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Russia and he Eu opean secu i y o de e isi ed:
om he cong ess o Vienna o he pos -cold wa
Tuomas Fo sbe g
To ci e his a icle: Tuomas Fo sbe g (2019) Russia and he Eu opean secu i y o de e isi ed:
om he cong ess o Vienna o he pos -cold wa , Eu opean Poli ics and Socie y, 20:2, 154-171,
DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182
To link o his a icle: h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182
© 2018 The Au ho (s). Published by In o ma
UK Limi ed, ading as Taylo & F ancis
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Russia and he Eu opean secu i y o de e isi ed: om he
cong ess o Vienna o he pos -cold wa
Tuomas Fo sbe g
a,b
a
Helsinki Collegium o Ad anced S udies, Uni e si y o Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland;
b
Tampe e Uni e si y,
Tampe e, Finland
ABSTRACT
Russia’s ole in he in e na ional o de is o en explained wi h
e e ence o his o ical examples, analogies and longue du ée
ends. This a icle examines Russia’s ole in, and isions o , he
in e na ional o de om he Cong ess o Vienna o he end o he
Cold Wa . The a icle also discusses he lessons, and pe haps also
he w ong lessons, ha he cu en Russian leade ship and eli e
ha e d awn on he basis o pas g and ba gains. I concludes ha
in he cou se o his o y, he e has been mo e a ia ion han
con inui y in Russia’s policy owa ds he Eu opean secu i y sys em
and, mo eo e , ha he pos -Cold Wa secu i y o de in Eu ope
was no imposed on Russia du ing he yea s immedia ely
ollowing he end o he Cold Wa .
KEYWORDS
Russia; in e na ional o de ;
secu i y o de ; Eu opean
secu i y
1. In oduc ion
Russia’s ole in and iews on he in e na ional o de is an old opic, bu i has become el-
e an again in he con ex o he deba es o e he a e o he pos -Cold Wa libe al in e -
na ional o de . Since he Uk aine c isis and annexa ion o C imea in 2014, Russia’s ole in
he Eu opean secu i y sys em has been a pa icula ly con es ed issue (see, e.g. Clunan,
2018; Hill, 2018; Janko ski, 2017; Kane , 2018; Mo ozo , 2015; Radin & Reach, 2017; Roma-
no a, 2018; Sakwa, 2017; Vosk essenski, 2016). A he isk o o e simplifica ion, one can
dis inguish be ween h ee posi ions in he ongoing deba e: o some, Russia is a e olu-
iona y o e isionis powe in en upon des oying he p esen o de ; o o he s, i is an
an i- e o mis conse a i e o ce seeking o es o e o de ; and o s ill o he s, i lies some-
whe e in be ween and seeks only mino adjus men s ( o an o e iew, see he in oduc-
o y a icle by Gö z and Me len, 2018).
Al hough assessmen s o Russia’s ole in he Eu opean secu i y o de a e poli ically sen-
si i e, classi ying s a es and hei s a egies in acco dance wi h ce ain ca ego ies has been
pa and pa cel o he s udy o In e na ional Rela ions om he beginning, and is also
common in his o ical s udies o Russian and So ie o eign policy. Indeed, many schola s
and pundi s con end ha his o y plays an essen ial ole in oday’s s uggle o e he
© 2018 The Au ho (s). Published by In o ma UK Limi ed, ading as Taylo & F ancis G oup
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CONTACT Tuomas Fo sbe g uomas. o sbe g@helsinki.fiHelsinki Collegium o Ad anced S udies, Uni e si y o
Helsinki, PB 4 (Fabianinka u 24), Helsinki FIN-00014, Finland
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY
2019, VOL. 20, NO. 2, 154–171
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182
in e na ional o de . The pas p o ides us wi h many analogies o he p esen . Mo eo e ,
pas expe iences mo i a e s a es in hei a emp s o shape he in e na ional o de , and
some may also pe cei e pe ennial his o ical ends –pa icula ly in Russia’s a i ude
owa ds he global o de –which explain he K emlin’s cu en beha iou (Ko kin, 2016;
Riebe , 2007). Hence, i is impo an o examine he ole played by Russia and i s isions
o he in e na ional o de du ing pas cen u ies. In e isi ing such his o y, his a icle
ocuses on majo peace con e ences and summi s whe e p inciples guiding he in e -
na ional o de ha e been nego ia ed.
Many gene alisa ions conce ning Russia’s wo ld o de policy can and ha e been made
on he basis o his o y. Nume ous obse e s a gue ha Russia’s app oach o secu i y go -
e nance ep esen s a s a e-cen ic wo ld iew and emphasises g ea -powe managemen
and mul ipola i y a he han libe al p inciples (see, e.g. Chebanko a, 2017; Kobayashi,
2017; MacFa lane, 2003; Maka yche , 2009; Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017). I is also
widely unde s ood ha Russia wan s o be pa o he in e na ional socie y (Aal o,
2007). Howe e , iews diffe on he deg ee o which Russia has p omo ed gene al p in-
ciples, o jus i s na ow sel -in e es s. The Russian iew, as Pu in (2013) has a gued, is
ha Russia’s‘winning s eng h in c i ical junc u es such as Vienna o Yal a has mani es ed
in gene osi y and jus ice.’O he s see Russia as me ely being guided by pa ochial sel -in e -
es in hese and simila si ua ions. Some a gue ha emp ing oppo uni ies p omp
Russia’s g eed (Mas ny, 1979, p. 7), while o he s belie e ha when Russia is ecognised
as a g ea powe i ends o ac mo e coope a i ely (Tsyganko , 2012).
Al hough Russia’s iews on he in e na ional o de and i s a emp s o shape i ha e
been much discussed, he e a e se e al easons o e isi ing he issue. Fi s , exis ing
esea ch is always anach onis ic o a ce ain deg ee as new ques ions a ise when new con-
as s a e p esen ed. New na a i es and my hs s a o li e a li e o hei own i his o ical
u ning poin s and ends a e no c i ically explo ed. Second, new ma e ial is eme ging
ela ed o he pos -Cold Wa e a and hence he pe iod me i s much close and sys ema ic
a en ion han has been possible hus a . Thi d, in ligh o he ecen deba es in social
heo y ocusing on mic o ounda ions (see, e.g. Ke ze , 2017), i is impo an o e hink
he ques ion o o de om he pe spec i e o agency, wi hou which he impac o s uc-
u al o ces canno be unde s ood (Wend , 1987). In his way, we can see how he c ea ion
and de e io a ion o o de is ela ed o diploma ic p ac ice, in e p e a ion and (mis)pe cep-
ion, a he han esul ing simply om s uc u al o ces o a ional choices based on
na ional in e es s, howe e hey a e defined.
In his a icle, I examine Russia’s ole in he e ol ing Eu opean secu i y o de fi s ly om
a his o ical pe spec i e, beginning wi h some heo e ical and concep ual no es. In he
second sec ion, I p o ide a mac o-his o ical analysis o Russia’s ole om he Napoleonic
Wa s o he Yal a Con e ence, while he hi d sec ion deals mo e specifically wi h he o -
ma ion o he pos -Cold Wa o de in Eu ope a e he So ie Union’s dissolu ion. The
sou ces consis mainly o seconda y esea ch li e a u e wi h ega d o he ea lie cen u ies,
bu I ha e also used ma e ial e ie ed om he a chi es o he Finnish Minis y o Fo eign
Affai s om 1989 o 1993 as a as he immedia e pos -Cold Wa e a is conce ned. Bo h he
space cons ain s o his a icle and he challenge o s udying each his o ical junc u e in
de ail ollowing he s ic p inciples o c i ical his o iog aphy mean ha he na a i e p e-
sen ed he e emains ske chy. The a ailable e idence is sufficien , howe e , o demons a e
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 155
ha he e has been significan a ia ion in Russia’s o e all s a egy conce ning in e -
na ional o de .
2. Theo e ical backg ound and esea ch design
Russia’s ole in he Eu opean secu i y o de needs o be discussed wi hin a la ge heo e i-
cal amewo k. Realis s, libe als and cons uc i is s diffe in hei iews on how in e -
na ional o de in gene al and he Eu opean secu i y o de in pa icula is c ea ed and
ec ea ed. Simply pu , ealis s emphasise he ole o powe , libe als he p e e ences o
key playe s and he o e all aming o deals as win-win si ua ions, and cons uc i is s
s ess he ole o sha ed belie s and p inciples. The end o he Cold Wa is c ucial he e
because ealis s see i simply as a powe shi , libe als as he domes ic poli ical ans o m-
a ion o he So ie Union, whe eas cons uc i is s insis ha i depended on changing
belie s conside ing no ma i e p inciples a he han coe cion o ade-off. Sha ed belie s
do no necessa ily lead o he bes possible secu i y o de , howe e . Mo eo e , once
accep ed, belie s s a o become a he igid and a e no open o ba gaining (see, e.g.
Sa o e, 2009). Wi h ega d o changes in powe ela ions, an impo an issue is he
abili y o concei e o powe as a social cons uc ion oo. In nego ia ions, powe
depends on pe cep ions and sha ed belie s a he han di ec ly on ma e ial condi ions.
Thus, psychological ac o s such as pe cep ions and emo ions a e ega ded as a necessa y
laye he e, wi hou which he s uc u al condi ions would no ha e any explana o y powe
(see, e.g. Je is, 2016).
The heo e ical pe spec i es also diffe in e ms o he o e all his o ical e olu ion o
in e na ional secu i y o de s. Realis s belie e ha , in he long un, he e is no quali a i e
imp o emen in he na u e o in e na ional o de . De elopmen is mo e cyclical han
linea (Cla k, 1989). In con as , libe als (and many cons uc i is s oo) belie e ha he
o e all e olu ion o in e na ional o de has been, despi e occasional se backs, owa ds a
mo e p og essi e sys em encompassing a wide and mo e jus se o p inciples (Ikenbe y,
2000). In ela ion o oday’s p oblems, one should ask whe he he e has been a s eady
g ow h in libe al p inciples cons i u ing he in e na ional o de , no solely ied o he US
leade ship, and wha kind o unde lying deepe o ces ha e d i en he p og ess
h ough he cen u ies and ha e now appa en ly ceased o ha e an effec . A e he
cu en p oblems o he libe al o de de e mined by poli ical, economic, echnological
and cul u al ends? O can hey be asc ibed o mo e con ingen a iables, such as
leade s, di e se domes ic poli ical ac o s and o he epheme al issues?
A his junc u e, we should also conside he ole o his o ical memo y in c ea ing and
accep ing secu i y o de s. Secu i y o de s a e usually c ea ed on he basis o pas expe i-
ences, seeking o a oid he mis akes o he p e ious o de , a he han being cons uc ed
om sc a ch. Bu he lessons lea ned a e o en mo e na ional han in e na ional. This is
pa icula ly ele an in he case o Russia, since his o ical lessons e y s ongly pe ade
cu en easoning (see, e.g. Cox, 2014). Fo his eason, we need o look a he ‘his o y
o lessons’along wi h lessons o his o y (Rasmussen, 2003).
Russia has been bo h a make as well as a ake o he ules upon which he in e -
na ional o de is based. Realis s would he e o e asse ha when Russia has been nego-
ia ing o e o a emp ed o influence he Eu opean secu i y o de , he key has been i s
sel -in e es and i s success has mainly been con ingen upon i s ela i e powe posi ion.
156 T. FORSBERG
Ye sel -in e es is an elusi e concep . The ‘sel ’can be defined as ‘ he K emlin’,‘ he Russian
s a e’o , mo e b oadly, as co e ing he impe ial ‘sel ’beyond he bo de s o he exis ing
na ion-s a e, pe haps e en encompassing humani y as a whole. In e es s, mo eo e , can
be sho - e m and myopic o long- e m and enligh ened. O , as A nold Wol e s (1965,
pp. 73–74) amously poin ed ou , s a es can define hei key goals eflec ing na ow
sel -cen ic aims (possession goals) o wide gene al isions (milieu goals). I is impo an
o no e he e ha he la e a e no necessa ily libe al and he o me no necessa ily ealis .
Finally, he e a e mani old ways o ca ego ising s a e policies ela ed o in e na ional
o de in he exis ing li e a u e. Kale i Hols i (1991, p. 348), o example, iden ifies h ee
s a egies o o ging majo peace se lemen s and pos wa o de s: domina ion, balance
o powe , and ans o ma ion o he sys em. Jeff ey Leg o (2005, pp. 8–10) dis inguishes
be ween h ee g ea -powe s a egies o in e na ional o de : e isionis , in eg a ionis ,
and sepa a is . B ian Ra hbun (2014)diffe en ia es be ween a a ie y o diploma ic
s yles, anging om coe ci e s a ec a o mo e coope a i e dialogue. In keeping wi h
such concep ual ca ego ies, Russia’s ole in, and pe cep ion o , he in e na ional o de
can be compa ed o o he g ea powe s. A he same ime, i can also be analysed in
e ms o his o ical con inui y and a ia ion. The ques ion hus is: When looking a
Russia’s policy owa ds he Eu opean secu i y o de in he pas as well as oday, is i poss-
ible o disce n any pa e n on his basis? In he nex sec ion, I will examine Russia’s key
objec i es owa ds in e na ional secu i y a angemen s, ins i u ions and p inciples a
majo his o ical junc u es, add essing how na owly o b oadly hey we e defined and
wha kind o lessons Russians ha e d awn om hese his o ical e en s.
3. Russia and he his o ical e olu ion o he Eu opean o de
Russia was no a pa y o he Wes phalian peace ea ies cons i u ing he Eu opean s a e
sys em no he Peace o U ech a e he Spanish succession wa s. Ins ead, i ough fi s
he Ing ian and hen he G ea No he n Wa agains Sweden and pa icipa ed in he h ee
pa i ions o Poland wi h P ussia and Aus ia in he la e eigh een h cen u y. Subsequen ly,
i became one o he key ac o s in he Vienna Cong ess sys em a e he Napoleonic Wa s.
Simila ly, Russia –o So ie Russia –once again did no ake pa in he nego ia ions o e
he Eu opean secu i y o de a e WWI, bu e-en e ed he Eu opean secu i y sys em in he
1920s and hen played a key ole in he o ma ion o he pos -WWII – ha is, he Cold Wa –
secu i y o de . I is in e es ing o e isi his his o y since i offe s many clues o analysing
he p esen si ua ion. Al hough his has been done o some ex en al eady (see Tsyganko ,
2012), he e a e plen y o ques ions ha can be asked anew. The objec i e o his a icle is
no only o c ea e an accu a e ac ual accoun in ligh o he la es esea ch li e a u e, bu
also o look a Russian in e p e a ions and he ole hey ha e played in he ecen Russian
deba e o e he Eu opean secu i y o de .
The Napoleonic Wa s p o ide a good jumping-offpoin . The Tilsi Peace T ea y o 1807
signed by Alexande I and Napoleon is an in iguing his o ical e en , no leas because i
esembles he Molo o -Ribben op Pac o 1939 be ween he So ie Union and Nazi
Ge many, and can also se e as a e e ence poin o any p esen bila e al peace deals
be ween Russia and Wes e n powe s. Russia ini ia ed he peace alks because he
F ench ca al y had eached he P ussian-Russian bo de in Tilsi (So e sk) and he Russians
we e no p epa ed o figh a e hey had been de ea ed by he F ench in he Ba le o
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 157

F iedland (nea oday’s Kalining ad). Al hough Alexande had al eady s ymied plans o a
a - eaching peace sys em in Eu ope based on enligh enmen hinking, a Tilsi he
p ima y objec was an honou able peace o Russia (Rey, 2012, p. 154, 181). Alexande
app ised Napoleon o he ac ha an alliance be ween F ance and Russia would
‘ensu e he happiness and anquili y o he wo ld’(quo ed in Ca endish, 2007). Napoleon
concu ed because he saw he oppo uni y o s abilise his dominan posi ion in cen al
Eu ope and isola e B i ain. The peace alks be ween he empe o s, amously conduc ed
on a a in he middle o he bounda y i e , led o a ea y in which Russia ag eed o
join he blockade aimed a des oying B i ain’s comme ce by closing i s po s o B i ish
ships and neu al ships engaged in B i ish ade. Alexande also pledged o wage wa
agains Sweden and o o ce i o join he con inen al sys em. Al hough Alexande was
elie ed abou he ou come o he summi , many Russians ega ded F ance and he alli-
ance wi h Napoleon wi h suspicion.
Indeed, he Tilsi T ea y soon became unpopula in Russia. Al hough Russia succeeded
in conque ing Finland om Sweden, domes ic p essu e g ew because o ade es ic ions
and he esul ing economic losses. Two yea s a e he ea y, Alexande opened Russian
po s o neu al ships, as he s a ed o belie e ha no ea y wi h Napoleon would las . This
led Napoleon o decla e wa agains Russia and in ade i in June 1812 –agains he ad ice
o his gene als. The es is his o y.
Al hough he Tilsi peace ea y was iewed as being an amoun o eason a he ime,
i is much mo e posi i ely assessed in con empo a y Russia. Fo example, Russian
Academy o Sciences his o ian S. N. Iskyul (2015) w o e ha Alexande I ne e wan ed
peace wi h F ance bu signed he Tilsi ea ies only o ga he s eng h o a new wa .
The adi ional iew ha he Con inen al Blockade caused an economic c isis o Russia
has also been challenged ecen ly (Tchoudino , 2015).
A e Napoleon was de ea ed, Russia –o a he Alexande I –became he d i ing o ce
in nego ia ing and c ea ing a new Eu opean secu i y o de a he Cong ess o Vienna. His
in en ions a e o en depic ed as admi able in Russian his o iog aphy: ‘He wished ha all
men could help each o he like b o he s, assis ing one ano he in hei mu ual needs,
and ha ee comme ce could be he unde lying bond o socie y’, bu i was also said
ha he ‘lacked he necessa y con ic ion and de e mina ion’(Zamoyski, 2008). Despi e
some libe al p inciples, he aim was conse a i e, namely o es o e peace and es ablish
a balance-o -powe sys em in Eu ope, o p e en F ance om ising o a dominan posi ion
again, o con ain na ionalism and o manage eme ging c ises in conce wi h he o he
Eu opean powe s (see, e.g. Kissinge , 1957; Kime ling Wi scha e , 2015; Mi zen, 2013).
Mo eo e , he cong ess discussed alues based on he Ch is ian ai h, which we e close
o he hea o he Russian Tsa . Alexande ’s ini ia i es led o he es ablishmen o he
Holy Alliance, a mul ila e al ea y be ween he leade s o Russia, P ussia, and Aus ia.
The Conce o Eu ope, by con as , was a less ideologically d i en alliance o he g ea
powe s –Aus ia, P ussia, Russia, he Uni ed Kingdom as well as F ance –which ocused
on in e na ional con e ence diplomacy o manage eme ging c ises.
I is li le wonde ha he Cong ess o Vienna and he Eu opean g ea -powe conce is
e y o en seen as he epi ome o a unc ioning Eu opean secu i y sys em in Russia. As
Fo eign Minis e Se gei La o (2016) pu i , ‘Russia became a sa iou o he in e na ional
sys em’a he Vienna cong ess, he o ma ion o which ‘led o de elopmen o he con i-
nen wi hou se ious mili a y conflic s o 40 yea s.’Se gey Ka agano (2015), one o he
158 T. FORSBERG
leading o eign-policy pundi s in Russia, has ele a ed he Vienna sys em as some hing
wo h emula ing. He s esses ha he main eason why he Cong ess o Vienna wo ked
was ha he pos wa a angemen was ela i ely ai and did no humilia e F ance in
de ea . Ano he p ominen expe , Fyodo Lukyano (2014), nos algically belie es ha
he nine een h-cen u y conce sys em bea s some hing o a esemblance o he los
ci y o A lan is. Fo him, he Uk aine c isis is ‘indica i e ha wha is needed is p ecisely
a genuine p o essional diplomacy in he spi i o he nine een h cen u y, a diplomacy
ha is amilia om ex books bu whose ac ual p ac ice has been i ually o go en.’
In hese in e p e a ions o his o y, oo much weigh may be gi en o he impo ance o
he Cong ess o Vienna, howe e . A e all, he se lemen was ‘less ca ed in s one han
migh seem he case’(Vick, 2014, p. 333). Mo eo e , he cong ess sys em ailed because
memo ies o he wa aded and na ional i al ies as well as he o ces o na ionalism
and libe alism s a ed o g ow. The cong ess a emp ed o se up ins i u ional coope a ion
bu was based on ambigui ies, and he ins i u ional s uc u e was flimsy. I was ollowed by
a mo e in o mal conce sys em ha did no aspi e o be a go e ning body (Ja e , 2014,
pp. 363–369). Undeniably, he cong ess sys em was success ul in managing many c ises
and p e en ing a majo wa be ween he g ea powe s. On he o he hand, i legi imised
mili a y measu es agains o he wise peace ul na ionalis up isings. Hence, he ack eco d
o he cong ess sys em is mo e mixed and no he unmi iga ed success s o y ha many
Russians poli icians and pundi s make i ou o be.
The C imean Wa (1853–56), pi ing an alliance o he O oman Empi e, F ance, B i ain
and Sa dinia agains Russia, was he fi s majo conflic in Eu ope a e he Napoleonic
Wa s. F om he Russian pe spec i e, s ill o en exp essed oday, he o he powe s
wan ed o weaken Russia and p e en i om expanding o he Eas and Sou h. In
Russia, he wa is also seen as an ou come o a clash o ci ilisa ions because Russia’s
igh o p o ec he O hodox Ch is ians in he O oman Empi e was a s ake (Vakulo a,
2016). Russian his o ians hold ha he Pa is Peace T ea y ha ended he wa des oyed
he Vienna sys em, c ea ed an imbalance in Eu ope and gene a ed oppo uni ies o
unp edic able poli ical imp o isa ion, which ul ima ely led o WWI (Sido o , 2016). The
e ms o he peace a e he C imean Wa we e ha sh, bu Russia was capable o nego ia -
ing some subs an ial changes in o de o ‘sa e he digni y o he coun y’(Tempe ley,
1932, p. 401). The Wes was no unified: F ance was hoping o app ochemen wi h
Russia whe eas ‘B i ain demons a ed he immu able enmi y o Russia’(Baumga , 1981,
p. 203). Al hough he wa is o en seen by Wes e n his o ians as a use ul igge o Alex-
ande II’s mode nisa ion effo s in Russia, con empo a y Russian his o ians seldom empha-
sise Russia’s weakness. Qui e he opposi e, he wa is seen no as a de ea bu as a mo al
and eligious ic o y in a conflic ha was ough o a jus and honou able cause agains
he Wes (Figes, 2010, p. 492). Mo eo e , pa allels be ween he pos -C imean Wa con ex
and he pos -Cold Wa se ing a e o en acknowledged. Fo eign minis e s P imako ,
I ano and La o ha e all ega ded Go chako as a sou ce o inspi a ion and a es o e
o Russian g ea -powe s a us by conduc ing a flexible o eign policy (Glasse , 2013; Splids-
boel-Hansen, 2002). I is also wo h no ing he e ha Go chako ecognised wide in e es s.
In ac , Russia was in he o e on o de eloping humani a ian law a he ime, o example
ini ia ing he Sain Pe e sbu g Decla a ion o 1868 enouncing he use o explosi e bulle s
and la e in e na ional peace con e ences conce ning disa mamen , he laws o wa and
he peace ul se lemen o dispu es (Mul a uli, 2017).
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 159
Russia was no pa o he Ve sailles Peace T ea y which ended he Fi s Wo ld Wa in
1919, al hough ‘ he Russian ques ion’was pa o he discussions (Kennan, 1960/61). Lenin
(1920) s ongly condemned he ea y, no so much because Russian in e es s we e
igno ed, bu because ‘Ge many canno exis om he economic s andpoin ollowing
he Peace o Ve sailles’ ha was imposed upon i . Al hough he goal o he Bolshe iks
was wo ld e olu ion, he So ie Union subsequen ly became a champion o a collec i e
secu i y sys em in Eu ope (Haslam, 1984). The mos amous figu e ad oca ing a ea y
sys em gea ed owa ds he peace ul esolu ion o conflic s and disa mamen was he dip-
loma and subsequen o eign minis e , Maxim Li ino , who was ins umen al in making
he So ie Union a pa y o he Kellogg-B iand Pac o 1928. The sys em, howe e , p o ed
weak when Ge man agg ession g ew. S ill, om he Russian poin o iew, as La o (2016)
has a gued, he policies o G ea B i ain and F ance we e sho -sigh ed and an i-Russian, so
hey oo should be blamed.The ac ha Russia was no a pa y o he Ve sailles Peace
T ea y is seen as ano he sho coming (U kin, 2009). F om he pe spec i e o he
p esen -day discussion in Russia, he lessons o be lea n om Ve sailles in 1919 a e
ha he de ea ed should no be ea ed oo ha shly, and ha Russia should no be
excluded om he nego ia ing able.
The secu i y sys em c ea ed a e he Second Wo ld Wa is ano he much-discussed his-
o ical p eceden . The Cong ess o Yal a in Feb ua y 1945 is he amous poin o e e ence
he e –‘one o he mos powe ul in Russian his o iog aphy’(Sakwa, 2016, p. 13). Hos ed by
Joseph S alin, he wo o he pa icipan s we e US P esiden F anklin D. Roose el and
B i ish P ime Minis e Wins on Chu chill. The pu pose was o discuss wha shape he Eu o-
pean secu i y sys em should ake, bu he ocus was eally on he a e o Ge many a he
han ha o Eas e n Eu ope. Mo eo e , he So ie Union p omised o join he wa agains
Japan in he Pacific hea e, which was he main goal o he Uni ed S a es. Indeed, i is a
equen misconcep ion ha he pa ies aimed o di ide Eu ope in o sphe es o influence.
Tha did no happen. The B i ish we e no willing o ag ee o g an ing S alin a ee hand
wi h ega d o Poland, al hough discussions on how powe would be sha ed in Eas e n
Eu ope had been held be ween he So ie s and he B i ish ea lie . While Chu chill had
al eady accep ed he Cu zon Line in p inciple, he s ill hoped ha he Polish exile go e n-
men in London would be somehow in ol ed in de e mining he u u e o Poland
(Ha bu , 2010, p. 286). S alin insis ed ha he bo de changes in eas e n Poland we e
non-nego iable and s essed ha he Polish go e nmen should be amicable owa ds
he So ie Union. He ne e heless p omised ha ee elec ions would be held in Poland
a e he wa . The p omise was no wo h much as he Red A my had al eady occupied
he coun y and much o Eas e n Eu ope (Mas ny, 1979). The ‘Yal a sys em’effec i ely
eme ged only a e he wa when he Wes e n allies ecognised he communis -led go -
e nmen s in he Eas e n Eu opean s a es.
The Yal a ag eemen duly appea ed o be a classic ade-offbe ween he pa ies. Ye
his o ians ha e deba ed how good he ade-offwas om he Wes e n poin o iew.
C i ics ha e poin ed ou ha he So ie s would likely ha e joined he wa agains Japan
in any case and, when hey did so, as ag eed a Yal a h ee mon hs a e he su ende
o Ge many, i was when he wa was al eady o e in p ac ice. Mo eo e , i he p omise
o ee elec ions was pa o he deal, i was a p omise ha was no kep . The e was,
howe e , he collec i e aim o showing uni y –‘a ha monious image o he mee ing –
hough o e y diffe en easons’: Roose el ’s easons we e mo e ideological and
160 T. FORSBERG
S alin’s mo e p agma ic (Ha bu , 2010, p. 286). Ye he mee ing was no de oid o sha ed
mo al p inciples: S alin ei e a ed ha he So ie Union had suffe ed mo e han he o he
allies as a esul o he wa , and should he e o e ha e a g ea e say in he peace nego-
ia ions, a sen imen wi h which he Wes e n leade s la gely concu ed.
The Yal a Con e ence is ega ded as a success by many Russians oday, as i c ea ed a
las ing peace. I he e is nos algia o Vienna, he e is a ce ain nos algia o Yal a, oo. Pu in
(2015) has ega ded Yal a as an exempla o building a coali ion o an i- e o is o ces in
oday’s wo ld in he same way as ‘ he coun ies ha de ea ed Nazism uni ed in hei effo s
o lay solid ounda ions o he pos -wa wo ld o de .’A Valdai 2014, Pu in (2014) said ha
‘i he e is a will, we can es o e he effec i eness o he in e na ional and egional ins i-
u ions sys em’. He con ended ha ,
we do no e en need o build any hing anew, om sc a ch; his is no a “g eenfield”, especially
since he ins i u ions c ea ed a e Wo ld Wa II a e qui e uni e sal and can be gi en mode n
subs ance, adequa e o manage he cu en si ua ion.
In a speech a he UN Gene al Assembly in 2015, Pu in (2015) a gued ha he UN mus be
consis en wi h he ‘na u al ans o ma ion’o he wo ld, bu conside ed a emp s o
unde mine he legi imacy o he Uni ed Na ions as ex emely dange ous. Fo La o
(2016), he Cold Wa sys em was no pe ec because i was based on i al y, al hough
i ne e heless gua an eed peace. In his iew, he secu i y o de based on he di ision
o sphe es o in e es be ween he blocks was sus ainable, bu as soon as he USSR col-
lapsed, chaos eme ged again in in e na ional poli ics.
To sum up, no clea pa e n o Russian hinking and policy ega ding he in e na ional
o de is appa en o he han he emphasis on i s own g ea -powe s a us. Howe e , s a -
egies and diploma ic s yles ha e a ied. Russia has displayed a mo e collec i e in e es in
e ms o ‘milieu goals’, as was he case a he Cong ess o Vienna, as well as mo e na owly
defined sel -in e es s in e ms o ‘possession goals’, as a Yal a. Hence, he deg ee o collec-
i e in e es does no di ec ly depend upon Russia’s ela i e powe posi ion since in bo h
cases Russia was nea he peak o i s ela i e powe in he in e na ional sys em. When
weak, Russia has some imes ocused on possession goals, as a e he C imean wa in
1856, bu i could also adop a wide ‘milieu’pe spec i e, o example when Go bache
was engaged in nego ia ing he e ms o he pos -Cold Wa o de , o which I will u n now.
4. The eme gence o he pos -cold wa secu i y o de in Eu ope and Russia
A he hea o con empo a y deba es abou a new secu i y o de in Eu ope is he simple
bu impo an ques ion: wha wen w ong wi h he pos -Cold Wa o de ? The e is a gene al
unde s anding ha he o de c ea ed a he end o he Cold Wa has no wo ked pe ec ly,
bu he e a e deep disag eemen s conce ning he oo s and key ac o s leading o his
ailu e, no o men ion how o emedy he si ua ion. Compe ing na a i es ha e been
c ea ed and ec ea ed (Zellne , 2017). His o ians a e s ill ge ing up o speed on his e a,
pa ly because mos o he key a chi es a e s ill closed (and in e ne sou ces a e sca ce).
Reasons o e isi ing he e a, pa icula ly he yea s 1990–94 be o e he fi s ound o
NATO enla gemen , a e he e o e abundan .
F om he Russian pe spec i e, he immedia e pos -Cold Wa yea s ep esen an e a o
weakness ha he Wes e n powe s exploi ed. The 1990s a e pain ed in nega i e e ms,
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 161
NATO, he main di iding line in Eu ope was no be ween Russia and he Wes bu be ween
he US and F ance. Wes e n pe cep ions o Russia we e ambi alen : while some o i s
ac ions we e c i icised, i s many ope a ions in he p i ileged sphe e o in e es in he
a ea o he o me So ie Union o he han he Bal ic s a es we e a leas ole a ed i
no endo sed.
Hence, he lesson o his o y is ha one should be cau ious abou d awing any conclus-
i e lessons om he pas . Al hough his o ical my hs may be conduci e o coope a ion as
well as conflic , i is clea ha iews o Russian wo ld o de policy ha a e based on some
anshis o ical law-like d i ing o ces a e exagge a ed and neglec he poli ical con ex and
he iews and belie s o he cu en leade ship. Mo eo e , seeing he oo causes o he
ongoing con on a ion be ween Russia and he Wes in some his o ical de elopmen s
and e en s in he ela i ely dis an pas is unpe suasi e and po en ially coun e p oduc i e,
as i shi s a en ion away om hose p oblems ha can be add essed he e and now.
Acknowledgemen s
Au ho would like o hank Elena Go bache a o esea ch assis ance and he edi o s, Elias Gö z and
Camille Me len o his special issue as well as he e iewe s o hei help ul commen s.
Funding
This esea ch was pa ially ca ied ou a Uni e si y o Tampe e and suppo ed by he Academy o
Finland [G an no. 298883] o he p ojec “Cul u al S a ec a in In e na ional Rela ions: The Case
o Russia”.
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