En ahona 29, 1998 1 1 9- 1 2 3
Kie kegaa d, he Apopha ic Theologian
Da id Kangas
Yale Uni e si y
The ques ion abou he « heological» s a us o Kie k e g a a d's au ho ship has
always been a complica ed one. The ecep ion o his wo k in he we n i e h
c e n u y has e e ed om s ong heological eadings by neo-o h o d ox he-
ologians o s ongly an i- heological eadings by pos -s uc u alis and de-
c o n s u c i e in e p e e s. The au ho ship i sel was concei ed wi hin he mi-
lieu o , and as a esponse o, he heology o specula i e idealism —a heo-
logical gen e which has also been subjec o adically di e en e a l u a i o n s .
Hegelian heology, o example, has been ead bo h as he ep is ina ion o
ini a ian o h o d oxy as well as he ha binge o he dea h o heological dis-
cou se. Ce ainly he e appea s o be no consensus in sigh on he heologi-
cal s a us o ei he Kie k e g a a d's o Hegel's wo k. In his si ua ion, i may be
nei he possible no desi eable o assign Kie k e g a a d's hough o a single he-
ological gen e. Ye he ques ion abou he e l i g i o u sn a u e o Kie k e g a a d's dis-
cou se pe sis s. Is i possible ha wi hin he hough o Kie k e g a a d (and
Hegel) he loca ion and meaning o heological discou se has i sel shi ed? I
wan o allow his unce ain y and his ques ion o cons i u e he ho izon o
his sho essay in which I will ne e heless sugges ha he gen e o
K i e k e g a a d's hough can be unde s ood as a kind o a p o p h a i c, o nega i e ,
h e o l o g y.
Apopha ic heology is i s o all a d i s c o u s eon he absolu e which in o l e s
he denial ha one can make posi i e p edica ions abou he na u e o ab-
solu e, o God; one canno say w h a he absolu e is. Wha cha ac e ize s
apopha ic hough as a discou se, howe e , is ha i con inues o speak abou
he absolu e, hough i a oids saying wha i is. Communica ion happens
h ough he o mo he discou se. Wi h apopha ic heology, I will sugges ,
K i e k e g a a d's au ho ship sha es he ollowing quali ies: 1) i p esupposes a
n o n - e n i a i e concep o he absolu e which is, in some espec , «beyond be-
ing»; 2) i main ains a no ion o discou se as «nega i e dialec ic». In hese wo
ways, Kie k e g a a d's hough esembles he adi ion o apopha ic heology
which ex ends om Plo inus h ough Ps e u d o - Dionysius and Ec k h a o
Nicholas o Cu s a .
1 2 0 En ahona 29, 1998 Da id Kangas
I. The Ab s o l u e
T h oughou his au ho ship and in his Pa p i e K i e k e g a a d e e s o he di-
ine as « he absolu e». In his Pa p i e K i e k e g a a d o mula es he concep o
God as he absolu e in wo philosophically p ecise ways: 1) as «uncondi ioned,
being in-and- o -i sel » (de ube ingede, Io g o s i g æ e n d e) (Pa p. XI 2, 133/J PI I ,
1449), and 2) as «pu e subjec i i y» ( ene Su b j e c i i e ) —which is de ined by
K i e k e g a a d as an «in ini e edoubling» (uendelig Fo d o b l e l s e). When one con-
side s he meaning o hese o mula ions, i becomes appa en ha bo h s a e
an apopha ic concep ion o God o he absolu e. Fi s I will conside he sec-
ond o mula ion. Kie k e g a a d w i es:
[ God] has no an elemen o objec i i y in his being […] o his would limi
God and e l a i i ze God; bu God ela es himsel objec i ely o his own subjec i-
i y, bu his again is simply a edoubling o his subjec i i y […] God is in ini e e-
doubling. (Pa p. XI 2A, 97; my i alics)
The concep o in ini e edoubling de i es di ec ly om he g ea es o
he apopha ic heologians —Meis e Ec k h a . Ec k h a called God «nega ion
o nega ion» and «doubling o a i med being». In ini e edoubling is apopha-
ic because i in o l es a double nega ion: no me ely he exclusion o objec-
i e and e l a i e being om God (a i s nega ion), bu he denial ha Go d
ela es as a subjec o e agains an objec (a second nega ion). As a double
nega ion, i exp esses an inde inable «posi i i y»: i says ha God's na u e is
« p u e ac ,» i.e., ac wi hou any hing being ac ed upon. This is a adically non-
e n i a i e and desubs an ialized di ine: God's being is pu ely posi ed being.
The di ine is made incommensu able wi h any esul o any hing de e mi-
na e. God does no ha e a p e-exis ing, de e mina e na u e which would be
a c u a l i zed in an in ini e ac o exis ence; God is no a subs ance a all, no
e en an in ini e subs ance o a highes being. In ini e edoubling is, u h e -
m o e, wha Kie k e g a a d calls a « o ali y de e mina ion» (To a l i e s - Be s e m m e l s e) :
i exp esses he inde inable posi i i y ha God is nei he subjec no objec ,
bu a o a l i y i n c l u s i e o bo h subjec i i y and objec i i y. Ac c o ding o his
concep ion, God does no ha e an «ou side»; God does no s and «o e agains »
any hing. The adical anscendence o he di ine, he e o e, does no exc l u d e
adical immanence. God is he ubique e nusquam, he «e e y w h e e and
n ow h e e » .
K i e k e g a a d has also e e ed o he di ine as he «uncondi ioned, being
in-and- o -i sel ». One is ini ially su p ised o see ha Kie k e g a a d e e s o
he di ine in his way, since his is p ecisely he Hegelian de ini ion o he
absolu e. Kie k e g a a d is able o employ his o mula ion because, o him, i
has a o ally apopha ic meaning. In his disse a ion, The Concep o I o n y,
K i e k e g a a d apopha ically coun e poses his own concep o being in-and- o -
i sel o he Hegelian one by claiming ha i is, no in ini ely de e mina e
being (as in Hegel), bu he «in ini ely abs ac ». As such, i is he «absolu e
Kie kegaa d, he Apopha ic Theologian En ahona 29, 1998 1 2 1
1 . He e and elsew h e e I e e o he hi d edi ion o Kie k e g a a d's Samlede V æ k e .
in he o m o no hing» (de Absolu e unde Fo m a In e ) (SV3, 1, 256)1. On c e
again, he e is a ela ion be ween his unde s anding o he di ine and he
Ec k h a ian concep o he di ine. Fo Ec k h a , oo, he Godhead is de inable
only as «no hing» (Ni c h s), i.e., as ha which lacks de e mina ion.
In e ms o hese o mula ions o God as he absolu e we mus e c o n s i-
de he meaning o Kie k e g a a d's amous «in ini e quali a i e di e ence» be-
ween he di ine and he non-di ine. We mus say ha i is no a di e e n c e
b e ween wo beings o en i ies. I canno be because, as he abo e passages
indica e, God canno be de ined as abeing. T h e e o e i is a alse pic u e o
p o ay Kie k e g a a d's God as a being s anding sepa a e om and simply o e
agains he non-di ine. The meaning o God as in ini e edoubling is ha Go d
does no app ehend he wo ld as some hing objec i e; God knows and e-
la es o he wo ld non-objec i e l y. The in ini e quali a i e di e ence mus
h e e o e e e o a di e ence o o m a he han a di e ence in being; a di -
e ence which canno be ma ked on ologically bu can only be ma ked wi hin
he discou se on he absolu e. Fo discou se, a desubs an ialized absolu e, he
absolu e unde he o m o no hing, e p esen s some hing adically un-
k n owable and unsayable. To a icula e he absolu e wi hin hough is p e c i s e l y
o con e i in o objec i e being and he e by o lose i as he absolu e; ha
is, o lose i absolu ely. Hegelian discou se is he absolu e loss o he di ine
p ecisely because i would be he absolu e's own discou se. Fo Kie k e g a a d ,
hough and discou se ollow an apopha ic pa h: he e is an a emp o speak
abou he di ine wi hou speaking abou he di ine, o le he absolu e be he
absolu e, pu e subjec i i y. This e q u i es a speaking which does no posi an
objec , a speaking which is apopha ic. To his we now u n.
II. Apopha ic Di s c o u s e
How, hen, o Kie k e g a a d, does one app ehend he absolu e o God? How
does one begin speaking a all? I is we l l - k n own ha Kie k e g a a d ejec s he
on ological a gumen o God's exis ence. This means ha Kie k e g a a d e-
jec s he possibili y o an on ological discou se on he di ine; i indica es, mo e
s p e c i i c a l l y, ha Kie k e g a a d ejec s he Hegelian posi ion ha discou se abou
he absolu e is he absolu e's own discou se abou i sel . I is also necessa y
o say, howe e , ha Kie k e g a a d ejec s he posi ion o Jacobi. Jacobi would
say ha , wi h espec o he absolu e o God, one mus simply gi e up dis-
cou se and all in o a silen in ui ion o God—a kind o app ehension o he
meaning o he di ine ou side o discou se. Fo Kie k e g a a d, such an in ui-
ion, o «immediacy», would be a alse abs ac ion. As he makes clea in his
unpublished De Omnibus Dubi andum es , Kie k e g a a d holds he posi ion ha
one canno ha e consciousness ou side o language. Language and cons-
ciousness a e equip imo dial. T h e e o e any ela ion o God o he absolu e
1 2 2 En ahona 29, 1998 Da id Kangas
mus be hough as media ed by language. We ha e, hen, a pa adox which
cons i u es he e y hea o Kie k e g a a dian discou se: on he one hand, he
absolu e is beyond a icula ion, ine able; on he o he hand, one canno e-
la e o he absolu e excep h ough language o discou se. This is he ci c u-
la pa adox which inhabi s all apopha ic discou se. Fo Kie k e g a a d, i is he
p oblem o «indi ec communica ion».
How, hen, wi hin his ci cle, is i possible o begin i n d i ec communica-
ion, o begin speaking abou God? This is i s o all a p oblem abou how
he mind is able o app ehend he absolu e as ha which cons i u es he mind's
own limi . Fo Kie k e g a a d, he mind can app ehend he absolu e only nega-
i e l y. This means, i canno app ehend he absolu e di ec ly ou o i s ow n
i n i i a i e and eedom. The in ellec —o , o use Kie k e g a a d's wo d, he «un-
de s anding» (Fo s a n d e n)— canno p oduce he p esence o he di ine o m
ou o i sel . I canno con e he di ine, pu e subjec i i y, in o an objec
which i would be able o app ehend di ec ly o e en in a media ed way. T h e
possibili y o Hegelian discou se depends upon his con e sion. Ye o
K i e k e g a a d, in o de o app ehend he absolu e he mind mus adically e m p -
y i sel o objec i e con en ; i mus «lock e e y hing ou o i s consciousness»
(S V 36, 46]; he unde s anding mus be «pu ou o ac ion» (e n l e d i g e ) (S V 36 ,
58). This emp iness o de e mina e con en is wha Ec k h a called «po e y » .
Wha suppo s his adical emp ying, howe e , is he unde s anding's d e s i e
o he absolu e. Kie k e g a a d names his desi e, his e os, «passion» (Li d e n s k a b) .
The unde s anding is able o enounce i sel o «will i s own down all» only
h ough he desi e o «disco e ha which canno be hough .» (SV3 6, 38)
Due o he necessi y o a momen o emp ying, he mind's app e h e n s i o n
o he absolu e canno be hough as he app ehension o de e mina e con-
en . Knowledge o he absolu e is mo e an «unknowing». This ac o know-
ing, which is an unknowing, does no imply on ological iden i y wi h i s ob-
jec . Jus as in apopha ic heology, Kie k e g a a d main ains he iden i y o he
unde s anding wi h he absolu e only as some hing essen ially «momen a y » .
He e one should poin ou ha Kie k e g a a d's cen al concep , he momen
(Ø i e b l i k k e ), is a we l l - k n own mys ical ciphe , employed in Pla o's Pa m e n i d e s
as well as in Ps e u d o - Dionysius, e e ing o he b e a k h ough o a know i n g
o he absolu e beyond concep . Kie k e g a a d is explici : «Wha we call he
momen , Pla o calls το ξαιφνÜσ ( he sudden).» (SV3 6, 176) Mo m e n a y iden-
i y wi h he absolu e is a non-s able poin which has con inually o be e-
won. The ask o s i ing and es i ing o his limi , an essen ially nega i e
ask, is wha Kie k e g a a d calls «nega i e dialec ic» (which coun e s he
Hegelian «posi i e dialec ic»).
Now, o Kie k e g a a d jus as o apopha ic heology, discou se on he ab-
solu e mus ake he o m o a nega i e dialec ic. The in ellec 's ac ion o emp-
ying mus epea i sel in discou se, a he le el o signi ica ion. To be p e-
cise: wi h espec o God o he absolu e, discou se mus con inually pu he
signi ied «ou o ac ion.» Language mus cease o be used asse o ically and
become pe o m a i e. To speak abou God is no he ac o making on ological
Kie kegaa d, he Apopha ic Theologian En ahona 29, 1998 1 2 3
p edica ions o an absolu e subjec . The discou se can signi y only m o m e n -
a i l y: in o de o le he absolu e be he absolu e, discou se canno allow a
e e en ial objec o congeal; i canno allow s able meanings o o m. Jus as
God is a « edoubling», discou se mus i sel become edoubled, con inually
ca ied h ough a p ocess o «double e lec ion» (dobbel Re l e x i o n). I mus
con inually u n back upon i sel o unsay wha has been said. He e i is no
m e ely a case o he « o m» o he discou se (wha Kie k e g a a d calls he
« a i s y») achie ing a p io i y o e i s «con en ». Ra he , i is he case ha
o m and con en , he «how» and he «wha » o discou se, become iden ical.
In Kie k e g a a d, howe e , he iden i y o o m and con en does no mean, as
pe haps ce ain e sions o pos -s uc u alism ha e i , ha discou se becomes
simply and sel -consciously a discou se abou discou se i sel . I does no mean
he e l i m i n a i o no e e ence. No: o Kie k e g a a d discou se is always discou se
ow a d he absolu e. The absolu e emains a e e en ial ho izon. Wha makes
i apopha ic, howe e , is he e usal o de ine he absolu e, he e usal o iden-
i y he s u b j e c o i s discou se. In o de o ela e o he absolu e o God, he e-
o e, one mus ha e ecou se o discou se; bu e en wi hin discou se, Go d
emains o Kie k e g a a d «jus a name» (blo e na n) (S V 3 6, 40), he «un-
k n own» (de Ub e k j e n d e). (SV3 6, 44)
Ul i m a e l y, signi ica ion o Kie k e g a a d is some hing e hical: signi ica-
ion occu s no h ough he s abiliza ion o a hema ic meaning, bu only when
becomes he discou se, when he subjec and objec o he discou se become
iden ical —and his, i will be no ed, is he g a m m a i c a l analogue o he di-
ine as «in ini e e d o u b l i n g » .
