On the Complexity and Wholeness of Human Beings: Husserlian Perspectives

This is an elec onic ep in o he o iginal a icle. This ep in may di e om he o iginal in pagina ion and ypog aphic de ail. Au ho (s): Ti le: Yea : Ve sion: Please ci e he o iginal e sion: All ma e ial supplied ia JYX is p o ec ed by copy igh and o he in ellec ual p ope y igh s, and duplica ion o sale o all o pa o any o he eposi o y collec ions is no pe mi ed, excep ha ma e ial may be duplica ed by you o you esea ch use o educa ional pu poses in elec onic o p in o m. You mus ob ain pe mission o any o he use. Elec onic o p in copies may no be o e ed, whe he o sale o o he wise o anyone who is no an au ho ised use . On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es Heinämaa, Sa a Heinämaa, S. (2017). On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es. In e na ional Jou nal o Philosophical S udies, 25(3), 393-406. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404 2017 Full Te ms & Condi ions o access and use can be ound a h p://www. and online.com/ac ion/jou nalIn o ma ion?jou nalCode= iph20 Download by: [Jy askylan Yliopis o] Da e: 28 Sep embe 2017, A : 02:52 In e na ional Jou nal o Philosophical S udies ISSN: 0967-2559 (P in ) 1466-4542 (Online) Jou nal homepage: h p://www. and online.com/loi/ iph20 On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es Sa a Heinämaa To ci e his a icle: Sa a Heinämaa (2017) On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es, In e na ional Jou nal o Philosophical S udies, 25:3, 393-406, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404 To link o his a icle: h p://dx.doi.o g/10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404 © 2017 The Au ho (s). Published by In o ma UK Limi ed, ading as Taylo & F ancis G oup Published online: 22 May 2017. Submi you a icle o his jou nal A icle iews: 59 View ela ed a icles View C ossma k da a In e na Ional Jou nal o PhIlosoPhIcal s udIes, 2017 Vol. 25, no. 3, 393–406 h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/09672559.2017.1323404 © 2017 he au ho (s). Published by In o ma uK limi ed, ading as aylo & ancis G oup. his is an open access a icle dis ibu ed unde he e ms o he c ea i e commons a ibu ion license (h p:// c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/), which pe mi s un es ic ed use, dis ibu ion, and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly ci ed. On he Complexi y and Wholeness o Human Beings: Husse lian Pe spec i es Sa a Heinämaa depa men o social sciences and Philosophy, academy o inland, uni e si y o Jy äskylä, Jy äskylä, inland ABSTRACT A he beginning o Being and Time, Heidegge ejec s Husse l’s classical phenomenology on h ee g ounds: he claims ha Husse lian phenomenology is impai ed by inde e mina e concep s, by naï e pe sonalism, and by obscu i ies in i s accoun o indi idua ion. The pape s udies he alidi y o his ea ly c i ique by explica ing Husse l’s discou se on human pe sons as bodily-spi i ual beings and by cla i ying his accoun o he p inciples by which such beings can be indi idua ed. The pape o e s h ee ypes o conside a ions. A e a summa y o Heidegge ’s ea ly c i ique o Husse l, he second sec ion o he pape dis inguishes be ween wo dimensions o Husse l’s discou se on human pe sons. I a gues ha Husse l does no pu o wa d one analysis o he being o humans, bu explica es wo di e en accoun s and hen s udies c i ically hei mu ual ela ions o dependency: on he one hand, he na u alis ic accoun o human beings as laye ed beings and on he o he hand he pe sonalis ic accoun o human beings as peculia kinds o uni ied wholes in which he men al and he bodily a e inex icably in e wined. The hi d sec ion o he pape cla i ies Husse l’s heo y o indi idua ion and i s consequences o ou discou se on human pe sons. Finally, he ou h sec ion explica es he concep ual means by which Husse l de elops his accoun o human beings as pe sons. The pape ends in d awing some conclusions o con empo a y philosophical an h opology. KEYWORDS husse l; heidegge ; pe son; embodimen ; indi idua ion; exp essi e whole 1. In oduc ion A he e y beginning o he i s pa o Being and Time, Heidegge dis in- guishes his own Dasein-analy ic and he new phenomenological he meneu ics ha i mo i a es om Husse l’s classical phenomenology which, in Heidegge ’s eading, is domina ed by epis emological in e es s and misguided by aken- o -g an ed concep s. Heidegge a acks classical phenomenology as a s ayed o m o philosophical an h opology, hopelessly en angled wi h on ic inqui ies CONTACT sa a heinämaa [email p o ec ed] OPEN ACCESS Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 394 S. HEINÄMAA and wi h empi ical no ions o human li e. Thus, he a gues ha his o me eache alls ic im o undamen al mis akes ha a e analogous o hose ha s ain nine een h- and wen ie h-cen u y li e philosophies and all philosophical ‘pe sonalism’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 47/72). The undamen al p oblem ha Heidegge iden i ies in his con empo a y phi- losophy is he neglec o he ques ion ha conce ns he meaning o beingand he c ucial and dis inc i e ole ha his ques ion plays in ou own exis ence. We a e no jus one ype o being among o he ypes, bu mo e essen ially a e beings who ques ion he sense o being (de Sinn on Sein) om wi hin unique places and si ua ions in he wo ld and who ask in pa icula abou hei own way o being, ha is,Da-sein. Fo Heidegge , he ealiza ion o ou dis inc- i e ela ion o being mus se e as he anscenden al basis o philosophical an h opology, as dis inc om all empi ical inqui ies in o human beings and hei possessions, ma e ial and men al. Heidegge acknowledges ha his con empo a y philosophies o li e and pe sonhood in ol e implici endencies owa d posing he ques ion abou ou human way o being, bu he a gues ha hese philosophies ne e unde ake his ask p ope ly, since hey do no c i ically in es iga e he inhe i ed philosophical e minology o pe sons, egos, souls and spi i s, bu ake hese e ms as gi en: ‘Thus we a e no being e minologically idiosync a ic when we a oid hese e ms as well as he exp essions “li e” and “human being” in designa ing he beings ha we ou sel es a e’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 46/71–72; c . GA20 124). In his con ex , Heidegge claims ha his con empo a y philosophy, in all i s a ia ions, is s ill se iously s ained and delimi ed by he in luences o Hellenis ic philosophy and Ch is ian heology, and mos ecen ly by Ca esian subjec i ism, pieced oge he om ancien and medie al concep s: ‘[w]ha obs uc s and misleads he basic ques ion o he being o Da-sein is he o ien a- ion ho oughly colo ed by he an h opology o Ch is iani y and ancien wo ld, whose inadequa e on ological ounda ions also pe sonalism and he philosophy o li e igno e’ (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48/73). In Heidegge ’s accoun , he a- di ion o an h opology se iously bu dens and delimi s also Husse l’s classical phenomenology: in a simila manne as i s philosophical con empo a ies and p edecesso s, Husse l analyses he exis ence o human beings by concep s ha ha e deep oo s in Ch is ian dogma and ancien philosophy, oo s ha al eady cen u ies ago had los con ac wi h hei o iginal sou ces in conc e e phenom- ena and li ing expe iences o human beings. Bu how exac ly is his p oblem mani es ed in Husse l’s phenomenology? Wha is he seeming sel -e idence ha classical phenomenology p esupposes, despi e all i s adicalness and igou ? The aim o his pape is o answe his ques ion by s udying he alidi y o he c i ique ha Heidegge di ec s agains classical phenomenology and o ask o wha ex en his p esen a ion o Husse l’s al e na i e app oach holds. Such a compa a i e inqui y ad ances he de elopmen o con empo a y philosophical Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 395 an h opology by sepa a ing be ween wo in luen ial discou ses on human being ha bo h a e ‘phenomenological’ in he gene al sense ha bo h desc ibe and analyse condi ions o ou expe iencing. Howe e , ins ead o he simple opposi- ion ha Heidegge ’s ea ly c i ique sugges s, we ind wo al e na i e app oaches ha sha e he phenomenological- anscenden al in e es in cla i ying he con- di ions o expe iencing bu di e on c ucial ma e s ha conce n ou expe i- ences o human beings, ou sel es and o he s. The pape o e s h ee ypes o conside a ions. A e a sho summa y o Heidegge ’s ea ly c i ique o Husse l, he second sec ion o he pape dis in- guishes be ween wo di e en dimensions o Husse l’s discou se on pe sons. I a gues ha Husse l does no pu o wa d one analysis o he being o humans bu explica es wo di e en accoun s and hen s udies c i ically hei mu ual ela ions o dependency. So a he han a guing o any one concep ion o human being, Husse l p o ides an explica ion o wo di e en concep ions: on he one hand he na u alis ic accoun o human beings as laye ed beings, and on he o he hand, he pe sonalis ic accoun o human beings as peculia kinds o uni ied wholes in which he men al and he sensuous-bodily a e inex- icably in e wined. The hi d sec ion o he pape cla i ies Husse l’s heo y o indi idua ion and i s consequences o ou discou se on human pe sons. Finally, he ou h sec ion explica es he concep ual means by which Husse l de elops his accoun o human beings as pe sons. The pape ends in d awing some conclusions o con empo a y philosophical an h opology. 2. Heidegge ’s C i ical Rema ks Fo Heidegge , he main p oblem o classical phenomenology is ha i lea es uncla i ied wha he pe o mance (Vollziehung) o ac s mean, how ac s a e gi en and wha hei being is (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48–49/73–75; c . GA20 170–175/123–125). Mo e p ecisely, wha emains me ely p esumed is he way in which pe o med ac s ela e o pe o ming subjec s, and how he subjec s a e gi en o hemsel es. In he 1925 lec u es on he his o y o he concep o ime, Heidegge acknowledges ha , while s udying he cons i u ion o ime-con- sciousness, Husse l does p o ide explica ions o he s uc u es o he s eam o li ed expe iencing and o he uni y o li e ha a e supposed o cons i u e he con inuum o in en ional ac i i y and in en ional ac s, bu despi e his, his c ucial objec ion emains: ‘Bu e en i he being o ac s and he uni y o he expe ien ial s eam we e de e mined in hei being, he ques ion o he being o he ull conc e e man would s ill emain’ (Heidegge GA20 173–174/125).1 In Heidegge ’ accoun , his undamen al inde e minacy o classical phe- nomenology mani es s mos clea ly in i s ambiguous discou se on pe sons. Fo Husse l, he con ends, he human pe son is essen ially a pe o me o ac s, bu since he concep s o ac s emain inde e mina e, Husse l and his ollowe s canno bu p oceed nega i ely and a gue ha he pe son is no a ma e ial hing Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 396 S. HEINÄMAA o a na u al o ganism. In Being and Time, Heidegge o mula es his objec ion as ollows: The pe son is no a Thing [Ding], no a subs ance, no an objec [Gegens and]. […] Essen ially he pe son exis s only in he pe o mance o in en ional ac s, and is he e o e essen ially no an objec . […] Ac s a e pe o med; he pe son is a pe o me o ac s. Wha , howe e is he on ological meaning o ‘pe o mance’? How is he kind o Being which belongs o a pe son o asce ained on ologically in a posi i e way [posi i ]? (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 47–48/73) Thus, Heidegge ’s c i ique emphasizes he ac ha classical phenomeno- logical accoun s p oceed by i s s a ing nega i ely ha he being o a pe son is no like he being o hings and na u al en i ies. As a p epa a o y s ep such a cha ac e iza ion would no be a p oblem, bu Heidegge hen a gues ha his in i ial nega i e mo e is ne e ully compensa ed in Husse lian phenomenology by a p ope accoun o he being o pe sons in posi i e e ms.2 In he 1925 lec u es, Heidegge is mo e explici in his c i ique o Husse l. He claims ha i we we e o ask Husse l wha he being o he pe son is, Husse l would be able o answe by me ely poin ing ou ha he being o pe sons di e s om he being o hinglike na u al eali ies. And i we would insis on ecei ing a mo e p ecise and posi i e de e mina ion o pe sonal being, Husse l would jus lead us o e lec on he inne s uc u es and p ocesses o pu e consciousness: ‘A he bo om, we a e being led back o he same basis, o he immanen e lec ion o ac s and li ed expe iences, wi hou hese ac s on hei pa being ac ually de ined’ (Heidegge GA20, 167/120; c . GA20 170–171/122–123). The e is ano he c ucial p oblem in Husse l’s ‘pe sonalism’, acco ding o Heidegge , connec ed o i s neglec o he on ologial p econdi ions o he ideas o pe sonhood and ac -pe o mance. 3 The mischie is ha classical phenomeno- logical discussions o human beings – hei souls, minds, spi i s, and bodies – implici ly e e back o and d aw esou ces om he na u al a i ude ha he phenomenological- anscenden al educ ion is supposed o lea e behind h ough he suspensions o he gene al hesis o being. The classical phenom- enologis s, so o say, bo ow concep s ha belong o he na u al a i ude and use hese concep s o lesh ou hei anscenden al accoun s o pe sonhood and subjec i i y. Howe e , hey ne e pay back his concep ual deb and hus emain bound o supposedly suspended na u al no ions. In o he wo ds, he he oic a emp s ha Husse l and his ollowe s made o he ein e p e a ion o he ela ions be ween soul, spi i , mind and body i e ie ably epea ancien and ea ly mode n concep ualiza ions, as well as na u al empi ical no ions abou ou li e and exis ence, and ne e eally b eak new g ound o a philosophical an h opology, and e en less o a ue on ology o ou sel es: In hei u n ‘body’, ‘soul’, and ‘spi i ’ may designa e phenomenal domains which can be de ached as hemes o de ini e in es iga ions; wi hin ce ain limis hei on ological ide ini eness way no be impo an . When, howe e , we come o he ques ions o man’s Being, his is no some hing we can simply compu e by adding Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 397 oge he hose kinds o Being which body, soul, and spi i espec i ely possess – kinds o Being whose na u e has no as ye been de e emined. And e en i we shopuld a emp such an on ological p ocedu e, some idea o he Being o he whole mus be p esupposed. (Heidegge [1927] 1993, 48/74) Heidegge hus con ends ha i we decide o p oceed by he me hods and concep s o classical Husse lian phenomenology, hen we a e bound o o mu- la e all philosophical ques ions ha conce n ou own being by he concep s o pe son, and since hese concep s a e inex icaby bound up wi h ancien and ea ly mode n concep s o ac , soul, spi i , mind and body as well as wi h naï e e e yday no ions abou human beings and hei li es, we do no eally p oceed in any philosophical way. The p oblema ic cha ac e o hese concep s can be p ope ly illumina ed only by undamen al-on ological in es iga ions ha lead us o pose he ques ions o ou own way o being in a comple ely new way. Fo sys ema ic easons, i is impo an o no ice ha in he 1925 lec u es, Heidegge also p o ides a hi d o mula ion o his c i ique o classical Husse lian phenomenology. This c i icism is mo e speci ic han his gene al complain abou he inadequacy o he concep s o pe sons (as ac -pe o me s), and also mo e speci ic han his consequen ema ks abou he inde e minacy o he concep s o ac , soul, spi i , mind and body. In he lec u es, Heidegge claims ha Husse l’s phenomenology is bound o eso o he concep s o body and embodimen in he ask o indi idua ing human beings. The poin is o mula ed as ollows: The undamen al s a um is s ill he na u ally eal, upon which he psychic is buil , and upon he psychic he spi i ual. Now comes he ques ion o he cons i u ion o he spi i ual wo ld. I is ue ha he genuine na u ali y o he pe sonalis ic a i ude is hema ically emphasized, bu he ac ual accoun s ill gi es p ecedence o he in es iga ion o na u e. The being o he pe son is no as such expe ienced in a p ima y way. The ma e ins ead emains in he e lec ion on ac s, in he inspec ion sui. Only now he heme is no he pu e consciousness and pu e ego bu ins ead he isola ed indi idual consciousness and ego. Bu he isola ion is always condi ioned by he body. (Heidegge GA20 172/124; c . Pa ocka [1995] 1998, 149–178; Dodd [1995] 1998, xxix) Heidegge does no dismiss he ac ha Husse l explici ly a gues ha con- sciousness has i s own in e nal o immanen manne o indi idua ion, bu he con ends ha his a gumen canno help us wi h he in e p e a ion o he being o human pe sons, since pe sons a e no pu e consciousnesses bu a e p ac ically engaged and a ec i ely in ol ed wi h he wo ldly objec s ha hey in end and wi h he wo ld as an in eg a ed con ex o such objec s. Essen ially Heidegge ’s c i ical ema ks he e sugges ha he immanen p inciple o indi- idua ion ha Husse l p esen s can me ely dis inguish he e lec ing ego om e e y hing else bu canno di e en ia e be ween sepa a e indi iduals in he expe ienced plu ali y o human li e. On pu ely immanen g ounds, we can only keep ou sel es dis inc om e e y hing alien o om a gene al anonymous o he wi hou e e coming o You, He, She, e c. 4 So, in o de o indi idua e o he Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 398 S. HEINÄMAA human beings, and no jus hemsel es, a Husse lian phenomenologis would ha e o eso o he na u al dis inc ness o human bodies, which goes agains he me hod being employed. In o de o be able o e alua e Heidegge ’s dismissal o classical phenomenol- ogy, o o see o wha ex en i may be jus i ied, we need o cla i y h ee cen al ac o s in Husse l’s discou se on pe sons: a dis inc ion be ween wo a i udes, he p inciples o indi idua ion and he analysis o he s uc u e o exp ession. This is he ask o he h ee sec ions below. 3. Psycho-physical Complexes and Uni ied Pe sons In he second olume o Husse l’s Ideas (Ideas II), we ind se e al ela ed accoun s and explica ions o ou app ehension o human beings. The main dis inc ion is be ween wo di e en a i udes wi h wo di e en kinds o he- ma ic posi ing: he na u alis ic (na u al-scien i ic) a i ude ha posi s na u e as a basis o all being, and he pe sonalis ic a i ude ha posi s spi i ual uni s and wholes. In o he wo ds, Husse l desc ibes wo di e en ways o unde s anding and s udying human beings, which is possible wi hin wo di e en a i udes. The main me hodological aim o Ideas II is o ca e ully dis inguish be ween hese wo hema iza ions, and be ween he wo a i udes and in e es s in which hey a e o med, and hen o s udy hei inne s uc u es espec i ely as well as hei mu ual ela ions o dependency. The e lec i e phenomenological a i ude is supposed o make his c i ical inqui y possible by suspending all posi ings ope a i e wi hin he wo a i udes unde in es iga ion. Mo e p ecisely, Husse l a gues, ha on he one hand human beings can be app ehended as s a i ied wo-laye ed complexes o psycho-physical sys- ems. On he o he hand, human beings can be g asped as pe sons, ha is, as spi i ual-bodily wholes wi h spi i ual-bodily cons i uen s and spi i ual-bodily ela ions o he en i oning wo ld. Ideas II cha ac e izes he di e ence be ween hese wo app ehensions as ollows: In he [na u alis ic a i ude], he o ali y o ‘objec i e’ physical na u e was, o is, he e o us, ounding, sca e ed he ein, li ing bodies, sensi i eness, and psychic li es. All men and animals we conside in his a i ude a e, i we pu sue heo e - ical in e es s, an h opological o , mo e gene ally, zoological objec s. […] Wha has been said conce ns ou ellow men as well as ou sel es, o he ex en ha we conside ou sel es heo e ically p ecisely in his a i ude: we hen a e anima ed li ing bodies [Leibe ], objec s o na u e, hemes o he ele an na u al sciences. Bu i is qui e o he wise, as ega ds he pe sonalis ic a i ude, he a i ude we a e always in when we li e wi h one ano he , alk o one ano he , shake hands wi h one ano he in g ee ing, o a e ela ed o one ano he in lo e and a e sion, in disposi ion and ac ion, in discou se and discussion. […] To li e as a pe son is o posi onesel as a pe son, o ind onesel in, and o b ing onesel in o, conscious ela ions wi h a ‘su ounding wo ld’. (Hua4 182–183/192–193) Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 399 This means ha , in he na u alis ic a i ude, we ha e wo laye s o beings, causally and unc ionally connec ed one o he o he : he psychic ha eme ges om and ope a es on a physical subs a e and he physic ha suppo s he psychic and p oduces i . In he pe sonalis ic a i ude, we only ha e one uni ied being. The spi i ual is no a second some hing eme gen on o jux aposed wi h i s bodily-ma e ial ‘basis’ bu ho oughly pene a es he body and o ganizes i acco ding o i s own p inciples. Bo h a i udes concei e human beings as men al beings wi h bodily capaci ies, bu whe eas he o me a i ude concep ualizes he men al as an eme gen psychic laye o being on ologically dependen on he undamen al on ological laye o he physical, he la e concei es he men al as a o ma i e spi i ual powe ha ope a es on bodily-sensible ma e ials. Unlike Heidegge , Husse l does no aim a unde mining he na u alis ic o na u al-scien i ic a i ude o i s heo ies o human beings. In his accoun , his a i ude is in eg al o many o ou p ac ices, om adi ional medical he apies o mode n neu o-sciences, and hus has i s own jus i ica ion, bu also i s own limi s (Hua4 190–191/200–201). Ra he han ejec ing he na u alis ic a i ude, Husse l aims a demons a ing unde which condi ions his a i ude becomes possible and wha in e es s i se es. Howe e , his c i ical inqui y in o he ela ions be ween he wo a i udes e eals ha he na u alis ic a i ude – wi h i s objec s, he me ely ma e ial hing and he human being as a psycho-phys- ical complex – is no a sel -suppo i e o independen sense- o ma ion. The analyses o Ideas II and The C isis o Eu opean Sciences (Hua6) disclose his a i ude as a highly complex sense-accomplishmen ha necessa ily e e s o and p esupposes a mo e undamen al a i ude in which we g asp human beings as uni ied wholes wi h meaning ul, exp essi e bodies. This a gumen is sum- ma ized as ollows by Husse l: Upon close sc u iny, i will e en appea ha he e a e no he e wo a i udes wi h equal igh s and o he same o de , o wo pe ec ly equal appe cep ions which a once pene a e one ano he , bu ha he na u alis ic a i ude is in ac subo dina ed o he pe sonalis ic, and ha he o me only acqui es by means o an abs ac ion o , a he , by means o a kind o sel - o ge ulness o he pe sonal ego, a ce ain au onomy – whe eby i p oceeds illegi ima ely o absolu ize i s wo ld, i.e., na u e. (Hua4 183–184/193, emphasis added; c . Hua6 244–245/297) Thus, Husse l ques ions he p imacy o he na u alis ic a i ude and a gues ha i depends, in i s sense, on a mo e p o ound a i ude, in which we do no app ehend o s udy human beings – ou sel es o o he s– as psycho-physical compounds bu expe ience hem as spi i ual-bodily pe sons wi h comp ehen- si e mo i a ional, signi ica i e and communica i e ela ionships wi h hei su - oundings. The p oblem o he na u alis ic app ehension o human beings is no ha i would lack sense o legi ima ion; a he he p oblem is ha i ha bou s in i sel uni e salizing endencies ha bu ess he alse no ion ha e e y hing ha appea s is ul ima ely physical. Downloaded by [Jy askylan Yliopis o] a 02:52 28 Sep embe 2017 406 S. HEINÄMAA Heinämaa, Sa a. 2007. “Sel hood, Consciousness, and Embodimen : A Husse lian App oach.” In Consciousness: F om Pe cep ion o Re lec ion in he His o y o Philosophy, edi ed by Sa a Heinämaa, Vili Läh eenmäki, and Pauliina Remes, 311– 328. Do d ech : Sp inge . Heinämaa, Sa a. 2010: “Embodimen and Exp essi i y in Husse l’s Phenomenology: F om Logical In es iga ions o Ca esian Medi a ions.” SATS–No he n Eu opean Jou nal o Philosophy 11: 1–15. Heinämaa, Sa a. 2011. “Body.” In The Rou ledge Companion o Phenomenology, edi ed by Sebas ian Lu and Sø en O e gaa d, 222–232. London: Rou ledge. Heinämaa, Sa a 2012: “Sex, Gende and Embodimen .” In The Ox o d Handbook o Con empo a y Phenomenology, edi ed by Dan Zaha i, 216–242. Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. Husse l, Edmund. Hua1. Ca esianische Medi a ionen und pa ise Vo äge, Husse liana I, edi ed by S ephan S asse . Haag: Ma inus Nijho , 1950. In English Ca esian Medi a ions, ans. Do ion Cai ns. Do d ech , NL and Bos on: Ma inus Nijho , 1960. Husse l, Edmund. Hua4. Ideen zu eine einen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zwei es Buch: Phänomenologische Un e suchungen zu Kons i u ion, Husse liana IV, edi ed by Ma ly Bimel. Haag: Ma inus Nijho , 1952. In English Ideas Pe aining o a Pu e Phenomenology and o a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: S udies in he Phenomenological Cons i u ion, ans. Richa d Rojcewicz and And é Schuwe . Do d ech , Bos on, London: Kluwe Academic Publishe s, 1993. Husse l, Edmund. Hua6. Die K isis de eu opäischen Wissenscha en und die anszenden ale Phänomenologie: Eine Einlei ung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Husse liana VI, edi ed by Wal e Biemel. Haag: Ma inus Nijho , 1954. In English The C isis o Eu opean Sciences and T anscenden al Phenomenology: An In oduc ion o Phenomenological Philosophy, ans. Da id Ca . E ans on: No hwes e n Uni e si y, 1988. Husse l, Edmund. Hua15: Zu Phänomenologie de In e subjek i i ä [Towa d he Phenomenology o In e subjec i i y], Tex e aus dem Nachlass, D i e Teil, 1929– 1935, Husse liana XV, edi ed by Iso Ke n. Haag: Ma inus Nijho , 1973. Ko ooms, Toine. 2002. Phenomenology o Time: Edmund Husse l’s Analysis o Time- Consciousness. Do d ech : Kluwe Academic. Me leau-Pon y, Mau ice. [1945] 1993. Phénoménologie de la Pe cep ion. Pa is: Gallima d. In English Phenomenology o Pe cep ion, ans. Collin Smi h. London: Rou ledge, 1995. O e gaa d, Sø en. 2004. “Heidegge on Embodimen .” Jou nal o he B i ish Socie y o Phenomenology 35: 116–131. 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