Speaking of what is not : Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Speaking of what is not : Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions © 2024 the Authors Published version Daşdemir, Yusuf Daşdemir, Y. (2024). Speaking of what is not : Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Early online. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2024.2315589 2024 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbjh20 British Journal for the History of Philosophy ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rbjh20 Speaking of what is not: Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions Yusuf Daşdemir To cite this article: Yusuf Daşdemir (07 Mar 2024): Speaking of what is not: Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2024.2315589 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2024.2315589 © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 07 Mar 2024. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 270 View related articles View Crossmark data ARTICLE Speaking of what is not: Hatibzâde and Taşköprizâde Kâsım on the existential import of negative propositions Yusuf Daşdemir Department of Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland ABSTRACT This paper undertakes an in-depth examination of the intriguing argument for the existential import of negative propositions by the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar Hatibzâde Mehmed (d. 1496) and the counterarguments by his disciple, Taşköprizâde Kâsım (d. 1513). It argues that this discussion is a significant example of Ottoman scholars engaging in long-standing disputes concerning the nature and ontological ground of negative propositions, which date back to Plato and Aristotle. It is also intended to underline the need for considering not only logic texts but also works primarily associated with other disciplines in order to attain a comprehensive picture of logical discussions in the post-classical period of Islamic thought. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 May 2023; Revised 6 June 2023; Accepted 3 February 2024 KEYWORDS Existential import; Arabic logic; Ottoman logic; negation; negative propositions Introduction “A proposition has existential import if and only if it cannot be true unless its subject refers to some existing object(s)”(Chatti, “The Cube, the Square”, 102). In other words, it has existential import (EI) “if it entails the corresponding existential proposition based on its subject term”(Horn, A Natural History, 24). ‘SisP’is said, therefore, to have EI if its truth presupposes that ‘Sis’or that there is at least one thing that is S. Conversely, if the subject of a proposition is empty with nothing existent to which it refers, then the proposition is inevitably false. In Arabic logic, it has been held that only affirmative propositions have EI. 1 Nevertheless, throughout the tradition’s extensive history, © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent. CONTACT Yusuf Daşdemir [email protected] 1 Ibn Sīnāis quite clear in this regard (see, e.g. Al-Najāt, 16; Al-Shifāʾ: Al-Maqūlāt, 258–259; Al-Shifāʾ: AlʿIbāra,80–82), and his view seems to have substantially determined the route subsequent generations took. See also Chatti, Arabic Logic,26–36. Unfortunately, the secondary literature on Arabic logicians’ BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2024.2315589 dissenting voices have emerged, challenging this prevalent position, such as the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar, Hatibzâde Muhyiddin Mehmed (d. 1496). 2 In his influential set of super-glosses on al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s (d. 1413) glosses on Shams al-D īn al-Is fahānī’s (d. 1349) commentary upon Nas īr al-Dīn al-Tūsī’s (d. 1274) widely studied philosophical kalām handbook, the Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād, Hatibzâde often adopts a rather polemical style, engaging in objections to various aspects of the glossator’s interpretations. Given the significant esteem in which Jurjānīwas held by contemporary Ottoman scholars, it should come as no surprise that Hatibzâde’s critical stance gave rise to numerous rejoinders within the literature of Tajrīd glosses and treatises on mental existence, two genres that were very popular in the Ottoman scholarly circles of the final quarter of the fifteenth century and the initial half of the sixteenth century. 3 Regarding the issue of EI, for instance, Hatibzâde (H awāshī, fols. 39a–b) 4 raises three objections to Jurjānī: (1) Like affirmative ones, negative propositions have EI. (2) Just like other affirmative propositions, the affirmative propositions with negative predicates (sālibat al-mah mūl) have EI. (3) Not only the subject-term but also the predicate of any proposition should denote something existing. These claims, at odds with the orthodox theory of EI, elicited elaborate responses from Taşköprizâde Kâsım (d. 1513), who once studied with Hatibzâde. 5 The paper picks up (1) as its subject, 6 and its first section analyzes Hatibzâde’s argument for it while the second is devoted to Taşköprizâde Kâsım’s theories of EI is rather limited. Among the studies immediatey related to the subject are Chatti, “Existential Import”,Daşdemir, “The Problem”, and El-Rouayheb, “Dashtakī(d. 1498)”. 2 Another significant figure who questions the prevailing stance of Arabic logicians on the EI is Shihāb alDīn al-Suhrawardī(d. 1191), the founder of the Illuminationist School, who pursued a similar approach with Hatibzâde’s, albeit on a distinct ground. For the overall reductionist project of Suhrawardī, see Kaukua, Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism, Chapter 2, and for the translation of the relevant passage, see 38. On the other hand, on Hatibzâde’s life and work, see Taşköprizâde, Eş-Şakâ’iku’n-nu‘mâniyye, 250–255; Bursalı,OsmanlıMüellifleri, I/307; Brockelmann, History of the Arabic Written Tradition, 1:301, 588; 2:257; Suppl. 1:668, 880, 964; Suppl. 2:332. For the sake of convenience, the Ottoman proper names are transliterated hereafter according to the modern Turkish conventions. 3 For the historical reasons why discussions of mental existence became widespread in this period, see Fazlıoğlu, “Between Reality and Mentality”. 4 The references to Hatibzâde’s super-glosses throughout the paper are to the copy in MS Istanbul, Beyazıt Manuscript Library, Veliyüddin 2006 (henceforth, H awāshī), which was handwritten by Taşköprizâde Ahmed, as the colophon on fol. 236a witnesses by noting that he completed the copy on the 20th of al-Jumādiya l-Ukhrā, 930 (the 25th of April, 1524). 5 Taşköprizâde Ahmed (Eş-Şakâ’iku’n-nu‘mâniyye, 616) mentions Hatibzâde among the masters of his paternal uncle, Taşköprizâde Kâsım. 6 His arguments for (2) deserves an independent treatment that is beyond the scope of this paper while those for (3) will be occasionally touched upon in the following. 2Y. DAŞDEMIR counterarguments. The third section attempts to demonstrate the pertinence of the discussion within the broader context of an age-old debate concerning the ontological ground or truthmaker of negative propositions, thereby linking it to the contemporary quandary recognized as the paradox of negative judgement. The study aims to underscore the importance of broadening the scope of inquiry to include not only logic textbooks and their commentaries but also texts primarily associated with other disciplines. This comprehensive approach is essential to obtain a holistic and nuanced understanding of the intricate and far-reaching logical discussions of the post-classical period of Islamic philosophy. 1. Hatibzâde on the existential import of negative propositions To begin with, let me give a quick overview of what I take as the orthodox position of Arabic logicians on the EI of propositions. It is necessary on this juncture to refer to the onto-logical principle, I will call the ‘principle of dependence’(qāʿidat al-farʿiyya), 7 which always makes appareance in various formulations at the centre of discussions of EI. The principle of dependence: one thing’s existing (thubūt/wujūd) for, or being affirmed (ithbāt/ījāb) of, another depends on the other thing’s itself existing. 8 In negative terms, nothing could exist for a non-existent subject; nor could a predicate be affirmed of such a subject. In sum, no property could conceivably subsist in a subject if the latter by no means existed, and no predicate could be affirmatively said of a non-referring subject-term. 9 Qut b al-Dīn al-Rāzīal-Tah tānī(d. 1365), one of the most influential logicians of the post-Avicennian period, accounts for the EI of affirmative propositions with reference to the principle. For him, nothing could be affirmed of a non-existent subject because of the necessary fact that affirming (ījāb) 7 In recent secondary literature, this foundational principle has been referred to under various designations. For instance, Benevich uses the “positive of positive rule”(“The Reality of the Non-Existent,”37), while Adamson and Benevich use ‘the affirmation principle’(The Heirs of Avicenna, 140). Zamboni prefers “the existential entailment of attribution”(At the Roots of Causality, 77) to speak of relatively early formulations of the principle. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the facts that the prevailing formulations of the principle frequently include the term ‘dependent’(farʿ) and that MullāS adrācalls it “qāʿidat al-farʿiyya”(Metaphysical Penetrations, 29), I adopt in the following the designation of ‘the principle of dependence’. I am grateful to Hassan Rezakhany for convincing me that this rendering is preferable to others on philosophical grounds. 8 Although the underlying idea of the principle can be easily traced back to Ibn Sīnāand his immediate successors (see, e.g. Ibn Sīnā,Al-Ilāhiyyāt, 33; Al-Shifāʾ: Al-ʿIbāra, 79; Bahmanyār, Al-Tah s īl, 288–289), it seems, we owe Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzīits first formulation in its fullness as “something’s obtaining (h us ūl) for something else is dependent on that thing’s obtaining in itself”(Al-Mabāh ith al-mashriqiyya, 1:130; see also Al-Mabāh ith al-mashriqiyya, 1:132; Al-Mulakhkhas , 1:296). 9 There is another principle accounting for the fact that negative propositions are true in the case that the subject-term is empty: “The absence of something from another could be due to the absence of the other itself”(Jurjānī,H āshiyat al-Tajrīd, 2:197). BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 one thing of another depends on the existence of the subject of the affirmation (al-muthbat lah). Negation, on the other hand, does not adhere to this limitation, because if affirming something of a non-existent subject is not true, then denying it of the same subject must be true. Hence, the truth of a negative proposition does not presuppose that its subject-term refers to something existent (Tah rīr al-qawāʿid al-mant iqiyya, 99). Hatibzâde, however, is not content with this position and, as we saw above, argues that negative propositions and affirmative propositions with a negative predicate (sālibat al-mah mūl) also have EI. For him, the requirement of EI should be extended to the predicate of propositions, too; the proposition will be true only if its predicate also refers to something existent. Hatibzâde sets forth his argument for the EI of negative propositions as follows: [t1] The first [of my objections is that] the truth of a negative proposition is due to the predicate’s being absent from the subject in nafs al-amr, which depends on the two [parts of the proposition] being multiple and different from each other in nafs al-amr, because negating something of itself could [never] be true. Their being multiple and different from each other are in turn based on their being distinct from each other with respect to nafs al-amr.‘Being multiple’ and ‘being distinct’are two positive attributes that apply to both the subject and the predicate, and therefore their subjects must also exist and be present. There is no difference, therefore, between affirmative and negative propositions in terms of the requirement that the subject of each exist during the time the predicate is considered. (Hatibzâde, H awāshī, fols. 39a21–39b4) I will reconstruct the argument in the text, which I will call the distinctness argument, as follows: The distinctness argument: (Assumption) A negative proposition like ‘S is not P’is true only if S exists. (Premise 1)‘S is not P’is true only if P is absent from S in nafs al-amr. (Premise 2) P is absent from S in nafs al-amr only if S and P are two different things in nafs al-amr. (Premise 3) S and P are two different things in nafs al-amr only if they are distinct from each other in nafs al-amr. (Premise 4) S and P are two things and distinct from each other only if they exist in nafs al-amr (during the time that P is taken as different and distinct from S). (Conclusion) Therefore, ‘S is not P’is true only if S and P exist in nafs al-amr (during the time that S and P are different and distinct from each other). The argument seems valid, but to establish whether it is also sound, we should take a closer look at the premises and Hatibzâde’s justification for them. 4Y. DAŞDEMIR (Premise 1) ‘S is not P’is true only if P is absent from S in nafs al-amr: This premise differentiates between the proposition and what it is about, 10 which it refers to as nafs al-amr, 11 grounding the truth of the former in the latter. A proposition is about a state of affairs in nafs al-amr, and it is true only if this state is just as the proposition says it is. That is, the proposition is made true by the state of affairs in nafs al-amr. In Hatibzâde’s interpretation, the state of affairs in the context of a negative proposition is nothing but P’s being absent from S. This interpretation appears consistent with the conventional understanding of predication, given that Ibn Sīnā, for instance, defines affirmation as the judgement that something exists for something else and negation as the judgement/judgement that something does not exist for another (Al-Najāt, 13; also, Al-Shifāʾ: Al-ʿIbāra,42–43). 12 Hence, an affirmative proposition signifies that the predicate exists for the subject in nafs al-amr, whereas a negative one denotes that the predicate does not exist for the subject therein. The proposition is true only if the situation in nafs al-amr is as the proposition says it is, i.e. if there is a correspondence between the proposition and the state of affairs in nafs al-amr. In fact, the relationship between a negative proposition and the reality it is about is symmetrical: if the predicate is not present for the subject, the negative proposition is true, and conversely, if the proposition is true, the predicate is absent from the subject. This symmetry would be succinctly captured if Premise 1 were put as a statement of logical equivalence: ‘Sis not P’is true if and only if P is absent from S in nafs al-amr. However, the current formulation of the premise with ‘only if’highlights Hatibzâde’s emphasis on the fact that the situation in nafs al-amr, the right-hand part of the premise, serves as the cause for the truth of the negative proposition in the left-hand part. The causal relation is not symmetrical; it is not because the proposition is true that the predicate does not exist for the subject in reality. As a final point related to the Premise 1, I should handle nafs al-amr, which stands for the domain of reality that is supposed to make the proposition true. Unfortunately, Hatibzâde provides no explanation of what he means by the term, but his glosses furnish us with some important hints for speculating. He, for instance, silently passes over Jurjānī’s remarks about the term in his H āshiyat al-Tajrīd(2:201), although he is normally very vocal in disagreeing with him. Taking his silence as a sign of agreement, I will assume that Jurjānī’s 10 In fact, Hatibzâde regards this distinction as a necessary one, giving it a highly crucial role to play in his solution to the liar paradox as a part of his manoeuvre to dismiss certain self-referential sentences as not propositions. For the edited Arabic text and translation of his treatise devoted to the paradox, see Daşdemir, “A Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Treatise”. 11 I will discuss nafs al-amr in detail shortly. 12 For similar definitions, see Fārābī,Kitāb al-Qiyās, 14; Rāzī,Al-Mulakhkhas , 1:112. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 5 view of nafs al-amr mirrors Hatibzâde’s. Let us then examine Jurjānī’s theory of nafs al-amr in more detail. According to Tūsī, one of the first figures to influentially associate nafs alamr with the role of a truthmaker for certain propositions: when only one or neither of the elements exists extramentally, the proposition is true if it corresponds to nafs al-amr (see Is fahānī,Tasdīd al-qawāʿid, 2:200). Commenting on these sentences (H āshiyat al-Tajrīd, 2:201–202), Jurjānīexplicates the concepts ‘mental’,‘extramental’, and nafs al-amr as well as the relationship between them. He first reminds us that there are only two kinds of existence: (i) primary (as īl) existence from which effects proceed and in which properties manifest and (ii) secondary (z illī) existence from which no such effects proceed. The latter can only be conceived of in the perceptive faculties (al-quwāal-darrāka), which is why it is called ‘mental existence’, whereas the former obtains only outside these faculties. Hence, extramental existence is opposed to existence in the mind. Nafs al-amr, on the other hand, literally means the thing in itself (nafsu l-shayʾifīh addi dhātihī), and accordingly, “The thing exists in nafs al-amr”means that it is existent in itself (see Rezakhany, “Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī’s Solution”, 194). That is, its existence is not contingent upon someone’s perspective (iʿtibār) or supposition (fard ) such that it would still exist even if all perspectives and suppositions were ignored. Jurjānīalso addresses the relationship between these concepts. Nafs alamr in a sense encompasses both the mental and the extramental realms of existence; it contains the latter in its entirety, for whatever exists extramentally also exists in nafs al-amr, but not vice versa. On the other hand, there is a partial overlap between nafs al-amr and the mind, as both contain some things that the other does not. For example, false judgements, like ‘Five is even’,canoccurinamindbutcannotberealizedin nafs al-amr. 13 It is clear therefore that nafs al-amr for Jurjānīis a term that refers to the sum of extramental existence and a part of mental existence. At this point, a possible objection may occur: if nafs al-amr is supposed to be an objective and mind-independent mode of existence, how or in what sense could it overlap with mental existence, even if only partially? How could something existent in the mind exist objectively and mind-independently? This question brings us to the most problematic aspect of the theory of nafs al-amr, an explanation of which is in order. 13 For an examination of Jurjānī’s theory of nafs al-amr, see Hasan, “Foundations of Science”, 181–212, but notice the common mistake of misattributing to Jurjānīa treatise titled as Risāla fītah qīq nafs al-amr, which is in fact by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, as recently shown by Aktaş,“An Examination of Authenticity”. Therefore, the author’s interpretations based on the treatise should be taken with caution. 6Y. DAŞDEMIR Let me first distinguish between two classes of entities that are mentally existent, based on Jurjānī(al-H āshiya al-kubrā, 125; for the translation of the relevant passage, see Hasan, “Foundations of Science”, 420): (i) The things whose existence in the mind relies solely on the assumption of the mind. This class, termed by Jurjānīas the “suppositional mental”(dhihniyyan farad iyyan), encompasses counterfactual fabrications of the mind, devoid of, and indeed impossible to possess, existence in nafs al-amr. Jurjānīgives ‘the evenness of five’as an example of the class. One could believe, for example, that five is even, but this belief is doomed to be false because it lacks a correspondent in nafs al-amr. Nonetheless, notice that its parts, namely ‘evenness’and ‘five’, could well be existent in nafs al-amr to function as the subject or predicate of a true proposition, such as ‘Five is odd’and ‘Four is even’. (ii) The sort of things, Jurjānīrefers to as the “real mental”(dhihniyyan h aqīqiyyan), whose existence in the mind takes its source from certain extramental facts, such as the evenness of four and the entailment relation between sunrise and the presence of daylight. This is because although the evenness of four and the mentioned entailment relation exist only in the mind, they possess a real aspect; one could arguably claim that there are no such things as ‘evenness’or ‘entailment’in the extramental reality despite one’s believing that four is even and sunrise entails the presence of daylight, even if no mind or mental supposition is considered. They are in the mind, but do not depend on the assumptions of the mind. 14 Hence, it is the real mental part of mental existence that overlaps with nafs alamr. Another point concerning nafs al-amr, both Jurjānīand Hatibzâde disagree with Tūsīthat nafs al-amr is identical to the Agent Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), the tenth of the celestial intellects according to Muslim philosophers’emanationist scheme (see, e.g. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect; McGinnis, Avicenna, 130–137). Hatibzâde raises three counterarguments against this view (H awāshī, fol. 105b5–9), which, for brevity’s sake, I will here leave aside. 15 It seems therefore justified to conclude that, for Hatibzâde, nafs al-amr is a term used to refer to a mode of existence that applies to all externally existent things and only some mental existents. It signifies that these exist objectively 14 Noteworthy here is the view that some predicates that are not extramentally existent could be truly said of extramentally existent subjects because it will serve as the pivot of Taşköprizâde Kâsım’s counterargument. 15 For Jurjānī’s objections against T ūsī’s view, see H āshiyat al-Tajrīd, 2:202; for the translation of the relevant passages, see Hasan, “Foundations of Science”, 425–426. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 7 between the subject and predicate arises from the fact that the subject is considered in terms of its extension and individuals falling under it while the predicate is taken in terms of its meaning (mafhūm) and intention (Tah tānī,Tah rīr al-qawāʿid al-mant iqiyya, 92; Jurjānī,H āshiyat al-Sayyid, 130). Consequently, a predicate, whether existent or not, can be said of a subject present in the external world, in the mind, or more broadly, in nafs al-amr. This perspective leads to a classification of predicates into those that exist and those that do not exist in a way reminiscent of concrete and abstract predicates. For instance, in ‘This swan is white’, whiteness is a concrete predicate existing in the external world. Conversely, in ‘This swan is blind’, blindness, being a privation and negation, does not exist in the external world. Even in the proposition ‘This swan exists’,it is open to question whether the predicate of existence extramentally exists. 23 As far as I could establish, Islamic theologians, starting with Jurjānī, assert that the external world, the mind, or nafs al-amr serves as a container for the self (nafs) 24 of the predicate that lacks existence there but can still be correctly said of existing subjects. According to this distinction, while the external world, for example, acts as a container for the existence of the swan and whiteness, it is a container for the self of blindness or existence itself. Consequently, as in Taşköprizâde Kâsım’s usage, the fact that nafs al-amr functions as a container for the self, rather than for the existence, of any specific entity implies that this predicate, even if lacking existence in nafs al-amr, can correctly hold true of things that do exist therein (Jurjānī,H āshiyat al-Tajrīd, 2:77; al-H āshiya alkubrā, 158–159). 25 To turn to Premise 1 in the light of this explanation, Taşköprizâde Kâsım assumes that Hatibzâde should have taken nafs al-amr in his argument as the container for the self of the absence, but not for its existence/presence. Probably, this is because it would be very absurd on Hatibzâde’s part if he meant the existence of the absence. For no one can reasonably claim that the absence, a concept evidently negative and non-existential, exists in nafs al-amr. Then he must have meant that nafs al-amr was a container for the self of the absence. Premise 2 is lucid: if nafs al-amr operates as a container for the self of the absence, it is not necessary for it to be existent therein, according to the distinction just explained. In Premise 3, Taşköprizâde Kâsım takes a pivotal step in achieving his objective, inferring from the absence’s non23 On different positions on the external existence of existence, see Zamboni, ‘Existence and the Problem of Ah wāl,’21 ff. 24 Actually, the reason why such a problematic term as nafs was preferred in this context is currently unclear to me. 25 Hatibzâde (H awāshī, fol. 105a) is also aware of this distinction and even seems to concede it but does not address it in the context of the EI of negative propositions. 14 Y. DAŞDEMIR existence in nafs al-amr the possibility that it is not distinct. Here, he invokes the principle of dependence to substantiate this inference: if one thing’s existence for another is contingent upon the other thing itself being existent, then nothing non-existent could serve as the subject of a positive property—in this context, distinctness. Incidentally, it appears that Taşköprizâde Kâsım agrees with Hatibzâde in considering distinctness as a positive property. Premise 4 is a conclusion in a sense because Taşköprizâde Kâsım obtains with it a part of the main conclusion, namely that S and P might not be distinct. Moving to Premise 5, he attains the desired consequence that S and P might not be two different things in nafs alamr, either. This conclusion follows because S and P being two different things depends on their being distinct, a point Hatibzâde has also granted in his Premise 3. Collectively, these premises lead to the overarching conclusion that P’s being absent from P implies the possible scenario where they are not two different and distinct entities. This is to say, negative propositions do not have EI because they could be true even in the absence of their subjects in nafs al-amr. In his second counterargument, Taşköprizâde Kâsım challenges the justificatory argument Hatibzâde raises to support Premise 2, in which Hatibzâde contends that a predicate’s being absent from a subject builds upon their being different from each other; otherwise, it would lead to the denial of something of itself, which he deems impossible. For Taşköprizâde Kâsım, however, rejecting the subject and predicate’s being different from each other would not boil down to the denial of something of itself. He argues as follows: [t3] It is not granted that such a denial is implied because [the fact that the subject and predicate are] not different from each other does not entail that [they are] one and identical. How could it be? “Being different”is the contradictory of “being not different”, not of “being one”, because [“being not different”], being more general, does not [necessarily] entail [“being one”]. For the former’s being true [of the subject and predicate] could be due to either one or both [of the subject and predicate] fails to exist. If either or both of them do not exist, being different could not apply to them so that denying something of itself could follow. (Taşköprizâde Kâsım, Risāla fīl-wujūd al-dhihnī, fol. 181b15–20) The passage makes a clear point: being one and being different are not contradictory pairs; both apply to existent subjects, and there is an intermediary between them. Therefore, something’s being not one does not necessarily entail that it is the other. For if either or both relata do not exist, which are possible scenarios as Taşköprizâde Kâsım proved in the first counterargument, neither ‘being one’nor ‘being different’apply to them. If they are not one, there could be no talk of denying something of itself. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 15 3. The ontological ground of negative propositions The foremost distinctive feature of propositions is the fact that they are either true or false. 26 According to a widely held theory of truth dating back to Aristotle’sMetaphysics 1011b25, a proposition is true if it faithfully represents in the mind an extramental reality. That is, this theory assumes a correspondence between the mental and external realms, and the proposition is true if the fact or the state of affairs in the world end of this world-to-word relation is as represented by the proposition; otherwise, the proposition is false. Hence, it is the extramental reality that constitutes the truthmaker of a proposition. Nevertheless, this intuitive theory of truth encounters a peculiar challenge when it comes to negative propositions. This challenge is eloquently put by Molnar (“Truthmakers”, 72) in four propositions: (i) the world is everything that exists; (ii) everything that exists is positive; (iii) some negative claims about the world are true; (iv) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. Taken on its own, each of these propositions appears sufficiently reasonable. However, considered collectively, they give rise to the dilemma that is called the paradox of negative judgement: if an affirmative proposition corresponds to a positive fact, then what does a negative proposition refer or correspond to? (Horn, A Natural History,3) Numerous solutions to this problem have been proposed throughout the history of philosophy as well as in contemporary discussions, 27 but I shall concentrate here on a specific solution, particularly relevant to the Ottoman debate in question, namely one that depends on finding a positive rendering to negative propositions: the correlation of the negative judgement with the positive relation of ‘difference’or ‘otherness’(for other solutions, see Wood, “The Paradox”). Historically, this approach, which is called ‘negation-as-otherness’, has often been associated with Plato. 28 In Plato’sSophist 257b, the Eleatic Stranger posits that when we speak of “not being”, we are not speaking of something opposed to being, but rather something different from being. He elucidates this by stating that the prefixed term “not”signifies something other than the subsequent words or, more precisely, something apart from the entities to which the uttered words following the negative apply. 29 26 This Aristotelian view of propositions as the only sentence type that is truth-bearer (see De Int. 16b35– 36) has been also universally held by Arabic logicians; see, e.g. Ibn Sīnā,Al-Shifāʾ: Al-ʿIbāra, 32; AlIshārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, 1:222; Rāzī,Al-Mulakhkhas , 1:107; Tah tānī,Tah rīr al-qawāʿid al-mant iqiyya, 82. 27 For example, in an attempt to solve the problem, Russell went so far as to accept the existence of negative facts; see, e.g. “On Propositions,”287. 28 For the designation of this approach as ‘negation-as-otherness’, see Horn, A Natural History. 29 For a discussion of the passage, see, e.g. Lee, “Plato on Negation”, Brown, “Negation and Not Being”, and Frede, “Plato’sSophist”. 16 Y. DAŞDEMIR Having laid this groundwork, let me return to Hatibzâde’s argument in order to argue that it exhibits notable parallels with the Platonic interpretation of negation: negation-as-otherness. 30 As we saw in [t1], Hatibzâde’s expedient in attributing EI to negative propositions is based on interpreting negative propositions primarily as involving the predicate’s being absent from the subject. However, since absence is a clearly negative concept and therefore useless for Hatibzâde’s purpose, he accounts for this absence in terms of difference, distinctness, and otherness. Accordingly, ‘S is not P’will mean that S is different/distinct from, or other than, P. Moreover, for him, ‘being distinct’and ‘being different’are positive concepts of relations. Therefore, as a positive relation, their relata, viz. the subject and predicate of the negative proposition, must exist, because otherwise it would be impossible for S to be other than P or the other way round. Such a view of negative propositions, I argue, is no doubt a form of the theory of negation-as-otherness. It evidently attempts to reduce negation to certain positive relations in order to identify positive/existential reference for negative propositions in the mindindependent world. However, Hatibzâde’s argument suffers from some crucial deficiencies prompting one to question the strength of his theory of negation-as-otherness. First, its pivotal move of basing the absence of the predicate from the subject on the difference/distinctness relation between them is a particularly contentious step. For ‘S is not P’is more generally true than ‘S is distinct from P’and therefore does not necessarily imply it. As Taşköprizâde Kâsım has aptly shown in his second counterargument, in the case that either or both of S and P are not existent, the former is true but not the latter. That is, unlike the former, the latter has EI. To put otherwise, as Taşköprizâde Kâsım’sfirst counterargument is meant to show, the former is true even if S and/or P are non-existent, but in that case, S and/or P are in no position to be relata of a positive relation like distinctness. Hence, Hatibzâde seems to commit an unwarranted step while inferring from the EI of the latter to that of the former. Another notable flaw in his argument arises from the consequence that if interpreted as statements of distinctness, a negative proposition would no longer contradict its affirmative counterpart. As mentioned earlier, Hatibzâde’s interpretation of predication relies on the notion of identity between the respective extensions of the subject and predicate, and he attempts to extend this view to negative propositions by positing non-identity between them. However, ‘being identical’and ‘being non-identical’are contrary predicates that apply exclusively to existent subjects. In order to 30 In this debate, Taşköprizâde Kâsım seems to have tended to agree with the negation-as-falsity approach, which is generally associated with Aristotle and probably with Ibn Sīnā(see Wood, “The Paradox”, 422; Horn, A Natural History, e.g. 60), but he does not put forward any positive argument on the issue. Therefore, commenting on his position would be too speculative. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 17 maintain the contradiction between affirmative and negative propositions, Hatibzâde would need to interpret negative predication as ‘S is not identical with P’. Yet, if Hatibzâde were to adhere to this interpretation, there would be no logical basis that enables him to argue for the EI of negative propositions because ‘being not identical’requires no existent subjects. To overcome this difficulty, Hatibzâde could consider categorically dismissing sentences with empty subjects as meaningless, not subject to truth or falseness, 31 on the ground that, as Hume suggests (A Treatise, 48), “to think of an object is always and necessarily to think of an existent object” (Reicher, “Nonexistent Objects”). According to this perspective, it is impossible to speak of what is not in a meaningful way. Hence, sentences like ‘God’s partner is not omnipotent’or ‘Pegasus does not exist’, which are meaningless as their subjects are empty, are not propositions. If no sentences with empty subject are propositions, then no propositions are with empty subjects. This amounts to saying that propositions do not imply, but rather presuppose, the existence of the subject in the Strawsonian sense (see Chatti & Schang, “The Cube, the Square”, 107). In other words, a sentence must first have a non-empty subject to count as a proposition, be it true or false. On this reading of propositions, ‘S is identical with P’and ‘S is non-identical with P’contradict each other because sentences with empty subjects has already been excluded from the set of propositions, and as acknowledged by Arabic logicians as well, if S refers to something existent, ‘S is non-identical with P’is equivalent to ‘S is not identical with P’, which is the direct contradiction of ‘S is identical with P’(Ibn Sīnā,Al-Najāt, 17; Al-Shifāʾ: Al-ʿIbāra, 82; Tah tānī,Tah rīr al-qawāʿid al-mant iqiyya, 100; Lawāmiʿal-asrār,282). However, there might be another option before Hatibzâde. He could also attribute an objective existence in nafs al-amr to everything that we can talk about, with some sort of epistemological realism that some of Hatibzâde’s contemporaries, such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī(d. 1502), 32 appear to have adopted. Hatibzâde seems to have leant towards resolving the problem by adopting this option. Regarding true propositions about impossible concepts, like “non-haecceity”(lā-huwiyya), for instance, ‘Non-haecceity is not haecceity’, Hatibzâde argues that the subject of such a proposition —‘non-haecceity’in this case—exists in nafs al-amr insofar as it exists in the mind. This is because mental constructs have existence in nafs al-amr as long as the mind is engaged with them (H awāshī, fol. 104b–105a). Nonetheless, this solution brings together its own shortcomings. First, it poses a significant threat to the objective and mind-independent nature 31 Indeed, Hatibzâde maintains a similar stance regarding liar sentences, asserting that despite their formal resemblance to propositions, they do not qualify as genuine propositions; see Daşdemir, “A Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Treatise”. 32 “All conceptual meanings (al-mafhūmāt al-tas awwuriyya) are present in nafs al-amr”(Dawānī, al-H ashiya al-jadīda, 57a18). 18 Y. DAŞDEMIR attributed to nafs al-amr by scholars such as Tūsīand Jurjānī. Furthermore, asserting that this proposition has a reference in nafs al-amr as long as the mind attends to it grants a limited and subjective kind of existence to its subject, namely judgemental existence, according to the distinction discussed above. However, Hatibzâde’s primary claim was to attribute objective and mind-independent existence to the subject and predicate of negative propositions, not solely a judgemental, but also an attributional form of existence. Perhaps more significantly for a theologian like Hatibzâde, assigning an objective and mind-independent existence to non-existent and even impossible entities could give rise to theological quandaries, because it would mean, for example, that God’s partner exists in nafs al-amr. 33 However, this is in flat contrast to the fundamental tenet of Islamic theology—the unity of God, as eloquently articulated by Hatibzâde’s Iranian contemporary, Sadr al-Dīn alDashtakī(d. 1498), in response to Dawānī:(H ashiya ʿalāSharh al-Tajrīd, fol. 29b13–14). This could explain why Tūsīconfines the content of nafs al-amr to possible entities (Risāla fīithbāt, 7) and his commentator, Shams al-Din al-Kīshī(d. 1296), underscores that impossible entities cannot exist in nafs al-amr (Rawd at al-nāz ir, 12, 15). Thus, it appears that this solution is also incapable of solving the complexities Hatibzâde’s position gives rise to. To wrap up, Hatibzâde’s argument for the EI of negative propositions could be read as a formulation of the negation-as-otherness position, but it appears inadequate in addressing the logical difficulties it is faced with. Consequently, the party that has the upper hand in this debate seems to be the other side presented by Taşköprizâde Kâsım. Conclusion This paper has examined Hatibzâde’s objections to the prevailing position of Arabic logicians on the EI of simple negative propositions and the counterarguments of Taşköprizâde Kâsım. It has found that Hatibzâde’s argument can be regarded as a new formulation of the ancient approach to negation, which is called ‘negation-as-otherness’and associated with Plato while Taşköprizâde Kâsım’s position seems to be closer to the other well-known position, ‘negation-as-falsity’, although he does not provide any argument for it. Hatibzâde’s stance on the problem appears to fall short in establishing a robust objective foundation for negative propositions, given the counterarguments presented by Taşköprizâde Kâsım and the limitations I have highlighted. Nevertheless, I should make the caveat that Hatibzâde may have only wanted to raise certain issues rather than develop a consistent and systematic theory of propositions. The fact that his relevant work is a series of super-glosses on Jurjānī’s glosses and is largely written in a polemical and non-committal style makes it difficult 33 For related discussions in Islamic theology, see Benevich, “The Reality of the Non-Existent”, Chapter 5. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 19 to understand his real views and whether he had in mind a systematic theory of negative propositions. Acknowledgements This paper owes much to the editors and anonymous reviewers of the BJHP; I express first my gratitude to them for their constructive criticisms and suggestions. I also extend my thanks to my colleagues at JYU, Jari Kaukua, Francesco O. Zamboni, and Hassan Rezakhany, for their valuable comments on the earlier drafts; and to the Wihuri Foundation for funding my research on Ottoman logic. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Funding This work was supported by Jenny ja Antti Wihurin Rahasto. Bibliography Adamson, Peter, and Fedor Benevich. The Heirs of Avicenna: Philosophy in the Islamic East, 12-13th Centuries Metaphysics and Theology. Leiden: Brill, 2023. Aktaş,M.Maşuk. “An Examination of Authenticity and Content: Demonstrating the Epistle on Nafs al-amr Attributed to Jurjanīas Having Been Taken from alSamarqandī’sal-Ma‘ārif.”Nazariyat 8, no. 2 (2022): 97–127. doi:10.12658/ Nazariyat.8.2.M0182en Arıcı, Müstakim, and Mehmet Arıkan. Taşradan Merkeze Bir OsmanlıUlema Ailesi Taşköprülüzâdeler ve İsâmüddin Ahmed Efendi. Istanbul: Ilem, 2020. Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione. Trans. with notes by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford: Clarendon, 2002. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Trans. with an Introduction and Notes by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2016. Bahmanyār b. al-Merzubān. Al-Tah s īl. Edited by Murtad āMut ahharī. Tehran: IntishārātiDānishgāh-i Tehrān, 1375. Benevich, Fedor. “The Reality of the Non-Existent Object of Thought The Possible, the Impossible, and Mental Existence in Islamic Philosophy (eleventh–thirteenth centuries)”.Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2018): 31–61. doi:10.1093/oso/ 9780198827030.003.0002. Brockelmann, Karl. History of the Arabic Tradition. 2 Vols. and 2 Supplements. Trans. by Joep Lameer. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Brown, Lesley. “Negation and Not-Being: Dark Matter in the Sophist.”In Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, edited by Richard Patterson, Vassilis Karasmanis, and Arnold Hermann, 233–54. Las Vegas; Zurich; Athens: Parmenides, 2012. Bursalı,MehmedTahir.OsmanlıMüellifleri. Edited by M. A. Yekta Saraç. Ankara: Tüba, 2016. Chatti, Saloua. “Existential Import in Avicenna’s Modal Logic.”Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2016): 45–71. doi:10.1017/S0957423915000119 20 Y. DAŞDEMIR Chatti, Saloua. Arabic Logic from Al-Fārābīto Averroes A Study of the Early Arabic Categorical, Modal, and Hypothetical Syllogistics. Springer, 2019. Chatti, Saloua, and Fabien Schang. “The Cube, the Square and the Problem of Existential Import.”.History and Philosophy of Logic 34, no. 2 (2013): 101–32. doi:10.1080/01445340.2013.764962. Daşdemir, Yusuf. “A Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Treatise on the Liar Paradox: A Case for H at ībzāde’s Authorship.”In Theories of Paradox in the Middle Ages, edited by Stephen Read and Barbara Bartocci, 204–38. College Publications, 2023. Daşdemir, Yusuf. “The Problem of Existential Import in Metathetic Propositions: Qutb al-Din al-Tahtani Contra Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.”Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi AraştırmalarıDergisi (Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences) 5, no. 2 (2019): 81–118. doi:10.12658/Nazariyat.5.2.M0075en Dashtakī,S adr al-Dīn. H ashiya ʿalāSharh al-Tajrīd. MS Istanbul: Beyazıt Manuscript Library, Veliyüddin 2027. Davidson, Herbert A. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Dawānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. al-H ashiya al-jadīda ʿalāSharh al-Tajrīd. MS Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye Manuscript Library, 2107. El-Rouayheb, Khaled. “Dashtakī(d. 1498) and Dawānī(d. 1502) on the Analysis of Existential Propositions.”Oriens 47, no. 3–4 (2019): 365–88. doi:10.1163/ 18778372-04800300 Fārābī.Kitāb al-Qiyās.Inal-Mant iq ʿinde l-Fārābī, edited by Rafīq al-ʿAjam, 11–64, Vol. 2. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986. Fazlıoğlu, İhsan. “Between Reality and Mentality -Fifteenth Century Mathematics and Natural Philosophy Reconsidered-.”Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi AraştırmalarıDergisi (Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences) 1, no. 1 (2014): 1–39. doi:10.15808/Nazariyat.1.1.M0001 Frede, Michael. “Plato’sSophist on False Statements.”In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut, 397–424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521430186.013 Hasan, Moiz. “Foundations of Science in the Post-Classical Islamic Era: The Philosophical, Historical, and Historiographical Significance of Sayyid al-Sharīf alJurjānī’s Project.”Unpublished PhD Diss. The University of Notre Dame, 2017. Hatibzâde Muhyiddin Mehmed. H awāshīKhat ībzāda ʿalāH āshiyat al-Tajrīd.MS Istanbul: Beyazıt Manuscript Library, Veliyüddin 2006. Horn, Laurence R. A Natural History of Negation. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature Volume I Texts. Edited by David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Ibn Sīnā.Al-Najāt. Edited by M. S. al-Kurdī. Cairo: Mat baʿat al-Saʿāda, 1938. Ibn Sīnā.Al-Shifāʾ: Al-Maqūlāt. Edited by George Anawātī. Cairo: al-Hayʾat al-ʿĀmma liShuʾūnal-Mat ābiʿal-Amīriyya, 1959. Ibn Sīnā.Al-Shifāʾ: Al-ʿIbāra. Edited by Mah mūd al-Khud ayrī. Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Mis riyya al-ʿĀmma, 1970. Ibn Sīnā.Al-Shifāʾ: Al-Ilāhiyyāt. Edited by George Anawātīand SaʿīdZāyed. Cairo: alHayʾat al-ʿĀmma li-Shuʾūn al-Mat ābiʿal-Amīriyya, 1960. Ibn Sīnā.Al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, Vol. 4. Edited by Sulaymān Dunyā. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Nuʿmān, 1992. Is fahānī, Shams al-D īn. Tasdīd al-Qawāʿid fīsharh Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid. Vol. 3. Edited by E. Altaş, et al. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2020. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 21 Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. al-H āshiya al-kubrā.Istanbul: HacıMuharrem Bosnevî Matbaası, 1303. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. H āshiyat al-Sayyid ʿala l-Tas awwurāt wa l-Tas dīqāt. Istanbul: Cemal Efendi Matbaası, 1318. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. H āshiyat al-Tajrīd. In Tasdīd al-Qawāʿid fīSharh Tajrīd alʿaqāʾid, edited by Eşref Altaşet al. Vol. 3. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2020. Kaukua, Jari. Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism A Philosophical Guide. Leiden: Brill, 2022. Kīshī, Shams al-Din. Rawd at al-nāz ir fīsharh nafs al-amr.In Risāla fīithbāt al-ʿaql almujarrad wa shurūh -i ān, edited by Tayyiba ʿĀrifniyā,11–44. Tehran: Markaz-i Pazhūhash-i Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 1393. Lee, Edward N. “Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist.”The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 267–304. doi:10.2307/2184327 McGinnis, Jon. Avicenna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Molnar, George. “Truthmakers for Negative Truths.”Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 1 (2000): 72–86. doi:10.1080/00048400012349361 MullāSadrā.Metaphysical Penetrations Kitāb al-Mashāʿir. Edited by Ibrahim Kalın& translated by S. Hossein Nasr. Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2014. Plato. Theaetetus and Sophist. Edited by Christopher Rowe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Al-Mabāh ith al-mashriqiyya fīʿilm al-ilāhiyyātwa-l-t abīʿiyyāt. Vol. 2. Edited by Muh ammad M. al-Baghdādī. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1990. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Al-Mulakhkhasfīal-mant iq wa-l-h ikma. Vol. 2. Edited by Ismail Hanoğlu. Jordan: al-As layn, 2021. Reicher, Maria. “Nonexistent Objects.”In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Winter 2022 Edition. https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/nonexistent-objects/. Rezakhany, Hassan. “Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox and Its Reception in QādīMubārak and MullāMubīn.”Journal of South Asian Intellectual History 1 (2018): 183–220. Rezakhany, Hassan. “The Paradox of the Absolute Unknown: Notes on the Eastern Islamic Literature.”In Theories of Paradox in the Middle Ages, edited by Stephen Read and Barbara Bartocci, 130–67. College Publications, 2023. Russell, Bertrand. “On Propositions: What They are and How They Mean.”In Logic and Knowledge Essays 1901–1950, edited by Robert C. Marsh, 283–320. New York: Macmillan, 1956. Samarqandī, Shams al-Dīn. Sharh al-Qist ās. MS Istanbul: Süleymaniye Manuscript Library, Amcazade Hüseyin 342. Samarqandī, Shams al-Dīn. Kıstâsu’l-efkâr Düşüncenin Kıstası. Edited by Necmettin Pehlivan. Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014. Tahānawī, Muh ammad ʿAlī.Kashshāfis  t ilāh āt al-funūn wa-l-ʿulūm. Vol. 2. Edited by Rafīq al-ʿAjam et al. Beirut: Maktabat LubnānNāshirūn, 1996. Tah tānī, Qut b al-Dīn al-Rāzī.Lawāmiʿal-asrārfīsharh Mat āliʿal-anwār.Edited by ʿAlīA. Jaʿfarīvalanī. Qum: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, 1393. Tah tānī, Qut b al-Dīn al-Rāzī.Tah rīr al-qawāʿid al-mant iqiyya. Cairo: Mus t afāal-BābīalH alabīwa Awlāduh, 1948. Taşköprizâde Ahmed. [H āshiya ʿalāH āshiyat al-Tajrīd]. MS Istanbul: Süleymaniye Manuscript Library, RagıpPaşa732. Taşköprizâde Ahmed. al-Shuhūd al-ʿaynīfīmabāh ith al-wujūd al-dhihnī. Edited by M. Zāhid Kāmil Jūl. Köln: Al-Kamel Verlag, 2019. 22 Y. DAŞDEMIR Taşköprizâde Ahmed. Eş-Şakâ’iku’n-nu‘mâniyye fî ulemâi’d-Devleti’l-Osmaniyye Osmanlı Âlimleri. Edited by Muhammet Hekimoğlu. Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019. Taşköprizâde Kâsım. Risāla fīl-wujūd al-dhihnī. MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Manuscript Library, RagıpPaşa 1459, fols. 175b–184a. Tūsī, Nas īr al-Dīn. “Risāla fīithbāt al-ʿaql al-mujarrad”.InRisāla fīithbāt al-ʿaql al-mujarrad wa shurūh -i ān, edited by Tayyiba ʿĀrifniyā,1–8. Tehran: Markaz-i Pazhūhash-i Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 1393. Tūsī, Nas īr al-Dīn. Asās al-iqtibāsfīl-mant iq. Translated Into Arabic by Molla Hüsrev & edited by H asan al-Shāfiʿī& Muh ammad S. Jamāl al-Dīn. Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlāli-lThaqāfa, 2004. Wood, Ledger. “The Paradox of Negative Judgment.”The Philosophical Review 42, no. 4 (1933): 412–23. doi:10.2307/2179908. Zamboni, Francesco O. “Existence and the Problem of Ah wāl: The Quiddity and Ontological Status of Existence in Avicenna and His Islamic Reception.”Oriens (2023): 1–45. doi:10.1163/18778372-12340026. Zamboni, Francesco O. At the Roots of Causality Ontology and Aetiology from Avicenna to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Leiden: Brill, 2023. Appendix: Arabic Texts t1: Hatibzâde, H awāshī, fols. 39a21–39b4: •ﻣﺎﺍﻷﻭ ّ ﻝﻓﻸﻥ ّ ﺻﺪﻕ َ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﻟﺒﺔﺑﺎﻧﺘﻔﺎﺀﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻝﻋﻦﺍﻟﻮﺿﻮﻉﻓﻲﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﻭﻫﻮﻳﺘﻮﻗ ّ ﻒ ُ ﻋﻠﻰﺗﻌﺪ ّ ﺩﻫﻤﺎﻭﺗﻐﺎﻳﺮﻫﻤﺎﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﺇﺫﺳﻠﺐ ُ ﺍﻟﺸﻲءﻋﻦﻧﻔﺴﻪﻏﻴﺮ ُ ﺻﺎﺩﻕ ٍ ﻭﻫﻤﺎﻣﺘﻮﻗ ّ ﻔﺎﻥﻋﻠﻰﺗﻤﺎﻳﺰﻫﻤﺎﺑﺤﺴﺐﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﻭﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩ ُ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰ ُ ﺻ ِ ﻔﺘﺎﻥ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻴ ّ ﺘﺎﻥﺛﺎﺑﺘﺘﺎﻥﻟﻠﻤﺤﻤﻮﻝﻭﺍﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻉﻓﻴﺠﺐ ُ ﺃﻥﻳﻜﻮﻥﻣﻮﺻﻮﻓ ُ ﻬﻤﺎﺛﺎﺑﺘ ً ﺎﻭﻣﻮﺟﻮﺩ ً ﺍﻓﻼﻓﺮﻕ َ ﺑﻴﻦﺍﻟﺴﺎﻟﺒﺔﻭﺍﻟﻤﻮﺟﺒﺔﻓﻲ ﺍﻗﺘﻀﺎﺀﻭﺟﻮﺩﺍﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻉﺣﺎﻝ َ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﺍﻟﺤﻜﻢ. t2: Taşköprizâde Kâsım, Risāla fīl-wujūd al-dhihnī, fol. 181b8–15: •ﻓﻤﻤﻨﻮﻉ ٌ ﻷﻧ ّ ﻪﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ٍ ﺟﻌﻞﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﻇﺮﻓ ً ﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲﺍﻻﻧﺘﻔﺎﺀﻻﻟﺜﺒﻮﺗﻪﻭﻭﺟﻮﺩﻩﻓﻴﺠﻮﺯﺃﻥﻻﻳﻜﻮﻥﺛﺎﺑﺘ ً ﺎﻓﻴﻬﺎﻣﻊﻛﻮﻧﻬﺎﻇﺮﻓ ً ﺎ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮﺍﻷﻣﻮﺭﺍﻟﺘﻲﻳﻜﻮﻥﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺝ ُ ﺃﻭﺍﻟﺬﻫﻦ ُ ﻇﺮﻓﺎﻟﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎﻻﻟﺜﺒﻮﺗﻬﺎﻓﻼﻳﺜﺒﺖ ُ ﻟﻪﺍﻟﺘﻤﻴ ّ ﺰﻓﻴﻬﺎﻷﻥ ّ ﺛﺒﻮﺕﺷﻲء ٍ ﻟﺸﻲء ٍ ﺇﻧ ّ ﻤﺎﻫﻮﻓﺮﻉﺛﺒﻮﺕﺍﻟﻤﺜﺒ َ ﺖﻟﻪﻭﺇﺫﻟﻴﺲﻟﻪﺛﺒﻮﺕ ٌ ﻟﻴﺲﻳﺜﺒﺖﻟﻪﺗﻤﻴ ّ ﺰ ٌ ﻓﺈﺫﺍﻟﻢﻳﺜﺒﺖﺍﻟﺘﻤﻴ ّ ﺰﻟﻼﻧﺘﻔﺎﺀﻓﻲﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﻻﻳﻠﺰﻡﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ َ ﻃﺮﻓﺎﻩﻣﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰﻳﻦﻓﻴﻬﺎﻷﻥ ّ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔﺇﻧ ّ ﻤﺎﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲﺗﻤﺎﻳﺰ َ ﻃﺮﻓ َ ﻴﻬﺎﻓﻲﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﺇﺫﺍﻛﺎﻧﺖﻣﺘﻤﻴ ّ ﺰﺓ ً ﻓﻴﻬﺎﻓﺈﺫﺍﻟﻢﻳﻜﻮﻧﺎ ﻣﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰﻳﻦﻓﻲﻧﻔﺲﺍﻷﻣﺮﻻﻳﺜﺒﺖﻟﻬﻤﺎﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩ ُ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮﺍﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻔﺎﻥﻋﻠﻰﺍﻟﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰ. t3: Taşköprizâde Kâsım, Risāla fīl-wujūd al-dhihnī, fol. 181b15–20: •ﻟﺰﻭﻡ ُ ﻫﺬﺍﺍﻟﺴﻠﺐﻏﻴﺮﻣﺴﻠ ّ ﻢﻷﻥ ّ ﻋﺪﻡ َ ﺛﺒﻮﺕﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩﻭﺍﻟﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮﻻﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲﺛﺒﻮﺕ َ ﺍﻻﺗ ّ ﺤﺎﺩﻭﺍﻟﻨﻔﺴﻴ ّ ﺔﻛﻴﻒﻭﺛﺒﻮﺕ ُ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩﻧﻘﻴﻀ ُ ﻪ ﻋﺪﻡ ُ ﺛﺒﻮﺕﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩﻻﺛﺒﻮﺕﺍﻻﺗ ّ ﺤﺎﺩﻭﺍﻷﻭ ّ ﻝﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪﺃﻋﻢ ّ ﻣﻦﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲﻻﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰﻣﻪﻷﻥ ّ ﺻﺪﻗﻪﻗﺪﻳﻜﻮﻥﺑﺄﻥﻻﻳﻮﺟﺪﺍﻣﻌ ً ﺎﺃﻭﻟﻢ ﻳﻮﺟﺪﺃﺣﺪ ُ ﻫﻤﺎﻓﺈﺫﺍﻟﻢﻳﻮﺟﺪﺍﺃﻭﺃﺣﺪ ُ ﻫﻤﺎﻻﻳﺜﺒﺖﺍﻻﺗ ّ ﺤﺎﺩﻟﻬﻤﺎﺃﻭﻷﺣﺪﻫﻤﺎﻛﻤﺎﻻﻳﺜﺒﺖﺍﻟﺘﻌﺪ ّ ﺩﻓﻴﻠﺰﻡ َ ﺳﻠﺐﺍﻟﺸﻲءﻋﻦﻧﻔﺴﻪ. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23