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On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es
Heinämaa, Sa a
Heinämaa, S. (2017). On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian
Pe spec i es. In e na ional Jou nal o Philosophical S udies, 25(3), 393-406.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404
2017
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On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human
Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es
Sa a Heinämaa
To ci e his a icle: Sa a Heinämaa (2017) On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings:
Husse lian Pe spec i es, In e na ional Jou nal o Philosophical S udies, 25:3, 393-406, DOI:
10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404
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On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings:
Husse lian Pe spec i es
Sa a Heinämaa
depa men o social sciences and Philosophy, academy o inland, uni e si y o Jy äskylä,
Jy äskylä, inland
ABSTRACT
A he beginning o Being and Time, Heidegge ejec s Husse l’s classical
phenomenology on h ee g ounds: he claims ha Husse lian phenomenology is
impai ed by inde e mina e concep s, by naï e pe sonalism, and by obscu i ies in
i s accoun o indi idua ion. The pape s udies he alidi y o his ea ly c i ique by
explica ing Husse l’s discou se on human pe sons as bodily-spi i ual beings and by
cla i ying his accoun o he p inciples by which such beings can be indi idua ed.
The pape o e s h ee ypes o conside a ions. A e a summa y o Heidegge ’s
ea ly c i ique o Husse l, he second sec ion o he pape dis inguishes be ween
wo dimensions o Husse l’s discou se on human pe sons. I a gues ha Husse l
does no pu o wa d one analysis o he being o humans, bu explica es wo
di e en accoun s and hen s udies c i ically hei mu ual ela ions o dependency:
on he one hand, he na u alis ic accoun o human beings as laye ed beings and
on he o he hand he pe sonalis ic accoun o human beings as peculia kinds
o uni ied wholes in which he men al and he bodily a e inex icably in e wined.
The hi d sec ion o he pape cla i ies Husse l’s heo y o indi idua ion and i s
consequences o ou discou se on human pe sons. Finally, he ou h sec ion
explica es he concep ual means by which Husse l de elops his accoun o human
beings as pe sons. The pape ends in d awing some conclusions o con empo a y
philosophical an h opology.
KEYWORDS husse l; heidegge ; pe son; embodimen ; indi idua ion; exp essi e whole
1. In oduc ion
A he e y beginning o he i s pa o Being and Time, Heidegge dis in-
guishes his own Dasein-analy ic and he new phenomenological he meneu ics
ha i mo i a es om Husse l’s classical phenomenology which, in Heidegge ’s
eading, is domina ed by epis emological in e es s and misguided by aken-
o -g an ed concep s. Heidegge a acks classical phenomenology as a s ayed
o m o philosophical an h opology, hopelessly en angled wi h on ic inqui ies
CONTACT sa a heinämaa [email p o ec ed]
OPEN ACCESS
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394 S. HEINÄMAA
and wi h empi ical no ions o human li e. Thus, he a gues ha his o me
eache alls ic im o undamen al mis akes ha a e analogous o hose ha
s ain nine een h- and wen ie h-cen u y li e philosophies and all philosophical
‘pe sonalism’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 47/72).
The undamen al p oblem ha Heidegge iden i ies in his con empo a y phi-
losophy is he neglec o he ques ion ha conce ns he meaning o beingand
he c ucial and dis inc i e ole ha his ques ion plays in ou own exis ence.
We a e no jus one ype o being among o he ypes, bu mo e essen ially a e
beings who ques ion he sense o being (de Sinn on Sein) om wi hin unique
places and si ua ions in he wo ld and who ask in pa icula abou hei own
way o being, ha is,Da-sein. Fo Heidegge , he ealiza ion o ou dis inc-
i e ela ion o being mus se e as he anscenden al basis o philosophical
an h opology, as dis inc om all empi ical inqui ies in o human beings and
hei possessions, ma e ial and men al.
Heidegge acknowledges ha his con empo a y philosophies o li e and
pe sonhood in ol e implici endencies owa d posing he ques ion abou ou
human way o being, bu he a gues ha hese philosophies ne e unde ake his
ask p ope ly, since hey do no c i ically in es iga e he inhe i ed philosophical
e minology o pe sons, egos, souls and spi i s, bu ake hese e ms as gi en:
‘Thus we a e no being e minologically idiosync a ic when we a oid hese
e ms as well as he exp essions “li e” and “human being” in designa ing he
beings ha we ou sel es a e’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 46/71–72; c . GA20 124).
In his con ex , Heidegge claims ha his con empo a y philosophy, in
all i s a ia ions, is s ill se iously s ained and delimi ed by he in luences o
Hellenis ic philosophy and Ch is ian heology, and mos ecen ly by Ca esian
subjec i ism, pieced oge he om ancien and medie al concep s: ‘[w]ha
obs uc s and misleads he basic ques ion o he being o Da-sein is he o ien a-
ion ho oughly colo ed by he an h opology o Ch is iani y and ancien wo ld,
whose inadequa e on ological ounda ions also pe sonalism and he philosophy
o li e igno e’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48/73). In Heidegge ’s accoun , he a-
di ion o an h opology se iously bu dens and delimi s also Husse l’s classical
phenomenology: in a simila manne as i s philosophical con empo a ies and
p edecesso s, Husse l analyses he exis ence o human beings by concep s ha
ha e deep oo s in Ch is ian dogma and ancien philosophy, oo s ha al eady
cen u ies ago had los con ac wi h hei o iginal sou ces in conc e e phenom-
ena and li ing expe iences o human beings.
Bu how exac ly is his p oblem mani es ed in Husse l’s phenomenology?
Wha is he seeming sel -e idence ha classical phenomenology p esupposes,
despi e all i s adicalness and igou ?
The aim o his pape is o answe his ques ion by s udying he alidi y o
he c i ique ha Heidegge di ec s agains classical phenomenology and o ask
o wha ex en his p esen a ion o Husse l’s al e na i e app oach holds. Such a
compa a i e inqui y ad ances he de elopmen o con empo a y philosophical
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 395
an h opology by sepa a ing be ween wo in luen ial discou ses on human being
ha bo h a e ‘phenomenological’ in he gene al sense ha bo h desc ibe and
analyse condi ions o ou expe iencing. Howe e , ins ead o he simple opposi-
ion ha Heidegge ’s ea ly c i ique sugges s, we ind wo al e na i e app oaches
ha sha e he phenomenological- anscenden al in e es in cla i ying he con-
di ions o expe iencing bu di e on c ucial ma e s ha conce n ou expe i-
ences o human beings, ou sel es and o he s.
The pape o e s h ee ypes o conside a ions. A e a sho summa y o
Heidegge ’s ea ly c i ique o Husse l, he second sec ion o he pape dis in-
guishes be ween wo di e en dimensions o Husse l’s discou se on pe sons. I
a gues ha Husse l does no pu o wa d one analysis o he being o humans
bu explica es wo di e en accoun s and hen s udies c i ically hei mu ual
ela ions o dependency. So a he han a guing o any one concep ion o
human being, Husse l p o ides an explica ion o wo di e en concep ions:
on he one hand he na u alis ic accoun o human beings as laye ed beings,
and on he o he hand, he pe sonalis ic accoun o human beings as peculia
kinds o uni ied wholes in which he men al and he sensuous-bodily a e inex-
icably in e wined. The hi d sec ion o he pape cla i ies Husse l’s heo y
o indi idua ion and i s consequences o ou discou se on human pe sons.
Finally, he ou h sec ion explica es he concep ual means by which Husse l
de elops his accoun o human beings as pe sons. The pape ends in d awing
some conclusions o con empo a y philosophical an h opology.
2. Heidegge ’s C i ical Rema ks
Fo Heidegge , he main p oblem o classical phenomenology is ha i lea es
uncla i ied wha he pe o mance (Vollziehung) o ac s mean, how ac s a e
gi en and wha hei being is (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48–49/73–75; c . GA20
170–175/123–125). Mo e p ecisely, wha emains me ely p esumed is he way
in which pe o med ac s ela e o pe o ming subjec s, and how he subjec s a e
gi en o hemsel es. In he 1925 lec u es on he his o y o he concep o ime,
Heidegge acknowledges ha , while s udying he cons i u ion o ime-con-
sciousness, Husse l does p o ide explica ions o he s uc u es o he s eam
o li ed expe iencing and o he uni y o li e ha a e supposed o cons i u e
he con inuum o in en ional ac i i y and in en ional ac s, bu despi e his, his
c ucial objec ion emains: ‘Bu e en i he being o ac s and he uni y o he
expe ien ial s eam we e de e mined in hei being, he ques ion o he being
o he ull conc e e man would s ill emain’ (Heidegge GA20 173–174/125).1
In Heidegge ’ accoun , his undamen al inde e minacy o classical phe-
nomenology mani es s mos clea ly in i s ambiguous discou se on pe sons.
Fo Husse l, he con ends, he human pe son is essen ially a pe o me o ac s,
bu since he concep s o ac s emain inde e mina e, Husse l and his ollowe s
canno bu p oceed nega i ely and a gue ha he pe son is no a ma e ial hing
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396 S. HEINÄMAA
o a na u al o ganism. In Being and Time, Heidegge o mula es his objec ion
as ollows:
The pe son is no a Thing [Ding], no a subs ance, no an objec [Gegens and].
[…] Essen ially he pe son exis s only in he pe o mance o in en ional ac s,
and is he e o e essen ially no an objec . […] Ac s a e pe o med; he pe son is
a pe o me o ac s. Wha , howe e is he on ological meaning o ‘pe o mance’?
How is he kind o Being which belongs o a pe son o asce ained on ologically
in a posi i e way [posi i ]? (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 47–48/73)
Thus, Heidegge ’s c i ique emphasizes he ac ha classical phenomeno-
logical accoun s p oceed by i s s a ing nega i ely ha he being o a pe son
is no like he being o hings and na u al en i ies. As a p epa a o y s ep such a
cha ac e iza ion would no be a p oblem, bu Heidegge hen a gues ha his
in i ial nega i e mo e is ne e ully compensa ed in Husse lian phenomenology
by a p ope accoun o he being o pe sons in posi i e e ms.2
In he 1925 lec u es, Heidegge is mo e explici in his c i ique o Husse l. He
claims ha i we we e o ask Husse l wha he being o he pe son is, Husse l
would be able o answe by me ely poin ing ou ha he being o pe sons di e s
om he being o hinglike na u al eali ies. And i we would insis on ecei ing
a mo e p ecise and posi i e de e mina ion o pe sonal being, Husse l would jus
lead us o e lec on he inne s uc u es and p ocesses o pu e consciousness: ‘A
he bo om, we a e being led back o he same basis, o he immanen e lec ion
o ac s and li ed expe iences, wi hou hese ac s on hei pa being ac ually
de ined’ (Heidegge GA20, 167/120; c . GA20 170–171/122–123).
The e is ano he c ucial p oblem in Husse l’s ‘pe sonalism’, acco ding o
Heidegge , connec ed o i s neglec o he on ologial p econdi ions o he ideas
o pe sonhood and ac -pe o mance.
3
The mischie is ha classical phenomeno-
logical discussions o human beings – hei souls, minds, spi i s, and bodies –
implici ly e e back o and d aw esou ces om he na u al a i ude ha he
phenomenological- anscenden al educ ion is supposed o lea e behind
h ough he suspensions o he gene al hesis o being. The classical phenom-
enologis s, so o say, bo ow concep s ha belong o he na u al a i ude and
use hese concep s o lesh ou hei anscenden al accoun s o pe sonhood
and subjec i i y. Howe e , hey ne e pay back his concep ual deb and hus
emain bound o supposedly suspended na u al no ions. In o he wo ds, he
he oic a emp s ha Husse l and his ollowe s made o he ein e p e a ion o
he ela ions be ween soul, spi i , mind and body i e ie ably epea ancien
and ea ly mode n concep ualiza ions, as well as na u al empi ical no ions abou
ou li e and exis ence, and ne e eally b eak new g ound o a philosophical
an h opology, and e en less o a ue on ology o ou sel es:
In hei u n ‘body’, ‘soul’, and ‘spi i ’ may designa e phenomenal domains which
can be de ached as hemes o de ini e in es iga ions; wi hin ce ain limis hei
on ological ide ini eness way no be impo an . When, howe e , we come o he
ques ions o man’s Being, his is no some hing we can simply compu e by adding
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 397
oge he hose kinds o Being which body, soul, and spi i espec i ely possess
– kinds o Being whose na u e has no as ye been de e emined. And e en i we
shopuld a emp such an on ological p ocedu e, some idea o he Being o he
whole mus be p esupposed. (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48/74)
Heidegge hus con ends ha i we decide o p oceed by he me hods and
concep s o classical Husse lian phenomenology, hen we a e bound o o mu-
la e all philosophical ques ions ha conce n ou own being by he concep s o
pe son, and since hese concep s a e inex icaby bound up wi h ancien and
ea ly mode n concep s o ac , soul, spi i , mind and body as well as wi h naï e
e e yday no ions abou human beings and hei li es, we do no eally p oceed
in any philosophical way. The p oblema ic cha ac e o hese concep s can be
p ope ly illumina ed only by undamen al-on ological in es iga ions ha lead
us o pose he ques ions o ou own way o being in a comple ely new way.
Fo sys ema ic easons, i is impo an o no ice ha in he 1925 lec u es,
Heidegge also p o ides a hi d o mula ion o his c i ique o classical
Husse lian phenomenology. This c i icism is mo e speci ic han his gene al
complain abou he inadequacy o he concep s o pe sons (as ac -pe o me s),
and also mo e speci ic han his consequen ema ks abou he inde e minacy
o he concep s o ac , soul, spi i , mind and body. In he lec u es, Heidegge
claims ha Husse l’s phenomenology is bound o eso o he concep s o
body and embodimen in he ask o indi idua ing human beings. The poin
is o mula ed as ollows:
The undamen al s a um is s ill he na u ally eal, upon which he psychic is buil ,
and upon he psychic he spi i ual. Now comes he ques ion o he cons i u ion
o he spi i ual wo ld. I is ue ha he genuine na u ali y o he pe sonalis ic
a i ude is hema ically emphasized, bu he ac ual accoun s ill gi es p ecedence
o he in es iga ion o na u e. The being o he pe son is no as such expe ienced
in a p ima y way. The ma e ins ead emains in he e lec ion on ac s, in he
inspec ion sui. Only now he heme is no he pu e consciousness and pu e ego
bu ins ead he isola ed indi idual consciousness and ego. Bu he isola ion is
always condi ioned by he body. (Heidegge GA20 172/124; c . Pa ocka [1995]
1998, 149–178; Dodd [1995] 1998, xxix)
Heidegge does no dismiss he ac ha Husse l explici ly a gues ha con-
sciousness has i s own in e nal o immanen manne o indi idua ion, bu
he con ends ha his a gumen canno help us wi h he in e p e a ion o he
being o human pe sons, since pe sons a e no pu e consciousnesses bu a e
p ac ically engaged and a ec i ely in ol ed wi h he wo ldly objec s ha hey
in end and wi h he wo ld as an in eg a ed con ex o such objec s. Essen ially
Heidegge ’s c i ical ema ks he e sugges ha he immanen p inciple o indi-
idua ion ha Husse l p esen s can me ely dis inguish he e lec ing ego om
e e y hing else bu canno di e en ia e be ween sepa a e indi iduals in he
expe ienced plu ali y o human li e. On pu ely immanen g ounds, we can
only keep ou sel es dis inc om e e y hing alien o om a gene al anonymous
o he wi hou e e coming o You, He, She, e c.
4
So, in o de o indi idua e o he
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398 S. HEINÄMAA
human beings, and no jus hemsel es, a Husse lian phenomenologis would
ha e o eso o he na u al dis inc ness o human bodies, which goes agains
he me hod being employed.
In o de o be able o e alua e Heidegge ’s dismissal o classical phenomenol-
ogy, o o see o wha ex en i may be jus i ied, we need o cla i y h ee cen al
ac o s in Husse l’s discou se on pe sons: a dis inc ion be ween wo a i udes,
he p inciples o indi idua ion and he analysis o he s uc u e o exp ession.
This is he ask o he h ee sec ions below.
3. Psycho-physical Complexes and Uni ied Pe sons
In he second olume o Husse l’s Ideas (Ideas II), we ind se e al ela ed
accoun s and explica ions o ou app ehension o human beings. The main
dis inc ion is be ween wo di e en a i udes wi h wo di e en kinds o he-
ma ic posi ing: he na u alis ic (na u al-scien i ic) a i ude ha posi s na u e as
a basis o all being, and he pe sonalis ic a i ude ha posi s spi i ual uni s and
wholes. In o he wo ds, Husse l desc ibes wo di e en ways o unde s anding
and s udying human beings, which is possible wi hin wo di e en a i udes.
The main me hodological aim o Ideas II is o ca e ully dis inguish be ween
hese wo hema iza ions, and be ween he wo a i udes and in e es s in which
hey a e o med, and hen o s udy hei inne s uc u es espec i ely as well as
hei mu ual ela ions o dependency. The e lec i e phenomenological a i ude
is supposed o make his c i ical inqui y possible by suspending all posi ings
ope a i e wi hin he wo a i udes unde in es iga ion.
Mo e p ecisely, Husse l a gues, ha on he one hand human beings can
be app ehended as s a i ied wo-laye ed complexes o psycho-physical sys-
ems. On he o he hand, human beings can be g asped as pe sons, ha is, as
spi i ual-bodily wholes wi h spi i ual-bodily cons i uen s and spi i ual-bodily
ela ions o he en i oning wo ld. Ideas II cha ac e izes he di e ence be ween
hese wo app ehensions as ollows:
In he [na u alis ic a i ude], he o ali y o ‘objec i e’ physical na u e was, o is,
he e o us, ounding, sca e ed he ein, li ing bodies, sensi i eness, and psychic
li es. All men and animals we conside in his a i ude a e, i we pu sue heo e -
ical in e es s, an h opological o , mo e gene ally, zoological objec s. […] Wha
has been said conce ns ou ellow men as well as ou sel es, o he ex en ha we
conside ou sel es heo e ically p ecisely in his a i ude: we hen a e anima ed
li ing bodies [Leibe ], objec s o na u e, hemes o he ele an na u al sciences.
Bu i is qui e o he wise, as ega ds he pe sonalis ic a i ude, he a i ude we a e
always in when we li e wi h one ano he , alk o one ano he , shake hands wi h
one ano he in g ee ing, o a e ela ed o one ano he in lo e and a e sion, in
disposi ion and ac ion, in discou se and discussion. […] To li e as a pe son is o
posi onesel as a pe son, o ind onesel in, and o b ing onesel in o, conscious
ela ions wi h a ‘su ounding wo ld’. (Hua4 182–183/192–193)
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 399
This means ha , in he na u alis ic a i ude, we ha e wo laye s o beings,
causally and unc ionally connec ed one o he o he : he psychic ha eme ges
om and ope a es on a physical subs a e and he physic ha suppo s he
psychic and p oduces i . In he pe sonalis ic a i ude, we only ha e one uni ied
being. The spi i ual is no a second some hing eme gen on o jux aposed wi h
i s bodily-ma e ial ‘basis’ bu ho oughly pene a es he body and o ganizes i
acco ding o i s own p inciples. Bo h a i udes concei e human beings as men al
beings wi h bodily capaci ies, bu whe eas he o me a i ude concep ualizes
he men al as an eme gen psychic laye o being on ologically dependen on he
undamen al on ological laye o he physical, he la e concei es he men al as
a o ma i e spi i ual powe ha ope a es on bodily-sensible ma e ials.
Unlike Heidegge , Husse l does no aim a unde mining he na u alis ic o
na u al-scien i ic a i ude o i s heo ies o human beings. In his accoun , his
a i ude is in eg al o many o ou p ac ices, om adi ional medical he apies
o mode n neu o-sciences, and hus has i s own jus i ica ion, bu also i s own
limi s (Hua4 190–191/200–201). Ra he han ejec ing he na u alis ic a i ude,
Husse l aims a demons a ing unde which condi ions his a i ude becomes
possible and wha in e es s i se es. Howe e , his c i ical inqui y in o he
ela ions be ween he wo a i udes e eals ha he na u alis ic a i ude – wi h
i s objec s, he me ely ma e ial hing and he human being as a psycho-phys-
ical complex – is no a sel -suppo i e o independen sense- o ma ion. The
analyses o Ideas II and The C isis o Eu opean Sciences (Hua6) disclose his
a i ude as a highly complex sense-accomplishmen ha necessa ily e e s o
and p esupposes a mo e undamen al a i ude in which we g asp human beings
as uni ied wholes wi h meaning ul, exp essi e bodies. This a gumen is sum-
ma ized as ollows by Husse l:
Upon close sc u iny, i will e en appea ha he e a e no he e wo a i udes
wi h equal igh s and o he same o de , o wo pe ec ly equal appe cep ions
which a once pene a e one ano he , bu ha he na u alis ic a i ude is in ac
subo dina ed o he pe sonalis ic, and ha he o me only acqui es by means o
an abs ac ion o , a he , by means o a kind o sel - o ge ulness o he pe sonal
ego, a ce ain au onomy – whe eby i p oceeds illegi ima ely o absolu ize i s
wo ld, i.e., na u e. (Hua4 183–184/193, emphasis added; c . Hua6 244–245/297)
Thus, Husse l ques ions he p imacy o he na u alis ic a i ude and a gues
ha i depends, in i s sense, on a mo e p o ound a i ude, in which we do no
app ehend o s udy human beings – ou sel es o o he s– as psycho-physical
compounds bu expe ience hem as spi i ual-bodily pe sons wi h comp ehen-
si e mo i a ional, signi ica i e and communica i e ela ionships wi h hei su -
oundings. The p oblem o he na u alis ic app ehension o human beings is no
ha i would lack sense o legi ima ion; a he he p oblem is ha i ha bou s
in i sel uni e salizing endencies ha bu ess he alse no ion ha e e y hing
ha appea s is ul ima ely physical.
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