Pos -quan um C yp og aphy o Connec ed
and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y:
A Comp ehensi e O e iew
Mohamed Saied Mohamed1(B), Julie Goda d2, Vic o Jimenez3, Ad ien Jousse2,
Pau Pe ea Paños3, and Miao Zhang1
1 FEV.Io GmbH, Neuenho s aße 188, 52078 Aachen, Ge many
[email p o ec ed]
2 CEA, LIST, Communica ing Sys ems Labo a o y, Gi -su -Y e e, F ance
3 Technology Cen e o Ca alonia, Uni o IT&OT Secu i y, Eu eca , Ba celona, Spain
Abs ac . Connec ed and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y (CCAM) appli-
ca ions, ins umen al in enhancing ehicle communica ion wi h in as uc u e
and he cloud, ace cybe secu i y ulne abili ies due o hei in ica e compo-
nen s equi ing mul i ace ed c yp og aphic alida ion. Wi h quan um compu ing
ad ancemen s, adi ional public key c yp og aphy becomes suscep ible, empha-
sizing he need o quan um- esis an algo i hms o assu e long- e m au omo-
i e cybe secu i y. Al hough Pos -Quan um C yp og aphy (PQC), which p o ides
solu ions o coun e his quan um isk is s ill unde esea ch, se e al algo i hms
ha e eme ged and a e unde s anda diza ion. This pape p o ides a comp ehensi e
o e iew o he s a us o PQC in au omo i e applica ions, including a pe o mance
analysis o selec ed algo i hms in his esea ch. F u he , i p esen s some po en-
ial use cases o PQC (such as Secu e O e -The-Ai (SOTA) so wa e upda e and
Vehicle o e e y hing (V2X) communica ion). By elying on PQC, he au omo i e
indus y can s ay ahead in secu ing connec ed ehicles agains eme ging quan um
compu e h ea s.
Keywo ds: Connec ed and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y (CCAM) ·
Pos -Quan um C yp og aphy (PQC) · Au omo i e Cybe secu i y · Long-Te m
Secu i y
1 In oduc ion
Au omo i e and CCAM applica ions p omise o e olu ionize u u e anspo a ion, mak-
ing i sa e , eco- iendlie , and mo e e icien . A i s co e, CCAM h i es on ne wo ks
ha in e wine ehicles (V2V), in as uc u e (V2I), b oade ne wo ks (V2N), and e en
pedes ians (V2P). Ye , he wea ing o hese ne wo ks cas s shadows o da a au hen ic-
i y and p i acy conce ns. In he CCAM wo ld, ehicles no only upda e so wa e and
elay in o ma ion o e ne wo ks bu also u ilize came as o pedes ian de ec ion, ehicle
iden i ica ion, and loca ion b oadcas ing.
© The Au ho (s) 2026
C. McNally e al. (Eds.): TRAcon e ence 2024, LNMOB, pp. 738–744, 2026.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/978-3-032-06763-0_105
Pos -quan um C yp og aphy o Connec ed and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y 739
Conside he po en ial consequences i a malicious ac o exploi s sha ed ehicula
in o ma ion o ack a a ge o e en manipula e a ehicle’s con ols. Wha i comp o-
mised loca ion da a o co up ed so wa e upda es we e b oadcas ? These scena ios a e
no jus heo ies. To a oid such isks, we need o in eg a e sophis ica ed cybe secu i y
and da a p o ec ion measu es in o CCAM designs. While hese s ys ems a e designed o
be secu e o a ime, hey mus be p epa ed o u u e h ea s such as he ise o quan um
compu ing. When quan um compu e s gain enough powe , ou exis ing c yp og aphic
solu ions, such as RSA [11], will be b oken [12]. This is pa icula ly conce ning in he
con ex o CCAM, whe e he e is a h ea o a ‘ha es now and b eak la e ’ a ack,
po en ially comp omising sensi i e in o ma ion and c yp og aphic me hods used in he
CCAM ecosys em.
2 Long-Te m Secu i y
In he CCAM con ex , ensu ing long- e m secu i y is o u mos impo ance. CCAM ep-
esen s he in eg a ion o mul iple ad anced anspo a ion sys ems: connec ed ehicles,
au oma ed ehicles, connec ed in as uc u es and hei coope a i e ope a ions. Vehicles
a e designed o 10–15 yea s, au omo i e in as uc u es e en mo e. Gi en he na u e
o hese sys ems and hei applica ions, long- e m secu i y is no jus a luxu y bu a
necessi y. The ollowing Table 1 lis s se e al scena ios and easons ha highligh he
need o long- e m CCAM secu i y.
Quan um compu e s p esen signi ican challenges o exis ing c yp og aphic p ac-
ices in au omo i e ehicles. Cu en ehicles ely on public key c yp og aphy o secu e
upda es, bo h h ough cables and wi elessly. While hese me hods ensu e in eg i y and
au hen ici y, hey’ e a isk om quan um ad ancemen s. The RSA enc yp ion, which
hinges on he di icul y o ac o ing la ge numbe s, can be swi ly deal wi h by quan um
capabili ies using Sho ’s algo i hm. Fu he mo e, symme ic enc yp ion isn’ en i ely
sa e, wi h G o e ’s sea ch algo i hm posing po en ial h ea s. Gi en ha ehicles e-
quen ly sha e da a wi h en i ies like manu ac u e s and insu ance agencies, he e’s an
u gen need o u n o pos -quan um c yp og aphy o p o ec upda es and p ese e da a
p i acy.
Mosca’s heo em helps calcula e he quan um h ea ’s a i al, weighing he du a ion
o desi ed da a secu i y agains he ime equi ed o quan um-sa e ansi ion. Gi en
a ypical ehicle’s 10–15 yea s li espan and NIST’s aim o s anda dize pos -quan um
algo i hms by 2024 [10], he ace is on. O all quan um de ense s a egies, PQC eme ges
as he on unne .
740 M. S. Mohamed e al.
Table 1. Long- e m secu i y scena ios o CCAM applica ions.
Scena io Desc ip ion Cause
Vehicle Li ecycle Du a ion Vehicles ha e a long li ecycle
( ypically 10–20 yea s o
mo e)
C yp og aphic me hods ha
we e conside ed secu e a he
ime o manu ac u e may
become ulne able. This
dispa i y be ween he apid
e olu ion o c yp og aphic
h ea s and he long li espan
o ehicles necessi a es
long- e m secu i y measu es
Fu u e In e ope abili y Vehicles om di e en
manu ac u ing yea s will
need o in e ac
Ensu ing ha olde ehicles
can secu ely communica e
wi h newe ones equi es
o wa d-compa ible secu i y
solu ions
O e - he-Ai (OTA) Upda es Vehicles inc easingly ely on
OTA upda es o so wa e
pa ches
To coun e ulne abili ies
disco e ed long a e a
ehicle’s p oduc ion, he OTA
upda e mechanism i sel mus
be secu ed o he long e m
Vehicle- o-E e y hing (V2X)
In e ac ions
Vehicles will in e ac wi h
o he ehicles and sma -ci y
in as uc u e de ices
The di e se and con inually
e ol ing landscape o V2X
in e ac ions demands ha
secu i y measu es be u u e
p oo ed o emain e ec i e in
he ace o un o eseen
challenges
3 Pos -quan um C yp og aphy
In Ma ch 2022, ENISA p oposed a hyb id app oach o ansi ioning om ou cu en
c yp og aphic ools o pos -quan um solu ions [1]. This me hod me ges he esilience o
p e-quan um algo i hms agains classical a acks wi h he de enses pos -quan um algo-
i hms o e agains quan um a acks. Fo key es ablishmen , a Key De i a ion Func ion
(KDF) is used, while signa u es u ilize conca ena ion.
The i s NIST’s pos -quan um compe i ion [10] ca ego ized pos -quan um algo-
i hms in o i e g oups:
– La ice-based C yp og aphy: Aj ai in oduced he SIS (Sho In ege Solu ion) p ob-
lem in 1996 as pa o he i s la ice-based c yp og aphic scheme [2]. Rege o mu-
la ed he LW E (Lea ning Wi h E o s) p oblem in 2005 [2], which was la e adap ed
in o he Module-LWE a ian [2] o be e pe o mance. Sepa a ely, he NTRU c yp-
og aphic app oach, aiming o mo e compac key s izes, was in oduced in 1996
[2].
Pos -quan um C yp og aphy o Connec ed and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y 741
– C yp og aphy based on hash unc ions: The i s pe son o use hash unc ions o sign
documen s was Me kle [2]. La e , Lampo [2] and Win e ni z [2]showedhow o
con e Me kle’s single signa u e scheme in o a mul iple signa u e scheme. Me kle
also in oduced a new scheme combining he Win e ni z app oach wi h bina y ees
called Me kle ee.
– Code-based c yp og aphy: The McEliece enc yp ion scheme [2]is i s asymme ic
me hod in his ield. I s secu i y elies on he di icul y o code- heo e ic p oblems,
such as he Synd ome Decoding (SD) p oblem. Subsequen ly, Niede ei e [2]p o-
posed a digi al signa u e scheme based on e o -co ec ing codes. A signi ican d aw-
back o many code-based c yp og aphic p imi i es is hei la ge key size. Tha is why
s uc u ed a ian s a e de eloped o educe key size.
– Mul i a ia e c yp og aphy: Mul i a ia e c yp og aphy is based on he di icul y o
sol ing a sys em o nonlinea , usually quad a ic, equa ions o e a ini e ield [2].
Mos signa u e schemes in his ca ego y a e based on he complexi y o he MQ
p oblem, inding solu ions o a sys em o mul i a ia e quad a ic equa ions.
– C yp og aphy based on isogenies o supe singula ellip ic cu es: This o m o c yp-
og aphy is based on he challenge o iden i ying isogenies be ween supe singula
ellip ic cu es [2]. I ’s used o acili a e a Di ie-Hellman- ype key exchange.
4 PQC in Au omo i e: S a e-o - he-A and Applica ions
As ehicles become in e connec ed pla o ms, he e is an u gen need o s onge c yp-
og aphic sys ems, especially conside ing quan um compu ing h ea s. As a esul , he
ocus is u ning owa ds PQC.
– He melink’s e al. In oduced a PQC p o ocol designed o ehicle componen
communica ion. This p o ocol becomes he ounda ion o V2X Communica ion,
ensu ing quan um-secu e exchanges wi h in as uc u e [3].
– La ice-based PQC has bene i s, especially o High-Pe o mance Sys ems.This
app oach ensu es swi and secu e communica ions, c ucial du ing high-speed d i ing
scena ios [4].
– Wang and S ö inge emphasized he impo ance o HSMs in Vehicles. They p oposed
quan um-secu e Ha dwa e Secu e Modules (HSM) o p o ec key ehicle unc ions,
such as s a ing he igni ion [5].
– Fo OTA So wa e Upda es, Bos’s e al. Sugges ed using CRYSTALS-Dili hium.
This ensu es upda es emain quan um-secu e, educing he need o u u e ecalls [7].
– Making ehicle Boo P ocesses quan um-sa e is ano he p io i y. Using PQC, we can
ensu e he ehicle’s so wa e emains un ampe ed each ime i s a s [8].
– Gonzalez e al. Highligh ed Signa u e Ve i ica ion me hods. Thei PQC echniques
allow o as alida ion, especially use ul o de ices like a ic came as [9].
– Vehicle- o-Vehicle Communica ion is ano he ocus. Resea ch unde sco es he need
o hese communica ions o be bo h p i a e and quan um-secu e [6].
The e’s a no iceable inc ease in esea ch on PQC o he au omo i e wo ld, high-
ligh ing how c ucial i is o he u u e o anspo a ion. The indus y is clea ly p epa ing
o ackle quan um challenges.
742 M. S. Mohamed e al.
5 Pe o mance o PQC in Au omo i e Sys ems
Kybe , Dili hium, and Falcon a e la ice-based c yp og aphic me hods oo ed in 512–
1024 dimensional ma hema ical p oblems, compe e o NIST’s PQC s anda diza ion
[10], wi h Kybe as a KEM and Dili hium and Falcon as digi al signa u e algo i hms.
To compa e hese unique algo i hms, NIST uses me ics like Key Leng h and Algo i hm
S eng h, de ailed in Table 2.
Table 2. Key Me ics o NIST’s PQC selec ed Algo i hms [10].
Algo i hm NIST Le el Key & Signa u e/Ciphe ex sizes (by es)
Dili hium2 2Sec e : 2528, Public: 1312, Signa u e: 2420
Dili hium3 3Sec e : 4000, Public: 1952, Signa u e: 3293
Dili hium5 5Sec e : 4864, Public: 2592, Signa u e: 4595
Falcon-512 1Sec e : 1281, Public: 897, Signa u e: 666
Falcon-1024 5Sec e : 2305, Public: 1793, Signa u e: 1280
NIST Le els (1–5): Le el 1 is he mos ulne able, easily b oken in 8 h wi h a small
in es men , while Le el 5 is he mos secu e, ensu ing ciphe ex doesn’ e eal plain ex .
In ou e alua ion o open Quan um Sa e (OQS) me ics o connec ed ehicles,
we simula ed a oad-elemen - o- ehicle in e ac ion using a clien /se e model. Due o
ha dwa e cons ain s o he OQS lib a y, wo Raspbe y Pi 4 wi h 4 CPU co es and 8 GB
o RAM we e u ilized. The se e , ope a ing on po 4433, sen packe s o a ying sizes-
1 KB, 1 MB, and 30 MB- o e lec common communica ion sizes. We adop ed he
Kybe KEM o encapsula ion and he Dili hium and Falcon algo i hms o signa u es,
aligning wi h he la es NIST s anda ds (Table 3).
Table 3. La ency om Clien Reques Launch o Packe Receip (Seconds)
Packe weigh : 1 KB NIST Secu i y Le el
2 3 5
Dili hium Kybe 512 0.072 0.072 0.073
Falcon 0.092 N/A 0.095
Dili hium Kybe 1024 0.072 0.075 0.077
Falcon- 0.097 N/A 0.100
Using OQS’s OpenSSL 3.2-de wi h TLS1.3, he Kybe KEM keys a e dynamically
gene a ed o each communica ion and s o ed empo a ily. We employed he Py hon ool
psu il o gauge CPU and RAM pe o mance, cap u ing da a a 10-ms in e als ac oss 100
i e a ions o di e en algo i hm/packe combina ions. The esul s, p esen ed in Table 4,
p o ide an a e aged iew o CPU and RAM (MB) u iliza ion o e he p ocess’s du a ion.
Pos -quan um C yp og aphy o Connec ed and Coope a i e Au oma ed Mobili y 743
Table 4. A e age CPU and RAM U iliza ion Du ing Reques Li ecycle (packe weigh 1KB)
Kybe 512 Kybe 1024
Algo i hm Dili hium2 Dili hium2 alcon512 alcon1024 Dili hium2 Dili hium2 alcon512 alcon1024
CPU (%) 3.949 3.897 3.594 2.897 3.726 4.137 3.361 3.447
RAM 1.059 1.467 1.230 1.477 1.304 1.586 1.354 1.515
6 Conclusion and Recommenda ions
In he ace o ad ancing quan um compu ing capabili ies, cu en c yp og aphic p ac ices
wi hin he au omo i e sec o , especially in CCAM, s and ulne able. Vehicles, now mo e
in e connec ed han e e , demand he obus p o ec ion o e ed by PQC. Ou in es iga-
ion has shed ligh on he indus y’s no iceable shi owa ds PQC s a egies, which ely
on a a ie y o ma hema ical ounda ions and algo i hms. Pa icula ly o p ocesses like
Vehicle- o-Vehicle Communica ion and OTA So wa e Upda es, PQC o e s enhanced
de ense agains quan um h ea s. P ac ical es s, no ably on Raspbe y Pi 4, ha e show-
cased he e ec i eness o speci ic pos -quan um me hods. Emb acing PQC in CCAM
no only bols e s secu i y bu also posi ions he anspo sec o o a quan um- esis an
u u e, ensu ing sus ained sa e y and op imal unc ionali y.
To ensu e he seamless in eg a ion o PQC solu ions in o eal CCAM and o he
c i ical au omo i e applica ions, i is impo an o de elop ligh e and as e PQC ech-
niques. On he o he hand, mo e sui able ha dwa e ailo ed o pos -quan um secu e
implemen a ions should be de eloped, hus b idging he gap be ween heo e ical abili y
and p ac ical easibili y.
Acknowledgmen . The esea ch leading o hese esul s has ecei ed unding om he Eu opean
Union’s Ho izon Eu ope p og amme unde g an ag eemen No 101069748- SELFY p ojec .
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