a i ica ion day o Augus c edi ag eemen
he Ge man ins uc ion110 was ca ied ou o he wa agains So ie Union. The e
was aken in o accoun ha So ie sea mili a y o ces will be des oyed and Ge man
ade in he Bal ic Sea will be sa egua ded including he sea connec ion in Eas P us-
sia. I we conside hen he mili a y-s a egical analyses, wa po en ial and a ac ha
Ge many didn’ dispose o sui able s a ing space o he o ensi e, hen could be as-
sumed ha he esponse o a ques ion aised is nega i e. E en he c ea ion o possible
on launched agains he So ie Union could be assessed as oo unila e al heo e ic
specula ion. H. A umäe a gues ha suppo e s o his idea unde es ima e he an ago-
nism wi hin a capi alis block and o ge ha eal s a e in e es s always s ay on he
i s place agains subjec i e opinions and moods o pa icula poli icians.111
Since he non-agg ession pac was connec ed wi h he sec e amendmen , bo h
documen s we e assessed nega i ely since he e y beginning. Acco ding o H. A -
umäe hei nega i e consequences consis ed in he ac ha Eu opean powe balance
which was exis ing ill his ime and ep esen ed he e ec i e elemen o in e na-
ional s abili y namely in a ou o Ge many, was des oyed. Hi le could ake a sha e
in he des uc ion o Poland and b eak o he Wo ld Wa II.112
Howe e , i ’s no so easy o ind an explici esponse o ques ion why he sys em
o collec i e secu i y was b oken down. The ep esen a i es o So ie diplomacy a e
c i icised in his con ex o he inconsis ency and pe manen e o o a eco e y
o he coope a ion wi h Ge many, dis ega d o democ a ic sys em and sho - e m
calcula ions wi h he aim o u n he Nazi agg ession owa ds he wes . All o hese
could be p o ed success ully. Simila accusa ions could be, howe e , applied e en
agains S alin’s democ a ic pa ne s as well. Acco ding o B. Li e a and J. Wanne is
much mo e di icul o assess he ex eme in e p e a ions which blame S alin o he
inci a ion o wa wi hin own powe s a egy, as well as a unila e al expedien ly o-
cused a emp s o So ie p o essional public o p o e a solida i y o he Fascism and
democ acy ela ing o he So ie Union.113
E en he his o ical expe ience o ha ime indica ed ha a collec i e secu i y
didn’ in ill he p og amme aim because esponsible powe s simply we en’ in e -
es ed in he ac ha small s a e o gans, he p inciples o in e na ional law, majes y
and e en democ acy, could complica e hei in en ions. The p oo o his a i ma ion
is o example he non-punishmen o Japanese expansion o China, inadequa e eac-
ion o Anschluss o Aus ia o he ci cums ances o Munich Deal. As Comin e n didn’
manage o discom i by i s mis aken and chao ic p og ess he Nazi’s g ab o powe ,
110 O. GROEHLER, Sebe ažedné spojenec í — německo-so ě ská spolup áce 1920–1941, P aha
1997, p. 82.
111 The Wo ld Wa II showed ha he G ea B i ain delibe a ely suppo ed he So ie Union,
and no Ge many. The e idence is he business ag eemen om Oc obe 1939 which los
i s alue when i eme ged ha he So ie Union exchanged B i ish p oduc s o he Ge -
man weapon s ockpile, howe e , he image o S alin wasnʼ damaged in any adical way.
ARUMÄE, p. 118.
112 Ibidem, pp. 119–120.
113 LITERA — WANNER, p. 37.
120 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
ei he he Wes unde es ima ed a dange o agg ession when didn’ espond o he
cancella ion o pa icula a icles o he Ve sailles ag eemen wi h a necessa y eso-
lu ion and elied upon o i s di e sion by a adi ional backs age diplomacy. E en i
he p inciple o collec i e secu i y was e iden ly he only ins umen agains he wa
led acco ding o Hi le ’s unp eceden ed ules and means, i was ne e an easy op ion.
Acco ding o he B i ish his o ian, N. Fe guson, he connec ion wi h a S alin’s e-
gime was p ac ically impossible o he B i ish conse a i es, likewise he deal wi h
a cza is Russia o he libe als be o e he Wo ld Wa I.114 Acco ding o I. Ke shaw,
R.D.Mülle o H. A umäe, all he sides in ol ed in he e up ion o wa ha e i s sha e
o esponsibili y, e en i Hi le ’s sha e was he bigges unambiguously.115
Wha mo i a ed bo h dic a o s o he coope a ion e en a a poli ical s age? Al-
hough Hi le was decided o he mili a y a ack agains Poland, we canno pass o e
he ac ha despi e nume ous pos ponemen s he would ha dly make so a al s ep
i he didn’ secu e he alliance wi h S alin. Acco ding o Suzanne Scha enbe g116 i
wasn’ a ailu e o F ench-B i ish policy bu in connec ion wi h he pac i could be
a he discussed abou he momen al con o mi y o wo di e en s a egies which
ag eed in a ce ain his o ical momen ega dless o hei inne policy, ideological
p inciples and undamen als.117 A. N. Tupole , a so ie ae o builde , cha ac e ized
concisely he alue o pac when he ead he Moscow jou nal wi h a published ex
o he ag eemen abou bo de s and iendship. He c umpled he news and yelled:
“Wha iendship? Wha is going on, hey al eady wen mad o ally?”118 Hi le p o ed a po-
li ical lexibili y; he connec ed sho ly wi h his ideological enemy in o de o simpli y
he way o his u u e assaul . S alin managed o exploi a maximum om he gi en
in e na ional si ua ion hanks o his calcula ion. Acco ding o W. Mase , he ague
o mula ions and o he law inadequacies o he documen gi e a clue ha bo h pac
pa ne s didn’ p epa e o keep exac ly he le e o documen s, i was jus a empo-
a y esolu ion dic a ed by ci cums ances which was con i med la e by hemsel es,
no only e bally.119
S alin wan ed o a oid a lone con lic wi h Hi le and a he same ime needed
a ee ansi o e Polish and Romanian a eas. When So ie s sugges ed a ila e al al-
liance wi h Wes e n Eu opean coun ies which would p o ec no only hem bu also
he neighbou ing coun ies agains he Nazi agg ession, hey we e ejec ed o he
114 FERGUSON, p. 377.
115 MÜLLER, pp. 343, 398; ARUMÄE, p. 120; I. KERSHAW, Hi le : 1936–1945: Nemesis, New
Yo k 2000, pp. 224–225.
116 Suzanne Scha enbe g (*1969), Ge man his o ian and p o esso a he Uni e si y o B e-
men.
117 S. SCHATTENBERG, Diploma ie de Dik a o en: De Molo o -Ribben op-Pak , in: Os eu opa,
Bd. 59, N . 7–8, 2009, p. 7.
118 See R. C. TUCKER, S alin in Powe : The Re olu ion om Abo e 1928–1941, New Yo k / London
1990, p. 599.
119 When Ribben op said o S alin a e he signing o Sep embe ag eemen ha he „is con-
inced abou he ac ha now bo h he Ge mans and Russians should ne e c oss he
weapons“, S alin had a hink abou o an ins an and hen eplied: “You a e igh , i should
be like ha p obably.” See MASER, pp. 123, 126.
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 121
nego ia ions we e ex ended disp opo ionally.120 Acco ding o H. Kissinge , he B i -
ish poli icians enabled unconsciously he So ie side o acqui e mo e ad an ageous
nego ia ing posi ion, hey p o ided S alin an unila e al gua an ee wi hou addi ional
cos s ha will de end he bo de s o all Eu opean coun ies neighbou ing wi h he
So ie Union excluding he Bal ic e i o y. This enabled S alin o choose he delay-
ing ac ics. He could alk wi h allies led in Moscow p ima ily used as an ins umen
o psychological p essu e on Hi le . 121 I Poland is a acked, he e will a wa con lic
occu bu i would ake place se e al hund eds o kilome es om So ie bo de s.122
I ’s also necessa y o unde s and ha S alin was help ul owa ds all he a ian s and
wan ed o decide o his one which would be he mos ad an ageous in ä gi en mo-
men wi h espec o po en ial e i o y gains. E en T. Wol on con i ms his indi ec ly
and holds an opinion ha when he B i ish-F ench delega ion a i ed o Lening ad a
he beginning o Augus 1939 o nego ia e he mili a y-poli ical ag eemen , he So ie
side didn’ look o ano he esolu ion al eady and was p epa ing o coope a ion
wi h Ge many.123
The Nazi egime wasn’ much p epa ed o a wa on wo on s. Acco ding o
N.Fe guson, Hi le elied a he on he in ingemen o liabili ies o Wes e n coun-
ies agains Poland.124 I Ge many a acked he So ie Union which would s ayed
neu al, hen a mili a y po en ial would be a he in a ou o S alin. The Red A my
exceeded he numbe o di isions o g ound o ces in Ge many wo and a hal , ou
imes as F ance, G ea B i ain i e imes, and he Uni ed S a es ele en.125 Ame ican
poli ician John F. Dulles ound as a as ascina ing simila i y when compa ing he
ideological basis o he S alinis dic a o ship o a mind base o he Hi le ’s egime,
mainly as ega ds he aims and e en means leading o hei achie emen . Bo h sys-
ems made e o s o acqui e he wo ld sup emacy and he ins umen wi h whose i
could ha e been achie ed was he “p og amme o unlimi ed expansion” which o he s
could “igno e jus a hei own isk”.126 Jus he Augus pac helped hem in aluably
as he means o achie emen o he con inen al majo i y. S alin enabled Hi le a e -
i o ial expansion, howe e , he could be awa e o ha he su es way how o s op he
Hi le ’s in en ions, is a h ea o enci clemen o Ge many a wo on s bu he didn’
calcula e ha . Acco ding o N. Fe guson, he B i ish liabili ies owa ds a Polish e i-
o y disallowed such alliance which could discou age Hi le o speed up his de ea .127
In my opinion, he Ge man-So ie pac is a cha ac e is ic example o a eal-policy
applied in p ac ise and hus i ’s no seldom called he Hi le ’s “ ouche o he wa ”.
Paul Schmid s ill had a chance o look inside he sec e p o ocol ha nigh and com-
men ed i s ex in wo ds: “The in en ions o bo h con ac sides couldn’ be exp essed mo e
120 FERGUSON, p. 377.
121 ZUBOV, p. 7.
122 KISSINGER, pp. 342–343.
123 WOLTON, pp. 24–25.
124 FERGUSON, p. 379.
125 ZUBOV, p. 4.
126 See J. L. GADDIS, The Uni ed S a es and he O igins o he Gold Wa 1941–1947, New Yo k
1972, p. 320.
127 FERGUSON, p. 377.
122 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
clea ly, I ealized ha I didn’ say goodbye o he peace unnecessa ily ha e ening be o e
a signa u e.”128
Bo h sys ems didn’ sha e oo many mu ual alues, ules o egula ions, no did
ideology connec hem. They ied p ima ily o ensu e mo e ad an ageous posi ion
and decisions subo dina ed o ha . The So ie a chi es indica e ha i wasn’ an ac
planned in he long e m bu a he a momen al con o mi y o in e es s achie ed se -
e al days be o e he deal’s a i ica ion. The e could be he un eadiness and a ce ain
a e o imp o isa ion when o ganizing p o ed by insu icien o mal essen ials o
he pape o m o pac as well as by he si ua ions, o a ce ain ex en pa adoxical, be-
o e and du ing he Moscow con e ence a which he non-agg ession ag eemen was
signed. The sec ecy o he ac ion was pu po edly so excellen ha nei he he So ie
an i-ai c a de ence knew abou i no planes des ined o Moscow we e bomba ded
o e he own o Smolensk.129 The Moscow ai po was ga nished wi h u ned-up
swas ikas bo owed om he Moscow ilm s udio which used hem o eco ding o
an i-Nazi ilms. Mo e consis en in o ma ion abou he p og ess o nego ia ion come
mainly om Ge man o icial sou ces and memo ies. The non-agg ession ag eemen
be ween he So ie Union and Ge many130 con ains se en a icles. Bo h signa o ies
ejec ed o use iolence in mu ual ela ions and ake pa a he powe g oupmen
ben agains one o hem, denied help o any hi d side in possible wa ac ion, ne -
e heless, he e was missing a clause abou au oma ic banishmen o he con ac in
case o agg ession commi ed by one o he con ac sides. Fu he , i embeds a du y
o consul issues o he common in e es and exchange in o ma ion. The i h a icle
imposes a du y o esol e all he issues by peace ul means. The ag eemen ’s li e ime
was p olonged om i e o en yea s and en e ed in e ec immedia ely a e he sig-
na u e. A he same ime i didn’ con ain na ional emblems, go e nmen o minis e-
ial seals and shields o no o con ac sides.
I am inclining o he opinion ha B i ish and F ench poli icians unde es ima ed
some key ma e s. They didn’ es ima e he eal So ie mili a y o ce, judged he
S alinism and didn’ app ecia ed he s a egical impo ance o he So ie Union o
Ge many in he Cen al and Eas e n Eu ope. They didn’ ealize as well ha will lose,
in case o alliance o bo h o ali a ian sys ems, an impac in la ge pa o impo an
Eu opean space, as well as hey missed ou he ac ha S alin has mo e op ions how
o en o ce his in e es s. A e he Munich c isis S alin was a aid o he long- e m
isola ion and needed o con ac he mili a y pac which would ensu e him he neu-
ali y and e i o ial gains in he sequence on Hi le ’s expansi e policy.131 Acco ding
o N. Fe guson, F ance and G ea B i ain s ill assumed inco ec ly ha o eign policy
o Ge many and So ie Union will be mo e co esponded wi h hei ideology han
p agma ism. The ep esen a i es o B i ish diplomacy made a mis ake acco ding o
his opinion when didn’ conduc agains Ge many mo e igo ously, didn’ es ima e
128 P. SCHMIDT, Pamě i Hi le o a lumočníka, B no 1997, p. 169.
129 This a ai was indi ec ly con essed by V. M. Molo o in he in e iew wi h a Russian his-
o ian F. Cuje om 4.10.1972; see F. CUJEV, Molo o Remembe s: Inside K emlin Poli ics, Chi-
cago 1993, p. 12.
130 See ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VII, Do. N . 228 p. 205; GK, Tom II, N . 602, pp. 319–321.
131 TUMIS, pp. 122, 125.

kLáRA FAbIANkO á 123
i s mili a y-economical powe and a he e ea ed in he second hal o he hi -
ies.132 Thus hey inc eased unconsciously he Hi le ’s chances o win in he long e m
planned wa . Two s ong coun ies decided in a ce ain momen o p e en a mu ual
con lic by de ining clea ly he sphe es o in luence and di ided he con o e sial
e i o ies. Bo h egimes we e in e es ed in Poland. This wouldn’ change e en i he
alliance wasn’ signed. Thanks o he absence o suspensi e clause, bo h signa o ies
could a ack hei neighbou s wi hou p ohibi ion by he second side. The i s an-
gible esul was he ag eemen abou bo de s and iendship.133
The addi ional sec e p o ocol134 speci ied he sphe es o in luence in he Sou h-
Eas Eu ope and Bal ic. S alin used nego ia ions o make a p ess on he Ge man
pa ne and achie e as many comp omises as possible. Hi le ound himsel in
a ime p essu e and his s a ing posi ion was wo se objec i ely. The inal e sion
hus much mo e co espond o he So ie equi emen s. In consequence o he Au-
gus and Sep embe pac and au umn expansion, he So ie Union’s bo de was
shi ed o he line o ou i e s Pisa-Na ew-Visla-San and hus exceeded he Cu -
zono ’s line pe nea ly 150 kilome es o wes , by which bo h coun ies became
neighbou s.135 The e i o ial changes conce ned mainly Li huania which he eby
ell in o he So ie sphe e o in luence. The Lublin p o ince and a pa o he Wa -
saw p o ince ell in o Ge many.136 Since ha ime he Thi d Reich con olled 48 %
o he e i o y o o me Poland ins ead o 35 % decla ed by he Augus ag eemen .
Thus e en he a ea eas o Visla bo de ed by he Bug Ri e as a as he K ylo ,
u he o wes o e Tomaszów as a as he San Ri e , including he hook a ound
Suwalki and Augos ow. The So ie s annexed inally 194,000 km2 o Polish a eas in-
cluding 12 million o inhabi an s o mainly Uk ainian and Belo ussian na ional-
i y. Sou h-wes a eas which belonged o Aus ia-Hunga y in he pas , o example
L o -Lembe g, un il ha ime didn’ make a pa o he So ie Empi e. They ac-
qui ed he con ol o e sea and ae o baselines in Es onia and La ia a he same
ime. The e i o ial balance was ac i e a he side o So ie Union which gained
successi ely 77,620 km2 e en wi h Romanian Bessa abia, he Bal ic, Ka elska is h-
mus and Finnish sea baselines compa ed o he e i o y o 72,866 km2 alling in o
he Ge man sphe e o in luence.137
E en i i ’s no so di icul o ace up he signals calling a en ion o he ag ee-
men ’s conclusion oday, in he eye o hen ellows he e en s an eceden o his ac
we e judged a he mo e bli hely. Fo example he agically a alis ic a i ude o he
Poles shows e idence ha hey assumed wi h a ma ellous calm ha “ his pac will
132 FERGUSON, pp. 379–380.
133 The ex o Ge man-So ie ag eemen abou bo de s and iendship om 28. 9. 1939 and
ela ed p o ocols see in ADAP: Die K iegsjah e: 4. Sep embe 1939 bis 18. Mä z 1940. Se ie D
(1937–1945), Bd. VIII, Baden-Baden 1961, Dok. N . 157–159, 193, pp. 127–129, 162–165.
134 See ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VII, Dok. N . 229, p. 206; GK, Tom II, N . 603, p. 321.
135 Valen in Falin in Ge man ele ision s a ed in 1989 ha he o iginal dema ca ion line was
equi alen o he Cu zono o ʼs line which was de e mined in Augus 1918 as he Eas e n
bo de o Poland, hus was co ec om he his o ical poin o iew. See GORNIG, p. 38.
136 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VIII, Dok. N . 159.
137 GORNIG, p. 29; SANTAMARIA, p. 28; ARUMÄE, p. 119.
124 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
no change any hing”138 and ully elied on B i ish-F ench help.139 In he Eu opean
socie y he pe suasion ha bo h sys ems a e so con a y ha hei econcilia ion
wouldn’ be possible, o i would ea lie o la e end in a wa con lic , hadn’ go a mi-
no i y posi ion.
The e we e he Ge maniza ion and So ie iza ion o he es o popula ion p o-
ceeded on he di ided e i o ies, including he igh s’ es ic ion o he local eli es.
The So ie iza ion unde Ch usco leade ship allowed he Red A my le y on he local
esou ces. The o e conce ning he Bal ic and Poland submi ed by Hi le could be
speci ied as a e y well-calcula ed s ep. H. A umäe supposes ha S alin conside ed
he exis ence o a so e eign Bal ic o be a empo a y e ec , i s implemen a ion in o
he So ie Union o be na u al and una oidable om he long- e m pe spec i e.140 The
So ie in e es in he men ioned a eas was inspi ed no only by an e o o b oaden
he communism, bu also by pa icula economical, mili a y-s a egical and his o i-
cal easons. Especially in he e lec ion on inc easing dange o he a ack, i was
necessa y o shi aside he posi ions o Ge man a mies as wes mos as possible.
Al hough he Ge man and So ie Union‘s policy we e calcula i e in ha momen
and hei means un o gi able, i was ealis ic a he e y mos . I we summa ize he
immedia e esul s o bo h poli ical ag eemen s, we will each he ollowing conclu-
sions. They allowed he So ie Union o es ic he scope and au ho i y o he Nazi e-
gime in he Eas Eu opean e i o y whe eby minimalized he wa con lic empo a -
ily. A he same ime ensu ed ha S alin had an app oach o he s a egical economical
a eas on he Wes e n bo de , no unnecessa y e en o his de ensi e. The So ie leade
go a sligh ime o a mamen and ealiza ion o some mili a y e o ms, including he
p omise o an economical coope a ion. S alin belie ed ha pac s will b ing he weak-
ening o a Ge man posi ion. Las bu no leas hey indi ec ly b ough abou he wa
con lic and des uc ion o he e y Poland. V. M. Molo o assessed he signi icance o
poli ical pac s in wo ds: “My mission was o b oaden he bo de s o ou na i e coun y. I
seems ha S alin and me aced up o his ask qui e well.”141 Acco ding o T. Wol on, S alin
was se iceable, econcilia o y and loyal ally since he i s days o he pac ’s exis-
ence, on he con a y Hi le was a he ese ed in he ul ilmen o obliga ions.142
The poli ical alliance p o ided Ge many bo h a eeling o ela i e secu i y in he
wa agains Poland and neu ali y o he second pa y, including a gua an ee o a se-
ies o commodi ies necessa y o he wa economy. The de ensi e alliance o Wes -
e n powe s became ine icien . Hi le go nea o he ealiza ion o main objec i es o
he concep ion o he New Rule in Eu ope. Whe he Hi le was mo i a ed by he e o
o apply he Nazi ideological plan, o was a ec ed pu ely by he powe -poli ical calcu-
lus and p agma ical usage o in e na ional poli ical si ua ion a his decision making,
he his o ians con o m ha he Nazi leade was willing o isk a wa con lic since
Munich c isis and subsequen occupa ion o he es o Czechoslo ak e i o y. The
ep esen a i es o B i ish diplomacy we e on one hand willing o a ange he alks
138 KERSHAW, p. 206; WATT, p. 466.
139 ADAP, Se . D, Bd. VII, Dok. N . 217, p. 195.
140 ARUMÄE, p. 122.
141 See CUJEV, p. 8.
142 WOLTON, p. 25.
kLáRA FAbIANkO á 125
abou Ge man equi emen s, on he o he hand hey didn’ accep o he co ec ions.
A he same ime hey didn’ accep he So ie e o s o e ision o Polish bo de s
jus i ied by ensu ing o secu i y. Only Hi le could o e a simila alliance o S alin.
Al hough hei mo i es we e di e en , bo h Ge many and So ie Union consid-
e ed he pac s as he means o eaching he long- e m in en ions. Bo h coun ies
enewed hei economical coope a ion143 and s eng hened he posi ions in he in e -
na ional si ua ion ha is wasn’ possible o each any deal on he Eu ope con inen
wi hou hem in he u u e.
CONCLUSION
S alin had se e al possibili ies o he o eign-poli ical o ien a ion in he second hal
o he hi ies o he Twen ie h Cen u y. Fi s ly o coope a e wi h he G ea B i ain
and F ance. Secondly, he could asse he isola ionis ic policy. Thi dly, o in ensi y
he economical-poli ical ela ions wi h he Thi d Reich, which we e e y limi ed in
ha ime. The So ie leade ship asse ed all h ee a ian s and pa allel nego ia ions
we e p oceeded in he las wo p e-wa yea s. The So ie espec able decision abou
coope a ion wi h Ge many was sudden, unplanned in he long un and caused p ob-
ably by a se ies o pa ial e en s and ci cums ances om July and beginning o Au-
gus 1939. The So ie a chi es imply ha K emlin leade ship de ini ely decided o
he poli ical deal wi h Be lin a e he ailu e o nego ia ions wi h F ance and G ea
B i ain oughly in he hal o Augus 1939 a he la es . Un eadiness and a ce ain a e
o imp o isa ion could be e idenced by insu icien o mal essen ials o he physical
o m o he pac and e en pa adoxical si ua ions be o e he pe o mance and e en
du ing he Moscow con e ence a which he Non-agg ession ag eemen was signed.
I am ending o he opinion ha B i ish and F ench poli icians unde es ima ed some
key ci cums ances. They didn’ es ima e he eal mili a y powe o Red A my, judged
he S alinism and unde alua ed he s a egical signi icance o he So ie Union o
Ge many in he Cen al and Eas Eu ope. They didn’ ealize as well ha in case o
he alliance o bo h o ali a ian egimes, hey will lose he in luence in a la ge pa o
impo an Eu opean a ea. They missed ou he ac ha S alin has mo e op ions how
o en o ce his aims. A e he Munich c isis S alin was a aid o isola ion and needed
o make a con ac which would ensu e him neu ali y as well as e i o y gains in
he sequence o Hi le ’s expansi e policy. A he same ime, he Nazi egime wasn’
p epa ed o he wa a wo on s. Fu he , F ance and G ea B i ain assumed w ong
ha he o eign policy o Ge many and So ie Union will co espond mo e wi h hei
ideology a he han p agma ism.
In my opinion, he Ge man-So ie pac was a cha ac e is ic example o a eal-
policy applied in p ac ice. I was a calcula ed deal wi h exac objec i es when bo h
143 Abou he impo ance and cha ac e o he enewed economical coope a ion see: K. FABI-
ANKOVÁ — T. KASHAPOV, To go lja i ekonomičeskoje so udničes o Ge manii i SSSR pe i-
od s 1939 po 1941 gg., in: Nacionalnaja bezopasnosť, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, pp. 111–123; K. FA-
BIANKOVÁ, Hospodářská spolup áce o ali ních ežimů na příkladu Německa a So ě ského s a-
zu le ech 1939–1941, in: D acá é s ole í — The Twen ie h Cen u y, No. 2, 2014, pp. 54–71.
126 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015
sys ems ou shone he ideological di e ences by common na ional in e es s which
among o he s consis ed in he di ision o Poland.
The poli ical alliance p o ided Ge many bo h a eeling o ela i e secu i y in
he wa agains Poland and neu ali y o he second pa y, including he gua an ee
o a se ies o commodi ies necessa y o he wa economy. The de ensi e alliance
o Wes e n powe s became ine icien . The Augus and Sep embe pac s enabled he
So ie Union o es ic he scope and au ho i y o he Nazi egime in he Eas Eu o-
pean e i o y by which minimalized he wa h ea empo a ily. They a he same
ime ensu ed ha S alin had an app oach o s a egical economical a eas a he Wes -
e n bo de , no unnecessa y e en o his de ensi e. The So ie leade achie ed he
ealiza ion o i s goals, he capi alis S a es en e ed he wa , wai ed o un ou and be
willing o accep i s condi ions. He acqui ed a sligh ime o he a mamen and eal-
iza ion o some mili a y e o ms, including he p omise o he economical coope a-
ion. The economical associa ion had a la ge signi icance e en o he Nazi economy
in ela ion o a longe pe sis ence o wa con lic and mili a y aid a he des uc ion
o he B i ish Empi e. Hi le d a ed a se ies o powe -poli ical decisions in which he
So ie Union played he cen al ole su p isingly, and because he also assumed ha a
he gi en economical si ua ion he So ie impo o mine al esou ces and oods u
is i eplaceable.
SEARCH FOR PARTNERSHIP: GERMAN-SOVIET POLITICAL RELATIONS
ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
ABSTRACT
The aim o he essay is o analyse he mos impo an ci cums ances which could a ec ed he inal
S alin’s decision leading o he a i ica ion o So ie -Ge man poli ical ela ions a he end o he hi -
ies. Among o he s o e i y he a i ma ion ha i was a calcula ed deal wi h exac objec i es in he
case o Ribben op-Molo o ‘s Pac . The Ge man-So ie Nonagg ession Pac o Augus 23 d, 1939 was
a calcula ed acco d wi h p ecise objec i es when in bo h sys ems common na ional in e es s, which
consis ed also in he pa i ion o Poland, o e shadowed hei ideological di e ences. This pape ou -
lines he ci cums ances o he nego ia ions, he main ac o s, and mo i es leading o he c ea ion o
he ag eemen . A pa o he esea ch is he analysis o impo ance and di ec consequences o he
Ge man-So ie Pac . The poli ical alliance p o ided Ge many bo h a eeling o ela i e secu i y in he
wa agains Poland and neu ali y o he second pa y, including he gua an ee o a se ies o com-
modi ies necessa y o he wa economy. The de ensi e alliance o Wes e n powe s became ine i-
cien . The Augus and Sep embe pac s enabled he So ie Union o es ic he scope and au ho i y
o he Nazi egime in he Eas Eu opean e i o y by which minimalized he wa h ea empo a -
ily. They a he same ime ensu ed ha S alin had an app oach o s a egical economical a eas a he
Wes e n bo de , no unnecessa y e en o his de ensi e.
KEYWORDS
Hi le ; Ge many; So ie Union; Ribben op-Molo o Pac ; Poli ical Rela ions; Augus 1939
Klá a Fabianko á | Depa men o Economic His o y, Facul y o Economics, Uni e si y o Econom-
ics, P ague, W. Chu chill Sq. 4, 130 67, P aha, Czech Republic, kla a. abianko a@ se.cz