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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
CHAPTER 12
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he
Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
TAPIO RAUNIO
Takeaways o Leading Change
Compa ing h ee semi-p esiden ial egimes, he main a gumen o his
chap e is ha ins i u ional design has a s ong independen e ec on
leade ship. D awing on o icial documen s and in e iew da a wi h op-le el
ci il se an s and poli icians, i unde lines he impo ance o coo dina ion
mechanisms be ween he p esiden and he p ime minis e . Such
ins i u ional a angemen s acili a e e ec i e policy-making and mi iga e
ensions be ween he wo execu i es. Re lec ing i s mo e s able and egula ed
poli ical sys em, Finland s ands ou wi h i s s ongly ins i u ionalised
coo dina ion mechanisms and low le el o in a-execu i e con lic . In
Li huania and Romania, on he o he hand, each new p esiden b ings he
own s a , pe sonali y and leade ship s yle o he equa ion, wi h Romanian
poli ics in pa icula cha ac e ised by high le els o ension be ween he
p esiden and he p ime minis e . The Li huanian and Romanian cases
indica e ha absen o w i en ules o o he wise s ong no ms guiding
in a-execu i e coo dina ion, p esiden s enjoy mo e disc e ion in designing
hei own modes o ope a ion. Unde such ci cums ances p esiden s a e
mo e likely o use al e na i e channels o in luence, such as public c i icism
o he cabine o di ec con ac s wi h poli ical pa ies, he legisla u e, o
ci il socie y s akeholde s, and o in e ene in ques ions alling unde he
compe ence o he go e nmen . This unde mines cohe en leade ship and
can e en ha e se ious consequences o egime s abili y, no leas in he
pe sonali y-cen ed poli ics commonly ound in Cen al and Eas Eu opean
coun ies and o he mo e agile democ acies.
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
S
emi-p esiden ialism deno es a poli ical sys em whe e a di ec ly-
elec ed p esiden sha es execu i e powe wi h a p ime minis e (PM).
Impo an ly, semi-p esiden ialism, which is he mos common egime
ype in Eu ope, seems mo e p one o con lic s han pa liamen a ism o
p esiden ialism. To be mo e speci ic, i is unique in he sense ha con lic s
can a ise wi hin he execu i e b anch, be ween he p esiden and he PM
and he go e nmen . Such con lic s can be pa icula ly damaging in e ms
o cohe en leade ship and policy-making. La gely in luenced by Shuga
and Ca ey (1992), s udies ha e es ablished ha con lic be ween he wo
execu i es is o be expec ed unde wo ypes o
semi-p esiden ialism – in p emie -p esiden ial
egimes (whe e he cabine can only be
dismissed by he pa liamen ) and p esiden -
pa liamen a y egimes (whe e bo h he
p esiden and he pa liamen ha e he o mal
powe o dismiss he cabine ). In a-execu i e
con lic is associa ed wi h nega i e ou comes
such as cabine ins abili y (Sedelius & Ekman,
2010) and dis up i e policy-making (Laza deux,
2015). Resea ch has u he mo e es ablished
ha con lic is mo e likely unde cohabi a ion,
de ined as a si ua ion whe e he p esiden and
he PM ep esen di e en poli ical pa ies
o ideological blocs (P o syk, 2005; 2006;
Sedelius & Mash ale , 2013; Elgie, 2018).
A la gely neglec ed a iable in he compa a i e li e a u e on in a-
execu i e con lic , howe e , is he ins i u ional ins umen s o coo dina ing
policy and execu i e leade ship be ween he p esiden and he cabine .
In ac , we know e y li le abou he ex en o which coo dina ion
mechanisms be ween he wo execu i es a y among semi-p esiden ial
coun ies, and mo e impo an ly, how such a ia ion may in luence he
balance o powe be ween he wo chie execu i es. This chap e a gues ha
coo dina ion mechanisms be ween he p esiden and he p ime minis e
a e o c ucial impo ance in explaining p esiden ial ac i ism and in a-
execu i e con lic . To be clea , i is no expec ed ha such coo dina ion
This chap e a gues
ha coo dina ion
mechanisms be ween
he p esiden and he
p ime minis e a e o
c ucial impo ance in
explaining p esiden ial
ac i ism and in a-
execu i e con lic .
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
mechanisms a e necessa ily mo e impo an han key ins i u ional a iables
such as p esiden ial powe s, cohabi a ion, o elec o al and pa y sys em
dynamics. Bu his chap e a gues ha ypical in a-execu i e con lic s
o e policy, legisla ion and appoin men s may in ac be mani es a ions o
coo dina ion p oblems. Success ul leade ship in semi-p esiden ial egimes
equi es egula dialogue be ween he p esiden and he PM, pa icula ly
in policy a eas whe e hey sha e powe . Apa om acili a ing bene icial
ou comes, e ec i e coo dina ion mechanisms educe unce ain y so ha
he indi iduals a e awa e o and can an icipa e each o he ’s p e e ences
and beha iou . In line wi h ins i u ional heo y, ins i u ions can hus make
a di e ence in ha hey induce ac o s o he wise d i en by sel -in e es
owa ds a “p oblem-sol ing” mode cha ac e ised by coope a ion and sea ch
o mu ually bene icial solu ions (e.g., Scha p , 1989; No h, 1990). And in
line wi h he “logic o app op ia eness” (Ma ch & Olsen, 1989; 2006), s able
and epea ed coo dina ion should also o e ime s eng hen he socialisa ion
e ec s o ins i u ions whe eby bo h execu i es, hei o ices, and o he
s akeholde s become accus omed o ce ain “ways o doing hings” and
pe cei e egula coo dina ion as he app op ia e cou se o ac ion.
Examining semi-p esiden ialism and in a-execu i e coo dina ion is
hus ul ima ely esea ch abou leade ship. S uden s o poli ical leade ship
no mally emphasise ha he leade s o poli ical egimes should p o ide
clea and su icien ly dynamic leade ship, especially du ing mo e u bulen
imes. Communica ion plays an impo an ole in mode n leade ship, wi h
leade s expec ed o jus i y hei posi ions and in o m he elec o a e h ough
a a ie y o channels (Helms, 2012; Rhodes & ‘ Ha , 2014; Elgie, 2018).
Hence he chap e con ibu es o his edi ed olume h ough examining
poli ical leade ship as exe cised by p esiden s in h ee Eu opean coun ies.
The compa a i e dimension enables us o d aw lessons abou bo h he
causes and consequences o p esiden ial beha iou and which ins i u ional
mechanisms acili a e s able leade ship.
The selec ed cases a e h ee p emie -p esiden ial coun ies: Finland,
Li huania and Romania. While he h ee coun ies ha e a he simila
cons i u ional designs, hey a he same ime ep esen a ia ion ega ding
p esiden ial powe s, le el o in a-execu i e con lic , and poli ical con ex .
Finland is a long es ablished democ acy wi h a highly ins i u ionalised
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
poli ical sys em, whe e a ecen cons i u ional e o m esul ed in a
signi ican weakening o i s his o ically s ong p esidency. Li huania, on he
con a y, is a young democ acy wi h a la gely pe sonalised poli ical cul u e
bu has gene ally unc ioned wi h ew ins ances o se e e in a-execu i e
con lic . Romania, inally, has aced mo e se e e ansi ional di icul ies
and has s uggled wi h dis up i e policy-making, widesp ead co up ion
and se e al ins ances o in ense con lic be ween he p esiden and he
go e nmen . The cons i u ional powe s o he p esiden a e somewha
s onge in Li huania and Romania han in Finland.
Asking “do ins i u ions ma e ”, his s udy will dig deepe in o ins i u ional
design a he le el o p ac ices, ou ines and coo dina ion ins umen s be ween
he execu i es, ha is, a a le el whe e compa a i e esea ch is cu en ly
lacking on sys ema ic and empi ical knowledge. By u ilising in e iew da a
wi h key ci il se an s and poli icians, and o icial documen s, i is able
o each “behind he scenes” o explo e he impo ance o coo dina ion
mechanisms and how hey a e associa ed wi h p esiden ial ac i ism and
in a-execu i e con lic . The nex pa se s he heo e ical amewo k by
add essing he incen i es and disincen i es o con lic and coope a ion
be ween he p esiden and he PM and by iden i ying coo dina ion
ins umen s ele an o he in e ac ion be ween he wo execu i es. The
subsequen sec ion p esen s case selec ion and da a. The empi ical analysis
is s uc u ed a ound he p esence o absence o coo dina ion mechanisms
iden i ied in he heo e ical sec ion. The concluding discussion summa ises
and discusses b ie ly he implica ions o he indings.
Theo e ical F amewo k: (Dis)incen i es o
Coope a ion and Coo dina ion Mechanisms
Semi-p esiden ial egimes encompass as di e ences on he p ecise
ela ionship be ween he cabine and he p esiden , also wi hin he ca ego y
o p emie -p esiden ial coun ies. The e a e coun ies whe e he p esiden
is me ely a ce emonial head o s a e and he PM con ols he policy-making
p ocess. Finland’s 2000 cons i u ion, o example, p o ides he p esiden
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
wi h o mal p e oga i es, pa icula ly h ough co-leade ship o o eign
policy, ha a e jus abo e hose o a ce emonial igu ehead. A po en ial
isk wi h his model, howe e , is ha a weak and ma ginalised, ye di ec ly-
elec ed, p esiden can seek o compensa e his o he limi ed powe s wi h
ob usi e beha iou , especially i he p esiden ’s popula i y ou weighs
his o he o mal powe s. The li e a u e on semi-p esiden ialism is ull o
examples o such beha iou . When he go e nmen is clea ly dominan , also
he PM can eel no need o coo dina ion beyond pe haps he p esiden ’s
o ice ecei ing in o ma ion abou go e nmen al decisions and policies.
In gene al, he p esiden and he PM should hus ha e s onge incen i es
o seek coope a ion whe e he e is a mo e balanced dis ibu ion o powe
be ween he go e nmen and he p esiden and i he wo execu i es
sha e powe s in pa icula policy a eas. Unde such powe -sha ing he e
a e simply mo e issues subjec o join decision-making and hus also o
in a-execu i e coo dina ion. To be su e, he e a e also mo e possibili ies
o disag eemen and con lic , which aise he need o egula and well-
de ined coo dina ion in o de o acili a e success ul policy-making. The
la e applies especially o o eign and secu i y policies, including Eu opean
Union (EU) a ai s, issue a eas whe e i is o en emphasised ha disuni y
a home should no unde mine success ab oad.
Rega dless o he exac powe s o p esiden s, p esiden ial ac i ism ends
o be highe when he coun y is expe iencing poli ical u bulence, wi h low
le el o socie al consensus o weak go e nmen s (e.g., Ta i s, 2009). These
conside a ions a e pa icula ly ele an o he younge democ acies such
as in Cen al and Eas e n Eu ope, whe e su eys show high le els o public
us in he p esiden s bu ou igh dis us in o he poli ical ac o s such as
he PM and he pa ies. The p esiden s’ g ea e popula i y may be a ibu ed
o hei limi ed powe s. They ha e p ojec ed hemsel es o be abo e pa y
poli ics, being somewha ele a ed om he usual poli ical qua els. P ime
minis e s, on he con a y, expe ience he dilemma o exe cising hei
powe in a eas o con o e sy, such as social and economic policies, he eby
u he e oding hei popula suppo . Hence, p esiden s a e no mally
cons i u ionally assigned o s and abo e pa y poli ics. The pa adox,
howe e , is ha p esiden s may eel ha hei popula i y does no ansla e
in o poli ical in luence. When seeking ways o con e ing hei pe cei ed

228
Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
p es ige in o ac ual powe , hey can publicly c i icise he go e nmen by
leaning on he popula manda e. Weak p esiden s hus seek o compensa e
hei limi ed cons i u ional powe s wi h mo e indi ec channels o in luence
o ob usi e beha iou . And, as s a ed in he in oduc o y sec ion, ensions
be ween he wo execu i es a e mo e likely unde cohabi a ion.
Ha ing discussed b ie ly he (dis)incen i es o coo dina ion be ween
he p esiden and he PM and he con ex ual ac o s in luencing in a-
execu i e coope a ion, Figu e 1 summa ises he basic heo e ical a gumen .
I unde s ands coope a ion mechanisms as in e ening a iables posi ioned
be ween key explana o y ac o s de i ed om p e ious li e a u e on semi-
p esiden ialism ( he dis ibu ion o powe be ween he p esiden and
he cabine , he ole o pa y poli ics, and he socie al con ex ) and he
ou come – which is he le el o p esiden ial ac i ism ha in luences in a-
execu i e con lic and he eby also leade ship capaci y o pe o mance.
The mo e egula and ins i u ionalised he coo dina ion mechanisms a e,
he s onge hei e ec should be.
I is a gued he e ha coo dina ion mechanisms can make a genuine
di e ence: indi idual o ice-holde s a e cons ained by hem, especially
when he mechanisms ha e become mo e en enched and ecognised
as legi ima e by he ac o s in ol ed. In con as , when coo dina ion
ins umen s do no exis o a e weak, hen bo h execu i es ha e mo e
eedom o manoeu e. Absen o a wo king cons i u ional di ision o labo
and egula coo dina ion, pa icula ly he p esiden s a e mo e likely o use
al e na i e channels o in luence – such as he s a egy o “going public”
o di ec con ac s wi h poli ical pa ies, he legisla u e, o ci il socie y
Le el o p esiden ial
ac i ism, in a-execu i e
con lic , leade ship
capaci y
Coo dina ion
mechanisms
Key a iables:
e.g. dis ibu ion o
powe , pa y poli ics,
pa liamen a y majo i y,
socie al con ex
FIGURE 1. Coo dina ion mechanisms and in a-execu i e con lic
229
Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
s akeholde s – and o in e ene in ques ions alling unde he compe ence
o he go e nmen . Fu he mo e, ad hoc p ac ices a e likely o a ou he
side ha , ei he because o cons i u ional di ision o powe o h ough
con ex ual ac o s, enjoys agenda-se ing powe s and can hus choose o
a leas s ongly in luence he le els and o ms o coo dina ion.
Bu how o de ine coo dina ion mechanisms? Th ee le els o coo dina ion
a e iden i ied – bila e al (be ween he p esiden he PM), collec i e
(be ween he p esiden and he go e nmen ), and adminis a i e (be ween
he o ices o he p esiden and he p ime minis e and he minis ies)
– whils also di e en ia ing among policy a eas. The coo dina ion
ins umen s a e in oduced one-by-one, iden i ying also hei p edic ed
oles in in a-execu i e coo dina ion (Figu e 2).
Bila e al mee ings be ween he p esiden and p ime minis e . Pa icula
impo ance is assigned o con iden ial exchanges be ween he wo leade s
ha o m he co e o in a-execu i e coo dina ion – hence his ca ego y o
Minis e ial
commi ees
Bila e al
mee ings
Na ional secu i y,
o eign policy o EU
a ai s councils
Adminis a i e
coo dina ion
FIGURE 2. Coo dina ion mechanisms be ween he p esiden and he cabine
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
coo dina ion mechanisms is placed a he cen e o he py amid in Figu e 2.
Regula alks be ween he p esiden and he PM enable hem o lea n abou
each o he ’s p e e ences, nego ia ion s yles, and pe sonali ies. Such ace-
o- ace con ac s should ideally ake place be o e he p esiden mee s he
whole go e nmen o be o e ei he side mee s o eign leade s o a ends
in e na ional o EU mee ings. In his way, po en ially sensi i e issues can be
discussed in p i a e and e en i no comp omise is ound, bo h leade s can
ag ee on how o p oceed wi h hese ma e s. Howe e , i is unlikely ha laws
would egula e such bila e al mee ings. Hence, hey can also be pa icula ly
ulne able o b eak down a e he elec ion o new o ice-holde s.
Minis e ial commi ees o join councils be ween he p esiden and he
go e nmen . As he li e a u e on coali ion go e nmen s shows, minis e ial
commi ees pe o m an impo an unc ion in bo h cabine decision-
making and as a con lic - esolu ion mechanism (Mülle & S øm, 2000;
S øm, Mülle , & Be gman, 2008). These minis e ial commi ees usually
b ing oge he a sub-se o minis e s om all coali ion pa ies and hey
deal wi h speci ic issue a eas such as economic policy o Eu opean policy.
The powe s and composi ion o he minis e ial commi ees a e ypically
egula ed by laws o e en by cons i u ions, wi h mo e de ailed ules ound
in he go e nmen ’s ules o p ocedu e. In policy a eas whe e he p esiden
sha es powe wi h he go e nmen , mainly in o eign and secu i y policy,
such minis e ial commi ees would enable bo h sides o keep ack o
de elopmen s and o exchange ideas be o e he o mal decision-making
s age. Va ious join councils would on a e age ha e a mo e in o mal s a us
and b ing oge he he p esiden and minis e s o discuss speci ic socie al
issues such as educa ion o economy. They could also ake he o m o
pe iodic mee ings be ween he whole go e nmen and he p esiden ha
would ocus pe haps mainly on opical issues.
Na ional secu i y, o eign policy, o EU a ai s councils. Ex e nal ela ions
we e iden i ied as a policy a ea whe e di ec ly-elec ed p esiden s no only
ha e cons i u ional powe s bu whe e coun ies a e expec ed o ac wi h one
oice. This applies pa icula ly o secu i y and de ense policies, issue a eas
ha a e highly salien and whe e domes ic consensus is app ecia ed (e.g.
Raunio & Wagne , 2017). Na ional secu i y councils o equi alen s o en ha e
a cen al ole in de ining and planning he coun ies’ secu i y and mili a y
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
s a egies. They can simul aneously acili a e in a-execu i e coo dina ion,
bu who chai s such bodies can be a delica e ques ion. Na u ally, minis e ial
commi ees can also be es ablished o examine o eign and secu i y policy
and indeed Eu opean ma e s. EU a ai s pose pa icula challenges o
coo dina ion, especially as he de elopmen o he EU’s Common Fo eign
and Secu i y Policy (CFSP) means ha na ional o eign and secu i y policies
– a eas whe e p esiden s enjoy cons i u ional powe s – a e inc easingly
linked o Eu opean le el policy p ocesses (Raunio, 2012). Hence, whe he
he p esiden is in ol ed in o excluded om he na ional EU coo dina ion
sys em can ha e b oade implica ions o leade ship in o eign a ai s.
Coo dina ion be ween ci il se an s o he o ices o he p ime minis e and
he p esiden . Mo ing o he adminis a i e le el, he in e ac ion be ween
he espec i e o ices o he p esiden and he PM can play an impo an
ole, especially ega ding in o ma ion exchange. Compa a i e li e a u e
sugges s ha he ole o op-le el adminis a i e eli es has become mo e
impo an o e he decades. Poli ical leade s ha e ypically wo ca ego ies
o s a wo king o hem: ci il se an s ha wo k o he s a e and poli ical
s a ha come and go wi h indi idual o ice-holde s. The s a a he p ime
minis e ’s o ice o e sees and coo dina es ac i i ies in he minis ies and
pe haps also public sec o agencies while handling cen al go e nmen al
communica ion. Pa icula ly he poli ical s a p o ides policy ad ice o he
PM o he p esiden , including in o eign and secu i y policy, and can be key
playe s in sol ing dispu es be ween di e en b anches o go e nmen (e.g.
Mi chell, 2005; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2014; Yong & Hazell, 2014; Ghe ghina &
Kopecký, 2016; Ma land, Lewis, & Flanagan, 2017).
Regula coo dina ion and exchange o in o ma ion be ween he s a s o
he p ime minis e and he p esiden should acili a e success ul coope a ion
be ween he wo execu i es. Howe e , he size and esponsibili ies o
he p esiden ’s s a can also be impo an a iables. The budge o he
p esiden ’s o ice is no mally de e mined by he annual na ional budge ,
and in semi-p esiden ial coun ies, he o al numbe o s a wo king o
he p esiden ends o be qui e small. P esiden s can compensa e his wi h
ec ui ing pe sonnel ha ocus on speci ic policy a eas, including hose
alling in he compe ence o he go e nmen . Fo example, a policy ad ise
in economy can p o ide c ucial in o ma ion o he p esiden and can
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Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
pa icipa ed in he majo i y o he Eu opean Council mee ings oge he
wi h he PM, i was decided by he go e nmen ha he PM would be
ep esen ing Finland. Acco ding o a cons i u ional amendmen om
2012 “The P ime Minis e ep esen s Finland on he Eu opean Council.
Unless he Go e nmen excep ionally decides o he wise, he P ime
Minis e also ep esen s Finland in o he ac i i ies o he Eu opean
Union equi ing he pa icipa ion o he highes le el o S a e” ( o mo e
discussion, see Raunio, 2012).
In Li huania, he cons i u ion, seconda y laws, o he ules abou
domes ic EU coo dina ion do no de ail who should ep esen he
coun y in he Eu opean Council. P esiden Adamkus pa icipa ed in
hose Eu opean Councils which ea u ed o eign and secu i y policy while
he PM co e ed o he ma e s. O en bo h execu i es would a end he
summi s. G ybauskai ė in u n pa icipa es in he Eu opean Council, e en
hough cons i u ional p o isions abou di ision o labo clea ly sugges
ha he PM should ep esen Li huania. O e all, he in luence appea s
qui e s ong in EU and economic a ai s, pa ly because G ybauskai é
had se ed p e iously as he inance minis e and as he Commissione
o Financial P og amming and he Budge . Acco ding o one in e iew
he p ime minis e s did no con es his a angemen : “The leade which
enjoys public suppo can easily do such hings ad hoc, he e o e i was
possible o es ablish ce ain p ac ices wi hou any legal documen s – jus
like wi h a endance o he mee ings o he Eu opean Council.” The lack o
con es a ion was aided by he weakness o he go e nmen as PM And ius
Kubilius needed p esiden ial suppo o he aus e i y measu es (Raunio &
Sedelius, 2017). In Romania i is also he p esiden ha a ends he summi s
o he Eu opean Council, wi h he PM only a elling o he mee ings upon
delega ion by he p esiden . Following a majo con lic be ween PM Vic o
Pon a and P esiden Băsescu in 2012, he Cons i u ional Cou con i med
ha he p esiden ep esen s Romania in he Eu opean Council.
O e all, ad hoc p ac ices acili a e p esiden ial in luence. Li huanian
and Romanian p esiden s also ha e he powe o ini ia i e ega ding
coope a ion, wi h o ms and le els o in a-execu i e coo dina ion
essen ially always de e mined by he p esiden . Fo example, while join
councils o minis e ial commi ees migh acili a e be e coo dina ion,

239
Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
p esiden s do no need such bodies. As one in e iewee om Li huania
pu i : “P esiden s ha ha e enough powe s do no c ea e such councils,
hey do no need such kind o ins i u ions, hey jus a ange ad hoc mee ings
despi e he ac ha i is no o eseen in any law.” Coo dina ion is clea ly
mos ins i u ionalised in o eign and secu i y policy, including be ween
o eign minis ies and he p esiden ’s o ice. Li huania and Romania
u ilise speci ic na ional secu i y councils whe eas Finland has a minis e ial
commi ee on secu i y policy. Such bodies acili a e con iden ial exchange
o in o ma ion be ween he wo execu i es, and he in e iews in gene al
con i m ha e en when he p esiden and he PM disag ee abou domes ic
ma e s, pa icula a en ion is paid o ensu ing ha he coun ies speak
wi h one oice in in e na ional nego ia ions.4
The esul s also p o ide e idence o conside able s abili y as ini ially
adop ed p ac ices ha e become he s anda d o app op ia e cou se o
ac ion. Re lec ing i s mo e s able and egula ed poli ical sys em, Finland
s ands ou wi h i s s ongly ins i u ionalised coo dina ion mechanisms.
In Li huania and Romania, on he o he hand, each new p esiden b ings
he own s a , pe sonali y and leade ship s yle o he equa ion. When
bo h coun ies adop ed semi-p esiden ial cons i u ions, i was o a ious
easons no pe cei ed impo an o legi ima e o es ablish coo dina ion
mechanisms be ween he execu i es. And as he analysis sugges s,
p esiden s may well bene i om such absence o egula coope a ion.
Discussion
This chap e has con ibu ed o he li e a u e on semi-p esiden ialism
and poli ical leade ship h ough paying a en ion o coo dina ion
mechanisms be ween he p esiden and he go e nmen . The esul s may
no be al oge he su p ising bu hey a e logical: he mo e ins i u ionalised
4 Howe e , clashes o e secu i y policy can s ill occu . In 2006 he Romanian PM Ta iceanu
announced publicly ha Romanian oops would wi hd aw om A ghanis an. P esiden
Băsescu disag eed and CSAT did no ollow Ta iceanu’s ecommenda ion. As a esul , he
go e nmen had o comply wi h he decision o CSAT (Ghe ghina & Miscoiu, 2013).
240
Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
and egula coope a ion be ween he wo execu i es is, he less we ind
p esiden ial ac i ism and he eby also in a-execu i e con lic . The absence
o coo dina ion in u n p oduces mo e ensions and opens he doo o
p esiden ial ac i ism, no leas h ough public c i icism o he cabine and
di ec con ac s o poli ical pa ies, he s a e adminis a ion, he legisla u e,
and ci il socie y ac o s.
A he same ime one mus exe cise cau ion when d awing lessons
om his s udy. I compa ed one s able democ acy (Finland) wi h wo
younge , less ins i u ionalised poli ical egimes (Li huania and Romania).
Fu he mo e, one canno exac ly measu e he impo ance o coo dina ion
mechanisms. Fo example, he ansi ion o democ acy and he b oade
mode nisa ion o he socie y ha e p o en di icul in Romania, wi h poo
cons i u ional design con ibu ing o he high le el o in a-execu i e
con lic s (Ghe gina, 2015; Elgie, 2018). Ye , one can ask whe he he
p esence o egula coo dina ion mechanisms could ha e p e en ed he wo
impeachmen s o P esiden Băsescu o he o e all asse i e p esiden ial
beha iou . Simila ly one can e lec on how much he ela i ely smoo h
in a-execu i e ela ions in Finland esul om he p esiden mee ing bo h
he PM and he whole go e nmen almos e e y week.
The chap e also highligh s he in e play be ween ins i u ional
mechanisms, poli ical cul u e, and pa y poli ics. The semi-p esiden ial
egimes in Cen al and Eas e n Eu ope a e in gene al cha ac e ised by
pe sonali y-cen ed poli ical cul u es coupled wi h low us in pa ies and
poli ical ins i u ions. This acili a es p esiden ial ac i ism i espec i e o
he pa y-poli ical con ex and makes i possible o indi idual p esiden s
o c ea e non-cons i u ional ins i u ions in hei own a ou . Bo h
Li huania and Romania ha e op ed no o es ablish egula in a-execu i e
coo dina ion mechanisms, and his s udy sugges s he need o explo e
whe he he lack o coo dina ion ins umen s and he obse ed beha iou al
pa e ns apply also o o he coun ies in he egion. Ins i u ionalised
coo dina ion mechanisms may make poli ics mo e bo ing h ough educing
public con on a ions be ween he wo execu i es, bu hey also acili a e
policy-making and cohe en poli ical leade ship, ou comes ha a e clea ly
ele an o all semi-p esiden ial coun ies.
241
Leading Change in a Complex Wo ld: T ansdisciplina y Pe spec i es
P esiden s, Ins i u ions, and he Ques o Cohe en Leade ship
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