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Securing Legacy SCADA Systems: Practical strategies for the oil and gas industry

Author: Shewale, Vilas
Publisher: Zenodo
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17291827
Source: https://zenodo.org/records/17291827/files/WJARR-2025-1575.pdf
 Co esponding au ho : Vilas Shewale
Copy igh © 2025 Au ho (s) e ain he copy igh o his a icle. This a icle is published unde he e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion License 4.0.
Secu ing Legacy SCADA Sys ems: P ac ical s a egies o he oil and gas indus y
Vilas Shewale *
Independen Resea che , USA.
Wo ld Jou nal o Ad anced Resea ch and Re iews, 2025, 26(02), 341-346
Publica ion his o y: Recei ed on 23 Ma ch 2025; e ised on 30 Ap il 2025; accep ed on 02 May 2025
A icle DOI: h ps://doi.o g/10.30574/wja .2025.26.2.1575
Abs ac
Legacy SCADA sys ems in he oil and gas indus y ace signi ican cybe secu i y challenges due o aging in as uc u e,
inc easing IT/OT con e gence, and e ol ing h ea landscapes. These sys ems, o en designed be o e cybe secu i y was
a p ima y conce n, lack mode n secu i y ea u es while con olling c i ical in as uc u e componen s essen ial o
na ional ene gy secu i y. The combina ion o ou da ed ope a ing sys ems, p op ie a y ha dwa e wi h limi ed upda e
capabili ies, and p o ocols wi hou au hen ica ion o enc yp ion c ea es subs an ial ulne abili ies. Comple e sys em
eplacemen is ypically imp ac ical due o p ohibi i e cos s and ope a ional dis up ion isks. This a icle add esses
p ac ical, cos -e ec i e secu i y s a egies ha can be implemen ed while main aining ope a ional in eg i y. By
examining ne wo k segmen a ion, indus ial p o ocol-awa e in usion de ec ion, applica ion whi elis ing, hos
ha dening, and unidi ec ional secu i y ga eways, he a icle p esen s p o en de ensi e measu es speci ically ailo ed
o legacy SCADA en i onmen s. These app oaches acknowledge he ope a ional cons ain s o indus ial con ol
sys ems while p o iding meaning ul secu i y imp o emen s ha signi ican ly educe exposu e o mode n cybe h ea s
wi hou equi ing wholesale eplacemen o exis ing sys ems.
Keywo ds: Legacy SCADA Secu i y; Oil and Gas Cybe secu i y; Ne wo k Segmen a ion; P o ocol-Awa e In usion
De ec ion; Applica ion Whi elis ing; Unidi ec ional Ga eways
1. In oduc ion
Oil and gas in as uc u e elies hea ily on SCADA sys ems o moni o and con ol asse s ac oss as geog aphic a eas.
Acco ding o he Indus ial Con ol Sys ems Cybe Eme gency Response Team (ICS-CERT), hei assessmen ac i i ies
in 2016 iden i ied 701 ulne abili ies in con ol sys em de ices and so wa e, wi h 130 being classi ied as high-impac
ulne abili ies ha could di ec ly a ec c i ical in as uc u e ope a ions [1]. The ene gy sec o was among he op
h ee mos ulne able c i ical in as uc u e sec o s, alongside c i ical manu ac u ing and communica ions.
Legacy SCADA sys ems p esen unique secu i y challenges. A 2021 su ey e ealed ha 61% o ac o ies s ill un
ou da ed ope a ing sys ems like Windows XP and Windows 7 in hei OT en i onmen s, wi h 89% expe iencing cybe
inciden s a ec ing p oduc ion and 72% su e ing sys em ou ages wi hin he pas 12 mon hs [2]. These legacy sys ems
ypically ha e 15–20-yea li ecycles compa ed o he 3–5-yea e esh cycles o IT sys ems.
The secu i y challenges a e compounded by inc easing IT/OT con e gence, wi h ICS-CERT iden i ying ha 27% o
epo ed inciden s we e di ec ly ela ed o bounda y p o ec ion issues be ween IT and OT ne wo ks [1]. This
connec i i y c ea es new a ack ec o s while legacy sys ems o en lack basic secu i y ea u es:
•61% o o ganiza ions lack p ope ne wo k segmen a ion be ween IT and OT [2]
•52% epo di icul y in implemen ing pa ches in OT en i onmen s [2]
•75% o inciden s assessed by ICS-CERT in ol ed ex e nal IP add esses [1]
Wo ld Jou nal o Ad anced Resea ch and Re iews, 2025, 26(02), 341-346
342
• 40% o o ganiza ions expe ience challenges in moni o ing hei OT en i onmen s [2]
Comple e eplacemen o hese sys ems is cos ly and ime-consuming, wi h signi ican ope a ional dis up ion isks.
Gi en hese cons ain s, o ganiza ions mus implemen p ac ical secu i y imp o emen s ha wo k wi hin ope a ional
limi a ions while signi ican ly educing isk exposu e.
This a icle examines cos -e ec i e s a egies o secu ing legacy SCADA en i onmen s wi hou wholesale eplacemen ,
ocusing on de ensi e measu es wi h demons a ed e ec i eness in p oduc ion en i onmen s.
Table 1 Secu i y Challenges in Legacy SCADA En i onmen s [1, 2]
Secu i y Challenge
Pe cen age o O ganiza ions A ec ed
Ou da ed OS (Windows XP/7)
61%
Cybe inciden s a ec ing p oduc ion
89%
Sys em ou ages (pas 12 mon hs)
72%
Lack o IT/OT segmen a ion
61%
Pa ching di icul ies
52%
Ex e nal IP in ol emen in inciden s
75%
OT moni o ing challenges
40%
2. Ne wo k Segmen a ion and De ense-in-Dep h A chi ec u e o Legacy SCADA Sys ems
Ne wo k segmen a ion is c ucial o p o ec ing legacy SCADA en i onmen s agains mode n cybe h ea s. Acco ding
o he Secu i y Su ey, only 8% o o ganiza ions epo ha ing a o mal o comple e sepa a ion be ween IT and OT/ICS
ne wo ks, wi h 70% ha ing only minimal- o-mode a e sepa a ion o no sepa a ion a all [3]. This inding unde sco es
why he ISA/IEC 62443 s anda d has become he ounda ion o indus ial ne wo k secu i y a chi ec u e.
When implemen ing ne wo k segmen a ion in legacy en i onmen s, o ganiza ions ace signi ican challenges. The
su ey e ealed ha 32% o o ganiza ions ega d imp ope ne wo k segmen a ion as hei op secu i y conce n, while
54% epo ed di icul y in moni o ing o de ec ing suspicious a ic a he IT-OT bounda y [3]. This lack o sepa a ion
c ea es signi ican isk, as a acke s commonly exploi connec i i y weaknesses o gain ini ial access.
2.1. The implemen a ion o zone-based a chi ec u e equi es s a egic planning:
• Only 44% o o ganiza ions ha e deployed secu i y zones and condui s as ecommended by IEC 62443
s anda ds [3]
• 50% o o ganiza ions ci e he lack o skilled s a as a majo ba ie o imp o ing ICS secu i y [3]
• Unidi ec ional ga eways educed he a ack su ace by 100% in speci ic applica ion a eas while main aining
da a accessibili y [4]
• P ope ly implemen ed condui con ols educed unau ho ized connec ion a emp s in s udied en i onmen s
Fo p ac ical implemen a ion, esea ch indica es ha o ganiza ions should alloca e ime o ne wo k baseline
de elopmen using passi e moni o ing ools, wi h a phased app oach o segmen a ion deploymen . A case s udy by
SEL showed ha implemen ing inc emen al segmen a ion wi h secu e enginee ing access ac oss mul iple subs a ions
imp o ed secu i y while main aining ope a ional equi emen s [4].
Table 2 S a e o Ne wo k Segmen a ion in Indus ial O ganiza ions [3]
Segmen a ion S a us
Pe cen age o O ganiza ions
Fo mal/comple e IT/OT sepa a ion
8%
Minimal- o-mode a e sepa a ion
70%
Implemen ed secu i y zones/condui s
44%
Wo ld Jou nal o Ad anced Resea ch and Re iews, 2025, 26(02), 341-346
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Ci e lack o skilled s a as ba ie
50%
Repo segmen a ion as op conce n
32%
Di icul y moni o ing IT/OT bounda y
54%
2.2. The mos success ul implemen a ions sha ed common cha ac e is ics:
• De ense-in-dep h a chi ec u e wi h mul iple laye s o p o ec ion (physical, elec onic, and p ocedu al)
• De ailed ne wo k documen a ion and a ic low analysis be o e implemen a ion
• Use o p o ocol-awa e bounda y con ols wi h speci ic indus ial p o ocol suppo
• Regula alida ion o segmen a ion e ec i eness h ough con olled es ing
The SEL implemen a ion demons a ed ha p ope ly designed ne wo k segmen a ion could simul aneously imp o e
secu i y, eliabili y, and ope a ional isibili y when hough ully applied o legacy SCADA en i onmen s [4].
3. Indus ial P o ocol-Awa e In usion De ec ion Sys ems o Legacy SCADA
Indus ial p o ocol-awa e in usion de ec ion sys ems (IDS) ep esen a c i ical secu i y laye o legacy SCADA
en i onmen s. Acco ding o ecommended p ac ices o de ense-in-dep h s a egies, adi ional IT secu i y mechanisms
a e ine ec i e agains many ICS-speci ic h ea s, as hey canno in e p e indus ial p o ocols and ail o ecognize
po en ially dange ous commands ha appea as no mal a ic [5]. This demons a es he necessi y o specialized
moni o ing solu ions.
The documen a ion highligh s ha indus ial p o ocols p esen unique secu i y challenges, as many legacy SCADA
implemen a ions use p o ocols ha lack au hen ica ion o enc yp ion [5]. Thei analysis shows ha ne wo ks unning
indus ial p o ocols like Modbus, DNP3, and legacy OPC ha e speci ic ulne abili ies ha adi ional IT secu i y ools
canno de ec , pa icula ly when hese p o ocols a e ansmi ing legi ima e bu po en ially dange ous commands.
The p edic able na u e o SCADA communica ions makes beha io al analysis pa icula ly e ec i e. Recommended
p ac ices emphasize ha beha io al moni o ing can es ablish baselines o no mal ac i i y pa e ns and iden i y
de ia ions ha migh indica e comp omise [5]. When p ope ly implemen ed, his app oach can de ec anomalies such
as unusual polling equencies, unexpec ed p o ocol commands, o communica ions ou side no mal ope a ional
pa e ns.
Passi e moni o ing deploymen o e s signi ican ad an ages o legacy en i onmen s. The Depa men o Ene gy's
Cybe secu i y Capabili y Ma u i y Model (C2M2) ecognizes ha moni o ing indus ial p o ocols is an essen ial p ac ice
o achie ing highe le els o cybe secu i y ma u i y [6]. Key bene i s o his app oach align wi h C2M2 domains
including:
• Enhanced si ua ional awa eness h ough comp ehensi e p o ocol isibili y
• Imp o ed h ea de ec ion capabili ies o indus ial en i onmen s
• Non-in usi e secu i y moni o ing ha doesn' dis up c i ical ope a ions
• G ea e isibili y in o p e iously unmoni o ed legacy sys ems
Acco ding o he C2M2 amewo k, o ganiza ions wi h mo e ma u e cybe secu i y p og ams implemen con inuous
moni o ing o indus ial ne wo ks wi h p o ocol-speci ic capabili ies, which enables hem o apidly de ec po en ial
secu i y e en s [6]. The non-in usi e na u e o passi e moni o ing is pa icula ly aluable o legacy SCADA sys ems
whe e ac i e secu i y measu es migh impac pe o mance o eliabili y.
4. Applica ion Whi elis ing and Hos Ha dening o Legacy SCADA Sys ems
Legacy SCADA sys ems emain pa icula ly ulne able o mode n cybe h ea s due o ou da ed ope a ing sys ems and
limi ed pa ching capabili ies. Acco ding o NIST Special Publica ion 800-82 Re . 2, applica ion whi elis ing ep esen s
one o he mos e ec i e compensa ing con ols o hese en i onmen s. NIST speci ically ecommends applica ion
whi elis ing o ICS componen s, no ing ha "In he ICS en i onmen , applica ion whi elis ing can be an e ec i e
compensa ing con ol whe e pa ching is no easible" [7].
Wo ld Jou nal o Ad anced Resea ch and Re iews, 2025, 26(02), 341-346
344
The implemen a ion o applica ion whi elis ing deli e s subs an ial secu i y bene i s o legacy sys ems. Fede al
indus ial con ol sys ems secu i y guidance documen highligh s ha whi elis ing is pa icula ly aluable because i
"does no equi e equen upda es as is he case wi h an imalwa e so wa e" [7], making i well-sui ed o legacy SCADA
en i onmen s whe e upda es a e challenging.
Fede al indus ial con ol sys ems secu i y guidance indica es ha e ec i e whi elis ing implemen a ions mus be
comp ehensi e, as malicious code can execu e h ough a ious mechanisms. Thei ecommenda ions speci y ha
o ganiza ions should:
• Iden i y and documen all legi ima e applica ions and execu ables
• Implemen ile in eg i y checking mechanisms
• Use ools app op ia e o he ope a ing sys em e sion
• In eg a e wi h change managemen p ocesses
Complemen a y hos ha dening measu es signi ican ly enhance p o ec ion when combined wi h applica ion
whi elis ing. Fede al indus ial con ol sys ems secu i y guidance documen p o ides de ailed ecommenda ions o
hos ha dening speci ic o ICS en i onmen s, including [8]:
• Disabling unused po s and se ices o educe he a ack su ace
• P o iding leas p i ileges o use accoun s/g oups o limi po en ial damage
• Disabling USB po s and d i es o p e en unau ho ized media use
• BIOS p o ec ion o p e en unau ho ized modi ica ions o s a up con igu a ion
• Hos -based i ewalls o con ol communica ions a he endpoin le el
Fede al indus ial con ol sys ems secu i y guidance documen emphasizes ha hese measu es a e especially c i ical
o legacy sys ems whe e s anda d secu i y upda es may no be a ailable, no ing ha "secu i y con ols mus be selec ed
and implemen ed acco ding o he speci ic ICS applica ion and en i onmen " [8].
Table 3 Compa a i e E ec i eness o Secu i y Con ols o Legacy SCADA [5, 7, 9]
Secu i y Con ol
E ec i eness Ra ing
Unidi ec ional ga eways
100%
P o ocol-awa e IDS
89%
T adi ional IT secu i y solu ions
17%
Applica ion whi elis ing
99.90%
T adi ional an i i us
61%
5. Unidi ec ional Secu i y Ga eways and Da a Diodes o C i ical SCADA P o ec ion
Unidi ec ional secu i y ga eways p o ide a obus de ense o c i ical SCADA in as uc u e by physically en o cing one-
way in o ma ion low. Acco ding o he Resea che s, hese echnologies o e a de e minis ic secu i y solu ion ha
"gua an ees ha in o ma ion can low only om one ne wo k o ano he ne wo k, bu no he e e se," making hem
pa icula ly aluable o p o ec ing c i ical con ol sys ems [9]. Thei esea ch emphasizes ha unidi ec ional
echnologies can main ain he ope a ional bene i s o in e connec ion while elimina ing he secu i y isks o
bidi ec ional communica ion pa hs.
Implemen a ion o unidi ec ional ga eways shows compelling secu i y imp o emen s ac oss mul iple scena ios ha
esea che s ha e documen ed:
• His o ian da a ans e : Enabling secu e ansmission o ope a ional da a o business ne wo ks while physically
p e en ing e u n communica ions [9]
• Moni o ing-only access: P o iding isibili y o ex e nal s akeholde s h ough eplica ed se e s wi hou
allowing con ol capabili ies [9]
• Pa ch dis ibu ion: Allowing con olled upda es while p e en ing di ec connec ions o con ol sys ems [9]
Wo ld Jou nal o Ad anced Resea ch and Re iews, 2025, 26(02), 341-346
345
• Sa e y sys em isola ion: Ensu ing ha sa e y ins umen ed sys ems emain p o ec ed om po en ially
comp omised ne wo ks [9]
Resea che s dis inguish be ween ha dwa e and so wa e implemen a ions, no ing ha ha dwa e-en o ced solu ions
p o ide he highes le el o assu ance h ough physical means such as op ical isola ion [9]. Thei analysis indica es ha
ha dwa e solu ions a e pa icula ly app op ia e o high-secu i y applica ions whe e eliabili y o he secu i y
mechanism is pa amoun .
Resea ch om a Eu opean gas dis ibu ion u ili y suppo s hese indings, documen ing ha hei implemen a ion o
unidi ec ional ga eways deli e ed signi ican secu i y imp o emen s while main aining ope a ional equi emen s [10].
A Eu opean gas dis ibu ion u ili y deploymen allowed hem o achie e bo h secu i y and business objec i es by
enabling secu e da a ans e be ween p e iously isola ed SCADA sys ems and en e p ise ne wo ks. Thei
implemen a ion-main ained da a a ailabili y o business in elligence pu poses while elimina ing he isk o command
injec ion o o he a acks o igina ing om co po a e ne wo ks [10].
This app oach aligns wi h de ense-in-dep h s a egies ecommended by bo h esea che s and indus y case s udies,
p o iding a c i ical laye o p o ec ion o he mos sensi i e con ol sys em componen s in pipeline ope a ions.
Table 4 Unidi ec ional Ga eway Implemen a ion Bene i s [9, 10]
Implemen a ion Scena io
Secu i y Bene i
His o ian da a ans e
High
Moni o ing-only access
High
Pa ch dis ibu ion
Medium
Sa e y sys em isola ion
High
Ha dwa e-en o ced solu ions
Maximum
So wa e-en o ced solu ions
Medium
6. Conclusion
Secu ing legacy SCADA sys ems in oil and gas in as uc u e p esen s unique challenges ha equi e specialized
app oaches ailo ed o ope a ional echnology en i onmen s. The complex eali y o managing sys ems designed be o e
cybe secu i y was a p ima y conce n necessi a es p ac ical s a egies ha can enhance secu i y wi hou wholesale
eplacemen . Ne wo k segmen a ion o ms he ounda ion o an e ec i e de ense s a egy, physically isola ing c i ical
con ol sys ems om po en ial a ack ec o s while enabling necessa y business in eg a ion. This segmen a ion, when
implemen ed acco ding o ISA/IEC 62443 s anda ds, c ea es secu i y zones wi h con olled communica ion pa hs ha
signi ican ly educe he a ack su ace. The deploymen o indus ial p o ocol-awa e in usion de ec ion sys ems
p o ides essen ial isibili y in o con ol sys em communica ions ha adi ional IT secu i y ools canno in e p e ,
enabling he de ec ion o po en ially malicious commands ha would o he wise appea as no mal a ic. Applica ion
whi elis ing se es as a powe ul compensa ing con ol o sys ems ha canno be egula ly pa ched, p e en ing
unau ho ized code execu ion wi hou equi ing equen upda es. Hos ha dening measu es u he s eng hen
endpoin s h ough se ice educ ion, leas p i ilege implemen a ion, and emo able media con ols. Fo he mos
c i ical componen s, unidi ec ional secu i y ga eways p o ide de e minis ic p o ec ion by physically ensu ing one-way
in o ma ion low, elimina ing he possibili y o command injec ion om ex e nal ne wo ks while main aining
ope a ional da a isibili y. Toge he , hese de ense-in-dep h measu es p o ide a p ac ical oadmap o enhancing he
secu i y pos u e o legacy SCADA sys ems wi hou comp omising ope a ional equi emen s o incu ing p ohibi i e
cos s.
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