Kierkegaard's «Silent» Voice

Enrahonar 29, 1998 1 1 51 1 7 Kierkegaard's «Silent» Voice Sergia Hay Columbia University (Columbia) Department of Philosophy It appears inappropriate to claim that Kierk e g a a rd used silence as one of his many voices since he could be considered one of the «noisiest» philosophers of all. He hardly kept his thoughts to himself: he was extraordinarily pro l i f i c and within his pages can be found scathing criticisms of his age and the Da n i s h c h u rch. The volume of his noise is increased by his frequent repetitions and discussions of what he has already written. So what then could be his connection to silence? In order to determine this connection, we first must take into account Kierk e g a a rd's understanding of silence. For Kierk e g a a rd, silence is not equivalent to soundlessness, stillness, or a lack of words. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Indeed, one can fail to be silent in the re l e vant sense while not making a sound, and inve r s e l y, one can be silent in the re l e vant sense while s c reaming. The re l e vant sense of silence has little to do with aural experience: r a t h e r, silence, (Ta u s h ed), is dependent on the notion of concealment. Silence conceals the individual's relationship with God. The authenticity of this relationship depends on its priva c y. Kierk e g a a rd perc e i ved in his age a tendency to believe being Christian equates to being born in De n m a rk and going to church equates to going to a social event. As opposed to the public n a t u re of so-called religiousness in Christendom, Kierk e g a a rd wrote that faith is a matter exc l u s i vely between the individual and God. Cow a rdice and conceit are the motivations that Kierk e g a a rd cites when one attempts to disclose the essence of the faith relationship: a disclosure that Kierk e g a a rd describes as «an emptying that weakens.» (J P 3 9 8 5 /PA P X2 A, 43) Silence conceals the self. Kierk e g a a rd wrote, «Silence is the way of interiorization for us ord i n a ry human beings.» (Ibid., p. 99) Silence marks the individual's withdrawal from society and «the crowd»: withdrawal which is nec e s s a ry for inward reflection and self-development. This concealment is not the concealment of some thing that resides outside of or is separate from the s e l f. Rather, it is the process of self-development that is concealed: a pro c e s s that holds meaning only for the self. Since it only applies to the self, it cannot properly be an object of discourse. Although it makes no sense to ask what this form of concealment communicates, because there is no object to com- 1 1 6 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Sergia Hay municate, it may be asked what purpose the concealment serves. Kierk e g a a rd w rote that this concealment provides the correct conditions for self-deve l o pment: it pre vents misunderstanding in others and pre vents trivialization of the self. Silence does not always guarantee a positive direction for self-deve l o p m e n t , h owe ve r. In Fear and Tre m b l i n g, Kierk e g a a rd wro t e , I always run up against the paradox, the divine and the demonic, for silence is both. Silence is the demon's trap, and the more that is silenced, the more terrible the demon, but silence is also the divinity's mutual understanding with the single individual. (SV1 III, 136/KW VI, 88) The «demonic» aspect of silence describes an entanglement in the pro c e s s of self-development: an entanglement from which there is no escape. In this case, the self continues to close inward on itself and cannot regain attachment to the world, to God, or to others. The «divine» aspect of silence describes s e l f - d e velopment that necessarily begins with an awakening of self-consciousness that makes the self aware of his isolation and separateness from the world, but it does not end here. «Divine» silence also indicates the transformation of the self's relations beyond himself. The self does not now relate to others and God in the same way he did before concealment of the self in silence. Rather, these relations are freshly established and in many ways have gained authenticity. Silence conceals authority. In Pa rt III of Two Ages: A Li t e ra ry Re v i e w, K i e rk e g a a rd noted that his age was characterized by a re f l e c t i ve apathy which caused a «leveling» of society to take place. Because of this «leveling», visible leadership had vanished and the true leaders became unrecognizable. In the p resent, age Kierk e g a a rd wrote, «not one of the unrecognizable ones will dare g i ve direct help, speak plainly, teach openly, assume decisive leadership of the c rowd.» (SV1 VIII, 101/K W X I V, 108) Without the claim of authority, the leader is placed on an equal level to the one who is led: outward l y, they are indistinguishable from one another. Kierk e g a a rd carried out his writing and teaching in this context. His concealment, his shedding of authority, came in many forms among which included his use of pseudonyms and his penning of rev i ews that allowed him to develop his ideas while discussing another's liter a ry production. These methods distance Kierk e g a a rd from the sentences he w rote and raise questions about whether the opinions that are expressed in these works can really be attributed to him. Without the authority of the aut h o r, the burden of meaning belongs to the re a d e r. No longer can the author's w o rds be matched up to the author's life, rather the reader is left alone to disc over how the words relate to his own life. The author is unrecognizable, silent. The reader is alone, active . Now we begin to see the significance of Kierk e g a a rd's silent vo i c e . Although he s a y s much, he is primarily concerned with d o i n g. As an ethical and religious teacher/writer, Kierk e g a a rd concentrated on how to make his Kierkegaard's «Silent» Voice Enrahonar 29, 1998 1 1 7 reader d o something, namely learn about and develop himself. Since there is no advice or manual to instruct one about the course of self-deve l o p m e n t , the individual must plunge into silence. Although all of them, when they are supposed to act, discuss it with «the others» and all thatthey all neve rtheless say depre c i a t i vely of someone: He went and discussed it beforehand with «the others». Consequently they betray themselves, betray their awareness of the fact that authentic intensive actions spring from an individual and from silence. (J P 3 9 8 6 /- PA P X4 A, 16) Like all significant of concepts of Kierk e g a a rd's philosophy, silence is ultimately paradoxical: the moment of concealment is at the same time the moment of profound disclosure. This disclosure still does not take place in the realm of words and sound, for when the individual hides the self, the re l ationship with God, and the claim of authority, he is simultaneously plunged into an action based, rather than word and idea based, ethic. The silent individual is not paralyzed by reflection, unless his is demonic silence. He is s e l f - responsible and decisive. The action of the silent individual is a form of communication that surpasses the language of description. Examples of «taushed» in Ki e rk e g a a rd's work •T h roughout Pa p i e r See KI E R K E G A A R D, Søren, Jo u rnals and Papers, Volume IV, S-Z. Tr a n s . How a rd and Edna Hong. Bloomington: Indiana Un i versity Press, 1975. p. 98-100. • Upbuilding Discourses in Various Sp i r i t s See KI E R K E G A A R D, Søren. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Sp i r i t s. Tr a n s . How a rd and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press, 1978. p. 21, 97-99. •The Sickness Unto De a t h See KI E R K E G A A R D, Søren. The Sickness Unto De a t h. Trans. How a rd and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press, 1980. p. 34, 66, 161. • Pa rt III of Fear and Tre m b l i n g . •Pa rt III of Two Ages: A Li t e ra ry Re v i e w. •The Concept of An x i e t y See KI E R K E G A A R D, Søren. The Concept of An x i e t y. Trans. Reidar T h o m t e . Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press, 1980. p. 55-56, 66, 124-128.