Leadership selection in the spanish political parties

Leadership Selection in the Spanish Political Parties Gabriel COLOMÉ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Lourdes LÓPEZ NIETO Universidad Complutense de Madrid Working Paper n. 6 Barcelona 1989 1.- Some Words About the Spanish Political System. Our study of the Spanish political system just covers a short period of eleven years, beginning in 1978 when the Spanish Constitution was approved. We could extend this period of time up to one year if we considered that the new system started with the first general elections after those held in February 1936. There is no agreement among political scientists neither about the initial and final moments of the Spanish transition1 from a dictatorship to a democratic political system nor about the stability of the party system that resulted from this process. Some writers consider the Spanish political system as a whole, with regional subsystems2, and analyze it just within the left-right cleavage; others3 believe that several political systems co-exist without being subordinated to the Spanish one. In this latter sense we can consider that Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarra, etc., have their own party systems mostly because the historical cleavage between the center and the periphery has not been resolved. There are certain features that differentiate the Spanish democratic political system and its consolidation from all other systems in Western European countries. In this paper, we will try to underline the most significant ones in order to see how they relate to leadership and to the election of political party leaders. During the 1960’s, Spain changed unlike any other First World country from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial age without having had an industrial period4. The crises of European parties generated alternative ways of political action, and parties were compelled to adapt themselves to the new ideological and organizational circumstances. After Franco’s death, the new political situation in Spain, with some political parties coming out from clandestinity and others just being founded, allowed for the development of the party system, that was to become quite different from the European ones: the attempt to follow the classic Duvergerian model, formally the mass parties’ model, contrasted with reality, exclusively based on institutional functions and on the consensus of the first democratic period (1977-79)5. There were other factors that also conditioned the Spanish political system, some specific to Spain and others shared with other Western countries. Spanish political culture is characterized by low participation in organizations. In this sense, civil society is not organized; even during Franco’s period just some few specific groups -workers, students and civil movementswere active and strongly rejected the dictatorial regime as a result of the Francoist strategy to provoke political demobilization within the different strata of society6. At present, the only articulated and meaningful channel of participation is the electoral one, with elections (at various levels) being held almost every year7, with different turnouts depending on the type of election and on the different geographic areas8. Another important fact is that television, unlike in most other Western countries, was already a consolidated media when the new Spanish political system was established9. This implied that public opinion and, more specifically, voters were less aware of the differences between the parties’ programs than of the political leaders’ public image representing both the party and its program. Although this process takes place in all Western democracies, we must also bear in mind that broadcasting takes place in the authoritarian and very personalized Spanish political culture. 2.- Party and Leadership. Models. As a result of the specific features we have just seen, the organization of the party system has been unstable and has been marked by internal disputes that have provoked different situations: — Disappearance of the party: The most significant example is that of «Unión de Centro Democrático» (UCD), an electoral coalition created around the President of the Government using the Old Regime’s institutional mechanisms, winner of the first democratic elections. The party disappeared from the political scene when its founding leader left it10. — Division of the party: We will talk about two parties that solved their break up in different ways. The crisis in the «Partido Nacionalista Vasco» (PNV) was caused by the confrontation between the party leader and the President of the Basque Government. As no solution seemed to exist to solve the conflicts among the members of the power elite within the party, it broke up and the dissenting section created a new party. On the other hand, in the first two general elections the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) failed in its hope to become the first party of the opposition on the left. Santiago Carrillo controlled the two confronted currents in the party -the Leninist and the Euro-Communistuntil the 1979 Party Conference was faced with the issue of ideological revisions and democratization within the party, both currents becoming more obvious and radical. That was the origin of crises and divisions that continue nowadays11. — Processes of unstable coalition: «Alianza Popular» (AP) aimed at organizing the right in Spain which was -and still iscrumbled into pieces; Manuel Fraga and AP wanted to integrate part of the Francoist right into the project of the new Spanish political system. AP and its leader tried to organize a strong right wing alternative by integrating prominent politicians and making coalitions with small parties, especially during pre-electoral periods. The division of the right had a negative effect: it meant the non-consolidation, and thus the instability of many coalition processes 12. — Party integration: The «Partido Socialista Obrero Español» (PSOE) impelled a process for the integration of all the different socialist options that were present in the first general election. This is the only example of a process carried out satisfactorily in the political system, being a positive point for the configuration of PSOE as a real alternative to government13. The focus of our research is based on the two main national parties: PSOE and AP. The unstable coalition differs from the integration model in a series of traits that we will see as follows. In the first place, PSOE achieved the union of the socialist political spectrum by integrating all the other socialist parties, whereas AP was unable to integrate the right in one political force thus finding itself in a permanent instability caused by its own forces. Secondly, both hierarchy and internal cohesion were imposed in PSOE. This was due perhaps to its leader’s ability to solve the complex internal situation provoked by the presence at once of the historical leaders, some critics and many young people that were just joining the party given the possibility of it becoming the alternative to government. The highest point of this process was the 28th Party Conference and the 1979 Extraordinary Conference14. At the same time, two parallel and related processes were taking place in AP. On the one hand, AP tried to establish a strong party organization, which would be achieved in certain areas but not in all of them because of the difficulties caused by the integration of the different clientele and personalities. On the other hand, it started coalition processes with other parties and some leaders that, coming from disappeared parties, entered its governing elite that implied a constant re-adaptation of the selection and internal operation mechanisms. In the third place, as a result of the two factors already mentioned Felipe González remained as the indisputable and hegemonic socialist leader since his election in 1974. On the other hand, AP’s leader Manuel Fraga gave special importance to the first factor, that is, the hope to place all the right wing around his party. This led to two temporary resignations and to an important renewal in the party’s leadership as an attempt to articulate AP’s political option. Finally, there is a strong leadership personality in both parties affecting the inner as much as the outer party. In PSOE this role is positive both internally and externally15. In AP the leader’s role is positive in order to keep the party together but negative in relation to the second factor16. In both parties, the leader’s influence imposes itself on the selection method17. Also in both of them, the two models described above are exactly followed. That is, in spite of his party’s instability, Manuel Fraga keeps his leadership in AP whereas Felipe González has a stable leadership in the PSOE. Thus far we have analyzed the external factors that affect the political parties, or the influences they receive from the political system where they operate. Let us now analyze the internal method to select and elect leaders in those parties, although we’ll have to bear in mind that some of the questions asked in this Working Paper do not have an easy answer, mainly because of the short period it covers. Selection Methods We will basically talk about formal selection mechanisms; nevertheless we think it would be interesting to complete this research in the future by determining the importance of the political party’s elite. There is usually a tendency to identify the party with its leadership and even with its national top man: this is also the position we take in our study. We will point out the importance of the horizontal dividing lines, the intermediate elites18 and their role in relation to the renewal of the governing bodies: we will bear in mind that they could be leaders in the future. In the Spanish situation, the parties’ crises (1978-79) and especially the change in their structure and dynamics since 1982 influence the renewal of the elite. The importance of mechanisms and formal selection procedures is conditioned by the role the PSOE plays in the political system. In AP, the strategy to develop the organization and coalition re-foundation processes caused two temporary resignations of its leader and a high degree of renewal within the party elite. The predominance of PSOE in elected positions and the employment of its members in large areas of government and public administration helped to decrease the tensions within the party. It also influenced the composition and renewal process of the party’s elite (ministers, presidents of autonomous governments, etc.) in the Federal Committee Commission. SELECTION METHODS USED IN PSOE After the Civil War, Indalecio Prieto, a historic Spanish socialist leader, first led PSOE followed by Rodolfo Llopis from 1944 to 1972. But there would be a progressive alienation between the socialist party in exile and the members of the party who lived in Spain, due to the differences in their respective views and analyses of Spanish politics. The final party break up took place during the 12th Party Conference held in Toulouse in 1972. The in-country members succeeded in turning the General Secretariat into an executive body, the first step in promoting Felipe González as party leader. This was finally achieved at the 13th Conference held in Suresnes in 1974 when the in-country members imposed themselves on the members in exile and obtained the control of the party’s leadership. Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra stated in their book: “in fact, the call for the celebration of the 12th Conference in 1972 was not carried out legally as it was not announced by the right person (Rodolfo Llopis, the party’s Secretary General) but by Nicolás Redondo, who was not entitled to do so.” It was a successful «coup d’état» in the party’s organization. The «orthodox» Conference took place in December of the same year, this one summoned by Llopis. So it is difficult to determine who divided PSOE, the renewed or the «historic» leaders. The latter had legality on their side, but the former ones won19. Rodolfo Llopis and his section never acknowledged the legality of that Conference nor accepted its resolutions. Finally, the International Socialist brought the discussion to an end by recognizing the «renewed» PSOE as the unique and legitimate representative of PSOE’s name. The dictator’s physical death in 1975 and the transition process towards a democratic system would open different ways to undertake the future within the fragmented Spanish socialism. PSOE tried to attract under its name the various existing socialist parties, the most important of which was the «Partido Socialista Popular», led by Enrique Tierno Galván. Two parallel processes began at a time: on the one hand the integration within the PSOE of a series of regional and provincial parties, with the exception of the Catalan socialists who organized themselves in the «Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE)» in 1978, becoming a legally independent party (although linked to PSOE). On the other hand, the creation of the «Federación de Partidos Socialistas», an electoral federation of socialist parties led by PSP. The results of the first election of 1977 brought about the merge of PSP and its federation of parties into PSOE in 1978. Through these processes, PSOE was able to organize its political area by integrating all the potential contending parties. Since he achieved power in the party, the figure of Felipe González as the leader has never been disputed, neither domestically nor abroad. Not even when he left the Secretariat in the 1979 crisis was there a real possibility that he would not be reelected in that same year’s Extraordinary Conference. A party ideological issue caused the crisis: Felipe González did not agree with the decision to maintain Marxism as the party emblem and decided to resign. But his succession was not clear, as none of the party leaders who supported the option of maintaining Marxism in the program wanted to take over the Secretariat. The 28th Conference and the Extraordinary Conference held in 1979 represented the «BadGodesberg» for Spanish socialism. After the failure in the 1979 general elections, internal and external party bases were established to make access to Government possible. Since 1976, the election of the General Secretary takes place in a Conference where the Federal Executive Committee and a part of the Federal Committee (the most important governing body between conferences) are elected. The delegates attending the Conference are representatives elected in the Federations’ Conferences (art. 3 of the party statutes). The election of the governing bodies takes place through the vote of each delegation’s spokesperson weighted by the members of each federation. Thus the largest federation can control the adopted resolutions. Table The internal representation of delegates in the conferences has changed throughout the years. We cannot say they represent the party membership but the politically active members20, the so-called «inner-circle» of the party. Conference delegates could be considered as a «snapshot» of the party, but their profile has changed, with an ever-increasing presence of members holding public elected offices. To a certain extent, this is logical, as PSOE has won central Government, the presidency of twelve «Autonomous Communities», and the most important city councils -the number of socialist councilors being 24,000. From the outside, Felipe González’s leadership is seen as «the electoral engine»21 that has dragged the party’s machinery to Government. In a country where mass media are centered on television, his leadership role has been very important to get such good electoral results. We can say that the leader’s influence displaces the selection process. According to Schonfeld22 we could define González’s figure as that of the «monocratic leader». The stability within the party since 1979 and the good electoral results make him an indisputable leader. The potential tensions within the party, like the Conference debate on the integration in NATO and the following referendum, have been absorbed through the acknowledgement of different currents of opinion within the party. The conflict with the socialist trade union, «Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)», led by Nicolás Redondo, is the only uncertainty: it is difficult to know how it is going to affect the party, the electorate and PSOE’s leadership. SELECTION METHODS USED IN AP The idea and foundation of AP in October 1976 was the consequence of the selection process of an executive leadership conceived by a section of the Francoist political elite. This section decided to start a political convergence platform in the context of the «pre-party system»23 created in Spain just after Franco’s death. Five months later, the supporters of all those groups24 approved this executive committee during the 1st AP Conference. From that moment onwards, members do the selection in the party conferences that normally take place once a year in accordance with the party statutes. The composition, distribution and nomination of delegates vary throughout the period studied here25: they change from non-fully structured patterns and methods to a progressive structuring of procedures. The selection NOTES (1) CACIAGLI,M.: Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1986, pp. 9 and ss. (2) LINZ,J and MONTERO,J.R. (eds): Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid (C.E.C.), 1986, pp. 27-71. GUNTHER,R. et alii: Sistema de partidos en España: génesis y evolución. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1986. (3) VALLES,J.M. in CACIAGLI and CORBETTA: Elezioni regionali e sistema politico nazionale. Milano (Il Mulino), 1987, pp. 97-131. CACIAGLI: Op. cit, pp. 122-187. (4) MURILLO FERROL,F.: "Dificultades" in Rev Dpto. Dcho. Político, n.6, 1980, p.8. (5) COTARELO,R.: Los partidos políticos. Madrid (Sistema), 1985, pp. 87-131. (6) AGULA,R. and MONTERO,J.R.: El discurso político de la transición española. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1984, p. 221. (7) The membership of both PSOE and AP is about 200.000. The percentage of affiliation to trade unions is between 10% and 15% of the active population. Electoral participation was of 80% in the two general elections (1977 and 1982), 70% in the others (1979 and 1986) and lower in local and regional elections. (8) As of January 1989, 28 electoral processes have taken place since the beginning of the political transition: 3 national and 5 regional referenda; four national, three local and one election to the European Parliament. The rest were regional elections. (9) MONTERO, J.R. "Partidos y participación política algunas notas sobre la afiliación política en la etapa inicial de la transición política". Revista de Estudios Políticos, n.23, 1981, pp. 33-73. SANI, in LINZ-MONTERO: Op.cit. pp. 27-71. LOPEZ GUERRA, L.: "Sobre la evolución de las campañas electorales y la decadencia de los partidos de masas". Revista Española Opinión Pública, n.45, 1976, pp. 91-110. (10) A.Suárez left the presidency of the Government and that of UCD in January 1981. Some days later, A. Rodríguez Sahagún was elected president of the party in the second and last conference of the coalition. The candidate for president of the Government was Calvo Sotelo. Several months after his election, part of the party's leadership left and moved to other parties. Herrero de Miñón went to AP; the current Foreign Affairs Minister, Fernández Ordóñez, to PSOE. Others created new parties, like the Christian Democrats who joined AP before the 1982 general elections. Landelino Lavilla took on UCD's presidency in February 1982, but the party had already broken up and the elections proved it was dead. See also CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit.pp.233-278. (11) Several crises that started in 1979 are still alive nowadays. After the conference in 1979, three leaders went through the party's presidency and the party split in two other communist parties. Before the 1986 general elections the PCE created a coalition -Izquierda Unidathat aimed to gather, in addition to other politicians, some of the communists that had left the party. See also GUNTHER, R et alii: Op.cit. pp. 80 ss. (12) AP was founded as a coalition of seven Francoist politicians in September 1976 and broke up two years later during the debates on the democratic Constitution. Since then, Manuel Fraga has carried on with AP through different coalitions with small right and center-right wing parties (Coalición Democrática just before the 1979 elections; Coalición Popular before the 1982). Two months ago, AP changed its name for "Partido Popular" at the time some UCD former leaders and some Christian Democrat politicians joined the party. See also LOPEZ NIETO, L.: AP: estructura y evolución electoral de un partido conservador. 1976-1982. Madrid (C.I.S.), 1988. and COTARELO,R.- LOPE NIETO,L.: "Spanish conservatism, 1976-1987" in R.E.P., v.II n.2, pp. 80-95. (13) Several socialist candidacies participated in the first general election (1977): PSOE, as a coalition of small regional socialist parties; PSP (whose leader was Tierno Galván and which obtained six seats), party that merged with PSOE in 1978: and the "Alianza Socialista Democrática", integrated by the historic socialists that had rejected F.González´s leadership after the 1973 party conference held in Southern France. See also GUNTHER,R. et alii: Op.cit. pp. 180 ss. (14) At the PSOE conference in 1979, an "ad hoc" commission was elected to prepare an extraordinary conference that was held six months later, and in which F. González was reelected and succeeded in his wish to give up the Marxist principles. See also CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit. pp. 184 ss. (15) CACIAGLI, M.: Op.cit. pp. 191 ss. (16) MONTERO in LINZ-MONTERO: Op.cit. pp. 345-433. (17) SCHONFELD, W.: "La stabilité des dirigeants des parties politiques" in Revue Française Sciences Politiques n. 3, 1980, pp477-505. and Revue Française Sciences Politiques n.4, 1980, pp. 846-866. BLONDEL, J.: Political leadership. London (Sage), 1987, pp. 78 ss. (18) BOTELLA, J.: Las élites intermedias de los partidos españoles: una década de cambio. Mimeografiado, Barcelona, 1988. (19) DE ESTEBAN, J. and LOPEZ GUERRA, L.: Los partidos políticos en la España actual, Barcelona (Planeta), 1982, pp. 115-116. (20) DUVERGER, M.: Los partidos políticos, México (FCE), 1981. PITARCH, I.E. et alii, Partits i parlamentaris a la Catalunya d´avui, 1977-1979, Barcelona (Ed.62), 1980, p. 164: To what degree would "delegates” represent the members of the party: - That only, or preferably those more worthy, more acknowledged or who are former members of the party would be elected as delegates; - That, needing a party conference a quite intense dedication for at least some days, some persons whose availability is limited (older members, housewives, etc.) would have less chances of being elected; - That the prevailing cultural and social values would somehow influence the choice of delegates. Maybe some of these reasons would go against women's presence or in favor of a greater representation of those persons with a higher cultural level. - We must not exclude that political parties, in their aim to create a certain "image" among public opinion, promote and encourage a major presence of certain sections or groups." CAYROL, R. and YSMAL, C.: "Les militants du PS, originalité et diversité" in Projet n.165, 1982, pp.572-586: "Les congrès des partis politiques constituent une instance particulièrement significative pour qui s'intéresse à la sociologie du militantisme. Ils rassemblent, en effet, en un moment solémnisé par la culture politique de l'organisation, tous les animateurs du parti, considéré à ses cadres intermédiaires et représentants actifs de la basse, qui tiennent à participer à ce "temps fort" de la vie de leur formation politique, où l'on définit la ligne du parti pour les mois et les années à venir, où l'on désigne la nouvelle direction, où l'on dessine le visage du parti pour l'extérieur et pour les médias." (p. 572). TEZANOS, J.F.: "Radiografía de los congresos. Una aportación al estudio sociológico de los cuadros políticos del socialismo español" in Sistema n.35, 1980, pp. 79-99. TEZANOS, J.F.: "Estructura y dinámica de la afiliación socialista en España" in Revista Estudios Políticos n.23, 1981, pp. 117-152. (21) CACIAGLI, M.: Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid (CIS), 1986. (22) LINZ, J. and MONTERO, J.R. (eds): Crisis y cambios: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid (CEC), 1986, p. 343: "We must consider the fact that the post-Francoist Spain constitutes one of the first cases (at least in the "first world") where the establishment of the party system took place after television conquered the mass-media market, having been able to shape the new mechanisms of political propaganda and electoral campaigns". GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: El sistema de partidos políticos en España. Génesis y evolución. Madrid (CIS), 1986. (23) Coalition practices were initiated in Spain by the PCE under Franco's Regime with the promotion of the "Junta Democrática", a political platform that included politicians and opposition groups. Later, PSOE promoted the "Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática". Both groups merged into one in early 1976, organizing the most important events for political change. AP was founded in September 1976, as a coalition of leading or former leading Francoist politicians representing different groups within the "Principles of the Movimiento (the single party)" which were mainly integrated by civil servants and members of the official trade union. Manuel Fraga was AP´s leader from the beginning. (24) The first Conference of AP, where M. Fraga was elected as the General Secretary of "Partido Unido de A.P.,” was held in March 1977. "Some of the seven original groups that joined "PUAP" kept a federative relation; from the beginning, this party established flexible forms of admission of different politicians and small groups. (25) The selection of delegates to the first three conferences (1977, 1978 and 1979) did not follow established rules. Later, the selection was made by the territorial organizations. In the last three conferences, the headquarter office has established a great control of the process or delegates' selection, centralizing in Madrid both the affiliation and the quota payment files. The number of delegates has always been about two thousand even though membership has varied from 10,000 to 20,000. (26) Data on this and following references mainly come from different official and internal documents of the party. The total of delegates was 2,837. Characteristics: 12% were women; only 12% were nominated – non -electeddelegates; 75% belonged to the party since before 1983. There was an important representation of "Nuevas Generaciones," the party youth organization that maybe explains that 28% of delegates belonged to the age group between 18 and 30 and that 14% were students, 21% had a liberal arts profession and 14% were in trade and industry. (27) A. Hernández Mancha, a civil servant, started his political career in 1978 as a provincial president of AP, later becoming a regional president, member of a regional parliament and senator. At the Conference he was supported and voted by "Nuevas Generaciones" and the biggest regional organizations, obtaining 1,930 votes against the 729 of his rival. (28) Herrero de Miñón transfered to AP´s parliamentary group in January 1982 and nine months later he was elected within AP´s candidacy. His strong position within the parliamentary group opened his way into the party's leadership, becoming AP´s vice-president two years later. (29) He got 27% of votes coming from different residual groups of the party: historical members, Francoists, members of Parliament and just a few territorial organizations. (30) AP suffered its first electoral defeat in 1977. Its leaders, especially Fraga, tried to create a strong structure and when the anti-system group was forced out by the end of 1978 Fraga promoted a new electoral coalition with some center-right leaders. A new defeat in 1979 provoked Fraga´s departure just for six months as he was reelected as AP´s president in the third conference (December 1979) in spite of internal disputes between the elected delegates and the party organization. (31) In October 1981 AP won the regional elections in Galicia and profited from UCD´s crisis in the general elections of 1982, ranking second with 26% of votes. AP obtained 3.5% of the city councilors in the first local elections and a third of them in the next two, which is about the same percentage it got in four elections to regional governments. (32) The statutes approved at the conference in January 1989 established that all the members of the European Parliament belong to the "Junta Directiva Nacional (JDN)" and the affiliated presidents of regional governments were included in the presidential list. In 1984, a year after the local elections in which AP got a third of the councilors and mayors, a representation of the principal city mayors and members of regional parliaments was established in the JDN. In fact, although by different ways (designated by the president without election, etc.), the percentage of elected representatives is very high in most of the directive bodies. (33) Throughout these years the percentage of non-elected delegates (being members of European, national or regional Parliaments or councilors) has varied. The lowest rate was of 2.5% in the 8th Conference (in which, moreover, the executive committee was elected in an open list) where Fraga got 78% of the votes. In the other eight conferences the percentage of non-elected delegates was higher, about 15%, and the executive committee was elected from a closed list led by the president.