Nationalism and intellectuals in nations without states : the catalan case

Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: the Catalan Case Montserrat Guibernau The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA WP núm. 222 Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials Barcelona, 2003 2 The Institute of Political and Social Sciences (ICPS) is a consortium created in 1988 by the Barcelona Provincial Council and the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the institution to which the ICPS is officially linked for academic purposes. “Working Papers” is one of the collections published by the ICPS, specialising in the publication of work currently being undertaken by social researchers –in the author’s original language– with the aim of facilitating their subsequent scientific debate. Inclusion of work within this collection does not prohibit its future publication by the author, who maintains full rights over the article. The work in question cannot be reproduced without the permission of the author. Publication: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) Mallorca, 244, pral. 08008 Barcelona (España) http://www.icps.es © Montserrat Guibernau Design: Toni Viaplana Printer: a.bís Travessera de les Corts, 251, entr. 4a. 08014 Barcelona ISSN: 1133-8962 DL: B-32.373-03 3 Abstract The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in Western nations without states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975). The paper is divided into three parts. To begin with, the first part sets up a theoretical framework which includes a definition of the concepts of nation, state and nationalism and also introduces the concept of nations without states. It then establishes a distinction between “state nationalism” and nationalism in “nations without states”. The second part analyses the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in the work of Elie Kedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith. The third part considers the specific context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. It concentrates on the study of the role of Catalan intellectuals in protecting their vernacular language and culture during Franco's regime together with the processes which, in the 1960s and 1970s, turned Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement. Particular attention is given to the cultural resistance activities carried out by Catalan intellectuals during this period, the reasons why some intellectuals may feel attracted to nationalism, and the rational and emotional arguments employed by intellectuals as mobilizing agents. Part One Introduction: What are nations without states? A basic conceptual distinction between nation, state and nationalism has to be made. By “state”, taking Weber's definition, I refer to “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991, p. 4 78), although not all states have successfully accomplished this, and some of them have not even aspired to accomplish it. By “nation” I refer to a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. Thus, in my view, the “nation” includes five dimensions: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical. By offering this definition, I distinguish the term nation from both the state and the nation-state, and I shall be using this distinction later when considering what I call “nations without states”. By “nationalism” I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny. But still another term needs to be defined and distinguished from the ones I have just mentioned: the nation-state. The nation-state is a modern phenomenon which emerged around the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century. Its characterised by the formation of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means of homogenisation, creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them. The distinctive character of this paper derives from its aim to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in “nations without states”. By “nations without states” I refer to nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves (Guibernau, 1999). At present, most thriving nationalist movements in Western nations without states emerge within nations which once enjoyed a separate political and/or cultural identity which is now being invoked, 5 revitalized and adapted to the new socio-political circumstances in which the nation lives and evolves Self-determination is sometimes understood as political autonomy, in other cases it stops short of independence and often involves the right to secede. Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flanders represent but a few nations without states currently demanding further autonomy. It could be argued that some of these nations already have some kind of state of their own since a substantial number of powers have been devolved to their regional parliaments. But political autonomy or even federation differ substantially from independence since they tend to exclude foreign and economic policy, defence and constitutional matters, and this is why it continues to make sense to refer to them as “nations without states”. I argue that a specific distinction between “state nationalism” and nationalism in “nations without states” is necessary in order to understand some of the key specific features of nationalism in both cases. It should be stressed that what distinguishes both types of nationalism has nothing to do with issuing a value judgement and claiming that one type of nationalism is “good” while the other is “bad, one is “ethnic” and the other “civic”. Rather the two fundamental differences between “state nationalism” and nationalism in “nations without states” concern their different access to power and resources, and the fact that while the former seeks to consolidate and strengthen the state, the latter challenges its legitimacy and often, but not always, seeks to construct a new state. When considering the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism, I shall be following Smith's definition of intellectuals as those who create artistic works and produce ideas. In so doing I distinguishing them from the “wider intelligentsia or professionals who transmit and disseminate those ideas and creations and form a still wider educated public that ‘consumes’ ideas and works of art” (Smith 1991, p. 93), although in practice, the same individual may fulfil all these different roles. Before turning to the specific study of the task of intellectuals in 6 nations without states, this paper reviews the theories of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith since they all have devoted some sections of their work to the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and intellectuals. But it should be stressed that their theories do not address the specific role of intellectuals in nations without states. On the contrary, they neglect the need to establish a clear-cut distinction between those intellectuals operating within the nation-state and contributing to create “state nationalism”, and those evolving within nations lacking a state of their own. An exception to this is represented by Kedourie's analysis of intellectuals in colonial societies. Part Two Intellectuals and nationalism Elie Kedourie: On “marginal men” “ ... I began to rebel against the glory I could not be associated with” (Quoted by Kedourie in Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p. 88) Kedourie sustains an hostile attitude towards nationalism and defines it as a sort of politics which is not concerned with reality, rather “its solitary object is an inner world and its end is the abolition of all politics” (Kedourie 1986, p. 85). He sees nationalism as a disease which originated in the West and then spread to other parts of the world. In his view, intellectuals are to be blamed for the generation of a doctrine based on the assumption that nations are obvious and natural divisions of the human race as history, anthropology and linguistics prove. According to Kedourie, alienated and restless intellectuals marginalized from politics under the impact of Enlightenment rationalism turned to Romanticism and generated nationalism as a doctrine that would have the capacity to grant them a major role within society1. He is extremely critical of Romantic intellectuals such as Herder or Fichte and 7 fully identifies nationalism with Romanticism. Kedourie focuses on the role of intellectuals in colonial societies. He describes how some Western educated indigenous people became completely alienated from their traditional societies and identified with the culture and manners of the colonizers only to discover that indigenous elites were excluded from positions of honour and responsibility reserved for the white colonizers. He writes, an Indian could be admitted to the civil service only if he had become so completely Europeanized as to be really and practically on the footing and imbued with the character of an English highly educated gentleman. But it did not prove to be the case that an Indian who had become “imbued” with such a character would be easily or automatically treated like an English gentleman (Kedourie 1971, p. 84). In fact, what Kedourie writes about indigenous elites in colonial societies is highly relevant to the analysis of some indigenous elites in nations without states, specially where some specific regional affiliation acts as a barrier for promotion within the state's socio-political and economic structure. One of the main objections to Kedourie's theory is that it fails to account for the nationalism defended and generated by “official” intellectuals who already have secured honour and status within the state. In doing so he ignores the nationalism espoused by the colonizers which included their own intellectuals and political leaders. It could be argued that the colonizers' nationalism was to be blamed for the exclusion experienced by indigenous elites who, in spite of being culturally homogenized and integrated, were never viewed as “belonging” to the colonizer's nation. Kedourie's theory presumes a wide gap between active intellectual elites and inert and disoriented masses. In his view, the only way to persuade the people to support the nationalist movement is through propaganda an control over education. To mobilize the people, elites must “appeal to the indigenous beliefs and practices, invoke the dark gods and their rites, and transform purely religious motifs and figures into political 8 and national symbols and heroes –which is all part of the ‘ethnicization’ and nationalization of previously universal and transhistorical religions” (Smith 1998, p. 113). Kedourie concedes that an elite of intellectuals captures the main injustices endured by the mass of the population and constructs a nationalist doctrine whose aim is to eliminate the unjust situation shared by all those belonging to the same nation, thus uniting elites and masses under a single banner. But, for him, the objective of these fanatical intellectuals goes well beyond the wish to end the unjust situation that their fellow country men and women are enduring. The intellectuals' objective is to gain power in society and halt their alienation and exclusion from positions of honour and privilege. Tom Nairn: The people's mobilizers “The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood” (The Break-Up of Britain, p. 340) Nairn approaches the study of nationalism from a Marxist perspective. He considers nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon which can be derived from the class consequences of the uneven diffusion of capitalism (Nairn 1977, p. 98-99). Nationalism generates and, at the same time, requires the exploitation of peripheries whose deprived elites have no alternative but to turn to the masses and engage them in the nationalist project. In this context, nationalism's main objective is to fight against a concrete form of “progress” promoted by the colonial capitalist while at the same time embracing a distinctive idea of progress generated by the intellectuals capable of leading their struggle against capitalist oppression (Nairn 1977, p. 339). Nairn explains the emergence of nationalism in deprived areas as a reaction against the uneven spread of capitalism. But he also 9 acknowledges the existence of some exceptions to the connection he establishes between nationalism, backwardness and periphery. To mobilize the masses and gain their support for the nationalist cause, the new intellectual elites have to work towards the construction of a “militant inter-class community” sharing a common identity even if, as Nairn stresses, they only share this identity in a mythical way. Nairn, as well as Hroch and Peter Worsley, envisages a chronological progression in the spread of nationalism from elite into mass involvement. In Nairn's theory, the support of the masses is crucial if a nationalist movement is to succeed. But, what are the implications of turning to the people? He points at three main implications: (1) speaking their language; (2) taking a more kind view of their general “culture” which had been relegated by the Enlightenment and (3) coming to terms with the enormous and still irreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life (Nairn 1977, p. 101). John Breuilly: The creators of ideology “Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society” (Nationalism and the State, p. 349) Breuilly understands nationalism as a form of politics, principally opposition politics. In his view, “the term ‘nationalism’ is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1982, p. 3). Breuilly, in line with Kedourie and Nairn, stresses the ability of nationalism to attain mass support and confers a pre-eminent role to intellectuals and members of the professions as key figures in the construction of nationalist ideologies. But, according to him “nationalism cannot be seen as the politics of any particular social class...[and] neither 16 is the existence and position occupied by the “potential elite”. By this I refer to those educated individuals who, if the nationalist movement succeeds, are likely to become its leaders. The potential elite includes: (a) Individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state's treatment of their community. The degree and strength of their dissatisfaction may vary. In some cases, it is connected to the intensity of the state's repressive and discriminatory measures which may range from cultural and socio-political measures to the use of force. Catalan intellectuals who engaged in resistance activities against Franco's regime are a case in point. (b) Individuals who have been excluded from the state's “official” elite because of their regional origin. In such cases, individuals are unable to develop their work within the state's circles of power and influence, and have to circumscribe their activities to their region. This could be exemplified by the widespread Castilian adverse attitude towards Catalans which lead to their exclusion from influential positions in the Spanish economic and political power structure during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. (c) Individuals who decide to prioritize their allegiance to the nation without state instead of aspiring to be integrated within the state's official elite. This involves their commitment to the advancement of a national cause opposed to that of the state, which often translates itself into their automatic exclusion from the state's selected elite. In these cases, it is the individual's choice rather than the state's systematic exclusion of some people because of their regional origin which leads to the inclusion of these individuals in the category of potential elite. In contemporary democratic Spain, the choice of some Catalan intellectuals to develop their work exclusively in Catalan automatically excludes them from Spanish speaking intellectual circles, unless their work is translated into Spanish. It has been argued that this is a strategy by means of which some educated people who would otherwise be unlikely to achieve a prominent position within the state's elite –because of fierce competition– would easily obtain a prominent position within a nation which is smaller and where competition 17 is bound to be less intense. This argument emphasizes the self-interest of some individuals in promoting regional forms of nationalism in order to gain access to privileged positions. In my view, although self-interest may in some cases play a substantial part in explaining why some intellectuals support sub-state forms of nationalism, it is misleading to explain all nationalist allegiances through economic motivation and the desire for power. A genuine love for the nation and a desire for its flourishing inspires many nationalists in nations without states, especially in those cases where the nation feels culturally, politically or economically oppressed by the state. Devoting one's life to the defence and enhancement of the specific character of one's own nation may act as a potent force. It provides meaning to the individual's life whilst setting a concrete and clear-cut objective to his or her actions. Because individuals usually embark upon nationalist projects as part of a group, they are bound to experience some kind of moral support and solidarity as members of a movement with a common goal. The sense of belonging to a nation can somehow be lived through the experience of comradeship arising within the nationalist movement or party. In spite of this, differences amongst nationalist leaders are not to be ignored since fierce confrontation between them is a common phenomenon. Jealousy and competition amongst intellectuals are also commonplace. They struggle to become more influential, obtain more recognition or be offered a better job. Intellectuals and nationalism in Catalonia. Cultural resistance During Franco's regime, the Catalan intellectual elite was divided between those who supported Francoism and those who stood against it and took upon themselves the task of maintaining the vernacular language and culture. Yet, while some of the former were incorporated into mainstream Spanish elite, the latter were automatically excluded and often 18 persecuted by the regime. When considering the initiatives to preserve Catalan culture and language, which rose during that period we should distinguish between: initiatives rising from particular individuals and groups, and those emerging from some sectors of two powerful institutions: the Catholic Church and the University. Individual and collective initiatives The Institute for Catalan Studies (Institut d'Estudis Catalans), dismantled in 1939, was reorganized in 1942 by Josep Puig i Cadafalch and Ramon Aramon. Their clandestine activities involved the publication of books and articles on medicine, science and other subjects in Catalan. Omnium cultural, a semi-clandestine institution from 1964, was legally recognized in 1967 and then saw a dramatic increase in membership (from 639 in 1968 to 11,000 in 1971). Among the activities of Omnium Cultural were the teaching of Catalan and the sponsoring of the Prize of Honour of the Catalan Letters (Premi d'honor de les lletres catalanes) (Vilar 1989, p. 358). The organization of cultural clandestine groups such as Amics de la Poesia, Estudi or Miramar, together with the holding of Literary competitions such as the Nit de Santa Llúcia (St. Lucy's evening) and the Cantonigrós, and the publication of journals in Catalan (Fabré, Huertas and Ribas 1978, pp. 156 ff), were some of the major activities organized by intellectual elites (Casassas, 1999). The Catholic Church Further to the activities of private individuals, the Catholic Church and the University contributed to sustain Catalan culture. The position of the Catalan Church was not homogeneous. Thus, while some sectors supported the Francoist regime, others were reluctant to adopt an attitude that could undermine the strong relationship between religion and Catalan culture sustained since the Middle Ages. Some sectors of the Catholic Church assumed a crucial role by preaching and teaching religion in Catalan and employing it as an instrument of culture and communication. 19 In 1942, the first book legally published in Catalan after the Civil War appeared. It was a religious book produced under the auspices of the Catholic Church. Amid other activities, the Abbey of Montserrat played a remarkable part in continuing to publish in Catalan. They created and promoted, among others, some children's publications (L'Infantil, Tretzevents) and some cultural and religious journals (Serra d'Or, Qüestions de vida cristiana). In 1958, the Abbey founded the Estela Press to promote religious books in Catalan (Masot i Muntaner, 1986) and in 1971 the PAM Press (Publications of the Montserrat's Abbey) became official (Faulí 1999, p. 35-39). The Abbey was also active in providing shelter to intellectuals and clandestine political activists from a wide political spectrum. The University The official organization of student life centred around the University Students Union (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitarios or SEU) under the control of pro-regime individuals, however, constant resistance activities developed within the university. The University Front of Catalonia (Front Universitari de Catalunya or FUC) combined people from different backgrounds. It advocated the reconstruction of Catalonia and produced a critical account of pre-war Catalan politics. Other university organizations included the National Front of Catalonia (Front Nacional de Catalunya or FNC), and the National Federation of Students of Catalonia (Federació Nacional d'Estudiants de Catalunya or FNEC) which represented an attempt to unify efforts in fighting the SEU. The university movement received new strength in the mid and late 1950s when new associations emerged. Three major campaigns were launched by the students between 1960 and 1961: the demand for the creation of Catalan culture and language Departments; a campaign against the increasing influence of Opus Dei; and the demand of amnesty for political prisoners and those in exile. In the late sixties and early seventies, the influence of the 1968 20 student uprisings in France and the “Prague Spring” favoured the proliferation of radical organizations within the university, and nationalist claims came to be perceived as bourgeois. Nationalist groups disappeared from the university arena to return only after Franco's death. From elite into mass movement Three main phenomena marked the transition of Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement, these are: the Nova Cançó, the Assembly of Catalonia and the proliferation of “solidarity actions”. The long years of repression endured by Catalans resulted in a widening gap between intellectual elites and the masses and such a gap posed a serious threat to the survival of the Catalan language and culture. The Nova Cançó (New Folk Song) movement of the sixties played a key role in the regeneration of the public sphere in Catalonia. The movement was founded by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singers and soon developed into an entirely popular phenomenon. The more Catalan singers were banned from the media and their concerts prohibited, the more popular they became. The Nova Cançó contributed to “give people –especially young people– all over the Països Catalans, or Catalan-speaking territories, a sense of community till then never felt nor expressed so intensely” (Giner 1998, p. 71-76). The Assembly of Catalonia (Assemblea de Catalunya, 1971) brought together three hundred people from diverse social backgrounds and political allegiances. It was the most important clandestine unitary movement in Catalonia since the Civil War and had no equivalent in any other part of Spain. The Assembly presented a common platform based upon four demands: (1) a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles; (2) the upholding of human rights; (3) the provisional reestablishment of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and; (4) the coordination of all peninsular peoples in fighting for democracy (Batista and Playà Maset 1991, pp. 301-302). The Assembly continued its unitary 21 mobilizing activities until the first Spanish democratic elections (15 June 1977). From that moment onwards, the recently legalized political parties took over leadership and concentrated on emphasizing difference between them in order to obtain good results in regional and national elections. Intellectual unity was definitely broken and differing nationalist discourses emerged. While remaining a dictatorship wedded to conservative ideology, the Francoist regime went through different stages as a number of its policies were certainly modified over time. These modifications were a response to pressures to become more acceptable to Western democracies and were reinforced by deepening technocratic influences upon the regime during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In addition, free market ideals fundamentally transformed the structure of the Spanish economy with unintended consequences on Spanish society and social structure. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the resistance movement took advantage of all possible breaches to actively protest against the regime. For instance, the early 1970s saw an increase in the number of “solidarity actions”. By “solidarity action” I mean an action that is usually instilled by a small elite but whose aim is to attain mass mobilization. The objective of a “solidarity action” is to show the opposition's strength by focusing upon a particular demand and presenting it as undeniable due to the massive support it receives (Guibernau 1996, p. 105). A “solidarity action” which exemplifies the moment in which Catalan nationalism had definitely shifted from an elite into a mass movement concerns the one million strong mass demonstration in Barcelona on 11 September 1977 demanding a statute of autonomy for Catalonia. Franco had died in 1975 and the Political Reform Programme presented by the then Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, had been ratified by an overwhelming majority. In spite of that, the status that Catalonia might achieve within the new democratic Spanish state had not been decided yet. The Constitution that would define Spain as a democratic state and confer autonomy to Catalonia was to be ratified in 22 1978. Rational and emotional arguments as mobilizing agents Rational and emotional arguments become intertwined when intellectuals seek to awaken the nation and generate a mass nationalist movement. Rationality stems from the objective reasons invoked by nationalists when defending their case. Independence or greater autonomy may mean: a better economy by encouraging regional development and the right to retain regionally generated wealth; a higher quality of life; freedom from a series of constraints imposed by the state and; even a deepening of democracy by favouring decentralization and selfdetermination. Emotions are aroused when the nation is presented as a community which transcends the limited lives of particular individuals while providing them with a collective sense of identity. Belonging to a nation, which is real in the minds of its members, confers them a sense of continuity grounded upon the sentiment of being part of a group portrayed as an extended family. Individuals are born into particular families in the same way as they are placed within specific nations which act as major socializing agents. Individuals are brought up within particular cultures which define the way in which they relate to themselves, others and nature. The use of a particular language increases the sentiment of belonging to a community sharing a common history and a common set of values and practices. As in a family, membership of the nation implies a certain solidarity, in this case, with fellow nationals. It also demands sacrifices and generates sentiments of love and affection which generally become more prominent when the well being of the group in under threat. Rational arguments in contemporary Catalan nationalism Rational and emotional arguments have a strong presence in Catalan nationalism which is currently split between a majority movement for greater political autonomy within Spain, and a minority movement for 23 Catalan independence. During Franco's regime, the key objective was to restore democracy and with it the right of Catalonia to develop its language and culture, and recover its autonomous political institutions. These were rational demands capable of arousing intense emotional reactions. In this section I examine some of the arguments which are currently being invoked by Catalan nationalists, including intellectuals as well as political leaders, to legitimize their demands for further autonomy for Catalonia some twenty years after the restoration of its autonomous government (Generalitat). In their view, Catalonia should enjoy increasing levels of self-government, be granted a fiscal regime balancing out regional inequalities and be recognized as a nation within Spain with the means to develop fully its distinct identity. Certain Catalan nationalists argue that only through independence can Catalonia thrive culturally and economically and thereby find itself considered a fully fledged political actor in the international arena. I distinguish three main rational arguments destined to convince not only those who share a strong sense of national identity but also those who are solely interested in supporting Catalan nationalism in so far as it proves capable of improving their quality of life, deepening democracy and/or dynamising civil society. First, the argument that Catalonia's contribution to the Spanish coffers heavily outweighs the income it receives from the central government. This is presented as an unjust situation which, if reversed, would automatically increase the Generalitat's spending power and improve the Catalans' quality of life. Second, the argument that political decentralization tends to strengthen democracy in as much as it brings decision-making processes closer to the people. Problems are identified, analysed and resolved where they emerge. Regional politicians usually have greater awareness of the needs and aspirations of their electorates, thus the argument follows, greater devolved powers for Catalonia would strengthen Spanish democracy and encourage greater democratic participation within the 24 region. Third, the devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the re-allocation of resources to facilitate discrete policies and regional budget planning. These processes, in turn, contribute to revitalize civil society, encouraging local and regional initiatives which include cultural, economic and social projects. The demand for greater autonomy is connected with the wish to increase Catalonia's ability and efficiency to govern itself and be recognized as a distinct political actor within the European Union and other international institutions. Emotional arguments in contemporary Catalan nationalism In Catalan nationalism, emotional arguments emphasize the sentiment of belonging to a cultural and territorial community which has suffered and rejoiced together throughout time. Emotional arguments evolve around three major clusters: history, territory and art. First, a considerable number of people who suffered under Francoism still hold live images of either their own or their loved one's experiences which may include: torture, imprisonment, exile, proscription, and lack of freedom to cultivate their vernacular language and culture. Memories of oppression under Franco are connected with a long list of grievances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to eradicate Catalan language, culture and political institutions. Key historical events, invested with particular meaning and capable of arousing an emotional response when Catalans “tell their history” include: The Revolt of the Reapers (Revolta dels Segadors) in 1640, when Catalans united against the harsh treatment they were receiving from Castile (Elliott, 1963) and, the abolition of Catalan rights and liberties in 1714 when on 11 September (turned into Catalonia's national day), after a massive FrancoSpanish attack, Barcelona surrendered. Philip V (Felipe V) ordered the dissolution of Catalan political institutions and Catalonia was subject to a regime of occupation; its language was forbidden and Castilian (Spanish) was proclaimed official (Balcells 1996, p. 12-17). More recent historical 25 memories include the suppression of the administrative government of the Catalan Mancomunitat (1913-1923) after the coup d'état of Miguel Primo de Rivera. Second, references to the territory of Catalonia are contested. A substantial number of people refers to the so called Països Catalans (Catalan Countries) including Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and territories across the Pyrenees on the French side of the border. They justify their claim by stressing that these territories which, in medieval times were included in the dominion of the Count of Barcelona, share a common linguistic and cultural background. Dialects of Catalan are currently spoken in Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the area around Perpignan (France). Particular landscapes are emotionally charged and portrayed as embodying Catalan traditions, history and culture. The monasteries of Ripoll, Montserrat and Cuixà (France); mountains such as the Canigó (France), or urban landscapes such as the Fossar de les Moreres (Barcelona) are among them. Third, selected works of art and artists turned into symbols of Catalan identity are often portrayed as part of a corpus of Catalan high culture which has received international recognition. The work of Joan Miró, Salvador Dalí, Antoni Gaudí, Antoni Tàpies and Pau Casals, among others, stands side by side with fine examples of Romanesque (Taüll) and Gothic art (Barcelona's gothic area). The rich Catalan folklore including the sardana (Catalan national dance) should be added to the list of symbols of Catalan identity. A further and powerful symbol of Catalan identity which somehow escapes the above typology concerns sport, football in particular. During Francoism, the Barcelona Football Club (Barça) was portrayed as a representative of the Catalan nation and exemplified resistance against the dictatorship. In Catalonia, the Barça's victories were celebrated as Catalan victories and whenever Barcelona F. C. and Real Madrid played each other the significance of the match went well beyond sport. Emotions were