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GOVERNANCE, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EU MEMBER STATES
Ba ha A ila
Cen e o Social Sciences, Hunga ian Academy o Sciences and In e na ional
Business School, Budapes
ba ha.a ila@ k.m a.hu
aba [email protected]
Abs ac :This pape in ends o unde s and he majo ins i u ional ac o s ela ed o
he economic de elopmen o he Eu opean Union (EU) coun ies in he las wo
decades. I p o ides some con ibu ions o he ins i u ionalis deba e o he p esen
c isis o he Eu opean Union, and wi hin i , he Economic and Mone a y Union
(EMU). The wo main issues o he empi ical esea ch a e he e ec o he di e en
ins i u ions on economic g ow h and he ela i e impo ance o ins i u ions compa ed
wi h he adi ional mac oeconomic componen s o economic de elopmen . The
ins i u ionalis adi ions o compa a i e poli ical science and poli ical economy as
well as ins i u ional economics de ine he amewo k o in e p e a ion. The analysis
sheds some ligh on he ela ionship be ween economic de elopmen and he
di e en ins i u ional dimensions, namely he legal en i onmen , poli ical ins i u ions,
public policy ins i u ions (go e nance) and he in o mal ins i u ions, he cul u al
componen s o he economic-poli ical beha iou . The empi ical esea ch examines
he de elopmen pa e n o he Eu opean Union coun ies be ween 1993 and 2011
as well as he ela ionship be ween economic de elopmen and ins i u ional quali y
in ha pe iod by desc ip i e and explana o y s a is ical me hods. The esul s e eal
s ong ela ionship among he di e en aspec s o ins i u ional quali y in he EU
coun ies; wi hin Eu ope we canno obse e a Singapo ean ype con adic o y
cons ella ion be ween he quali y o democ a ic ins i u ions and public policy
e ec i eness. The pa h o Eu opean de elopmen has been d awing a
conspicuously s ong co ela ion among he di e en ins i u ional dimensions: he
high quali y o democ a ic ins i u ions, he espec o he ule o law and p ope y
igh s and he e ec i e go e nance a e going hand in hand wi h he g ow h-
suppo ing componen s o he cul u e. In cul u al e ms, he high le el o us ,
espec and sel -de e mina ion as well as he lack o obedience ensu e he mos
success ul long- e m g ow h pa e n in Eu ope. Ano he impo an inding is ha he
EMU coun ies a e conspicuously he e ogeneous in hei ins i u ional quali y and he
Medi e anean membe s o he Eu o a ea a e ins i u ionally close o he non-EMU-
membe Cen al-Eas e n Eu opean coun ies han he co e EMU coun ies.
Conce ning he economic policy consequences, he he e ogenei y o he in o mal
ins i u ions undamen ally challenges he e ec i eness o he app oach o s onge
ha monisa ion by s ic e o mal ules and s ic e sanc ions agains he no m-
b eaking Eu o a ea membe s.
Keywo ds:economic de elopmen ; Eu opean Union; Eu o a ea; ins i u ions;
cul u e, democ acy
JEL classi ica ion:O43; O52; P16
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1. In oduc ion
The Eu opean Union (EU) is in deep c isis; a he momen he e is no se ious
p o essional o in e na ionally espec ed public igu e who can deba e i . In me e
economic sense i is ob ious ha he global inancial c isis has implied a deb c isis
and a subsequen long-las ing ecession in se e al coun ies o he EU. A he
beginning o 2013 i seems ha he Eu opean Union as an ac o in i sel has mo e
di icul ies in managing he c isis han o he de eloped egions o he wo ld.
Mo eo e , i is al eady doub ul whe he he EU, and wi hin i especially he g oup o
he coun ies using he common cu ency, he Eu o ( he Economic and Mone a y
Union, EMU) will be able o su i e his c isis wi hou losing some o i s membe s.
Indeed, he EMU (and also he en i e EU) is se iously endange ed as a poli ical
cons uc ion, a leas in i s p esen o m (Habe mas 2012).
Mos o he policy sugges ions p esen ed as ‘solu ions’ o he p esen c isis explici ly
o implici ly de i e om he diagnosis ha he p oblem is ul ima ely he weakness o
iscal ede alism in Eu ope. B ie ly, he mains eam app oach is ha he Eu ozone
can be sa ed only i decision-making is ede alized (Da as 2010); he e icien
managemen o he p esen c isis o he EMU equi es s ic e ules as well as s ic e
sanc ions agains he no m-b eaking coun ies (Hodson 2012). I is no ewo hy ha
e en hose who deba e his he apy accep he ‘ ede alism p oblem’: he ypical
coun e -a gumen s poin o he p oblems o legi imacy o he EU ins i u ions, he
con adic o y na u e o so e eign y wi hin he EU, and he p oblems o he Eu opean
iden i y, he lack o a Eu opean ‘demos’ (Cede man 2001, Schimmel ennig 2010).
Bu hese p oblems ha e al eady been well-deba ed se e al imes, among o he s,
nine yea s ago when a big-bang enla gemen happened (see he o e iew o
Kö ösényi, 2004 abou ha ). Logically, he absence o a s ong common Eu opean
iden i y implies a ela i ely weak solida i y po en ial owa ds o he EU na ions: he
willingness o suppo o bailou pu poses in a ime o an endu ing c isis is mode a e
–incompa able o example wi h he quasi-au oma ic solida i y o Wes -Ge man
ci izens and poli icians owa ds Eas -Ge many in he decade a e he Ge man
euni ica ion (Docha aigh 2010).
In his pape I in end o open he black-box o he Eu opean ins i u ions. By s epping
ou om he ede alism deba e ame, I in e p e he de elopmen o he Eu opean
economies in he las wo decades om a deepe ins i u ionalis pe spec i e ha
in eg a e he ecen heo e ical and empi ical indings o new ins i u ionalism in
poli ical science as well as in compa a i e mac oeconomics.
The nex sec ion b ie ly deals wi h he po en ially ele an ins i u ional app oaches in
he con ex o he EU coun ies’ de elopmen . Sec ion 3 analyzes empi ically he
economic and ins i u ional de elopmen o he EU and EMU coun ies be ween 1993
and 2011. The inal sec ion p esen s he concluding ema ks and discussion.
2. Ins i u ional de elopmen and economic g ow h
The ins i u ionalis pe spec i e has ecen ly become in eg a ed in he main s eams
o he di e en social sciences. In he poli ical science he expansion o new
ins i u ionalism s a ed in he eigh ies (Pe e s, 2005:16). In o ganisa ional sociology,
he e i al o he ‘embeddedness’ app oach o Polányi (1957) in he seminal pape
o G ano e e (1985) implied a cul u alis esea ch pe spec i e: he ole o alues
and no ms in he wo king o o ganisa ions became a new esea ch p og amme in
he nine ies (DiMaggio, 1990). Mo eo e , he ins i u ionalis app oach is ob iously
207
impo an in economics as i was al eady pa o he classical school (Smi h,
1899[1776]). Howe e , he speci ic ins i u ional explana ions o he basic ques ion o
g ow h heo y (why some coun ies a e ich and why a e o he s poo ), has only come
back in o he mains eam in he las wo o h ee decades when he new g ow h
heo y app oach in eg a ed he majo esul s o ins i u ionalis economics (Helpman
2004, Czeglédi 2006).
2.1. G ow h and ins i u ional quali y in he Eu opean Union
The Eu opean Union and especially he Economic and Mone a y Union as one o i s
enhanced ins i u ionalis coope a ion p ojec s has ollowed he logic o p o-ac i e
ins i u ion-building: he less de eloped coun ies o he communi y a e supposed o
inco po a e he ‘good’ o mal ins i u ions o he mos de eloped ones. Theo e ically
he EU and again, especially he EMU is supposed o be a con e gence club
(Baumol, 1986): he c i e ia o en ance selec among he aspi an s, and he applied
new ules and o ganisa ions (in e ms o No h 1990: he o mal ins i u ions) will help
he less de eloped coun ies o g adually con e ge owa ds he mo e de eloped
ones. Howe e , he imi a ion o he ‘bes ’ o mal ins i u ions has no necessa ily
implied a con e gence in economic de elopmen . In his con ex , he li e a u e
sugges s ou po en ial ins i u ional ac o s o economic de elopmen (Ba ha, 2012):
(a) he legal ins i u ions, (b) he poli ical ins i u ions, (c) he ins i u ions o go e nance
(p o essional bu eauc acy, public policy expe ise) and (d) he in o mal ins i u ions
( alues and no ms o ien ing he beha iou o poli ical and economic ac o s).
2.2. Resea ch ques ions and hypo hesis
This pape a emp s o answe wo main ques ions: (1) Wha is he e ec o he
di e en ins i u ions on economic g ow h in he EU and he EMU coun ies? (2) Wha
a e he ela i e impo ance o he di e en ypes o ins i u ions compa ed o each
o he and he adi ional mac oeconomic a iables? The hypo hesis o be es ed he e
is he ollowing: as he las wo decades o he Eu opean de elopmen was
cha ac e ized by an inc easing con e gence in he o mal (legal and poli ical)
ins i u ions, he s ubbo n di e ences in economic de elopmen le els a e mainly
caused by he di e ences in in o mal ins i u ions and go e nance.
3. Empi ical esea ch
3.1. Va iables, ope a ionaliza ion
The g ow h accoun ing amewo k is he s a ing poin o he empi ical esea ch;
namely he augmen ed Solow model (Mankiw e al. 1992:408) ha among he
explana o y a iables o g ow h includes he accumula ion o human capi al as well
(in addi ion o physical capi al and labou ). In his con ex , he ole o ins i u ions is
e lec ed by he unobse ed o al ac o p oduc i i y (TFP), as a coun y’s o al ac o
p oduc i i y ‘is a unc ion o he coun y’s policies and ins i u ions’ (Pa en e 2001:56).
Consequen ly, he di e en (legal, poli ical, policy and cul u al) ins i u ional
app oaches a e i al speci ica ions o he TFP esidual in he g ow h accoun ing.
3.1.1. Dependen a iable
The dependen a iable chosen o his esea ch is economic g ow h. The indica o
is he change in GDP pe capi a in Pu chasing Powe Pa i y be ween 1993 and 2011.
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The sou ce o hese da a (as also o o he mac oeconomic da a) is he Penn Wo ld
Table 7.0 (Hes on e al., 2011) da abase o 1993-2009; he alues o 2009-2011
a e ex apola ions based on Eu os a da a.
3.1.2. Independen a iables
Mac oeconomic a iables
The independen a iables a e speci ied in he amewo k o condi ional
con e gence (Ba o- Sala-i-Ma in, 1992:226). The i s independen a iable is he
le el o economic de elopmen (GDP pe capi a in Pu chasing Powe Pa i y) in
1993. I he quali y o ins i u ions does no play a majo ole in long- e m economic
g ow h, his a iable basically de ines he ends: he poo e coun ies should
g adually bu s eadily con e ge owa ds he mos de eloped ones.
The nex independen a iable is he change in physical capi al; he p oxy o i ,
ollowing he in e na ional p ac ice, is he in es men /GDP a io. The change o
labou is measu ed by he a e age change in he numbe o people employed, he
echnological change and he amo isa ion (a negligible ac o in he p esen
analysis) a e supposed o be 0.05 (an in e na ional con en ion since he seminal
pape o Mankiw e al., 1992).
I ha e used a less con en ional indica o o he p oxy o human capi al in es men .
Among o he s, an Leeuwen and Föld á i (2008) e ealed ha when we compa e
he EU coun ies, he use o he con en ional ‘a e age yea s o educa ion’ p oxy
o e alues he human capi al o he Cen al-Eas e n Eu opean coun ies. The e o e
I ha e applied as a p oxy o human capi al in es men he indica o o ‘cogni i e
skills’ de eloped by Hanushek and Woesmann (2009), al hough wi h some
modi ica ion. Thei ‘cogni i e skills’ indica o is de i ed om he OECD P og amme
o In e na ional S uden Assessmen (PISA) su ey: cogni i e skills a e “measu ed
by he simple a e age o all obse ed ma h and science sco es be ween 1964 and
2003 o each coun y” (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2009:8), i is p obably biased
somewha agains he li e acy skills. Consequen ly, I ha e also included he simple
a e age o all obse ed li e acy skills sco es; his ‘cogni i e and li e acy skills’ is he
p oxy o human capi al in es men used o each o he Eu opean coun ies.
Ins i u ional a iables
I ha e ope a ionalized ou di e en ins i u ional ype a iables om di e en
in e na ional su eys. The p oxy o he No hian o mal ins i u ions is he sub-index
o Legal S uc u e and Secu i y o P ope y Righ s om he 2011 Annual Repo o
he Economic F eedom o he Wo ld om he Ca o Ins i u e (Gwa ney e al., 2011).
The p oxy o he No hian in o mal ins i u ions, i.e. he cul u al componen s guiding
he beha iou o he economic and poli ical ac o s comes om he ‘cul u e’ p incipal
componen o Williamson and Ma he s (2010). The au ho s cons uc ed he alues
o his cul u e p incipal componen om he di e en da a collec ion wa es o he
Wo ld Values Su ey; acco ding o hei in e p e a ion, us , sel -de e mina ion and
espec a e posi i e co ela es o he economic de elopmen , while he obedience is
a nega i e componen o ha . The p oxy o he quali y o democ acy, he quali y o
poli ical ins i u ions comes om he democ acy index o he Economis In elligence
Uni . This index in ol es he quali y aspec o he democ acy (Ringen, 2011); in
addi ion, we ha e alues o all o he EU membe s a es o se e al measu emen
pe iods. Finally, he p oxy o he go e nance, he quali y o expe -bu eauc a ic
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ins i u ions comes om he Wo ld Bank “Wo ldwide Go e nance Indica o s (WGI)”
p ojec (Kau mann e al., 2010) he sub-index o go e nmen e iciency was selec ed
o his. By using long- e m a e age alues o all o he ou ins i u ional p oxies I
ollowed he in e na ional con en ions.
3.2. Main indings
3.2.1. Ins i u ional ela ions be ween legal ins i u ions, democ acy,
go e nance and cul u e
The compa ison o he ela i e s anda d de ia ions (see Table 1) suppo s ou
hypo hesis: among he 26 Eu opean Union membe coun ies, he mos impo an
di e ences can be egis e ed in he in o mal ins i u ions. Howe e , he smalles
di e ences a e in he quali y o democ acy, while in he legal ins i u ions and he
quali y o go e nance we ind mo e signi ican di e ences (bu less signi ican ones
han in he dimension o cul u e).
Table 1: The he e ogenei y o ins i u ional indica o s
LEGAL
CULTURE
GOVERN
DEMOC
S anda d de ia ion
1.18
1.80
12.99
0.79
Means
7.32
5.24
73.50
8.06
Rela i e s anda d
de ia ion
16.15
34.34
17.68
9.75
Sou ces: LEGAL (Legal S uc u e and Secu i y o P ope y Righ s): Ca o Ins i u e,
Gwa ney e al., 2011; CULTURE: Williamson and Ma he s (2010); GOVERN
(Go e nmen E ec i eness): Wo ld Bank “Wo ldwide Go e nance Indica o s (WGI)”
p ojec (Kau mann e al., 2010); DEMOC (Democ acy), Economis In elligence Uni
Democ acy Index
Ne e heless, i would be misleading o d aw a conclusion o ‘incompa ibili y’
be ween democ acy and cul u e in he EU. The co ela ion ma ix o he ou
ins i u ional a iables e eal a s ong ela ionship: he bi- a ia e co ela ion is
signi ican a a 0.01 p obabili y le el be ween each o he ou a iables.
Table 2: Co ela ion be ween ins i u ional ac o s
LEGAL
CULTURE
GOVERN
DEMOC
LEGAL
1.00
0.72
0.93
0.86
CULTURE
0.72
1.00
0.69
0.82
GOVERN
0.93
0.69
1.00
0.89
DEMOC
0.86
0.82
0.89
1.00
Sou ces: LEGAL (Legal S uc u e and Secu i y o P ope y Righ s): Ca o Ins i u e,
Gwa ney e al., 2011; CULTURE: Williamson and Ma he s (2010); GOVERN
(Go e nmen E ec i eness): Wo ld Bank “Wo ldwide Go e nance Indica o s (WGI)”
p ojec (Kau mann e al., 2010); DEMOC (Democ acy), Economis In elligence Uni
Democ acy Index
The quali y o democ acy co ela es s ongly wi h all o he h ee o he dimensions,
bu he s onges s a is ical ela ionship (93%!) can be egis e ed be ween he
go e nmen e ec i eness and he legal s uc u e. These indings indica e ha he

210
Lee- hesis, he assumed Singapo ean ype con adic ion be ween democ acy and
go e nmen e ec i eness is no alid in he EU on he long- un ( o mo e c i icism
abou he Lee- hesis see: Knu sen, 2010); ei he he quali y o democ acy o he
go e nmen e ec i eness is he s onges in he No dic coun ies, while Bulga ia and
Romania a e he lagga ds in bo h aspec s (see Figu e 1).
Figu e 1: Quali y o democ acy and go e nmen e ec i eness in he EU
Sou ces: Economis In elligence Uni and he Wo ld Bank
Consequen ly, i equi es a speci ic me hodological ea men o minimize he
ob ious endogenei y and mul icollinea i y p oblems: we ha e o include a common
ac o o ins i u ional de elopmen in ou explana o y models (and no ou di e en
ins i u ional a iables). The p incipal componen analysis de i es one p incipal
componen om he ou ins i u ional dimensions ha explain 86.5% o he a iance
o he o iginal ins i u ional a iables. The s ong ela ionship be ween his
cons uc ed ins i u ional de elopmen componen and he economic de elopmen
le el suppo s ou in e p e a ion abou he unde lying ins i u ional ac o s behind he
seemingly economic p oblems o he Eu opean in eg a ion. Figu e 2 ega ding he
EU membe coun ies’ economic and ins i u ional de elopmen ob iously indica es
ha he Economic and Mone a y Union is no he club o he mos de eloped
Eu opean coun ies; nei he in economic, no in ins i u ional de elopmen e ms. No
only because he ins i u ionally wo mos de eloped coun ies o he EU (Sweden
and Denma k) a e no membe s o he EMU, bu also because o he appa en
weaknesses o he Medi e anean coun ies’ ins i u ions.
211
Figu e 2: Ins i u ional and economic de elopmen in he Eu opean Union
Sou ces: Penn Wo ld Table 7.0 and calcula ions by au ho
Among o he hings, ou ins i u ional da a indica e ha one ounding membe , I aly
is mo e like he wo coun ies ha joined he EU only i e yea s ago (Bulga ia and
Romania), han Sweden ( he ins i u ionally mos de eloped EU membe ). I is also
no ewo hy ha he ins i u ional de elopmen le el o F ance is only a ound he EU
a e age and i is signi ican ly weake han ha o Ge many; pa adoxically, in addi ion
o Aus ia, he ins i u ional de elopmen le el o Ge many is he closes o ha o
I eland and he Uni ed Kingdom. Though he e a e se e al a gumen s ha mul iple
de elopmen clubs a e o ming wi hin he EU in he spi i o di e en ia ed in eg a ion
(Kolle , 2012), i is doub ul ha he EMU can be conside ed an ou s anding
de elopmen club o enhanced inancial coope a ion. This is no ue in economic
e ms; i is e en less ue in ins i u ional de elopmen e ms. Mo eo e , because
nei he he Czech Republic, no he Uni ed Kingdom a e EMU membe s, i is no
e en ue ha he common cu ency a ea concen a es he EU a e age coun ies in
economic and ins i u ional de elopmen e ms.
The hie a chical clus e ing p ocess o he ins i u ional dimensions d aws h ee sub-
g oups among he mo e de eloped EU coun ies: he h ee No dic s a es and he
Ne he lands o m he g oup o he mos de eloped coun ies; Ge many, Aus ia,
I eland and he Uni ed Kingdom cons i u e a second g oup, while F ance, Belgium
and Spain a e on he ma gin o he mo e de eloped EU coun ies. The ins i u ionally
less de eloped Sou he n and Eas e n EU membe coun ies a e posi ioned along a
con inuum; only Bulga ia and Romania o m a sepa a e clus e .
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3.2.2. Economic de elopmen : ins i u ional and o he explana ions
I would like o e lec b ie ly on he weigh o ins i u ional and o he explana ions in
economic de elopmen . Though he ini ial de elopmen le el (in his analysis in
1993) co ela es signi ican ly and nega i ely wi h he economic g ow h in he las wo
decades, he mode a e alue o he de e mina ion coe icien (0.58) con o ms wi h
ou expec a ions, ha is, he mo e e ined explana ions can ha e empi ical ele ance
in he de elopmen o he EU coun ies. The inclusion o ou ins i u ional
de elopmen p incipal componen signi ican ly inc eases he explana o y o ce: in
his model he alue o he adjus ed R2is 0.65. Howe e , in a echnical sense, ou
ins i u ionalis explana ion is weake han he human-capi al-augmen ed Solow
model ( he adjus ed R2inc eases o 0.76). Indeed, he human capi al seems o be
he decisi e ac o (besides he ini ial de elopmen di e ences). Ne e heless, his
does no mean ha we ha e o neglec he ins i u ional e ec s in in e p e ing he
economic de elopmen o he EU coun ies; he no el y o ou human capi al
in es men p oxy is p ecisely he inclusion o he labou ma ke adap abili y
dimension in he educa ional a iable ha means an implici inco po a ion o he
ins i u ions, especially he in o mal ins i u ions.
4. Conclusion and discussion
This pape p esen ed an ins i u ional, compa a i e poli ical economy pe spec i e o
he EU coun ies’ g ow h pa e ns; i also o e ed he ins i u ional he e ogenei y hesis
in aming he endu ing c isis o he EU and he Economic and Mone a y Union. Fou
po en ial ins i u ional explana ions o long- e m g ow h we e ope a ionalized: he
o mal ins i u ions by he legal s uc u e, he No hian in o mal ins i u ions by he
cul u al componen s guiding he beha iou o ac o s, he poli ical ins i u ions by he
quali y o democ acy, and he bu eauc a ic-expe ins i u ions by he quali y o
go e nance.
The expec a ion o he empi ical esea ch was ha he o mal ins i u ional
esemblance o he EU and especially he EMU coun ies is in sha p con as wi h
he s ubbo n and signi ican di e ences along he dimensions o he go e nance and
he cul u al componen s. Howe e , he empi ical indings a e no undoub edly
suppo ing his hypo hesis. In ac , he pa h o Eu opean de elopmen d aws a s ong
co ela ion among he di e en ins i u ional dimensions: he high quali y o
democ a ic ins i u ions, he good legal s uc u e, he e icien go e nmen and he
suppo ing componen s o cul u e ( us , espec and sel -de e mina ion and he lack
o obedience) a e going hand in hand.
This implies ha he p esen c isis o he Eu ozone is no mainly economic in na u e,
and i is no p edominan ly he p oblem o he supposed bad go e nance o he
Sou h-Eu opean poli ical eli es. The oo o he poli ical c isis comes om he much
deepe ins i u ional he e ogenei y; conce ning hei ins i u ions, he olde Sou he n
EU membe s a es a e much mo e like he new Eas e n-Cen al EU membe
coun ies han he ins i u ionally mos de eloped No dic ones. Because o he
endogenous na u e o his ins i u ional he e ogenei y, he s ic e ules and he
s ic e sanc ions agains he no m-b eaking coun ies a e unlikely o sol e he c isis
and p ese e he su i al o he Eu ozone in i s p esen o m. The bes case scena io
is a slow, g adual con e gence when he cons an human capi al imp o emen o
he less de eloped EU and EMU coun ies imply a sel - ein o cing imp o emen in
he legal and poli ical ins i u ions, go e nance and he cul u al componen s guiding
he beha iou al pa e ns o economic and poli ical ac o s.
213
Why can we obse e hese conspicuously s ong ela ions be ween he di e en
ins i u ional aspec s in Eu ope in he las wo decades? One possible explana ion
de i es om he global in e connec edness, he inc eased ole o pe cep ion o he
global inancial and capi al ma ke s. P ac ically all o he EU membe coun ies
depend basically on he ex e nal pe cep ion, bu hey depend independen ly (and
no oge he as he EU o he EMU). The coun y isk p emiums a e ob iously
coun y-speci ic ones, and hey e eal he global in ui i e pe cep ion o he majo
inancial and capi al ma ke playe s abou he economic and ins i u ional
de elopmen p ospec s o he indi idual coun ies. The p esen ed s ong ins i u ional
he e ogenei y wi hin he EU and he EMU shed some ligh on he endu ing Eu opean
c isis, ne e heless hese indings a e a he p elimina y, and should be es ed by
mo e sub le indica o s and on longe ime pe iods as well.
5. Acknowledgemen s
Fo commen s on ea lie e sion o his pape , I hank wo anonymous e e ees o
help ul sugges ions. I also hank o he commen s my esea ch ellows a he
Ins i u e o Poli ical Science (CSC HAS, Budapes ), my colleagues a In e na ional
Business School (IBS, Budapes , G ow h and Ins i u ions esea ch g oup) as well as
my p o esso s and colleagues a he Doc o al School in Economics a he Uni e si y
o Deb ecen.
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