Kierkegaard as a Hegelian

1 . Copenhagen: Gy l d e n d a l . 2 . I.e., TH U L S T RU P, N. (1980). K i e rk e g a a rd's Relation to He g e l. Trans. St e n g ren, G.L. Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press. German translation: K i e rk e g a a rds Ve rhältnis zu He g e l und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835-1846. St u t t g a rt: Verlag W. Ko l h a m m e r, 1972. 3 . TH U L S T RU P, N. (1980). p. 1 2 . Enrahonar 29, 1998 1 4 71 5 2 Kierkegaard as a Hegelian Jon Stewart University of Copenhaguen Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre One of the most interesting of the many faces of Kierk e g a a rd is Kierk e g a a rd as Hegelian. The ve ry notion might strike many people as an ox y m o ron. Gi ve n K i e rk e g a a rd's bitter polemics against Hegel and Hegelianism, it might seem a b s u rd to think that Kierk e g a a rd himself had a Hegelian side at all. The thesis that Kierk e g a a rd has nothing in common with Hegel was made famous by Niels T h u l s t rup in his influential work, K i e rk e g a a rds Fo rhold til Hegel og til den spekulative Idealisme indtil 1846, published in 19671with German and English translations following shortly there a f t e r2.T h u l s t rup puts forth his main thesis thus: «Hegel and Kierk e g a a rd have in the main nothing in common as thinkers, neither as re g a rds object, purpose, or method, nor as re g a rd s what each considered to be indisputable principles.»3T h u l s t rup's claim about the radical discontinuity between Hegel and Kierk e g a a rd has been taken up uncritically by a number of scholars of nineteenth century Eu ropean philoso p h y. As a result, many commentators see it as a foregone conclusion that K i e rk e g a a r d rejected eve rything that had even the slightest look of He g e l i a n i s m about it. T h e re are, howe ve r, a number of reasons to believe that T h u l s t ru p ' s v i ew of the matter is oversimplified. When we examine Kierk e g a a rd's work s c a re f u l l y, we can see that his relation to Hegel was in fact considerably more d i f f e rentiated than T h u l s t rup would have us believe . I . In The Concept of Iro n y, we can discern a marked Hegelian influence which K i e rk e g a a rd himself acknowledges. In that work, he repeatedly praises He g e l and his analyses of Socrates and Greek culture. In addition to the actual content of The Concept of Iro n y, there are many good reasons external to the text 1 4 8 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Jon Stewart 4 . CI p. 234; BI p. 310. (CI = The Concept of Irony; Schelling Lecture No t e s. Trans. Ho n g , H . V. and Hong, E.H. Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press, 1989. K WII. BI = Om Be g re b e t Iro n i. (S V 1 X I I I ) 5 . JP IV, 4281; Pa p. X-3, A477. (translation slightly modified.) (JP = S ø ren Kierk e g a a rd ' s Jo u rnals and Pa p e r s. Ed. and trans. Hong, H.V. and Hong, E.H. Bloomington and London: Indiana Un i versity Press, 1975. Cited by entry number. Pa p. = S ø ren Kierk e g a a rds Pa p i re r, 16 volumes. Eds. Heiberg, P.A., Ku h r, V. and Torsting, E. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 19091948; supplemented by T h u l s t ru p, N. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968-1978. Cited by volume number and entry number. ) itself to believe that Kierk e g a a rd was strongly under Hegel's influence at the time of its composition. Ab ove all, his own later assessments of the work consistently refer to the fact that it was too Hegelian. In the Pa p i rer f rom the ye a r 1850, almost ten years after the dissertation, there is a re vealing passage where K i e rk e g a a rd writes, Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the maturity really to comprehend greatness, I could not resist pointing out somew h e re in my d i s s e rt a t i o n4that it was a defect on the part of Socrates to disre g a rd the whole and only consider individuals numerically. What a Hegelian fool I was! It is precisely this that powe rfully demonstrates what a great ethicist Socrates was5. Although it is evident that Kierk e g a a rd was critical of Hegel when writing this entry in 1850, nonetheless he says rather clearly that at the time of his dissertation he was under Hegel's sway, indeed, so much so that he mistakenly criticized Socrates along Hegelian lines. The self-critical expre s s i o n «a Hegelian fool» leaves little ambiguity in this re g a rd . In a similar passage from 1854, Kierk e g a a rd expresses re g ret at having p romulgated in his dissertation an aspect of Hegel's doctrine of the state. He writes: «That the state in a Christian sense is supposed to be what He g e l taught —namely that it has moral significance, that true virtue can appear only in the state (something I also childishly babbled after him in my diss e rtation), that the goal of the state is to improve men— is obviously nonsense.» (Pa p . X12 A108, 114/J P, 4238) He r e Kierk e g a a rd admits by way of self-criticism to having parroted Hegel's claim that virtue is to be found in the state. As in the passage above, it is clear that Kierk e g a a rd no longer bel i e ves this to be true and re g rets having claimed it pre v i o u s l y, but this entry l e a v es no room for doubt that, at least according to his own interpre t a t i o n of his intellectual development, he accepted uncritically some aspects of Hegel's philosophy at the time of his dissertation and was not merely iro nically pretending to do so. Fi n a l l y, there is in the Pa p i rer from 1845 a re l e vant entry, which was originally a part of a draft of the Concluding Unscientific Po s t s c r i p t. T h e re Kierk eg a a rd under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus criticizes himself as being under the sway of Hegel in The Concept of Iro ny:« In his dissertation, Ma g i s t e r K i e rk e g a a rd was alert enough to discern the Socratic but is considered not to Kierkegaard as a Hegelian Enrahonar 29, 1998 1 4 9 6 . TAY LO R , M.C. (1980) Jo u rneys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierk e g a a rd. Be rkeley: Un i versity of California Press, p. 228-262. h a ve understood it, probably because, with the help of Hegelian philosophy, he has become super-clever and objective and positive, or has not had the courage to acknowledge the negation.» (Pa p . VIB 34, 24/J P, 5796) By saying that he used «the help of Hegelian philosophy» and by designating himself as «objective» and «positive», Kierk e g a a rd at this later date seems once again to think that his interpretation of Socrates in the dissertation was too Hegelian in character. He indicates that this allegiance to Hegel at that time led him to misunderstand important aspects of the figure of So c r a t e s . All of these passages indicate that Kierk e g a a rd at a later date judged himself to have been strongly influenced by Hegel while he was writing T h e Concept of Iro n y and that he later repudiated these aspects of He g e l i a n i s m . They make it clear that he sees the Hegelian influence as only a passing phase which he later rejected. The tone of self-criticism and re g ret provides clear evidence that Kierk e g a a rd was truly influenced by Hegel and was not merely pretending to be a Hegelian. If he had intentionally wanted to paro d y Hegelian philosophy by playing the role of a Hegelian, then there would be no need for re g ret or self-critique at a later period. I I . Some scholars have noted the similarities between Ei t h e r / Or and the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy of Sp i r i t or some of Hegel's other work s6.In Ei t h e r / Or K i e rk e g a a rd makes use of the Hegelian methodology of opposing contrasting concepts and analyzing each of them for internal consistency. These concepts are related to one another, and indeed one passes into the other as soon as contradictions are re vealed. In Ei t h e r / OrK i e rk e g a a rd juxtaposes the concepts of the aesthetic and the ethical. Thus, based on these similarities, one might say that the basic stru c t u re of Ei t h e r / Oris in a sense He g e l i a n . In the «Insignificant In t roduction» to the second chapter of Pa rt On e , «The Immediate Erotic Stages», the esthete discusses different criteria for judging the truly great work of art.(S V 1I, 31-43/K WIII, 47-59) This discussion s h ows clear signs of Hegelian influence. He re the esthete examines in ord e r t h ree possible criteria for determining the great work of art; the first places the emphasis on the subject matter which is considered the essential element. At the second stage a case is made for the formative activity of the individual artist as the essential thing. Fi n a l l y, what Kierk e g a a rd calls «the idea» of the work of art is introduced as the third criterion. He re the measuring ro d is the degree of abstraction of the idea of the work of art, with re p re s e n t a t i o n of the most abstract idea being the greatest work. The criteria are examined and rejected as being one-sided until an adequate view is reached, just as in the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy individual Notions are examined and rejected as part i a l or incomplete before absolute knowing is re a c h e d . 1 5 0 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Jon Stewart 7 . C f. HØ F F D I N G, H. (1892). S ø ren Kierk e g a a rd som Fi l o s o f . Copenhagen and Kristiania: Gydendalske Boghandel, p. 92ff. See also his «Søren Kierk e g a a rd» in his Danske Fi l o s o f e r. (1909). Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, No rdisk Forlag, p. 158. Later on in the same chapter, the esthete traces three stages of what might be called «the dialectic of desire.» (S V 1 I, 56-68/KW III, 74-87) The movement once again clearly has the form of Hegel's dialectic. Unlike the pre v ious movement, these stages are actually broken down under individual headings and are re f e r red to explicitly as «stages». Each stage portrays a distinct aspect of the concept of desire, and each is re p resented by a different literary or dramatic p e r s o n a. The esthete describes the stages in a fashion similar to the way in which Hegel describes the stations of consciousness in the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy : When I use the term «stage» as I did and continue to do, it must not be taken to mean that each stage exists independently, the one outside the other […] the specific stages are more a disclosure of a predicate in such a way that all the predicates plunge down in the richness of the last stage, since this is the stage prop e r. The other stages have no independent existence; by themselves they are only for re p resentation, and from that we also see their fortuitousness in relation to the last stage. (S V 1 I, 74/KW III, 56) As in Hegel's dialectic, aspects of previous Notions are pre s e rved and contained in later ones, and the final stage brings together the previous stages within itself. As some commentators have noted, Judge Wilhelm seems to employ Hegelian methodology in his discussion of love and marriage in the first chapter of Pa rt Two, «The Esthetic Validity of Marriage.» (S V 1 II, 16-30f. /K W I V, 1 7 - 3 2 f.) Some see in this section Hegel's doctrine of mediation in Ju d g e Wilhelm's argument that the immediate impulse of love must be mediated and transformed into the institution and ethical union of marriage7.He re in this chapter, a three-step dialectical movement like the ones in Pa rt One is discernible. Judge Wilhelm refers to this as «love's dialectic.» (S V 1 II, 17/K W I V, 18). This movement illustrates yet another we l l - k n own aspect of He g e l ' s dialectical methodology, namely, that of immediacy and mediation. Just like Hegel in the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy, Kierk e g a a rd begins with immediate know l e d g e and pro g resses to more sophisticated notions of tru t h . I I I . One of the best-known parts of The Sickness unto De a t his Kierk e g a a rd's analysis of the different stages of despair in the subsection B, «Despair as De f i n e d by Consciousness». This discussion has particular affinities with the He g e l i a n dialectic. It is here that we find a genuine phenomenological analysis along Hegelian lines. He re the dialectic is determined by the degree of conscious- Kierkegaard as a Hegelian Enrahonar 29, 1998 1 5 1 ness. The different stages re p r esent increasingly higher levels of consciousness of despair. Gi ven that consciousness is the key, this analysis can be seen as Kierk e g a a rd's phenomenology. Like Hegel's dialectic, this analysis also m oves by virtue of opposite terms: first being ignorant of being despair and then being conscious of being despair, then in despair first not to will to be oneself and then to will to be oneself, and finally first despair over the eart hly and then despair of the eternal. He re there seems to be a determinate linear pro g ression, and the order of the stages cannot be changed or revised without harming the developmental movement of thought. This dialectical m ovement has several similarities with the dialectic of the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy of Sp i r i t. In his explanation of what it means to exist before God, Kierk e g a a rd implicitly draws on Hegel's notion of recognition that plays the key role in the famous dialectic of the lord and the bondsman in the Ph e n o m e n o l o gy of Sp i r i t . As is well known, Hegel attempts to demonstrate that in order to be a human subject, intersubjective recognition from an equal is re q u i re d . The irony of the position of the master is that he cannot achieve the status of personhood since the recognition of a slave is not valid. Kierk e g a a rd re f e r s to this notion of recognition when he discusses what it means to exist bef o re Go d : A cattleman who (if this we re possible) is a self directly before his cattle is a ve ry l ow self, and, similarly, a master who is a self directly before his slaves is actually no self—for in both cases a criterion is lacking. The child who previously has had only his parents as a criterion becomes a self as an adult by getting the state as a criterion, but what an infinite accent falls on the self by having God as the criterion! (S V 1 XI, 191/K W XIX, 79) The allusion to the master and his slaves seems in this context to be a clear re f e rence to Hegel's account of lordship and bondage. The notion of recognition is the key to interpreting what Kierk e g a a rd means by the levels of consciousness before God. Gi ven that one's own consciousness is determined by the intersubjective recognition of the other, it follows that the status of the other is the determining factor in one's own level of consciousness. If the other is a slave or a cow as in Kierk e g a a rd's example, then t h e r e is a low level of consciousness. If the other is God, then one's consciousness is accordingly high; more ove r, there will be variations of this heightened consciousness in accordance with one's conception of Go d . K i e rk e g a a rd writes, «Despair is intensified in relation to the consciousness of the self, but the self is intensified in relation to the criterion for the self, infinitely when God is the criterion. In fact, the greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more self, the greater the conception of Go d . » (S V 1 XI, 192/KW XIX, 80) This last period of Kierk e g a a rd's authorship is provo c a t i ve since, although he puts aside the direct polemics against Hegel and Hegelianism that he had 1 5 2 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Jon Stewart so long engaged in, he in his own analysis nonetheless makes use of some aspects of Hegel's thought more ove rtly than eve r. T h roughout his care e r K i e rk e g a a rd avails himself of a dialectical methodology akin to Hegel's and e ven prides himself on being a dialectician. Thus, at eve ry stage of Kierk eg a a rd's literary care e r, there we re points of overlap between his thought and that of Hegel. All of this gives evidence for a complicated and differe n t i a t e d relation to Hegel to which T h u l s t rup's analysis can hardly do justice.