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Democracy and Resilience: From Neoliberal Governance to Post-Liberal Democracy?

Author: Bíba, Jan
Publisher: Zenodo
DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2025.80.2.7
Source: https://zenodo.org/records/17732699/files/0415112910.31577filozofia.2025.80.2.7.pdf
238
DOI: h ps://doi.o g/10.31577/ ilozo ia.2025.80.2.7
Democ acy and Resilience: F om Neolibe al Go e nance o
Pos -Libe al Democ acy?
JAN BÍBA, Depa men o Poli ical Science, Facul y o A s, Cha les Uni e si y, P ague,
Czech Republic
BÍBA, J.: Democ acy and Resilience: F om Neolibe al Go e nance o
Pos -Libe al Democ acy?
FILOZOFIA, 80, 2025, No 2, pp. 238 – 251
The pape explo es he ela ionship be ween esilience hinking and
democ a ic heo y, a opic o en o e looked in bo h ields. While
esilience hinking sha es on ological and epis emological
commi men s wi h neolibe al go e nance, i should no be equa ed
wi h neolibe alism, pa icula ly in i s c i ical o m. The pape
examines Da id Chandle ’s concep o pos -libe al democ acy, which
builds on a c i ical unde s anding o esilience. Howe e , i a gues
ha esilience hinking limi s human agency due o i s on ological
assump ions. As a esul , pos -libe al democ acy depa s om key
democ a ic concep s such as collec i e will, popula so e eign y,
delibe a ion, and ep esen a ion. This is due o esilience hinking’s
ejec ion o he mode nis libe al amewo k o au onomous subjec s
and i s debasemen o he social. The pape concludes ha while
esilience canno be educed o neolibe alism, esilience hinking
p omulga es an impo e ished no ion o democ acy, making i less
s imula ing o democ a ic heo y han i s widesp ead use in he social
sciences migh imply.
Keywo ds: esilience – pos -libe al democ acy – au onomy – on ology –
neolibe alism
The cu en c isis o democ acy, cha ac e ized as democ a ic decay, i.e. “ he
inc emen al deg ada ion o he s uc u es and subs ance o libe al
cons i u ional democ acy” (Daly 2019, 17), b ings wi h i he in e es o schola s
no only in democ acy’s possible demise bu also in i s de ence, li e, and
su i al. Democ a ic esilience schola ship is one o he p ominen s ands o
FILOZOFIA
Volume 80, Numbe 2, 2025
FILOZOFIA 80, 2 239
his end. I di e s om o he app oaches (e.g., mili an democ acy) (Ki shne
2014) in ha i does no ocus exclusi ely on s eng hening democ acy’s
obus ness (i.e., a democ a ic egime’s abili y o wi hs and shocks and c ises –
in he case o mili an democ acy, p ima ily by con ainmen o an i-democ a s)
bu also highligh s democ acy’s abili y o su i e and h i e ia in e nal
adap a ion (see, e.g., Me kel – Lüh mann 2021, 872). While he idea o democ a ic
esilience has become es ablished in mo e empi ically o ien ed esea ch (e.g.,
Boese 2021; Guas i 2020; Ro ny 2023), i has been haun ed by he ambigui y o
he e y no ion o democ a ic esilience. Josh Holloway and Rob Manwa ing
(2022) claim in hei e iew pape on ecen discussions wi hin he democ a ic
esilience schola ship ha he ield “su e s om an absence o clea de ini ions,
cohe en heo izing, and means o measu emen ” (Holloway – Manwa ing 2022,
69). They ha e also lis ed 14 de ini ions o democ a ic esilience (Holloway –
Manwa ing 2022, 90) in he li e a u e on democ a ic esilience. As Volacu and
Aligica no e, his ambigui y is challenging since “de elopmen o a esea ch a ea
a ound any concep equi es basic ag eemen on i s co e ene s” (Volacu –
Aligica 2023, 622).
The ambigui y o de ini ions wi hin he democ a ic esilience schola ship
has a leas h ee causes. Fi s , he success o he concep o esilience, which
“in he ecen pas apidly in il a ed as a eas o he social sciences,” leading
o he p oli e a ion o i s a ious concep ualisa ions (Walke – Coope 2011, 143;
see also Bo beau 2018). Second, as Kole s (2016, 92) a gues, “by la ge, poli ical
philosophe s ha e missed he esilience ush,” which means ha poli ical
philosophy, he discipline by de ini ion mos ocused on elabo a ing and
de ining concep s, ends o o e look he idea o esilience ha con ibu es o he
gap be ween esilience hinking, on one hand, and democ a ic esilience
schola ship and democ a ic and poli ical heo y mo e gene ally, on he o he .
Thi d, poli ical philosophe s end o igno e he idea o esilience because o
he widesp ead belie ha esilience is associa ed wi h neolibe al go e nance
(see, e.g., Joseph 2013; E ans – Reid 2014; Foucaul 2008; S iegle 2022; Zeb-
owski 2013).
The p esen pape is si ua ed wi hin he ield o poli ical philosophy. I
does no del e in o he discussion wi hin empi ically o ien ed democ a ic
esilience schola ship and does no in end o p o ide ye ano he de ini ion o
democ a ic esilience. Ins ead, i asks a mo e gene al ques ion abou he
ela ionship be ween democ acy and esilience hinking s emming om social-
ecological sys ems (Walke – Sal 2006). Hence, he pape ocuses on esilience
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hinking and i s ela ionship o democ a ic heo y, a opic ha democ a ic
heo y and democ a ic esilience schola ship end o neglec o add ess only
lee ingly (see Bu elli 2024; Volacu – Aligica 2023). I sugges s ha e en hough
esilience hinking sha es on ological and epis emological commi men s wi h
neolibe al go e nance, esilience canno be iden i ied wi h neolibe alism,
especially in esilience’s c i ical o m. To p o e he hesis, he pape engages
wi h Da id Chandle ’s concep ion o pos -libe al democ acy, a guably he
mos in luen ial concep ion o democ acy based on a c i ical unde s anding o
esilience. Howe e , he pape also sugges s ha esilience hinking, because
o i s on ology, p oposes a limi ed unde s anding o human agency (Schmid
2015; Joseph 2016). This leads o pos -libe al democ acy being a ela i ely
idiosync a ic no ion o democ acy, one ha iden i ies democ acy wi h
e lec ion on he inne li e and, he e o e, e uses some o he che ished
democ a ic heo y concep s such as collec i e will, popula so e eign y,
delibe a ion, and ep esen a ion, o name jus a ew (Chandle 2014b; Chandle
2014c, 162 – 180). The pape sugges s ha his impo e ished no ion o
democ acy esul s om esilience hinking’s e usal o he mode nis libe al
amewo k o au onomous subjec s and he debasemen o he social. The
pape concludes ha al hough esilience canno be iden i ied wi h
neolibe alism, esilience hinking is s ill less s imula ing o democ a ic
hough han he widesp ead use o he esilience concep in social sciences
migh sugges .
The pape is s uc u ed in o h ee pa s. The i s wo pa s b ie ly discuss
he genealogy o he esilience concep wi hin social-ecological sys ems and F.
A. Hayek’s unde s anding o adap a ion as a c ucial ea u e o esilience’s
on ology o adap i e sys ems. The pape ’s inal sec ion u ns o Da id
Chandle ’s concep o pos -libe al democ acy as an example o a c i ical
esilience’s ake on democ a ic heo y.
I. F om Ecological o Social Resilience
As sugges ed abo e, he concep o esilience (i.e., i s meaning, o igin, and
genealogy) is con es ed (Bou beau 2018). The e o e, i s in e p e a ion a ies
ac oss a ious disciplines, om enginee ing o psychology. Howe e , he e is
a consensus ha esilience in he social and poli ical sciences o igina es in
ecology (G o e 2018; Walke – Coope 2011). C aw o d S anley Holling’s 1973
pape on he esilience and s abili y o ecological sys ems is widely ega ded
as a ounda ional s udy in he ecological unde s anding o esilience. Holling,
d awing on e olu iona y heo y, whose main “pay-o ,” he claimed, is o “s ay
FILOZOFIA 80, 2 241
in he game” (Holling 1973, 18), i.e., o p ese e he sys em, highligh ed wo
ways o concei ing how sys ems migh be p ese ed: esilience and s abili y.
He de ined s abili y as a sys em’s abili y o e u n o equilib ium a e a
empo a y pe u ba ion. In con as , esilience was de ined as he “pe sis ence
o ela ionships wi hin a sys em” (Holling 1973, 17), meaning he sys em’s
capaci y o abso b change while main aining i s co e unc ions. F om his
pe spec i e, a sys em can be highly esilien ye ela i ely uns able; in o he
wo ds, esilience is compa ible wi h signi ican luc ua ion.
Acco ding o Holling, he dis inc ion be ween s abili y and esilience also
de e mines di e en app oaches o sys ems managemen based on di e en
epis emologies. The s abili y app oach emphasizes main aining a s able and
iden ical equilib ium, implying a p edic able wo ld wi h minimal luc ua ions.
By con as , he esilience app oach equi es accep ing ha i is impossible o
achie e comple e knowledge, acknowledging human igno ance, and unde -
s anding ha “ u u e e en s a e expec ed bu ha hey will be unexpec ed”
(Holling 1973, 21).
The concep o esilience la e expanded in o social science unde he
heading “social-ecological esilience.” This iew highligh s ha “people and
na u e” a e “in e dependen sys ems” ha can’ be unde s ood independen ly
(Folke e al. 2010, 2; Adge 2000). Howe e , his ex ension also means a
e o mula ion o he esilience concep . Whe eas o Holling, he sys em
equi ed esilience only in he p esence o ex e nal shocks, meaning ha in he
case o hei absence, he sys em could exis wi hou esilience; social-ecological
esilience sees bo h sys ems as in e ac ing, which places shocks and changes a
he e y co e o social-ecological sys ems. In o he wo ds, while o Holling
esilience was ex e nal o he sys em, social-ecological sys em makes change
and esilience he sys em’s on ological p op ie y. Following his, he social-
ecological sys em app oach o esilience di e en ia es wo s a egies o
esilience (o s aying in he game): adap abili y and ans o mabili y. Adap -
abili y in ol es he capaci y o social-ecological sys em “ o lea n, combine
expe ience and knowledge, adjus i s esponses o changing ex e nal d i e s
and in e nal p ocesses, and con inue de eloping wi hin he cu en s abili y
domain” (Folke e al. 2010, 2). By con as , ans o mabili y cap u es he
capaci y o social-ecological sys em o “ ans o m he s abili y landscape i sel ”
and become “a undamen ally new sys em when ecological, economic, o social
s uc u es make he exis ing sys em un enable” (Folke e al. 2010, 2 – 3).
Howe e , many au ho s ha e no ed he simila i y be ween his
unde s anding o na u al and socioeconomic sys ems, such as ma ke s. Some
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(see, e.g., Walke – Coope , 2011, 144) e en p oclaimed esilience’s “ideological
i wi h a neolibe al philosophy o complex adap i e sys ems” as de eloped
in he la e wo ks o F. A. Hayek. The connec ion be ween ecological hinking
and economics o e en neolibe alism should no be su p ising as hey all sha e
he iew o he wo ld as a sel - egula ing mechanism ending owa ds
equilib ium. In his con ex , Ch is Zeb owski (2013, 164) poin s o he “co-
cons i u ion” o disciplines o economics and ecology, emphasizing he ac
ha ecology has been unde he in luence o Ca l Linnaeus’s 1749 seminal
wo k The Oeconomy o Na u e, o iginally unde s ood as “na u e’s economy.”
Mo eo e , i was Thomas Mal hus’s concep o na u al selec ion ha in luenced
Da win’s heo y o e olu ion, and, in u n, e olu iona y heo y in luenced
many 19 h- and 20 h-cen u y poli ical hinke s, including he god a he s o
neolibe alism, Wal e Lippmann and F. A. Hayek (e.g., Hayek 1988, 23 – 28;
S iegle 2022).
A close look a he ela ionship be ween esilience hinking based on
social-ecological esilience and neolibe alism e eals key a eas o hei
in e connec ion: epis emic-on ological and go e nance. Le us s a wi h he
epis emic-on ological le el. Bo h neolibe alism and esilience hinking sha e a
o m o epis emic modes y. This s ems om bo h app oaches’ concep ion o
he wo ld as being subjec o cons an lux and change, beyond he ull g asp
o human eason. Hence, economis Douglass C. No h de ines he wo ld as
non-e godic, by which he means ha he wo ld has no s able s uc u e ha
would allow us o de elop a heo y ha could be “applied ime a e ime,
consis en ly” (No h 1999, 2).
Rega ding go e nance, he non-e godic wo ld o cons an change and lux
causes pe manen dange , unce ain y, and he consequen secu i iza ion o
li e. Unce ain y esul s om he impossibili y o calcula ing p obabili y
dis ibu ions in a non-e godic wo ld due o i s pe manen changes. The e o e,
knowing he ou comes o bo h social and na u al p ocesses in ad ance is
impossible. As o he dange , i is pa and pa cel o biological li e i sel , which
can ne e be sa e due o i s ulne abili y and mo ali y. Simila ly, in neolibe al
as well as libe al hough , dange a ises pa ly om he eedom o he
indi iduals o pu sue hei in e es s, om hei ulne abili y and abili y o
choose o a oid pain and su e ing. As Foucaul claims, “The mo o o
libe alism is: ‘Li e dange ously’“ (Foucaul 2008, 66, 171 – 173).
This awa eness o he non-eliminable dange and he ulne abili y ha is
i s sou ce, oge he wi h he non-e godic na u e o he wo ld, de e mines he
sha ed na u e o he go e nance p ac ices o bo h social-ecological esilience

FILOZOFIA 80, 2 243
and neolibe alism. These p ac ices shi om unde s anding go e nance ia
mo e o less s able sociological ca ego ies like class, na ion-s a e, o social
iden i y o seeing he wo ld as comp ising o a iable webs o o e lapping
ela ionships be ween indi iduals and hei en i onmen . Coming o e ms
wi h one's ulne abili y hen equi es, on a biological le el, esilience as an
endless p ocess o adap a ion o indi idual o ganisms and en i e ecosys ems
o he en i onmen al condi ions hey a e exposed o and depend on. Simila ly,
neolibe al go e nance unde s ands li e as a ne e -ending p ocess o
adap a ion by he neolibe al subjec s o he changing s a e o hei en i onmen
beyond hei con ol (Reid 2016, 52).
II. Hayek and he Psychological Na u e o Adap a ion P ocess
As sugges ed abo e, he non-e godic wo ld o ulne able ac o s equi es
go e nance p ac ices wi h adap a ion a hei co e. Saying ha , howe e ,
implies ha i is i al o unde s and he adap a ion p ocesses and he
cons ain s and demands ha a e placed on adap ing ac o s. In his ega d, F.
A. Hayek’s unde s anding o adap a ion as a psychological p ocess is
commonly conside ed seminal o esilience hinking (see, e.g., Walke – Coope
2011; Schmid 2015; Chandle 2016, 34 – 39). Hayek in e p e s he issue o
adap a ion as a ques ion o e olu ion, which, he says, “is a p ocess o
con inuous adap a ion o un o eseeable e en s, o con ingen ci cums ances
which could no ha e been p edic ed” (Hayek 1988, 25). Fo Hayek, he subjec
capable o adap a ion is he esul o he e olu iona y p ocess, which, as he
epea edly emphasises, is unin ended and canno be con olled o p edic ed by
eason since he human mind i sel is he esul o e olu ion. Hayek hus
con as s e olu ion wi h “cons uc i is a ionalism,” which alsely sees “ he
human mind as an en i y s anding ou side he cosmos o na u e and socie y,
a he han being i sel he p oduc o he same p ocess o e olu ion o which
he ins i u ions o socie y a e due” (Hayek 2021, 19 – 20).
Hayek dis inguishes biological and cul u al e olu ion (Hayek 1988, 11 –
17). While biological e olu ion endows humans wi h ins inc s h ough genes,
he cul u al e olu ion leads o he eme gence o ules ha go e n man and
c ea e he “ex ended o de o human coope a ion.” These ules a ose
spon aneously and unin en ionally in he cou se o cul u al e olu ion, and
“men end o dislike [ hese ules], whose signi icance hey usually ail o
unde s and, whose alidi y hey canno p o e” (Hayek 1988, 6). Howe e , by
his, Hayek makes clea , i s ly, ha we do no lea n hese ules by eason bu
by adi ion and imi a ion (Hayek 1988, 21 – 23), i.e., by ollowing ules ha
244
ha e p o en hemsel es in na u al selec ion, and, secondly, ha hese new
ules o e ide o eplace gene ically inhe i ed ins inc s, which also means ha
he human mind “does no so much make ules as consis o ules o conduc ”
(Hayek 2021, 35).
This poin sugges s ha he adap a ion p ocess is psychological by i s
na u e. Hayek, who s udied psychology be o e deciding o ocus on
economics, add essed his opic a leng h in his The Senso y O de (2017),
o iginally published in 1952. The e, Hayek de eloped a speci ic o m o neu al
ne wo k heo y, which became he basis o his heo y o spon aneous o de
(see, e.g., Gaus 2006). Ve y b ie ly, he cen al issue in Hayek’s psychological
doc ine is he ela ionship be ween physical and phenomenal o de . While he
physical o de classi ies hings acco ding o whe he hey lead o simila
ex e nal e en s, he phenomenal o de classi ies hings based on hei senso y
quali ies, such as colou s, sounds, as es, e c. Howe e , he dis inc ion be ween
hese o de s should no be unde s ood as he di e ence be ween eali y and
appea ance bu a he as “ he di e ences o e en s in hei e ec s upon each
o he and he di e ences in hei e ec s on us” (Hayek 2017, 138). The ask o
heo e ical psychology, hen, is o explain he phenomenal o de and i s
noncong uence wi h he physical o de , which – as Hayek sugges s – is a
consequence o he “s uc u e o hese o ganisms” (Hayek 2017, 141), i.e., in
o he wo ds, a esul o he cen al ne ous sys em.
I is impo an o see ha he di ision be ween phenomenal and physical
o de makes he ex e nal wo ld – bo h he na u al wo ld and he wo ld o social
hie a chies – p incipally unknowable and uncon ollable by human eason and
incapable o ans o ma ion by pu pose ul human beha iou . Indeed, his
di ision places in e nal limi s on human easoning esul ing om he
psychological s uc u es o he gi en subjec s ( hei ins inc s, ules lea ned by
imi a ion, and pas expe iences), a he han om o ien a ion owa ds a u u e
goal. Thus, no human beha iou can be explained wi hou “in e ening
p ocesses in he b ain” (Hayek 2017, 174).
Hence, his no ion o adap a ion/e olu ion and i s co olla y unde -
s anding o esilience p esen wo challenges o democ a ic hough : a
debasemen o he social and a denial o au onomy. The ac ha adap a ion
akes place a he milieu in é ieu , i.e., “ he in e nal en i onmen , wi hin which
he cen al ne ous sys em unc ions” (Hayek 2017, 205), means ha i is no
he ex e nal social wo ld ha causes social hie a chies bu indi idual esponses
o ex e nal e en s condi ioned by in e ening p ocesses in each indi idual’s
b ains, and as such de e mine hei ac ions in he social wo ld. This also implies
FILOZOFIA 80, 2 245
he impossibili y o au onomous subjec s and he consequen impossibili y o
he wo ld’s ans o ma ion h ough sel -di ec ed ac ion (Chandle 2016, 36).
Indi idual humans and he en i e human communi y a e concei ed as
biological o ganisms ha e ol e “in hei s uc u e o ac i i y” (Hayek 2017,
206) h ough hei adap a ion in a con ingency-d i en e olu iona y p ocess.
While human beings a e no concei ed o de e minis ically in his p ocess
because he ules ha go e n ou ac ions mu a e, and i is impossible o
de e mine in ad ance which mu a ions will p e ail, i is no possible o hink
o humans as au onomous i by au onomy we unde s and “ he wish on he
pa o he indi idual o be his own mas e ” whose decisions depend on hem
alone and “no on ex e nal o ces o wha e e kind.” Au onomy p esupposes
ha I am mo ed “by conscious pu poses, which a e my own, no by causes
which a ec me, as i we e, om ou side” (Be lin 1969, 131).
III. Pos -Libe al Democ acy beyond Neolibe alism
The p e ious sec ion concluded ha he no ion o adap a ion in esilience
hinking esul s in a debasemen o he social and a denial o au onomy. The
ques ion is how hese epis emological-on ological assump ions a e compa ible
wi h democ acy – in o he wo ds, wha concep ion o democ acy s ems om
esilience hinking. Ne e heless, he no ion o democ acy is a ela i ely
neglec ed concep in esilience esea ch compa ed o concep s like c ises, isk,
and secu i y. Fo example, he jou nal Resilience, he main ou le o discussing
opics conce ning esilience (published om 2013 o 2019), does no ea u e any
a icles ocusing p ima ily on democ a ic heo y. Howe e , I ind Da id
Chandle ’s (2014b and 2014c) concep o pos -libe al democ acy o be he mos
de eloped discussion o democ acy in esilience hinking. Chandle claims
ha pos -libe al democ acy has been enabled by he cu en pos -ideological
zei geis ollowing he end o he con es a ion be ween le and igh o s a e
powe . The main h us o pos -libe al democ acy is “ eeing democ acy om
i s libe al limi s” (Chandle 2014b, 43), whe e hese limi s a e iden i ied wi h a
linea ela ionship be ween s a e powe and socie y. Pos -libe al democ acy,
he e o e, does no ocus on he cons uc ion o a uni ied collec i e will dis inc
om he pa icula wills o indi idual ci izens and i s ep esen a ion in s a e
ins i u ions bu on “ he p oblema ic o legi imizing ule h ough b inging
democ acy down o he socie al le el o plu al and indi idua ed ‘e e yday
li e’“ (Chandle 2014c, 163).
As men ioned abo e, Chandle accep s he on ological and epis emic
limi a ions o esilience hinking, leading him o ejec he mode nis
246
amewo k o democ a ic heo y. Hence, he asse s ha “democ acy can be
p omulga ed wi hou he assump ion o uni e sali y, a ionali y, and
au onomy” (Chandle 2014c, 164). Ne e heless, e en hough he builds on a
non-e godic on ology, Chandle di e en ia es his posi ion om neolibe alism
on wo accoun s. Fi s ly, Chandle a gues speci ically agains Hayek’s
o e es ima ion o ma ke a ionali y and i s becoming a sel -adap i e deus ex
machina and sugges s ha Hayek o e looks ha he ma ke is also de e mined
by he e hical s ances o gi en communi ies (Chandle 2014a; see also
Koopman 2009). Secondly, by e e ing o Dewey’s p agma ism, Chandle
sees democ acy as “a mechanism o enable he esponsi e and adap i e
capaci ies” o indi iduals (Chandle 2014c, 162), p esupposing a speci ic o m
o human agency.
Chandle de elops he concep o pos -libe al democ acy by discussing he
concep o he public in Wal e Lippmann’s and John Dewey’s wo ks. His
s a ing poin is Lippmann’s diagnosis o he G ea Socie y (i.e., mode n
capi alis socie y) and i s challenges o democ acy.1
Ins ead o ha one g and sys em o e olu ion and p og ess, which he
nine een h cen u y ound so eassu ing, he e would appea o be
innume able sys ems o e olu ion, a iously a ec ing each o he , some
linked, some in collision, bu each in some undamen al aspec mo ing a i s
own pace and on i s own e ms. The disha monies o his une en e olu ion
a e he p oblems o mankind (Lippmann 2022, 73 – 74).
Acco ding o Lippmann, he disha monies o G ea Socie y e eal he
una ainabili y o he ounda ional democ a ic ideal o he so e eign and
omnicompe en ci izen (Lippmann 2022, 29). The eason o his is he lag ha
s ems om he logic o e olu ion, om he ac ha adap a ion o
en i onmen al o social change occu s only a e he change has aken place.
This means ha human unde s anding and knowledge o wo ld a ai s ne e
co espond o he cu en eali y. I should be emphasized he e ha
Lippmann’s a gumen is no inhe en ly eli is and is based no on he di e ence
in he men al capaci ies o he masses and he eli es bu a he on he complex
na u e o mode n socie y. Consequen ly, he public canno be unde s ood as
cons i u ed h ough a delibe a i e public sphe e o ep esen a i e ins i u ions.
Ins ead, publics a e concei ed as plu al and luid, empo a ily eme ging
1 The ollowing pa ag aphs do no claim o be exhaus i e no o p o ide he only possible
in e p e a ion o he so-called Lippmann-Dewey deba e. Thei aim, abo e all, is o explica e
Chandle ‘s a gumen .