ACTA
285
ACTA ELECTRONICA UNIVERSITATIS LAPPONIENSIS 285
Gus a Pé u sson
The De ence Rela ionship
o Iceland and he Uni ed
S a es and he Closu e o
Ke la ík base
PÉTURSSON THE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP OF ICELAND AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE CLOSURE OF KEFLAVÍK BASE
Ac a elec onica Uni e si a is Lapponiensis 285
GUSTAV PÉTURSSON
The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es
and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Academic disse a ion o be publicly de ended
wi h he pe mission o he Facul y o Social Sciences
a he Uni e si y o Lapland in oom 2 on 12 Sep embe 2020 a 12 noon
Ro aniemi 2020
Uni e si y o Lapland
Facul y o Social Sciences
Supe ised by
D . Lassi Heininen, P o esso Eme i us Facul y o Social Sciences.
Uni e si y o Lapland
D . Michael T. Co gan, Associa e P o esso o In e na ional Rela ions
a he F ede ick S. Pa dee School o Global S udies. Bos on Uni e si y
Re iewed by
D . Magnus Pe e sson, P o esso o Mode n His o y.
The No wegian Ins i u e o De ence S udies
D . Rasmus G. Be elsen, P o esso o No he n S udies, Ba en s Chai in Poli ics.
The A c ic Uni e si y o No way
Opponen
D . Magnus Pe e sson, P o esso o Mode n His o y.
The No wegian Ins i u e o De ence S udies
© Gus a Pé u sson
Layou : Tai o alo P in One
Ac a elec onica Uni e si a is Lapponiensis 285
ISBN 978-952-337-222-1
ISSN 1796-6310
Pe manen add ess o he publica ion: h p://u n. i/URN:ISBN:978-952-337-222-1
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
This PhD disse a ion is dedica ed o he memo y o
Alyson J.K. Bailes 1949-2016 and
Michael T. Co gan 1941-2018.
Inspi a ional men o s who made he wo ld a be e place.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Abs ac
A small s a e wi h no a med o ces o i s own Iceland o med a close de ence
ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es a e gaining ull independence om Denma k
in 1944. In 1951 he wo s a es signed a bila e al de ence ag eemen allowing
o a U.S. mili a y base in Iceland. Following ailed bu den sha ing nego ia ions
in 2005/2006 be ween he wo go e nmen s he U.S. go e nmen unila e ally
closed down Ke la ík base and handed all de ence unc ions o e o he Icelandic
go e nmen . This disse a ion analysis h ough p ocess acing and he use o p ima y
sou ce ma e ial he de ence unc ions o he U.S. mili a y a Ke la ík base, he ailed
2005/2006 bu den sha ing nego ia ions and how om 2006 un il 2013 consecu i e
Icelandic go e nmen s adap ed o he closu e o Ke la ík base. While his s udy
is ancho ed wi hin he heo e ical schools o Neo ealism and Ins i u ionalism i s
conclusions a e ha o gain a holis ic unde s anding o he decision making p ocess
du ing he bu den sha ing nego ia ions and he a e ma h o he closu e o Ke la ík
base i is impo an o look beyond he s a e cen ic app oaches o Neo ealism and
Ins i u ionalism and ac o in al e na i e heo ies on he mo i es o indi idual ac o s
in ol ed in he decision making p ocess.

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Tii is elmä
Islan i, pieni al io ilman omia ase oimia, loi läheisen puolus ussuh een Yhdys al-
ain kanssa uonna 1944saa u e uaan äydellisen i senäisyyden Tanskas a. Vuonna
1951 maa alleki joi i a kahden älisen puolus ussopimuksen, joka salli Yhdys-
al ain pe us aa so ilas ukikoh (i)a Islan iin. Kus annus enjakoa koske ien epäon-
nis uneiden neu o elujen ( uosina 2005-2006) seu auksena Yhdys al ain halli us
sulki Ke la ikin so ilas ukikoh ansa yksipuolisella pää öksellään ja luo u i kaikki
puolus us oiminno Islannin halli ukselle. P imaa iaineis oon pohjau uen ämä
äi öski ja u kimus jälji ää ja analysoi Ke la ikin ukikohdan puolus us oimin oja,
em. epäonnis uneiden neu o elujen kulun, ja mi en Islannin halli us mukau ui
Ke la ikin ukikohdan sulkemiseen. Vaikka u kimus ankku oi uu Neo ealismin ja
Ins i u ionalismin koulukun iin sen keskeinen joh opää ös on, e ä kokonais al ai-
sen ymmä yksen saa u amiseksi ämänkal aisessa kus annus enjakoa koske assa
pää öksen ekop osessissa on ä keä ä ka soa Neo ealismin ja Ins i u ionalismin
al iokeskeisen näkökulman yli sekä o aa huomioon aih oeh ois en eo ioiden
näkökulma yksilö oimijoiden mo ii ien me ki ykses ä pää öksen eossa.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Acknowledgemen s
Doing PhD esea ch is a jou ney wi h un o eseen wis s and u ns. This jou ney
began as an idea du ing a cold Feb ua y mo ning in 2009. A he ime I was a esh-
aced g adua e hal way h ough an unpaid h ee-mon h in e nship a he Icelandic
De ence Agency. Th ough my daily wo k and casual co ee alk wi h my ellow co-
wo ke s I came o ealise ha he closu e o Ke la ík base h ee yea s ea lie and he
na u e o he de ence asks handed o e o Icelandic au ho i ies p esen ed a e ile
g ound o a PhD disse a ion.
The comple ion o his disse a ion would ne e ha e been possible wi hou he
suppo and encou agemen o a la ge g oup o people. Chie among hem a e my
PhD supe iso s, D . Lassi Heininen and D . Michael T. Co gan. I would like o
exp ess my g a i ude and hanks o he Icelandic Minis y o Fo eign A ai s and
he Icelandic Coas Gua d o esponding a ou ably o my esea ch inqui ies and
o assis ing me sou cing ele an documen s wi hin hei a chi es. In pa icula
Jónas G. Allansson a he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s and Jón B. Guðnason a he
Coas Gua d. I also hank Guðmundu I. Guðmundsson o g an ing me access o
he p i a e pape s o his a he , Fo eign Minis e Guðmundu Í. Guðmundsson, and
all hose in e iewed du ing his esea ch p ojec . A numbe o people ead a ious
chap e s o he manusc ip du ing i s s ages o de elopmen and o e ed hei ad ice
and ecommenda ions. I exp ess my g a i ude o A nó Sigu jónsson, G ego y
Winge , Jon Te je Eide, Jón B. Guðnason and Alyson J.K. Bailes. O cou se, he
esponsibili y o he con en o hese pages is mine.
I would also like o hank my wi e Be g ún A na Óladó i and ou ou child en:
Ka ín Valge ðu , K is ján Óli, Ey ún S ala and S eina Pé u o p o iding me wi h
a lo ing home and app ecia ion o he impo an hing in li e.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Table o Con en s
Lis o illus a ions .............................................................................................................................................................................................9
Lis o abb e ia ions ....................................................................................................................................................................................10
1. In oduc ion ..................................................................................................................................................................................................11
2. Me hodology and heo y ...........................................................................................................................................................14
2.1. Resea ch me hods ................................................................................................................................................................................14
2.2. Validi y and eliabili y .....................................................................................................................................................................16
2.3. Theo e ical app oach ........................................................................................................................................................................19
2.3.1. Neo ealism and de ence ................................................................................................................................................19
2.3.2. Ins i u ionalism and de ence .....................................................................................................................................24
2.3.3. Al e na i e heo ies o explana ion .....................................................................................................................28
3. Iceland’s de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es ...................................................................31
3.1. Ea ly his o y ............................................................................................................................................................................................31
3.2. The de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es ....................................................................................................34
3.3. The ela ionship as a sou ce o inancial assis ance ..............................................................................................43
3.4. The ela ionship as a le e age in gaining o eign policy objec i es .........................................................50
3.4.1. The i s Cod Wa 1958-1961 .................................................................................................................................50
3.4.2. The Second Cod Wa 1972-1973 ........................................................................................................................58
3.4.3. The Thi d Cod Wa 1975-1976 .............................................................................................................................69
3.5. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................................................77
4. The de ence unc ion o Ke l ík base .......................................................................................................................79
4.1. Iceland Ai De ence Sys em (IADS) ..................................................................................................................................80
4.2. NATO acili ies in Iceland ..........................................................................................................................................................86
4.3. Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y Iceland ..................................................................................................................................87
4.4. Implemen a ion o de ence asks p io o 2006 .......................................................................................................88
4.5. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................................................93
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
5. The closu e o Ke la ík base ..................................................................................................................................................95
5.1. The impac o he de ence issue on domes ic poli ics .........................................................................................95
5.2. The o ma ion o an Icelandic base policy ................................................................................................................100
5.3. U.S. posi ion owa ds Ke la ík base ................................................................................................................................ 102
5.4. Base nego ia ions 2005-2006 ................................................................................................................................................107
5.5. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................................120
6. Go e nmen policy ollowing he closu e o Ke la ík base ................................................ 124
6.1. Ke la ík ai po and base acili ies....................................................................................................................................124
6.2. Icelandic ins i u ional de ence amewo k ..............................................................................................................132
6.3. The Icelandic de ence amewo k 2009-2013 ....................................................................................................... 142
6.4. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................................156
7. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................................159
Bibliog aphy .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 170
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
he esea che o obse e some possible hidden elemen s and o he nuances ha
o he esea ch me hods migh o e look (Be g, 2009, p. 318).
Da a and da a collec ion is an impo an elemen in e e y esea ch and in his
s udy I ely on p e ious publica ions, newspape a icles, go e nmen epo s, eco ds
o he Icelandic Pa liamen , poli ical pa y mani es os; a chi ed ma e ial in a chi es
bo h in Iceland and ab oad as well as semi-s uc u ed in e iews wi h indi iduals
close o he decision making p ocess in go e nmen and public adminis a ion. All
in e iews we e eco ded and ansc ibed. In his esea ch he ule o anonymi y is
espec ed and in e iewees a e no e e ed o by name bu posi ion only as i ela es
o hei ole in he e en s unde discussion. When I began planning o his esea ch
I decided o adhe e o he ule o anonymi y in he belie ha in e iewees would
eel less es ained and mo e a ease knowing hey would be quo ed acco ding o
posi ion a he han name.
The chap e s in his disse a ion ely on di e en sou ces o da a collec ion.
Chap e h ee o e s a his o iog aphical accoun o Iceland’s de ence ela ionship
wi h he U.S. and as such elies mo e on exis ing li e a u e han la e chap e s.
Howe e , impo an p ima y sou ces a e also used. Fo emos o hose a e; a chi ed
documen s o he Secu i y Collec ion (Ö yggismálasa n) a he Icelandic Na ional
A chi es; B i ish go e nmen documen s ela ing o he Cod Wa s, s o ed a he
B i ish Na ional A chi es in Kew; U.S. embassy cables om he ime pe iod 1971-
1973 s o ed a he U.S. Na ional A chi es in Washing on D.C accessible h ough
online a chi al da abases (AAD); p i a e pape s o NATO Sec e a y Gene al
Joseph Luns s o ed a he NATO a chi es in B ussels also a ailable a NATO
a chi es online; p i a e pape s o Fo eign Minis e Guðmundu Í. Guðmundsson
in he possession o his son Guðmundu I. Guðmundsson; and he p i a e pape s
o o me Fo eign Minis e Bja ni Benedik sson s o ed a Reykja ík Ci y A chi es.
The p i a e pape s o Guðmundsson ha e been sou ced in p e ious academic wo ks
(Jóhannesson, 2004 and Óla sson, 1999). I would like o ex end my since es hanks
o Guðmundu I. Guðmundsson o g an me access o his a he ’s pe sonal pape s
and be allowed o sou ce hem o his disse a ion.
Chap e ou , i e and six, ely o a la ge ex end on p ima y sou ces such as in e nal
Icelandic go e nmen documen s o he a chi es o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s
and he a chi es o he Coas Gua d which inhe i ed he a chi es o he Rada
Agency and he De ence Agency when he De ence Agency was shu down and mos
o i s asks mo ed o he Coas Gua d. O he sou ces include p ima y sou ces om
he online a chi es o o me Sec e a y o De ence Donald Rums eld, in e iews
wi h ele an ac o s di ec ly in ol ed in he Icelandic/U.S. de ence nego ia ion,
decision making on he Icelandic side and implemen a ion o he de ence asks a
Ke la ík base.
Mos o hose a chi es I isi ed in pe son o ga he da a. Reykja ík Ci y A chi es,
Icelandic Na ional A chi es and he B i ish Na ional A chi es in Kew I isi ed in

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
he win e o 2011/2012. The a chi es o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s and he
Coas Gua d I isi ed in he au umn o 2015. Al hough he in e nal documen s
sou ced ha e no been published bo h he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s and he
Coas Gua d we e g acious enough o g an me access a e I had p esen ed my
le e o in oduc ion p esen ing mysel and my esea ch. Special hanks o Jónas G.
Allansson, a he ime Di ec o o he O ice o De ence a he Minis y o Fo eign
A ai s and Jón B. Guðnason Chie o Ae onau ical Di ision a he Coas Gua d.
E e nal g a i ude o bo h men o hei help and assis ance in sou cing ele an
ma e ial used in his disse a ion.
2.2. Validi y and eliabili y
A alid case s udy acco ding o Robe K. Yin “…is one ha has p ope ly collec ed
and in e p e ed i s da a, so ha he conclusions accu a ely e lec and ep esen he
eal wo ld ha was s udied” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). The e o e, he quali y o alidi y
canno be unde es ima ed as i is he benchma k o good esea ch. The alidi y
es s commonly applied o esea ch p ojec s o assess hei quali y a e h ee old: (1)
cons uc alidi y; (2) in e nal alidi y; and (3) ex e nal alidi y. Ex e nal alidi y
ela es o how applicable esea ch indings a e gene alised o a gene al popula ion.
As a case s udy o he de ence ela ionship be ween he Uni ed S a es Iceland his
esea ch does no claim gene alizable indings applicable o de ence ela ionships
be ween o he s a es. Howe e , elemen s in luencing he de ence ela ionship, he
nego ia ion p ocess ha led o he closu e o Ke la ík base and how he go e nmen
o Iceland a emp ed o compensa e o he depa u e o U.S. mili a y o ce om
Iceland p o ides insigh s and lessons lea ned ha can be applicable o simila
ela ionships.
In scien i ic s udies he unc ion o cons uc alidi y is he assessmen o how
accu a ely he dependen and independen a iables o he esea ch hypo hesis
measu e o e lec wha hey a e supposed o measu e (Hoyle, Ha is, & Judd, 2002,
pp. 33-35). The belie e ha a cons uc is ac ually measu ing wha i is supposed
o measu e is s eng hened i a causal ela ionship is es ablished be ween an
independen a iable and a dependen a iable h ough wo o mo e da a poin s.
Cons uc alidi y is hus inc eased by using mul iple sou ces o e idence and by
measu ing each cons uc in mo e han one way (Yin, 2009, pp. 41-42). This is o en
e e ed o as iangula ion which is he p ocess o balancing a ious e iden ia y
sou ces ob ained h ough a combina ion o me hods. The logic is ha simila o
same esul s ob ained h ough di e en echniques alida e and con i m he esea ch
indings (Be g, 2009, pp. 6-7).
O cou se, he e a e a ious s eng hs and weaknesses associa ed wi h sou cing
di e en ma e ial. By elying hea ily on seconda y sou ces, I isk accep ing o he
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
esea che s’ in e p e a ion o e en s ins ead o e iewing he p ima y ma e ial
and d awing my own conclusions. Howe e , a chi al ma e ial may be agmen ed
o incomple e gi ing a pa ial o one-sided accoun o e en s. Equally, in e iews
may no be so eliable. E en hough in e iews a e eco ded and ansc ibed he
in e iewee may no necessa ily gi e an accu a e accoun o he opic unde
discussion. People’s memo y can be aul y, i is possibly no in hei bes in e es o
be u h ul o in e iewees can be emp ed o embellish o exagge a e hei own ole.
To minimise such biases I ha e s i ed o s eng hen he cons uc alidi y o
my esea ch by es ablishing causal links be ween my esea ch ques ions and policy
ac ions h ough wo o mo e sepa a e sou ces o da a. Such as by in e iewing people
close o decision making and by sou cing ele an go e nmen policy documen s.
A second app oach o inc ease cons uc alidi y in ol es es ablishing a chain o
e idence h oughou he esea ch. Tha in essence means building a isible b idge
be ween my esea ch ques ions, da a collec ion and da a analysis. In sho :
The p inciple is o allow an ex e nal obse e o – in his si ua ion he eade o he
case s udy – o ollow he de i a ion o any e idence om ini ial esea ch ques ions o
ul ima e case s udy conclusions (Yin, 2009, p. 122).
In p ac ical e ms i means ha e e y piece o da a I sou ce, whe he documen s,
a chi ed ma e ial, in e iews e c. mus be s o ed and ci ed in such a way ha an
obse e can ollow he s eps I ha e aken h oughou he esea ch.
Las ly, in e nal alidi y o a esea ch p ojec “…conce ns he ex en o which
conclusions can be d awn abou he causal e ec s o one a iable on ano he ”
(Hoyle e al., 2002, p. 32). Tha is o say, how secu e am I in claiming ha y was in
ac caused by x bu no by z o some o he a iable. Th ough his s udy I apply he
esea ch me hod o p ocess acing. P ocess acing is a aluable ool in dissec ing
chain o e en s and s eng hening in e nal alidi y as:
The p ocess acing me hod a emp s o iden i y he in e ening causal p ocesses – he
causal chain and causal mechanism – be ween an independen a iable (o a iables)
and he ou come o he dependen a iable (Geo ge & Benne , 2005, p. 206).
Thus, by sc u inizing each s ep along he causal pa hway, he esea che is able
o assess whe he he e a e any o he possible causes o a pa icula ou come o he
han hose ha he esea ch hypo hesis assumes o be co ec .
And ew Benne and Colin Elman (Benne & Elman, 2006, pp. 459-460), lis a
numbe o c i e ia’s ha should be p esen wi hin a case s udy analysis o a pe suasi e
applica ion o a p ocess acing me hod: (1) p ocess acing analysis should ha e a
con incing beginning when analysing a his o ical episode o a social phenomenon.
(2) A p ocess acing accoun should un con inuously wi h no o as ew b eaks as
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
possible in he na a i e. The eason o his is simple, a missing link in he chain o
causal p ocesses could mean ha an impo an piece o he puzzle is being le ou .
(3) Wi hin e e y p ocess acing analysis, he e is e idence ha is consis en wi h a
numbe o explana ions as well as some e idence ha will suppo one explana ion.
Subsequen ly, a p ocess acing analysis will be s eng hened i e idence is p o ided
o a speci ic link wi hin he hypo hesized chain o e en s ha canno be subs i u ed
by any o he explana ion. (4) Ou belie ha he hypo hesised explana ion is
co ec , will be imp o ed, i by p ocess acing we ind angible e idence h ough
da a collec ion ha plausible al e na i e explana ions canno explain speci ic e en s
o decisions. This is especially use ul in elimina ing i al al e na i e explana ions.
Las ly, bu ela ing o all o he a o emen ioned s eps (5) p ocess acing analysis
becomes mo e con incing i he issue o con i ma ion bias is add essed head on by
he esea che . Tha is o accoun o o he possible and plausible explana ions o a
chain o e en s, o in he wo ds o Elman and Benne (Elman & Benne , p. 460)
“… o gi e hese explana ions a “ ai shake” is-à- is he e idence, and o de elop
su icien ly di e se, de ailed, and p oba i e e idence o ele a e one explana ion o e
all o he s.”
While he ocus o his disse a ion is he 2005/2006 U.S.-Icelandic de ence
nego ia ions and he adap a ion o he go e nmen o Iceland o he closu e o Ke la ík
base, he p esen is always shaped by pas e en s. Consequen ly, chap e h ee gi es
a his o iog aphical accoun o pi o al his o ical episodes in Iceland’s ela ionship
wi h he Uni ed S a es and NATO o weeze ou he main cha ac e is ics ha ha e
shaped ha ela ionship. In chap e ou he me hod o p ocess acing is used o
analyse he de ence unc ion o Ke la ík base, wha did hose unc ions consis
o and how we e hey ca ied ou p io o he closu e o Ke la ík base in 2006. In
chap e i e p ocess acing is used o analyse he impac o he de ence ela ionship
wi h he U.S. on domes ic poli ics in Iceland, he o ma ion o an Icelandic base
policy in he 1990s and U.S. policy owa ds Ke la ík base be o e mo ing on o he
2005/2006 base nego ia ion. Chap e six p ocess aces he assump ion o de ence
asks by he go e nmen o Iceland p e iously he esponsibili y o he U.S. de ence
o ce and how successi e Icelandic go e nmen s adap ed o he closu e o he base
du ing he ime pe iod 2006-2013. Chap e se en d aws oge he he esul s o his
disse a ion in a conclusion chap e .
This s udy is ancho ed wi hin he schools o Neo ealism and Ins i u ionalism.
Bo h schools sha e he assump ion ha s a es a e a ional uni ied ac o s whose
beha iou is egula ed (Mon oe & Mahe , 1995, p. 2) by speci ic goals ha e lec
pe cei ed sel -in e es s. As his is a s udy o a de ence ela ionship be ween wo
so e eign s a es bila e ally and h ough NATO hose wo schools o hough p o ide
app op ia e pe spec i e o analysis.
Bo h schools assume ha p e e ences o s a e ac o s a e conside ed o be s able
and consis en wi h highes expec ed u ili y chosen. Ac o s a e conside ed o
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
be in o med on he ou come o all al e na i es and ully awa e o he mos likely
ou come o hei choice. Howe e , he assump ion ha a s a e ac o is able o iew all
possible al e na i es and weigh e e y possible ou come agains a unc ion o u ili y
does o e look some undamen al issues (Simon, 1995, pp. 46-47). In eali y ac o s
a e no omnipo en en i ies and he possibili y emains ha a quicke mo e e icien
way o a ain a speci ic goal exis s while a w ong ac ion may be aken on he basis o
incomple e in o ma ion abou a gi en si ua ion. Addi ionally, e e y ac ion ca ies
mul iple consequences ha a e impossible o calcula e wi h unin ended esul s
while pu suing mul iple goals a he same ime may in e e e wi h he a ainmen o
one pa icula goal.
These limi a ions on subs an i e a ionali y imply ha a heo y o a ional
beha iou needs o be supplemen ed wi h assump ions abou he goals i.e. he ac o ’s
concep ualiza ion and in o ma ion o a gi en si ua ion, as well as an unde s anding
o how an ac o in e p e s he in o ma ion a hand (Simon, 1985, pp. 294-296). As
we ha e se ou sel es ce ain bounda ies and expec a ions ega ding how he ac o
beha es his bounded a ionali y can hus be applied o analyse eal-li e e en s. These
assump ions a e hen he building blocks o heo y which in u n guide esea ch
and analysis. I ollows hen ha he ole o heo y is o “…abs ac , o gene alize,
and o connec ” (Hollis & Smi h, 1991, p. 61); as well as “… o explain gene alized
pa e ns o social beha iou and o guide an in e p e a ion o a pa icula episode
o sequence o e en s” (Le y, 2001, p. 48). The ollowing discussion d aws ou he
ele an assump ions o Neo ealism and Ins i u ionalism and how hese pe spec i es
ela e o his s udy.
2.3. Theo e ical app oach
2.3.1. Neo ealism and de ence
A guably he mos in luen ial heo y, his o ically, wi hin he ield o in e na ional
ela ions in explaining s a e beha iou seeking o p ese e i s exis ence in he
in e na ional sys em. I s assump ion is ha s a es a e d i en by sel -p ese a ion in
an ana chical in e na ional sys em wi h no sup ana ional au ho i y. Fundamen al o
ha s udy is he ole powe plays in s a e o s a e ela ions. In Theo y o In e na ional
Poli ics Kenne h Wal z de ined he in e na ional poli ical s uc u e as consis ing o
h ee componen s “… he p inciple acco ding o which hey a e o ganized o o de ed,
second by he di e en ia ion o uni s and he speci ica ion o hei unc ions, and
hi d by he dis ibu ion o capabili ies ac oss uni s” (Wal z, 1979, p. 88).
Bo owing hea ily om classical economic heo y, Wal z asse ed ha as wi h
i ms in a ma ke he in e na ional sys em is a sel -help sys em whose s uc u e is
de ined by he in e ac ions o so e eign s a es whose basic mo i a ion is o secu e
hei own su i al (Wal z, 1979, p. 118). The second de ining a ibu e o Wal z
20
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
poli ical s uc u e is he di e en ia ion o uni s. Bu as he lack o any sup ana ional
au ho i y in an ana chical sys em o ces he uni s o emain alike Wal z only accep s
so e eign s a es as uni s o he in e na ional sys em and his ac o emains cons an
(Wal z, 1979, pp. 93-96). Wi h so e eign s a es as a cons an ac o in he sys em
i is he dis ibu ion o capabili ies ac oss he uni s ha p e en s he sys em om
becoming s a ic. As s a es ace he same goals and asks hei abili y o do so a ies.
S a es a e unequal in hei mili a y, economic and poli ical powe which ansla es
in o exis en ial conce ns o e how much powe a s a e has in compa ison wi h o he s
(Wal z, 1979, pp. 129-131). S a es can ne e be ce ain abou each o he ’s in en ions
and he lack o any sup ana ional au ho i y ansla es in o a looming possibili y o
o ce being used in s a e ela ions. The e o e, a s a e mus be mind ul o ela i e gains
in any ansac ion, i.e. ha i s sha e is mo e han ha o he coope a ing s a e.
Despi e inhe en cau ion s a es mus exe cise in in e na ional coope a ion he
heo y o Neo ealism is no blind owa ds he ac ha since he end o he Second
Wo ld Wa in e na ional coope a ion has s eadily inc eased. This, howe e , is he
esul o one s a e gaining a hegemonic s a us wi hin he in e na ional sys em and i is
his hegemon which is he gua an o o s abili y (Gilpin, 1981, p. 144). Fo s abili y
o be main ained wi hin he in e na ional sys em he hegemon mus main ain i s
compa a i e supe io i y. This hegemonic s abili y heo y ames he ounda ion o
he libe al in e na ional economic sys em as being c ea ed by he Uni ed S a es as
a esul o i s p edominan posi ion in he pos -wa in e na ional sys em and he
cu en libe al o de will con inue o h i e as long as he Uni ed S a es main ains
i s hegemonic s a us wi hin he in e na ional sys em o is displaced by ano he s a e
which chooses o p ese e he s abili y o he sys em.
Bu how can a s a e su i e in such a sys em and a oid being gobbled up a i al?
The e a e wo cou ses o ac ion a ailable o a s a e. The i s op ion is o augmen i s
own in e nal s eng h ha mani es s in i s human capi al and economic and ma e ial
basis as well as i s o ganiza ional capabili ies (Handel, 1990, p. 68). Howe e , small
s a e a emp s o expand i s own in e nal s eng h o coun e ex e nal p essu e om
a would-be agg esso a e o en hampe ed by a small popula ion base, limi ed na u al
esou ces and small geog aphic a ea. Consequen ly, in ielding soldie s and chu ning
ou economic ou pu a smalle s a e will always be a a disad an age compa ed o a
la ge s a e. The second op ion is o s a es o seek o mal alliances wi h one ano he
– o a leas an in o mal suppo – o de e and igh agg esso s. The ideal s a egy
o weake /small s a es is o ally wi h o he small s a es1 and c ea e a balance o
powe agains he mo e powe ul s a es.
1 In he wo ds o Kenne h Wal z: “Seconda y s a es, i hey a e ee o choose, lock o he weake side,
o i is he s onge side ha h ea ens hem. On he weake side, hey a e bo h mo e app ecia ed and
sa e , p o ided o cou se ha he coali ion hey join achie es enough de ensi e o de e en s eng h o
dissuade ad e sa ies om a acking (Wal z. K, 1979, p. 127).

21
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
An in luen ial hinke wi hin he school o Neo ealism, S ephen Wal , a gued
ha i is a pa icula h ea ha a s a e balances agains bu no powe in isola ion.
Ha ing o choose whe he o balance o bandwagon a s a e will always look owa ds
wha ype o h ea a powe is o ha pa icula s a e. In his con ex , h ea s consis
o a numbe o s a e a ibu es ha include agg ega e powe , geog aphic p oximi y
and o ensi e powe as well as agg essi e in en ions (Wal , 1987, pp. 22-26). A
physically close s a e wi h g ea e indus ial and mili a y capabili ies, he abili y o
p ojec ha mili a y powe ab oad and wi h agg essi e ambi ions o boo will be
iewed as a h ea by o he s a es. And as each s a e seeks o gua an ee i s exis ence
ins ances will a ise when s a es a e compelled o o m an alliance agains a g ea e
powe . In a bipola in e na ional sys em, he capabili ies o each supe powe dwa s
hose o o he alliance membe s which in u n ansla es in o ma ginal con ibu ion
o smalle membe s o he alliance and undamen ally does no a ec he o e all
balance o powe (Wal z, 1979, pp. 168-170). Leeway o alliance membe s o
in luence he balance o powe be ween s a es is he e o e se e ely educed.
On his iew he Cold Wa pe iod can be explained by he in e es s and ac ions
o he wo dominan s a es wi hin NATO and he Wa saw Pac i.e. he Uni ed
S a es and he So ie Union as hose blocks we e c ea ed and shaped by he mos
powe ul ac o s in he in e na ional sys em o p o ide e ec i e ools o managing
h ea agains each o he (Mea sheime , 1995, pp. 13-14), and should be mo e
ap ly desc ibed as secu i y gua an ees a he han alliances among equals as he wo
opposing blocs sough o balance each o he h ough build-up o in e nal capabili ies
and alliance o ma ion.
Howe e , some schola s (Mo ow, 1991 and Leeds & Sa un, 2007) a gue ha
symme ical alliances as desc ibed abo e, i.e. alliances ha a e o med o inc ease
he secu i y o i s membe s a e in ac less s able han wha hey e m as asymme ic
alliances (Mo ow, 1991). The la e e m applies o alliances whe eby a s a e
ecei es secu i y gua an ees om a la ge s a e in exchange o suppo o bene i s,
o example he igh o se up mili a y bases on i s e i o y. By ba e ing secu i y o
au onomy, he membe s o on asymme ic alliance s ike a mo e balanced alliance
ha is mo e likely o con inue o p o ide bene i s o i s membe s a e he o iginal
h ea has eceded.
Leeds & Sa un (Leeds & Sa un, 2007) build on ha asse ion and con end ha
alliances be ween democ a ic small and la ge s a es a e less likely o be ab oga ed
oppo unis ically by i s membe s, and mo e so i he alliance includes p o isions o
non-mili a y coope a ion which in u n inc eases he cos o ab oga ion. Al hough
alliances be ween small and la ge powe s a e deemed by hose schola s as mo e s able
han symme ical alliances Leeds & Sa un iden i y ou ac o s ha a e c ucial o he
alue o an alliance o i s membe s: he le el o ex e nal h ea , mili a y capabili ies
o i s membe s, sha ed policy goals among he allies and he a ailabili y o subs i u e
allies (Leeds & Sa un, 2007, p.1118).
22
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
How much au onomy a small s a e is willing o elinquish in exchange o secu i y
is open o deba e. A c ucial ac o is o cou se he ulne abili y o a pa icula s a e.
One pa icula school o hough (Þó hallsson e al. 2018) ad ances he hough
ha poli ical, economic and socie al ulne abili y o smalle s a es ela i e o la ge
s a es pushes hem owa ds seeking shel e by allying wi h la ge s a es, joining
in e na ional o ganiza ions and by p omo ing in e na ional no ms and ules ha
bene i smalle s a es o a la ge ex en han bigge powe s. In i s mos ex eme o m
ulne abili ies o a small s a e may compel i o subo dina e i sel o a la ge s a e.
Tha is o say, se e ely es ic i s au onomy in exchange o secu i y.
The a e o an alliance a e a h ea o he powe balanced agains has disappea ed
is ambi alen ly add essed by Neo ealism. Alliance’s don’ come cheap. Membe s align
hei de ence policies and oops and ma e ial mus be commi ed and i he need
a ises membe s will ul ima ely go o wa . I is he e o e easonable o assume ha he
uni y o an alliance and he willingness o i s membe s o honou hei obliga ions
(McCalla, 1996, pp. 451-452) depends o a la ge ex end on he pe cep ion o a
h ea o he h ea ening beha iou o a g ea powe . Falling sho o o ecas ing he
dea h o NATO, McCalla p edic ed (McCalla, 1996, p. 454) ha he absence o a
common h ea coupled wi h he p essu e o cos s would d i e NATO membe s o
cu mili a y expendi u e while membe s become mo e asse i e and independen
as in e -alliance dispu es o e alliance policy g ows and membe s g a i a e owa ds
o he less cos ly a angemen s o in e na ional coope a ion.
O he Neo ealis s blun ly s a ed hei iews ha he Cold Wa had indeed been
he binding glue in alliance cohesion and wi h he collapse o he So ie Union
NATO and he Wa saw Pac had los hei pu pose and would bo h end up on he
ash heap o his o y (Mea sheime , 1990, pp. 5-6). A he same ime S ephen Wal
p ophesised (Wal , 1990, p. ii), ha “Al hough NATO’s elabo a e ins i u ional
s uc u e will slow he pace o de olu ion, only a esu gence o he So ie h ea is
likely o p ese e NATO in any hing like i s p esen o m.”
While o he heo is s (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991, p. 124) en isioned NATO
eplaced by a Eu opean collec i e secu i y a angemen simila o he 19 h cen u y
Conce o Eu ope. Compa able o i s p edecesso a new Eu opean conce
should consis o he majo Eu opean powe s while also including he Uni ed
S a es. To succeed he conce would ha e o be ounded on a ule-based sys em
and i s abili y o coun e he powe o any single s a e. O cou se, he membe s o
he conce would ha e o ha e a common iew o wha necessi a es a s able and
accep able in e na ional o de and a sha ed unde s anding o a speci ic in e na ional
communi y ounded on he sha ed belie ha p ese ing ha communi y is in he
in e es o indi idual na ions.
Neo ealis p edic ions ha NATO would ade in o obscu i y ha e no come ue.
Since he end o he Cold Wa he alliance has expanded o include 29 s a es. As
be o e he co e o he alliance is a icle V o he Washing on T ea y s a ing ha an
23
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
a med a ack agains one o i s membe s in Eu ope o No h Ame ica is conside ed
an a ack agains all membe s. O cou se, i could be a gued ha NATO’s su i al is
inhe en ly linked o he unipola na u e o he pos -Cold Wa in e na ional sys em
(Wal z, 2000, p. 20). The h ea ins umen al o cohesion among NATO membe s
has disappea ed bu NATO li es on because i se es he in e es o he hegemon
o he alliance i.e. he Uni ed S a es since h ough he alliance i is able o in luence
he o eign- and secu i y policies o i s membe s, an in luence ha would be se e ely
educed wi hou he alliance.
Iceland is a small s a e wi h a popula ion well unde hal a million and has
been unde o eign ule o mos o i s exis ence since se lemen in he nin h and
en h cen u y AD. Th oughou he ages, Iceland’s small popula ion base ansla ed
in o lack o a c i ical mass o people o aise a mies while i s small ma e ial base
o p oduc ion and limi ed na u al esou ces has been a om p o iding c edible
o e ec i e de ences. F om a Neo ealis pe spec i e, since building up i s own
capabili ies o de e and esis possible agg ession has no been an op ion he wises
cou se o ac ion has been o seek o mal alliances wi h o he s a es which has been
he policy o Icelandic decision-make s since 1941.
F om he signing o Iceland´s i s de ence ag eemen wi h he Uni ed S a es in
1941 Iceland was i mly placed in he U.S. sphe e o in luence. A posi ion u he
en enched wi h NATO membe ship in 1949 and he signing o he second
de ence ag eemen wi h he Uni ed S a es in 1951. F om a Neo ealis s andpoin
he de ence ag eemen s se ed bo h he in e es s o he Uni ed S a es and Iceland.
The Uni ed S a es gained an impo an s a egic mili a y base in he No h A lan ic
while Iceland gained an alliance ha c edibly de e ed any u u e mili a y h ea o
agg ession. The decision by he Uni ed S a es in 2006 o close i s base in Ke la ík
spelled he end o 65-yea con inuous U.S. mili a y p esence in a coun y wi h no
a med o ces o i s own.
As an asymme ical alliance he de ence ela ionship be ween Iceland and he U.S.
ansla ed in o U.S. use o Icelandic e i o y o a mili a y base in e u n o secu i y
a he expense o na ional au onomy. A e all, he 1951 De ence Ag eemen be ween
Iceland and he U.S. en us ed he U.S., on behal o NATO, wi h he de ence o
Iceland and he eby absol ing Icelandic go e nmen s o indi idual de ence planning
and p epa edness. Fo mos o he pos wa pe iod he le el o ex e nal h ea and
sha ed policy goals emained he same: o de e and esis So ie agg ession in he
No h A lan ic. Howe e , as he Cold Wa came o an end he policy goals o he U.S.
shi ed away om e i o ial de ence owa ds in e en ion du ing he Yugosla ian
wa s o succession in he 1990s o igh ing wa s in A ghanis an and he Middle Eas
in he ea ly 2000s.
Howe e , al hough he So ie Union was gone Icelandic p io i ies emained he
same: keeping he U.S. de ence o ce in Iceland and e ain as much o he s a us
quo as possible wi hou o e ing up a c edible a ional why U.S. mili a y o ces
24
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
should be kep in Iceland. As a esul , a logical conclusion should be ha he de ence
ela ionship be ween Iceland and he U.S. should become less s able in he 1990s and
onwa d in o he ea ly 2000s as U.S. policy goals shi ed o o he egions o he wo ld.
On ha iew, Icelandic decision make s should ha e been d i en o ensu e con inued
U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland du ing he 2005/2006 de ence nego ia ions, o , a
he e y leas , a con inued U.S. mili a y gua an ee a e he base closed down. In he
yea s ollowing he closu e i should also be expec ed ha Icelandic decision make s
should mo e owa ds deepening de ence coope a ion wi h o he egional s a es and
mo e owa ds building up domes ic de ence capabili ies in Iceland o compensa e
o he loss o he U.S. de ence o ce and he de ence capabili ies ha i p o ided.
2.3.2. Ins i u ionalism and de ence
Ins i u ional heo y builds on he ounda ion o Neo ealism bu supplemen s i s
ocus on powe and in e es s wi h in e na ional coope a ion h ough in o mal o
o mal ins i u ions. O as ph ased by Robe Keohane:
Realis heo ies ha seek o p edic in e na ional beha iou on he basis o in e es s and
powe alone a e impo an bu insu icien o an unde s anding o wo ld poli ics. They
need o be supplemen ed, hough no eplaced, by heo ies s essing he impo ance o
in e na ional ins i u ions (Keohane, 2005, p. 14).
Neo ealism gi es p ominence o powe and secu i y while Ins i u ionalism
ocuses on how s a es bene i by os e ing us by coope a ing h ough ins i u ions.
Ins i u ionalis heo y is no in disag eemen wi h Neo ealism abou he na u e o
he in e na ional sys em. As in Neo ealism he s a e is iewed as he p ima y uni
o an in e na ional sys em ha is ana chical in na u e. And, as wi h Neo ealism,
he s a e is assumed o be a a ional sel -p ese ing uni ha seeks o maximise i s
own in e es s. Howe e , wha se s Ins i u ionalis s apa is he alue hey place on
in e na ional egimes/ins i u ions in os e ing coope a ion among s a es.
Fully sel -in e es ed s a es in an ana chical in e na ional sys em wi h no
sup ana ional au ho i y acknowledge he ac ha in e na ional coope a ion
p o ides s a es wi h Pa e o-e icien gains i.e. op imal solu ions ha lea e all pa ies
be e o a e a ansac ion (Va ian, 2003, pp. 15-16). Howe e , in a sel -help sys em
coope a ion is always h ea ened by he isk o a s a e de aul ing on i s commi men
o sel ish gains.
In he con ex o de ence, in pa icula nuclea a ms educ ion alks, such a
p isone ’s dilemma uns he isk ha a e coun y A and B ha e ag eed o educe
hei nuclea a senals he incen i e emains o bo h s a es o chea in he hope ha
he o he pa y honou s he ag eemen , hus il ing he balance o powe in i s a ou .
O cou se, by bo h chea ing hey will ind hemsel es in he same ela i e posi ion as
i no ag eemen had been eached. The e o e, o ensu e ha bo h sides honou hei
31
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
3. Iceland’s de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es
Un il he ea ly and mid-20 h cen u y Iceland was an isola ed pa o he Kingdom o
Denma k on he pe iphe y o Eu ope. Technological de elopmen s and wo wo ld
wa s made Iceland an indispensable ally o he Uni ed S a es and he Wes e n
block du ing he Cold Wa . This chap e p o ides an o e iew o he undamen al
ulne abili ies acing Iceland un il en e ing a de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed
S a es in 1941 and how he de ence ela ionship bene i ed Iceland du ing he
Cold Wa . In pa icula in economic e ms in he 1950s and in p o iding a poli ical
le e age o Iceland in achie ing i s majo o eign policy objec i e in he la e pa
o he 20 h cen u y, he g adual ex ension o Iceland’s EEZ un il he cu en 200
nau ical mile EEZ was eached in 1976.
3.1. Ea ly his o y
Iceland was se led in he 9 h and 10 h cen u y wi h he a i al o No se se le s om
No way and he B i ish Islands. A e decades o con lic be ween he uling amilies
o Iceland in he 13 h cen u y Iceland came unde he ule o he No wegian mona chy
in 1262 h ough signing o he Old Co enan (Gamli sá máli). In 1380 con ol o
Iceland passed o e o he Danish mona chy h ough a ma iage be ween he Danish
and No wegian oyal houses. Following he e en ual aboli ion o he Kingdom o
No way in 1537 Iceland was uled di ec ly by he Danish king and his o icials.
Du ing he cen u ies o Danish ule Iceland’s emo eness om Denma k ansla ed
in o di icul y o he Danish mona chy o p o ide Iceland wi h adequa e de ence
(Tho s einsson, 1992b, p. 10). In he ea ly 15 h cen u y English me chan s and
ishe men inc easingly se sail o Iceland and while ela ions we e usually peace ul
English aide s occasionally obbed he esidency o he Danish go e no o Iceland
and loo ed chu ches. Th oughou he 16 h and 17 h cen u y he e we e ins ances o
pi a es aiding he coas o Iceland wi h he mos no o ious aid aking place in 1627
when Alge ian pi a es killed up o 50 people and abduc ed oughly 400 Icelande s.
Danish wa ships in Icelandic wa e s we e a a e sigh and i seen p o ided esco o
Danish me chan essels. No local mili a y o ce exis ed in Iceland al hough in 1580
king F ed ik II o Denma k dispa ched a shipmen o six guns and eigh spea s o
e e y coun y in Iceland (Jóhannesson, 1968, p. 123-126) and in 1586 o de ed he
cons uc ion o a small o i ica ion in Ves mannaeyja Island o he sou h coas o
Iceland.

32
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
As a pa o he Kingdom o Denma k he e loomed he isk ha Iceland would
be d agged in o con lic s ha Denma k was emb oiled in wi h o he na ions. A
no able episode ook place in 1809 du ing he Napoleonic wa s. A e Denma k
sided wi h Napoleonic F ance he B i ish Na y began o in e cep shipping be ween
Denma k and he e i o ies in he No h A lan ic.
By es ic ing ade be ween Iceland and Denma k he B i ish Na y opened up
luc a i e business en u e o o he s (Agna sdó i , 1979, p. 29-36) and in Janua y
1809 a London based soap me chan Samuel Phelps se sail o Iceland on an a med
me chan essel. A i ing in Iceland Phelps and his companions we e o bidden o
ade by he local au ho i ies. No in ending o le a good business oppo uni y go o
was e Phelps was e en ually able o sign a ade ag eemen wi h he ep esen a i es
o Danish au ho i y in Iceland. Howe e , he ade ag eemen Phelps secu ed was
nulli ied by he highes - anking Danish o icial in Iceland, Coun T ampe, who
also decla ed ha ading wi h B i ish me chan s would be punishable by dea h.
A e o cing he Coun o honou he p e ious ag eemen Phelps and his c ew o
ele en men decided o s age a coup. T ampe was a es ed and Phelps appoin ed a
Danish p isone o wa , Jø gen Jø gensen, as Lo d P o ec o o a ee independen
Iceland.
In mid-Augus his li le coup came o an ab up end wi h he a i al in Reykja ík
o he B i ish iga e HMS Talbo . I s commande , Alexande Jones, ook he iew
ha he B i ish go e nmen would no sanc ion he coup as Phelps had iola ed no
only B i ish bu also in e na ional law (Agna sdó i , 1999, p. 129). On 21 Augus
Jones handed o e all powe in Iceland o Danish o icials. The ad en u e o Phelps
and Jø gensen unde lines Iceland’s ulne abili y, as well as Denma k’s inabili y o
p o ide he island wi h adequa e de ences. Iceland’s g ea es gua an ee lay in i s
emo eness, bu as he mode n e a d ew close ha assu ance became mo e and
mo e ou wo n.
In 1874 King Ch is ian IX g an ed Iceland a sepa a e cons i u ion and in 1904
he Minis y o Icelandic a ai s was ans e ed om Copenhagen o Reykja ík
and Icelande s g an ed home ule.
Wi h he ou b eak o wa in 1914 Iceland’s dependency on open ade ou es in
he No h A lan ic became pain ully ob ious. A e he B i ish go e nmen ini ia ed
an emba go on he Cen al Powe s he B i ish Na y began o in e cep me chan
essels sailing be ween Iceland and Denma k and con isca e ca go conside ed a
isk o being sold onwa d o Ge many. Unde s andably he Danish go e nmen
p o es ed his iola ion o Danish so e eign y. Unde he h ea ha he Uni ed
Kingdom would s op supplying Iceland wi h coal (Jónsson, 1969, p. 578-579) he
Icelandic home ule go e nmen ag eed in Augus 1915 ha all ships sailing om
Iceland o Eu opean po s would ha e o make a po -o -call in a B i ish ha bou o
inspec ion. In he win e o 1915-1916 he B i ish g ip on Icelandic o eign ade
became igh e and igh e .
33
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
In ea ly sp ing 1916 a ade ag eemen was signed be ween he B i ish
go e nmen and he Icelandic home ule go e nmen ha ga e special conside a ion
o Icelandic-Danish ade (Jensdó i , 1980, p. 105). The B i ish au ho i ies se a
quo a o Icelandic expo s ha could be aded o Denma k. Howe e , Icelande s
we e allowed o expo eely o B i ain and o he allied and neu al na ions excep
o hose bo de ing Ge many (Jensdó i , 1980, p. 45). Fo i s pa , he B i ish
go e nmen was obliged o pu chase Icelandic expo s ha Iceland was unable o
sell o o he ma ke s and o p o ide Iceland wi h essen ial goods such as coal and
sal .
This was o cou se highly unusual as any nego ia ions on o eign ade should ha e
been be ween he B i ish go e nmen and hei Danish coun e pa in Copenhagen.
Howe e , he B i ish emba go and B i ish- Icelandic ade ela ions e ealed a
simple u h: Iceland was wi hin a B i ish sphe e o in luence and B i ain could do
as i pleased. Danish powe lessness was appa en and all ha he Danish go e nmen
– in he o m o Minis e o Fo eign A ai s E ik Sca enius – could hope o was a
b ie ing om he Icelandic nego ia o s on he con en o he B i ish-Icelandic ade
ag eemen (Bjö nsson, 1957, p. 101). B i ish in e e ence wi h Icelandic ade las ed
un il he end o he wa . The ade ag eemen was enego ia ed in 1917 and 1918
and emained alid un il 1 May 1919.
De e mining Iceland’s o eign ade policy du ing he wa was no he only
B i ish in e e ence in Icelandic ma e s as hey also dic a ed h ough hei Consul
in Reykja ík ha all eleg ams sen ab oad had o be in ei he English o F ench. The
only eleg ams exemp om his ule we e ciphe ed eleg ams he B i ish Consul
sen o his supe iso s in London (Jensdó i , 1980, p. 17). Why he Icelandic home
ule go e nmen complied wi h such in e en ion is qui e simple. The only eleg am
cable connec ing Iceland wi h he ou side wo ld lay be ween Iceland and Sco land.
The e o e, o he B i ish o se e e comple ely Iceland’s communica ion wi h he
ou side wo ld was qui e easy.
The 1918 Union Ac be ween Denma k and Iceland was a miles one owa ds
Icelandic independence. The Ac de ined he s a us o Iceland and Denma k as
wo so e eign s a es in a pe sonal union ha sha ed as head o s a e he Danish
mona ch. Gi ing bo h s a es he op ion o e mina e he Union Ac a e 25 yea s
which would g an Iceland a ully independen s a ehood. The highes le el o he
judicia y emained in Copenhagen un il he es ablishmen o he Icelandic Sup eme
Cou (Hæs i é u ) in 1920. And in ma e s o o eign a ai s and de ence he
same symbio ic ela ionship emained be ween he wo s a es. Wi hou any o eign
se ice o i s own he Icelandic go e nmen o mula ed i s own o eign policy which
was hen implemen ed on Iceland’s behal by he Danish o eign se ice.
The Union Ac s a ed ha Iceland was a neu al s a e which has o be iewed
in con ex o he pe sonal union be ween Iceland and Denma k as i s pu pose was
o p e en Iceland o Denma k om being au oma ically in ol ed in a con lic
34
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
alongside he o he s a e. Howe e , Iceland was ee o wi hd aw i s neu ali y and
ake side in a con lic . The me i s o he neu ali y clause we e ho ly deba ed a he
ime among he poli ical eli e in Iceland (A nó sson, 1923, p. 119). Some we e o he
iew ha i p o ided an adequa e sa egua d agains agg ession while o he s a gued
ha decla a ions o neu ali y we e o limi ed use and had no p o ec ed Belgium
o Luxembou g om agg ession in 1914 and ha a decla a ion o neu ali y would
no p o ec Iceland du ing imes o wa i he g ea powe s belie ed hey could use
Iceland o hei own ad an age.
3.2. The de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es
Wha emained o he bond be ween Iceland and Denma k was se e ed by he Nazi
in asion and occupa ion o Denma k on 9 Ap il 1940. On he same day B i ish
au ho i ies in i ed he Icelandic go e nmen o join he allied cause and eques ed
use o acili ies in Iceland. The o e was u ned down on he basis o he neu ali y
clause o he Union Ac (Whi ehead, 2006, pp. 30-32) while Icelandic cabine
membe s p i a ely exp essed hei iew o he B i ish ambassado in Reykja ík ha
hey hoped B i ish na al dominance in he No h A lan ic would de e any Ge man
agg ession agains Iceland.
The B i ish, mind ul o hei own in e es s, sp ang in o ac ion and on 10 May
1940 a B i ish expedi iona y o ce in aded and occupied Iceland. La e ha e ening
P ime Minis e Jónasson in a na ional adio add ess ga e an accoun o he in asion
and desc ibed he B i ish occupa ion as a p ecau ion agains possible Ge man ac ion
agains Iceland while emphasising ha he B i ish go e nmen had no in en ion o
in ol ing i sel in Icelandic domes ic a ai s.
The Uni ed S a es, s ill a neu al coun y in he win e o 1940-1941, was
inc easingly becoming mo e in ol ed in he allied wa cause and ac i ely sough
ways o alle ia e p essu e on o e s e ched B i ish o ces. Fo P esiden Roose el
such a cou se o ac ion migh include eplacing B i ish o ces in Iceland wi h U.S.
oops (Co gan, 1992, p. 139). In la e 1940 en a i e discussions ook place be ween
U.S. o icials and he Icelandic go e nmen . As discussions p og essed i became
clea ha he U.S. go e nmen was only willing o ake o e he de ence o Iceland
h ough a o mal in i a ion om he Icelandic go e nmen (U.S. Depa men o
S a e, 1959, pp. 777-780). The issue was deba ed wi hin he Icelandic go e nmen
since such an in i a ion signi ied a undamen al change in Icelandic de ence policy
as i mean abandoning he posi ion o neu ali y and joining he allied camp
(S e ánsson, 1966, pp. 190-194). A e all, Iceland was an occupied coun y and
had no say in he p esence o B i ish oops on i s e i o y. Howe e , by in i ing
U.S. oops o Iceland he go e nmen o Iceland was making a so e eign decision o
accep U.S. mili a y p o ec ion.
35
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
E en ually, he go e nmen ag eed o enounce neu ali y and on 1 July 1941
an exchange o no es ook place be ween P esiden Roose el and P ime Minis e
Jónasson whe eby he go e nmen o Iceland in i ed he U.S. go e nmen o
supplemen and e en ually eplace B i ish o ces in Iceland. Howe e , he in i a ion
depended on a numbe o condi ions ha he U.S. go e nmen was equi ed
o mee . Chie among hem was a p omise ha all U.S. mili a y o ces would be
immedia ely wi hd awn om Iceland on he conclusion o he wa . The go e nmen
o Iceland would no ha e o con ibu e any unding o he de ence o Iceland.
The Uni ed S a es would ecognize he independence and so e eign y o Iceland,
secu e shipping o Iceland, g an Icelande s a ou able ade ag eemen s and o
supply Iceland wi h necessi ies (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1959, pp. 785-787).
Simul aneously he Icelandic go e nmen eached an ag eemen wi h he B i ish
go e nmen o ecognise Iceland´s independence a e he wa and o p omo e ade
be ween he wo coun ies (Tho s einsson, 1992b, p. 214). A e he go e nmen s o
he h ee coun ies had eached a inal ag eemen he oad was pa ed o he a i al
o U.S. oops on 7 July 1941. Two days la e he Icelandic Pa liamen a i ied he
1941 Icelandic-U.S. De ence Ag eemen and U.S. o ces g adually eplaced mos o
he B i ish oops in Iceland al hough some emained in Iceland un il 1945.
Th oughou he wa bo h U.S. and B i ish mili a y au ho i es cons uc ed
a numbe o mili a y acili ies in Iceland. Chie among hem we e he aipo s in
Reykja ík and Ke la ík. Reykja ík ai po , cons uc ed by he B i ish in 1940, was
handed o e o he Icelandic au ho i ies bu a mo e complica ed pic u e eme ged
wi h he hando e o Ke la ík ai po (buil by he U.S. in 1942). As ea ly as 1942
policy make s in Washing on D.C. ealised ha i emained a U.S. s a egic in e es
o e ain mili a y bases in Iceland a e he end o he wa and by 1944 he U.S. Join
Chie s o S a concluded ha Iceland was second only o England and G eenland
o U.S. o ensi e and de ensi e pu poses in Eu ope (Whi ehead, 1998, pp. 18-19).
Sho ly a e he end o hos ili es in Oc obe 1945 he U.S. go e nmen o mally
eques ed a 99-yea lease o land o mili a y bases a Ke la ík ai po and wo na al
acili ies close o he capi al o Reykja ík. The Icelandic go e nmen was willing o
en e explo a o y alks (Whi ehead, 1976, p. 144) bu ejec ed he p oposal o
domes ic poli ical easons.
Howe e , in Augus 1946 he wo sides eached an al e na i e a angemen
ha allowed con inued U.S. mili a y use o he ai po (Tho s einsson, 1992b,
pp. 313,314). Ke la ík ai po was o be handed o e o he Icelandic au ho i ies.
Howe e , ai a ic con ol and all o he aspec s o unning he ai po would
emain in he hands o a U.S. ci ilian con ac o unded by he U.S. go e nmen .
The so called Ke la ík Ag eemen e oked he De ence Ag eemen o 1941 and in
ea ly 1947 all U.S. oops had been emo ed om Iceland. Fa om wha he U.S.
go e nmen had been planning o in 1945 he ag eemen ne e heless ga e he U.S.
a oo hold in pos -wa Iceland.
36
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Among he Icelandic poli ical es ablishmen he e was li le suppo o long e m
U.S. mili a y bases in Iceland bu he e we e clea gains o be had om con inued
U.S. in e es in Iceland and miniscule U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland in he o m
o ansi ligh a Ke la ík ai po be ween No h Ame ica and Eu ope. The e was
a ce ain elemen o de e ence in ha ing Ame ican con ac o s p esen a Ke la ík
ai po and clea inancial gains o be had since he Icelandic au ho i ies we e ully
exemp om unding he ai po and he Icelandic go e nmen could o cou se
hope in u n o a ou able ade concessions om he Uni ed S a es.
The1918 Union Ac came o an end in 1944 and Iceland eme ged as a ully
independen s a e. Following he de ea o he Axis powe s in 1945 he wa ime
alliance be ween he Uni ed S a es and he So ie Union quickly un a elled and by
1947 i was clea ha he wo powe s we e becoming locked in a Cold Wa .
The p eca ious wo ld si ua ion was no los on Iceland’s coali ion go e nmen 3
o med in Feb ua y 1947 o he poli ical leade ship in neighbou ing Scandina ian
coun ies who sha ed hei conce ns o So ie expansion and agg ession wi h hei
Icelandic colleagues (S e ánsson, 1967, pp. 42-43 and Jónsson, 1973, pp. 132-133).
The o ma ion o a egional secu i y de ence egime in Scandina ia was d eam up
and he leade s o Sweden, Denma k and No way discussed he c ea ion o a No dic
de ence alliance. Delibe a ions began in May 1948 bu soon eached a dead end
because o a undamen al disag eemen o he p emise o such an alliance. Sweden
insis ed ha he alliance would ha e o be based on he concep o neu ali y and
non-alignmen (Lundes ad, 1980, pp. 211-212) while No way and Denma k
insis ed on close alignmen wi h wes e n powe s.
The Icelandic go e nmen ollowed he discussions om a a bu was looking
wes wa d a he han eas wa d in seeking de ence gua an ees. In he au umn o
1948 he U.S. ambassado in Reykja ík, Richa d P. Bu ick, b ough up wi h
Fo eign Minis e Bja ni Benedik sson he possible c ea ion o a de ence alliance
ha would include No h Ame ica and Wes e n Eu ope and sough his iews on
a possible Icelandic pa icipa ion (BB, 1948). Benedik sson in o med Bu ick
ha he would ha e o consul his go e nmen be o e a o mal in i a ion could
be ecei ed and ha he posi ion o he Icelandic go e nmen would be g ea ly
in luenced by wha posi ion he Danish and No wegian go e nmen s had owa ds
such an alliance.
In la e Janua y 1949 Benedik sson consul ed wi h bo h Danish Fo eign Minis e ,
Gus a Rasmussen, in Copenhagen and he No wegian Fo eign Minis e Hal a d
Lange in Oslo. The Danish posi ion was ha he go e nmen was conside ing
he U.S. p oposal as an al e na i e op ion in case he Scandina ian de ence alks
would ail (BB, 1949a), howe e , he poli ical pa ies we e di ided on he issue
3 The coali ion go e nmen consis ed o Social Democ a s, P og essi e Pa y and he Independence
Pa y, headed by he Social Democ a ic P ime Minis e , S e án Jóhann S e ánsson.

37
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
and he Danish go e nmen would ha e o ob ain mo e in o ma ion abou wha
membe ship en ailed be o e making any commi men s.
In Oslo Benedik sson ecei ed a simila p agma ic and cau ious eply as in
Denma k. Fo eign Minis e Lange explained ha he No wegian go e nmen
would mos likely choose o pa icipa e in ea y alks wi h he Uni ed S a es as he
did no expec he c ea ion o a Scandina ian alliance o become a eali y. Howe e ,
he No wegian go e nmen would insis ha he e should be no o eign bases in
No way du ing peace ime (BB, 1949b). Ha ing mapped ou he posi ion o Iceland’s
ellow No dic na ions Benedik sson in o med Lange ha his go e nmen desi ed o
be able o consul wi h No way on hese ma e s since Icelande s lacked expe ise
and knowledge in mili a y ma e s o which Lange esponded a ou ably.
E en ually in Ma ch 1949 he Depa men o S a e in i ed he go e nmen o
Iceland o send a delega ion o Washing on D.C. o u he discussions abou he
p oposed alliance. Made p ima ily up o ep esen a i es o he h ee-pa y coali ion
go e nmen he delega ion consis ed o Fo eign Minis e Bja ni Benedik sson
(Independence Pa y), Minis e o Comme ce and T ade Emil Jónsson (Social
Democ a ic Pa y), Minis e o Educa ion, Eys einn Jónsson (P og essi e Pa y),
he ambassado o he Uni ed S a es Tho Tho s and Hans G. Ande sen om he
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s.
The delega ion was g ee ed a he S a e Depa men by Sec e a y o S a e Dean
Acheson who was lanked by a numbe o high- anking o icials. Acheson amed he
discussion by acknowledging ha Iceland had no a med o ces o i s own and ha
he go e nmen o Iceland had no desi e o o eign oops o be s a ioned in Iceland
du ing peace ime. A e gi ing a b ie in oduc ion o he gene al p inciples o he
ea y a icles Acheson ook his lea e and allowed he alks o con inue wi hou his
p esence.
The discussion ha ollowed cen ed on he obliga ions Iceland would be
expec ed o assume as a membe o he alliance (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1975).
The p ima y goal o he Icelande s was o ensu e ha o eign oops and bases would
no be placed in Iceland du ing peace ime while he e we e also conce ns ha ha an
ag eed ea y would oblige Iceland o enew he 1946 Ke la ík Ag eemen . Di ec o
o he O ice o Eu opean A ai s John D. Hicke son was he one o answe by saying
ha alliance membe s would need ce ain acili ies in Iceland and Ke la ík ai po
would ha e o be a ailable du ing eme gencies. Howe e , main enance would mos
likely be unded by he U.S. go e nmen . Wi h ega d o o eign o ces in Iceland,
a he han elying on s a ic o ces he in en ion was o ensu e he p o ec ion o
Iceland h ough he con ol o he ai and sea lines o communica ion.
The Icelande s we e con en wi h lea ing he issue o bases aside o he ime being
bu inqui ed whe he he U.S. and he U.K. would no be au oma ically compelled o
aid Iceland i a acked because i s impo ance o hei in e es s ega dless o whe he
Iceland became a membe o he alliance o no . No disag eeing wi h ha s a emen
38
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Cha les E. Bohlen, counsello a he S a e Depa men , eplied ha Iceland would
be sending ou signals ha he So ie Union migh ake ad an age o and help would
only a i e a e an a ack had aken place. The Icelande s also inqui ed whe he
Iceland could s and ou side he ea y bu decla e ins ead ha Iceland would p o ide
he U.S. and he U.K. wi h acili ies in Iceland i wa b oke ou . In u n, he U.S. and
he U.K. would announce ha an a ack on Iceland equalled an a ack on hem.
Bohlen and Hicke son eplied ha he Icelande s we e alking abou a sepa a e
alliance be ween Iceland and he U.S. and he U.K. which was no on he able and
nei he was a unila e al U.S. secu i y gua an ee o Iceland.
Recon ening he day a e he U.S. side was ein o ced by o icials om he
Pen agon. The pu pose o his second mee ing was o discuss Iceland’s mili a y
ulne abili y and p o ide answe s o any ques ions o a de ence and mili a y na u e
he delega ion migh ha e. Fo he Icelande s he undamen al issue emained
ha no o eign o ces should be based in he coun y du ing peace ime while a
he same ime no jeopa dizing Iceland´s secu i y. I came o Ai Fo ce Majo
Gene al Ande son o answe his ques ion. Ande son poin ed ou ha Iceland
was s a egically well placed o an a ack bo h on he Uni ed S a es and he So ie
Union. The e o e, in he e en o wa bo h sides would y o p e en he o he
om using Iceland o mili a y pu poses. Na y Admi al Woold idge backed up his
colleague and poin ed ou ha i would be possible o ein o ce Iceland p io o
ou b eak o wa as hos ili ies a e usually p eceded by a pe iod o escala ion.
Wi h good planning and acili ies in place Iceland would be easonably secu e
wi hou pe manen oops in he coun y as a So ie a ack would mos likely
in ol e landing small numbe o oops in subma ines and eigh e s o he use o
pa a oope s o cap u e impo an ai ields. Ande son and Woold idge emphasised
ha he Uni ed S a es would ne e ole a e So ie con olled Iceland ega dless o
whe he Iceland would be a membe o he planned mili a y alliance o no (BB,
1949c). A coun e a ack o e ake he island would incu huge damage and loss o
li e since mos o he popula ion in Iceland was concen a ed in he Sou h-Wes o
he coun y in close icini y o he main ai po s and ha bou .
The inal mee ing was con ened in he S a e Depa men on 16 Ma ch. Holding
i m o i s posi ion ha no o eign oops should be s a ioned in Iceland du ing
peace ime he Icelande s sough a con i ma ion ha acili ies in Iceland would no be
equi ed unless a membe s a e had been a acked which in oked a icle V o he ea y
ag eemen s ipula ing ha a ack on one-membe equalled a ack on all. Hicke son
ag eed ha a icle V would ha e o be in oked o a s a e o an eme gency decla ed
in which he go e nmen o Iceland would ha e o decide whe he o accep o eign
oops o no o i s own ee will. A he conclusion o he inal session Hicke son
s a ed ha he Uni ed S a es would be willing o publicly decla e ha alliance
membe ’s unde s ood Iceland’s special s a us as a coun y wi hou a med o ces and
ha no o eign oops o bases should be s a ioned in Iceland du ing peace ime.
39
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Sho ly a e he delega ion e u ned o Iceland he go e nmen pu o h a
esolu ion in Pa liamen ha would commi Iceland o membe ship o he No h
A lan ic T ea y O ganisa ion (NATO). In ense deba es ensued in Pa liamen
wi h he Socialis Pa y ehemen ly agains membe ship as hey saw i as one s ep
owa ds deli e ing Iceland in o he hands o Ame ican impe ialism (Guðlaugsson
& Jónsson, 1976, p. 130). Pa liamen o ed on membe ship on 30 Ma ch 1949
unde a hails o m o b oken glass as socialis demons a o s in on o Pa liamen
bomba ded he pa liamen building wi h ocks. Accession was app o ed wi h 37
o es agains 13. Opposed we e all he membe s o he Socialis Pa y, wo membe s
o he Social Democ a ic Pa y, and one membe o he P og essi e Pa y while wo
P og essi e Pa y membe s abs ained.
As p e iously discussed, one o he main conce ns o he Icelandic delega ion
du ing he Washing on alks in Ma ch 1949 had been ha no mili a y bases o
o eign oops should be placed in Iceland du ing peace ime. Du ing he Second
Wo ld Wa , ens o housands o o eign soldie s li ed amongs he 120,000 na i es
o Iceland and al hough ela ions be ween Icelande s and allied soldie s we e mos ly
amiable such high numbe s o o eign soldie s did cause ension wi hin an Icelandic
socie y coming o g ips wi h i s own pos -independence iden i y and was iewed by
many Icelande s as a h ea o Icelandic cul u al in eg i y.
Howe e , he Icelandic insis ence no o accep o eign oops in Iceland – coupled
wi h he absence o any Icelandic de ence o ce – was a sou ce o us a ion o
policy make s in Washing on D.C. as e idenced in a epo by he U.S. Depa men
o S a e, da ed 15 May 1950:
This inconsis ency be ween Iceland’s unwillingness o unde ake any measu es in i s
own de ence on he one hand, and i s desi e o p o ec ion on he o he , is mani es ed
in he a i ude o Icelande s owa d he Ke la ik ai po . Recogni ion o i s s a egic
impo ance had led he go e nmen o acquiesce in i s exis ence – and o use i as a
ba gaining poin in ob aining such inancial and o he assis ance as hey ha e desi ed.
Ne e heless, hey ha e no only emained opposed o any mili a y measu es designed
o p o ec Ke la ik agains sudden a ack bu ha e shown a con inuing u ge o assume
ull con ol o e he ai po e en hough hey a e nei he echnically no inancially
able o ope a e i (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1977, p. 1466).
Jus i ied o no , wha he U.S. Depa men o S a e pe cei ed as an apa he ic
Icelandic app oach o i s own secu i y would soon change wi h e en s aking place
in Sou h Eas Asia. On 25 June 1950 No h Ko ea in aded Sou h Ko ea. Coinciding
wi h moun ing ensions in Eu ope be ween Eas and Wes was he appea ance o a
So ie he ing lee in he ishing g ounds o he coas o no he n Iceland.
Icelandic decision make s could no dismiss he possibili y ha his was a
disguised So ie na al con oy as gun moun ings we e spo ed on ship decks al hough
40
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
no isible weapon y was in sigh (FO-371/86501, 1950c). Fo eign Minis e Bja ni
Benedik sson oiced his conce ns o he U.S. and B i ish ambassado s and he U.S.
esponse was o o e o send ou des oye s o Icelandic wa e s. Sho ly a e he
des oye s a i ed in Reykja ik ha bou umou s sp ead ha locals had spo ed a
subma ine in he wa e s o Reykjanes peninsula close o Ke la ík ai po . The U.S.
and B i ish au ho i ies con i med ha none o hei subma ines we e in he a ea
p omp ing he Icelandic go e nmen o eques o he des oye s o be s a ioned
in Iceland un il he So ie he ing lee had depa ed la e in he au umn (FO-
371/86501, 1950d). The U.S. and B i ish au ho i ies we e inclined o ega d he
mys e ious subma ine as a me e umou while conside ing whe he his sca e could
be used o p ess Icelande s in o imp o ing he de ences o Iceland.
Ins ead o elying on di ec p essu e he U.S. S a e Depa men and he B i ish
Fo eign O ice decided o make an appeal o No dic solida i y and see i No wegian
Fo eign Minis e Hal a d Lange, du ing a isi o Iceland, would be willing o y
o in luence Icelandic decision make s (FO-371/86501, 1950e). Ini ially, he S a e
Depa men decided o emain in he backg ound and only app oach Lange in
case he B i ish el i necessa y. The pu pose was o p e en he Icelande s om
ge ing he imp ession ha Lange was simply se ing U.S. and B i ish in e es s (FO-
371/86501, 1950e). In his con e sa ion wi h he B i ish ambassado in Oslo Lange
p omised o do his bes and unde s ood he impo ance o aming his conce ns as
genuine No wegian de ence conce ns (FO-371/86501, 1950a).
In la e Augus Benedik sson and Lange me a a ecep ion held by he No wegian
Embassy in Reykja ík (INA, 1950). As p omised, Lange made i clea o
Benedik sson ha i was unaccep able ha he ai po s in Ke la ík and Reykja ík
we e wi hou any de ences. No dic coope a ion, Lange con inued, was wo h li le
i he No dic coun ies did no ealise ha hey belonged o a g oup o ee na ions.
The e o e, Icelande s should ake he ini ia i e and o ganize a de ence o ce o
de end i s ai po s. Such a mo e would be bene icial o Iceland and inc ease he sense
o secu i y among Iceland’s neighbou s. I he c ea ion o such an Icelandic de ence
o ce was un easible o he Icelandic go e nmen hen o he measu es would ha e
o be aken Benedik sson eplied ha he Icelandic go e nmen had al eady decided
o ac on he ma e and was explo ing a numbe o al e na i es.
Following his e u n o No way, Lange in o med he B i ish ambassado on
his con e sa ion wi h Fo eign Minis e Benedik sson (FO-371/86501, 1950b).
Al hough ague, Benedik sson’s eply was no in ended o b ush Lange o . The day
hey me he go e nmen had delibe a ed abou how o espond o Iceland´s lack
o mili a y capabili ies in he ligh o ecen wo ld de elopmen s. I seemed ha he
choice s ood be ween o ma ion o an Icelandic de ence o ce, he ein oduc ion
o o eign oops in Iceland, o some combina ion o bo h (Ingimunda son, 1996,
p. 205). Cabine was unable o each a conclusion bu i decided ha Benedik sson
should use an upcoming NAC mee ing in New Yo k o ques ion wha p ecau ions
47
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
we e many NATO suppo e s in he new Icelandic go e nmen , no leas he new
Fo eign Minis e .
The i s p epa a o y alk be ween he Icelandic go e nmen and he U.S.
go e nmen o e ision o he de ence ag eemen ook place in ea ly Oc obe 1956
a he S a e Depa men in Washing on D.C. (INA, 1956a). The e oca ion o he
ag eemen had been coaxed in e ms o eeing Iceland om hos ing o eign oops
bu du ing he mee ing Icelandic nego ia o s d ew clea lines be ween economic
assis ance and he e en ion o he de ence ag eemen . P esen a he i s mee ing,
we e Sec e a y o S a e John Fos e Dulles, Unde sec e a y He be Hoo e J .,
and Assis an Sec e a y o De ence Go don G ay. Rep esen ing he go e nmen o
Iceland was ac ing Fo eign Minis e Emil Jónsson, in he absence o Fo eign Minis e
Guðmundsson, Ambassado Tho Tho s, and Vilhjálmu Þó Þó a insson on behal
o he P og essi e Pa y.
Sec e a y Dulles opened he alks by emphasising ha he Uni ed S a es and
Iceland had h ough NATO membe ship, aken on ce ain obliga ions. This said,
howe e , e isions in ligh o changed ci cums ances we e o cou se unde s andable.
Dulles s a ed ha he Uni ed S a es would happily emo e hei oops om Iceland
i he NAC came o he conclusion ha hey we e no longe needed. He unde s ood
ha o eign mili a y o ces, al hough in sligh numbe s, migh cause di icul ies
o a small na ion. Bu Iceland could no escape i s mili a y impo ance a ising
om i s geog aphic posi ion. Ac ing Fo eign Minis e Jónsson hanked Sec e a y
Dulles o his opening wo ds be o e ou lining he policy o his go e nmen which
emained ha du ing peace ime no o eign oops should be s a ioned in Iceland.
A e aming he Icelandic posi ion Jónsson ad ised ha a possible way o wa d
would be o gi e Þó a insson a change o discuss Iceland’s economic p oblems be o e
esuming alks on he u u e o he de ence ag eemen . A decision was made o make
oom o Þó a insson o mee wi h ep esen a i es om he S a e Depa men , he
U.S. T easu y and he U.S. o eign assis ance p og am In e na ional Coope a ion
Adminis a ion be o e esuming nego ia ions. The mee ings wi h Þó a insson
e ealed o U.S. o icials ha he Icelandic go e nmen was going o make su i al
o he de ence ag eemen dependan on inancial aid. On behal o he Icelandic
go e nmen Þó a insson eques ed la ge loans o be used o he cons uc ion o he
Ri e Sog hyd opowe p ojec (Ingimunda son, 1996, p. 328) and a ou able loans
o und impo s o Iceland.
When o mal discussions esumed Unde sec e a y He be Hoo e J . –
subs i u ing Sec e a y Dulles – was able o in o m Jónsson ha he Uni ed S a es
go e nmen would ca e ully s udy Iceland’s economic and inancial p oblems
as ou lined by Þó a insson and ha he U.S. was willing o lend Iceland up o $5
million o comple e he Sog hyd opowe plan . Howe e , he loan was o be g an ed
on he condi ion ha elec ici y gene a ed by he plan would be sold o he de ence
o ce a Ke la ík base. Addi ionally, he U.S. go e nmen was conside ing lending

48
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Iceland unds h ough a so-called PL-480 p og am o inance Icelandic impo
needs. Jónsson hanked Hoo e o his s a emen and commen ed ha he belie ed
he main goals o his isi had been achie ed (INA, 1956b). The wo sides hen
decided ha nego ia ions ega ding he u u e o he de ence o ce should ake place
he ollowing No embe in Reykja ík.
I was no only he p omise o inancial assis ance and a ou able loans ha
ensu ed he e en ual e en ion o he de ence ag eemen . Inc eased ension in he
in e na ional secu i y en i onmen also had a ole o play. A ew weeks be o e
nego ia ions we e se o ake place Is ael in aded Egyp , spa king he Suez C isis,
while in Eas e n Eu ope a e ol in Hunga y was b u ally c ushed by he So ie
mili a y. Un olding o hese e en s se he a mosphe e o he nego ia ions in
Reykja ík. On 24 No embe bo h sides ag eed o suspend u he alks on he
emo al o he de ence o ce and issued a join p ess s a emen ha ead:
… ecen de elopmen s in wo ld a ai s and he con inuing h ea o he secu i y o
Iceland and he No h A lan ic communi y call o he p esence o de ense o ces in
Iceland unde he Uni ed S a es-Iceland De ense Ag eemen o May 5, 1951, and
he e o e ha he discussions eques ed by he Go e nmen o Iceland conce ning
he e ision o he ag eemen and he wi hd awal o he de ense o ce should be
discon inued (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1957c).
Howe e , an added no el y eme ged om he session which was he es ablishmen
o a join U.S. Icelandic De ence G oup as a consul a ion o um in ma e s ela ing
o he de ence o ce and in ended o p omo e inc eased pa icipa ion by Icelandic
na ionals in asks pe o med by he De ence Fo ce (U.S. Depa men o S a e,
1957a, p. 100). The u ili y o he De ence G oup p o ed o be sho and une en ul
as i con ened only once du ing i s li e ime and abolished in 1958 a e a change o
go e nmen (Tho s einsson, 1992a, p. 576).
The Uni ed S a es go e nmen would g an Iceland h ee sepa a e loans, o alling
nea ly $12 million. The i s loan ag eemen , in ended o inance essen ial gene al
impo s in o Iceland, amoun ing o $4 million, was signed on 28 Decembe 1956,
a anged h ough he In e na ional Coope a ion Adminis a ion. $600,000 while
he ou s anding $3.4 million we e d awn om he Special P esiden ial Fund, which
he P esiden had been au ho ised by Cong ess o use a his will o se e he secu i y
needs o he Uni ed S a es (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1957d, p. 100). On he basis
o he PL-480 P og amme, he U.S. go e nmen en e ed in o an Ag icul u al Su plus
Commodi y Ag eemen wi h Iceland on 11 Ap il 1957, hus inancing Icelandic
pu chase o U.S. ag icul u al p oduc s wo h $2,785,000 (U.S. Depa men o S a e,
1957b, p. 709). The inal ins almen o he p omised loans was inalised on 10 May
1957, wo h $5 million, ea ma ked o he cons uc ion o Sog hyd opowe s a ion
(INA, 1957, p. 7).
49
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
While he wish o emo e o eign oops om Iceland may ha e s emmed om
na ional o paci is o igins and a belie ha he wo ld was in ac mo e peace ul
han in 1951 i soon became appa en ha he nego ia ions we e o be used as a
ba gaining chip o secu e a ou able loans. The link be ween inancial bene i s
and con inued U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland was acknowledged by he o eign
diploma ic communi y in Reykja ík and spelled ou in a epo by he B i ish
ambassado And ew Gilch is o he B i ish Fo eign O ice,
…one can pe haps sum up he p ospec s o e aining an e ec i e base a Ke la ik as a
compound o h ee ac o s, he u u e cou se o in e na ional ension, he ex en o
which he Ame icans a e willing o unde w i e a policy o economic aid, and he skill
wi h which hey ca y ou ha policy. In o he wo ds, i he Icelande s emain a aid o
Russia and i he Ame icans make hei p esence unob usi ely an essen ial pa o he
Icelandic economy, he ine i able ic ion o e he s a ioning o Uni ed S a es oops in
Iceland is unlikely du ing he nex ew yea s o each a poin a which he oops will be
asked o lea e (FO-371/124888, 1956c).
A U.S. Secu i y Council epo w i en in he ollowing mon h o May ook s ock
o he p eceding e en s and laid ou u u e U.S. objec i es in Iceland. The epo
began by asse ing Icelandic impo ance o U.S. na ional secu i y:
Iceland now p o ides he Uni ed S a es and NATO wi h (a) a key link in he Ea ly
Wa ning Sys em o he de ense o he Uni ed S a es and o he NATO coun ies;
(b) an impo an base o an i-subma ine ope a ions; (c) o wa d logis ics suppo
o S iking Flee ope a ions; (d) a signi ican ai base o NATO equi emen s and
(e) a key communica ion link be ween he Uni ed S a es, he Uni ed Kingdom and
o he NATO coun ies. Denial o hese ad an ages o he Uni ed S a es and NATO
would esul in a g a e weakening o he No h A lan ic de ense sys em, and he loss o
Iceland o So ie con ol would di ec ly h ea en he secu i y o he Uni ed S a es (U.S.
Depa men o S a e, 1992, pp. 499-500).
In ligh o Iceland’s impo ance, he mos i al goal o he Uni ed S a es
go e nmen was o main ain U.S. o ces in Iceland, and educe he economic and
poli ical in luence o he So ie Union in Iceland. An app op ia e applica ion o
economic and poli ical p essu es would he e o e be needed by U.S. au ho i ies,
in o de o id he go e nmen o communis s as well as p e en ing Iceland om
becoming oo dependen on So ie bloc ma ke s (U.S. Depa men o S a e, 1992,
pp. 503-504). To ha end, economic assis ance and loans o speci ic p ojec s in
Iceland we e needed o u he U.S. in e es s.
50
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
3.4. The ela ionship as a le e age in gaining
o eign policy objec i es
The de ence ela ionship p o ed success ul o he go e nmen o Iceland in gaining
economic assis ance om he Uni ed S a es bu i was also c i ical o Iceland o
unila e ally ex end i s EEZ o 12 nau ical miles in 1961, 50 nau ical miles in 1973
and in 1976 o i s cu en 200 nau ical miles. The ex ension was a majo Icelandic
o eign policy goal and he de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es and Iceland’s
membe ship in NATO played a c ucial ole in achie ing ha . The ollowing
discussion ou lines he connec ion be ween success ul unila e al ex ensions o
Iceland’s EEZ and Iceland’s de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es and
membe ship in NATO.
3.4.1. The i s Cod Wa 1958-1961
A emp ing o e mina e he de ence ag eemen was no he only ouble ha he
cen e–le go e nmen o 1956-1958 was poised o s i up in NATO. I also had
on i s agenda he ex ension o Iceland’s e i o ial sea o 12 nau ical miles gi ing
Icelande s he exclusi e igh o ish wi hin ha limi . The decision o go ahead wi h
he ex ension would a ec o he na ions as he ich Icelandic ishing g ounds we e
awled by ellow NATO membe s such as he U.K., Wes Ge many, Belgium and
No way.
Bu ex ension would be complica ed by he way he go e nmen al pa ies
a ou ed ca ying i ou . The p e e ed cou se o P og essi es and Social Democ a s
was o a oid con lic wi h o he na ions and seek consul a ion and ag eemen wi hin
NATO (Hjálma sson, 1985, p. 69). The People’s Alliance, by con as , wished o
hu y ex ension as much as possible. Failing o secu e suppo o a na ional 12-mile
e i o ial sea a he Uni ed Na ions Con e ence on he Law o he Sea (UNCLOS)
in ea ly 1958 spu ed he go e nmen on. The only ques ion a his poin was
no whe he bu when he Icelandic go e nmen would go ahead wi h unila e al
ex ension.
Du ing a NATO Minis e ial Mee ing in Copenhagen in May 1958 he
imminen ex ension b ough Iceland o blows wi h o he allies. As he mee ing
was abou o begin, Fo eign Minis e Guðmundsson and his s a lea ned ha he
B i ish ep esen a i es had spoken wi h NATO Sec e a y Gene al P.H. Spaak and
eques ed him o speak wi h he Icelandic Fo eign Minis e and encou age him o
consul wi h o he NATO membe s be o e going ahead wi h he 12 nau ical miles
ex ension (GÍG, 1958b). Spaak In o med Guðmundsson o he B i ish app oach
and exp essed his own conce ns o e a unila e al ex ension. Guðmundsson e o ed
ha his was a p essing issue o his coun y and he la es decision wi hin he
Icelandic go e nmen had been o wai un il a e he conclusion o UNCLOS in
Gene a. Howe e , almos all o he alliance na ions had been agains he Icelandic
51
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
posi ion, he e o e, consul a ion wi hin NATO wi h hose same na ions would
mos likely be doomed om he beginning. Spaak implo ed Guðmundsson o allow
o such alks a a NAC mee ing in Pa is wi hin h ee weeks. Ag eeing o such a
mee ing Guðmundsson also eques ed a special mee ing o add ess Iceland’s ishe ies
ex ension du ing he Copenhagen session.
A a NAC mo ning session p io o he one ese ed o Icelandic ishe ies
ex ension B i ish Fo eign Sec e a y Lloyd ose up and eques ed o add ess he
Council. La e in he a e noon, Lloyd decla ed, a special session would ake place
o discuss possible Icelandic ac ions ega ding hei e i o ial sea ex ension. Such
unila e al ac ions could ha e se ious consequences and colleagues in he NAC
should oice hei opposi ion and s a e hei ag eemen wi h he B i ish posi ion.
A e Lloyd had inished he Fo eign Minis e s o Po ugal, Belgium, Ne he lands,
I aly, Canada, Wes Ge many and he Uni ed S a es, add essed he mee ing and
oiced hei suppo o he B i ish p o es agains he imminen Icelandic ex ension.
The Icelandic side ega ded he B i ish in e en ion as a sneak a ack and
coun e ed ha Iceland depended on i s ishe ies and i was common sense o Iceland
o secu e hem o i sel . The Icelandic go e nmen , Guðmundsson con inued, had
been wo king owa ds ex ension since a UN Gene al Assembly in 1949. F om
a poli ical pe spec i e i was di icul o he go e nmen o Iceland o pos pone
ex ension any u he and he decision o ex end i s e i o ial sea o 12 nau ical
miles was in line wi h he majo i y iew a he UNCLOS Gene a Con e ence
and had e en been p oposed by he U.S. and Canadian delega es ea ly on in he
con e ence. Guðmundsson acknowledged ha ci izens o o he NATO coun ies
had in e es s a s ake and ha many alliance membe s would p e e Iceland no
o go h ough wi h unila e al ex ension, a leas no wi hou nego ia ions. Bu
p ese ing he ishe ies was a ques ion o li e and dea h o Icelande s. The e o e,
o nego ia e o any hing less han 12 nau ical miles was ou o he ques ion (GÍG,
1958b). Following Guðmundsson speech, Sec e a y Gene al Spaak commen ed
ha ob iously his was no a simple legal dispu e bu also an issue o poli ical and
economic impo ance. Iceland had al eady wai ed 10 yea s and i was no solu ion
o hem i o he alliance membe s opposed demands conside ed jus by Icelande s.
The e o e, he issue had o be app oached wi h unde s anding and a emp s made o
sol e i (GÍG, 1958b).
The Council decided o cancel he scheduled a e noon session and ins ead
Sec e a y Gene al Spaak held a sho mee ing in his o ice wi h Fo eign Minis e
Guðmundsson and Fo eign Sec e a y Lloyd. Spaak ag eed wi h he Icelande s ha
hey had wo powe ul a gumen s o back hei claim: (1) en yea s o wo king
owa ds an ex ension, (2) and he impo ance o ishe ies o hei li elihood. The
h ee ag eed ha a possible way o wa d would ha e o be discussed in NATO
headqua e s. Two NATO o icials, unde he au ho i y o Depu y Sec e a y
Gene al Ba on Adolph Ben incks, we e asked o wo k on p oposals alongside an
52
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Icelandic o icial (GÍG, 1958b). On Iceland’s behal , Guðmundsson nomina ed
Pe manen Sec e a y o he Fo eign Minis y Hen ik S einsson Bjö nsson, as he had
been p esen a he Copenhagen mee ing and was well in o med abou wha had
aken place.
Fo he nex ew days in NATO headqua e s in Pa is, Bjö nsson and NATO
o icials ied o ind a comp omise pala able o bo h Icelande s and o he NATO
membe s (GÍG, 1958a). In he cou se o hei wo k, he idea su aced ha possibly
he Icelandic go e nmen would be willing o allow o eign awle s o ish wi hin
he 12 nau ical miles o a limi ed numbe o yea s and in e u n o he alliance
membe s would ecognise he new e i o ial sea limi . Bjö nsson p esen ed he idea
o Sec e a y Gene al Spaak and he bo h ag eed ha ecogni ion in exchange o
limi ed ishing igh s was he bes cou se o ac ion and would mos likely be accep ed
by he o he s a es (GÍG, 1958a, p. 22). Wha ollowed was a an ic exchange o
eleg ams be ween Bjö nsson in Pa is and Guðmundsson in Reykja ík. Howe e ,
he coali ion go e nmen was s a ing o ay a he seams wi h he mili an People’s
Alliance i mly agains g an ing empo a y ishing igh s in exchange o ecogni ion
while he p o-NATO Social Democ a s and P og essi es suppo ed he comp omise.
Finally, on 19 May Bjö nsson ecei ed a eleg am om Fo eign Minis e
Guðmundsson in o ming him ha he go e nmen o Iceland had decided o issue a
di ec i e on 23 May, claiming he ex ension o Icelandic e i o ial sea o 12 nau ical
miles. The di ec i e would be e ec i e om 1 Sep embe 1958. Howe e , i o he
NATO membe s a es consen ed o he di ec i e be o e noon on 22 May, hey
would be allowed o ish be ween 6 and 12 nau ical miles o he ollowing h ee
yea s (GÍG, 1958c, p. 40).
On he mo ning o 20 May Bjö nsson deli e ed his Minis e ’s esponse o
Sec e a y Gene al Spaak who immedia ely called a NAC mee ing. Bjö nsson began
he mee ing by ecapping Fo eign Minis e Guðmundsson a gumen s du ing he
Copenhagen Council mee ing while a s a emen om he Icelandic go e nmen
on he imminen ex ension was ci cula ed in he Council. Following Bjö nsson’s
s a emen he Sec e a y Gene al add essed he Council and while unde lining
he se iousness o he issue he did no belie e ha a solu ion could be eached in
wo days. The Sec e a y Gene al hanked he Icelandic go e nmen o consul ing
wi h ellow membe s a es wi hin NATO al hough he did no hink he Icelandic
p oposal was accep able in i s p esen o m bu hoped o coun e -p oposals
om o he alliance membe s du ing he mee ing (GÍG, 1958a, pp. 24-25). The
B i ish ambassado was he nex o speak. The Uni ed Kingdom could no ag ee
o a unila e al ex ension o Iceland’s e i o ial sea and i was dis u bing o see he
Council aced wi h an ul ima um on he issue. The B i ish s ance was suppo ed by
Wes Ge many, Belgium, Ne he lands, Po ugal, I aly and G eece. The only NATO
membe o h ow i s weigh behind Iceland was Tu key which ag eed ha his
was a ques ion o li e and dea h o he Icelandic na ion and he e o e jus i iable

53
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
no o wai o ano he con e ence. To b eak he deadlock he Danish ambassado
p oposed a special con e ence asked wi h sol ing he dispu e and o add ess he
e i o ial sea ex ension o he Danish con olled Fa oese Islands.
Nex o speak was he U.S. ambassado . A e s a ing his g a e conce ns abou
Iceland’s unila e al decision, he sugges ed a comp omise ha ollowed closely he
Icelandic p oposal. Iceland’s 12 nau ical miles limi would be ecognised bu na ions
wi h his o ical ishing igh s would be allowed o ish wi hin a 6-12 nau ical mile
bel subjec o maximum ca ch limi a ions. This comp omise solu ion would la e
be ollowed by a special con e ence in line wi h he Danish p oposal. The B i ish
ambassado welcomed he Danish and U.S. p oposals and encou aged Iceland o
pa icipa e in such a con e ence. A his poin , he Sec e a y Gene al commen ed
ha i had become clea ha he Icelandic p oposals was no accep able o o he
alliance membe s and ha coun e -p oposals p esen ed by he Uni ed S a es and
Denma k migh be combined in o one. He himsel would like o add he hi d
p oposal (GÍG, 1958a, p. 26): a con e ence es ic ed o NATO membe s and
limi ed o wo mon hs ha would y o sol e he dispu e. I no solu ion could
be ound each coun y would be ee o eso o wha e e measu e i belie ed
necessa y.
La e ha e ening, Spaak sen a eleg am o he Icelandic P ime Minis e He man
Jónasson. Al hough o he alliance membe s we e agains unila e al ex ension on a
ju idical basis he Sec e a y Gene al belie ed ha hey would be willing o nego ia e
on a common ju idical posi ion ha would also mee he basic legi ima e conce ns o
he Icelandic go e nmen . Con inuing, Spaak s a ed ha such a con e ence wi hin
NATO would p o ide a much quicke and su e means han a la ge in e na ional
con e ence. He concluded:
…se ious consequences would ollow e usal o he p oposal made his mo ning and
would a ec he whole Alliance [s op] un o una e a ec s o Iceland would hus
p obably be p oduced a he ime when OEEC pa ne s show willingness o open
up ma ke s o Icelandic ish [pa a] Pe mi me o appeal o you eelings o A lan ic
solida i y and o ask you o allow his las a emp concilia ion by ag eeing o con inue
nego ia ions which I am con inced will esul in a solu ion a ou able in Iceland (GÍG,
1958d, p. 42).
In Reykja ík he coali ion was on he e ge o collapse o e disag eemen
be ween he Social Democ a s on one hand and he Socialis s on he o he hand
(Jóhannesson, 2004, pp. 556-557). The People’s Alliance, led by Minis e o
Fishe ies Lúð ík Jóse sson, was adaman ly agains con inuing nego ia ions wi hin
NATO hus opposing he Social Democ a s led by Fo eign Minis e Guðmundu Í.
Guðmundsson lea ing he P og essi es led by P ime Minis e He man Jónasson in
he middle.
54
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
As he wo d go ou ha he go e nmen was on he b ink o collapse Sec e a y
Gene al Spaak se o wo k on a decla a ion acknowledging he willingness o he
alliance o sol e he dispu e. The decla a ion was e y much in ended o Icelandic
domes ic use as Spaak’s in en ion was o aid he poli ical pa ies in Iceland and
especially he Social Democ a s as hey we e commi ed o sol ing he ishe ies
dispu e wi hin NATO (FO-371/134965, 1958). Ini ially, Spaak’s idea was o he
NAC o issue a join decla a ion ha would include all membe s o he alliance
bu as he go e nmen o Iceland was expec ed o collapse ha same day and o be
go e ned by a ca e- ake go e nmen he Sec e a y Gene al sugges ed ha Iceland
should be excluded. Thus, making i a join decla a ion by he emaining ou een
NATO membe s, Spaak’s e en ual d a s a ed ha ,
Deeply conscious o he undamen al impo ance o he ishing indus y o he
Icelandic economy and anxious o assis hei pa ne , < he ou een na ions> a i m
hei eadiness o ini ia e nego ia ions wi hou delay wi h Iceland on he ollowing
basis: (1) Iceland may exe cise exclusi e ishing igh s wi hin a six mile limi . (2) Iceland
may simila ly exe cise exclusi e ishing igh s in a u he zone o six miles o e and
beyond ha men ioned abo e on he unde s anding ha hose na ions whose essels
al eady ish wi hin his a ea should con inue o do so unde condi ions o be nego ia ed
wi h he Icelandic Go e nmen (FO-371/134965, 1958).
The decla a ion gained he suppo o he B i ish ambassado o NATO Si F ank
Robe s and his supe io s a he Fo eign O ice bu hei poli ical mas e s we e no
amused by hei ini ia i e. In London, P ime Minis e Ha old Macmillan u iously
demanded o know wha minis e had au ho ised he Fo eign O ice o suppo his,
since i conceded mo e o less e e y hing o he Icelande s (Jóhannesson, 2003, p.
190). In Iceland he p oposed decla a ion did no a e much be e . On 24 May,
he ba e ed go e nmen had managed o pull i sel om he b ink o collapse
and announced ha a new egula ion on a 12 nau ical miles e i o ial sea would
be issued on 30 June o ake e ec om 1 Sep embe . The in e im pe iod o wo
mon hs would be used o mus e in e na ional ecogni ion and unde s anding o
Iceland’s igh and need o ex ending i s ishe ies limi (Jóhannesson, 2004, p. 557).
Ten a i e discussions con inued h oughou he summe wi hin NATO bu i was
clea ha nei he side was willing o shi an inch – le alone budge a mile. O he
NATO membe s, especially he U.K. and Wes Ge many, we e ixedly agains a 12
nau ical miles ishe ies limi (Óla sson, 1999, pp. 269-275) while he Icelande s
e used o ecan hei ea lie decision.
As Sep embe d ew close wi h no solu ion in sigh , he imminen clash be ween
wo NATO membe s and possible damage o he alliance was causing conce ns
wi hin he B i ish go e nmen . As he e seemed o be no solu ion in sigh , he mos
pessimis ic app aisal sugges ed ha Iceland migh ac ually be pushed ou o NATO
55
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
(CAB/129/94, 1958). Al eady in mid-May, he B i ish had weighed up he possible
op ions o p o ec ing hei lee o up o 130 deep-sea awle s om ha assmen o
a es by he Icelandic Coas Gua d. The mos iable cou se o ac ion, acco ding o
he Admi al y, would be:
Physical obs uc ion by a Task Uni o he Icelandic gunboa s when a emp ing o
e ec a es in he dispu ed wa e s. The p esence o one o H.M. ships migh de e
he gunboa wi hou ha ing o eso o physical obs uc ion. I mus be ecognised,
howe e , ha in an ex eme case his policy migh esul in he sinking o an Icelandic
gunboa (CAB/129/93, 1958).
E e since he Copenhagen mee ing in ea ly May he B i ish delega ion a NATO
had ound i sel unde inc easing p essu e om o he alliance membe s as well as
Sec e a y Gene al Spaak himsel . Du ing a NAC mee ing on 23 May Spaak scolded
he B i ish o being unnecessa ily legalis ic in hei app oach, since keeping Iceland
in he alliance was he mos essen ial objec i e o NATO and he Sec e a y Gene al
(FO-371/134965, 1958). O he NATO membe s sha ed Spaak’s conce n o he
allou and Si F ank Robe s ound himsel being g illed by o he ambassado s as
o whe he ,
… he Uni ed Kingdom o all coun ies a e indi e en o he dange s o h owing Iceland
ou o N.A.T.O and in o he So ie emb ace, hus des oying a a momen when we a e
weakening ou own na al con ibu ion o he loa ing ba ie he only land ba ie o
So ie subma ines en e ing he A lan ic (FO-371/134964, 1958).
On he i s o Sep embe , as o eign awle s sailed ou o he 12 nau ical miles
zone, B i ish wa ships en e ed in o de o p o ec he emaining B i ish awle s.
Un il Ma ch 1960 B i ish awle s con inued o ish wi hin designa ed B i ish ishing
ha ens, unde p o ec ion by he Royal Na y, while Icelandic Coas Gua d essels
(ICGV) a emp ed o app ehend hem. On some occasions hese con on a ions
became iolen when awle s ammed he ICGV (Gudmundsson, 2006, pp. 100-
101). The B i ish eso ed o hei p e e ed ac ic o using hei iga es o o m a
ba ie be ween B i ish awle s and he ICGV. Luckily, such con on a ions did no
esul in a shoo ing ma ch o he sinking o any essel.
The posi ion o he U.S. go e nmen in he build-up o hese e en s was one
o cau ion. A e he comp omise p oposed by he U.S. ambassado du ing he
20 May NAC mee ing ailed he Eisenhowe adminis a ion made e o s o
p e en physical clashes be ween he B i ish Fishe ies Pa ol and he ICGV
(FO-371/134984, 1958) by encou aging he B i ish go e nmen o e ain om
p o ec ing B i ish awle s caugh wi hin he old e i o ial sea zone o 6 nau ical
miles a ound Iceland while simul aneously encou aging he Icelandic go e nmen
56
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
no o a es awle s beyond a 4 nau ical miles, limi , lea ing a zone o 2 nau ical
miles as no man’s land.
The Eisenhowe adminis a ion was pain ully awa e ha Ke la ík base migh be
pu a isk i he dispu e would ge ou o hand. Those conce ns we e no los on
B i ish decision-make s as P ime Minis e Macmillan no ed in his dia y on 20 May
1958:
The Icelande s look like decla ing he 12 mile limi unila e ally. I hey y o a es ou
awle s, we shall ha e o ake ac ion o p o ec hem. This will lead o ouble wi h
Canada (who wan o do he same hing) and wi h U.S.A., who a e a aid ha Iceland
(which is e y communis minded) will go ou o NATO and he Ame icans may lose
hei base (Macmillan & Ca e all, 2011, p. 118)
Keen o exploi hose ea s he Icelandic go e nmen was quick o link he
ishe ies dispu e oge he wi h Ke la ík base. In an a icle published on 21 May
1958, in Tíminn, a daily newspape s ongly a ilia ed wi h he P og essi e Pa y, he
ques ion was asked whe he B i ish ship-owne s had conside ed ha in ca ying ou
hei du y he Icelandic Coas Gua d had e e y igh o demand assis ance om he
U.S. de ence o ce and he Icelandic go e nmen could eques e e y means a ailable
o he alliance o hwa agg ession agains Iceland. I no , he use ulness o he
A lan ic T ea y would be called in o doub , hus opening up he ques ion o whe he
Iceland should seek allies ou side he A lan ic alliance (“Reyni nú á y s a skip i á
það h e hag æði Íslendingum e að þ í að að e a í A lan sha sbandalaginu,” 1958).
Coinciden ally, he ini ials o he unknown au ho (HJ) we e he same as hose o
he P og essi e Pa y P ime Minis e , He mann Jónasson.
Fo egoing sub le ies, P ime Minis e Jónasson decided o u n di ec ly o he U.S.
ambassado in Reykja ík, John J. Muccio. In a le e o he ambassado , Jónasson
wa ned ha public hos ili y owa ds he B i ish migh o ce he go e nmen o
b eak o diploma ic ela ions and e en o lea e he alliance. Mos Icelande s, he
a gued, hough i con adic o y o belong o an alliance whose pu pose was o
ensu e peace, democ acy, and jus ice, while ano he alliance membe used o ce
agains hem (INA, 1958b). In his eply, Muccio ema ked ha his go e nmen
was e y conce ned abou he dispu e and eminded he P ime Minis e ha
he U.S. had be o e 1 Sep embe encou aged bo h sides o show modes y and
cons ain :
…dispu es om ime o ime a ise be ween na ions which a e membe s o NATO, as hey
do wi hin amilies in spi e o hei join membe ship. In cases o his kind he acili ies
a ailable wi hin NATO o en p o ide he oppo uni ies o wo k ou dispu es. We hope
ha his may be possible in he p esen case and s ongly u ge ha you Go e nmen
gi e his possibili y i s ea nes conside a ions and encou age he o ganiza ion o ake
63
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
in G eenland and he Fa oese Islands o med a pa o LORAN A and LORAN C
essen ial o communica ion and na iga ion o mili a y and comme cial ships and
ai c a ope a ing in he High No h. The epo poin ed ou ha i Ke la ík base
closed he ada s:
…would p obably con inue o ope a e. On he o he hand he NATO- unded
communica ions links e mina ing in Iceland would become edundan , and he loss
o he p oposed MATELO5 would mean ha no al e na i e communica ion o Uni ed
Kingdom ai c a om his coun y in he poo communica ion en i onmen o he
high no he n la i udes would be a ailable (De e/5/196/6, 1973).
To he B i ish side i was clea ha e aining Ke la ík base was essen ial bo h o
he join de ence pos u e o NATO and B i ish de ence in e es s.
By sp ing 1973 o he NATO membe s – and non-NATO s a es – we e becoming
inc easingly ala med abou he u u e o Ke la ík base. The U.S. ambassado o
Iceland, F ede ick I ing, b ie ed his Danish and No wegian colleagues on ecen
de elopmen s and he h ee o hem decided o exe some ligh p essu e on he
Icelandic delega ion a NATO h ough he Danish and No wegian delega ions a
NATO (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973a). Meanwhile So ie sa elli es in Eas e n
Eu ope seemed conce ned ha he closu e o Ke la ík base would h ow he
MBFR- alks o balance. The Romanian ambassado o Iceland, Ploes enau, called
up Ambassado I ing and:
…spen his en i e call elling me how impo an i was o he US o succeed in he
MBFR and o he US no o make unila e al oop wi hd awals om Eu ope. He said
ha his coun y’s posi ion was ha bo h So ie and Ame ican oops should wi hd aw
in o hei own coun ies bu as long as So ie oops a e in o he coun ies he Ame ican
oops should also emain (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973).
Al hough no a NATO membe he Swedish go e nmen was also ala med by
he imminen weakening o NATO’s No he n Flank (US Embassy S ockholm,
1974) and Swedish P ime Minis e Ola Palme made his conce ns known o he
Icelandic go e nmen (Sec e a y o S a e, 1973) du ing a b ie isi o Iceland in
May 1973.
As he dispu e escala ed and NATO became mo e ac i ely in ol ed NATO
Sec e a y Gene al Joseph Luns decided in ea ly June 1973 o ac on his own and
a emp o ge nego ia ions back on ack. Con ac ing he B i ish go e nmen
Luns ga e– wi hou any suppo om he Icelandic go e nmen – a pe sonal
5 MATELO (Ma i ime Ai Telecomunic ions O ganisa ion Facili y), a p oposed on-line c yp o
communica ion link (De e/5/196/6, 1973).

64
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
gua an ee ha he ICGV would cease ha assmen o B i ish awle s in exchange o
wi hd awal o B i ish na al essels ou side o he 50 nau ical miles limi (Luns, 1973
and Ingimunda son, 2003, pp. 115-116). Al hough guided by he bes o mo i es,
Luns’s o e was s opped dead in i s ack as no assu ance could be had om he
Icelande s ha ICGV would no a emp o app ehend B i ish awle s.
On 25 June 1973, he Icelandic go e nmen ollowed h ough wi h i s h ea
i had made o P esiden Nixon a ew weeks ea lie and in oked a icle VII o he
de ence ag eemen he eby ini ia ing he six-mon h e ision pe iod equi ed be o e
i s e mina ion. Du ing i s session on 5 July he NAC discussed he decision. The
mee ing began wi h Luns gi ing a b ie accoun o his la es a emp o media e. The
B i ish go e nmen , acco ding o his p oposal, would wi hd aw hei na y om he
50 nau ical miles a ea as soon as he B i ish awle s had ished he 145,000 ons
o e ed in he la es B i ish p oposal. He had submi ed his idea o he B i ish and
Icelandic go e nmen and was encou aged o lea n ha he wo Fo eign Minis e s
had me p i a ely in Helsinki. Rega ding he in oca ion o A icle VII, he council
decided o di ec he Mili a y Commi ee o:
…p epa e a epo on Iceland´s s a egic and mili a y signi icance and submi he epo
in “due cou se”. MC epo will p o ide he basis o he app aisal and ecommenda ions
which he Council will in u n submi o he wo Go e nmen s (US Mission NATO,
1973b).
The wo ding “due cou se” was no ee o poli ical machina ions. A week be o e
ha council mee ing he Sec e a y Gene al and he U.S. ambassado o NATO,
Donald Rums eld, had me on se e al occasions o discuss p i a ely an app op ia e
elease da e o he Mili a y Commi ee epo . Thei conce n was ha i he
epo would be eleased oo ea ly i migh be used as poli ical odde by hose who
wished o link he base issue wi h he ishe ies dispu e (US Mission NATO, 1973a).
Howe e , i delayed o oo long, he Icelandic go e nmen would be gi en an excuse
no o begin nego ia ions and simply le he six-mon h e ision pe iod un i s cou se
In Iceland ambassado I ing and Fo eign Minis e Ágús sson began in o mal
discussions abou he o hcoming nego ia ions. Al hough main aining he o icial
line ha he ul ima e objec i e o he Icelandic go e nmen was o close he base, in
p i a e Ágús sson conceded ha he U.S. go e nmen and NATO we e unlikely o
accep emo al o U.S. o ces om Iceland. The e o e, he was willing o p oceed on
he ollowing in e im objec i es:
(A) emo al o as many IDF unc ions as possible om Iceland’s soil wi hou impai ing
e ec i eness o IDF; (B) educ ion o mili a y manpowe by a leas one- hi d om
he p esen numbe o 3300 o e a ime pe iod o be nego ia ed bu no o exceed i e
yea s h ough emo al o unc ions and by subs i u ion o ci ilians which ini ially can
65
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
be combina ion o US and Icelandic ci ilians bu e en ually o al Icelandiza ion (US
Embassy Reykja ik, 1973b).
As no o d aw all ee h ou o he base ba gaining ploy, Ágús sson emphasised
ha public opinion con inued o sou owa ds NATO and he base because o
he B i ish in asion o Icelandic wa e s. The e o e, i would ha e ex emely bad
e ec s in he upcoming nego ia ions i B i ish na al ships emained wi hin he 50
nau ical miles EEZ. He himsel , Ágús sson con inued, and P ime Minis e Óla u
Jóhannesson we e o he same mind: ha he base issue and ishe ies dispu e should
be kep sepa a e bu hey could no s and agains public opinion. Ambassado
I ing w yly poin ed ou ha hen i migh be ime o he pai o hem o s op hei
an i-NATO and de ence o ce s a emen s in he media and y ins ead o calm he
si ua ion (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973b). Ágús sson eplied ha such was hei
in en ion and I ing would soon see e idence o i . Following his exchange he da e
o o mal alks was se o la e Sep embe .
The P og essi e Pa y was playing a dange ous balancing ac . Publicly i s leade s
had linked he base e en ion wi h he ishe ies dispu e, implying ha he base migh
be closed. Bu p i a ely a clea di ide exis ed be ween he go e nmen al pa ies. Mos
o he P og essi e Pa y saw a need o con inued U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland
and wished o he base o emain, while he People’s Alliance happily exploi ed he
ishe ies dispu e o u n public opinion agains he base by e e ing o he B i ish
na al essels as NATO wa ships (“S æ s i mó mæla undu á Íslandi,” 1973). Fo he
P og essi es he isk was ha esen men owa ds he base and NATO would spi al
ou o con ol, handing he ini ia i e o e o he People’s Alliance.
The dispu e emained in deadlock h oughou he summe . Du ing a June
NATO De ence Minis e ial mee ing in Copenhagen he No wegian and Danish
De ence Minis e s ied o nudge bo h sides owa ds alking by u ging he B i ish
go e nmen o uncondi ionally wi hd aw hei na al essels ou side he 50 nau ical
miles limi (Jóhannesson, 2005, p. 98) bu wi hou success. The ICGV con inued
o ha ass B i ish awle s, cu ing hei ishing wa ps and a emp ing o boa d, while
B i ish iga es we e deployed as a ba ie be ween he an agonis s. The esul was
epea ed collisions o ICGV wi h B i ish essels. On 29 Augus he ski mishing
e en ually claimed he i s and only casual y o he Cod Wa s. Following a collision
wi h HMS Apollo a sailo on boa d ICGV Ægi was acciden ally elec ocu ed while
ca ying ou empo a y epai s on a damaged hull sec ion. Tíminn, he P og essi e
Pa y newspape , pu he blame squa ely on he Royal Na y (“O beldisaðge ði og
y i d epuskapu ,” 1973) and hei iolen and dange ous amming ac ics agains
ICGV.
The sailo ’s dea h ma ked a u ning poin in he ishe ies dispu e. In B ussels,
he Icelandic ambassado o NATO in o med Sec e a y Gene al Luns ha his
go e nmen would soon ecall him o Iceland as an ac o p o es o e NATO’s
66
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
inabili y o hal B i ish agg ession. The Sec e a y Gene al esponded o he escala ion
by con ac ing Fo eign Sec e a y Douglas-Home and p opose a B i ish wi hd awal
ou side o 50 nau ical miles in exchange o he Icelande s’ willingness o bila e al
alks. No su p isingly, he B i ish eply was nega i e (S a e Depa men , 1973) and
on 11 Sep embe he go e nmen o Iceland issued an ul ima um: Iceland would
b eak o diploma ic ela ions wi h he U.K. i B i ish na al essels would con inue
o am Icelandic essels.
To hampe B i ish e o s in moni o ing he mo emen o ICGV he go e nmen
o Iceland also ins uc ed Icelandic ai a ic con olle s o s op communica ion
wi h he B i ish Nim od ma i ime econnaissance planes om 14 Sep embe (“Nú
e það B e a að elja,” 1973) as hey we e used o ga he in elligence abou he
mo emen o ICGV in he sea a ound Iceland (Welch, 2006, pp. 134-135). The
su eillance ligh s we e a pa icula ly sensi i e issue o many Icelande s as hey we e
iewed as a use o NATO asse s by one alliance membe agains ano he . Al hough
h ea ening o cease communica ion wi h he je s seemed like a bold mo e i soon
u ned ou ha in eali y i was no an op ion. In o ma ion on mo emen s o he
Nim ods was essen ial o ai a ic sa e y and Icelandic ai a ic con olle s de ied
he Minis e o T anspo a ion, Bjö n Jónsson, and e used o en o ce he ban
(“Nim od-þo u na : Við me um þe a h e ju sinni,” 1973) on he g ounds ha
b eaking communica ion would pose an unaccep able isk o he sa e y o ai line s
lying h ough he Icelandic ai a ic con ol zone.
While he ishe ies dispu e con inued o simme and boil he NAC had p epa ed
i s ecommenda ion on he e ision o de ence ag eemen , equi ed be o e he
ag eemen could be ab oga ed. On 16 Sep embe Sec e a y Gene al Luns a i ed in
Iceland in o an emo ionally cha ged a mosphe e o p esen in pe son he Council’s
ad ice. On he mo ning o 17 Sep embe Luns b ie ed he go e nmen , ep esen ed
by ou minis e s om he h ee coali ion pa ies. The assessmen s a ed ha he
s a egic impo ance o Ke la ík base o su eillance o So ie na al ac i i y in he
No h A lan ic and i s ole in secu ing he A lan ic sea lanes o communica ion could
no be done as e ec i ely om any o he NATO coun y (INA, 1973 ) and ha he
secu i y o NATO, in pa icula i s no he n membe s Iceland and No way, would
be se e ely unde mined i he base would be closed. A e he Sec e a y Gene al had
inished i was ime o he Icelande s o eac . P ime Minis e Jóhannesson opened
by o e ing his g a i ude o he p esen a ion and a i ming ha his go e nmen
would gi e i se ious conside a ion. Jóhannesson, howe e , emphasized ha he
de ence ag eemen was i s and o emos a bila e al a angemen be ween he
Uni ed S a es and Iceland (INA, 1973b). He himsel and his go e nmen we e mos
conce ned wi h he secu i y o Iceland and al hough he NAC ook he iew ha
closing he base would make Iceland de enceless and hus a emp ing a ge o So ie
expansionism he e we e hose ha belie ed he base i sel made Iceland a a ge o
So ie agg ession. Jóhannesson inished his opening ema ks by s a ing ha :
67
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
I ha e seldom hea d mili a y expe s p oposing educ ions. I is a pi y o ha e o admi
ou o a leas my igno ance in mili a y ma e s, so he epo is hal was ed on me, bu
I ha e some unde s anding o poli ical ma e s (INA, 1973b).
Raising he s akes, Jóhannesson b ough up he issue o NATO membe ship
i sel . The will o his go e nmen , he con inued, had been o close he base bu
emain in NATO. Since la e May he alliance had p o ed unable o ge he B i ish
go e nmen o wi hd aw i s na y ou side he 50 nau ical miles limi and his ac
begged whe he :
…I he ac is ha NATO has no powe in such cases […] we ask ou sel es wha ha e we
o do in he alliance. We can go ou in one yea . Then he base issue sol es i sel (INA,
1973b).
The Sec e a y Gene al eplied ha i lay ou side he powe o NATO o in e ene
in poli ical decision-making o i s membe s bu added ha li e ally all NATO
membe s we e e y wo ied abou he B i ish a i ude. He himsel would mee wi h
B i ish o icials a London ai po he mo ning a e and he would con ey P ime
Minis e Jóhannesson’s wo ds (INA, 1973b). He hen wen on o lis his own p i a e
a emp s o use his in luence o ge he B i ish o wi hd aw hei na y and e u n o
he nego ia ion able (INA, 1973b). In he end o May he had app oached Fo eign
Sec e a y Si Douglas-Home and P ime Minis e Hea h; 4 June he sen a le e o
Si Alec Douglas-Home; 1 July he had me wi h he B i ish chie nego ia o , Lady
Tweedmui , in London and also enlis ed he help o Sup eme Allied Commande
A lan ic (SACLANT), Admi al Cousins, o inc ease he p essu e on he B i ish
go e nmen .
The Icelandic insis ence on en angling con inued U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland
wi h he ishe ies dispu e was making he Sec e a y Gene al gloomie by he minu e.
Du ing an hono a y dinne on he e ening o he 17 Sep embe he con ided in
Ambassado I ing ha “He was comple ely ed up wi h B i ish in ansigence which
[…] will d i e Iceland ou o NATO and is making IDF [Iceland De ence Fo ce]
e en ion di icul i no impossible” (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973c). A e in i ing
he B i ish Ambassado , Mckenzie, o join hem, Luns ema ked ha esen men
owa ds NATO and he de ence o ce, bo h wi hin he Icelandic go e nmen and
among he public, was g ea e han he had ealized and ha Iceland’s membe ship
in NATO would be a isk unless he ishe ies dispu e was esol ed quickly. He
hen implo ed Mckenzie o do his bes in con incing his supe io s in London o
he damage he p esence o he B i ish Na y wi hin he 50 nau ical miles zone was
causing he alliance. The possibili y was eal ha in ace o popula esen men
owa ds NATO o he coali ion pa ies would placa e he People’s Alliance and
ac ually close he base. Fo NATO he loss o Ke la ík base would be “un hinkable”
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
(US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973c). The e o e, he would ha e o inc ease his own
pe sonal e o s o sol e he ishe ies dispu e.
Despi e he Sec e a y Gene al’s impassioned a gumen s Ambassado Mckenzie
was in disag eemen . In ac , he had been ad ising his supe io s a he Fo eign and
Commonweal h O ice ha he Icelandic go e nmen was blu ing and would ne e
close he base no ma e how much i ied o link base nego ia ions wi h he ishe ies
dispu e. Disag eeing wi h Mckenzie, I ing poin ed ou ha :
…al hough i is no logical o associa e ishe ies dispu e wi h de ense issues we
ne e heless canno o e look he ac ha GOI [Go e nmen o Iceland] o icials and
he public a e doing i . We would be deluding ou sel es no o ake no ice o his in
assessing IDF nego ia ion p obabili ies (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1973c).
In he ollowing days, clashes con inued in he Icelandic ishing g ounds be ween
ICGV and he B i ish Na y. On 27 Sep embe , ollowing wo se ious amming
inciden s be ween ICGV Ægi , and HMS Lincoln, he Icelandic go e nmen
announced ha diploma ic ela ions wi h B i ain would be se e ed i he na y
would no be wi hd awn be o e 3 Oc obe .
P essu e wi hin he NAC on he B i ish go e nmen was ising. On 28 Sep embe
he Sec e a y Gene al called a p i a e council mee ing o discuss he c isis. The B i ish
ambassado , Si Edwa d Peck, opened by ei e a ing he posi ion o his go e nmen
which was ha he ishe ies dispu e was one o in e na ional legal disag eemen – i.e.
he igh o B i ish awle s o ish ou side he 12 nau ical miles zone, in an a ea he
B i ish go e nmen ega ded as in e na ional wa e s. Following his s a emen , he
Belgian ambassado o NATO, And é De S ae cke, called o he U.K. o” abandon
legali ies. And encou aged he SYG [Sec e a y Gene al] […] o he Council o ake
some o m o ac ion o in e cede in his ma e ” (US Mission NATO, 1973c). In
he end he Council decided ha he Sec e a y Gene al should send a le e o he
go e nmen o Iceland and B i ain and implo e hem o enew nego ia ions.
The Sec e a y Gene als in e en ion bo e ui and on 30 Sep embe in London
he me wi h P ime Minis e Hea h and Fo eign Sec e a y Douglas-Home o ind
some way ou o he s alema e. His plan called o a mee ing be ween he wo
P ime Minis e s ha would ake place in pa allel wi h wi hd awal o B i ish na al
essels om he 50 nau ical miles mile limi while he ICGV would simul aneously
s op ha assing B i ish awle s wi hin ha zone (US Mission NATO, 1973d). The
Sec e a y Gene al’s plan wo ked and on 3 Oc obe he B i ish go e nmen wi hd ew
hei iga es ou side o he dispu ed a ea. On 16 Oc obe , he wo go e nmen s
eached an in e im ag eemen alid o wo yea s. Up o 140 B i ish awle s would
be allowed o ish wi hin he 50 nau ical miles zone wi h a limi on o al ca ch se a
130,000 ons (Ras ick & Íslei sson, 2004, p. 373). Wi h he ishe ies dispu e ou o
he way, nego ia ions abou he u u e o he de ence o ce could con inue. Howe e ,

69
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
because o disag eemen be ween he go e nmen pa ies on how o p oceed he
ma e emained unsol ed un il a e pa liamen a y elec ions in May 1974.
Following he elec ions, a coali ion consis ing o he Independence Pa y
and he P og essi e Pa y was o med and he new igh -o -cen e go e nmen
abandoned he policy o e mina ing he de ence ag eemen . In p i a e con e sa ion
Independence Pa y P ime Minis e , Gei Hallg ímsson assu ed Ambassado I ing
ha his go e nmen had no in en ion o closing he Ke la ík base (US Embassy
Reykja ik, 1974) and on 22 Oc obe 1974 an ag eemen on he u u e e en ion o
Ke la ík base was eached be ween ep esen a i es o he wo go e nmen s.
As migh be expec ed om he base nego ia ions in 1956 he 1974 ag eemen had
a s ong economic o e u e. Some 420 De ence Fo ce pe sonnel would be g adually
eplaced by Icelandic ci ilian wo ke s whose aining would be handled by he
Uni ed S a es. In addi ion, he Uni ed S a es unde ook o inance he cons uc ion
o 500 apa men s wi hin he Ke la ík base o de ence o ce membe s cu en ly
esiding in local communi ies. Bu he la ges concessions ega ded Ke la ík ai po .
The Uni ed S a es p omised o sepa a e all mili a y and ci ilian a ic wi hin
Iceland’s only in e na ional ai po and suppo inancially he cons uc ion o a
new e minal building as well as upg ade ai po in as uc u e so ha wi hin 10
yea s (INA, 1974) Ke la ík ai po would comply o ca ego y II s anda ds o he
In e na ional Ci il A ia ion O ganiza ion (ICAO).
3.4.3. The Thi d Cod Wa 1975-1976
The new go e nmen in Iceland sol ed he base c isis bu Hallg ímsson’s
go e nmen would p o e as di icul o he B i ish go e nmen and NATO as he
p e ious one. In he un-up o he na ional elec ions in 1974 u he ex ension o
he EEZ o 200 nau ical miles had been endo sed by all poli ical pa ies, howe e ,
he new go e nmen decided o wai un il he conclusion o he 1975 UNCLOS
as he expec a ion was ha an in e na ional consensus on 200 nau ical miles EEZ
would be eached by he delega es (Jónsson, 1982, pp. 157-160). As he con en ion
p o ed a ailu e he Icelandic go e nmen decla ed, on 15 July 1975 ha i would
ex end Iceland’s EEZ o 200 nau ical miles o ake e ec om 15 Oc obe ha
same yea .
Explo a o y alks be ween he B i ish and Icelandic go e nmen began on
Sep embe 11 in Reykja ík. The B i ish delega ion led by Assis an Sec e a y o
S a e Roy Ha e sley hoped ha he p e ious ishe ies ag eemen ha ended he
1972-1973 Cod Wa could be ex ended o u he en yea s. Thei posi ion was
s eng hened by an ICJ uling in 1974 ha Iceland’s p e ious unila e al ex ension
beyond he 12 nau ical miles had been unlaw ul (Jónsson, 1981, p. 11). Choosing
o igno e he uling he Icelandic nego ia o s p oposed ins ead a yea ly ca ch o
65,000 ons ha would g adually be phased ou in he coming yea s. The ollow-up
mee ing ook place in la e Oc obe in London. This ime he Icelandic o e had
70
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
lowe ed. Fo eign Minis e Ágús sson was no willing o o e he B i ish mo e han
a yea ly ca ch o 50,000 ons while Ha e sley could go no lowe han 100,000 ons
(Guðmundsson, 2007 p. 55) lea ing an unb idgeable gap be ween he wo sides.
The go e nmen o Iceland ollowed h ough wi h i s decision and ex ended
Iceland’s EEZ o 200 nau ical miles on15 Oc obe 1975, howe e , B i ish ishe men
would be allowed o awl wi hin he 200 nau ical miles limi un il 13 No embe ,
h ee days a e he expi a ion o he 1973 ag eemen . In a las -di ch a emp o
hamme ou an ag eemen o some so s he B i ish and Icelandic nego ia o s me
o he second ime in Reykja ík on 16 No embe . Despi e he e o he a mosphe e
was sullied om he s a . The ICGV had cu he ishing wa ps o wo B i ish
awle s he day be o e and con inued o ha ass B i ish awle s du ing he en i e
nego ia ion session. The Icelandic go e nmen e u ned o i s p e ious i s o e o
65,000 ons which emained unaccep able o Ha e sley and his companions.
Following hose ailed No embe discussions, he B i ish go e nmen placed a
landing emba go on Icelandic ish in B i ain and decided, ye again, o send he na y
o p o ec i s ishe men. The i s iga es a i ed in Icelandic wa e s on 25 No embe
1975 and he same ca and mouse game ha had cha ac e ised he p e ious Cod
Wa s esumed. The essels o he Icelandic Coas Gua d a emp ed o cu ishing
wa ps o B i ish awle s while he B i ish na al essels ied o come be ween and
o en amming ICGV in he p ocess.
A e a mon h and a hal o wa p cu ings and collisions in he wa e s a ound
Iceland he Icelandic ambassado o NATO, Tómas Tómasson, called o a
special NAC mee ing ollowing a ha sh collision be ween ICGV Tho and HMS
And omeda. Tómasson ha shly c i icised he B i ish go e nmen o inconsis ency
in hei ac ions. On one hand hey exp essed willingness o an amiable esolu ion,
bu on he o he hey sen B i ish wa ships in o Icelandic wa e s, esul ing in se e al
amming wi h he much slowe and smalle Icelandic essels. Concluding, Tómasson
decla ed ha “I he B i ish Na y con inues o in e ene in Icelandic wa e s, I
canno con inue o si a he same able wi h he UK ep esen a i e” (Sec e a y o
S a e, 1976) he eby h ea ening o wi hd aw Iceland’s ep esen a ion o NATO.
The B i ish ambassado , Si John Killick, eplied ha his go e nmen did no wish
o deba e he con lic in he NATO o um, “bu was no in any way pu ou ha he
Go e nmen o Iceland called o a Council mee ing” (Sec e a y o S a e, 1976).
Fu he mo e, Killick coun e ed wi h he adi ional legalis ic a gumen ha B i ish
awle s had e e y igh acco ding o in e na ional law o ish in Icelandic wa e s.
Howe e , he Icelandic manoeu e o use NATO ye again as a o um o exe
p essu e on he B i ish had wo ked. Following he Icelandic and B i ish s a emen s
o he ambassado s oiced hei opinions, oo. The Belgian ambassado , De S ae cke,
c i icised he B i ish go e nmen o disp opo iona e use o o ce and asked why i
was no possible o hem o wi hd aw he na y i ha would help ge nego ia ions
back on ack. O he ambassado s echoed he Belgian iew and encou aged a
71
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
B i ish na al wi hd awal as a i s s ep in enewing nego ia ions (Sec e a y o S a e,
1976). As he mee ing concluded Sec e a y Gene al Luns announced his plan o
isi Reykja ík and London in an a emp o media e he dispu e as he had done so
success ully h ee yea s be o e.
Upon his a i al in Reykja ík on 14 Janua y 1976 P ime Minis e Hallg ímsson
and Jus ice Minis e Jóhannesson in o med he Sec e a y Gene al ha he e would
be no deal wi h he B i ish un il hey wi hd ew hei na y uncondi ionally and
wi hou expec ing any ecip oci y om he Icelandic side. Fu he mo e, i he
B i ish would no comply hen he go e nmen o Iceland would ha e no choice bu
o b eak diploma ic ela ions be ween he wo s a es. Disappoin ed wi h Icelandic
in lexibili y he Sec e a y Gene al eplied ha he had hoped o ac as liaison be ween
bo h sides, bu he could no pu himsel in he posi ion o “bea ing an Icelandic
ul ima um o London” (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1976a). Whe he he Sec e a y
Gene al’s alk so ened Hallg ímsson’s posi ion is no clea bu no wai ing un il he
had con e ed wi h he B i ish side Hallg ímsson announced on 16 Janua y ha his
go e nmen was willing o begin nego ia ions i he B i ish go e nmen wi hd ew
i s iga es and NIMROD je s ou side he 200 nau ical miles be o e 24 Janua y. I
no , he Icelandic go e nmen would b eak o diploma ic ela ions. The B i ish
go e nmen yielded, and on 24 Janua y nego ia ions esumed in London.
Un o una ely, he whole p ocess would be o pedoed by an inciden on 26
Janua y. A aci unde s anding was in place ha ICGV should lea e he B i ish
awle s alone du ing nego ia ions. Despi e his, he cap ain o ICGV Tý cu he
ishing wa p o he awle Bos on Blenheim. As nego ia ions an ag ound he B i ish
p oposal was o mally ejec ed and on 5 Feb ua y he B i ish go e nmen enewed
na al p o ec ion o hei awling lee . Soon umou s began o su ace ha he wa p
cu ing had been ca ied ou wi h he consen o Jus ice Minis e Jóhannesson who
was adaman ly agains any so o deal wi h he B i ish (Jónsson, 1981, pp. 54-55).
Why he P og essi es migh wan o sabo age he nego ia ions could be explained by
hei ea s ha Hallg ímsson migh ag ee o le he B i ish con inue ishing wi hin
he 200 nau ical miles limi ins ead o d i ing hem comple ely ou o he new EEZ
(Ras ick & Íslei sson, 2004, pp. 385-386). This umou would la e be quashed by
he Cap ain o Tý , Guðmundu Kjæ nes ed, who in an in e iew s a ed ha i had
been his own decision o cu he wa ps om Bos on Blenheim (Guðmundsson, 2007,
p. 111) and ha o de s o desis om ha assing he B i ish awle s a i ed only
minu es a e he epo ed his ac ions o his supe io s
The e was a clea di e ence in s yle be ween he P og essi e and Independence
Pa y leade s on how o handle he c isis. As he con lic had eached a s alema e
Jus ice Minis e Jóhannesson paid a isi o U.S. ambassado I ing and a e
dispensing wi h some o mal small alk, Jóhannesson a emp ed – ye again – o ge
he Ame icans in ol ed on he Icelandic side:
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
His eal pu pose u ned ou o be a wa ning ha unless he USG olun a ily akes on
an ac i e and isible de ence o Iceland agains he B i ish, he IDF will be in se ious
dange . He also wan ed me o know ha whe eas in he le is GOVT which he headed
(1971-1974) he wo ked o sa e he base (commen : his is ue), he will no do he
same oday unless he USG hono s i s “obliga ion” o Iceland. As alleged p oo ha
USG is obliged o d i e he B i ish iga es ou o he dispu ed wa e s he ci ed poin E
o he ag eed minu e o he 1974 MOU which eads as ollows: “The wo go e nmen s
will s udy ways o u he he coope a ion be ween he Iceland De ence Fo ce and he
Icelandic Coas Gua d, ci il de ense and ci il a ia ion au ho i ies.” A e exp essing my
as onishmen as o how he as an in e na ional lawye o his s anding and as he as u e
GOVT leade he claims o be could possibly belie e his, […] he e is no hing anyplace
in he MOU which obliga es he USG o become in ol ed in Iceland´s ishe ies dispu e
(US Embassy Reykja ik, 1976b).
Wha ollowed was an hou -long hea ed a gumen be ween he wo men.
Ambassado I ing wa ned Jóhannesson ha he U.S. go e nmen did no gi e in o
blackmail, and i seemed o him ha “Iceland was ying o lex muscles i eally did
no ha e” (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1976b). Con inuing, I ing lis ed he possible
consequences o Iceland i he base should be closed and he de ence o ce o ced o
lea e he coun y:
All cons uc ion a IDF would na u ally s op, hi ing Iceland he ha des a a ime when
Iceland expec s unemploymen o de elop. I poin ed ou ha Iceland ge s exci ed when
unemploymen hi s 200. I IDF closes, Iceland can expec o add a leas en imes ha
numbe o i s unemploymen olls. Iceland ea ns app oxima ely $26 million a yea
in o eign exchange om IDF ope a ions which jus happens o be he amoun o i s
ese es in good imes and which his yea has been o indesc ibable ad an age i is a
cushion Iceland denies i needs bu is always glad o ha e. I IDF is o ced o wi hd aw,
Iceland´s secu i y would be so endange ed ha i s inancial c edibili y wi h o eign
lende s could be shakie han i is now. Icelandic Ai lines cu en ly enjoys an a ac i e
concession om USG. The e would be a se ious ques ion whe he his concession
should be con inued. I wi hd awn Iceland would be ha d p essed o ill one 727 a
week o New Yo k ins ead o he p esen nine s e ch DC-88. The o eign exchange
loss would be el . I Iceland b oke ela ions wi h UK, le NATO and o ced ou he
IDF, he e was no eason o belie e Iceland would be be e o on he ishing g ounds
han now. In my opinion, mos likely wo se. Iceland´s la ges cus ome o ish is U.S.
i Ame icans became ang y enough o e Iceland´s ac ion, we could concei ably look
elsewhe e o supplie s. I USSR o e ed o ill he gap and ake Iceland´s ish, i will no
be wi hou disad an ages o Iceland (US Embassy Reykja ik, 1976b).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
4. The de ence unc ion o Ke l ík base
On 15 Ma ch 2006 a phone call om U.S Assis an Sec e a y o S a e o Iceland’s
Minis e o Fo eign A ai s b ough an end o 55 yea s o unb oken U.S. mili a y
p esence in Iceland. Be o e he end o Sep embe he las ou emaining F-15
igh e je s we e emo ed and wi h hem wen he las es ige o U.S. mili a y powe
in Iceland. O cou se, Ke la ík base was a Cold Wa o sp ing and i could be a gued
ha i s closu e was ine i able. Du ing i s exis ence he base pe sonnel moni o ed
So ie ac i i y in he skies and he sea a ound Iceland and in imes o con lic i would
ha e se ed as a bas ion in NATO’s No he n Flank agains he So ie No he n
Flee in he No h A lan ic and a b idgehead in he de ence o Iceland. Howe e , he
base also played se e al la en oles bene icial o successi e Icelandic go e nmen s.
The e o e, Fo eign Minis e ’s Haa de mid-Ma ch phone call had wide implica ions
han saying a ewell o a edundan mili a y o ce in a s a egically insigni ican
egion o he wo ld.
When he i s U.S. soldie s a i ed in 1951, hey we e e u ning o a decade-old
mili a y ai po cons uc ed by he U.S. ha also se ed as Iceland’s only in e na ional
ai po . While he 1951 De ence Ag eemen designa ed he U.S. de ence o ce as
esponsible o all a ia ion se ices a he ai po (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s,
1951) esponsibili y o ci il a ia ion was in he hands o he Icelandic au ho i ies
which gained ee use o base equipmen o he Icelandic a ia ion agency. Thus,
Iceland’s only in e na ional ai po was se iced and main ained o a g ea ex en
by U.S. mili a y au ho i ies and did no unc ion wi hou he in ol emen o U.S.
mili a y pe sonnel.
By he mid-1970s e o s we e unde aken o sepa a e ci ilian and mili a y a ic
wi hin Ke la ík ai po . The U.S. go e nmen con ibu ed unds o he cons uc ion
o a new ci ilian e minal and new amps, axiways and oads wi hin he ai po a ea
(INA, 1979), in line wi h he 1974 MoU ha solidi ied con inued U.S. mili a y
p esence in Iceland. In he mid-1980s he Reagan adminis a ion emba ked on
ex ensi e upg ades o base acili ies and equipmen o coun e g owing So ie na al
powe in he No h A lan ic (Gunna sson, 1985, pp. 3-4). Those p ojec s included
he cons uc ion o a ha bou and oil depo , ha dened igh e hanga s, comple e
enewal o an obsole e ada sys em, a new command cen e and an inc ease in he
numbe o igh e je s om 12 o 18 in conjunc ion wi h he phasing ou o he olde
F4E Phan om in a ou o he new F-15 Eagle igh e je .
Apa om eaping bene i s om ha ing he Uni ed S a es go e nmen und
se ices and majo wo ks wi hin Ke la ík ai po he exis ence o a small Ame ican

80
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
ownship on Reykjanes peninsula bene i ed he Icelandic economy. The need o
local labou in cons uc ion and se ices a he base in he 1950s pumped U.S.
dolla s in o he Icelandic economy, elimina ing unemploymen while causing
manpowe sho ages in o he sec o s o he economy (Fjá mála íðindi, 1956). In
he 1960s he se ices and labou needed a he base p o ided a s eady s eam o
e enue and aluable o eign cu ency (Fjá mála íðindi, 1960) and by he 1970s
he base had become a pe manen ea u e in he Icelandic economy: he hi d
la ges single buye o elec ici y om he na ional elec ic g id while employing
1.4% o he a ailable labou o ce in Iceland. (Sigu pálsson, 1976). This end
con inued in o he la e 1980s when e enues gene a ed by he U.S. mili a y in
Iceland cons i u ed 2.5% o Iceland’s G oss Na ional P oduc (Cen al Bank o
Iceland, 2006).
Th oughou he decades he U.S. mili a y also p o ided an impo an – al hough
unin ended – ole as a p o ide o Sea ch and Rescue. S a ioned alongside he igh e
je s was a Rescue Squad on (56 h RQS) o i e HH-60G Pa ehawk helicop e s
suppo ed by a HC-130 He cules e uelling ai plane (Eydal, 2006, p. 50) and upon
eques by he Icelandic Coas Gua d would ly non-mili a y Sea ch and Rescue
missions (Senio o icial Icelandic Coas Gua d, 2014). Deployed o p o ide
comba Sea ch and Rescue o he base he squad on had an imp essi e escue eco d
o non-base pe sonnel. F om 1971 o 2005 he squad on lew o e 400 missions
and escued o e 300 indi iduals om o e 20 na ionali ies (Iceland De ence Fo ce,
2006). The squad on’s ac i i y declined as domes ic Sea ch and Rescue capabili ies
we e buil up wi hin he Icelandic Coas Gua d bu i is impo an no o unde alue
i s impo ance as i con inued o p o ide Coas Gua d wi h added backup in case
i was e e needed igh up un il hey we e emo ed om Iceland in 2006 (Senio
o icial Icelandic Coas Gua d, 2014).
4.1. Iceland Ai De ence Sys em (IADS)
A he ime o he U.S. depa u e om Iceland he Iceland Ai De ence Sys em
(IADS) was he backbone o U.S. NATO ai su eillance in he No h A lan ic.
The componen s o IADS include bo h NATO equipmen and NATO acili ies.
IADS is di ided in o h ee sub-sys ems: (1) ada sys em, (2) communica ion
sys em and a (3) elecommunica ion sys em. The ada sys em consis s o p ima y as
well as seconda y ada sys em. The ada and communica ion si es a e ou and a e
si ua ed in each quad an o Iceland: Miðnesheiði (H-1A), Gunnól s íku jall (H-
2), S okknes (H-3) and Bola jall (H-4). Op ical ib e cables connec hese si es o a
Command and Repo ing Cen e (CRC) and a Iceland So wa e Suppo Facili y
(ISSF) si ua ed wi hin he o me Ke la ík base a ea (Uni ed S a es Na y Na al
Facili ies Enginee ing Command, 2005, p. A-1).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
The communica ion componen o IADS connec s he sys em wi h command
and con ol cen es in o he NATO coun ies; while he elecommunica ion sys em
makes i possible o he s a a he CRC o communica e h ough secu e UHF and
VHF channels as well as Tac ical Digi al In o ma ion Links (TADIL) wi h mili a y
ships and ae oplanes (Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, pp. 76-77). These h ee
sys ems ga he in o ma ion om ada s and o he ai de ence sys ems and mili a y
ae oplanes and ships. The da a collec ed by he sys ems is ansmi ed o he CRC in
Ke la ík whe e hey a e combined in o a Recognised Ai and Sea Pic u e (RASP), a
eal- ime-pic u e o mo emen o all mili a y ae oplanes and essels wi hin a gi en
a ea. The CRC in Ke la ík sha es he RASP wi h o he NATO command cen es in
Eu ope, which in u n sha e hei RASP wi h he Ke la ík CRC (Icelandic De ence
Agency, 2010, pp. 80-82), hus c ea ing knowledge o all mili a y ai and sea a ic
wi hin he a ea co e ed by NATO In eg a ed Ai De ence Sys em (NATINADS).
Fu he mo e, he CRC in Ke la ík sha es digi al p ima y ada da a on ai
a ic wi h Icelandic ci ilian ai a ic con olle s. Wi hou his, ci ilian ai a ic
con olle s would only be able o see ae oplanes ha send au oma ic signals o
seconda y ada . O he a ic, i.e. non-allied mili a y ligh s, would emain unseen
(Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, p. 85) causing possible dange o ci ilian ai a ic.
Following he U.S. depa u e in 2006 he Ke la ík CRC was in eg a ed in o
Eu opean NATO Combined Ai Ope a ions Cen es (CAOCS) in he NATO
de ence s uc u e. Ini ially, in Sep embe 2006 o CAOC-3 in Rei an, No way
and la e o CAOC-9 in High Wycombe in he English Midlands. Wo k began
o in eg a e IADS in o NATINADS in Augus 2007 and he Ke la ík CRC was
eassigned o CAOC-F in Finde up, Denma k (Icelandic De ence Agency, 74).
Following he deac i a ion o CAOC-F in 2013, he Ke la ík CRC was ye again
eassigned and his ime o CAOC Uedem-U in Uedem, Ge many (Commande o
Ke la ík Ai Base, 2014).
One o he majo unc ions o Ke la ík base du ing he Cold Wa was o moni o
So ie ac i i y a ound Iceland. Be o e he end o he Cold Wa So ie mili a y
ligh s in o he No h A lan ic we e commonplace. Be ween 1962 and 1973 igh e
je s om he 57 h Figh e In e cep o Squad on based a Ke la ík base in e cep ed
o e one housand So ie ai c a (INA, 1974). In he 1980s he numbe o So ie
mili a y ligh s con inued o ise wi h an a e age o 126 planes in e cep ed each
yea (Jónsson, 1990, p. 74). In he ea ly 1990s, ollowing he collapse o he So ie
Union, Russian mili a y ligh s wi hin he Icelandic Mili a y Ai Iden i ica ion
Zone (MADIZ) declined sha ply and pe e ed ou in 1991. A he u n o he
cen u y, Russian mili a y planes consis ing o Cold Wa e a Tupole -95 we e again
spo ed wi hin he Icelandic MADIZ. A single ligh o wo planes was epo ed
in 1999 (“Bi ni á lugi,” 1999) and again in 2003 (“T æ ússneska éla inn á
lo a na s æðið,” 2003). Wi h he closu e o Ke la ík base and he depa u e o
U.S. mili a y pe sonnel om Iceland egula Russian mili a y ligh s in o he No h
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
A lan ic esumed and con inued wi h egula in e als du ing he ime pe iod
2006-2013.
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&ůŝŐŚƚƐ EƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚƐ
Figu e 1 Russian mili a y ligh s and ai c a s wi hin he Icelandic MADIZ 2006-2013
(Icelandic Coas Gua d, 2014).
Figu e 1 shows he o al numbe o Russian mili a y planes, and ligh s, wi hin
he Icelandic MADIZ, enamed NATO Ai Policing A ea ollowing he closu e o
Ke la ík base. Ten o hese ligh s ha e been ci cula ligh s a ound Iceland wi h a
minimum dis ance o 35 nau ical miles om land (Icelandic Coas Gua d, 2014).
The equency o hese ligh s is s ill a below wha i was du ing he Cold Wa
e a, bu hei p esence in he skies a ound Iceland is in s a k con as o he 1990s
and ea ly 2000s and shows enewed lexing o Russian mili a y powe in he No h
A lan ic. The ligh s mimic hose lown by he So ie nuclea s a egic o ce du ing
he Cold Wa :
We ha e simply opened old So ie mili a y manuals om he Cold Wa and seen
ha hey ha en’ changed a hing. They ha e been p ac icing c uise missile a acks on
a ge s on land. They ha e clea ly been exe cising c uise missile a acks on NATO HQ,
SHAPE, and a ge s in Ge many, No way, and Iceland, as well as lying down o he
U.S. eas e n seaboa d. They ha e also been exe cising an i-subma ine wa a e. I ’s he
whole package. They ly pas Iceland and head sou h owa ds Eu ope (Senio o icial
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013).
The eappea ance o Russian mili a y ligh s is no simply a Cold Wa echo
epackaged in a eil o Russian na ional in e es s he e is also some isk in ol ed
o ci ilian ai a ic c ossing he A lan ic. The Russian mili a y au ho i ies do
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
no in o m Icelandic ai a ic con ol se ices o hei ligh plans; nei he do
he Russian bombe s send signals o seconda y ada s used by Icelandic ai a ic
con olle s o answe o adio communica ion (Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, p.
84). The isk o a mid-ai collision be ween a passenge plane c ossing he A lan ic
and a Russian bombe a e low bu he e ha e been ins ances when ci ilian ai a ic
has had o be edi ec ed because o nea by Russian bombe ligh s:
The Russians came in 2008, when he F ench we e he e [Ai Policing mission] and hey
lew up and ac oss a ic. The e we e numbe o ins ances which we would egis e as
inciden s, because hey [Russian bombe s] we e ha close o he middle o ai a ic.
We o wa ded he in o ma ion [ o Icelandic ci il a ia ion au ho i ies]. The e has been
mo e han one inciden . Especially in he sou h-eas co ne [o Iceland] and Icelandic
ci il a ia ion au ho i ies ha e di ec ed a ic abo e and o he side o he a ea (Technical
c ew chie IADS, 2014).
In hese ins ances, i is he ole o he CRC in Ke la ík o iden i y and ack he
planes and elay in o ma ion abou hei ligh s o he CAOC in Uedem. I is hen
up o ai de ence con olle s in ha pa icula CAOC o decide om whe e o
sc amble igh e s o in e cep he bombe s (Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, pp. 83-
84). I he Russians ly close o No way on hei way o Iceland, No wegian igh e s
a e sc ambled om hei bases in No way.
The linkage be ween he CRC in Ke la ík and CAOC Uedem, Ge many is
in eg a ed. NATO uni s deployed in Iceland o NATO ai policing missions
include ai de ence con olle s who di ec he igh e planes om Ke la ík CRC.
O cou se, NATO ai policing is ca ied ou a he eques o and on he behal
o he Icelandic go e nmen bu ac ical con ol is in he hands o o eign mili a y
pe sonnel ha ope a e wi hin a join NATO command s uc u e and wo k
acco ding o NATO ules and p ocedu es. In he e en ha igh e s om Ke la ík
need o in e cep mili a y ligh s wi hin he so-called Icelandic NATO Ai Policing
A ea an au ho iza ion needs o be gi en by CAOC Uedem (Commande Ke la ík
Ai Base, 2014). NATO membe s ha e asked SACEUR o conduc ai policing on
hei behal , and his is execu ed by he NATO chain o command ollowing s ic
Rules o Engagemen (ROE) in consul a ion wi h he na ion in whose ai space an
inciden po en ially occu s.
The i s s eps owa ds moun ing NATO ai policing missions akes place a
Sup eme Headqua e s Allied Powe s Eu ope (SHAPE), du ing NATO Fo ce
Gene a ion Con e ence held in he i s week o No embe each yea (Icelandic
De ence Agency, 2010, p. 87). Du ing he e en indi idual NATO membe
announce pa icipa ion in NATO missions and hei con ibu ion. Among hose
missions ad e ised is Ai Su eillance and In e cep ion Capabili y o mee Iceland’s
Peace ime P epa edness Needs (Commande Ke la ík Ai Base, 2014). The missions
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
a e he esponsibili y o and conduc ed on behal o NATO al hough indi idual
membe s a es send pe sonnel and equipmen o conduc ai policing in Iceland.
NATO s anda d AJP4.5, i led: Allied Join Doc ine o Hos Na ion Suppo ,
desc ibes he six phases ha mus be comple ed be o e NATO mili a y o ces can
a i e in Iceland o pa icipa e in ai policing:
1. A Memo andum o Unde s anding is nego ia ed wi hin SHAPE, ou lining
he o e a ching p inciples o p o ision o Hos Na ion Suppo be ween
NATO S a egic Commands he Sending Na ions and he Hos Na ions;
2. Wi hin SHAPE a Hos Na ion Suppo Reques is d a ed, summa ising
he need o Hos Na ion Suppo and ou lines he scope o he desi ed
a angemen . The Hos Na ion is hen expec ed o espond o he Hos Na ion
Suppo Reques be o e mo ing on o discussions wi h he designa ed NATO
Commande on needed Hos Na ion Suppo A angemen s;
3. Combined Join S a emen o Requi emen s is hen sen om SHAPE o he
hos na ion ou lining he equi ed suppo needed by he sending na ion. I
co e s acili ies, anspo a ion, secu i y, elecommunica ion e c.;
4. A Join Implemen a ion A angemen be ween he Hos and Sending Na ion
is de eloped. A bila e al ag eemen be ween he Hos Na ion and indi idual
Sending Na ions, obliga ing he signa o ies o p o ide he inancial and o he
esou ces de ailed wi hin he ag eemen ;
5. S a emen o Requi emen is hen de eloped. I s pu pose is o ake he
planning p ocess om he gene ic o he speci ic: iden i ying wha o ces
need o be suppo ed, i shall include all Hos Na ion Suppo needed by he
Sending Na ion o ces;
6. The S a emen o Requi emen is hen annexed o a Join Implemen a ion
A angemen which ou lines in de ail he p ocedu es and concep s
unde pinning a ailable Hos Na ion Suppo . The Join Implemen a ion
A angemen includes a lis o all na ions pa icipa ing in he mili a y ac i i y
(NATO S anda diza ion. O ice, 2013, pp. 3-1 - 3-8 and Commande Ke la ík
Ai Base, 2014).
Al hough he p ocedu e laid ou in NATO s anda d AJP-4.5 is he s anda d
me hod o p epa ing o Ai Policing missions in eali y only h ee o hese s eps
a e aken when p epa ing o Ai Policing missions in Iceland (Icelandic De ence
Agency, 2010, pp. 88-89): (1) The O ice o De ence a he Icelandic Minis y
o Fo eign A ai s and Commande Allied Join Fo ce Command Headqua e s
B unssum (JFC B unssum) sign a memo andum o unde s anding conce ning
he p o ision o Hos Na ion Suppo o he isi ing NATO coun ies ai o ces,
(2) The De ence Depa men and JFC B unssum sign a Technical Ag eemen on
Hos Na ion Suppo and implemen a ion o Ai Policing and (3) he Icelandic

85
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
au ho i ies and each Sending Na ion de elop a Join Implemen a ion A angemen
which is based on he exis ing Technical Ag eemen .
Table 1 Con ibu ing na ions in NATO Ai Policing in Iceland 2008-2013 (Icelandic Coas
Gua d, 2013).
NATO Ai Policing Missions in Iceland 2008-2013
2008 F ance F ance U.S.
2009 Denma k No way U.S.
2010 Denma k Ge many U.S.
2011 Canada No way U.S.
2012 Ge many U.S. Po ugal
2013 Canada I aly U.S.
In he sp ing o 2008, he i s NATO Ai Policing Mission ook place in Iceland.
The Sending Na ion was F ance which deployed ou Mi age 2000 igh e s om he
F ench Ai Fo ce. Followed by a U.S. Ai Policing mission in Sep embe ha same
yea .
Be ween 2008 and 2013 h ee pe iodic deploymen s ook place a yea , each
las ing i e o six weeks. The U.S. has illed one slo a yea while Canada, Denma k,
F ance, Ge many and No way ha e illed wo slo s each wi h Po ugal and I aly
co e ing he emaining wo slo s. Be o e he depa u e o U.S. o ces om Ke la ík
Iceland enjoyed a yea ound ai de ence p o ided by he F-15 igh e s s a ioned
a he base and h ee pe iodic deploymen s a yea is a a c y om pe manen
s a ioning o igh e s in Iceland. The Bal ic S a es (Es onia, La ia and Li huania)
a e also p o ided wi h egula NATO Ai Policing missions; howe e , hei co e age
is con inuous and he e a e oices wi hin he Icelandic public adminis a ion ha
ha e a gued o inc eased co e age:
We had a clea claim o ask o ull co e age like he Bal ic s a es, pe haps i was a
mis ake no o do so, and end somewhe e in be ween. This cu en a angemen is no
accep able as he e can be up o six mon hs be ween deploymen s. […] The a angemen
is ou slo s [deploymen s a yea ] bu we ha e ne e used he ou h slo . The e ha e
only been h ee missions a yea since we didn’ hink we could suppo ou slo s a e
he banking c isis [au umn 2008]. A adi ion has o med a ound h ee missions a yea ,
and we ha en’ eques ed any inc ease. Bu his is no an accep able a angemen as we
do no ha e adequa e ai de ences (Senio o icial Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013).
This iew om wi hin he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s d aws a en ion o he
p oblem o cos s a dilemma accen ua ed by Iceland’s smallness, al hough, he b un
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
o he cos s associa ed wi h each ai policing slo is he esponsibili y o he Sending
Na ion. The a e age cos o he Icelandic go e nmen o each ai policing mission
is oughly €77,000 (Senio o icial Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013) ha is mos ly
imbu semen o local anspo a ion, inc eased secu i y measu es a Ke la ík
ai po as well as paymen s o he na ional ai po and ai na iga ion se ice p o ide
ISAVIA o g ound se ices,
4.2. NATO acili ies in Iceland
Th ough he decades a numbe o de ence p ojec s we e unded in Iceland. While he
ini ia i e was in he hands o he U.S. au ho i ies, he p ojec s we e ca ied ou wi h
consen om hei Icelandic coun e pa s (Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, p. 66),
and hei unding was ei he in he hands o he U.S. go e nmen , NATO o bo h.
The acili ies and equipmen in ques ion di e in size and shape. F om ha bou and
ai po acili ies o ada communica ion si es and ib e op ic cables. Un il 2007 he
Uni ed S a es had ep esen ed Iceland wi hin he NATO In as uc u e Commi ee,
oday known as he NATO Secu i y In es men P og amme, bu in ligh o changed
ci cums ances he go e nmen o Iceland ook o e ha ole and began o con ibu e
o he NATO Secu i y In es men P og amme (NSIP), a equisi e o Hos Na ions
o ecei e NATO common unding o de ence in as uc u e.
Du ing he hand o e p ocess in 2006, base and ai po acili ies we e ca ego ized
in o wo sepa a e g oups acco ding o hei sou ce o unding: U.S. owned and
hose in NATO in en o y. The wo sides eached an ag eemen o hando e o
U.S. acili ies; and bo h go e nmen s decided o join ly ecommend o NATO ha
Iceland would assume Hos Na ion esponsibili y o all NATO unded acili ies in
Iceland (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2006, p. 13). As an in e im a angemen he
U.S. go e nmen con inued i s Use Na ion ole o NATO in as uc u e, pending a
decision by NATO on he inal disposi ion o hese acili ies. Howe e , ollowing U.S.
no i ica ion o NATO mili a y au ho i ies ha he Uni ed S a es no longe equi ed
he use o hese acili ies ha in e im a angemen could no exceed wel e mon hs.
In he summe o 2008, he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s published a de ini i e
eco d o all NATO acili ies in Iceland (Go e nmen Gaze e, 2008). In sho , hese
acili ies we e di ided in o h ee ca ego ies: (1) a ious acili ies loca ed wi hin he
Ke la ík ai po a ea, (2) IADS acili ies and equipmen and (3) Helgu ík ha bou
acili ies and oil depo s ha supply Ke la ík ai po wi h je uel h ough a 5.5 km long
pipeline. O cou se, Ke la ík ai po has always se ed as a dual mili a y and ci ilian
ai po , while IADS and Helgu ík ha bou we e a pa o an ex ensi e in es men
p og am in he 1980s ca ied ou by he U.S. mili a y bu inanced by NSIP.
De ence in es men in Iceland unded wi h U.S. axpaye ’s money o NATO unds
has been subs an ial. In 2007 NATO alued i s own con ibu ion a €550 million.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
O which €300 million had gone owa ds ci il wo k p ojec s wi h he emaining
€250 million ea ma ked o IADS (NATO Secu i y In es men P og amme, 2007).
Howe e , he o al alue o IADS was se a €385 million (Icelandic Coas Gua d,
2006), he disc epancy o €135 million accoun s o di ec U.S. in es men owa ds
IADS.
The p e iously men ioned lis (Go e nmen Gaze e, 2008) o NATO
in as uc u e co e s 187 acili ies o which 46 we e in a dele ion p ocess om he
NATO in en o y a he ime o i s publica ion. O he emaining 141 acili ies, a
numbe o hose wi hin Helgu ík ha bou and Ke la ík ai po ha e been leased
ou o hi d pa ies. In u n, he leaseholde s a e esponsible o main aining he
acili ies bu NATO e ains a i s use igh .
The e a e a numbe o buildings owned by NATO wi hin ou a ea. They a e ei he used
by us, unused o leased ou o ISAVIA. We [Icelandic au ho i ies] ha e also leased ou
he NATO oil depo in Helgu ík ha bou , which is a subs an i e acili y. We saw igh
om he s a ha we would ne e be able o main ain Helgu ík. The de ence o ce
had al eady leased ou he ha bou acili ies o Reykjanes municipali y and we simply
con inued wi h ha a angemen . The oil depo was la e leased ou o Olíud ei ing, and
he income is used o inance supe ision o he con ac : making su e ha Olíud ei ing
pe o ms equi ed main enance (Commande Ke la ík Ai Base, 2013).
Owne ship o wo ks unded by NSIP is no ully de ined. Indeed, ins alla ions
inanced unde common NATO in as uc u e a e he esponsibili y o he ele an
Hos Na ion bu NATO “…has he igh o use wo ks ha ha e been accep ed in o
he NATO In en o y and he igh o eimbu semen o he esidual alue o NATO
Secu i y In es men P og amme unded wo ks ha a e dele ed om he in en o y”
(NATO O ice o Resou ces, 2011, pp. 256-257). Howe e , cos s incu ed om
main aining and sc apping NATO acili ies aken o he NATO in en o y lis
ha e exceeded any esidual alue owed o NATO (Icelandic Pe manen Delega ion
a NATO, 2014). The e o e, du ing he ime pe iod co e ed by his hesis he
go e nmen o Iceland has no had o eimbu se NATO o any in as uc u e NSIP
has unded in Iceland.
4.3. Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y Iceland
Membe ship o a mili a y alliance calls o a collec i e amewo k o secu i y
s anda ds and p ocedu es ha ensu e a common deg ee o p o ec ion o classi ied
in o ma ion. The e o e, he hi d se o asks ha he Icelandic au ho i ies ully
assumed a e he U.S. depa u e was he implemen a ion o NATO secu i y
s anda ds and p ocedu es o gua d classi ied in o ma ion. The No h A lan ic
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Council secu i y policy documen C-M(2002)49 obliga es NATO membe s a es
o es ablish a Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y (Icelandic De ence Agency, 2010, pp. 47-
48) whose esponsibili ies a e as ollows:
1. P ese e he secu i y o NATO classi ied in o ma ion in na ional o ganiza ions;
2. Ca y ou egula inspec ions o secu i y a angemen s in ended o p o ec ion
o NATO classi ied in o ma ion in all na ional o ganiza ions;
3. Pe o m secu i y checks on indi iduals be o e hey a e g an ed secu i y
clea ance;
4. Ensu e ha na ional secu i y plans a e in place o p e en NATO classi ied
in o ma ion om alling in o unau ho ised o hos ile hands; and
5. G an he es ablishmen o dises ablishmen o cen al na ional egis ies.
Classi ied in o ma ion includes in o ma ion o ma e ial de e mined o equi e
p o ec ion agains unau ho ized disclosu e ha has been so designa ed by secu i y
classi ica ion. Classi ied in o ma ion does no only include w i en in o ma ion
and/o da a ga he ed om NATO da a sys ems bu also buildings and equipmen .
Each membe s a e Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y compe ence is egula ly
moni o ed by he NATO O ice o Secu i y6 h ough egula inspec ions (Icelandic
De ence Agency, pp. 48-52). These inspec ions ocus on: (1) Pe sonnel Secu i y,
eliabili y o indi iduals wi h access o classi ied in o ma ion; (2) Physical Secu i y,
physical p o ec ion in place a acili ies con aining in o ma ion equi ing p o ec ion;
(3) Secu i y o In o ma ion, o e all de ensi e measu es in ended o iden i y and
p e en loss o classi ied in o ma ion and (4) Indus ial Secu i y, applica ion o
de ensi e measu es o p e en he loss o classi ied in o ma ion ha has been
de ol ed o p i a e sec o ac o s o con ac ual easons, o example in connec ion
wi h cons uc ion wo k on a classi ied acili y. Fu he , he NATO O ice o Secu i y
in es iga es, in coope a ion wi h he Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y, ins ances o los
o comp omised NATO classi ied in o ma ion.
4.4. Implemen a ion o de ence asks p io o 2006
In acco dance o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen he U.S. go e nmen was esponsible
o he de ence o Iceland on behal o NATO. The e o e, he U.S. main ained asse s
and pe sonnel in he coun y o p o ide Iceland wi h de ences. In addi ion, he U.S.
se ed as a Hos and Use Na ion o all NATO acili ies in Iceland, and sha ed
6 “The NATO O ice o Secu i y is a dis inc body esponsible o coo dina ing, moni o ing and
implemen ing NATO’s secu i y policy, o o e all secu i y wi hin NATO and o he NATO Headqua e s
Secu i y Se ice” (NATO Encyclopedia, 2016, p. 295).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
5. The closu e o Ke la ík base
5.1. The impac o he de ence issue on domes ic poli ics
Be o e del ing in o he e en ual base nego ia ions ha esul ed in he 2006 closu e
o Ke la ík base i is necessa y o b ie ly ou line he na u e o he Icelandic poli ical
pa y sys em and wha posi ions he domina ing pa ies ha e had owa ds U.S.
de ence coope a ion and Icelandic membe ship in NATO.
The Icelandic 19 h and ea ly 20 h cen u y poli ical pa y sys em was la gely shaped
by Iceland’s ela ionship wi h Denma k and he mo e owa ds sel -de e mina ion
and e en ual so e eign y (Ha ða son, 2002, p. 107). Wi h he 1918 Union Ac
Iceland became se on a ajec o y ha would lead o ull independence. In he
la e 1910s he poli ical pa y sys em began o il owa ds adi ional class poli ics
cen ing on economic and social issues. Du ing a 15-yea pe iod he ou majo
pa ies we e o med ha would domina e he Icelandic poli ical scene h oughou
he 20 h cen u y. In 1916, he Social Democ a ic Pa y (Alþýðu lokku ) and he
ag a ian P og essi e Pa y (F amsókna lokku ) we e es ablished. Followed In
1929 by he c ea ion o he conse a i e Independence Pa y (Sjál s æðis lokku ),
and he Communis Pa y (Kommúnis a lokku Íslands) in 1930. The Communis
Pa y e ol ed in o he Uni ed Socialis Pa y In 1938 (Sameininga lokku
alþýðu-Sósíalis a lokku inn), which in u n ans o med in o he People’s Alliance
(Alþýðubandalagið) in 1956.
The Social Democ a ic Pa y, unlike i s sis e pa ies in o he No dic coun ies,
was ne e able o gain a domina ing posi ion in he Icelandic poli ical landscape. As
a poli ical ou g ow h o he Icelandic labou mo emen i ep esen ed adi ional
wo king-class in e es s. A e ini ial success in he 1920s and 1930s, i s elec o al
suppo s agna ed below he 20 pe cen iles and he pa y was ne e able o p opel
o he o e on o Icelandic poli ics. A majo ealignmen on he le wing o he
spec um ook place in 1999 wi h he me ge o ou le o cen e pa ies in o
he Social Democ a ic Alliance (Sam ylkingin). The in en was o consolida e
he le in o a single block o coun e he Independence Pa y ha has his o ically
ep esen ed a uni ed igh o cen e on .
Wi h he me ge o he People’s Alliance and he Social Democ a ic Pa y in o
he Social Democ a ic Alliance, a splin e g oup om he People’s Alliance o med
he Le G een Mo emen (Vins ih ey ingin g æn amboð). O e shadowed by
he Social Democ a ic Alliance he Le G een Mo emen gained ini ially 9% o
he elec o al o es ising o 14.3% in he 2007 Pa liamen a y elec ions. Two yea s

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
la e , ollowing he 2008 inancial c isis, he Le G een Mo emen ca ied h ough
i s bigges Pa liamen a y elec o al ic o y by winning 21.7% o he elec o al o es.
The ag a ian P og essi e Pa y has adi ionally been he second la ges pa y in
Pa liamen . Malappo ionmen in he Icelandic elec o al sys em has bene i ed u al
cons i uencies in Iceland ansla ing in o disp opo iona e elec o al P og essi e
Pa y gains (Ha ða son, 2002, pp. 150-151). In he pos -wa decades he P og essi e
Pa y could ely on 20-30% o he elec o al o es bu i s elec o al base has g adually
e oded h ough u banisa ion as people mig a ed om he u al cons i uencies o
u ban a eas. To compensa e o i s dwindling u al elec o al base he P og essi e Pa y
has b anched ou o u ban o e s (K is jánsson, 1994, pp. 154-155). His o ically,
his has ansla ed in o a necessi y o he P og essi e Pa y leade ship o be able o
o m coali ion go e nmen s wi h pa ies ei he o he le o igh on he poli ical
spec um
Compa ed o he P og essi e Pa y and he Social Democ a ic Pa y, he
conse a i e Independence Pa y was a ela i e la e come on he poli ical scene. The
Independence Pa y has combined conse a i e and libe al elemen s (Ha ða son,
2002, p. 108) while d awing on wo king class suppo . The cen e igh wing o he
poli ical spec um has been uni ed wi hin he Independence Pa y hus secu ing he
pa y 30%-40% o he elec o al o es.
Despi e he dominance o he ou -pa y s uc u e a peculia i y o he poli ical
sys em has been he con inuous eme gence o a single issue i h pa y. Usually
inhabi ing he poli ical sys em only o a b ie pe iod (K is insson, 2007, pp.
108-109), such pa ies usually championed a popula single issue wi h a b oad
appeal o he elec o a e. Howe e , a e hei ini ial success, he es ablished
pa ies would o en adop hei policies, hus dep i ing hem o hei uniqueness.
Fo ins ance, such was he a e o he na ionalis ic and an i-communis Na ional
P ese a ion Pa y (Þjóð a na lokku inn). A e mode a e success in he 1953
Pa liamen a y elec ions by capi alising almos solely on opposi ion o he Ke la ík
base he Na ional P ese a ion Pa y ga ne ed 6% o he o e and wo membe s o
Pa liamen . (Nuech e lein, 1961, p. 122). Howe e , as he Social Democ a ic Pa y
and he P og essi e Pa y adop ed an an i-base posi ion p io o he 1956 elec ion
he Na ional P ese a ion Pa y los i s elec o al suppo and i s ep esen a ion in
Pa liamen .
Since he es ablishmen o he Icelandic epublic in 1944, he de ence ela ionship
wi h he Uni ed S a e and la e membe ship o NATO has had a decisi e in luence on
he Icelandic domes ic poli ical scene. As he ic o s o he wa began o d i apa i
became appa en o he leade s o Iceland’s h ee majo poli ical pa ies – excluding
he communis s – ha Iceland needed wes e n de ence gua an ees o compensa e
o i s ulne abili ies. In he win e o 1948-1949 he coali ion go e nmen , led
by he Social Democ a ic Pa y wa ched om a a a emp s by No way, Denma k
and Sweden o o m a Scandina ian de ence alliance. Al hough he Icelandic
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
go e nmen ollowed de elopmen s wi h in e es , i s use ulness o Iceland appea ed
doub ul since wi hin such a secu i y a angemen Iceland would always emain
a he pe iphe y. E en ually a undamen al di e ence abou wha ole he Uni ed
S a es should ha e is-à- is a No dic de ence alliance u ned he discussions ba en.
In he win e o 1948-1949 i was no su p ising ha he Icelandic go e nmen
p o ed ecep i e o U.S. o e u es on Icelandic pa icipa ion in a U.S. led de ence
alliance. Ten a i e discussions abou his u u e mili a y alliance ook place be ween
Ambassado Bu ick and Fo eign Minis e Benedik sson bu he decision o join
had o be ag eed upon by all membe s o he uling coali ion go e nmen . The e o e,
he Icelandic delega ion ha con ened wi h Sec e a y o S a e Dean Acheson and
his s a a he S a e Depa men in Washing on D.C. in Ma ch 1949 consis ed o
in luen ial poli ical igu es om each o he h ee coali ion pa ies: Fo eign Minis e
Bja ni Benedik sson, Independence Pa y; Minis e o Comme ce Emil Jónsson,
Social Democ a ic Pa y; and Minis e o Educa ion Eys einn Jónsson, P og essi e
Pa y. The h ee pa ies ep esen ed a uni ied on du ing he nego ia ions, bu i
is necessa y o sepa a e Icelandic NATO membe ship om he mo e poli ically
explosi e issue o U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland ha would cause in e nal di ision
wi hin he P og essi e Pa y and he Social Democ a ic Pa y.
The di ision was al eady appa en du ing he 1946 Pa liamen o e on he
Ke la ík Ag eemen ha ga e he Uni ed S a es he igh o con inue o use
Ke la ík ai po o mili a y ansi ligh s. Opposing he ag eemen a he ime
was he leade o he P og essi e Pa y, He mann Jónasson, who a gued o a
comple e Icelandic ake-o e o Ke la ík ai po . Howe e , he was coun e ed by a
la ge ac ion wi hin his own pa y in a ou o he ag eemen . He mann Jónasson’s
eluc ance o close de ence ies wi h he Uni ed S a es emained in 1949 as he
abs ained in he Pa liamen a y o e on NATO membe ship, suppo ed by a small
g oup wi hin his own pa liamen a y g oup. Equally, he Social Democ a ic Pa y
was no ully uni ed in1946 and 1949. While a majo i y o six Social Democ a ic
pa liamen a ians o ed in a ou o he Ke la ík Ag eemen wo we e in opposi ion
while one abs ained. A pa e n ha epea ed i sel h ee yea s la e when he Social
Democ a s o ed on whe he o join NATO wi h wo o i s pa liamen a ians
o ing agains membe ship.
The in e nal di ision wi hin he P og essi e Pa y and he Social Democ a ic
Pa y can be explained by wo undamen al easons. As a ecen ly independen
na ion Icelande s we e sensi i e o losing i s newly gained independence o a o eign
powe and o many he Ke la ík Ag eemen , and la e , NATO accession we e i s
s eps owa ds g ea e dependency on he Uni ed S a es and e osion o Icelandic
na ional iden i y. The second objec ion was closely ela ed o he i s one. A e
being d awn in o he a med Wes e n camp Iceland would no be able o a oid
becoming a a ge in any u u e s uggles be ween he Uni ed S a es and he So ie
Union. An ana hema o hose who wished o Iceland o emain ou o ha m’s way
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
and adop he same neu al s a us i had held a e becoming a so e eign s a e in
1918.
Despi e in e nal di ision among he P og essi e’s and he Social Democ a s
he b eak-ou o he Ko ean Wa in 1951 p o ed o be he ex e nal ca alys ha
o med a consensus wi hin he h ee majo pa ies o he necessi y o s a ion U.S.
mili a y o ces in Iceland (Ingimunda son, 1996, p. 223). The day be o e Pa liamen
adjou ned o he summe , 5 May 1951, Fo eign Minis e Benedik sson signed
he de ence ag eemen and in oduced as a go e nmen bill when Pa liamen e-
assembled in he au umn and passed wi h unanimous suppo by he Independence
Pa y, he P og essi e Pa y and he Social Democ a ic Pa y. While he h ee pa ies
discussed and deba ed he de ence ag eemen he socialis s we e in en ionally le
ou in he da k.
Al hough he h ee pa ies had p esen ed a uni ed on in accep ing U.S. o ces
in Iceland he decision was a c isis esponse. As he shock-wa es ha ippled om
he Ko ean Wa eceded opposi ion wi hin he P og essi e Pa y and he Social
Democ a ic Pa y owa ds he de ence ag eemen became mo e ocal. Following he
1953 elec ions he Independence Pa y and a weakened P og essi e Pa y enewed
hei coali ion go e nmen , bu opposi ion o he de ence ag eemen was eme ging
as a domina ing issue on he poli ical landscape.
In he un-up o he 1956 Pa liamen elec ions he P og essi e Pa y mo ed o
disengage i sel om he Independence Pa y owa ds posi ioning i sel as hei
main poli ical i al (K is jánsson, 1994, p. 154). The ision o he P og essi e Pa y
Chai man He mann Jónasson ha monised well wi h he agenda o a new adical
leade ship wi hin he Social Democ a ic Pa y. The e o e, he oad was pa ed o he
1956 go e nmen o P og essi e Pa y, he Social Democ a ic Pa y and he socialis
People’s Alliance whose o eign policy goal was o e oke he de ence ag eemen
and o ex end unila e ally Iceland’s e i o ial wa e s o 12 nau ical miles in 1958.
Howe e , a e he coali ion collapsed he de ence ag eemen eceded in o he
backg ound as a poli ical issue ollowing wel e yea s o Independence Pa y and
Social Democ a ic Pa y coali ion ule.
The issue o he de ence ag eemen had no aded in o poli ical obscu i y.
Following he 1971 Pa liamen elec ions a coali ion go e nmen was o med
by he P og essi e Pa y, People’s Alliance and a splin e g oup om he People’s
Alliance, he Union o Libe als and Le is s (Sam ök jálslynd a og ins imanna).
The binding glue be ween he 1971-1974 coali ion go e nmen was e ision o he
de ence ag eemen and ex ension o Iceland’s EEZ o 50 nau ical miles. Howe e ,
he pa ies disag eed on how a he e ision should go. T ue o hei 1956 posi ion,
The People’s Alliance a gued o i s e mina ion and an Icelandic esigna ion
om NATO. Union o Libe als and Le is s championed e mina ing he de ence
ag eemen bu o Iceland o emain wi hin NATO. Meanwhile, he P og essi e
Pa y was di ided in i s posi ion. Wi hin he pa y a new gene a ion o young
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
P og essi es, mo e adical han i s p edecesso s, was coming o p ominence, and
his ac ion championed he depa u e o he U.S. de ence o ce while suppo ing
con inued Icelandic membe ship in NATO (Ingimunda son, 2002, p. 123).
Howe e , he coali ion was unable o conclude he e ision and a e i s collapse
in 1974 he issue o whe he o eign o ces should be s a ioned in Iceland o no
eceded om he poli ical a ena.
In he la e 1970s and onwa d he p esence o U.S. mili a y o ces in Iceland
became mo e accep ed by he Icelandic elec o a e han in p e ious decades. By he
ea ly 1980s a su ey on he a i ude o Icelande s owa ds he Ke la ík base e ealed
ha 54% o hose polled app o ed o con inued U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland
while 30% disapp o ed wi h 16% emaining indi e en (Ha ða son, 1985, p. 18).
Indeed, he lack o in e es among leade s o poli ical pa ies adi ionally opposed
o he de ence ag eemen , o exploi he issue o poli ical gains is e lec ed in he
ac ha nei he one o wo le o cen e go e nmen s (1978-1979 and 1989-1991)
made a e mina ion o e ision o he de ence ag eemen a policy issue.
While he de ence coope a ion wi h he U.S. and he p esence o a U.S.
mili a y base in Ke la ík could be deba ed on ideological g ounds he e we e also
ma e ial ac o s o conside as a d i ing o ce behind poli ical pa y posi ion o
he de ence o ce. As p e iously no ed, in chap e ou , he base i sel g adually
became a pe manen ix u e o he Icelandic domes ic economy and he ou main
poli ical pa ies had o be mind ul o ha ac . The base was an impo an sou ce
o employmen o he communi ies in he Reykjanes egion and la ge economic
gains we e o be had by p i a e and public business in e es s. Reduced U.S. mili a y
p esence a he base could ansla e in o ewe o es a he ballo box o h ee o
he ou main pa ies. Fo he Independence Pa y as he pa y o business in e es s,
he P og essi e Pa y as he ep esen a i e o u al cons i uencies and he Social
Democ a s as ep esen a i es o labou in e es s in Reykjanes egion.
Apa om di ec o e suppo he e was also he issue o clien elism, whe eby,
he wo majo poli ical pa ies, he Independence Pa y and he P og essi e Pa y
bene i ed di ec ly om economic ac i i y o he de ence o ce. Iceland P ime
Con ac o s (ÍAV) is an example o such en anglemen . ÍAV was o med in 1954 on
he ini ia i e o he Icelandic s a e and gi en monopoly o e all cons uc ion wo k a
Ke la ík base. 50% o he company was owned by Sameinaði Ve k aka h , which in
u n was owned by in luen ial membe s o he Independence Pa y. 25% was owned
by Reginn h which was a daugh e company o Fede a ion o Icelandic Coope a i e
Socie ies which in u n had close ies wi h he leade ship o he P og essi e Pa y
and 25% owned by he Icelandic s a e (Á nason, 1991, pp. 258-259). In 1996 he
go e nmen o Iceland decided o abolish he ÍAV monopoly and he company was
gi en an adjus men pe iod un il 2003. The s a e would e en ually sell all o i s sha es
in ÍAV du ing a go e nmen p i a iza ion p ocess comple ed in 2003.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
5.2. The o ma ion o an Icelandic base policy
The end o he Cold Wa he alded cu backs and downsizing a he base as i s s a egic
impo ance and ha o Iceland, dwindled as . Wi h he So ie menace ou o he
pic u e he Uni ed S a es go e nmen became inc easingly conce ned wi h cu ing
mili a y expendi u es. This al e ed eali y was no los on he Icelandic go e nmen
and coming o e ms wi h he immedia e scaling down o U.S. o ces a Ke laík base
became a ask o he 1991-1995 Independence Pa y/Social Democ a ic Pa y
coali ion go e nmen . While no announcing any e ision o Iceland’s de ence policy
in i s go e nmen mani es o (O ice o he P ime Minis e , 1991) he wo pa ies did
ag ee ha Icelandic secu i y in e es s would be bes se ed by main aining he U.S.-
Icelandic de ence ela ionship and h ough con inued Icelandic NATO membe ship.
Bu wi h moun ing U.S. p essu e i became clea ha he go e nmen would ha e
o de ise a u u e s a egy o coun e U.S. eluc ance o main ain Ke la ík base in i s
cu en o m. In Ma ch 1993 ha s a egy saw he ligh o day in a epo published
by he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s on Iceland’s de ence policy. Commissioned and
published by he Social Democ a ic held Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, he epo
ejec ed Icelandic bu den sha ing a Ke la ík base (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s,
1993, pp. 46-47) and iden i ied cos educ ion as he Independence Pa y/Social
Democ a ic Pa y coali ion nego ia ion goal is-à- is he Uni ed S a es. The au ho s
o he epo se abou gauging he iews o he Uni ed S a es and he Icelandic
go e nmen abou he u u e o Ke la ík base. Bo h sides ag eed ha sa ings could
be made, bu he e was a clea di e ence o opinion (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s,
1993, pp. 46-47). Al eady he Uni ed S a es had adop ed he posi ion ha he way
o wa d was a cos sha ing scheme. An unde s andable posi ion gi en ha 40% o
ai a ic going h ough Ke la ík ai po was ci ilian.
Ten a i e discussions soon began ha esul ed in a 1994 MoU be ween he wo
sides. The MoU can be in e p e ed as a s a emen by he coali ion pa ne s abou
wha asks he Icelandic side iewed as essen ial and wha educ ions a Ke la ík
base hey we e willing o accep (Bja nason, 2011, p. 305). In essence, he nego ia ed
MoU (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 1994) me he s a ed policy goal o he
Independence Pa y/Social Democ a ic Pa y coali ion by iden i ying hose base
unc ions o be con inued and wha could be made edundan . Wi hou incu ing
addi ional cos s on hei Icelandic hos , he de ence o ce would emain wi h he
Icelandic go e nmen laying down ed lines ha made i possible o decla e ha
he de ence ag eemen emained alid as long as he Uni ed S a es e ained hose
capabili ies spelled ou in he MoU.
The 1994 MoU ei e a ed he soundness o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen
al hough he numbe o igh e je s would be educed o ou . U.S. in en ions o
educe cos s had been made clea bu any b oade conce ns abou i s closu e
appea ed o ha e been quenched. The p o-go e nmen Icelandic daily Mo gunblaðið

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
p oclaimed “Equi y in decision making acknowledged” (“Ja n æði í ák a ðana öku
iðu kenn ,” 1994), while he base own weekly jou nal, Whi e Falcon, announced in
mo e somb e ones ha “U.S./Iceland alks ende decision. U.S. o ces o emain,
wi h some changes” (“U.S./Iceland alks ende decisions,” 1994). In Ap il 1996 he
wo go e nmen s enewed he MoU o u he i e yea s, by which ime he wo
go e nmen s would ha e o econ ene again.
Following elec ions in he sp ing o 1995, he Independence Pa y and he
P og essi e Pa y o med hei i s o i e consecu i e coali ions c ea ing he longes
se ing poli ical pa ne ship in Icelandic poli ical his o y. A ibu ing o his long
s eak was a s ong leade ship wi hin he Independence Pa y led by Da íð Oddsson
and he P og essi e Pa y led by Halldó Ásg ímsson.
Da íð Oddsson i s made his ma ks in Icelandic poli ics when a he age o
34 he led he Independence Pa y o ic o y in he 1982 Reykja ík municipal
elec ions becoming mayo o Iceland’s capi al, a pos he would hold o nine yea s.
In 1991, hen ice-chai man o he Independence Pa y, Oddsson an agains
and na owly de ea ed he si ing chai man, Þo s einn Pálsson in a leade ship bid
du ing he Independence Pa y Na ional Con e ence. Less han wo mon hs la e ,
despi e no holding a sea in Pa liamen , Oddsson led his pa y o ic o y in he
1991 pa liamen a y elec ions ha led o a coali ion go e nmen wi h he Social
Democ a ic Pa y. The Independence Pa y/Social Democ a ic Pa y coali ion
would only su i e one e m bu Oddsson would go on o hold he posi ion o P ime
Minis e con inuously om 30 Ap il 1991 un il 15 Sep embe 2004 becoming he
longes se ing P ime Minis e in Icelandic poli ical his o y.
The ci cums ances su ounding Halldó Ásg ímsson’s ascension o powe
we e less d ama ic. A seasoned pa liamen a ian, Ásg ímsson was i s elec ed o
Pa liamen in 1974, and se ed as Minis e o Fishe ies 1983-1991 and Minis e o
Jus ice and Ecclesial A ai s 1988-1989 in p e ious P og essi e Pa y led coali ion
go e nmen s. Elec ed pa y ice-chai man in 1980, Ásg ímsson became he na u al
successo a he 1994 P og essi e Pa y na ional con e ence wi h 97% o he cas
o es (“Halldó ékk 97% a k æða,” 1994) when he ou going P og essi e Pa y
chai man, S eing ímu He mannsson, e i ed om poli ics.
In he 1995 Independence Pa y/P og essi e Pa y coali ion Oddsson e ained
he p emie ship and Ásg ímsson became Minis e o Fo eign A ai s, posi ions
hey would bo h hold un il au umn 2004 when hey swapped pos s. In ma e s
o de ence he 1995 go e nmen s ayed he same cou se al eady plo ed by he
Independence Pa y/Social Democ a ic Pa y coali ion. I made no changes o
p e ious go e nmen policy o he U.S.-Icelandic de ence ela ionship (O ice o he
P ime Minis e , 1995) and in nego ia ing o a second MoU wi h he U.S. on u he
cos educ ion a Ke la ík base in 1996 Fo eign Minis e Ásg ímsson did no de ia e
om he undamen als o he 1994 MoU nego ia ed by he Social Democ a ic held
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
In ma e s o de ence he Independence Pa y ended o be he mo e domina ing
pa ne in he coali ion. The 1993 Independence Pa y Na ional Cong ess
mani es o was pe ec ly aligned wi h he go e nmen posi ion. The mani es o
iden i ied he 1951 De ence Ag eemen as he co e pilla o Iceland’s de ence
policy and mi o ed (Independence Pa y, 1993, pp. 7-8) key componen s o he
ye o be nego ia ed 1994 MoU by de ining Icelandic de ence in e es s in e ms o
main aining ai de ences and su eillance capabili ies a he base as well as he 56 h
Rescue Squad on.
The Independence Pa y had always been a s ong suppo e o he U.S.-Icelandic
de ence ela ionship and Oddsson emained a key playe a e e y ound o de ence
nego ia ion, i s as P ime Minis e om 1991-2004 and hen as Fo eign Minis e
om 2004-2005. When he i s news s o y b oke in 1993 ha Ke la ík base migh
unde go ex ensi e downsizing (“Mikill niðu sku ðu e y i hugaðu í Ke la ík,”
1993) Oddsson me in ea ly Augus wi h Vice-P esiden Al Go e in Washing on
D.C. (“Va na s öð aðeins b ey í nánu sam áði ið Ísland,” 1993) and secu ed
assu ances ha no changes would be made a Ke la ík base wi hou a p io consen
om he Icelandic go e nmen . Howe e , ha mee ing ook place less han wo
yea s a e he o mal dissolu ion o he So ie Union and he u u e o he o me
communis s a es o Cen al- and Eas e n Eu ope emained unce ain. The e o e,
i made sense o he Uni ed S a es o make mode a e educ ions a he base and
accommoda e he needs o i s Icelandic nego ia ing coun e pa .
Following he 1999 Pa liamen a y elec ions he Independence Pa y and The
P og essi e Pa y e ained hei pa liamen a y majo i y and o med hei second
coali ion go e nmen . Wi h 36 ou o 63 Membe s o Pa liamen he coali ion
e ained a s ong majo i y (“Alþingiskosninga 1999 ú sli ,” 1999). Da íð Oddsson
e ained his p emie ship and Halldó Ásg ímsson con inued as Minis e o Fo eign
A ai s. In ma e s o secu i y and de ence he enewed coali ion did no p esen
any o hcoming changes (O ice o he P ime Minis e , 1999) and he wo pa ies
e ained he posi ion ha he U.S.-Icelandic de ence ela ionship should con inue
o be he co e o Iceland’s de ence policy. Al hough he 1999-2003 Independence
Pa y/P og essi e Pa y coali ion wished o main ain he s a us quo e en s ab oad
made such a posi ion ha de o a ain.
5.3. U.S. posi ion owa ds Ke la ík base
Downsizing a Ke la ík base was clea ly in line wi h a gene al Uni ed S a es policy
o exploi he pos -Cold Wa peace di idend. F om 1989 o 1996 a sco e o U.S.
bases in Eu ope we e shu down while a he same ime he numbe o Uni ed S a es
oops s a ioned in Eu ope was cu om 325,000 o 100,000 (Douglas, 2008, p. 82).
Ke la ík base had su i ed he i s ounds o U.S. base ealignmen bu whe he i
would su i e he coming ounds was ques ionable.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
On 18 Janua y 2001, Geo ge Walke Bush was swo n in o o ice as he 43 d
P esiden o he Uni ed S a es and ew days la e he appoin ed Donald Rums eld as
Sec e a y o De ence wi h a manda e o begin a comp ehensi e e iew o he U.S.
a med o ces. I soon became ob ious o Rums eld ha u he oop educ ions
ab oad we e needed:
The way ou o ces we e s a ioned o e seas was so ou da ed. I was i hey had been
ozen in ime o he decades since Be lin and Tokyo ell in 1945, he a mis ice hal ed
he Ko ean Wa in 1953, and he Cold Wa ended in 1991. O he qua e million
oops deployed ab oad in 2001, mo e han one hund ed housand we e in Eu ope,
he as majo i y in Ge many o end o an in asion by a So ie Union ha no longe
exis ed (Rums eld, 2011, p. 301).
Wi h 532 U.S. mili a y acili ies sp ead h oughou 16 Eu opean coun ies7 and
unding o U.S. o ces deployed in Eu ope ising be ween 1999 and 2001 om
$10.9 billion o $11.8 billion Eu ope was iden i ied as a hea e o u he cos
sa ings (Rums eld pape s, 2001b) wi h Ke la ík base singled ou as a showcase o
an an iqua ed de ence pos u e. In la e Ma ch 2001 Rums eld had his mind made up.
Via e-mail, Rums eld in o med Depu y Sec e a y o De ence, Paul Wol owi z, ha
he was conside ing emo ing U.S. capabili ies cu en ly in Iceland as hey had no
o he pa icula pu pose han “…p o iding sea ch and escue o Iceland” (Rums eld
pape s, 2001a). The Depa men o S a e was no in ag eemen and on 11 July
Rums eld complained o Sec e a y o S a e Colin Powell ha :
DoD [Depa men o De ense] has been ying o se e al yea s o educe ou p esence
[In Iceland]. Howe e , we ge esis ance om Iceland, and hen we ge ha esis ance
e lec ed back om he S a e Depa men (Rums eld pape s, 2001c).
In his eply, Powell emphasised ha he Depa men o S a e and Depa men o
De ence sha ed he same objec i es ega ding Iceland. ha in Powell’s mind we e:
[1] o maximise he impac o ou mili a y p esence in Iceland while [3] seeking o
educe ha p esence, [2] o ob ain elie on U.S. – unded cos s associa ed wi h
pu ely comme cial use o he Ke la ik ield and o [4] p ese e access o he base while
con inuing ou mu ually bene icial ela ionship wi h his NATO ally (Rums eld pape s,
2001d).
7 Those 16 coun ies included non-aligned Aus ia – home o one U.S. Ai Fo ce ins alla ion. The
emaining 15 coun ies we e all NATO membe s. Mos o hese acili ies, 326, loca ed in Ge many
(Rums eld-pape s, 2001b).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Powell, u he mo e, sugges ed ha i migh be mo e e ec i e o sepa a e alks
abou o ce composi ion, i.e. igh e s, Sea ch and Rescue, and suppo pe sonnel,
om ac ual enego ia ion o he base ag eemen .
Clea ly, he wo depa men s di e ed in hei policy. Indeed, he Depa men
o S a e was mind ul o he poli ical consequences i Rums eld had his way. Fou
mon hs p io o Powell’s exchange wi h Rums eld, he U.S. ambassado o Iceland,
Ba ba a J. G i i hs, ad ised Powell agains emo ing he ou emaining igh e s
om Iceland as ha would be c ossing a “ ed line” ha he Icelandic go e nmen
had d awn (Rums eld pape s, 2001d). The esul ing backlash, in he iew, would
lead he Icelande s o s op u u e cos -sha ing alks dead in hei acks. T ying o
ge his iew ac oss, Powell a ached Ambassado G i i hs’ epo o his eply o
Rums eld wi h a no e eading “PS – Don, see ou Ambassado ’s le e (a ached.)
Lays ou he case. Le ’s cha a e you’ e ead” (Rums eld pape s, 2001d).
The ambassado ’s assessmen ha emo ing he igh e s om Iceland would
be unaccep able o he go e nmen o Iceland was accu a e. Al eady he Icelandic
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s had made i a o mal Icelandic posi ion ha Iceland
should be p o ided wi h minimum de ence capabili ies in land, sea and ai . Any o ce
changes a he base would ha e o be nego ia ed be ween he wo go e nmen s, in
acco dance o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 1999, p.
9). Wha minimum de ence capabili ies en ailed was open o in e p e a ion bu wi h
only ou emaining igh e s a he base he Icelandic go e nmen had in e ec made
i s posi ion clea : no u he o ce educ ions o U.S. mili a y p esence a he base.
In ea ly Augus 2001, Sec e a y o S a e Colin Powell and he Icelandic Minis e
o Fo eign A ai s, Halldó Ásg ímsson, me in Washing on D.C. Among he issues
ouched upon was he upcoming enego ia ion o he 1996 MoU. Rega dless o he
ug o wa aking place behind he scenes be ween he wo depa men s o De ence
and S a e Powell ga e no hin o u he o ce educ ions, and Ásg ímsson ei e a ed
his go e nmen ’s posi ion ha cu en o ce le els p o ided Iceland wi h minimum
de ence capabili ies (“Powell kynn i enga áhe slub ey inga ,” 2001). Bu be o e he
wo sides had ime o econ ene he Uni ed S a es was hi by he 11 Sep embe
e o is a acks. Now he Bush adminis a ion was aced wi h a adically al e ed
secu i y en i onmen . The implica ions o he u u e o Ke la ík base we e wo old:
in he sho e m, all nego ia ions be ween he Uni ed S a es and he Icelandic
go e nmen we e pos poned inde ini ely (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2002, p. 26).
In he long un he incen i e o pull o ces and equipmen ou o Iceland was bound
o ga he pace.
As 2002 wound on he Bush adminis a ion became u he engaged in he “wa
on e o ” (Wol e, 2008), bu Ke la ík base had no disappea ed al oge he om
Rums eld’s sigh . In ea ly Decembe 2002 Rums eld i ed o a memo o his Unde
Sec e a y o De ence o Policy, Douglas J. Fei h, in which Rums eld a gued in a ou
o emo ing he igh e s om Iceland in ligh o U.S. commi men s in A ghanis an
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
eg e ed he slow p og ess made while decla ing ha he U.S. go e nmen would
ha e o say i i was no willing o p o ide Iceland wi h de ences o did no hink
hey we e needed. Con inuing, Ásg ímsson added ha his go e nmen would ne e
o ce o ask U.S. o ces o s ay in Iceland i hey did no wan o (“Y ðum að eys a
be u sambandið ið E ópu,” 2005). As he nego ia ions had come o a s ands ill,
he P ime Minis e was i e ocably being d awn owa ds ecognizing he possibili y
ha U.S in en ions we e in ac o close he base.
No u he ad ance was made un il an exchange o le e s be ween Fo eign
Minis e Haa de and Sec e a y o S a e Rice b oke he deadlock wi h a new ound
o nego ia ions scheduled in he coming mon hs. On 2 Feb ua y 2006, Fo eign
Minis e Haa de and Sec e a y o S a e Rice con ened in Washing on D.C. The
mee ing was amiable enough. Sec e a y o S a e Rice began by discussing he long
and close iendship be ween he Uni ed S a es and Iceland be o e del ing in o
he changing secu i y and de ence h ea s s a es aced ollowing he collapse o he
So ie Union.
Concu ing wi h he opening s a emen o he Sec e a y o S a e, Fo eign
Minis e Haa de eplied ha he e s ill was need o isible de ences in Iceland and
emphasised he impo ance o eaching a pe manen solu ion in he spi i o he
1951 De ence Ag eemen and he No h A lan ic T ea y (UTN, 2006a). P essing
o con inued U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland, he Fo eign Minis e a gued ou
main poin s: (1) he acuum c ea ed by unce ain y was in i sel a h ea ; (2) The
co e alues unde pinning U.S.-Icelandic ela ions s ill emained; (3) he mode n
secu i y en i onmen was augh wi h unce ain y; (4) and wha di ec ions asse i e
na ionalis ic Russia would head owa ds in he u u e emained o be seen. Howe e ,
o mee he Uni ed S a es go e nmen mid-s eam, he Fo eign Minis e con inued,
he Icelandic go e nmen was willing o ake o e Ke la ík ai po and p o ide he
de ence o ce wi h ull Sea ch and Rescue co e age.
The Icelande s had gone a long way o mee U.S. demands. Bu despi e ha he
Sec e a y o S a e sides epped he issue o e aining U.S. o ces in Iceland and ga e no
clea answe s. Ins ead, Rice discussed he need o mode nise he de ence ela ionship
wi h app op ia e capabili ies, and he impo ance o no holding on “ o de ense
capabili ies ha may no be necessa y” (UTN, 2006a). Con inuing, he Sec e a y
o S a e added ha a his s age he immedia e s ep was o e iew he bu den sha ing
p oposal p esen ed by he Fo eign Minis e , which seemed like a good s a and a way
o wa d o he upcoming nego ia ions ocusing on mode nising Iceland’s de ences.
The mo ning a e , nego ia ions con inued a he S a e Depa men be ween
o icials om he wo sides wi h Fo eign Minis e Haa de and Sec e a y o S a e
Rice absen om he p oceedings (UTN 2006d). The Icelande s opened by s a ing
ha hei p esence in Washing on D.C. was an ea nes a emp o end he in ole able
unce ain y in he de ence ela ionship be ween he wo coun ies, and o each a
consensus on he ou lines o a new ag eemen by pu ing conc e e p oposals on he

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
able. Unlike he Sep embe p oposal ha assumed an unde e mined pe cen age
sha e o e a pe iod o eigh yea s he Icelandic go e nmen was now o e ing a
comple e akeo e o Ke la ík ai po as well as ull Sea ch and Rescue co e age o
Ke la ík base. The Icelande s, howe e , main ained ha he Icelandic go e nmen
would no pay he Uni ed S a es o he de ence o he coun y. Tha poin o iew,
hey con inued, had been s a ed coun less imes in p e ious nego ia ions, and i was
needless o go o e i once again.
Replying a ou ably o hese o e s, he U.S. side wen deepe in o he Sea ch and
Rescue pa o he p oposals. Wha in e es ed he U.S. nego ia o s was “pe o mance
and capabili ies” bu how he Icelandic go e nmen wen abou i was a seconda y
issue since hey we e “no in sales business, only in capabili ies business” (UTN,
2006d). Howe e , he Ame icans did o e assis ance o hei Icelandic coun e pa s
in pu chasing o leasing U.S. helicop e s i he Icelandic go e nmen choose o do so.
Nex opic o discussion was he bila e al secu i y and de ence consul a ion
be ween he wo coun ies. The Icelande s a gued ha holding egula bila e al
poli ical/mili a y alks would be bene icial o bo h, o which The U.S. nego ia o s
ag eed. A e all, such consul a ion would be use ul o e alua ing U.S.-Icelandic
secu i y coope a ion a any gi en ime. Ac ually, a join U.S.-Icelandic de ence
commi ee was al eady in place bu i s ole was limi ed o ma e s in ol ing he
de ence o ce. The e o e, a new high-le el o um would be use ul o discuss secu i y
h ea s and wha ways o ackle hem. A case in poin , he Ame icans con inued,
migh be con aine secu i y a ha bou s, seeing how he secu e anspo o goods
was a g owing conce n o Iceland. Ano he a ea o coope a ion migh be in I aq
and A ghanis an (UTN, 2006d). Acco ding o he U.S. delega es, Iceland had
consis en ly pe o med well in NATO missions since i began sending Icelandic
doc o s and nu ses o Bosnia in he mid-1990s. The hi d ield singled ou o
conside a ion was inc eased coope a ion be ween he Icelandic Cos Gua d and he
U.S. Coas Gua d, h ough mu ual isi s, aining and join ope a ions.
A e e iewing hese possible opics o a U.S.-Icelandic de ence o um o discuss
he mee ing was adjou ned un il la e ha day. When he wo sides econ ened in
he a e noon he U.S. delega es dis ibu ed a lis o buildings wi hin he base a ea
ha would be handed o e a e he ai po ans e was comple ed. The in en ion
was o he lis o se e as a concep ual amewo k o he wo k ahead. Acco ding
o U.S. calcula ions, ha lis comp ised abou 30% o base acili ies and 20% o he
wo k o ce employed by he de ence o ce, in addi ion o acili ies Iceland had al eady
o e ed o ake o e . A e a b ie b eak, du ing which he Icelandic ep esen a i es
con e ed wi h hei Fo eign Minis e , hey in o med hei coun e pa s ha he
Icelandic go e nmen had ag eed o con inue nego ia ions on he ag eed basis. The
U.S. eam eplied ha hey would in o m hei supe iso s in he S a e Depa men
and, hope ully, hey could soon ell he Icelande s whe he he esul was accep able
o no .
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
I appea ed ha nego ia ions we e back on ack. In Mo gunblaðið, bo h Robe
G. Lo is, he head o he U.S. nego ia ion eam, and Ragnheiðu Á nadó i ,
assis an o Fo eign Minis e Haa de, wen on eco d saying ha alks had been
bene icial and cos sha ing discussions we e mo ing along a ou ably (“Við æðu na
sagða e a á angu s íka ,” 2006). Bu less han a mon h and a hal la e , wi hou
any o ewa ning, Fo eign Minis e Haa de ecei ed ha a e ul phone call om
Assis an Sec e a y o S a e Nicholas Bu ns in o ming him ha in ac he las
igh e s would be emo ed om Iceland. Al hough Icelandic decision make s
suspec ed ha he U.S. go e nmen in ended o wi hd aw he igh e s he me hod
s ill came as a su p ise:
I had he eeling ha his had become e y di icul , bu o cou se I didn’ know ha
hey would do i in such a b u al way. To jus pick up he phone. O cou se, hey had
al eady eached a decision wi hin hei own sys em, which goes h ough some p ocesses.
A one poin someone says: hey Nick Bu ns! This phone call is you s (Independence
Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014a).
The ollowing day, Fo eign Minis e Haa de made a 10 minu e e bal epo
o Pa liamen (Pa liamen , 2006a), du ing which he ga e a ch onological accoun
o he nego ia ions, ending wi h he la es Feb ua y mee ing in Washing on D.C
and exp essing his disappoin men o e he U.S. decision, he con inued ha his
go e nmen had been unde he imp ession ha nego ia ions had been ongoing and
mowing o wa d.
In he immedia e a e ma h unce ain y linge ed abou wha a e awai ed Ke la ík
base. In his epo o Pa liamen , Haa de spoke o as educ ions o de ence o ce
unc ions and in an in e iew wi h Mo gunblaðið, he s essed ha i was now up o
he Uni ed S a es and he Icelandic go e nmen o come up wi h a solu ion ha
p o ided Iceland wi h minimum de ences, since “…a de ence ag eemen wi hou
de ences has e y li le alue.” (“Va na samningu án a na ekki mikils i ði,” 2006)
A simila no e was s uck by media pundi s who specula ed ha a small oken o ce
would emain, and ha Ke la ík base would possibly con inue o exis in a do man
s a e (“Ge u ma kað uppha endaloka a na sams a sins,” 2006 and “Hó un um
uppsögn a na samningsins i ðis o ðin óm,” 2006).
Indeed, U.S. diploma s, and U.S. mili a y pe sonnel a he base did no seem o
ha e a clea pic u e o wha would happen a e 30 Sep embe 2006. The head o
he U.S. nego ia ion eam, Ambassado Lo is, wen on eco d wi h Mo gunblaðið
saying ha U.S. mili a y p esence would be diminu i e, bu jus how small he was no
willing o specula e (“Lí ið i í að ha a o us uþo u á Íslandi,” 2006). Meanwhile
he base commande , Cap ain Ma k Laugh on, announced o his s a o 1,240
mili a y pe sonnel and 100 Depa men o De ence ci ilian employees ha he
d awdown o Ke la ík base would lead o “no signi ican mili a y p esence in Iceland
114
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
a e 30 Sep embe ” (“NASKEF leade ship announces plans o base downsizing,”
2006). Clea ly, he base would go h ough a eaching al e a ions, bu he ph ase
“no signi ican mili a y p esence” implied ha some U.S. mili a y pe sonnel migh
emain.
Whe he a small oken o ce would s ay emained unclea bu i was clea
ha he go e nmen o Iceland had o come up wi h a plan. Fi e days a e he
announcemen , du ing a own mee ing wi h he locals a Ke la ík, P ime Minis e
Ásg ímsson announced ha his go e nmen would ocus on h ee key issues:
(1) each an ag eemen wi h he Uni ed S a es go e nmen abou u u e de ence
o Iceland; (2) assume esponsibili y o Ke la ík ai po ; and (3) espond o he
imminen mass lay-o s among he locals employed a he base (“Segi að an aus
ha i skapas milli þjóðanna,” 2006). Howe e , Ásg ímsson wa ned ha eaching
an unde s anding wi h he U.S. go e nmen migh p o e a bumpy oad. P eceding
e en s had e oded Icelandic us owa ds he Uni ed S a es and i emained o be
seen whe he ha us could be ebuil . Con inuing, he added ha i migh be
necessa y o e oke he de ence ag eemen , o a leas e ise i , in which case NATO
would ha e o be consul ed. S ill, he expec ed some U.S. mili a y p esence wi hin
he old base a ea al hough ha depended on he ou come o discussions be ween
he wo go e nmen s.
Bu why was he e con usion o e wha , i any, U.S. mili a y p esence would emain
a e 30 Sep embe ? Fo his he e we e wo easons. A he ime o nego ia ions,
command o Ke la ík base was in he mids o being ans e ed om he U.S. Na y
o he U.S. Ai Fo ce (Senio membe o he U.S. nego ia ion eam, 2015) and o
Icelande s wo king a he base his was isible on a daily basis as he Ai Fo ce has
al eady s a ed o ake o e ce ain key buildings om he Na y (Fo me senio
o icial wi hin he Rada Agency, 2013). The e o e, despi e he ense nego ia ions
h oughou 2005 he U.S. nego ia o s had no been wo king owa ds closing down
he base as such (Senio membe o he U.S. nego ia ion eam, 2015). Secondly,
he ab up b eak o he Icelandic nego ia ion eam du ing he p e ious Oc obe
mee ing had been a u ning-poin bu no because i ga e he U.S. S a e Depa men
an excuse o end alks. Ra he , i ga e Sec e a y o De ence Rums eld he excuse he
needed o elimina e unding o Ke la ík base al oge he :
They walked ou and un o una ely when hey walked ou he wo d go ou o
Sec e a y Rums eld ha old he con olle s, he guys ha con ol he budge , o ze o
ou he accoun a he end o he iscal yea . In o he wo ds, a he end o he iscal
yea which would ha e been Sep embe 30 2006 he mili a y would no longe be
allowed o spend any money on keeping Ke la ík open, which is essen ially o shu i
down. [….]... once you ha e ha o de ha you a e no longe allowed o spend money,
i is a c iminal o ence so hey had no choice. Bu he people I alked o we e no
happy abou ha . Tha was a unila e al decision on pa o Rums eld; he didn’ check
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
wi h he Whi e House he jus did i . [….] We [S a e Depa men ] ac ually didn’ ind
ou abou he decision un il se e al days la e (Senio membe o he U.S. nego ia ion
eam, 2015).
Icelandic decision make s had suspec ed Sec e a y o De ence Rums eld as he
key p o agonis behind he decision bu he iew on he Icelandic side had been
ha P esiden Bush had simply chosen Rums eld’s iew as he mos p e e ed op ion
(P og essi e Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014, and Independence Pa y,
o me membe o cabine , 2014b). The e en s ha ollowed ha ailed Oc obe
mee ing echoed Rums eld’s p e ious a emp o emo e he igh e s; howe e , his
ime a ound Rums eld did no ace e ec i e opposi ion om he S a e Depa men .
Any hope ha he U.S. go e nmen would main ain some mili a y p esence in
Iceland a e 30 Sep embe was soon dashed. Two weeks a e he announcemen ,
he wo sides me in Reykja ík.8 In he con ex o hose alks U.S. Unde Sec e a y
o S a e, Nicholas Bu ns, published an open le e in Mo gunblaðið (“Ö lug a
a na sams a á 21. öldinni,” 2006) discussing pas and p esen secu i y and
de ence coope a ion be ween Iceland and he Uni ed S a es. In b ie , Bu ns a gued
ha he non-exis ence o a c edible mili a y h ea in he No h A lan ic and he
g owing p eponde ance o new secu i y h ea s which s a ic mili a y o ces a e
no he ideal ool o add essing such as e o ism and p oli e a ion o weapons o
mass des uc ion, we e a he hea o P esiden Bush’s decision o end pe manen
s a ioning o U.S. o ces in Iceland. Howe e , he U.S. go e nmen in ended o
honou he 1951 De ence Ag eemen by p o iding Iceland wi h mobile o ces
si ua ed in he U.S. and elsewhe e.
Since he U.S. go e nmen had ei e a ed i s commi men o he de ence
ag eemen he logical nex s ep was o open up a dialogue abou how he Uni ed
S a es go e nmen en isioned an adequa e de ence pos u e o Iceland. In ea ly Ap il
Fo eign Minis e Haa de in o med Pa liamen (Pa liamen , 2006b) abou ongoing
discussions be ween he wo sides on a new de ence plan o Iceland ha he Uni ed
S a es Eu opean Command (EUCOM) in S u ga was wo king on. Clea ly,
e oking he de ence ag eemen , al hough some imes laun ed as a ba gaining chip,
had ne e been a eal op ion o Icelandic decision make s:
No, i was no an op ion. Pe haps someone said a one poin , “OK i hey’ e gone we
can jus ea up hese pape s”, bu i was ne e se ious. I [ he De ence Ag eemen ] was
always he bo om line. Ins ead o calling o physical p esence in Iceland, as he 1951
ag eemen did, i is no necessa y o ead i [ he de ence ag eemen ] o in e p e i ha
8 The Minis y o Fo eign A ai s minu es om mee ings held on 31 Ma ch, and 26-27 Ap il 2006 a e
no accessible since hey con ain in o ma ion on he U.S. de ence planning o Iceland.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
way, ins ead we emphasised he commi men . We hough ha in ligh o e en s and
he changed secu i y en i onmen ha his was accep able (Independence Pa y, o me
membe o cabine , 2014a).
E en ually, a de ence plan was wo ked ou , pala able o bo h sides, and a new
amewo k o secu i y and de ence coope a ion was ag eed upon. The 1951 De ence
Ag eemen con inued o se e as he basis o de ence coope a ion be ween he wo
s a es, bu wi h amendmen s made o i s annexes and echnical schedules (Minis y
o Fo eign A ai s, 2006) o e lec he edeploymen o U.S. o ces om Iceland
and he e u n o land and acili ies o he Icelandic go e nmen .
In ea ly Oc obe 2006, a ew days a e he o mal hando e o Ke la ík base, he
P ime Minis e in o med Pa liamen (Pa liamen , 2006c) ha a inal se lemen
had been eached be ween he wo go e nmen s. A se lemen which was gi en
lesh in ou sepa a e ag eemen s: h ee o which conce ned p ac ical issues such
as he handing o e o land, in as uc u e and equipmen , while he ou h deal
di ec ly wi h he u u e secu i y and de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es.
The p eamble o he 2006 Secu i y and De ence Coope a i e Ag eemen (O ice o
he P ime Minis e , 2006a) ei e a ed he alidi y o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen
be o e se ing ou he u u e de ence ela ionship be ween he wo coun ies. The
Icelandic go e nmen accep ed EUCOM’s plan o ensu e Iceland’s u u e de ence’s
wi h mobile o ces. Addi ionally, he wo sides commi ed hemsel es o egula
consul a ion and in o ma ion sha ing. No only wi hin he con ex o mili a y
secu i y, bu also ega ding non-mili a y secu i y h ea s such as e o ism, law
en o cemen , bo de con ol and sa e y a sea.
In Pa liamen he opposi ion c i icised he go e nmen o handling he
nego ia ion p ocess poo ly. Pa icula ly o insis ing on holding on o he ou
emaining igh e je s wi hou o e ing any al e na i es (Pa liamen , 2006c). This
s ubbo nness, he opposi ion claimed, le Iceland wi h no clea de ence policy goals
beyond main aining as much o he s a us quo as possible.
Indeed, pu ing so much emphasis on keeping he ou emaining F-15’s may
ha e seemed a chaic and exaspe a ing o U.S. nego ia o s and decision make s. Bu
he e was mo e o i han ha . In one o m o ano he he emaining base unc ions
a Ke la ík base exis ed o suppo he igh e je s. Wi hou hem he a ionale
o main ain he base disappea ed and wi h i he ce ain y ha he Uni ed S a es
go e nmen would espond quickly o any mili a y o e o is h ea acing Iceland
since such h ea s would pu U.S. ci izens and a U.S. mili a y base also a isk. Wi h
he de ence o ce gone his assu ance o immedia e esponse had disappea ed.
Consequen ly, i is no su p ising ha in hei inal epo o he Minis e o
Fo eign A ai s he Icelandic nego ia ion eam emphasised he need o make up o
his acuum h ough al e na i e me hods:

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
The e o e, he Icelandic au ho i ies mus make necessa y a angemen s o inc ease he
likelihood o a swi and e ec i e U.S. esponse agains h ea s made owa ds Iceland.
Such a angemen s pe ain o communica ion lines be ween U.S. and Icelandic
au ho i ies du ing a c isis, bu also, and no leas , by es ablishing as close ies and
coope a ion as possible wi h he U.S. mili a y and o he U.S. secu i y ins i u ions such
as law en o cemen and Coas Gua d (UTN, 2006c).
On he o he side o he A lan ic Rums eld cong a ula ed himsel on ending
U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland despi e opposi ion om he S a e Depa men
(Rums eld pape s, 2006). Howe e , dissen e s wi hin he Depa men o S a e
con ended ha his ic o y was a hollow one:
This was no some hing ha we [S a e Depa men ] ook e y ligh ly. The e we e a
couple o hings a play a he same ime. The e was he U.S.-Iceland ela ionship o e
all, bu he e was also he pe cep ion ha Iceland had been a e y aluable pa ne in
he No h A lan ic Council, Iceland had been deploying... you know i doesn’ ha e
a mili a y bu i had people who we e wo king in I aq and A ghanis an, we we e
jus in eg a ing he Bal ics, small coun ies he e who we e wo ied abou NATO’s
commi men . So, i is no jus how you deal wi h Iceland, i is how you deal wi h a small
ally wi hin a la ge alliance, and he pe cep ion ha when people a e no longe use ul
you kind o h ow hem aside, and wha ha does o he es o he alliance. So, o he
S a e Depa men and a lo o he ca ee people a he Pen agon, his was a shock and
[…] un o una ely gi en Rums eld’s powe , he e wasn’ a lo we could do o he change
he decision […] so he ques ion was hen how do you go abou ixing a p oblem ha
you c ea ed, and main aining he alliance and making su e ha Iceland unde s ood ha
[…] ou commi men o he de ence o Iceland s ill was e y s ong (Senio membe o
he U.S. nego ia ion eam, 2015).
The sense o being sides epped and dis ega ded by he U.S. go e nmen was
sha ed by Iceland’s own decision make s:
I may well be ha long- e m a igue among indi iduals such as Rums eld had some
e ec . He was umou ed o ha e go en he imp ession o Icelande s du ing he Cod
Wa s ha Icelande s we e demanding, in lexible and g eedy. So, he was no iewed as
iendly owa ds Icelande s. Then he e is he ques ion whe he we could ha e ied
o in luence he nego ia ion p ocess h ough connec ions in he U.S. Cong ess o
Sena e. We had iends he e… o as good iends as is possible o alk abou in his
business. Looking back and hinking abou how his e ol ed, i is possible o say ha we
[go e nmen o Iceland] should ha e app oached his di e en ly. We could ha e said:
OK, you can ake he igh e s bu a e you willing o lea e behind a small o ce o wo k
wi h us on echnical issues ega ding IADS and also o show ha you espec he old
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
ag eemen om 1951 wi h some physical p esence, a small o ce ha would also se e
as de e ence (Independence Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014a).
Wha s ung Icelandic decision make s was ha he U.S. go e nmen had decided
o pull i s mili a y ou unila e ally despi e a de ence ela ionship ha s e ched mo e
han 60 yea s – going back o he de ence ag eemen o 1941 – and he ac ha
he 1951 De ence Ag eemen is a e all a bila e al ag eemen ha called o join
decision making ega ding o e all oop le els a he base. As ea ed by membe s o
he Depa men o S a e, di ec ly in ol ed in he nego ia ions, his ac ion e oded
us and con idence in he in eg i y o he Uni ed S a es among Icelandic decision
make s:
I always had g ea us in my dealings wi h he U.S., bu h ough all his I los ha us .
[….] This is all wa e unde he b idge and U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland is no a
goal in i sel . Wha ma e s is ha he secu i y o Iceland is gua an eed h ough NATO
membe ship and he bila e al de ence ag eemen . We ha e o be able o ely on he
de ence ag eemen , and he Ame icans ha e ied o eassu e us, bu I ha e my doub s
(P og essi e Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014).
Whe he Icelandic decision make s could ha e done some hing di e en ly o
main ain he s a us quo a Ke la ík base seems imp obable, bu he chain o e en s
was no wholly p ede e mined. The Icelandic go e nmen had iewed he base
i sel as a gua an ee ha he Uni ed S a es would espond swi ly o any u u e
agg ession o h ea agains Iceland. As a esul , ins ead o ocusing on he main
goal o main aining some U.S mili a y p esence in Iceland, e en i only in oken
o m, he main bone o con en ion o Iceland had become he igh e je s. This in
u n had opened he way o he Pen agon wi h Rums eld a he helm o p esen
he go e nmen o Iceland wi h a ai accompli by shu ing down wha he saw as a
edundan Cold Wa elic in a s a egically insigni ican pa o he wo ld.
The coali ion go e nmen o he Independence Pa y and P og essi e Pa y was
ex emely esilien and one o he longes se ing coali ion in Icelandic poli ical his o y.
P ime Minis e Oddsson was a cen al igu e du ing he di e en phases o de ence
nego ia ions bu his go e nmen was a coali ion o wo pa ies and he P og essi e
Pa y leade ship s ood i mly by he ha d-line posi ion pushed by Oddsson:
We wi hin his go e nmen o en had di e en opinions ha we discussed among
ou sel es wi hou making hem public. [….] We had di e en iewpoin s bu in such
an impo an ma e he end esul was o each a consensus ha e e yone could ag ee
wi h and ollow ha policy h ough-and- h ough. [….] We ag eed ha hey [U.S.
de ence o ce] we e going o s ay and ha we we e no going o gi e way (P og essi e
Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
The pe cep ion o he leade ship o he wo pa ies was ha despi e U.S. cu backs
a Ke la ík base hei end-game was no o close he base and end U.S. mili a y
p esence in Iceland bu o coe ce he go e nmen o Iceland o sha e he cos s
associa ed wi h he ai po and he base i sel . Howe e , in he au umn o 2005 he
de ence nego ia ions we e in a g idlock and i would ake Oddsson’s e i emen om
poli ics o b ing abou a change o policy. On 27 Sep embe 2005 Haa de succeeded
Oddsson as Minis e o Fo eign A ai s, and elec ed chai man o he Independence
Pa y a ew weeks la e . A e aking o ice as Fo eign Minis e , he al e ed his
p edecesso ’s policy and sough o es a he s alled de ence nego ia ions by o e ing
his U.S. coun e pa s some elaxa ions om p e ious Icelandic o e s (Independence
Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014a). The esul was he 2006 Feb ua y mee ing
in Washing on D.C. be ween Fo eign Minis e Haa de and Sec e a y o S a e Rice
du ing which Haa de s epped back om he p e ious ed line d awn by Oddssson
and o e ed Icelandic assump ion o esponsibili y o Ke la ík ai po and p o ide
he de ence o ce wi h Sea ch and Rescue se ices hus eeing up he much needed
56 h Rescue Squad on.
The change o policy a e Haa de ook o e he chai manship o he
Independence Pa y should no be so su p ising. Wi hin he coali ion he e
had been oices ha a gued ha ins ead o igh ing he U.S. nego ia o s on cos s
associa ed wi h he ci ilian side o Ke la ík ai po a wise cou se o ac ion was o
be mo e accommoda ing, since he ul ima e goal was o cou se o each an amiable
ag eemen wi h he Ame icans ha would secu e u u e p esence o U.S. mili a y
o ces in Iceland (Independence Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014a and
(Independence Pa y, o me membe o cabine , 2014b). Oddsson’s e i emen had
c ea ed a leeway o mode a es wi hin he pa y ha wished o mee he Ame icans
hal -way and ind some accommoda ion ha bo h sides could accep .
A Simila e e sal o policy ook place wi h he possible e oking o he 1951
De ence Ag eemen . Oddsson’s en husiasm abou e mina ing he ag eemen i he
las emaining igh e s we e emo ed om Ke la ík base was no sha ed by Haa de
and Ásg ímsson as hey did no ollow h ough wi h Oddson’s h ea . Ins ead, hey
saw h ough an a angemen wi h he U.S. whe eby he 1951 De ence Ag eemen
was in e p e ed in such a way ha he U.S. would con inue o p o ide Iceland wi h
mili a y de ences albei wi h mo eable o ces s a ioned ou side o Iceland. Whe he
Oddsson would ha e gone h ough wi h his h ea i he had emained as Fo eign
Minis e and leade o he Independence Pa y is impossible o asce ain. Bu seeing
how quickly he ha d-line policy was e e ed a e Haa de ook o e he eins a he
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s implies ha Oddsson would ha e me ie ce opposi ion
wi hin his own pa y as well as om his coali ion pa ne .
Oddsson’s b inkmanship in making he de ence ag eemen dependen on he
p esence o ew igh e je s was unde s andable. Oddsson a ional was ha he
igh e s we e he linchpin o he base i sel (Senio go e nmen o icial, 2015).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Wi hou hem he e was no need o a ious suppo s a a Ke la ík base and one
by one a ious laye s o base se ices and s a would peel away un il he base would
become an emp y shell.
Bu he e we e also domes ic poli ical ac o s o be conside ed. In he Icelandic
poli ical landscape, he Independence Pa y had always been he mos s ead as
suppo e o U.S. mili a y p esence in Iceland. I se ed U.S. de ence in e es s o
ha e a base in Iceland bu he Independence Pa y had championed he de ence
ag eemen and he base as necessa y o Icelandic de ence needs since 1951. Fo
he Independence Pa y leade ship, o abandon i s policy o a isible U.S. mili a y
p esence in Iceland was an amoun o acknowledging he a gumen o hose who
opposed he de ence ag eemen h oughou he Cold Wa pe iod on he g ounds
ha Ame ican o ces we e only in Iceland o p o ec U.S. in e es s, and had li le o
do wi h he secu i y needs o Icelande s. Con incing Pa liamen o alloca e unds o
Ke la ík ai po and bu den sha ing as a equisi e o main aining he de ence o ce
in Iceland would also be a ough sell o he coali ion go e nmen . Fo Oddsson and
his eam his was ega ded as unwo kable:
Le ’s say ha we had gone home wi h his o e . Then we would ha e had o ask
Pa liamen o he money, le ’s say 10 billlion ISK o he yea 2005. I Pa liamen had
asked whe he ha would keep hem in Iceland o i we would come back in a ew
yea s o ask o mo e money, we could no gi e hem any assu ances, his was a hopeless
si ua ion (Senio go e nmen o icial, 2015).
Clea ly, he hough was ha Pa liamen would ne e accep conside able
inancial expendi u es o ai po main enance; paying he sala ies o Icelandic
de ence o ce employees and assume inancial esponsibili y o he Rada Agency
wi hou ha ing a gua an ee ha he Uni ed S a es would keep he base open. In he
end, Rums eld’s in e en ion e mina ed any possible u u e se lemen o e aining
Ke la ík base, ega dless o whe he Oddsson’s ha d nego ia ion ac ic o Haa de’s
so e app oach p e ailed.
5.5. Conclusion
Iceland’s de ence ag eemen wi h he U.S. and membe ship o NATO was a
con ended issue in domes ic poli ics un il he la e 1970s. Especially du ing he h ee
Cod Wa s wi h he pa ies o he le o cen e on he poli ical spec um calling
o he e mina ion o he de ence ag eemen and wo coali ion go e nmen s ha
included he P og essi e Pa y calling publicly o he e mina ion o he de ence
ag eemen in 1956 and 1971. Howe e , by he la e 1970s and onwa ds he p esence
o U.S. mili a y o ces in Iceland and he de ence ag eemen eceded in o he
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
a mon h a e he ansi ion, b ough he poin home ha some u u e a angemen
was needed o Ke la ík base a ea.
Be o e he ans e was comple e he wo sides had o come o an ag eemen
on h ee issues: (1) ans e o esponsibili y o base in as uc u e and equipmen
o he Icelandic au ho i ies; (2) en i onmen al clean-up o he a ea coming in o
Icelandic possession; and (3) he u u e o IADS. The i s session ook place on 7
July in Reykja ík ollowed by a session in ea ly Augus in Washing on and a inal one
in mid-Sep embe in Reykja ík.
T ans e o esponsibili y. T ans e ing essen ial ai po equipmen o he Icelandic
au ho i ies was a s aigh o wa d ma e . The U.S. side was no willing o gi e he
equipmen ee o cha ge, bu hey we e willing o lease i o he Icelande s o a
nominal sum o a ew housand dolla s. Bu ans e ing base in as uc u e was a
ickie a ai . In he beginning, he U.S. side claimed ha he eplacemen alue o
he base was $2.5 billion, howe e , he Uni ed S a es go e nmen was willing o le
i go o $150 million. An o e p esen ed by he U.S. nego ia o s as “…a magni icen
oppo uni y o ake o e magni icen acili ies” (UTN, 2006e). The o e was
ejec ed by he Icelande s who coun e ed ha hey we e only in e es ed in acili ies
essen ial o unning he in e na ional ai po , and hose needed o ecei ing U.S.
and NATO mili a y o ces in he u u e. Howe e , he Icelande s had a coun e -
o e o make: hey migh be willing o ake o e all base acili ies i he esidual
alue o hose no needed would be deduc ed om he p ice o acili ies ha he
go e nmen o Iceland uly wan ed. Bo h sides emained a logge heads and we e
obliged o seek a comp omise h ough o he means.
En i onmen al clean-up. In due cou se, he wo sides del ed in o he en i onmen al
condi ion a he base. The Icelandic nego ia o s main ained ha a icle VIII o he
gene al annex o he de ence ag eemen 9 obliged he Uni ed S a es go e nmen o
clea he ag eed a eas o was e ma e ial, which implied ha he U.S. go e nmen
should pay o closing ga bage dumps and cleaning up con amina ed soil a Ke la ík
base a a o al cos acco ding o Icelandic es ima es o $47 million (UTN, 2006e).
No buying in o he Icelandic a gumen , he U.S. nego ia o s a gued ha he concep
o en i onmen al clean-up had been unknown in 1951 and coun e ed ha ha
pa icula a icle only applied i he de ence ag eemen was e oked (UTN, 2006e).
To bols e i s claim he U.S. go e nmen had hi ed an en i onmen al consul ing i m
o ca y ou a su ey wi hin he base a ea.
Acco ding o he s udy, he mos p e alen con agion was g oundwa e pollu ion,
bu his was a well-known issue ha had al eady been se led wi h an ag eemen
be ween he wo go e nmen s in 1989. Wi h ega d o o he con amina ion, ou
o 60 p e-de ined zones 14 needed u he in es iga ion, howe e , only wo had
9 “…was e ma e ial, will o he ex en p ac icable, be emo ed des oyed o o he wise disposed o upon
he su ende o he ag eed a eas” (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 1951).

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
been used by he U.S. mili a y. The emaining 12 had been used by con ac o s and
domes ic ai po au ho i ies unde Icelandic supe ision. Appa en ly, he si ua ion
was pa icula ly bad in a so-called con ac o a ea ha he U.S. mili a y had had no
con ol o e . Adaman ha hey we e no obliged o ca y ou any kind o clean-up,
he U.S. nego ia o s a gued ha i was pa icula ly un ai o hold hem esponsible
o pollu ion caused by Icelandic con ac ing i ms. Howe e , i he Icelandic
go e nmen would choose o ca y ou en i onmen al clean-up ha cos migh be
conside ed a pa o a esidual paymen o U.S. base acili ies.
The U.S. side had decided o mesh en i onmen al clean-up se lemen s wi h
inancial eimbu semen s o base acili ies. The Icelande s acceded somewha o ha
poin o iew, and ag eed o clean up he con ac o a ea and old aining g ounds
known o con ain unexploded muni ions om pas mili a y exe cises. E en ually, a
comp omise was eached. The Icelandic go e nmen was gi en owne ship o all 541
U.S.-owned base acili ies ee o cha ge. In e u n he Uni ed S a es go e nmen was
absol ed o any obliga ions o u u e en i onmen al clean-up (O ice o he P ime
Minis e , 2006b) and he wo go e nmen s ag eed o u he consul a ion on bes
ways o espond i an en i onmen al haza d de imen al o people’s heal h should
become known wi hin he nex ou yea s.
The u u e o he Iceland Ai De ence Sys em. When seeking ag eemen on IADS
i was clea ha he wo sides had di e en goals in mind. The Icelandic posi ion
was ha IADS played a pi o al ole in he secu i y o Iceland. A e all, i was he
esponsibili y o any so e eign s a e o be awa e o wha was aking place wi hin
i s e i o y in land, sea and ai . Addi ionally, he sys em had s ong implica ions
o ci ilian ai sa e y. IADS ada signals we e o wa ded o he Icelandic a ia ion
au ho i ies and used o moni o ligh s and na iga e ci ilian ai a ic a ound
Iceland. Because o i s signi icance, a con inued U.S. pa icipa ion in IADS would
cons i u e a isible U.S. con ibu ion o he de ence o Iceland. The e o e, he
Icelandic nego ia o s made hei U.S. coun e pa s an o e : Iceland would und he
ope a ional cos s o IADS while he U.S. payed o main enance, equi ed spa e pa s
and u u e upg ades (UTN, 2006c). The a gumen was ha because o economics
o scale he Uni ed S a es would be able o und main enance a much lowe cos s
han he Icelandic go e nmen . I accep ed, he o e would ha e made he U.S. and
Iceland pa ne s in Hos Na ion S a us o IADS unde NATO de ini ions wi h
Iceland paying up o 75% o he cos s. The e was, howe e , e y li le in e es in he
Icelandic o e among U.S. nego ia o s. EUCOM in S u ga had al eady decided
ha he e was no u he U.S. mili a y need o he sys em, al hough NATO would
ha e o gi e i s iew on he ma e . Wha was impo an o he U.S. nego ia o s
was ha he Uni ed S a es had commi ed i sel o main ain he sys em and ada
signals om wo o i s ou s a ions du ing a 12-mon h pe iod o no ice, ending on
15 Augus 2007. The U.S. side hus esponded coolly ha he u u e o IADS was
s ill unde discussion.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Bu I he U.S. go e nmen was no willing o und IADS hen wha abou o he
elemen s o u u e U.S. mili a y isibili y in Iceland? Du ing he nego ia ions, he
Icelande s had made i clea ha Ke la ík ai po would con inue o be a con ibu ion
o he common de ence o NATO and would emain open o U.S. and NATO o ces.
The Icelandic go e nmen also a gued ha he U.S. go e nmen should main ain
some acili ies and pe sonnel o be able o ecei e la ge o ces in ime o need. This
o cou se ied in wi h he Icelandic desi e o egula a i al o o ce elemen s o
ca y ou exe cises in ol ing ai de ence (wi h igh e je s), Sea ch and Rescue as well
as special o ces (e.g. o coun e - e o ism). While no commen ing on he issue
o e aining pe sonnel and acili ies wi hin he base a ea he U.S. nego ia o s had
esponded a ou ably o he sugges ion o hos ing egula exe cises and sugges ed
ha some hing migh be a anged simila o he bi-annual No he n Viking exe cise
al eady held in Iceland.
A consis en p oblem, o he Icelandic side, h oughou he six-mon h ansi ion
phase had been o ge hei U.S. coun e pa o p o ide hem wi h accu a e
in o ma ion abou he winding-down p ocess o base ope a ions. Repea edly, he
Icelandic side eques ed a planned ime able (UTN, 2006d) only o be gi en one on
24 May, du ing he six h ansi ion mee ing, by which ime a se ious b each o us
had al eady occu ed. A ew days ea lie , he 932 ACS had walked ou o he CRC,
lea ing he Rada Agency aced wi h an unexpec ed eali y: no-one was moni o ing
IADS ada da a, o elaying ha da a onwa d o NATO command cen es in
Eu ope and No h Ame ica.
The walk ou signalled he end o di ec U.S. in ol emen in moni o ing signals
om IADS al hough he U.S. go e nmen was obliged o und he sys em un il mid-
Augus 2007. Despi e he walk ou he echnical capabili ies o IADS we e all in
place and hei unc ions could be eac i a ed. Wi hin he Rada Agency a decision
was made o assume ai su eillance p e iously ca ied ou by he 932 ACS:
We made he decision and o cou se e e ybody knew abou i , his wasn’ a p i a e
decision. We decided o con inue. We did his he poo man’s way. We used he
echnicians o moni o he signals a he ada si es because hey we e s ill pa ly
manned. Then we manned he CRC du ing day ime. G adually we s opped manning
he CRC wi h echnicians and hey simply became shi wo ke s which made i possible
o man he CRC 24 hou s a day. The e we e ew s eps in he p ocess bu we ne e
s opped, i [ai su eillance] ne e s opped (Commande Ke la ík Ai Base, 2013).
The ecollec ion o a echnician manning IADS gi es a aluable insigh in o how
he Rada Agency s a ook he ini ia i e:
They [932 ACS] jus walked ou o he CRC and we simply ook he ball o e . Wha
we did i s o all was o moni o he ai space, ha is he signal and main ain i . Then
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
we had o s a om he beginning and es ablish con ac wi h No way and U.K., and
ge us in o wha is called CAOC. We a e mos ly in con ac wi h he No wegians and
he B i ish and we had o build his up om sc a ch. We simply sa down and opened
he ins uc ion manuals abou how o do his. You jus si down and you know… his is
wha we ha e and now we a e going o do his [….] I am no joking, people we e simply
h own a ball and old ha hey had o hold i and ha is wha we did (Technical c ew
chie IADS, 2014).
The abandonmen o he CRC ook he Icelandic au ho i ies by su p ise. Ac ually,
du ing a p eceding T ansi ion G oup mee ing he upcoming deac i a ion o he 932
ACS had been men ioned. Howe e , he U.S. message had been ha :
…in he case o he 932nd Squad on, i will mean ha a deac i a ion ce emony will ake
place bu ha all unc ions and acili ies will s ill be he e un il an ag eemen has been
eached o u n o e he unc ions o he GOI [go e nmen o Iceland] (UTN, 2006d).
Unde s andably his did no si well wi h he Icelande s. The embi e ed Icelandic
delega es s essed ha his should ha e been b ough o hei a en ion much ea lie .
Especially since, acco ding o hei sou ces, base au ho i ies and U.S. embassy s a
had been awa e o he in en ion o pull he 932 ACS ou a ull mon h in ad ance.
Adding ha “ he mo e is being pe cei ed [by he go e nmen o Iceland] as he
disman ling o Iceland’s ai de ence h ough he back doo ” (UTN, 2006d).
Con inuing, he Icelandic ep esen a i es a gued ha his mo e was a b each o an
MoU be ween he wo go e nmen s s a ing ha a no ice mus be p o ided a yea in
ad ance and no such no ice had been se ed.
Holding hei line, he U.S. side e o ed ha he announcemen ha he de ence
o ce was lea ing Iceland implied ha ce ain unc ions would no longe be ca ied
ou in he same ashion as be o e. Con inuing, ha he inal U.S. posi ion had
been o decla e he ada si es an excess o U.S. needs, al hough “…conside able
in e agency discussions a e going on in Washing on, D.C. ega ding his subjec ”
(UTN, 2006d). No imp essed by such a gumen s, hei Icelandic coun e pa s
eplied ha his was no a U.S. in e -agency ma e bu a bila e al U.S.-Icelandic
issue and ha he U.S. side should ha e been explici abou he ada si es.
How elemen s wi hin he U.S. mili a y es ablishmen iewed he closu e o
Ke la ík base will only be e ealed in he dis an u u e bu wha is ce ain is ha
a e May 2006 connec i i y be ween IADS and he No h Ame ican Ae ospace
De ense Command (NORAD) was se e ed, dep i ing command cen es in No h
Ame ica o he Recognised Ai and Sea Pic u e o he No h A lan ic:
Wha explains i is a echnical p oblem. They [Uni ed S a es Ai Fo ce] ope a ed he
NATO sys ems in Iceland by using U.S. c yp o keys and connec ions. They o cou se
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
s opped supplying us wi h hei c yp o keys when hey le and we s a ed o un he
sys em on NATO c yp o keys. The p oblem is ha NORAD in he U.S. does no accep
NATO c yp o keys so he sys ems [IADS and NORAD] do no mesh oge he . In he
end he Canadians acqui ed NATO c yp o keys and he connec ion be ween IADS
and NORAD was es o ed in 2010 h ough he Canadian side (Commande Ke la ík
Ai Base, 2013).
As he U.S. go e nmen had e mina ed i s obliga ion o ope a e he sys em and
he Icelandic go e nmen had no legal amewo k in place o egula e he unc ions o
he Rada Agency IADS now exis ed wi hin a legalis ic limbo. Howe e , he sys em
was in ended o mee he de ence needs o NATO and i s membe s and as soon as he
U.S. go e nmen announced in Ma ch ha i in ended o close Ke la ík base NATO
agencies and o he NATO membe na ions began o show in e es in IADS:
Rep esen a i es om NATO o ganiza ions began o isi us as well as ep esen a i es
om SHAPE. Asking us wha hey could do o suppo us. The No wegians and
Canadians sen a eam o 15 people who s ayed he e o wo weeks o each us [.…] The
No wegians send men o e on a egula basis o ain us and con inue o gi e eno mous
suppo . They a e ac ually o e ing mo e aining han we can abso b [….] The Canadians
we e quick o eac and so did he No wegians and NATO o ganiza ions in Belgium.
They jus s olled in and asked wha hey could do o help. So, NATO began as ea ly as
he summe o 2006 o do some hing (Commande Ke la ík Ai Base, 2013).
Al hough he Rada Agency s a had decided o pick up he ball Iceland was
wi hou any o m o ai de ences a e he emo al o he las F-15 igh e je s.
Soon a e he o mal hando e o Ke la ík base wo Russian Tupole -95 bombe s
appea ed wi hin Iceland’s MADIZ, he i s such ligh since 2003. Icelandic o icials
had been in o med h ough NATO in elligence channels be o ehand (Fo me
senio o icial wi hin he Icelandic De ence Agency, 2014). Unde s andably, he
Icelandic au ho i ies we e unsu e abou how o espond. A senio o icial in ol ed in
he ansi ion phase (who would la e become a senio o icial wi hin he Icelandic
De ence Agency) desc ibes he e en in such a way:
No one knew whe he he planes would u n back o be in e cep ed by he No wegians
o wha [….] e en ually he Russians we e in e cep ed by he No wegians. A e ha
some sys em was pu in place so we knew wha p ocedu es ake place when he Russians
ly hei bombe s o Iceland. This e en igge ed ce ain hings, he ball s a ed o oll
owa ds ai policing (Fo me senio o icial, he Icelandic De ence Agency, 2014).
Soon a e he U.S. depa u e Icelandic o icials wi hin he Minis y o Fo eign
A ai s began o discuss wi hin NATO Mili a y Commi ee how o add ess Iceland’s
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
lack o ai de ences as he abili y o in e cep Russian bombe s was o cou se a
ques ion o a i ming Iceland’s e i o ial in eg i y and so e eign y. F om NATO’s
pe spec i e ha ing no in e cep ion capabili ies, apa om No way, in he No he n
Flank o he alliance aised conce ns among o he NATO membe s.
Bu how could Iceland sol e i s lack o ai de ence? The Uni ed S a es had no
been willing o main ain a con inuous igh e p esence in Iceland. The e o e, i was
ha dly ealis ic ha o he NATO membe s would be willing o do so. Howe e , a
comp omise migh be eached. A e consul a ion be ween he Icelandic Minis y
o Fo eign A ai s and he Headqua e s o he U.S. Ai Fo ce in Rams ein,
Ge many (Senio o icial, Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013) he conclusion was
eached ha since Iceland was no aced wi h a mili a y h ea in he o eseeable
u u e a pe iodical ai policing deploymen ou imes a yea was bes sui ed o mee
Iceland’s needs.
The u u e a angemen o Iceland’s ai de ence now began o ake shape. On 2
July 2007 NATO Mili a y Commi ee decided ha he ope a ion o IADS had o
be con inued (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2007a) and soon a e wo k began o
in eg a e IADS in o NATINADS. Following he decision, he Icelandic Minis y
o Fo eign A ai s announced la e ha yea in Oc obe ha egula NATO Ai
Policing missions in Iceland would s a in sp ing 2008 (Minis y o Fo eign
A ai s, 2007b).
6.2. Icelandic ins i u ional de ence amewo k
In May 2006 he Independence Pa y and he P og essi e Pa y enewed hei
coali ion go e nmen , al hough wi h ce ain changes. The Independence Pa y ook
o e he p emie ship, and while Gei Haa de mo ed in o he P ime Minis e ’s o ice
he P og essi e Pa y assumed esponsibili y o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s. The
new go e nmen had enough on i s pla e in add essing he U.S. legacy: edundan
base acili ies had o be disposed o and a pe manen solu ion was needed o und
Ke la ík in e na ional ai po . On 26 Sep embe he Icelandic go e nmen issued a
s a emen (O ice o he P ime Minis e , 2006c) decla ing: (1) he es ablishmen o
a co po a e en i y designed o acili a e he ans e o buildings wi hin he old base
a ea in o ci ilian use, (2) he planned enhancemen o he Coas Gua d’s Sea ch and
Rescue capabili ies, and (3) planned a angemen s o ead he ada signals p oduced
by he Rada Agency.
Wi h hese i s en a i e s eps aken, he nex mo e was o ealign Iceland´s
de ence policy in ligh o he closu e o Ke la ík base. In a speech a he NATO
Summi in Riga in No embe 2006 P ime Minis e Gei Haa de b ough up
Iceland’s lack o ai de ence, and a mon h la e he Icelandic go e nmen sen a
o mal eques o NATO Sec e a y Gene al Jaap de Hoop Sche e o ins uc he

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
NAC o di ec he NATO Mili a y Commi ee o de elop al e na i es o Iceland’s
peace ime p epa edness needs.
In ligh o added de ence esponsibili ies u he Icelandic ep esen a ion was
needed wi hin he NATO decision o ganiza ional s uc u e (Icelandic De ence
Agency, pp. 30, 121, 2010). In 2006 he Icelandic Fo eign Minis e appoin ed bo h
a ep esen a i e o SHAPE and NSIP, oles p e iously handled by he Uni ed S a es.
Unlike o he NATO membe s Icelandic had ne e a i ied he 1951 Ag eemen
be ween he Pa ies o he No h A lan ic T ea y ega ding he S a us o hei Fo ces,
mo e gene ally e e ed o as NATO-SOFA. The ag eemen de ines he legal s a us
o mili a y o ces o one NATO s a e when ope a ing on he e i o y o ano he
NATO membe . The eason was ha he 1951 De ence Ag eemen made NATO-
SOFA edundan as a icle 11 o he de ence ag eemen p o ided ha mili a y o ces
om o he NATO membe s in Iceland enjoyed he same legal s a us as U.S. mili a y
o ces (Pa liamen , 2007). Wi h he depa u e o he de ence o ce i was necessa y
o ec i y he si ua ion. In Ma ch 2007, he go e nmen a i ied NATO-SOFA and
he 1995 Pa ne ship o Peace S a us o Fo ce Ag eemen be ween NATO membe s
and coun ies pa icipa ing in he Pa ne ship o Peace p og amme.
A mon h la e , he Icelandic go e nmen ook s eps o deepen i s secu i y
and de ence coope a ion wi h i s neighbou ing NATO allies. On 26 Ap il 2007
Fo eign Minis e Valge ðu S e isdó i signed a bila e al secu i y amewo k wi h
he No wegian coun e pa , Jonas Gah S ø e, emphasising join consul a ion,
in o ma ion sha ing and o ce coope a ion in he sea and ai a ound Iceland and
a join decla a ion wi h he Danish Fo eign Minis e , Pe S ig Mølle , on inc eased
Icelandic-Danish secu i y and de ence coope a ion. Simila ag eemen s ollowed
wi h he Uni ed Kingdom in May 2008 and Canada in Oc obe 2010. This deepening
o de ence coope a ion wi h o he NATO allies was an a emp o compensa e o
he loss o U.S. mili a y p esence, bu hey we e no subs i u e o he de ence o ce
o Iceland’s de ence ela ionship wi h he U.S.
Secu ing pe iodical NATO ai policing missions, a i ying NATO-SOFA and
seeking ac i e de ence coope a ion wi h Iceland’s geog aphical neighbou s we e all
s eps aken less han a yea a e he closu e o Ke la ík base bu he main ask o
c ea ing a legisla i e amewo k o de ence asks in Iceland p e iously handled by
he U.S. mili a y had o wai .
Fo una ely, he Icelandic go e nmen had been gi en a b ea hing space – a gap
yea o abso b and diges . The U.S. was s ill obliged o inance IADS un il mid-Augus
2007, and main ain o a yea hose 83 NATO acili ies no immedia ely aken o e
by he Icelandic go e nmen . When ha ime was up unding was aken o e by he
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, bu wha would happen o he Rada Agency emained
unclea . As 2007 u ned in o 2008, he bes choice a hand seemed o be he c ea ion
o a new go e nmen agency subo dina e o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s; o as a
senio o icial ph ased i :
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
The Icelandic go e nmen was handed o e nigh a ownship o 5,000 people. Who was
going o be esponsible o his? O cou se, he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, o he
O ice o De ence wi hin he Minis y, while no pe manen solu ion had been ound.
[…] Bu who was going o go in and check i he ligh s we e on o he buildings we e
hea ed? No one was doing ha . Then pipes s a bu s ing in he buildings du ing he
eezing Oc obe nigh s and people a e aced wi h huge damages. This e en , in my
opinion, ein o ced he idea ha we needed o ge he en i e package ou o his house
and pu i in he hands o a special agency ha should be si ua ed wi hin he Ke la ík
base a ea and ake ca e o his (Senio o icial, Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013).
Following Pa liamen a y elec ions in he sp ing o 2007 he Independence
Pa y/P og essi e Pa y coali ion came o an end. Howe e , his did no consign
he Independence Pa y o opposi ion. Wi h 43 ou o 63 membe s o Pa liamen
he Independence Pa y and he Social Democ a ic Alliance o med a new coali ion
go e nmen . Haa de e ained he pos o P ime Minis e which he had assumed
a e Ásg ímsson’s e i emen om poli ics in mid-June 2006 and he leade o
he Social Democ a ic Alliance, Ingibjö g Sól ún Gísladó i , ook up he pos o
Fo eign Minis e .
As he ideological successo o he Social Democ a ic Pa y, The Social
Democ a ic Alliance was a suppo e o Iceland’s membe ship in NATO. Howe e ,
Social Democ a ic Alliance pa y con e ence esolu ions ha e only made lee ing
e e ences o NATO and hen in he con ex o he added alue Iceland s ood o
gain by coope a ing wi h o he so e eign s a es h ough in e na ional ins i u ions
(Social Democ a ic Alliance, 2005). Bu any men ion o he Icelandic-U.S.
de ence ela ionship o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen has been absen om Social
Democ a ic Alliance pa y con e ence esolu ions. The silence was unde s andable
o wo easons. A e all, he Social Democ a ic Alliance was a usion o h ee le o
cen e pa ies, including membe s o he adical People’s Alliance. The e o e, he le
wing o he pa y would no be com o able suppo ing a de ence ag eemen which
in a p e ious poli ical li e hey had opposed.
Secondly, he alue o e aining he igh e planes a Ke la ík base had emained
elusi e o he leade ship o he Social Democ a ic Alliance. A yea a e he 2003
U.S. a emp o emo e he igh e s om Ke la ík base, he Social Democ a ic
Alliance se up an in e nal secu i y and de ence policy wo king g oup. I s conclusion
was ha a om se ing a mili a y ole he ou emaining igh e s a Ke la ík base
we e much mo e a symbolic ges u e o U.S. de ence commi men s o Iceland a he
han mee ing any pe cei ed mili a y h ea . Thus, he U.S. should ha e a ee hand
o educe i s mili a y p esence and i s esponsibili y o Ke la ík ai po (“Skip a
skoðani um lo a ni ,” 2004). The Social Democ a ic Alliance agenda did no
include e ision o he de ence ag eemen bu he e was no much poli ical capi al
in e aining he igh e s.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
When i came o o ming a go e nmen , he Independence Pa y and he Social
Democ a ic Alliance did no come ac oss any s umbling blocks in e ms o secu i y
and de ence. In ac , no men ion was made o NATO o he 1951 De ence Ag eemen
in he Independence Pa y/Social Democ a ic Alliance coali ion mani es o,
howe e , i did e e o wes e n coope a ion as a pe manen co ne s one o Iceland’s
o eign policy (O ice o he P ime Minis e , 2007). An al e na i e exp ession o
main aining he s a us quo ega ding Iceland’s de ences.
Wi h a new go e nmen in powe he necessi y o some kind o a legisla i e
amewo k was su ely p essing. Wi hin he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, o icials
we e ponde ing al e na i es (Senio o icial Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2013a).
One op ion discussed was o c ea e a legal amewo k a ound he unc ions o he
Rada Agency and main ain i as a sub-o ganiza ion wi hin he O ice o De ence a
he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s. Al hough a iable op ion he go e nmen decided
ha some hing mo e adical was needed and chose a di e en ou e:
Yes, he go e nance had always been wi hin he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, and i
began o mula ing a legal amewo k. My opinion was ha his was a child o a pas
e a… he Rada Agency ha is. Now we we e esponsible o ou own de ence and we
had o lead he way in building up knowledge o deal wi h his. I did no hink i was
necessa ily igh ha i should be in e wo en wi h o he wo k wi hin he Minis y.
I wan ed o emo e i om he Minis y and ha is how he idea abou an Icelandic
De ence Agency was bo n. An agency ha would lead in ou [Icelandic] secu i y and
de ence ma e s, and accumula e knowledge (Social Democ a ic Alliance, o me
membe o cabine , 2014).
In la e No embe 2007, Fo eign Minis e Gísladó i announced he
o hcoming es ablishmen o an Icelandic De ence Agency (“Va na málas o nun
eki a sjá s öð a ,” 2007). Wi hin i s pu iew would all NATO In as uc u e
in Iceland, he hos ing o mili a y exe cises in Iceland and he esponsibili y o
communica ing classi ied in o ma ion be ween Icelandic au ho i ies and NATO.
By mid-Janua y 2008 he go e nmen was p epa ed o in oduce he de ence ac
bill (Va na málalög) in Pa liamen . In essence, he pu pose o he ac was ou old:
1. Delimi he powe s o he Icelandic au ho i ies ega ding de ence ela ed
p ojec s;
2. Dis inguish be ween de ence ela ed p ojec s and ci ilian p ojec s pe aining
o law en o cemen and in e nal secu i y o he s a e;
3. Dis inguish be ween policy and implemen a ion issues in he ield o de ence;
and
4. Facili a e he democ a ic con ol o de ence ela ed ac i i ies (Pa liamen ,
2008c).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
I ollowed ha he p oposed de ence agency would all wi hin he pu iew o
he Minis e o Fo eign A ai s. On 17 Janua y 2008, Fo eign Minis e Gísladó i
opened he deba e on he de ence ac in Pa liamen (Pa liamen , 2008a). A e he
closu e o Ke la ík base esponsibili y o IADS and a ious NATO acili ies had
been ans e ed o he Icelandic au ho i ies and o ca y ou hese unc ions he
de ence ac would se up a new agency ha would also ep esen Icelandic au ho i ies’
is-a- is allied o ces isi ing Iceland.
Del ing in o he adminis a i e and legalis ic p emises o he de ence ac
Gísladó i a gued ha he bill c ea ed a clea legal amewo k o de ence asks
by sa egua ding anspa ency and adminis a i e con ols while building a legal
i ewall be ween de ence on one hand and law en o cemen and ci il eme gency on
he o he . Wha he de ence agency was asked o do is-à- is NATO was se ou in
A icle 7 o he de ence ac :
1. Ope a e IADS, including NATO communica ion and ada si es in Iceland;
2. Pa icipa e in coo dina ed NATO ai su eillance and ai policing in Iceland;
3. Supe ise and manage he Secu i y A eas, and acili ies wi hin hem, owned
by he Icelandic s a e and NATO in acco dance wi h Iceland’s Hos and Use
Na ion esponsibili ies;
4. P epa e and supe ise de ence exe cises held in Iceland;
5. Implemen Hos Na ion suppo on behal o he Icelandic go e nmen ;
6. Ope a e da a links connec ed o NATO in o ma ion sys ems as well as
p ocessing in o ma ion om hose sys ems;
7. Pa icipa e in NATO commi ees and agencies. Al hough he Minis e o
Fo eign A ai s migh also appoin ep esen a i es om o he go e nmen
agencies, in consul a ion wi h he ele an Minis y, o si in a NATO
commi ee wi hin he sphe e o ci ilian coope a ion;
8. Pe o m asks associa ed wi h he implemen a ion o he 1951 De ence
Ag eemen and he NATO-SOFA Ag eemen (Pa liamen , 2008c).
In addi ion, he de ence ac de ined he de ence agency as he main ad iso y
au ho i y on de ence ma e s wi hin he Icelandic go e nance s uc u e.
On 1 June 2008 he Icelandic De ence Agency opened i s doo s o he i s
ime. In essence i was an amalgama ion o a numbe o ins i u ions. A i s co e was
he s a o he now de unc Rada Agency alongside o icials ans e ed om he
O ice o De ence wi hin he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s. Wi h he s a egic cou se
plo ed by he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, and ac ical execu ion en us ed o he
De ence Agency Gísladó i claimed ha “… a new chap e has been opened up
whe eby Icelande s a e o he i s ime wholly esponsible o hei own secu i y
and de ence” (“Ísland e og e ðu he laus land,” 2008).
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Bu how much o ha decision could be a ibu ed o a ional calcula ion o
sa ings and cos s as he new go e nmen was an ically seeking ways o balance
he pos -collapse go e nmen budge o he esul o poli ical ba gaining be ween
he Social Democ a ic Alliance and he Le G een Mo emen ? As he ideological
successo o he People’s Alliance he Le G een Mo emen was adaman ly opposed
o he de ence ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es and Icelandic membe ship in
NATO. The i s Le G een Mo emen mani es o ollowing hei 1999 na ional
con en ion did no de o e discussion on an Icelandic de ence policy o he de ence
ela ionship wi h he Uni ed S a es (Le G een Mo emen , 1999). The pa y was
s ill e o ming a e he b eak-up o he People’s Alliance bu by 2001 he Le G een
Mo emen na ional con en ion made de-mili a iza ion o Iceland i s o mal policy
(Le G een Mo emen , 2001) and called o immedia e nego ia ions be ween he
Icelandic and U.S. go e nmen o he emo al o he de ence o ce and o Iceland
o lea e NATO.
Fo he Le G een Mo emen he e en ual closu e o Ke la ík base was a s epping
s one owa ds a paci is Icelandic o eign policy ha would see Iceland ou side o
mili a y alliances. The e o e, i was no su p ising ha du ing he de ence ac bill
discussions in Pa liamen in 2008 he Le G een Mo emen passiona ely opposed
he c ea ion o an Icelandic de ence agency (Pa liamen , 2008b). Thei c i icism was
le ied a Gísaldó i o in oducing a bill ha would ie Iceland in o he mili a y
componen o NATO while opening he coun y up o ee access o NATO o ces.
Iceland should s ay ou side o mili a y alliances as he coun y was in no need o
mili a y o ces and he cos s associa ed wi h unding a de ence agency would be o
be e use i i was alloca ed o law en o cemen agencies.
I would be up o he chai man o he Le G een Mo emen , S eing ímu
J. Sig ússon, o summa ise his, and his ellow Le G een Mo emen membe ’s
opposi ion o he de ence ac bill (Pa liamen , 2008h). Du ing Pa liamen a y
discussions, Sig ússon b ie ly ou lined he geopoli ical changes since he end o he
Cold Wa be o e c i icising Gísaldó i o in oducing he bill wi hou p e iously
es ablishing a bi-pa isan consul a ion p ocess and conduc a ho ough isk
assessmen o de ine Iceland’s de ence needs. On a poli ical no e, Sig ússon c i icised
he bill o pushing Iceland in o mili a y unc ions o NATO o which i had ne e
pa icipa ed, hus changing Iceland’s s a us as a passi e membe o NATO. While
u he adding his conce n ha he alloca ed budge o de ence would in coming
yea ’s balloon ou o con ol.
Le G een Mo emen hos ili y o he de ence ac and he c ea ion o he De ence
Agency was hus well es ablished. In Pa liamen he Le G een Mo emen was isola ed
in i s opposi ion as hey we e he only membe s o Pa liamen who o ed agains he
bill. The e o e, when coali ion nego ia ions began in Janua y 2009 be ween he Social
Democ a ic Alliance and he Le G een Mo emen i was o be expec ed ha he
2008 de ence ac and he De ence Agency would be a opic o discussion.

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Coali ion go e nmen s a e based on comp omises and he May 2009 go e nmen
mani es o o he Social Democ a ic Alliance/Le G een Mo emen coali ion
bo e wi ness o he ac ha bo h sides had o gi e way on issues in which hey
had p e iously in es ed poli ical capi al. Be o e he 2008 inancial c ash he
Social Democ a ic Alliance had been a champion o Icelandic Eu opean Union
(EU) membe ship and a e he c ash i s leade ship began o iew an Icelandic
membe ship o he EU as way ou o he economic mo ass (Jóhannesson, 2009, p.
306). The e o e, he Le G een Mo emen had o gi e way on hei opposi ion o
Icelandic applica ion o he EU and accep he Social Democ a ic Alliance posi ion
ha Iceland should begin accession nego ia ions as soon as possible (O ice o he
P ime Minis e , 2009). Recip ocally, he Social Democ a ic Alliance ag eed o e ise
he unc ion o he De ence Agency and NATO Ai Policing missions in Iceland.
Bu why make i a go e nmen policy o eassess he unc ion o a go e nmen
agency less han a yea a e i was es ablished? The mos ob ious eason was
a despe a e need o balance he go e nmen books. Secondly, in Ma ch 2009
an in e disciplina y secu i y and de ence commission (appoin ed in 2007 by
Fo eign Minis e Gísladó i ) deli e ed he i s e e isk assessmen o Iceland.
The commission concluded ha isks s emming om o he sou ces such as
en i onmen al disas e s, inancial ins abili y, o ganized c ime e c. o e shadowed
mili a y h ea s, and in e ms o se e i y and likelihood we e no a p essing conce n
(Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, 2009). Consequen ly, educing cos s wi hin he mos
ecen ca ego y o go e nmen expendi u e: de ence seemed a pala able op ion.
The ph asing e ise, howe e , did no do jus ice o he ac ual nego ia ions be ween
he wo pa ies ega ding he a e o he De ence Agency and e ision o he de ence
ac . Fo he Le G een Mo emen ha only a yea be o e had opposed he de ence
ac on he basis ha i en enched Iceland wi hin he mili a y componen s o NATO
no hing less han i s aboli ion was on he able o he Social Democ a ic Alliance
o accep :
I was a clea demand by us he Le G eens o abolish he agency and we had ou way
o cou se [….] we el ha mos o i s unc ions was unnecessa y and ha i should be
shu down. Rega ding he ada si es and ecei ing he signals we el ha o he s could
do i and we looked immedia ely o he Coas Gua d (Le G een Mo emen , o me
membe o cabine , 2015).
Al hough he demand was no o elimina e all o i s asks, he Le G een
Mo emen pe cei ed he De ence Agency as a quasi-mili a y ins i u ion ha needed
o be pu down and i s unc ions eloca ed o mo e accep able o ganiza ions:
The De ence Agency was de ined on a pu ely mili a y basis and a ound hose people
[S a o he De ence Agency] e e y hing e ol ed a ound a mili a y h ea , NATO,
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
and mili a y coope a ion. We wan ed o push ha aside and eloca e hose unc ions
ha emained in o agencies ha we e de ined as being ci ilian (Le G een Mo emen ,
o me membe o cabine , 2015).
Fo he Social Democ a ic Alliance shu ing down he De ence Agency had
been one o he comp omises needed o he Social Democ a ic Alliance/Le
G een Mo emen coali ion o ake o , bu why did he Social Democ a ic Alliance
so eadily accep he demand? One eason was an elec o al p essu e on he Social
Democ a ic Alliance and he Le G een Mo emen o o m a go e nmen . P io o
he elec ions, he Social Democ a ic Alliance and Le G een Mo emen leade s had
signalled ha hey we e willing o con inue he coali ion a e he elec ion (“Áhugi
á leng a sams a i,” 2009). Following he elec ions, he Social Democ a ic Alliance
and he Le G een Mo emen gained he combined majo i y o he elec o al o es
and a clea manda e o o m a go e nmen . While he Social Democ a ic Alliance
inc eased i s sha e o he o e om 26.8% o 29.8%, he Le G een Mo emen
g ew om 14.3% o 21.7%, hei bes esul in any pa liamen a y elec ion o
da e (“Þingmei ihlu i y i aðilda umsókn að ESB,” 2009). A he same ime, he
elec o a e me cilessly punished he Independence Pa y which los a hi d o i s
elec o al suppo , sh inking om 36.6% o 23.7%.
Ano he eason o he ab up U- u n was a change o leade ship wi hin he Social
Democ a ic Alliance. The De ence Ac and he c ea ion o he De ence Agency
had been ca ied ou unde o me Social Democ a ic Alliance leade , Ingibjö g
Sól ún Gísladó i . Howe e , in Sep embe 2008, Gísladó i was diagnosed wi h
a b ain umou and was s ill unde going ea men in Janua y 2009 when she ook
he decision o elinquish he leade ship ole o he Social Democ a ic Alliance and
e i e om poli ics. When nego ia ions ook place be ween he wo pa ies abou
a u u e Social Democ a ic Alliance/Le G een Mo emen coali ion, Gísladó i
had al eady le he poli ical scene and he pa y eins passed on o he successo .
E en ually i would become he esponsibili y o Gísladó i ’s Social Democ a ic
Alliance eplacemen a he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, Össu Ska phéðinsson,
o e ise he de ence ac and abolish he De ence Agency. Ska phéðinsson had
p e iously se ed as chai man o he Social Democ a ic Alliance om 2000 un il
being unsea ed in 2005 by Gísladó i who an agains and de ea ed Ska phéðinsson
in a bid o he pa y leade ship. Clea ly, he successo a he Minis y o Fo eign
A ai s had no in es ed he same amoun o poli ical capi al in he De ence Agency
and no as a ached o i s su i al.
Al eady in ea ly Feb ua y 2009, Fo eign Minis e Össu Ska phéðinsson had
hin ed ha sa ings migh no be es ic ed o educing unds alloca ed o he De ence
Agency, bu migh include abolishing i al oge he (“Spa naðu il a huguna ,” 2009).
La e ha mon h, he Chai man o he Pa liamen Fo eign A ai s Commi ee, he
Le G een Á ni Þó Sigu ðsson, (“Va na málas o nun kannski lögð niðu ,” 2009)
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
wen e en u he by s a ing ha he agency would be shu down and i s unc ions
eloca ed wi hin p e-exis ing ci ilian ins i u ions, such as he Coas Gua d and ci il
a ia ion au ho i ies.
Appa en ly, he pos - inancial collapse go e nmen had al eady eached a
decision abou he u u e o he De ence Agency. Wi h a ull manda e ollowing
he 2009 sp ing elec ions, he enewed Social Democ a ic Alliance/Le G een
coali ion se abou implemen ing i s policy. The closu e was o be combined wi h a
a - eaching es uc u ing o public adminis a ion ha would include a educ ion
o go e nmen minis ies om wel e o nine. E en ually, on 4 Decembe 2009 he
go e nmen o mally ag eed o abolish he De ence Agency and ans e i s asks
o ins i u ions wi hin a es uc u ed Minis y o he In e io . A e he go e nmen
had eached i s decision, in ea ly Decembe 2009, a wo king g oup was es ablished
headed by he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s. I s manda e was o e alua e how bes o
in eg a e de ence asks wi h o he go e nmen agencies.
The g oup handed in i s p oposals in ea ly Ma ch 2010. I s conclusions we e ha
he asks o he De ence Agency alongside he Coas Gua d and he Ma i ime T a ic
Au ho i y should be eloca ed wi hin a new agency subo dina e o he Minis y o
he In e io . Rega ding Icelandic ep esen a ion wi hin NATO he wo king g oup
sugges ed a di ision o labou be ween he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s and he soon
o be Minis y o he In e io : The Minis y o Fo eign A ai s would con inue o
handle NATO’s poli ical aspec s, such as ep esen ing Iceland in he NAC while
he Minis y o he In e io would be esponsible o he mili a y aspec o NATO
coope a ion. Thus, when he ansi ion would be comple e, he Minis y o he
In e io would assume he de ac o ole as Iceland’s Minis y o De ence om he
Minis y o Fo eign A ai s.
Indeed, he e was clea added alue o he Coas Gua d and he Na ional
Commissione o Police o ake hose asks o e (Minis y o Fo eign A ai s,
2010, pp. 17-18). The Coas Gua d would imp o e i s si ua ional awa eness in he
No h A lan ic by being able o dissemina e he Recognised Ai and Sea Pic u e
p oduced by IADS and he Na ional Commissione o Police would imp o e i s isk
assessmen s and analysis o gene al na ional secu i y pu poses by gaining access o
NATO in o ma ion sys ems.
Du ing he in e im pe iod he wo king g oup sugges ed ha (Minis y o Fo eign
A ai s, 2010, p. 24) he Coas Gua d should assume esponsibili y o : (1) IADS, ai
su eillance, and implemen ing ai policing missions; (2) o ganising and managing
de ence exe cises; (3) implemen ing Hos Na ion Suppo ; (4) pa icipa ion in
ele an NATO commi ees and agencies; and (5) esponsibili y o implemen ing
he 1951 De ence Ag eemen . The Na ional Commissione o Police was o be
allo ed he asks o (1) Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y; (2) unning secu i y clea ances
on equi ed pe sonnel, secu i y g ade classi ied in o ma ion and (3) pa icipa e in
ele an NATO commi ees and agencies. Addi ionally, bo h go e nmen bodies
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
we e expec ed o p ocess and dissemina e in o ma ion om NATO in o ma ion
sys ems.
Bu wha iew did he wo agencies asked o shoulde hese addi ional esponsibili ies
ha e owa ds he p oposed change? In i s assessmen gi en o Pa liamen , he Coas
Gua d a gued (Pa liamen , 2010 ) ha he c ea ion o he De ence Agency had in ac
hampe ed hei coope a ion wi h mili a y au ho i ies in neighbou ing allied coun ies
( he No wegian Coas Gua d and he Danish Na y in he seas a ound Iceland) since
he De ence Agency had insis ed on being he only in e media y be ween go e nmen
agencies in Iceland and o eign mili a y bodies. Consequen ly, ollowing he closu e
o he De ence Agency ha ela ionship should e u n o wha i had been be o e. In
addi ion, he Coas Gua d ag eed ha i s in o ma ion abou ma i ime a ic in he
seas a ound Iceland would imp o e by aking o e IADS.
F om i s an age poin , he Na ional Commissione o Police aised no
objec ions o assume he ole o Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y. Howe e , he Na ional
Commissione o Police did a gue hese wo agencies deal wi h di e en aspec s o
secu i y ha cons i u e a necessa y sepa a ion be ween mili a y unc ions on he one
hand and law en o cemen and in e nal secu i y on he o he (Pa liamen , 2010b).
The e o e, he sugges ed abolishmen o The De ence Agency aised conce ns abou
“A undamen al misunde s anding abou wha de ence issues is na u al o in eg a e
wi h ci ilian asks such as ci il de ence and in e nal secu i y”. Clea ly, he Na ional
Commissione o Police had some ese a ions abou he go e nmen ’s decision o
close down he De ence Agency and amalgama e i s unc ions wi h p e-exis en
ci ilian agencies.
In ea ly Decembe 2010, he Minis e o Fo eign A ai s and he Minis e o he
In e io acquiesced o he ecommenda ions o he wo king g oup and ans e ed
he bulk o he de ence asks o he Coas Gua d and he Na ional Secu i y Au ho i y
ole o he Na ional Commissione o Police. The ag eemen be ween he wo
minis e s was in ended as a sho - e m a angemen un il a o mal decision could
be eached abou u u e di ision o esponsibili ies be ween he wo minis ies. O
cou se, he condi ions o such a me ge es ed on he assump ion ha Pa liamen
would se a new legal amewo k eplacing he De ence Ac o 2008 (Minis y o
Fo eign A ai s, 2010, pp. 22-23) and du ing he ansi ion pe iod he ealloca ion
o de ence asks would be coo dina ed wi h he es ablishmen o he new Minis y
o he In e io and i s new an icipa ed secu i y and de ence agency.
On 30 Ma ch 2010, Fo eign Minis e Ska phéðinsson in oduced in Pa liamen
amendmen s o he 2008 De ence Ac abolishing he De ence Agency e ec i e
om 1 Janua y 2011 (Pa liamen , 2010e). As soon as he changes we e a i ied by
Pa liamen he Fo eign Minis e appoin ed a ansi ion g oup esponsible o he
daily managemen o he De ence Agency un il i s closu e. As an in e im s ep he
amendmen s included a clause making i law ul o he Minis e o Fo eign A ai s
o ou sou ce asks ha by law we e i s esponsibili y o ano he Minis y.
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
Despi e hese changes, Ska phéðinsson emphasised ha hey would no a ec
Iceland’s de ence commi men s, ha is o say he implemen a ion o de ence asks
handled by he De ence Agency. The planned es uc u ing was, howe e , aising
some conce ns among ellow NATO allies. In ea ly Decembe 2010 F é ablaðið
epo ed ha U.S. au ho i ies we e igh ing agains he closu e o he De ence
Agency and ha he U.S. ambassado in Reykja ík, Ca ol Van Voo s , was pu ing
p essu e on Ska phéðinsson no o do so (“Banda íkin bö ðus gegn lokun
Va na málas o nuna ,” 2010). Al hough he epo – based on leaked embassy cables
– may ha e exagge a ed he ex en o U.S. opposi ion i was clea ha Ambassado
Voo s had genuine conce ns abou he e ec he inancial c isis would ha e on
Icelandic de ence ela ed expendi u e.
In No embe 2008 Voo s had exp essed conce ns o he S a e Depa men ha
huge public deb and iscal es ain s we e making cu s in he Icelandic de ence
budge a “… emp ing a ge o pa liamen no accus omed o ha ing o und
de ense” (Wikileaks, 2009a). Du ing he Feb ua y 2009 mee ing, e e ed o by
F é ablaðið, Ska phéðinsson in o med Voo s ha his go e nmen was unde
inancial s ain, and ha he was looking a in eg a ing some o De ence Agency asks
wi h he Icelandic Coas Gua d. Gauging o he U.S. posi ion owa ds he change
Ska phéðinsson inqui ed whe he i ma e ed i hose asks would be ca ied ou by
some o he go e nmen agency. To which Voo s eplied ha he secu i y s uc u e
se in place ollowing he 2006 De ence Fo ce depa u e was “… a lexible, ela i ely
cheap ins umen ha has se ed Iceland and i s allies well”. Adding u he ha :
Iceland and he IDA [De ence Agency] ha e de eloped an excellen epu a ion
wi h NATO mili a ies ha ha e deployed he e. I is impo an o main ain hose
ela ionships and he hy hm o exe cises and deploymen s in o de o keep s anda ds
o p o iciency and acili ies main enance high (Wikileaks, 2009b)
In he concluding ema ks o he S a e Depa men , Voo s exp essed he conce n
ha :
Ska phedinsson has no buil -in loyal y o he IDA [De ence Agency], and hough sold
on he impo ance o NATO, he has a imes been a eluc an ad oca e o he idea ha
Iceland should und i s own de ense. The lu e o being able o cu nea ly 10 pe cen
om he MFA’s budge may simply be oo much o he me cu ial Ska phedinsson o
esis (Wikileaks, 2009b).
Bu he U.S. ambassado was no he only one ha ing ese a ions abou he me i
o closing down he De ence Agency. In Pa liamen , he Fo eign A ai s Commi ee
was di ided in i s opinion owa ds he p oposed ans e o de ence asks om
he De ence Agency. The majo i y was in a ou o he ans e and he goal o

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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
eo ganising he Coas Gua d and he Na ional Commissione o Police in a new
agency wi hin he planned Minis y o he In e io (Pa liamen , 2010a).
Uni ied in i s opposi ion o he plan, he mino i y o he Fo eign A ai s
Commi ee spli in wo and handed in sepa a e opinions. The i s mino i y
(Pa liamen , 2010b) ques ioned he u ili y o closing down he De ence Agency and
pa celling ou adminis a i e esponsibili y o i s asks gi en ha hose asks would
con inue o be ca ied ou wi hin he old base a ea and by he same s a as be o e.
The decision was also c i icised on he g ounds ha one o he main a gumen s o
he es ablishmen o he De ence Agency had been o ensu e sepa a ion be ween he
implemen a ion o asks whose e y na u e we e undamen ally di e en : de ence
asks in ended o p o ide secu i y agains ex e nal s a e h ea s and in e nal secu i y
ca ied ou by ci ilian secu i y agencies. The objec i es o he amendmen s we e
also c i icised o being oo ague and he i s mino i y no ed ha hey ga e he
Fo eign Minis e he au ho i y o mo e de ence and secu i y ela ed asks o o he
agencies wi hou explaining he expec ed bene i s o change. Good adminis a i e
p ac ices, hey a gued, called o making adap a ions o he De ence Ac a e he
p oposed Minis y o he In e io had been es ablished, ins ead o placing Iceland’s
secu i y and de ence ma e s in a s a us o unce ain y. The s a emen o he second
mino i y (Pa liamen , 2010c) wen e en u he and c i icised he go e nmen o
being poli ically mo i a ed in shu ing down he De ence Agency and o closing i
down wi hou a long- e m s a egy in sigh .
The decision o ans e de ence asks om he De ence Agency o he Minis y
o he In e io in Janua y 2011 b ough an end o a clea sepa a ion be ween ci ilian
and mili a y secu i y agencies as championed by Gísaldó i in he au umn o 2007,
bu he change esona ed well wi h Bja nason’s a gumen s o a close syne gy
be ween he Coas Gua d and de ence asks ca ied ou by he De ence Agency.
Howe e , he idea o c ea e a new de ence agency wi hin he soon o be c ea ed
Minis y o he In e io was no suppo ed by he soon o be Le G een Minis e
o he In e io Ögmundu Jónasson. In Sep embe 2010 Jónasson was quo ed in a
newspape in e iew as saying ha “The e has ne e been an in en ion o c ea e a
new go e nmen agency. Ins ead we a e closing down an agency and hose asks ha
will be con inued will be assigned app op ia ely (“He u ekki lo að að e a þægu ,”
2010).”
By ea ly Decembe 2010 a dispu e echoing he p e ious ug o wa be ween
Gísladó i and Bja nason was in ull swing. Behind he scenes he new Fo eign
Minis e Ska phéðinsson and he new Minis e o he In e io Jónasson a gued
whose minis y should be in cha ge o he o phaned asks o he soon o be de unc
De ence Agency. Wha was a s ake was di e en in e p e a ion o whe he closing
down he De ence Agency ansla ed in o sc apping he de ence asks o eloca e
hem. The Le G een Mo emen was o he o me opinion while he Social
Democ a ic Alliance was o he la e :
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
We wan ed, he Le G een Mo emen wan ed o shu down he De ence Agency. The
Social Democ a ic Alliance was in ag eemen , and hen he Minis e o Fo eign A ai s
in oduced a bill o ha e ec , bu all o i s asks would emain mo e o less in ac [….]
now he lines had become a he unclea , bu ou posi ion [Le G eens] was always
clea [….] The e we e di e en isions. They [Social Democ a ic Alliance] wan ed o
main ain a lo o De ence Agency asks associa ed wi h coope a ion wi hin NATO. We
we e agains ha and wan ed o es ic ou sel es o ci ilian asks, hose asks associa ed
wi h he mili a y alliance [NATO] we wan ed ou (Le G een Mo emen , o me
membe o cabine , 2016).
Fo he Le G een Mo emen , he main issue was no he s uc u e i sel , bu
he de ence asks ca ied ou wi hin ha s uc u e i.e. ai su eillance, NATO ai
policing e c. Meanwhile, he Social Democ a ic Alliance and Fo eign Minis e
Ska phéðinsson wished o con inue o ope a e hose de ence asks he De ence
Agency had pe o med. The ou come was a mid-Decembe , empo a y ag eemen
be ween he wo minis e s ha ollowed he o iginal plan and ans e ed he day
o day ope a ion o he bulk o de ence asks o he Coas Gua d and he Na ional
Commissione o Police bu hei legal esponsibili y emained wi h he Minis y
o Fo eign A ai s. Nei he Ska phéðinsson no Jónasson we e willing o elen and
he esul was an adminis a i e limbo be ween wo minis e s wi h as ly di e en
iews on wha Iceland’s de ence policy should be.
Because o his peculia si ua ion, soone o la e , he e was bound o be a head
on collision be ween Jónasson and Ska phéðinsson. In he sp ing o 2012, as a pa
o a go e nmen iscal es ain p og amme, he Minis y o Finance eques ed
go e nmen minis e s o educ ion in hei budge s. Fo he Minis y o he In e io
he eques was a budge cu o 528 million ISK. Jónasson’s p oposed cu backs
cen ed on sc apping NATO ai policing missions in Iceland and shu down he
ada sc eens and he command cen e o IADS. Fo Ska phéðinsson his amoun ed
o a backdoo a emp by Jónasson o d ag Iceland ou o NATO. Du ing a cabine
mee ing on 15 June 2012 he wo minis e s came o blows wi h Ska phéðinsson
e using o accep he p oposed cu :
I did no espond quie ly, old him [Jónasson] ha his p oposals we e i esponsible,
a b each o he coali ion mani es o and hey showed ha he was no o be us ed o
his ace o de ence. I concluded by saying ha a igh cou se o ac ion would be i all
a ai s ela ing o he de ence o Iceland should be emo ed om he Minis y o he
In e io and e u ned o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s, and hose handling de ence
made employees o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s (Ska phéðinsson, 2013, p. 194).
Despi e p edic able opposi ion by he Le G een Mo emen o de ence asks
Ska phéðinsson suspec ed ha he e was mo e behind Jónasson’s bid han me he
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Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
eye. A e all, he s ood li le change o ge ing his p oposal h ough cabine – le
alone Pa liamen . Howe e , he p oposal exe ed p essu e on he Finance Minis e
whose cons i uency s ood o lose jobs i IADS would be shu down and by pu ing
p essu e on he Finance Minis e , he a gumen wen , Jónasson would educe
p essu e o cu s a his own minis y.
Apa om disag eeing wi h Jónasson on poli ical g ounds he e we e also
a gumen s pe aining o in e na ional obliga ions owa ds o he NATO membe s
ha Ska phéðinsson le ied agains he p oposal (Ska phéðinsson, 2013, p. 219).
A e all, shu ing down IADS and cancelling NATO ai policing missions in
Iceland would be a d ama ic e e sal o Icelandic o eign policy ha would ha e o
be discussed in he Pa liamen Fo eign A ai s Commi ee. Jónasson backed down
and a ew days a e p esen ing his i s p oposal he e u ned wi h a wa e ed-down
e sion. Ins ead o shu ing he en i e sys em down he now p oposed o u n o
wo ou o ou ada sc eens while keeping IADS ope a ional. The undamen al
a gumen s aised by Ska phéðinsson emained he same and wi h he P ime Minis e
and o he Social Democ a ic Alliance minis e s siding wi h Ska phéðinsson (Le
G een Mo emen , o me membe o cabine , 2016) Jónasson’s p oposal s ood no
change o passing h ough cabine .
Despi e Ska phéðinsson’s specula ion ha he p oposal was a ploy by Jónasson o
d aw demands o budge cu s away om his own minis y Jónasson had been ue
o his pa y policy and ideals. The Le G een Mo emen had no desi e o con inue
ai policing missions and ope a e IADS since hose unc ions se ed pu ely de ence
pu poses. Mo eo e , he p oposal was ully in line wi h a pa liamen a y esolu ion
p esen ed by he Le G een Mo emen ha p e ious yea calling o a na ional
e e endum on Icelandic membe ship in NATO (Pa liamen , 2011). The esolu ion
ne e made i s way h ough pa liamen a y p ocedu es o be o ed on by membe s o
Pa liamen , bu clea ly he Le G een Mo emen held dea i s opposi ion o NATO.
The esul was ha he wo minis e s we e ne e able o wo k ou hei di e ences
and se le he de ence asks pe manen ly wi hin he Minis y o he In e io , o
e e hem back unde con ol o he Minis y o Fo eign A ai s.
The coali ion had been p eca ious om he s a and he wo pa ies di e ed on
o he issues apa om de ence. Domes ic poli ics we e o a la ge ex end amed
wi hin he seismic a e ma h o he 2008 inancial c isis ha d o e he go e nmen
agenda, bu Iceland’s de ence policy and i s implemen a ion we e no he only
o eign policy issue ha c ea ed di icul y o he Social Democ a ic/Le G een
Mo emen coali ion. Less han a yea away om pa liamen a y elec ion in 2013
he ela ionship be ween he wo pa ies had become s ained. The Le G een
Mo emen expe ienced mu iny among some o i s membe s in Pa liamen as
dissen e s a gued ha he pa y leade ship had sold ou i s p incipled opposi ion
o Icelandic EU membe ship by suppo ing accession alks wi h he union
(To ason, 2016, pp. 171-179). Meanwhile, he Social Democ a ic Alliance was no
152
Pé u sson: The De ence Rela ionship o Iceland and he Uni ed S a es and he Closu e o Ke la ík base
wi hou i s own dissen e s who a gued ha in paci ying i s Le G een Mo emen
coali ion pa ne i s leade ship had mo ed o a o he le and away om i s social
democ a ic oo s. As a esul , he indecision and pa alysis ha cha ac e ised he
pe manen loca ion o de ence asks wi hin a pe manen adminis a i e amewo k
was pe ec ly unde s andable. The decision o close he De ence Agency had been
poli ically d i en uelled by he Le G een Mo emen ideological opposi ion o
Iceland’s de ence policy. Bu al hough he Social Democ a ic Alliance was willing
o acquiesce o Le G een Mo emen demands o al e he adminis a i e o m o
Iceland’s de ence asks he Social Democ a ic Alliance emained i m in i s decision
o e ain hei subs ance.
One o he s a ed pu poses o he closu e o he De ence Agency and he eloca ion
o i s asks had been o educe cos s and in Decembe 2010 Ska phéðinsson had
decla ed in Pa liamen ha he in ended closu e would sa e he go e nmen 500
million ISK (Pa liamen , 2010d). A subs an ial amoun gi en ha he De ence
Agency had been alloca ed 1.2 billion ISK in he 2009 go e nmen budge
(Pa liamen , 2008g, p. 58).
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ϮϬϬϴ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϭ ϮϬϭϮ
/^dZ/hd/K/EK&'KsZEDEdK^d&KZ&Ed^<^/E
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ĞĨĞŶĐĞ ZĂĚĂƌŐĞŶĐLJ
ĞĨĞŶĐĞŐĞŶĐLJ /ĐĞůĂŶĚŝĐŽĂƐƚ'ƵĂƌĚ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ/ĐĞůĂŶĚŝĐWŽůŝĐĞ DŝŶŝƐƚƌLJĨŽƌ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ
Figu e 2 Dis ibu ion o go e nmen cos o de ence asks in million ISK 2008-2013 (Icelandic
Audi O ice, 2013, p. 13).
Figu e 2 illus a es he dis ibu ion o go e nmen cos s o de ence ela ed asks
be ween 2008 and 2012. The g aph does no depic o al amoun acc edi ed in he
go e nmen budge s o he yea 2009 and onwa d bu o al expendi u es. This is
because acco ding o a icle 16 o he 2008 De ence Ac he De ence Agency was
au ho ised o lease ou NATO in as uc u e and equipmen o o se main enance
cos s p o ided ha all secu i y equi emen s we e me (Pa liamen , 2008c). This