The Politics of Revenue Bargaining in Africa: Triggers, Processes, and Outcomes

Kjæ , Anne Me e (Ed.); Sand ad Ul iksen, Ma ianne (Ed.); Bak, Ane Ka oline (Ed.)
Book
The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining in A ica: T igge s,
P ocesses, and Ou comes
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Ox o d Uni e si y P ess (OUP)
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Kjæ , Anne Me e (Ed.); Sand ad Ul iksen, Ma ianne (Ed.); Bak, Ane Ka oline
(Ed.) (2024) : The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining in A ica: T igge s, P ocesses, and Ou comes, ISBN
978-0-19-196482-4, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, Ox o d,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/9780192868787.001.0001
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The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining in A ica
The Poli ics o Re enue
Ba gaining in A ica
T igge s, P ocesses, and Ou comes
Edi ed by
Anne Me e Kjæ
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen
and
Ane Ka oline Bak

G ea Cla endon S ee , Ox o d, OX2 6DP,
Uni ed Kingdom
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Published in he Uni ed S a es o Ame ica by Ox o d Uni e si y P ess
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ISBN 9780192868787
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192868787.001.0001
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Acknowledgemen s
The ea ly ideas o his book eme ged a decade ago. In 2013, Jalia Kanga e,
Mesha ch Ka usiimeh, Ma ianne Ul iksen, and Anne Me e Kjæ we e wo k-
ing on a con ibu ion o an UNRISD esea ch p og amme on domes ic
e enue mobiliza ion o inancing social policies. The p og amme was un
byKa jaHujoa UNRISD.Whiledoing hiswo k,we ealized he ewasalack
o sys ema icandcompa a i e esea chin ocaseso mic o-le el e enueba -
gaining be ween speci ic g oups o e enue p o ide s and he s a e. In ac ,
we knew li le o he poli ical dynamics o e enue ba gaining in A ica.
Jalia, Ma ianne, and Anne Me e pu sued he idea o e a couple o yea s
and discussed i on se e al occasions in Aa hus and Johannesbu g. Would
aid dependence be u he educed and would his lead o inc eased e o s
a aising domes ic e enues and mo e domes ic s a e–socie y ecip oci y? A
i s unsuccess ul p oposal led o ou na owing in on e enue ba gaining as
he cen e o a en ion in he analy ical amewo k we hen de eloped. This
became he cen al ocus in he p oposal o he esea ch p og amme ‘Poli i-
cal Se lemen s and Re enue Ba gains in A ica’, which was g an ed unding
in 2016 by Danida’s Consul a i e Resea ch Commi ee (16-03-AU). Conse-
quen ly, he acknowledgemen s o his book would be incomple e wi hou
men ioning hose ha made he b oade esea ch p ojec happen h ough
commen ing and inspi ing discussions: Ole The kildsen and he membe s
o he compa a i e poli ics sec ion a he Depa men o Poli ical Science,
Aa hus Uni e si y. Also, Jalia Kanga e, who was ini ially pa o he p oposal
bu who hengo aposi ionwi h heIDSinSussex andhad olea eus,o e ed
aluable insigh s. Membe s o he esea ch sec ion o compa a i e poli ics a
he Depa men o Poli ical Science also o e ed gene ous commen s on he
p oposal.
The esea ch p og amme ‘Poli ical Se lemen s and Re enue Ba gains in
A ica’ (PSRB) www.ps.au.dk/ps b de eloped in o a uly collabo a i e e o
and esea ch on e enue ba gaining in pa icula in Tanzania and Uganda
bu also Senegal, Togo, and Zambia. The p ojec has also seen c oss-coun y
collabo a ions wi h impo an compa a i e con ibu ions. P o esso Bak-
ibinga and D Jamal Msami as heads o sou h eams o he PSRB p og amme
ha ebeen hebes pa ne s: hankyou.All hesep ojec s ha ebeendiscussed
con inuously a i e inc edibly engaging and inspi ing p ojec wo kshops in
i Acknowledgemen s
Aa hus in 2016, En ebbe in 2017, Bagamoyo in 2017, A usha in 2019, and
hen inally again in Aa hus in Augus 2022. Thank you o all he p og amme
esea che s o always being keen o p o ide commen s and cons uc i e
eedback on ea ly as well as la e pape d a s. In hese p ojec wo kshops, we
we e also lucky enough o ge inpu s om he ou side. Thank you o Odd-
Helge Fjelds ad, who joined us in En ebbe and Aa hus; o Ma ilde Tho sen
who was wi h us in Bagamoyo; and Pe Tidemand, who hos ed us in A usha
and joined us in Aa hus.
The impo ance o hese PSRB wo kshops o his book canno be empha-
sized enough. Qui e conc e ely, he heo e ical amewo k, which is ca ied
h ough in his book, is la gely buil on a collabo a i e e o and some imes
s enuous concep ual and heo e ical discussions a hese wo kshops.
The book i sel came in o being when ou e iewe s p o ided excellen
eedback on he ini ial book p oposal sen o Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. The
commen swe eexcep ionally hough ul andmadeus hinkand wo kha de
on he common amewo k as well as in oduc o y and concluding chap e s.
Thank you also o he edi o s Adam Swallow and Vicki Sun e o hei
pa ience and belie in ou wo k.
Anna Pe sson, Lise Rakne , and Anne Me e Kjæ o ganized a panel abou
e enue ba gaining a he ECPR join sessions in Cyp us in 2018, and we
hankpa icipan sa hepanel,andAnnaPe ssonandCh is ian onHalden-
wang in pa icula . Se e al o he chap e s he e became a pa o he book
p ojec in he wake o his wo kshop.
We p esen ed di e en chap e s a a ious e en s: he E ec i e S a es and
Inclusi e De elopmen con e ence in Manches e in Sep embe 2019; he
IPSA in B isbane in 2018; he NoPSA in 2021; he annual mee ings o he
Danish Poli ical Science Associa ions; and a wo kshop a he Cen e o
Eme ging A ican Economies a Roskilde Uni e si y in Decembe 2019. We
hank Sam Hickey, La s Buu , Rasmus Hundsbæk Pe e sen, and Lindsay
Whi ield o commen s on hese occasions. The E ec i e S a es and Inclu-
si e De elopmen p og amme a Manches e has been a special sou ce o
inspi a ion, and we hank in pa icula Sam Hickey and Tom Good ellow o
hei willingness o discuss hei own book p ojec s and pass on expe iences.
Fu he mo e, se e al annual mee ings o he A ican S udies Associa ion
ha e p o ided he se ing o p esen ing and discussing many o he book’s
empi icalchap e s,includinginBos onin2019whe eNic an deWalle ac ed
as discussan on ou book panel and ga e insigh ul commen s o which we
a e g a e ul, and a he Taxa ion in A ica panel in 2020 whe e Ca he ine
Boone was ano he b illian discussan .
Acknowledgemen s ii
Fo commen s on many pa s o he book p ojec along he way, we would
like o hank he Compa a i e Poli ics sec ion a he Depa men o Poli ical
Science, Aa hus Uni e si y, and he Danish Cen e o Wel a e S udies a he
Depa men o Poli ical Science, Uni e si y o Sou he n Denma k.
Mia Woe p o ided excellen esea ch assis ance o he in oduc o y
chap e , o which we a e hank ul.
We hank ‘ he Be gen ax people’ Odd-Helge and Lise Rakne o con inu-
ous discussions abou he book p ojec , and axa ion and de elopmen issues
ingene al.Thesecon e sa ionsha ebeenimmenselyimpo an o hebook,
and we a e hank ul o Odd and Lise o you con inuous suppo .
Mick Moo e, always a ha d bu ai c i ic, has commen ed on a ious
pape s o ou s which ha e de eloped in o pa s o he book, and we owe a
lo o Mick’s way o hinking abou ax and he go e nance di idend.
We owe a special and hea el hanks o Ole The kildsen o his always
e y cle e and hough ul inpu s.
To he ‘Tax Ladies’—Rachel Beach, Ma ilde Jeppesen, and Ane Edsle
Jacobsen:Thankyou o allou e eningso ne dy axdiscussions,whichha e
ed in o his book and en iched i .
Finally, Anne e B uun Ande sen and Na asha Elizabe h Pe e a ha e been
e icien and pa ien wi h us in he language- e ision phase and we a e
e e nally g a e ul o you o bea ing wi h us.
2Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
hen poli ically o e uled. In his case, as in many o he s, he ba gaining
p ocess ends in ( he con inua ion o ) ax exemp ions. We a gue ha his ou -
come ep esen s a mic o-le el iscal con ac de ined as explici o implici
ag eemen s be ween uling eli es (o ep esen a i es he eo ) and indi idu-
als o g oups o e enue p o ide s ela ed o e enue p o ision. While no
an ag eemen conce ning an exchange o axes o goods o se ices, i is s ill
an ag eemen in which he ba gaining pa ies ecognize hei mu uali y and
in e dependence. Tax exemp ions may seem a poo choice om a e enue
mobiliza ion pe spec i e, bu hey accommoda e he demands o he a me s
and hepoli icalconce nso Ugandanpoli icians.This ensionbe ween iscal
andpoli icalin e es sisa hehea o hisbook.Th oughou hechap e s,we
p esen mic o-le el ins ances o e enue ba gaining ac oss i e A ican coun-
ies o explo e how and unde wha condi ions e enue ba gaining eme ges,
e ol es, and leads o iscal con ac s.
Ou heo e ical amewo k (Figu e 1.1) in o ms he case s udies p esen ed
in he empi ical chap e s, Chap e s 3–12. The bo om pa o he amewo k
illus a es how he e enue-ba gaining p ocesses un old a he mic o le el.
As we heo ize in Chap e 2, whe he and when e enue ba gaining leads o
mic o-le el iscal con ac s is condi ioned by wha igge ed he ba gaining,
how and whe e he ba gaining p ocesses un old, and in pa icula he ela i e
ba gaining posi ions o e enue p o ide s is-à- is uling eli es.
We ocus on he mic o le el o gain a nuanced and in-dep h unde s and-
ing o he poli ics o e enue ba gaining. Howe e , mic o-le el ins ances o
e enueba gaininga e o med bymac o-le el con ex s and ha emac o-le el
implica ions ( op pa o Figu e 1.1). Thus, we si ua e he mic ocosmoses o
e enue ba gaining wi hin coun ies’ poli ical con ex s, ha is, he poli ical
se lemen s. The poli ical se lemen app oach helps o disagg ega e s a e and
socie al ac o s and o pay a en ion o e enue p o ide s’ esou ces and ba -
gaining powe wi hin con ex s domina ed by in o mal clien elis ic ela ions
in esou ce-cons ained economies. The poli ical dynamics a play ac oss
he cases show, among o he hings, ha uling eli es (i.e. indi iduals who
ha e ei he o mal o in o mal posi ions o go e ning powe ) o en accep
ax exemp ions in o de o main ain hei posi ions o powe . We assess
whe he he mic o-le el iscal con ac s en ail some le el o esponsi eness
and epea ed in e ac ions be ween he uling eli e o ep esen a i es he eo
and e enue p o ide s; wha we e m s a e–socie y ecip oci y. Many o he
case s udies show ha go e nmen s p o e willing o nego ia e wi h e -
enue p o ide s— om big business o in o mal sec o wo ke s—and make
concessions, al hough hese a e o en in he o m o educed ax paymen s.

Poli ical se lemen
Holding powe o s a e and
socie al ac o s
T igge
Ac ions, e en s o changes
in ci cums ances ha
p omp nego ia ions
Rela i e ba gaining posi ions
Re enue p o ide s' o ganiza ional
and iscal impo ance is-a- is
uling eli es
Re enue ba gaining
Di ec o indi ec nego ia ions
be ween uling eli es and e enue
p o ide s ela ed o e enue
p o ision
Mic o-le el iscal con ac
Ag eemen s be ween indi idual o
g oups o e enue p o ide s and
uling eli es ela ed o e enue
p o ision
S a e-socie y ecip oci y
Responsi e and epea ed in e ac ion
be ween s a e and socie al
ac o s a ound policy
Mac o-le e
l
Mic o-le el
Figu e 1.1 The bookʼs heo e ical amewo k.
4Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
While he concessions gi en by go e nmen s do no amoun o inc eased
poli ical accoun abili y o imp o emen s in public se ice deli e y, ou
empi ical case s udies show ha nego ia ions can p omp esponsi eness and
epea edengagemen s.In somecases, hese engagemen sbecameins i u ion-
alizedwi hin he o mals a e s uc u es, he ebyha ing hepo en ial o mo e
beyond in o mal p ocesses o policymaking. Consequen ly, in his book, we
con ibu e o knowledge abou when and how expanding e enue mobi-
liza ion may p omp ins i u ionaliza ion o s a e–socie y in e ac ions a ound
axa ion.
In he ollowing, we begin by desc ibing he inc eased ocus on domes ic
e enue mobiliza ion, i s e ec on he poli iciza ion o axa ion, and whe he
cu en esea ch has ound signs o he eme gence o iscal social con ac s.
Second, we look back a he ea ly con ibu ions on axa ion and on s a e–
socie y ela ions in A ica and a gue ha poli ical changes since he 1990s
ha e e ilized he g ounds o a link be ween axa ion and s a e–socie y eci-
p oci y. Thi d, we ou line ou heo e ical con ibu ions o he iscal con ac
and hepoli icalse lemen heo ies( oppa o Figu e1.1).Finally,wese he
s age o s udying e enue ba gaining by p esen ing ou compa a i e design,
which includes case s udies in Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Senegal, and
Togo. Chap e 2 will hen de ail he heo e ical amewo k (bo om pa o
Figu e 1.1), explain he me hodological app oach, and b ie ly in oduce he
empi ical chap e s in he olume.
1.2 Expanding axa ion, poli icizing axa ion
Since he u n o he new millennium, he ocus on he impo ance o
domes ic e enue mobiliza ion in low o lowe -middle income coun ies
has inc eased immensely among academics, go e nmen s, and de elop-
men p ac i ione s alike. This is mos impo an ly explained by inc easing
demands o he inancing o de elopmen and public goods p o ision such
as imp o ed public in as uc u e and be e public se ices in heal h, educa-
ion, and social p o ec ion (IMF, 2018;UN, 2021). The UN’s ambi ious Sus-
ainable De elopmen Goals (SDGs), ag eed upon by all membe s a es, a e
a mani es a ion o hese demands and se e o ein o ce he need o de el-
opmen inancing, beyond wha can be achie ed by o e seas de elopmen
assis ance (ODA).
While o al ne ODA has e ec i ely inc eased in absolu e e ms in ecen
yea s, e en eaching i s highes -e e poin (USD 162 billion) in 2020, i s ill
only cons i u es a e y small p opo ion o he es ima ed amoun needed o
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 5
inance he SDGs, a ound USD 2.5 illion (Doumbia and Lau idsen, 2019;
Winckle Ande sen and The kildsen, 2019). The UN has acknowledged his
c i ical gap in he inancing o he SDGs, which led o he o mula ion o
he Addis Ababa Ac ion Agenda in 2015, and wi h i he in en ion o in e-
g a e inancing in o he wo k o eaching he SDGs. A designa ed UN Tax
Commi ee was es ablished o suppo , in pa icula , de eloping coun ies in
s eng hening ax sys ems and domes ic e enue mobiliza ion (see e.g. UN,
2021).
Inc easing deb bu dens ha e u he heigh ened he p essu e on go e n-
men s o expand domes ic e enue mobiliza ion o balance deb s ocks (Bak,
Jeppesen, and Kjæ , 2021;Smi h, 2021;OECD, 2021), a demand which has
become e en mo e p onounced since he COVID-19 pandemic.
A en ion o domes ic e enue mobiliza ion has inc eased and, since he
u n o he millennium, so oo has ax e enue ac oss A ica. Acco ding o
he IMF (2018), o al e enue, excluding g an s, inc eased om an a e age
o 14% o GDP in he 1990s o abou 18% in 2016, while o al ax e enues
inc eased om 11 o 15% in he same pe iod (Moo e, P icha d, and Fjeld-
s ad, 2018, 32). The same end is ound in se e al newly de eloped da ase s
(UNU-WIDER, 2021;Cogneau e al., 2021;Je en, 2022) which ha e sough
o imp o e bo h da a quali y and measu emen alidi y, as well as o bols e
a enues o compa ison o e enue ends ac oss ime and space. Albe s and
Suesse (2022) ca e ully calcula e eal ax e enue pe capi a om 1900 up
un il he p esen . They ind ha o he a e age A ican coun y, axa ion has
inc easedsince he1960s,bu ookala gejumpa he u no hemillennium.
Cogneau e al. (2021) ind ha in o me F ench colonies, ax pe GDP has
inc eased by 5.9 pe cen age poin s o GDP be ween independence and oday.
They ind ha his inc ease is la gely explained by na u al esou ce e enue,
bu o he esea che s a gue ha he inc ease ollows a ise in he capaci y o
ax socie y mo e b oadly (Je en e al., 2022;Moo e, 2021). Many so-called
mode n axes such as pe sonal and company income axa ion, and p ope y
axes had al eady been in oduced in colonial imes (Genschel and Seelkop ,
2022). Beyond a sus ained pe iod o economic g ow h in he 2000s, ecen
expansions in domes ic e enue mobiliza ion can be explained a leas pa ly
by g owing capaci y in ax adminis a ions, new echnological oppo uni-
ies, he adop ion o ax ins umen s ha a ge and accommoda e challenges
posed by he globalized economy, and he economic s uc u es and eali ies
on he g ound (Moo e, 2021).
The expec a ion among academics, dono s, and de elopmen p ac i ion-
e s alike is ha axa ion could be he sou ce o a ‘heal hy’ con lic be ween
ci izens, bu eauc a s, and poli icians, and be ween s a e and socie y mo e
6Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
b oadly (Moo e, 2004;B äu igam, 2008;P icha d, 2015;Lucas, 2017). As
indi iduals eel a highe iscal bu den, hey could be expec ed o make
demands o a e u n in he o m o imp o ed public goods and se ices
and mo e poli ical accoun abili y om s a e ac o s. In heo y, s a es will hen
seek o accommoda e hese demands because i is less adminis a i ely and
poli ically cos ly o ax people i hey a e hemsel es mo e willing o pay.
O e ime, such in e ac ions a ound axa ion ha e been heo ized o c e-
a e an exchange-based mac o-le el iscal social con ac , whe eby he s a e
deli e s public goods and se ices in e u n o ax compliance and e enue
(Le i, 1988;B äu igam, Moo e, and Fjelds ad, 2008;Moo e, P icha d, and
Fjelds ad, 2018;Bak, 2019).
Looking ac oss he con inen , axa ion has been sou ce o some con lic ,
as indi iduals and axpaye s ha e eac ed o new o inc eased axes. To high-
ligh a ew examples om ecen yea s: se e al A ican coun ies ha e sough
o ax social media, which me wi h s ong popula eac ions in, o example,
Uganda (Reu e s, 2018) and Benin (Okunoye, 2019); o o ax mobile money
ansac ions, which ook people o he s ee s in Ghana and Tanzania in 2021
(The Eas A ican, 2021;BBC, 2022). In Kenya, he emo al o VAT exemp-
ions o uel led o s ikes and widesp ead p o es s on social media and in
he s ee s in Sep embe 2018 (Mi i i, 2018); and in E hiopia, small business
owne s shu hei businesses o p o es agains a ax hike (A icanews, 2017).
Such p o es s o e speci ic axes spu e enue ba gaining be ween e enue
p o ide s and s a e ac o s, bu hey ela i ely a ely e ol e a ound a new
demand o publicse icedeli e yandaccoun abili yinexchange o he ax.
Ra he , he demand is ha he p oposed change in axa ion is no adop ed.
Thep o es sa esome imessuccess ulinp omp inggo e nmen s o espond.
In Benin, o example, he social media ax was ne e adop ed; in Kenya he
sugges ed VAT a e on uel was hal ed om 16 o 8%; and in E hiopia, he
ax hike was abolished.
Tax g ie ances some imes coincide wi h la ge g ie ances and dissa is-
ac ions wi h go e nmen . One o -ci ed case om he 1990s is he p o es s
agains inc eases in VAT in Ghana, which led o la ge-scale an i-go e nmen
p o es s (P icha d, 2015, ch. 3). In he 2017 case o E hiopia, he so-called
ax hike p o es s e ol ed in o an i-go e nmen p o es s in O omia s a e,
la gely explained by he O omo people’s al eady s ained ela ions wi h he
na ional go e nmen (Dahi , 2017). Howe e , such cases a e a e and he
ci cums ances o en qui e speci ic, as in O omia.
Summing up, he e a e signs o poli iciza ion o axa ion in he wake o
inc easing domes ic e enue mobiliza ion on he A ican con inen . Bu i is
no clea wha his poli iciza ion implies o he expec a iono he eme gence
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 7
o iscal social con ac s be ween s a e and socie y, especially ones cen ed on
he exchange o axes o poli ical accoun abili y and public se ice deli e y.
1.3 Signs o iscal social con ac s?
Du ing he pas wo decades, he schola ly li e a u e on axa ion and iscal
con ac s has g own immensely, seeking o answe whe he axa ion leads
o iscal social con ac s and whe he i has posi i e so-called go e nance
di idends (Moo e, 2004;2015) such as poli ical accoun abili y and ep esen-
a ion. I is ai ly es ablished ha , on he mac o le el and ac oss con inen s,
highe axa ion le els a e posi i ely co ela ed wi h ce ain poli ical ou -
comes. Taxa ion has been linked s a is ically o le els o democ acy (Ross,
2004;Baska an, 2014), he quali y o go e nance (Baska an and Bigs en,
2013;B oms, 2015), and e ical accoun abili y (Dom, 2018). Su ey-based
esea ch examining he beha iou al e ec s o axa ion upon he indi iduals
paying axes ha e also ound posi i e e ec s on a ious measu es o poli ical
engagemen o accoun abili y demands (Pale , 2013;B oms, 2015;Sju sen,
2018). Howe e , as Dom (2018, 31) no es, he obse a ions o an a e age
co ela ion on he mac o le el ells us li le abou whe he and how axa ion
ela es o such poli ical ou comes in indi idual coun ies. No do indi idual-
le el su ey expe imen s ansla e in o implica ions abou he po en ial o
socie al and poli ical changes.
While i seems ha axa ion may ha e some e ec s on poli ical ou comes,
he e a e ew signs o mac o-le el exchange-based iscal social con ac s
whe eby imp o ed public se ice deli e y is p o ided in e u n o ax
paymen s (Moo e, P icha d, and Fjelds ad, 2018,Guima aes, Duca, and
Ndlo u, 2018;Fjelds ad and The kildsen, 2020). As Fjelds ad and The k-
ildsen (2020, 38) s a e, ‘we do no know o any majo poli ical deals
( iscal con ac s) in ecen yea s in ol ing an inc ease in b oad-based
axes in exchange o he p o ision o public se ices (educa ion, heal h,
oads, e c.)’.
The e is also a la ge s and o quali a i e case-based esea ch ha aims o
u he explo e he e ec s o axa ion on poli ical ou comes and s a e–socie y
ela ions (Rakne and Gloppen, 2003;Eubank, 2012;Jibao and P icha d,
2015;P icha d, 2015;Rakne , 2017;Ga and Owen, 2018;Good ellow and
Owen, 2018;Bak,2019;Schneide ,2020).Mos o his esea chdemons a es
ha axa ion can p omp s a e–socie y in e ac ions. Howe e , hey emain
isola ed case s udies wi h ew o no c oss-coun y compa isons, and hey
do no sys ema ically disagg ega e he causal mechanisms be ween axa ion

8Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
and i s poli ical ou comes. One no able excep ion is P icha d’s (2015) s udy
o ax ba gaining ac oss he di e se poli ical con ex s o Ghana, Kenya, and
E hiopia. He inds ha axa ion can lead o changes in public se ice p o i-
sion, ax policy, and adminis a ion and expansions in accoun abili y, and he
goes some way owa ds heo izing when go e nmen s’ ax ini ia i es lead o
ax ba gaining, ocusing on a limi ed se o ins i u ional condi ions.
The schola ly in e es has been mainly ocused on b oad-based exchanges
o axa ion in e u n o some hing. As P icha d himsel la e obse ed
(2019, 9), much o he o iginal iscal con ac li e a u e on he mac o le el
has s udied la ge, ela i ely d ama ic shi s in ax collec ion and acco dingly
iscal con ac s. Pe haps we ha e been looking in he w ong places? The e
is g owing e idence ha changes in axa ion do lead o e enue ba gaining
a ound ax policies, bu as shown abo e, a ely a he mac o le el. Ba gaining
iscon ined ospeci icg oupso axpaye so ospeci icins anceso ax e o m
o eac ions o changes in ax adminis a ion. As Moo e, P icha d, and Fjeld-
s ad(2018,182)ha e igh lya gued, we need oexplo eno somuchwhe he
mac o-le el iscal con ac s a e eme ging, bu a he ‘wha kinds o ax ba -
gains a e likely in di e en con ex s’. Inc emen al ye signi ican changes and
poli ical e ec s a e also likely o un old a he mic o le el, whe e indi iduals
o g oups nego ia e wi h s a e ac o s o e axes.
A c i ical and mo e ecen s and o he li e a u e has s essed he impo -
ance o con ex ualizing axa ion o unde s and i s e ec s below he mac o
le el (Fjelds ad, 2001;Kjæ , 2009;Bodea and Lebas, 2016;B oms, 2017;
P icha d and an den Boogaa d, 2017;Meaghe , 2018;Bak, 2019; an den
Boogaa d, P icha d, Beach, and Mohiuddin, 2021). Speci ically, his esea ch
shows ha whe he o no socie al ac o s engage wi h s a e ac o s a ound
ax- ela ed issues is condi ioned by hei capaci y o collec i e ac ion, ax-
collec ion me hods, he p esence o communi y-based se ice, and social
ci cums ances such as gende , e hnic iden i y, and pa onage ies. Local poli-
ics and socie al s uc u es condi ion he e ec s o axa ion bu , impo an ly,
a e also shaped, dis up ed, o ein o ced by axa ion. Thus, when obse ing
he e ec s o inc eases in axa ion on s a e–socie y ela ions and poli ical ou -
comes, we need o pay a en ion o he e ec s on social and poli ical powe
s uc u es.
The e o e, his book embeds he analysis o e enue ba gaining wi hin a
heo e ical amewo kcognisan o mac o-andmic o-le el powe s uc u es.
This implies ha as we s udy e enue ba gaining a he mic o le el, we pay
pa icula a en ion o how he powe posi ions o e enue p o ide s is-à-
is uling eli es shape he p ocesses and po en ial ou comes. We heed Mick
Moo e’s ad ice, and ‘go beyond he ini ial eac ions o axa ion o each ype
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 9
o ac o and ake in o accoun he ways in which hey hen in e ac , whe he
con lic ual, coope a i ely, o in mo e complex ways’ (Moo e, 2007, 16). This
enables us o obse e how nego ia ions ela ed o e enue p o ision esul
om and eed in o exis ing powe s uc u es, and he eby we can de e mine
whe he and when such momen s could indeed be e med ecip ocal in e ac-
ion a ound axa ion. We gain a deepe unde s anding o he po en ial e ec s
o axa ion on s a e–socie y ecip oci y and, in u n, a new pe spec i e on he
implica ions o he ecen inc eased poli iciza ion o axa ion in A ica.
In he ollowing, we u he de elop ou unde s anding o s a e–socie y
ecip oci y and how i ela es o axa ion. We p esen a b oade and olde
li e a u e on s a e–socie y ela ions and disengagemen in A ica and ela e
his o ecen poli ical p og ess on he con inen . We a gue ha , in a con ex
o egula elec ions, inc eased poli ical compe i ion, and s eng hened ci il
socie y, he s age may be se o s a e–socie y ecip oci y o de elop h ough
e enue ba gaining.
1.4 Taxa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica
The idea ha expansions in axa ion in less democ a ic de eloping coun ies
could cause accoun abili y and s a e–socie y engagemen o igina es om
Eu opean s a e-building expe iences. The compa a i e his o ical accoun s
by Le i (1988) un old he idea ha axa ion in ol es some kind o ba -
gained exchanges be ween s a es and hei ci izens. D awing speci ically
on he eme gence o ins i u ionalized ep esen a ion and accoun abili y in
B i ain and jux aposing en ie s a es wi h iscal s a es, Moo e (2004) de el-
oped he p oposi ion o a go e nance di idend o axa ion in con empo a y
de eloping coun ies. Building on hese seminal wo ks, he edi ed olume
by B äu igam, Fjelds ad, and Moo e (2008) cemen ed he po en ial links
be ween axa ion and he de elopmen o poli ical ins i u ions and s a e-
building in de eloping coun ies h ough bo h heo e ical and empi ical
chap e s. Since hen, he iscal con ac li e a u e has lou ished.
An olde li e a u e on s a e–socie y ela ions, s a e-building, and de el-
opmen in A ica had in ac ouched on simila issues, al hough wi h a
less sys ema ic ocus on axa ion (Ekeh, 1975;Hyden, 1983;Ro hchild and
Chazan, 1988;Migdal, 1988;Boone, 1992;B a on and Hyden, 1992;Guye ,
1992;Ha beson,Ro hchild, and Chazan, 1994). In hisli e a u e, heconcep
o ecip oci y ea u ed cen ally in he analysis o he A ican s a e. The s a e
was o en desc ibed as being de ached om socie y, as ci izens would wi h-
d aw omo en ep essi es a eac ions.InVic o Aza ya’s(1988)wo ds, hey
10 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
would ‘disengage’ om he s a e, seeking su i al in he ecip ocal ela ions
exis ing in al e na i e ealms. Such al e na i e ealms ha e been de ined in
sligh ly di e en ways and gi en a a ie y o labels, including he ‘economy
o a ec ion’ (Hyden, 1983) o in Pe e Ekeh’s (1975) e m ‘ he p imo dial
ealm’. Ekeh amously a gued ha eal ecip oci y exis ed in he p imo dial
ealm a he han in he o mal ‘ci ic ealm’. In he o me , ci izens el ha
hei con ibu ions, gi en in he o m o ibu e, ime, labou , and loyal y,
we e uly ecip oca ed. They we e willing o in es in he p imo dial ealm
because hey ecognized ha he e hey had du ies as well as igh s.
Wi hin his li e a u e, Hyden (1980;1983) o mula ed a nega i e link
be ween axa ion and ecip oci y. Based on he concep o ‘ he peasan
mode o p oduc ion’, he a gued ha he peasan economy wi h i s limi ed
echnological ad ances and widesp ead subsis ence p oduc ion did no gi e
g ounds o he s a e o g ow s uc u al o unc ional oo s in socie y. Rule s
could no ax su plus p oduc ion, which would eme ge only ou o p oduc-
i i y inc eases, and ins ead, hey had o demand ibu es om he exis ing
s ock. Consequen ly, axa ion was seen as an imposi ion and he s a e an
in ude , coe ci e in na u e. Ra he han op ing ully in o he o mal sys em,
peasan s p e e ed o ha e an exi op ion and would he e o e always keep
one leg in he in o mal ‘economy o a ec ion’. Any axa ion-induced eci-
p oci y be ween s a e and socie y became di icul , p ecisely because genuine
ecip oci y e ec i ely only exis ed wi hin he economy o a ec ion.
Hyden’s con ibu ion was c i icized o exagge a ing he ex en o which
peasan s we e able o exi he sys em (Ba es, 1981), and i was ques ioned
whe he cus oma y ela ions could indeed be ecip ocal gi en he na u e o
highly hie a chical socio-economic s uc u es. Fo example, René Lema c-
hand a gued ha ecip oca ion may a ise as much om he ea o e alia ion
as om a ‘s uc u ally induced o m o al uism’ (1989, 38–40).
In a la e con ibu ion on concep s in he s udy o poli ics in A ica, Hyden
(1992, 9 ) de elops his unde s anding o ecip oci y, on which we ely he e.
He a gues ha s a e–socie y ela ions do no es me ely on immedia e quid
p o quo exchanges, and ha we should b ing in o he analysis he concep
o ecip oci y. While ecip oci y has much in common wi h exchange, i di -
e s i s and o emos in ha i cons i u es a con inuous ela ionship, which
is based as much on expec a ions o beha iou as i is on ac ual beha iou .
Recip oci y equi es b oade ag eemen and a consensual unde pinning.
Examining how e enue ba gaining and he poli ics he eo in luence s a e–
socie y ecip oci y hus allows us o iden i y di e en and mo e nuanced
e ec s o axa ion and e enue ba gaining han simple exchanges o axa ion
o public se ices and accoun abili y.
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 11
As is e iden om he h i ing iscal con ac li e a u e, Hyden’s ocus on
he ela ionship be ween axa ionand ecip oci y emains ele an ;howe e ,
he e a e easons o subsc ibe o a mo e posi i e pe spec i e han ha which
p e ailed in he 1980s.
1.4.1 Fe ilized g ound o s a e–socie y ecip oci y?
Since he publica ion o hese impo an con ibu ions on s a e–socie y ela-
ions in A ica in he 1980s and 1990s, he poli ical and economic con ex s
ha e changed signi ican ly, wi h implica ions o he dynamics o s a e–
socie y ecip oci y. Subsequen gene a ions o poli ical science esea ch ha e
highligh ed, among o he hings, he signi icance o inc eased poli ical com-
pe i ion and a s eng hened ci il socie y. This changed con ex may ha e
e ilized he g ound o he eme gence o e enue ba gaining as ‘heal hy’
in e ac ions be ween s a es and hei ci izens, which in u n build s a e–
socie al ecip oci y.
Many A ican coun ies expe ienced democ a ic openings du ing he
1990s and wi h hem a poli ical compe i ion ha caused op imism o he
de elopmen o s a e–socie y ecip oci y (B a on and an de Walle, 1997).
Was hisposi i eexpec a ion ealized?F omonepe spec i e,i canbea gued
ha p og ess owa ds democ a ic consolida ion has been disappoin ing, as
mos A ican egimes did no ully democ a ize. Indeed, ecen schola ly
con ibu ions on A ican poli ics highligh he s abili y o hyb id egimes
whe e o mal democ a ic ins i u ions, such as elec ions, pa liamen s, and
cou s,coexis wi h au ho i a ian ea u essuchas heconcen a iono powe
in he p esiden who o en p olongs e m limi s o uses he pa liamen
as a ubbe s amp in de ac o one-pa y sys ems, and ep essi e p ac ices
which in inge on poli ical igh s and ci il eedoms (Cheeseman and Klaas,
2018;Bleck and an de Walle, 2019. On he o he hand, a e se e al hun-
d ed compe i i e elec ions o e he las hi y yea s, he holding o elec ions
has become he ‘de aul op ion o poli ics’ (Bleck and an de Walle, 2019,
6), and elec ions ha e caused changes o A ican poli ics as ci izens ha e
become o e s wi h expec a ions and hopes o be e li es (B a on and
Logan, 2006). Bleck and an de Walle (2019, 20–22) a gue ha elec ions
a e poli ical momen s o ‘heigh ened ci izenship’ and can ha e bo h posi-
i e as well as nega i e implica ions. They migh p omo e exclusiona y and
demagogic poli ics as much as hey can also p omo e esponsi eness on he
pa o he go e nmen . Gene ally, he u n o egula compe i i e elec ions
has implied ‘an unp eceden ed explosion in poli ical pa icipa ion’ (ibid, 22),
1980
1981
1982
1986
1989
1998
1999
2000
2018
2019
0,12
0,1
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
% o GDP
2020
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1988
1987
1985
1984
1983
Mozambique Senegal SSA a e age
Tanzania Togo Uganda
Figu e 1.3 G an s, pe cen age o GDP, 1980–2020.
Sou ce: ʻUNU-WIDER Go e nmen Re enue Da ase ʼ. Ve sion 2021. h ps://doi.o g/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021.

Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 19
Mozambique’s ax e enue in 2013, 2017, and 2019 a e la gely explained by
la ge one-o winnings om capi al gains axa ion o asse sales in he ex ac-
i e indus y (IMF, 2016, 20; 2020, 14). Mos ecen ly, he all in e enue
be ween 2019 and 2020 in he coun ies whe e da a a e a ailable indica es a
clea impac o he COVID-19 pandemic on he economies (Fjelds ad and
The kildsen, 2020).
The o he essen ial change is ha he coun ies ha e become less aid
dependen . This is shown in Figu e 1.3. Th oughou he pe iod displayed in
he g aph, he le el o g an s, measu ed as sha e pe GDP, is highly ola ile,
bu since he change o he millennium he endency, wi h some a ia ion,
is ela i ely clea : he coun ies a e gene ally less aid dependen and a e hus
in need o expanding domes ic e enue. Following he iscal con ac he-
o y, hese wo signi ican changes ( ising domes ic e enues and declining
aid dependence) would lead o he expec a ion o a iscal impe us o e enue
ba gaining.
Upon examina ion, he economic s uc u es o he i e case coun ies
appea ypical o low- o lowe -middle-income coun ies (see Table 1.1). The
i e coun ies’ GDPs pe capi a ange om USD 587 (Mozambique) o USD
1,585(Senegal),whicha eallbelow hea e ageinsub-Saha anA icao USD
1,656. They also sco e below a e age on he Human De elopmen Index,
and he p opo ion o he popula ion li ing below he USD 1.90 po e y line
anges om 38.5% o 63.7%, wi h only Senegal below he sub-Saha an A ica
a e age. None o he coun ies bene i om la ge, s able lows o ex ac i e
na u al esou ce en s.
The economies in all i e coun ies a e s ill domina ed by ag icul u e.
While he sec o only accoun s o abou one qua e o less o o e all
economic ou pu , ag icul u e p o ides li elihoods o he la ge majo i y o
he coun ies’ popula ions. Ag icul u e hus cons i u es be ween 30 (Sene-
gal) and 72% (Uganda) o o al employmen . Ag icul u al p oduc i i y, as
shown by ce eal yields in kilog ammes pe hec a e, is low, be ween 835 kg
and 2 onnes, on a e age almos hal o he a e age yields o Sou h Asia
(Ab aham and Pingali, 2020, 186). Subsis ence ag icul u al p oduc ion is
widesp ead and in o mal comme cial sec o s a e la ge.
F om a poli ical se lemen pe spec i e, his sugges s ha he le el o cap-
i alis de elopmen is limi ed, and he e o e ha a capi alis class o any
signi ican size o in luence will be limi ed. Consequen ly, he poli ical se -
lemen s in ou case coun ies a e mainly clien elis a he han capi alis , a
ea u e which cha ac e izes all poo coun ies (Khan, 2010). This also means
ha ew o ganized socie al g oups a e able o c ea e weal h ou side access o
20 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
en oppo uni ies nu u ed h ough hei ela ionships wi h poli ical eli es
(Khan, 2010, 54–55; Hickey and Hossain, 2019, 26).
Ul ima ely, he lack o economic ans o ma ion, oge he wi h he conse-
quen absence o a capi alis class, implies ha subs an ial s uc u al ba ie s
o expanding he ax base emain in all ou i e case coun ies. This has
implica ions o he poli ics o e enue ba gaining and axa ion. Unde he
condi ions o a small ax base, he na ional budge is simila ly cons ained.
This makes i di icul o secu e poli ical s abili y h ough he ealloca ion
o domes ic e enue o powe ul g oups (Khan, 2010). Ins ead, dis ibu-
ion o esou ces and access o en s mus happen o budge and h ough
clien elis o o he in o mal ne wo ks. In clien elis se lemen s like ou case
coun ies, building a s able uling coali ion equi es ha eli es balance and
accommoda e powe ul ac ions, and his is likely o mani es in whe he
and how e enue ba gaining eme ges. Fu he mo e, he holding powe o
he indi idual and g oups o e enue p o ide s is-à- is he uling eli e will
be signi ican o he kind o ou comes ha esul om such ba gaining.
Table 1.2 p esen s he sco es o ou case coun ies on a numbe o poli ical
ea u es ha ha e been ound o condi ion whe e and how we expec e enue
ba gaining o occu (Moo e, 2004;P icha d, 2015; an den Boogaa d e al.,
2021). All i e coun ies ha e ins i u ionalized egula elec ions, which p o-
ide one possible poli ical channel h ough which socie al ac o s can engage
s a e ac o s o e ax policies. The quali y o he elec ions and he openness o
he poli ical space do a y be ween he coun ies. Senegal s ands ou among
he cases as he mos democ a ic wi h he highes le el o poli ical igh s, ci il
libe ies, go e nmen e ec i eness, and poli ical s abili y, bu a look beyond
heseindica o slea esli ledoub ha Senegals ill allswi hin heca ego yo
a hyb id egime wi h s ong execu i e powe , poli iciza ion o he judicia y,
and ins ances o iolen ep ession, oge he wi h s ong clien elis ne wo ks
pe mea ing democ a ic ins i u ions (Dumon and Kan é, 2019;Kohne and
Ma aing, 2019;Kelly, 2020). A he o he end o he scale, Uganda should
undoub edly be conside ed an elec o al au oc acy, bu he e is s ill mean-
ing ul poli ical compe i ion, and poli ical igh s and ci il libe ies a e no
conside ably wo se a ec ed han in Tanzania.
1.6.2 The poli ical se lemen s o ou case coun ies
The poli ical indica o s only ell pa o he s o y. To unde s and he poli ical
space o e enue ba gaining and speci ically he con ex ual condi ions o
ba gaining powe o di e en e enue p o ide s is-à- is he uling eli es, we
Table 1.1 Economic indica o s
Senegal Mozambique Togo Tanzania Uganda SSA (sub-Saha an
A ica) a e ageg
GDP pe capi aa1,381.6 598.8 630.8 1,071.4 894.5 1,656.1
HDIb0.512 0.456 0.515 0.529 0.544 0.547
Po e y head coun unde USD 1.90
(sha e o popula ion)c38.5 % (2011) 63.7 % (2014) 51.1 % (2015) 49.4 % (2017) 41.3 % (2016) 42.3 %
(2014)
Employmen in ag icul u e (sha e o o al
employmen )d30.1% 70.2% 32.4% 65.1% 72.1% 52.9%
Ce eal yield (kg pe hec a e)e1301.9 835.1 1145.6 1568.3 2049.5 1445.2
Na u al esou ce income (sha e o GDP) 0.016 % 0.04 %∗0.014 %∗∗ 0.015 %∗0.007 % 0.029 %
aYea : 2019 (cons an 2015 USD), om Wo ld Bank na ional accoun s da a, and OECD Na ional Accoun s da a iles.
bYea : 2019, index om 0–1, om Human De elopmen Repo O ice, 2020.
cRespec i e yea s in pa en heses, om Wo ld Bank, De elopmen Resea ch G oup. Da a a e based on p ima y household su ey da a ob ained om go e nmen s a is ical
agencies and Wo ld Bank coun y depa men s.
dYea : 2019, om In e na ional Labou O ganiza ion, ILOSTAT da abase. Da a e ie ed on 29 Janua y 29 2021.
eYea : 2018, om Food and Ag icul u e O ganiza ion, elec onic iles and websi e.
Yea : 2015–2020 (a e age o pe iod), om UNU-WIDER Go e nmen Re enue Da ase . Ve sion 2021. h ps://doi.o g/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/GRD-2021. Indica o :
Non- ax Re enue. A e age o non- ax e enue be ween 2015 and 2020 is made by own calcula ion. ∗Missing da a om 2020. ∗∗Missing da a om 2019–2020.
gWDI’s de ini ion o sub-Saha an A ica (excluding high income).
22 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
Table 1.2 Poli ical indica o s
Senegal Mozambique Togo Tanzania Uganda
Elec o al
democ acya0.75 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.31
Poli ical igh sb29 14 15 12 11
Ci il libe iesb39 29 27 22 23
Go e nmen
e ec i enessc0.01 −0.72 −0.69 −0.77 −0.58
Poli ical s abili yc−0.02 −1.16 −0.92 −0.41 −0.69
Na u e o Poli ical
Se lemen dS ong
dominan Weak
dominan S ong
dominan Vulne able
au ho i a ian Compe i i e
clien elis
Sou ce:
aYea : 2021, index 0–1, om Nazi a Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gas aldi, Sand a G ahn, Sebas ian
Hellmeie , Palina Kol ani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lüh mann, Se aphine F. Mae z, Sh eeya Pillai, and
S a an I. Lindbe g. 2021. Au oc a iza ion Tu ns Vi al. Democ acy Repo 2021. Uni e si y o
Go henbu g: V-Dem Ins i u e.
bYea : 2022, index 0–100, om F eedom House Sco e. Coun ies and Te i o ies. 2022. h ps://
eedomhouse.o g/coun ies/ eedom-wo ld/sco es.
cYea : 2020, index om −2.5 o +2.5, om Wo ld Go e nmen Indica o s h p://in o.wo ldbank.o g/
go e nance/wgi/Home/Repo s.
dYea 2018, Ca ego iza ion om he ESID da a, excep o Togo (lacking in ESID), which is based on
seconda y sou ces.
need o ake as ou poin o depa u e he case coun ies’ poli ical se lemen s
(see also bo om o Table 1.2).
In he ollowing, we b ie ly p esen he poli ical se lemen ypology and
use i bo h o in oduce he ypical ea u es o ou case coun ies’ poli ical se -
lemen s, and o ou line whe e hey di e . Each chap e conside s (implici ly
o explici ly) how indi idual o speci ic g oups o e enue p o ide s in ol ed
in ins ances o e enue ba gaining a e posi ioned in ela ion o he uling
coali ion and he uling eli es.
We ollow he o iginal poli ical se lemen ypology as in oduced by Khan
(2010, 55). This ypology has been discussed and u he elabo a ed by o h-
e s (e.g. Whi ield e al., 2015;Hickey and Kelsall, 2020;Schulz and Kelsall,
2021), wo k which we d aw on in wha ollows when ca ego izing ou case
coun ies.² Khan’s ypological ca ego iza ion ollows wo s eps. The i s is
o dis inguish be ween capi alis and clien elis se lemen s. As discussed,
all ou case coun ies all in o he la e o hese wo ca ego ies: Clien elis
² Pa icula ly, we d aw on he Poli ical Se lemen s (PolSe ) da ase (Schulz and Kelsall, 2021), de el-
oped by he E ec i e S a es and Inclusi e De elopmen (ESID) p og amme based in Manches e , which
ca ego izes coun ies in e ms o hei poli ical se lemen based on expe su eys and hei openly a ail-
able de ailed desc ip ions. The o iginal Khan ypology has subsequen ly been subjec o much discussion,
bu o ou pu poses he e ( o cha ac e ize di e en se lemen and he e o e o emphasize he di e si y o
he coun ies in which case s udies a e ca ied ou ), i su ices.
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 23
se lemen s a e cha ac e ized by he ac ha ‘signi ican holding powe
is based on sou ces ou side he incomes gene a ed by o mal ins i u ions’
(Khan, 2010, 53). While o mal ins i u ions such as p ope y igh s o eg-
ula elec ions will be in place, hey a e a ely en o ced, because hey a e a
odds wi h he in e es s o powe ul g oups. When his is he case, he e is a
misma ch be ween o mal ins i u ions and how poli ics wo k in o mally.
The second s ep in Khan’s ypology is o ca ego ize di e en ypes o clien-
elis se lemen . To his end, Khan (2010, 64–65) dis inguishes be ween he
ho izon al and he e ical dis ibu ion o powe . The ho izon al dis ibu ion
o powe e e s o ‘ he powe o excluded ac ions, ela i e o he uling coali-
ion’. Some uling eli es can c ea e a b oad-based coali ion which includes
many powe ul ac ions, while o he s canno . In he la e case, i excluded
ac ions a e s ong, he uling coali ion is mo e ulne able. The e ical dis-
ibu ion o powe dis inguishes be ween highe - and lowe -le el ac ions
wi hin he uling coali ion. Lowe -le el ac ions a e he ones who mobilize
suppo in local cons i uencies, and hei sou ce o holding powe depends
la gely on how much suppo hey can mobilize o he uling coali ion. The
s onge he lowe -le el ac ions, he mo e he uling eli e will ha e o a end
o hei in e es s in o de o keep hem wi hin he uling coali ion.
Be ween he e icalandho izon alpowe dimensions, he ea e ou ypes
o clien elis se lemen : (1) S ong lowe -le el as well as s ong excluded ac-
ions imply compe i i e clien elism, whe e compe i ion be ween ac ions is
s ong. (2) S ong lowe -le el combined wi h weak excluded ac ions imply
weak-dominan pa y coali ions, in which he dominan pa y is no h ea -
ened by excluded ac ions bu whe e he s ong lowe -le el ac ions ha e
he powe , o example, o block policy implemen a ion o o achie e good
access o en s. (3) Whe e bo h lowe -le el and excluded ac ions a e weak,
he coali ion is s ong-dominan , mee s li le esis ance, and he uling eli e is
ai ly ee o implemen he policies i pleases. (4) Finally, when lowe -le el
ac ions a e weak and excluded ac ions a e s ong, he poli ical se lemen
is cha ac e ized by a ulne able au ho i a ian coali ion, which enjoys some
en o cemen capaci y bu su e s om ins abili y because i has o eso o
ep ession o excluded ac ions.
Wi hin his ypology, Uganda can be ca ego ized as compe i i e clien-
elis (Schulz and Kelsall, 2021). P ima ily as a esul o he colonial bo de s,
he coun y has since independence been cha ac e ized by many di e -
en egional, eligious, e hnic, and socio-economic clea ages. In he sou h
he e we e ela i ely s ong cen alized kingdoms wi h a his o y o con lic s
be ween hem, and no h o he i e Nile he e we e smalle chie doms
belonging o di e en e hnic g oups (e.g. he Alu in Wes Nile close o

24 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
Sudan and he Ka amojong close o Kenya) (Ka ugi e, 1996;Reid, 2017,
118). These clea ages made o a agmen ed poli ical se lemen , ha is, a
balance o powe ha had many compe ing g oups and ac ions. In such
a agmen ed poli ical se lemen , i is always di icul o cons uc a s a-
ble uling coali ion wi h ac ions ha p o ide eliable and las ing suppo
o he uling eli e (Kjæ , 2015;Whi ield e al., 2015). Se e al ea ly pos -
independence leade s in Uganda s uggled o c ea e du able coali ions, bu
since he Na ional Resis ance A my (NRA) and i s leade , Yowe i Muse eni,
won a gue illa wa in 1986, he coali ion has been ela i ely du able e en
i i s composi ion has changed cha ac e o e he yea s, wi h agmen a ion
and inc easing compe i ion be ween ac ions. A key d i e o he inc eased
agmen a ion was he in oduc ion o mul i-pa y elec ions in 2006 and he
simul aneous li ing o p esiden ial e m limi s. Elec ions and he in oduc-
ion o NRM pa y p ima ies ha e se ed o inc ease he powe o lowe -le el
ac ions (Kjæ and Ka uusiihmeh, 2021). A he same ime, powe is mo e
dispe sed among he eli es, and al hough he e is a powe ul ci cle a ound
he p esiden , he mili a y seems mo e agmen ed (Reuss and Ti eca, 2017).
Du ing he la es elec ions, opposi ion candida es ha e been able o mobi-
lize subs an ial suppo (Khisa, Vokes, and Wilkins, 2021). So, e en i i is
s ongly au ho i a ian and wi h he exe cise o powe pe sonalized a ound
he p esiden , he agmen a ion and compe i ion be ween ac ions gi es
Uganda he ca ego iza ion o compe i i e clien elis . Fo e enue ba gain-
ing, Uganda’s compe i i e clien elism means ha eli es will be incen i ized
o gi e in o demands om powe ul ac ions o a highe ex en han in a
s ong-dominan pa y se lemen . Chap e s 7 (by Kjæ and A inanye) and
8 (by Ngabi ano) ocus on e enue ba gaining wi h, espec i ely, Uganda’s
ag icul u al sec o and mul ina ional companies in he pe oleum sec o . In
Chap e 9, Khisa, Msami, and The kildsen examine campaign inancing and
e enue ba gaining in bo h Uganda and Tanzania.
Tanzania is ca ego ized by he PolSe da ase as ulne able au ho i a -
ian wi h a he s ong excluded ac ions and weak lowe -le el ac ions (see
Table 1.2). This labelling shows a signi ican change om he Julius Nye e e
pe iod when powe was mo e concen a ed wi h much ewe powe ul
excluded ac ions. Fo a long pe iod a e Nye e e’s e i emen , he coali-
ion became mo e agmen ed, especially du ing he Jakaya Kikwe e yea s
(The kildsen and Bou goin, 2012;Kelsall, 2018). Howe e , his changed
when he CCM pa y had o elec a new chai man in 2015. Fac ional com-
pe i ion wi hin he pa y led o an in e nal pa y spli , whe eby he cen al
igu e Edwa d Lowassa b oke away o he opposi ion pa y Chadema ak-
ing wi h him bo h inancial and poli ical powe (Kelsall, 2018, 18). The
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 25
new pa y chai man John Magu uli unde s ood he need o con ol excluded
ac ions and cen alize powe in he pa y. In ulne able au ho i a ian se -
lemen s, he expec a ion is ha he go e nmen should be able o en o ce
some policies and, o example, could expand hei ax e o wi hou ha ing
o comp omise o less in speci ic ins ances o e enue ba gaining. How-
e e , se e al chap e s in his book p o ide g ounds o ques ioning whe he
his is he case o he poli ics o axa ion. I should be no ed ha ield-
wo k o he chap e con ibu ions was done unde he now la e Magu uli’s
p esidency. A e wo yea s in powe , i is e iden ha he uling coali-
ion has changed wi h he new p esiden Samia Suluhu Hassan, allowing
o mo e poli ical opposi ion and ejuggling he coali ion so as o exclude
some o Magu uli’s suppo e s. I is s ill ea ly o assess he implica ions o
his change. In Chap e 3, Edsle Jacobsen ocuses on e enue ba gaining in
he u ban in o mal sec o in Da es Salaam, while Chap e s 5 (by Ul iksen,
Ka e a, and Msami) and 6 (by Fjelds ad and Rakne ) examine he nego i-
a ion p ocesses a ound a ious ax e o ms in Tanzania. Las ly, in Chap e
11, Ul iksen, Myamba, and Geo ge s udy ba gaining be ween he Tanzanian
go e nmen and in e na ional aid agencies a ound he inancing o a cash
ans e p og amme.
Senegal is ca ego ized as s ong-dominan wi h weak excluded ac ions,
weak lowe -le el ac ions, and concen a ed powe in he leade ship. The e
has been li le change in he poli ical uling eli e o e he yea s despi e Sene-
gal’s wo poli ical u no e s: in bo h cases, he new incumben s had se ed
wi h he o me egimes. Ne e heless, a ound elec ions ma king he end o
a p esiden ’s wo e ms (in 2000 and in 2012), momen a y agmen a ion o
he uling coali ion occu ed, and poli ical compe i ion opened in he igh
a ound succession. In 2000, poli ical compe i ion was in pa acili a ed by
he ac ha s uc u al adjus men p og ammes and educed domes ic e -
enue cons ained Abdou Diou ’s abili ies o main ain he uling coali ion
h ough buying he suppo o , amongs o he s, impo an eligious g oups
(Diop and Diou , 1990;Ko e , 2021). In 2012, Abdoulaye Wade’s a emp a
secu ing an uncons i u ional hi d e m was coun e ed by a s ong popu-
la mo emen and a uni ed opposi ion. Following bo h elec ions, he new
incumben s succeeded in econsolida ing he uling coali ions and ensu -
ing s abili y in he poli ical se lemen by clien elis means (Mbow, 2008;
Kelly, 2012;Dumon and Kan é, 2019). These bou s o mo e compe i i e
clien elism and subsequen econsolida ion a e impo an o unde s anding
he e enue ba gaining wi h e enue p o ide s in he in o mal economy and
hei b oke s as well as he e olu ion o in o mal sec o axa ion in Senegal,
as discussed by Bak in Chap e 12.
26 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
Mozambique’s poli ical se lemen is cha ac e ized as weak-dominan
wi h s ong lowe -le el ac ions bu weak excluded ac ions. The cu en
Mozambican coali ion has i s oo s in he peace deals ha ended he long-
unning ci il wa be ween he FRELIMO and he RENAMO esis ance. The
FRELIMO s a egy was a mix o co-op ing and di iding RENAMO ac ions,
and his s a egy has gene ally been deemed success ul (Vines, 2018;Buu
and Salimo, 2018). Unde he Guebuza p esidency (2005–2012), he coali-
ion became s ong-dominan , as Guebuza s eng hened con ol o e he
pa y, elyingonapowe ulna a i eo ‘na ionaluni y’(Macuane, Buu ,and
Monjane, 2017). Howe e , e en i he egime is au ho i a ian and ep essi e,
con ol o lowe -le el ac ions has weakened somewha du ing he ecen
Nyusi leade ship. One d i e was he local elec ions in 2018, which se ed o
s eng hen he impo ance o hese ac ions. In Chap e 4, on Schille exam-
ines he implica ions o he ela ions be ween local and cen al go e nmen s
o e enue ba gaining in Mozambique.
Togo is no included in he ESID’s PolSe da ase , bu om ou own anal-
ysis (Beach, 2018;Chap e 10), we ca ego ize he poli ical se lemen in Togo
as s ong-dominan wi h weak excluded ac ions and a he weak lowe -le el
ac ions. P esiden Fau e Gnassingbé has chosen a s a egy o co-op a ion
o he leade s o o he poli ical pa ies, and like his a he be o e him, has
o en eso ed o b u al opp ession o ensu e ha elec o al esul s lean in his
a ou . His a he , Eyadéma Gnassingbé, came o powe in a coup in 1967
and uled as a dic a o o 38 yea s. Eyadéma did ace a na ional con e ence
in 1991, which in oduced space o poli ical compe i ion and opposi ion
oices; howe e , he emo ed e m limi s sho ly he ea e . Fau e u he
manipula ed he elec o al sys em o a ou his well-o ganized pa y, UNIR
(l’Unionpou laRépublique).Thepa y,domina edbyhispeople heKabiyé,
holds he majo i y o sea s in pa liamen despi e ep esen ing a lowe p o-
po ion o he popula ion. The e a e ou main e hnic g oups in Togo: he
Ewe (and Minas), he Kabiye, he Moba, and he Ko okoli and Tem. The Ewe
people li e along he mo e economically ad an aged coas in he sou h and
domina e in bo h he ci il se ice and comme cial sec o s, while he p es-
iden ’s clan domina es he mili a y and law en o cemen in Togo (Beach,
2018). In ecen yea s, he e has been inc easing p essu e o mo e demo-
c a ic modes o go e ning, including he possibili y o decen alizing and
de ol ing some powe . Howe e , he e has been no e ec i e poli ical open-
ingso a .InChap e 10,Beachdesc ibes woins anceso e enueba gaining
in u al and u ban Togo.
The i e case coun ies o his book ha e all seen an expansion in domes-
ic e enue mobiliza ion du ing he las wo decades ha , like elsewhe e,
Poli iciza ion o axa ion and s a e–socie y ecip oci y in A ica 27
has p omp ed many ins ances o e enue ba gaining. Some o hese a e
he ocus o he case s udies in his book. Ou case coun ies a e ypi-
cal o lowe -income coun ies in A ica, wi h economies la gely no ha ing
unde gone economic s uc u al ans o ma ion, wi h a limi ed ax base,
and wi h he uling eli es’ con inuous need o main ain hei uling coali-
ions h ough dis ibu ion o esou ces and access o en s. The case s udies
se in hese i e coun ies p o ide new knowledge on when and how e -
enue ba gaining eme ges, e ol es, and leads o iscal con ac s in clien elis
poli ical se lemen s ac oss di e en deg ees o uling coali ion agmen-
a ion. Toge he , ou case coun ies p o ide a ounda ion o compa a i e
and gene alizable obse a ions o he poli ics o e enue ba gaining in
A ica.
1.7 Conclusion
Domes ic e enue mobiliza ion has been inc easing in A ica, and axa ion
has become mo e poli icized since he u n o he millennium. Howe e ,
he e seem o be ew signs o exchange-based iscal social con ac s eme g-
ing a he mac o le el, whe e ci izens pay axes in e u n o public se ice
deli e y and accoun abili y. Ne e heless, ecen de elopmen s in e ms o
inc eased poli ical compe i ion and ci il socie y pa icipa ion o e g ounds
o e isi ing olde insigh s abou he po en ial ole o axa ion in s a e–
socie y ela ions. Pe haps we ha e been looking in he w ong places o he
poli ical e ec s o axa ion.
Re enue ba gaining, ha is, nego ia ions ela ed o e enue p o ision,
a guably happens on he mic o le el be ween, on he one side, indi idual
o g oups o e enue p o ide s and, on he o he side, s a e ac o s o uling
eli es. Howe e , sys ema icand compa a i e esea ch on mic o-le el e enue
ba gaining in A ica emains limi ed. This book a ends o his gap and seeks
o deepen ou knowledge and unde s anding o he dynamics and poli ics o
e enue ba gaining in A ica.
In doing so, his book con ibu es o wo key li e a u es in he s udies o
A ican poli ics: he iscal con ac li e a u e and he poli ical se lemen li -
e a u e. In combining hese app oaches, we add a sys ema ic iew o poli ics
o he iscal con ac heo y while in eg a ing a nuanced e enue dimension
o he poli ical se lemen heo y. Fu he mo e, a majo con ibu ion o his
book is o ope a ionalize hese wo p ima ily mac o-le el heo ies o acili-
a e mic o-le el analyses o e enue ba gaining. The heo e ical amewo k
is elabo a ed in mo e de ail in Chap e 2. The book hen explo es ins ances
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an den Boogaa d, V., W. P icha d, R. Beach, and F. Mohiuddin. 2021. ‘Enabling
Tax Ba gaining: Suppo ing Mo e Meaning ul Tax T anspa ency and Taxpaye
Engagemen in Ghana and Sie a Leone’. De elopmen Policy Re iew.h ps://doi.
o g/10.1111/dp .12563.
Vines, A. 2018. ‘Eli e Ba gains and Poli ical Deals P ojec : Mozambique Case S udy.
S abiliza ion Uni . UK.
36 Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak
Whi ield, L., O. The kildsen, L. Buu , and A. M. Kjæ . 2015. The Poli ics o A ican
Indus ial Policy: A Compa a i e Pe spec i e. Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y
P ess.
Winckle Ande sen, O., and O. The kildsen. 2019. Can he SDGs in Low-income
Coun ies Be Financed? And Should We Ca e? DIIS Woking Pape s,2019, no 2.
Copenhagen: Danish Ins i u e o In e na ional S udies.
2
Unpacking e enue ba gaining
T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
2.1 In oduc ion
In he in oduc o y chap e , we o e ed an o e iew o he iscal con ac li -
e a u e and a gued ha he e is a need o mo e knowledge abou he ex en
o which inc eased e enue mobiliza ion leads o e enue ba gaining and
po en ials o s a e–socie y ecip oci y. In pa icula , we need o s udy sys-
ema ically he mic o-le el poli ics o e enue ba gaining, and o his end,
weneed o heo izeands udy he iscalandpoli icalimpo ance ha e enue
p o ides. This chap e he e o e de elops a heo e ical amewo k (see also
Figu e 1.1 in Chap e 1) o help us answe ou esea ch ques ion, namely how
and unde wha condi ions e enue ba gaining eme ges, e ol es, and leads
o iscal con ac s.
We begin by de ining he main heo e ical concep o e enue ba gain-
ing and dis inguish i om ha o iscal con ac s. Second, in eg a ing iscal
con ac heo y and he poli ical se lemen app oach, we disagg ega e he
concep o ba gaining powe , add he dimension o e enue p o ide s’ iscal
impo ance, and heo ize how i in luences hei ela i e ba gaining posi ion
is-à- is uling eli es. The ea e , we discuss how e enue p o ide s, gi en
hei ela i e ba gaining posi ion, can in luence policy and when e enue
p o ide s and uling eli es a e able o each ag eemen s in he o m o iscal
con ac s. Finally, we discuss po en ial igge s o e enue ba gaining, ha is,
hee en so ac o s ha kick-s a e enueba gaining.The heo e ical ame-
wo k ha we de elop he e is applied in his olume’s empi ical Chap e s
3–12 ha analyse mic o-le el ins ances o e enue ba gaining in ou i e case
coun ies: Uganda, Tanzania, Togo, Mozambique, and Senegal (discussed in
Chap e 1). We end his chap e wi h a b ie discussion o he me hodology
applied ac oss he con ibu ions in his olume, ollowed by an in oduc ion
o each o he empi ical chap e s.
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ , Unpacking e enue ba gaining. In: The Poli ics o Re enue
Ba gaining in A ica. Edi ed by: Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
© Ox o d Uni e si y P ess (2024). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192868787.003.0002
38 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
2.2 The concep s o e enue ba gaining and iscal
con ac
In his book, we de ine e enue ba gaining as implici o explici nego ia-
ions ela ed o e enue p o ision be ween indi idual o g oups o e enue
p o ide s and uling eli es (o ep esen a i es he eo ). This de ini ion di -
e s om ha o o me li e a u e in wo ways. Fi s , i delimi s ba gaining o
he p ocess o nego ia ion and dis inguishes i om he po en ial ou come. In
he iscal con ac li e a u e, he p ocess o e enue ba gaining has o en been
implied and hence con la ed wi h he ou come in he o m o a con ac (Bak
2019, 53). Ea lie de ini ions ha e hus desc ibed e enue ba gaining as ‘ he
exchange o e enues ( o he s a e) o ins i u ionalized in luence o e pub-
lic policy ( o ci izens)’ (Moo e, 2008, 36, emphasis added). We s ess ha
e enue ba gaining happens, in p inciple, p io o he exchange o , as we
ocus on, an ag eemen ela ed o e enue p o ision. Wi h ou de ini ion, we
a oid he seman ic and possibly analy ical con la ion o e enue ba gaining
(p ocesses) wi h ba gains ( he po en ial ou comes, e.g. in he o m o iscal
con ac s). Second, we use he e m e enue a he han ax ba gaining (as
employed, e.g., by P icha d, 2015 and an den Boogaa d e al., 2021) because
i , pe de ini ion, includes o he so s o income sou ces ha a e no s ic ly
axes, such as a ious so s o le ies, ees, oyal ies, o de elopmen aid. As
Wilson P icha d (2019, 7) has a gued, ‘a na ow ocus in legally de ined axes
will exclude la ge pa s o how go e nance and se ices a e ac ually inanced
in A ica’.
As a esea ch objec , e enue ba gaining can be di icul o obse e. As
Moo e (2008, 37–38) sugges s, ba gaining includes:
[a] wide ange o ypes o (poli ical) exchange, anging om explici haggling (ʻI
you do his, I will do ha ʼ) o indi ec , s a egic, an icipa o y in e ac ion (ʻLe us
announce mo e public spending on heal h now, in he hope ha Pa liamen will
be eady o accep an inc ease in VAT a es nex yea ʼ).
Re enue ba gaining can be di ec and obse able, such as when Ghana-
ians in 1999 p o es ed agains he 2.5% inc ease in he VAT a e and he
go e nmen eac ed by ea ma king he won e enue he Ghana Educa ion
Fund (P icha d, 2015). In line wi h Moo e’s desc ip ion, we emphasize ha
e enue ba gaining will also—and pe haps mo e o en—be indi ec , wi h
no obse able nego ia ion in ol ing wo pa ies wi h dis inc in e es s. This
was he case wi h he aboli ion o in o mal sec o pe sonal axes in Uganda
and Tanzania a ound elec ion ime (Kjæ and The kildsen, 2013). He e, he
Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 39
go e nmen s abolished axes because hey we e unpopula , and gi en ha
opposi ion candida es campaigned agains hem, he ule s would no isk
losing u al o es by insis ing he axes emain. The uling eli es hus an ic-
ipa ed a loss o o es o he opposi ion, and he policy o abolishing he ax
was based mo e on a pe cep ion han on a di ec ba gain wi h axpaye s.
Hence, e enue ba gaining could happen anywhe e and any ime; as
p o es s in he s ee s o e new axes, as op-eds in newspape s pushing o
new axes,a campaignmee ings,du ingclosedcon e sa ionsinMPs’o ices,
as a pa o legisla i e e o m p ocess, and a he ma ke loo be ween en-
do s and ax collec o s. The ins ances o e enue ba gaining analysed in his
book span he spec um and allow us o make compa a i e obse a ions
abou when and whe e e enue ba gaining is likely o ake place and how
hese condi ions shape he ou comes.
Ac oss he chap e s o his book, e enue ba gaining includes a ange
o s akeholde s. A e enue p o ide is any ac o who con ibu es unds o
he public budge including indi idual axpaye s, sec o g oups, local eli es,
mul ina ional companies, and e en in e na ional dono s. On he s a e side,
we see he in ol emen o heads o s a e, membe s o he go e nmen , and
poli icians elec ed o na ional o local o ices, as well as bu eauc a s. Some
o hese may be membe s o he uling eli e, ha is, indi iduals who hold
o mal o in o mal posi ions o poli ical powe , and o he s who may no .
Fo example, a cabine minis e can hold a o mal posi ion bu migh no
be a membe o he uling eli e gi en lack o poli ical in luence. On he o he
hand, a pe son may be a close ad ise o he p esiden bu wi hou any o mal
posi ion o powe .
Ou de ini ion o e enue ba gaining is b oad in he sense ha nego ia ion
simply mus ‘ ela e o e enue p o ision’. The eby, we ecognize ha e -
enue ba gaining may no only conce n posi i e exchanges o axa ion o a
e u n bu may also esul in e enue o egone (Moo e, 2015). This includes
si ua ions ha can be di icul o ca ego ize as cases o e enue ba gaining
because he e migh no be a ax in place o a ax could ha e been abol-
ished, such as in Kampala, Uganda whe e boda bodas, he mo o bike axis,
ha e been exemp ed because hey cons i u e an impo an suppo g oup o
he uling eli e (Good ellow, 2015). Judi h Tendle (2002) called his ype o
a angemen ‘ he de il’s deal’—you o e o me and I will no ax you—while
Holland (2016) e ms in en ional non-en o cemen o laws o he sake o
maximizing o es ‘ o bea ance’. O he powe ul g oups may be able o a oid
paying ax by in luencing membe s o he go e nmen o ge exemp ions.
Such exemp ions ha e pe cei able consequences o policy and iscal ou -
comes. Fo example, he g an ing o ax exemp ions educes he o e all ax

40 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
ake and hence impedes he p o ision o public se ices. The in luence o
powe ul g oups may also esul in he uling eli e p io i izing he p o ision
o club goods, o example powe supply o a speci ic indus y a he han,
say,coun ywide u alelec i ica ionp og ammes.Thus,speci icins anceso
e enue ba gaining can esul in mic o-le el con ac s ha a e coun e p o-
duc i e o he mac o-le el achie emen o accoun abili y and b oad-based
de elopmen .
To deepen he unde s anding o when e enue ba gaining leads o mic o-
le el iscal con ac s, he wo mus be concep ually and empi ically dis in-
guishable. Whe e e enue ba gaining deno es he p ocesses o implici o
explici nego ia ions, iscal con ac s a e he po en ial ou comes o hese p o-
cesses; hey occu in cases whe e he in ol ed pa ies a e able o each an
ag eemen o comp omise.
In he li e a u e on axa ion and go e nance, he iscal con ac has mos
o en been associa ed wi h a loose concep ion o a ‘heal hy’, b oad-based
exchange ela ionshipbe weens a eandsocie yinwhich axesa eexchanged
o publicgoodsandpoli icalaccoun abili y(Moo e, 2004;2008;Ma in and
P asad, 2014). Since he analy ical in e es o his book is e enue ba gaining
a he mic o le el, including i s po en ial ou comes, we need a iscal con ac
unde s andingon hesameanaly ical le el. Le i(1988)andTimmons(2005)
ep esen a s and o he iscal con ac li e a u e ha desc ibes mic o-le el
iscal ela ions be ween s a e and e enue p o ide s. They bo h a gue ha
go e nmen s s ike di e en ba gains wi h di e en g oups o ac o s. Speci -
ically, Le i (1988, 12) sugges s ha in a coun y, se e al ( iscal) con ac s
can exis in pa allel, comp ising he di e en deals a ule en e s in o wi h
di e en g oups o socie al ac o s in o de o s ay in powe . Such mic o-
le el iscal con ac s deno e di ec exchanges be ween a (g oup o ) e enue
p o ide (s) and he uling eli e, and i allows us o cap u e he immedia e
ou comes o mic o-le el ins ances o e enue ba gaining. Speci ically, we
de ine mic o-le el iscal con ac s as explici o implici ag eemen s be ween
uling eli es (o ep esen a i es he eo ) and ei he indi idual o a g oup o e -
enue p o ide s ela ed o e enue p o ision. Fou poin s o elabo a ions a e in
o de .
Fi s , hemic o-le el iscalcon ac doesno ha e obeabalancedcomp o-
mise in absolu e e ms ha ma e ializes in an equal exchange (Hyden, 1992).
The ag eemen can mani es i sel as much in mu ual ecogni ion and com-
mi men as in ma e ial e ms (Hyden, 1992; see also Le i and Sacks, 2009).
Second, he con ibu ion by e enue p o ide s can ake many o ms. The
con ibu ioncanbe o mal, public(mos o en ax) paymen s, suppo ing he
uling eli e ia he na ional budge , o in o mal, p i a e paymen s o uling
Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 41
eli es, o example in he o m o campaign inancing a he han h ough
s a e co e s. Thi d, he uling eli e side o he con ac could include posi-
i e ac ions, such as goods o se ice p o ision, o nega i e ac ions including
non-decisions, o bea ance, and ‘de il’s deal’ (Tendle , 2002;Holland, 2016;
Pi acha and Moo e, 2016). In o he wo ds, posi i e o nega i e does no e e
o a alue judgemen bu a he o posi i ely deli e ing a public se ice o
nega i ely e aining om axing and/o deli e ing. He e, ou unde s anding
o he iscal con ac di e s om bo h Le i (1988) and Timmons (2005), who
onlyconside exchangeso e enue o bene i so poli icalin luence.Fou h,
he con ac does no ha e o be in line wi h he ini ial p oposal. Theo e i-
cally, he implica ion could be la ge as well as smalle e enue mobiliza ion
by he go e nmen . Gi en he economic and poli ical con ex s (as heo ized
in de ail below), ag eemen s a e, howe e , mo e likely o in ol e a comp o-
miseo alowe axbu den o he e enuep o ide and he e o eless e enue
mobiliza ion by he go e nmen . Whe he o mal o in o mal con ibu ions,
posi i e o nega i e ac ions, o an ag eemen o lowe ax paymen s, he
ag eemen scons i u econ ac ual ela ionsbe ween ulingeli esand e enue
p o ide s wi h implica ions o he shape o he ax sys em, iscal ou comes,
and o s a e–socie y ecip oci y.
While a case s udy app oach does enable one o ge close o he o en
di icul - o-obse e a ibu es o an explici o implici ag eemen , mu ual
ecogni ion, and commi men , i is no an easy ask. We sugges se e al
obse able implica ions o mic o-le el iscal con ac s. One is an exchange.
E idence o an exchange ela ed o e enue p o ision, whe he posi i e o
nega i e, can be aken a leas as an indica ion o a mic o-le el iscal con-
ac . Ano he app oach is o iden i y when e enue ba gaining ends and
inqui e why i ended and wha happened a e i did so. Fu he , a iscal con-
ac can be implied om con ac pa ies’ exp essions o expec a ions o and
commi men o each o he .
Whe eas iscal con ac s a e always p eceded by e enue ba gaining, e -
enue ba gaining does no always end in ag eemen and a iscal con ac . They
migh end in non-exchanges. To illus a e di e en non-con ac ual ou -
comes, we can d aw on ecen e o s o le y a ax on social media ac oss he
A ican con inen . In Benin, he go e nmen ’s p oposal o ax ce ain ypes o
social media p omp ed widesp ead mobiliza ion o social media use s, bo h
online unde he hash ag #TaxePasMesMo (‘Don’ Tax My MegaBy es’) and
aking o he s ee s (Okunoye, 2019). In esponse, he P esiden wi hd ew
he ax. In Uganda, he social media ax was also me wi h p o es s; howe e ,
he e he go e nmen igno ed he opposi ion and wen ahead wi h he axes
wi hou commi ing o a e u n. Bo h cases cons i u e ins ances o e enue
42 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
ba gaining ha did no lead o iscal con ac s, hough in wo di e en ways.
In he Beninese case, he ax was wi hd awn and hus no exchange es ab-
lished. The Ugandan case is, a ace alue, a case o coe ci e axa ion wi hou
an exchange. Howe e , in eac ion, many Ugandans decided o qui he a -
ge ed in e ne se ices (o use VPNs). To he ex en ha his is seen as ax
esis ance, one could a gue ha he e enue ba gaining is ongoing.
Ul ima ely, whe he a mic o-le el iscal con ac is p esen o no is an
empi ical ques ion, and his book’s empi ical chap e s p o ide illus a ions
o he many kinds o iscal con ac s o which e enue ba gaining migh lead.
Analysing unde which condi ions mic o-le el iscal con ac s eme ge is an
ins umen al means o de e mining he implica ions o he poli iciza ion o
axa ion.
2.3 The poli ics o ba gaining
Ha ing dis inguished be ween he concep s o e enue ba gaining and is-
cal con ac s, we also need o be able o see how powe ela ions a ec he
ba gaining p ocesses. Poli ical se lemen heo y o e s a ool o g asp he
ela i e ba gaining powe o e enue ac o s. A poli ical se lemen e e s o
he dis ibu ion o powe among g oups and ins i u ions in a socie y based
on which he uling eli es c ea e coali ions o di e en key poli ical ac ions
(Khan,2010;Whi ielde al.,2015).Rulingcoali ionsa emain ained,and he
uling eli es’ hold on powe secu ed, by gi ing powe ul g oups o ac ions
in socie y access o en s such as go e nmen con ac s, land igh s, o ax
exemp ions (No h e al., 2013;Kjæ , 2015;Bak and The kildsen, 2022). The
holding powe o hese g oups o indi iduals e e s o hei abili y o engage
inandsu i econ lic sand,byimplica ion, oimpose hei in e es sono he
g oups o he s a e.
In he ollowing, we i s discuss he powe o he uling eli e and e enue
p o ide s, espec i ely. Subsequen ly, as ac ual ba gaining powe mus be
unde s ood as a ela ional concep whe eby he wo pa ies engage in nego i-
a ions, we u he elabo a e on he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o he uling
eli e and e enue p o ide s. The model o ba gaining posi ions emphasizes
ha nego ia ing pa ies go in o he ba gaining p ocess om a ce ain posi-
ion wi hin he poli ical se lemen . F om he ou se , he g oups ha e ce ain
esou ces and holding powe ha may pu hem on ei he a be e , a weake ,
o an equal oo ing wi h espec o hose on he o he side o he ba gain-
ing able. Ini ial ba gaining posi ions, e en i hey change along he way, may
hus ma e o he iscal con ac ou comes.
Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 43
2.3.1 The ba gaining powe o uling eli es
Li e a u e onA ican poli ics ends o iew uling eli esas a he au onomous
policymake s because, as hey o en deal wi h weak poli ical opposi ion pa -
ies and ci il socie y o ganiza ions, hey a e a ely cons ained in making
policy decisions ( an de Walle, 2001). Howe e , ule s do no ac in isola ion;
hey a e esponsi e o he g oups wi h s ong holding powe , whose suppo
hey need in o de o emain in powe (Khan, 2010;No h e al., 2013). The
powe o he uling eli e depends on he poli ical, economic, and adminis a-
i e esou ces in he uling eli e’s possession (Le i, 1988, 19), which again a e
de i ed om he poli ical se lemen .
Ruling eli es a e poli ically esou ce ul i ac ions opposing hem a e no
s ong—and i lowe -le el ac ions suppo ing he uling eli e a e weak,
me ely complying and suppo ing a he han ac ing as e o-playe s om
wi hin (see Khan, 2010;Whi ield e al., 2015). On he o he hand, uling
eli es a e less powe ul when such ac ions a e s ong and he e o e need
o be accommoda ed. Hence, decisions o inc ease e enue can be poli -
ically cos ly i axes a ge impo an cons i uen s. A poli ical se lemen
pe spec i e shows ha gi en he need o main ain legi imacy and suppo ,
ule s may no be able o maximize e enue, as is o en assumed. This ol-
lows Le i’s (1988, 10) a gumen ha ule s’ abili y o maximize e enue is
cons ained by hei need o suppo i e cons i uen s. Fu he , as Fjelds ad
and The kildsen (2020, 39) poin ou , while mac o-le el ag eemen s a ound
some le el o edis ibu ion om ich o poo h ough axa ion is a e in
Wes and Eas A ica, some kind o edis ibu ion does occu as ule s dis-
ibu e esou ces in exchange o poli ical loyal y o main ain s able uling
coali ions.
Wi h ega d o economic esou ces, he a ailabili y o non- ax e enuesuch
as aid o na u al esou ce e enues can change he au onomy o he uling
eli e, simply because hey depend less on domes ic axpaye s and can a o d
o dis ega d hei in e es s. Al hough, as ega ds aid, uling eli es ins ead
become dependen on aid agencies (Ul iksen 2013). Aid dependency weak-
ens he ba gaining powe o he uling eli es is-à- is dono s whe eas he
a ailabili y o incomes om ex ac i es would s eng hen ba gaining powe
owa ds axpaye sanddono salike(ibid.).Rela ed oeconomic esou cesa e
also he cos s o ba gaining, including he cos s o acqui ing in o ma ion, o
he ac ual ba gaining, and o subsequen ly implemen ing he policy esul ing
om he ba gain (Le i, 1988, 27). Such cos s will also in luence uling eli es’
ba gaining powe .
50 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
The ocus on expansion o domes ic e enue mobiliza ion as a igge
o s a e–socie y in e ac ions o igina es in he Eu opean s a e-building expe-
iences. Non-democ a ic ule s in oduced new axes in o de o mobilize
esou ces o win wa s, and in e u n, hey needed o p o ide openings
o poli ical ep esen a ion (Schumpe e , 1991;Tilly, 1992). Nego ia ions
o e e enue in A ican coun ies ope a e in a pos -colonial poli ical con-
ex cha ac e ized by he absence o in e -s a e wa , hyb id ins i u ions, and
economies in which he majo i y emains employed in low- echnology sub-
sis ence ag icul u e (Jackson and Rosbe g, 1982; an de Walle, 2001;Moo e,
2004;B äu igam, 2008;No h e al., 2013). Thus, e enue p essu e and he
d i e o collec e enue in A ica come om many ac o s o he han in e -
s a e wa . One such ac o is ule s’ need o main ain poli ical s abili y in a
si ua ion o wha Done e al. (2005) call ‘sys ema ic ulne abili y’. Sys emic
ulne abili y is p esen unde a combina ion o esou ce sca ci y, pe cei ed
h ea s o he uling eli e, and he need o esou ces o main ain poli ical
s abili y.While sys emic ulne abili yismo eexpedien inasi ua ioncha ac-
e ized by ex e nal secu i y h ea s, ulne abili ies can also a ise om a iscal
c isis, a decline in o eign aid, o a sho age o oppo uni ies o ake up loans.
Many A ican eli es ha e expe ienced ising poli ical cos s o s aying in
powe . Mos A ican coun ies ha e ins i u ionalized, egula , and ela i ely
ee and ai elec ions (Bleck and an de Walle, 2018). Elec ions o e an
impe us o collec e enue o win o es h ough public se ice p o ision
(S asa age, 2005). Running elec ion campaigns is also cos ly, so incumben
uling eli esmaywan o aise e enue o hei campaignpu poses, al hough
he con e se scena io is also plausible, namely ha elec ions lead o declin-
ing e enue as exemp ions may be g an ed in e u n o suppo (Bak and
The kildsen, 2022). Elec ions may also o e he oppo uni y o a ax o be
poli icized, as happened wi h he in o mal sec o axes in Uganda and Tan-
zania (Kjæ and The kildsen, 2013). Finally, and less di ec ly connec ed o
elec ions, h ea s om,andneeds oo e sidepaymen s o,impo an g oups
(wi hino ou side he ulingcoali ion)couldins iga e a sense o ulne abili y
and hence mo i a e he uling eli e o sea ch o e enue (Dono e al., 2005;
Whi ield e al., 2015).
Summing up, uling eli es in A ica do expe ience e enue p essu e,
which is an impo an d i e in go e nmen s’ mo e o inc ease esou ce
mobiliza ion. Howe e , gi en ha mos A ican s a es a e economically
ulne able, hei iscal need is cons an , hough i may be la en . The e o e,
i alone canno explain he eme gence o e enue ba gaining. To b oaden
ou knowledge he eo , we need o look o he immedia e ac o s ha igge
e enue ba gaining.

Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 51
Such ac o s could include ac ions by s a e ac o s including go e nmen
o icials, local poli icians, and ax adminis a ion employees, such as an
announcemen o an adop ion o a new ax. Bu no all a emp s o inc ease
axa ion leads o e enue ba gaining. The e o e, some empi ical chap e s
explo e he condi ions unde which his is mo e likely o happen. T igge s
could also be e en s such as elec ions o a change in ci cums ances ha en-
de anal eadyimplemen ed ax hesudden ocal poin o e enueba gaining.
The ax adminis a ion may begin o en o ce a ax policy hi he o le unim-
plemen ed. Ci izens may ecei e new in o ma ion abou he axes hey pay
o lea n abou a co up ion scandal, p omp ing a esis ance owa ds paying
axes. Simila ly, he en y o ci il socie y o ganiza ions p omo ing human
igh s and ax awa eness could igge a ba gaining p ocess. These a e jus
a ew o he b oad a ie y o igge s and condi ions unde which e enue
ba gaining eme ges ha a e explo ed in his book’s empi ical chap e s.
2.5 The bookʼs me hodological app oach
and in oduc ion o chap e s
The heo e ical amewo k p esen ed and discussed in his chap e has as
i s poin o depa u e he poli ical se lemen and iscal con ac li e a u es,
and is based on a syn hesis o he wo. Howe e , he pu pose has no been
o build a comp ehensi e heo y o he poli ics o e enue ba gaining o be
es ed in he book’s case coun ies. Ins ead, we ake an i e a i e app oach o
ou inqui ies.Weha econcep ualizedkeyno ionsand heo ized o heex en
possible a p io i. The heo y, he concep s, and he heo e ical amewo k
we e hen con inuously e isi ed and discussed in ligh o eme ging ind-
ings a wo kshops o he Poli ical Se lemen and Re enue Ba gains in A ica
P ojec ,anda con e ences,includingadesigna edEu opeanConso ium o
Poli ical Resea ch join session in Cyp us, whe e con ibu o s we e p esen .
Wi hin his collabo a i ely de eloped amewo k, he book’s chap e s ake
an explo a i e app oach o unco e new empi ical knowledge o he poli ics
and dynamics o e enue ba gaining, which in u n allows us o deepen ou
unde s andinghe eo and o build a mic o-le el heo e ical ounda ion o he
iscal con ac heo y.
To de elop a comp ehensi e unde s anding o he poli ics o e enue ba -
gaining a he mic o le el, we a gue ha i is impe a i e o s udy a la ge
a ia ion o cases. The book includes bo h cases whe e e enue ba gaining
does un old and cases whe e e enue ba gaining could ha e been expec ed
52 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
bu did no occu . Di e en chap e s ocus on di e en aspec s o e enue
ba gaining in hei case s udies; hese include whe he and when e enue
p o ide s mobilize, whe he hey a e able o ge s a e ac o s o nego ia e,
how he ba gaining e ol es, o wha he ou come is. One example is s udy-
ing how di e encesin ba gaining powe be ween di e en g oups o e enue
p o ide sin luence heou comeo hei e enueba gainingwi hs a eac o s.
This is done in Chap e 7 whe e he ba gaining powe o ag icul u al sec o
ac o s in Uganda di e s depending on hei posi ion in ela ion o he uling
coali ion and whe he hey a e able o join o ces wi h o he o ganiza ions.
Ano he example ocuses on ins ances o collec i e ac ion p omp ed by ax-
ela ed g ie ances and whe he hese ac ually lead o e enue ba gaining, as
inChap e 3whe ein o malwomen ade sin Da es Salaam,Tanzania, e en
when o ganized el unable o in luence whe he hey we e axed o i hey
ecei ed a e u n. A hi d example is whe he and how he p esence o hi d
pa ies in luences he p ocesses and ou comes o di e en cases o e enue
ba gaining which is he ocus o Chap e 10 in which local chie s in Togo
play a la ge ole in he ba gaining p ocesses be ween e enue o icials and
axpaye s. Mos o he cases ha e been selec ed based on an unde s anding o
he con ex ual condi ions o he e enue-ba gaining ins ances, which in u n
helps us o unde s and and explain a ia ions in he p ocesses and ou comes.
All he book’s con ibu ions build on ex ensi e ield esea ch, includ-
ing in e iews wi h conce ned e enue p o ide s, ele an s a e ac o s, and
expe s. Some d aw as well on pa icipan obse a ion da a (Chap e s 3 and
10), o iginal su ey da a (Chap e s 4 and 9), o da a om p ima y and sec-
onda y sou ces such as news a icles, epo s, and legal ex s (Chap e s 5,6,
7,8,11, and 12). Based on ex ensi e empi ical knowledge o he cases com-
bined wi h o iginal collec ed da a, he au ho s p esen he cases o e enue
ba gaining in quali a i e na a i es o di e en o ms. This is an ins umen-
al means o unco e ing he dynamics o e enue ba gaining, how posi ions
and ela ions o powe may change, and whe he and unde wha condi ions
ins ances o e enue ba gaining lead o some so o ag eemen in he o m
o a (mic o-le el) iscal con ac .
Employing he explo a i e app oach has mean ha some case s udies a e
so-called nega i e cases o iscal con ac s whe e e enue ba gaining occu s
bu does no lead o an ag eemen be ween e enue p o ide s and he uling
eli e. To men ion one, e enue ba gaining be ween he Tanzanian go e n-
men and in e na ional aid agencies does no lead o an ag eemen a ound
paymen o he social p o ec ion p og amme (Chap e 11). Such a nega i e
case is help ul, me hodologically, o ule ou spu ious causes, and empi ically
Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 53
i appea s o se e as ini ial engagemen s, which in some cases shape o
di ec ly lead o u u e e enue ba gaining and build ecip oci y.
We now b ie ly in oduce he empi ical Chap e s 3–12 o his book.
In Chap e 3, AneEdsle Jacobsend awsonex ensi e ield esea chamong
in o mal women ade s in Da es Salaam, Tanzania. Edsle Jacobsen inds
ha e en i hese women a e axed and do expe ience ax- ela ed g ie ances,
hey e y o en do no ac collec i ely because o hei al eady ma ginalized
posi ion. Only wi h he aid o an NGO a e hey able o o ganize and ini ia e
a dialogue wi h local go e nmen ac o s.
In Chap e 4, A min on Schille examines wha may lead o e enue ba -
gaining be ween Mozambican municipali ies and hei ci izens, based on
o iginal in e iew da a. He inds ha e enue p essu e plays a la ge ole and
ha opposi ion municipali ies ace s onge e enue p essu e han o he s
because o he unp edic abili y o cen al ans e s. This incen i izes hem
o ba gain wi h ci izens o e e enue in consensual a he han con lic ual
ways.
In Chap e 5, Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Jamal Msami, and Lucas Ka e a exam-
ine ou di e en ins ances o e enue ba gaining in Tanzania, based on
in-dep h in e iews wi h key ac o s. In hei analysis, hey ocus on he di -
e en a enas o ba gaining and he s a egies employed by he nego ia ing
pa ies. They ind ha e enue p o ide s can succeed in ge ing he go -
e nmen o concede o lowe ax paymen s, pa icula ly when ba gaining is
mo ed o a enas ha enable he building o s uc u ed, epea ed, and us ed
ela ionships.
In Chap e 6, Lise Rakne and Odd-Helge Fjelds ad examine he 2014 VAT
Ac e o m in Tanzania and he ole o lobbying in he ba gaining p ocess,
based on documen analysis and o iginal in e iews wi h in ol ed pa ies.
They ind, among o he hings, ha by c ea ing alliances, business associa-
ions and o he lobby g oups wo ked pu pose ully and managed oshape he
VAT ac in acco dance wi h hei own in e es s.
In Chap e 7, Anne Me e Kjæ and Clay on A inanye p esen indings on
se en ins ances o ba gaining conce ning Uganda’s ag icul u al sec o . Based
on ex ensi e ield obse a ions, in e iews, and policy documen s, hey show
ha ag icul u al sec o ac o s succeed mo e when hey p o es agains axes
han when hey y o lobby o imp o ed se ice deli e y. In he o me case,
i is easie o hem o ally wi h o he ac o s and easie o he uling eli e o
gi e concessions.
In Chap e 8, Dan Ngabi ano examines e enue ba gaining in he judicial
a ena in his s udy o how he Ugandan go e nmen ook a mul ina ional oil
54 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
company ocou .Thego e nmen wonand heco po a ionwasmadeliable
opayala gesumo capi algains ax.Basedonananalysiso legaldocumen s
combinedwi hin e iews,Ngabi ano’schap e shows ha e enuep o ide s
who we know o be economically impo an o he uling eli es ha e a weak
ba gaining posi ion because hey a e no poli ically impo an .
In Chap e 9, Moses Khisa, Jamal Msami, and Ole The kildsen examine
he connec ion be ween campaign inancing and ax exemp ions in Uganda
and Tanzania h ough o iginal su ey da a and in e iews. They a gue ha
campaign inance gi es dono s o such inance mo e ba gaining powe han
ax paying does.
In Chap e 10,RachelBeachexamines woins anceso e enueba gaining
in Togo based on ex ensi e ieldwo k and pa icipa o y obse a ion wi hin
he Togolese e enue au ho i y. She inds ha a hi d pa y’s in e en ion
can bols e as well as in e he ba gaining powe and posi ion o he e enue
au ho i ies in impo an ways.
In Chap e 11, Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine
Geo ge explo e he e enue-ba gaining p ocess be ween he in e na ional
aid agencies— he cu en e enue p o ide s o Tanzania’s cash ans e
p og amme—and he Tanzanian go e nmen . They pay pa icula a en ion
o hep e e enceso nego ia ingpa iesandhow hepa ies seek omaximize
hei own in e es s in he nego ia ions, and hey ind ha e en i he in e na-
ional aid agencies p o ide subs an ial e enue, he agencies a e unable o
ully impose hei p e e ed in e es s on he Tanzanian go e nmen .
In Chap e 12, he book’s inal empi ical chap e , Ane Ka oline Bak o e s a
his o ical analysis o e enue ba gaining be ween he Senegalese uling eli es
and he in o mal comme cial sec o . Bak inds ha he e olu ion in axa ion
o he sec o can be explained in pa by he ela i e ba gaining posi ions ha
shi o e ime depending on he composi ion o he uling coali ion and he
changing ba gaining powe o he e enue p o ide s and, in pa icula , o
hei b oke UNACOIS.
The chap e s all d aw on he heo e ical amewo k de eloped and ou -
lined in his chap e o examine ins ances o e enue ba gaining. Though he
book’s chap e s ocus on di e en pa s o he e enue-ba gaining p ocesses,
heydoo e lapinmul ipleways,allowingcompa a i eand c oss-case, c oss-
sec o , and c oss-coun y obse a ions o be made. When ele an and possi-
ble, c oss-chap e compa isons a e e e enced in he espec i e chap e s. No
leas gi en he sha ed heo e ical amewo k, we a e able o d aw ou wi h
con idence some b oadly gene alizable pa e ns in he conclusion (Chap e
13). Beyond ha , he concluding chap e discusses comp ehensi ely he
Unpacking e enue ba gaining: T igge s, p ocesses, and ou comes 55
collec i e answe s ha he chap e s p o ide o ou esea ch ques ion o how
and unde wha condi ions e enue ba gaining eme ges, e ol es, and leads
o iscal con ac s.
2.6 Conclusion
O e he pas wo decades, domes ic e enue mobiliza ion has been expand-
ing and axa ion has become poli icized ac oss A ica. Concu en ly, a li e -
a u e s udying he poli ical ou comes o axa ion has blossomed, bu ound
ew signs o he expec ed exchange-based iscal social con ac s be ween s a e
and socie y. Despi e he p oli e a ion o iscal con ac esea ch, he dynam-
ics and poli ics o e enue ba gaining emain unde heo ized. As discussed
in Chap e 1, we he e o e need o de elop a heo e ical amewo k ha helps
us mo e om he mac o o he mic o le el and allows us o embed he analy-
sis o e enue ba gaining wi hin he economic and poli ical powe s uc u es.
I hasbeen hepu pose o hischap e op esen a heo e ical amewo k ha
allows us o s udy he poli ics o e enue ba gaining h ough case s udies o
mic o-le el ins ances he eo .
This heo e ical amewo k is based on he exis ing iscal con ac heo y
and he poli ical se lemen app oach and p o ides wo majo con ibu ions.
Fi s , he amewo k con ibu es o he iscal con ac li e a u e by de ining
and unpacking he concep o e enue ba gaining and, impo an ly, dis-
inguishing i om i s po en ial ou come: mic o-le el iscal con ac s. This
allows us o sepa a e p ocesses om ou comes, and analyse he condi ions
ha shape each o hem as well as hei ela ionship. Second, he ame-
wo k acili a es b inging poli ics in o he analysis o e enue ba gaining. We
heo ize ha bo h e enue p o ide s’ o ganiza ional impo ance and hei
iscal impo ance o uling eli es de e mine he s eng h o hei ba gaining
posi ions. We include a heu is ic de ice o iden i y ba gaining pa ies’ ini-
ial ba gaining posi ion as a poin o depa u e o explo ing how and unde
wha condi ions e enue p o ide s a e able o p omo e hei demands in
nego ia ions ela ed o e enue p o ision.
Equipped wi h his heo e ical amewo k, he empi ical chap e s ha ol-
low ake an explo a i e app oach o unde s anding p ocesses o e enue
ba gaining. Besides examining he ole o powe , he empi ical chap e s also
go beyond he common s udies o e enue ba gaining by paying a en ion
o he ac ual immedia e igge s besides he ai ly s a ic e enue p essu e, as
well as lea ing he imagina y ba gaining able behind and going o whe e
ins ances o e enue ba gaining ac ually ake place.

56 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, and Anne Me e Kjæ
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an den Boogaa d, V., W. P icha d, R. Beach, and F. Mohiuddin. 2021. ‘Enabling
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Indus ial Policy. Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess.
66 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
3.3 Me hodology
This compa a i e case s udy has been conduc ed in Tanzania’s la ges ci y,
Da es Salaam, a apidly g owing ci y wi h a sizeable in o mal economy and
a la ge sha e o in o mal women wo ke s. By limi ing he ocus o Da es
Salaam, mul iple mac o-le el his o ical, social, poli ical, cul u al, and eco-
nomic ac o s a e held cons an . A he same ime, he s udy is ca ied ou
in se en ma ke s ac oss h ee municipali ies in Da es Salaam o exploi he
a ia ions in axa ion and capaci y o collec i e ac ion. Ac oss he munic-
ipali ies, axa ion o ma ke ade s a ies because he local go e nmen in
each municipali y has he manda e o o mula e egula ions on ma ke ax-
a ion wi hin he municipali y. Capaci y o collec i e ac ion a ies ac oss
he di e en ma ke s because o he ma ke s’ di e se social composi ion and
o ganiza ional landscape.
The esea ched ma ke si es a e M ambani, Magomeni, and Tandale
(Kinondoni Municipali y); Ilala, Kisu u, and Mchikichini (Ilala Municipal-
i y); and Fe y (Kigamboni Municipali y). The s udy is based on in e iews
andpa icipan obse a ionswi h22womenma ke ade sin Da esSalaam
in Ma ch–Ap il 2018. Fou ocus g oup discussions (FGDs) o ou people
each and se en in-dep h in e iews (IDs) we e conduc ed. The in e iewees
di e in age, educa ional le el, amily s a us, commodi y aded, and wo k
his o y. The pa icipan obse a ions we e conduc ed a a VICOBA ( il-
lage communi y bank) g oup mee ing in Ilala and an inaugu a ion e en
o a VICOBA g oup in Mchikichini (O1–O2). Cases in which he women
epo ed o collec i ely ha ing aken uni ed ac ion wi h he aim o p essu -
ing au ho i ies o accede o hei demands a e deno ed cases o collec i e
ac ion. Cases in which he women ha e joined o ounded an o ganized
g oup wi hou he in en o in luence au ho i ies a e deno ed cases o col-
lec i e o ganizing. Cases in which nei he o he abo e was iden i ied a e
deno ed nega i e cases.
3.4 Findings
3.4.1 Pa e ns o collec i e ac ion and collec i e o ganizing
Table 3.1 p o ides an o e iew o he iden i ied c oss-ma ke pa e ns in
collec i e ac ion and collec i e o ganizing. O he 22 in e iewed women,
12 women had ne e engaged in collec i e ac ion o collec i e o ganizing
(ma ked by ‘–’ in Table 3.1). O hese 12 women, 11 wo ked in ma ke s in
Kinondoni Municipali y, and one wo ked in Ilala ma ke . The emaining

We pay, we ac ? 67
10 in e iewed women we e all engaged in collec i e o ganizing. Sp ead
ac oss i e ma ke s, hese women epo ed engaging in di e en ma ke -
based o ganized g oups. A woman in Tandale pa icipa ed in a ma ke -based
upa u g oup (in o mal sel -lending g oup) (ID1). In Mchikichini ma ke ,
wo women we e membe s o VICOBA g oups (sel -loaning g oups), and
one o hese was also a membe o coope a i e socie y o kiosk ade s
in he ma ke (ID2–ID3, O1). Two women in Mchikichini ma ke we e
membe s o he Na ional Women T ade s Associa ion (NWTA), which, a
he ime o esea ch, was in he p ocess o egis e ing as a o mal o ga-
niza ion (NWTA1).¹ In Ilala ma ke , a woman was a membe o bo h
a VICOBA g oup and he NWTA (ID7, NWTA2, O2). In Kisu u ma -
ke , ou women we e membe s o a VICOBA g oup and a ma ke -based
women’s associa ion accessible o all women in he ma ke (FGD4). Las ly,
in Fe y ma ke , wo women we e VICOBA g oup membe s and also pa ic-
ipa ed in a women’s pla o m, a women-empowe men g oup in he ma ke
and su ounding neighbou hood ini ia ed by he municipal de elopmen
depa men (ID4–ID5).
Table 3.1 Pa e ns o collec i e o ganizing and collec i e ac ion
Municipali y Ma ke Collec i e
o ganizing
Collec i e ac ion Da a sou ce
Kinondoni M ambani – – FGD1
Magomeni – – FGD2
Tandale – – FGD3
Upa u – ID1
Ilala Mchikichini VICOBA – ID3
VICOBA Inaugu a ion e en ID2, O2,
NWTA∗– NWTA1
Kiosk coope a i e
socie y ID3
Ilala – – ID6
VICOBA Elec ici y ee p o es O1, ID7
NWTA – NWTA2
Kisu u VICOBA – FGD4
Women’s associa ion –
Kigamboni Fe y VICOBA – ID4–ID5
Women’s pla o m –
No e: ∗NWTA is an abb e ia ion o he Na ional Women T ade s Associa ion. FGD s ands o ocus
g oup discussion, ID is in-dep h in e iew, and O is obse a ion.
¹ As o 2022, he Na ional Women T ade s Associa ion is o mally egis e ed as an associa ion.
68 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
Only wocaseso collec i eac ion( ela ed o axa ion)we eiden i ied.The
i s case o collec i e ac ion, he elec ici y ee p o es , e e s o an e en in
Ilala ma ke in he beginning o 2018 when he elec ici y supply was uns a-
ble, wi h he ade s some imes expe iencing hou -long powe cu s. A his
ime, he ma ke leade ship, headed by a municipal ep esen a i e, decided
o aise he weekly elec ici y ee in Ilala ma ke by TZS 500 (Tanzanian
shillings) o alls all ade s.A i s , mos o he ade saccep ed his because
hey expec ed i o be accompanied by elec ici y imp o emen s. Howe e , as
powe cu s kep occu ing, he ade s became discon en ed wi h he lack o
imp o emen and demanded he ee be lowe ed o he p e ious le el. The e-
o e, se e al o he VICOBA g oups in Ilala ma ke join ly p o es ed o he
ma ke leade ship. A e a ew weeks, he ma ke leade ship ag eed o lowe
he elec ici y ee. A woman ha had headed he p o es epo ed ha , in
he opinion, i was he uni ed on by he VICOBA g oups ha had o ced
he ma ke leade ship o accede o he ade s’ demands (ID7, O1). In e es -
ingly, his case illus a es how collec i e o ganizing (VICOBA g oups) can
me amo phose in oa ehicle o collec i e ac iondi ec ed owa dsmunicipal
au ho i ies.
The second collec i e ac ion case, he inaugu a ion e en , was a one- ime
e en held by a VICOBA g oup in Mchikichini ma ke (Ilala Municipal-
i y). The women wan ed o showcase he po en ial o VICOBA g oups o
women’s empowe men and o d aw he local au ho i ies’ a en ion o he
challenging economic condi ions and gende - ela ed issues expe ienced by
women ade s in Mchikichini. Fo his pu pose, he women had managed
o in i e he Dis ic Commissione o Ilala Municipali y and o he p omi-
nen localgo e nmen ac o s.Thewomenheldspeechesandsangabou hei
conce ns o pe suade he local go e nmen o p io i ize women’s economic
empowe men and o p o ide be e secu i y o women in he ma ke . By
he end o e en , he women had asked he local go e nmen o p o ide
inancial suppo o he VICOBA g oup o alle ia e hei economic ha d-
ship (O1). La e , a VICOBA membe s a ed ha he main sou ces o hei
economic ha dship we e a lack o access o loans and capi al, high p ices
cha ged by middlemen (madalali), low incomes, and high le ies cha ged by
he municipali y (ID2).
3.4.2 Unde s anding he pa e ns
Mos o he collec i e o ganizing and he wo collec i e ac ion cases a e in
he ma ke s in Ilala Municipali y and in Fe y ma ke in Kigamboni Munic-
ipali y, whe eas he nega i e cases a e mainly loca ed in he ma ke s o
We pay, we ac ? 69
Kinondoni Municipali y. In he ollowing, I use he women’s expe iences o
axa ionandle elo capaci y o collec i eac ion oexplo ewhe he axa ion
mo i a ed collec i e ac ion and whe he di e ences in capaci y can explain
he collec i e engagemen pa e ns iden i ied abo e.
3.4.2.1 Mo i a ion: Does axa ion igge collec i e ac ion and
collec i e o ganizing, and i so, how?
As a gued ea lie , axa ion can mo i a e e enue p o ide s’ collec i e engage-
men i hey expe ience ha paying axes con ibu es o hei economic
ha dship. Table 3.2 shows he ma ke ade s’ sel - epo ed o mal paymen s
ha heymake oconduc business.Some ade spay onaweeklybasis,while
o he s pay e e y day.
The mos no iceable di e ence is be ween he ege able ade s in ma ke s
in Kinondoni Municipali y, who epo ed paying TZS 1,400–2,900 weekly,
and he ege able ade s in Fe y ma ke in Kigamboni Municipali y, whose
weekly paymen s amoun o TZS 7,000 (FGD1–FGD3, ID4–ID5). In 2018,
TZS 1,400 co esponded o abou USD 0.6, and now TZS 7,000 is abou USD
3. While his may seem a small amoun —and a small di e ence be ween
he highes and lowes paymen —i is wo h no ing ha mos o he women
we e small-scale ade s epo ing o ha e e y low incomes, which mean
ha e en small le y changes we e el . Howe e , since mos o he women
Table 3.2 Ma ke ade sʼ sel - epo ed weekly o mal paymen s (Tanzanian shillings
(TZS))
Municipali y Ma ke Sel - epo ed o mal
paymen s
(weekly)
Pa e ns o collec i e
o ganizing (1) and
collec i e ac ion (2)
Kinondoni M ambani 1,400 –
Magomeni 2,900–5,000 –
Tandale 1,750–3,000 1: Upa u g oup
Ilala Mchikichini 4,200–4,600 1: VICOBA g oups,
NWTA, Kiosk coop. socie y
2: Inaugu a ion e en
Ilala 4,900 1: VICOBA, NWTA
2: Elec ici y ee p o es
Kisu u 4,500 1: VICOBA, women’s
associa ion
Kigamboni Fe y 7,000 1: VICOBA, women’s
pla o m
No e: Da a om in e iews FGD1–FGD4 and ID1–ID7.
70 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
epo ed no o hold accoun s o pu chases, sales, o le ies paid, i has no
been possible o es ablish exac ly how much hese weekly paymen s a e away
om he ade s’ income. This also mean ha i was di icul o es ablish
whe he he highe o mal axa ion in Fe y ma ke pu a g ea e economic
p essu e on he Fe y ade s compa ed o he ade s in he o he ma ke s.
Women in all ma ke s exp essed being unde se e e economic p essu e,
and ac oss he cases o collec i e o ganizing and ac ion, economic ha dship
seemed o mo i a e collec i e engagemen wi h he p ospec o easing he
economic p essu e (FGD4, ID2–5, O1–O2), among o he hings. Illus a-
i ely, a VICOBA membe in Fe y said he ollowing abou why she joined
he g oup:
. . . because you can sa e up li le by li le. I you ha e 2 million TZS [Tanzanian
shillings] in sha es, you can bo ow up o 6 million, and hen you a e in a posi ion
o b ing abou de elopmen . I ha e been able o ake my child en o school, I ha e
buil a house, and I ha e bough a land while in VICOBA. (ID4)
In Kisu u ma ke , in o mal axa ion appea ed o be a challenge, and some
women epo ed his o be hei main eason o joining a VICOBA g oup.
He e,inaddi ion opayings all en oIlalamunicipalau ho i ies, hewomen
we e unlaw ully cha ged be ween TZS 30,000and 50,000 a mon h in s all
en by o he ade s who had p e iously occupied he s alls. The women
said hey had complained o he ma ke leade ship, bu only indi idually
as i had no occu ed o hem o use he VICOBA g oup o he women’s
associa ion o oice hei complain s (FGD4). As such, his is an example
o axa ion issues igge ing collec i e o ganizing bu no collec i e ac ion.
Gene ally, he women said ha his economic ha dship could, in pa , be
asc ibed o axa ion because hey had o pay he o mal le ies e en on days
whe e hey did no make any sales. Howe e , axa ion seemed o be one o
many ac o s a he han he pa amoun igge ing ac o o hei collec i e
engagemen .
Ano he way axa ion could mo i a e e enue p o ide s’ collec i e engage-
men isi heyexpe iencealacko ecip oci yo unsa is ac o y e u n o hei
paymen s. To examine whe he his mo i a ion is p esen , i is i s impo an
o unde s and wha he women would expec in e u n o hei ax paymen .
The women hemsel es explained ha hey pay he a o emen ioned le ies o
be allowed o conduc business in he ma ke and o co e a ange o ma ke
se ices.Thewomen epo ed ha hele ieswe epaid o helocalau ho i ies
o he ma ke leade ship and ha he le ies we e collec ed by municipal o i-
cials, ma ke leade ship, o appoin ed ade s. Resul s di e ed as o whe he
We pay, we ac ? 71
Table 3.3 Ma ke ade sʼ accoun s o wha hei weekly paymen s a e supposed o
und
Municipali y Ma ke Ga bage
collec-
ion
Cleaning Secu i y Elec ici y S all
en
Ma ke
in as uc-
u e and
epai
wo k
Kinondoni M ambani X X
Magomeni X X X X
Tandale X X X X
Ilala Mchikichini X X X
Ilala X X
Kisu u X X
Kigamboni Fe y X X X
he ade s we e awa e ha he a es and pu pose o he o mal le ies igu e
in municipal bylaws. Table 3.3 shows he ade s’ accoun s o wha he weekly
paymen s we e supposed o und.
Acco ding o he ade s, he o mal le ies a e supposed o und di e -
en ypes o ma ke se ices as well as s all en (FDG1–FDG4, ID1–ID5).
In e es ingly, esul s di e ed qui e a bi ega ding whe he he women we e
sa is ied wi h he e u n hey go om hei paymen s and whe he hey
expe ienced a lack o ecip oci y on he pa o he local go e nmen (and
some imes he ma ke leade ship). In M ambani and Fe y ma ke s, he
in e iewedwomenwe equi esa is iedwi h hei e u ns(ID4–ID5,FDG1).
In he o he ma ke s, he women exp essed signi ican discon en wi h he
se ice p o ision. In Tandale ma ke , he ade s said ha he paymen s
hey made o ‘ma ke in as uc u e’ we e supposed o und a unc ioning
d ainage sys em. Howe e , du ing he in e iews, he women would poin
o he open sewe s wi h s agnan wa e and was e su ounding us and say
ha he local au ho i ies we e clea ly no upholding hei end o he ag ee-
men (FDG3). Asimila p oblemwasa icula edby hewomenin Magomeni
ma ke (FDG2).
Whe he his expe ience o a lack o ecip oci y mo i a ed he women’s
collec i e engagemen a ied ac oss he ma ke s. In Magomeni and Tandale
ma ke s, he dissa is ac ion wi h he se ice p o ision did no igge any
kind o collec i e engagemen ; he e, only one woman epo ed o be in an
upa u g oup o deal wi h he economic challenges. Con e sely, in o he ma -
ke s, he lack o ecip oci y igge ed discon en and collec i e engagemen .
The elec ici y ee p o es in Ilala ma ke is one such case. He e, he ade s

72 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
we ediscon en ed ha heinc easeinelec ici y eeswasno accompaniedby
elec ici y imp o emen s, and his made hem p o es o he ma ke leade -
shipheadedbyamunicipal ep esen a i e(ID7,O2).Theinaugu a ionpa y
in Mchikichini ma ke is ano he case. He e, he women’s complain s o he
local go e nmen we e based on dissa is ac ion wi h he poo s a e o secu-
i y o women ade s in he ma ke now ha hey ac ually paid o secu i y
(O2). In he cases o collec i e o ganizing, he issues o di e economic con-
di ions and lack o se ice deli e y (in pa icula , secu i y) con ibu ed o
he women’s decisions o o m and join g oups. In hese cases, he women
said hey el like hey had o ely on hemsel es—and hei own o ganized
g oups— o handle hese challenges (along wi h he social and gende - ela ed
challenges). A guably, his implici ly speaks o a lack o ecip oci y. Mos o
hese ade s connec ed he issues o poo se ice deli e y, subs anda d ma -
ke in as uc u e, and he expe ience o ha ing o ely on hemsel es o
ackling hese challenges o he issue o a lack o ecip oci y on he pa o
he local go e nmen . Howe e , as e idenced, i was only in a ew cases ha
hese o ganized g oups me amo phosed in o ehicles o collec i e ac ion o
complain o he local au ho i ies abou his expe ienced lack o ecip oci y.
Summing up, axa ion can mo i a e collec i e engagemen among e -
enue p o ide s h ough he wo economic g ie ances. Howe e , e en hough
almos all he ade s said hey expe ienced hese g ie ances, he e was qui e
a a ia ion in he collec i e engagemen : o e hal o he ade s did no pa -
icipa e in any o m o collec i e engagemen , and I only iden i ied wo cases
o ac ual collec i e ac ion a ound axa ion. Thus, ax- ela ed g ie ances do
no seemsu icien o igge collec i eo ganizingand,pa icula ly,collec i e
ac ion.
3.4.2.2 Capaci y: P econdi ions o he link be ween axa ion
and collec i e ac ion?
As a gued ea lie , women ade s’ collec i e le el o o ganiza ional and ela-
ional capaci y is likely o condi ion whe he hey manage o o e come
powe - ela ed ba ie s o collec i e ac ion. In he ollowing, I show how a i-
a ions in o ganiza ional and ela ional capabili ies help explain he nega i e
and posi i e cases o collec i e engagemen ac oss ma ke s.
3.4.2.2.1 O ganiza ional capaci y
Fi s , in he ma ke s whe e no collec i e engagemen was iden i ied, he o ga-
niza ional capabili ies o he women we e indeed e y limi ed. Fo example,
in Magomeni ma ke , he women appa en ly iewed collec i e o ganizing as
We pay, we ac ? 73
a po en ial way o add ess hei economic ha dship and oice hei discon-
en wi h hei condi ions, bu hey also exp essed a lack o knowledgeo how
o do i in p ac ice. One woman simply pu i : ‘We do no how o deal wi h
ha [collec i e engagemen ]’ (FGD2). Ano he woman added: ‘The one way,
we know, is he way you see us: coming om home o he ma ke he e and
home again . . . we end up discussing ou challenges as no mal con e sa ion,
bu no hing will change [because] us women in his ma ke , we do no ha e
ha unde s anding’ (FGD2). As such, he women expe ienced ha ing a un-
damen al lack o know-how in o ganiza ional de elopmen . Mo eo e , he
women exp essed ha ing a limi ed unde s anding o hei igh s and a lack
o access o in o ma ion and channels o ad ocacy. In Magomeni, a woman
said: ‘Things like g oups a e no he e, and he e is no one who can speak o
us. The e should be a pe son who could enligh en us, elling us ha we as
women need o igh o ou igh s by choosing one pe son who will speak
on ou behal ’ (FGD2). This quo e also o e s ano he in e es ing insigh :
he woman alks o an ‘us’ and ‘we as women’ illus a ing ha womanhood,
e en in spaces wi hou collec i e engagemen , may in oke a sense o commu-
ni y, hus making womanhood a po en ially ui ul iden i y a ound which
o mobilize. I e u n o he po en ial o he collec i e iden i y o womanhood
la e .
The women pa icipa ing in collec i e engagemen had a g ea e o gani-
za ional capaci y; as such, o ganiza ional capaci y and engagemen seem o
ein o ce each o he . Howe e , om he women’s accoun s i was e iden ha
hei o ganiza ionalcapabili ies o someex en hadp ecededandenabled he
eme gence o hei collec i e engagemen . In Fe y ma ke , o example, one
womanhadp e iouslypa icipa edin oca ionalando ganiza ional aining
acili a ed by he NGO CARE In e na ional. When she s a ed he business
in he ma ke , she used he acqui ed o ganiza ional capabili ies o mobi-
lize o he women ade s in Fe y ma ke in o o ming a VICOBA g oup o
alle ia e economic ha dship: ‘I lea n [wi h CARE] ill I unde s ood abou
leade ship, and now I ha e he abili y o each o he people, and each hem
so ha hey can each o he people’ (ID4). Ano he ade in Fe y indi-
ca ed ha he woman ained by CARE was a decisi e human o ganiza ional
esou ce: ‘Yes, ha woman [ID5] was one o he people who in luenced me
o join [VICOBA]. She ga e me in o ma ion, and we decided ha we should
wo k o be like women we always [see] in he news; we should igh o ha e
ou own g oup’ (ID4).
In Ilala, Mchikichini, and Kisu u ma ke s, i was he aining by a local
ci il socie y o ganiza ion (CSO) called Equali y o G ow h (E G) ha
spa ked hei o ganiza ionalcapaci y. Thewomenin hese ma ke sexplained
74 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
ha E G—a CSO es ablished in 2008 wi h he aim o empowe in o -
mal women wo ke s in Tanzania—s a ed hos ing semina s o he women
ade s ocusing on legal and human igh s, ad ocacy, and building capac-
i y o collec i e engagemen . La e , E G assis ed he women in es ablishing
VICOBA g oups, and in 2018, he women ade s—p ima ily cen ed in he
ma ke s o Ilala Municipali y— ook s eps o es ablish he Na ional Women
T ade s Associa ion (NWTA) (ID2–ID3, FGD4, ID7, O1–O2, NWTA). The
NWTA was egis e ed as an NGO in 2021; has engaged in i s i s ad ocacy
e o s on behal o women ma ke ade s; and is cu en ly o mula ing a
cons i u ion, building up he in e nal o ganiza ion, and accessing unding
(In e iews wi h E G and he chai pe son o NWTA, Ma ch–Ap il 2022).
In ela ion o o e coming ba ie s o collec i e engagemen , i was e i-
den ha mos o hese women’s iews on he cos s o collec i e engagemen
changed as hei o ganiza ional capaci y g ew. P e iously, hey had iewed
collec i e engagemen as ye ano he ime-consuming and cos ly ac i i y, bu
wi h he o ganiza ional aining, mos o hem said hey had lea ned how
o o ganize in ways ha we e cos and ime e icien (e.g. holding mee ings
in he ma ke on a egula basis a a ime in be ween peak business hou s).
As a es ed by he cases o collec i e ac ion, some o he women e en ually
s a ed using hei g oups as channels o in luence o municipal and ma ke
au ho i ies. This a es s o he ac ha o ganiza ional capaci y—a leas o e
ime—can help e enue p o ide s o e come poli ical ba ie s o collec i e
ac ion and hus become a poli ical esou ce ha he e enue p o ide s can
use o hei ad an age (O1–O2, ID4). I also subs an ia es ha o disad an-
aged e enue p o ide g oups he e is a ce ain sequencing in he collec i e
engagemen : collec i e o ganizing can be a necessa y s ep o o e come, o e
ime, he poli ical ba ie s o collec i e ac ion.
3.4.2.2.2 Rela ional capaci y
S a ing wi h Tandale and Magomeni ma ke s whe e collec i e engagemen
was almos non-exis en , he women’s accoun s a es ed o qui e a limi ed
ela ional capaci y. Se e al women desc ibed ha he e was a lack o social
us in he ma ke s. In Magomeni ma ke , one woman said: ‘Tha ela ion-
ship o us , o be hones , is no he e. He e, we jus know each o he , bu
whene e you encoun e a challenge, you will ha e o deal wi h i you sel ’
(FGD2). In e es ingly, a woman in Ilala ma ke who did no pa icipa e in
any o m o collec i e engagemen oiced a simila expe ience: ‘Mos people
he eha e g oups in hes ee s whe e hey li e, becausehe e, heydono us
each o he e y much’ (ID6). O he accoun s spoke o a lack o ecip oci y.
In Tandale ma ke , a woman who had p e iously been in an upa u (sel -
lending) g oup said ha she had s opped pa icipa ing because ‘people will
We pay, we ac ? 75
chea you... heybecomeb u al,because heyonly ecei e,bu wheni ’s hei
ime o pay, hey won’ pay’ (FDG3). In hese con ex s ma ked by a lack o
us and ecip oci y, I did no obse e a s ong sense o communi y o sense
o ‘we-ness’. Ra he , he social ela ions seemed o be domina ed by an ‘e e y
pe son o he sel ’ no ion. Illus a i ely, when I asked i he ade s gene ally
helped each o he , one woman esponded: ‘No! I ’s like his: I I’m expe ienc-
ing challenges mysel , how can I suppo someone else who has challenges?’
(FGD3). This lack o ela ional capaci y was decisi e o he women’s lack o
collec i e engagemen . In Magomeni ma ke , a woman said i well: ‘In his
ma ke , he e is a lo o sel ishness, so i is a bi ha d o o ganize’ (FGD2).
Con e sely, women pa icipa ing in collec i e engagemen in Mchikichini,
Ilala, Kisu u, and Fe y ma ke s displayed a much g ea e social capi al
and o en a s ong collec i e iden i y. In e es ingly, he women’s ela ional
capaci y was no jus a p oduc o hei collec i e engagemen . Ra he , i
was e iden ha hei collec i e engagemen was mos o en p eceded and
enabled by he women’s close, us -based, and ecip ocal social ela ion-
ships. A woman in Fe y ma ke ecoun ed ha i was he iendship wi h
ano he woman ade in he ma ke ha made he wan o o m a VICOBA
g oup, explaining ha hey we e ‘like a amily’ and helped each o he wi h
capi al and amily- ela ed ac i i ies (such as une als and weddings) (ID5). A
woman in Mchikichini ma ke simila ly said: ‘I was eluc an o join, because
I did no ge enough in o ma ion abou i . Bu a e I came he e, I me o he
women and hey ad ised me o join VICOBA, so he ea wen away, and
I became con iden and joined’ (ID2). F iendships be ween women ade s
hus a guably help he women o e come psychological ba ie s o collec-
i e engagemen . Fo he posi i e cases o collec i e ac ion, high ela ional
capaci y clea ly p eceded he ac ual ac ion, as bo h ac s happened unde he
auspices o well- unc ioning VICOBA g oups.
3.4.2.2.3 The collec i e iden i y o womanhood: A s ong sou ce o communi y
Ac oss he ma ke s, i becomes clea ha a s ong sou ce o communi y,
and he mos p e ailing and uni ying collec i e iden i y, was ela ed o he
no ion o womanhood— ha is, he pe cei ed commonali ies ela ed o being
women. The in e iews o e ed se e al insigh s in o why his was he case. In
gene al,i seems ha hisno iono womanhoodisshapedby pa ia chalgen-
de no ms and powe hie a chies. Fi s , he women’s pe cei ed commonali y
s emmed om hei expe ience ha hey, as women, had amily espon-
sibili ies. A woman in Fe y ma ke explained i like his: ‘Look, women,
like me, we ha e huge esponsibili ies . . . . We women should come o -
wa d because we ha e amilies o ake ca e o ’ (ID5). Second, he no ion
o womanhood s emmed om gene ally being subjec ed o (and ha ing o
82 Ane Edsle Jacobsen
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic o Collec i e Ac ion: Public Goods and he Theo y o
G oups. Camb idge, MA: Ha a d Uni e si y P ess.
Polle a, F.,and J.M.Jaspe . 2001. ‘Collec i e Iden i yand Social Mo emen s’. Annual
Re iew o Sociology 27(1): pp. 283–305. h ps://doi.o g/10.1146/annu e .soc.27.1.
283.
P icha d, W. 2015. Taxa ion, Responsi eness and Accoun abili y in Sub-Saha an
A ica: The Dynamics o Tax Ba gaining. Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1017/CBO9781316275511.
P icha d, W., and V. an den Boogaa d. 2017. ‘No ms, Powe , and he Socially
Embedded Reali ies o Ma ke Taxa ion in No he n Ghana’. A ican S udies
Re iew 60(1): pp. 171–194.
P ud’homme, R. 1992. ‘In o mal Local Taxa ion in De eloping Coun ies’. En i on-
men and Planning C: Go e nmen and Policy 10(1): pp. 1–17. h ps://doi.o g/10.
1068/c100001.
Pu nam, R. D., R. Leona di, and R. Y. Nane i. 1994. Making Democ acy Wo k: Ci ic
T adi ions in Mode n I aly. P ince on, NJ: P ince on Uni e si y P ess. h ps://
p ess.p ince on.edu/books/pape back/9780691037387/making-democ acy-
wo k.
Roe e , S. 2014. In o mal Economy Moni o ing S udy Sec o Repo : S ee Vendo s.
Camb idge, MA: WIEGO.
Sewell, W. H. 1992. ‘A Theo y o S uc u e: Duali y, Agency, and T ans o ma ion’.
Ame ican Jou nal o Sociology 98(1): pp. 1–29.
Sha p, S., S. Swee , and A. R. Menocal. 2019. Ci il Socie y Engagemen in Tax
Re o m. London: O e seas De elopmen Ins i u e. h ps://cdn.odi.o g/media/
documen s/12926.pd .
Snow, D. A., and S. A. Soule. 2010. A P ime on Social Mo emen s. New Yo k: W.W.
No on.
Timmons, J. F. 2005. ‘The Fiscal Con ac : S a es, Taxes, and Public Se ices’. Wo ld
Poli ics 57(4): pp. 530–567.
an den Boogaa d, V., W. P icha d, R. Beach, and F. Mohiuddin. 2022. ‘Enabling
Tax Ba gaining: Suppo ing Mo e Meaning ul Tax T anspa ency and Taxpaye
Engagemen in Ghana and Sie a Leone’. De elopmen Policy Re iew 40(1):
pp. 1–22. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/dp .12563.
an den Boogaa d, V., W. P icha d, and S. Jibao. 2019. ‘In o mal Taxa ion in
Sie aLeone: Magni udes, Pe cep ionsandImplica ions’. A ican A ai s118(471):
pp. 259–284.
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WIEGO. 2014. The U ban In o mal Wo k o ce: S ee Vendo s. Camb idge, MA:
WIEGO.

4
T igge s and s a egies o e enue
ba gaining
E idence om Mozambican municipali ies
A min on Schille
The e is only one hope. I mo e people belie e in wha we a e doing,
heyʼll s a paying ax. Tha will be ou budge . Then we can s a o
ebuild.
A aujo, Mayo o Quelimane, in a BBC in e iew in 20131
4.1 In oduc ion
Re enueba gainingimpliesanexplici o implici nego ia ionbe weenago -
e nmen and e enue p o ide s (see Chap e s 1 and 2 in his olume). When
conside ing e enue ba gaining and iscal con ac s, he e is a na u al en-
dency o ocus on na ional go e nmen s as hey con ol mos o he public
e enue. Howe e , e enue ba gaining also happens a he in e na ional as
well as subna ional le els, and, in o de o be e unde s and e enue ba -
gaining, i seems ha he subna ional le el is a pa icula ly p omising a enue
o in es iga ion. Mos ci izens eel ha na ional and in e na ional ba gaining
p ocessesa e ese ed o mo epowe ulac o s.²Thei ownpowe andin lu-
ence will end o be pe cei ed as highe a he subna ional le el. In addi ion,
incen i es o engage in e enue ba gaining migh also be s onge a his le el
because, beyond expec ed in luence, he links be ween e enue and public
se ices a e s onge and mo e isible he e.
Based on his idea, his chap e explo es d i e s o e enue ba gaining
based on a compa a i e analysis o Mozambican municipali ies. The ocus is
¹Johnson (2013).
² See discussion on dimensions o ba gaining powe in Chap e 2.
A min on Schille , T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining. In: The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining in A ica.
Edi ed by: Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
© Ox o d Uni e si y P ess (2024). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192868787.003.0004
84 A min on Schille
on he ole o ac o s connec ed o he concep o poli ical se lemen s, which
has ecei ed li le a en ion so a in unde s anding he ax pe o mance o
subna ional uni s (Kjæ , 2009;Jibao and P icha d, 2015). Mozambique is
a pa icula ly appealing case o his explo a i e analysis as i is a highly
pola ized poli ical en i onmen combined wi h some le el o poli ical and
iscal decen aliza ion. As a consequence, a dispu ed decen aliza ion p o-
cess o e ecen decades has led o he c ea ion o 53 municipali ies, wi h
some ema kable au onomy in decision-making a ound axa ion coupled
wi h locally elec ed municipal go e nmen s.
In pa icula , he chap e aims o imp o e he unde s anding o wo
aspec s: wha igge s municipali ies o each ou o ci izens and ini ia e
e enue-ba gaining p ocesses, and wha s a egies do hey employ, including
explana ionso hedi e encesinin ensi yanduse. Inaddi ion,i assesses he
deg ee o which hese ac i i ies appea o be success ul and ac ually in luence
he con en o he municipal iscal con ac as he expec ed inal ou come o
e enue ba gaining (see Chap e 2).
To answe hese ques ions, da a was collec ed om 101 semi-s uc u ed
in e iews conduc ed in Mozambique wi h ep esen a i es o municipal and
na ional-le el go e nmen . A he municipal le el, in e iewees included
membe so hemunicipalgo e nmen , hemunicipalassembly,localadmin-
is a ion, and ci il socie y o ganiza ions (CSOs). A he na ional le el,
academic expe s, ep esen a i es o di e en minis ies in ol ed in he
decen aliza ion p ocess, and in e na ional dono s we e in e iewed. The
sample o municipali ies included 11 ou o he 53 municipali ies in Mozam-
bique, including di e se municipali ies in e ms o size, p o ince, and in a-
municipal le el o poli ical compe i ion as well as poli ical alignmen wi h
he na ional go e nmen .
The esul s indica e ha wo ac o s igge he p edisposi ion o munic-
ipali ies o each ou o ci izens and ini ia e e enue-ba gaining p ocesses:
pe cei ed e enue p essu e and poli ical compe i ion (see Chap e 2).
P icha d (2015) ex ensi ely discusses he ele ance o he le el o e enue
p essu e acing go e nmen s on hei p edisposi ion o ba gain. In essence,
a go e nmen acing s onge e enue p essu e is mo e likely o be open o
comp omise wi h axpaye s in o de o access e enue. In his analysis, e -
enue p essu e inc eases o he municipali ies as a esul o he unce ain y
ega ding he imeliness and size o in e go e nmen al ans e s. This e ec
is pa icula ly s ong in municipali ies go e ned by pa ies no in powe a
he na ional le el. Hence, he esul s sugges ha he po en ial poli iciza ion
o he ans e sys em is a main de e minan o e enue p essu e.³ Poli ical
³ E idence on poli iciza ion o he ans e sys em can, o ins ance, be ound in Ban ul (2011) and
B ollo and Nannicini (2012).
T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 85
compe i ion igge s e enue ba gaining by inc easing he p essu e on local
go e nmen s o show hemsel es as pe o ming well. Al hough his ac o is
iden i ied as ele an in all municipali ies, i appea s o be pa icula ly s ong
in municipali ies go e ned by opposi ion pa ies.
In e ms o s a egies, he in e iew ma e ial indica es ha among ep e-
sen a i es o local go e nmen s and adminis a ions, he na a i e a ound a
mo e coope a i e app oach wi h ci izens is p esen e e ywhe e bu is some-
how s onge in municipali ies cha ac e ized by poli ical compe i ion. This
posi i e pe spec i e owa ds e enue ba gaining does no , howe e , seem o
esul in conc e e measu es. Con e sa ions wi h ep esen a i es o CSOs do
no , on he whole, con i m he alleged e o s. When compa ing pe cep ions
in municipali ies wi h a lowe and highe deg ee o poli ical compe i ion,
he di e ences a e also minimal. Simila ly, while sel - epo ed ini ia i es
a ound e enue ba gaining by he municipali ies di e be ween low- and
high-compe i ion en i onmen s, hese seem no o be pa icula ly success ul
and do no esul in subs an ial a ia ion in he e enue ba gaining aking
place a he local le el. Also, in many cases, i seems ha ini ia i es we e
d i en ex e nally and, in pa icula , by dono s, which may explain he lack o
iden i iable success.
O e all, his chap e con ibu es o he g owing e o o unde s and he
poli ics o e enue ba gaining by ocusing on iden i ying ac o s shaping he
p edisposi ion o local go e nmen s o ba gain. The analysis also indica es
limi a ions on measu es in his a ea and he necessi y o hinking ca e ully
abou p econdi ionsi e enueba gainingis owo k.Following om his, he
esul s also ca y ele an policy implica ions. Enhancing e enue mobiliza-
ionandp omo ing e enueba gainingis highon heagendao in e na ional
dono s. This is also based on he assump ion—only pa ly backed up in he
li e a u e— ha e enue ba gaining can ha e a subs an ial go e nance ‘di -
idend’ by a ec ing poli icians’ esponsi eness and ci izens’ engagemen in
public a ai s, ul ima ely leading o mo e accoun able go e nmen ins i u-
ions (see Chap e 1;Fjelds ad, 2014;Moo e e al., 2018, chap e 8). The
esul s p esen ed in his chap e call o cau ion and o hinking ca e ully
abou p econdi ions o e enue ba gaining o eme ge and o i o ep esen
a meaning ul p ocess, able o b ing he a o emen ioned desi able ou comes.
In pa icula , he analysis shows how—whe e CSOs a e oo weak o coo -
dina e and ep esen e enue p o ide s— he ou look o he success o any
ini ia i es a ound e enue ba gaining is slim, e en i we assume he poli i-
cal au ho i ies ins iga ed hem wi h good in en ions. This is connec ed o he
accep ed p emise ha lack o capaci y o collec i e ac ion unde mines he
po en ial o ba gaining (P icha d, 2015).
86 A min on Schille
The chap e p oceeds as ollows. Sec ion 4.2 desc ibes he poli ical con-
ex and he decen alized sys em in Mozambique in o de o unde s and
he con ex in which municipali ies ope a e. Sec ion 4.3 p o ides de ails on
he me hodological app oach, be o e he esul s a e p esen ed in Sec ion 4.4.
Sec ion 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Fiscal and poli ical decen aliza ion sys em
in Mozambique
Mozambique has been in an ongoing p ocess o decen aliza ion since he
peace acco ds o 1992. In ac , poli ical and iscal decen aliza ion ep e-
sen ed a c ucial pa o he peace nego ia ions (Ames e al., 2010, 103;
Maschie o, 2016). Howe e , he decen aliza ion p ocess, especially in i s
iscal and poli ical dimension, u ned ou o be less ambi ious han ini ially
en isioned. I ook un il 1997 o es ablish au onomous municipal go e n-
men s in Mozambique (Weime , 2012, 4). The main eason was poli ical in
na u e. The Resis ência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO, Mozambican
Na ional Resis ance) ecei ed unexpec ed elec o al suppo in he no he n
and cen al u al a eas a he i s mul i-pa y elec ions in 1994. The po en-
ial loss o powe in he e en o decen aliza ion led he F en e de Libe ação
de Moçambique (FRELIMO, Mozambican Libe a ion F on ) o con es he
planned ambi ious decen aliza ion model, which was hen e o mula ed in
a new comp omise wi h RENAMO (Fo quilha, 2016, 130; Maschie o, 2016,
109).
As a esul , a dual-s uc u ed sys em o local go e nance was in oduced
by law numbe 9/96, and in Mozambique, wo ypes o decen aliza ion
coexis : de olu ion and deconcen a ion (Buu , 2009, 99; Maschie o, 2016,
105). Municipali ies (au a quias locais) ep esen he de olu ion aspec o
he sys em. They ha e au onomous poli ical powe and con ol a ema kable
numbe o e enue ins umen s. A he o he end o he spec um, p o inces,
dis ic s, andlocali ies ep esen hedeconcen a edpa o hesys em. A he
ime his esea ch was unde aken, deconcen a ed uni s lacked au onomous
poli ical powe , we e di ec ly accoun able o he cen al s a e, and con olled
only a limi ed numbe o e enue ins umen s.⁴
⁴ This was changed by a cons i u ional e o m in 2018 (a e he ime o his esea ch), by which assem-
blies a all le els a e now di ec ly elec ed and subsequen ly elec he head o he subna ional execu i e ou
o hei membe s. How o whe he his new change in poli ical decen aliza ion will be ma ched in iscal
e ms is unclea and is he subjec o deba e a he ime o w i ing.
T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 87
Table 4.1 Yea o es ablishmen and ypes o municipali ies
Yea o c ea ion Municipali y Type o municipali y
1997 Mapu o A
Ma ola, Bei a, Nampula B
Xai-Xai, Inhambane, Chimoio, Te e, Quelimane,
Lichinga, Nacala, Ilha de Moçambique, Pemba C
Chokwe, Chibu o, Maxixe, Manica, Dondo,
Mocuba, Gu ue, Angoche, Mon epuez, Cuamba D
Manhiça, Mandlakazi, Vilankulo, Ca andica,
Ma omeu, Moa ize, Milange, Monapo,
Me angula, Mocimboa da P aia
Vilas
2008 Namaacha, Macia, Massinga, Go ongoza,
Gondola, Ulongue, Ribaue, Al o Molocue,
Moeda, Ma upa
Vilas
2013 Boane, P aia do Bilene, Quissico, Sussundenga,
Nhama anda, Nhamayabue, Maganja da Cos a,
Malema, Chiu e, Mandimba
Vilas
Sou ce: Law no. 10/97 (República de Moçambique, 1997); Law no. 11/2013 (República de Moçambique,
2013); MAEFP, (2016)
Gi en he ocuso hischap e on he e ec o ac o sconnec ed opoli ical
se lemen on shaping e enue ba gaining a he local le el, he empi i-
cal analysis is cen ed on Mozambican municipali ies, as, in compa ison o
deconcen a ed uni s, hey con ol subs an ial ax handles and ha e some
deg ee o eedom in se ing up hei s a egies and p io i ies. As shown in
Table 4.1, 53 municipali ies ha e been es ablished since hen in h ee wa es
(1997, 2008, and 2013).⁵
The Minis é io da Adminis ação Es a al e Função Pública (MAEFP, Min-
is y o S a e Adminis a ion and Public Func ion) di ides all municipali ies
in o he ollowing i e ca ego ies based on a se ies o aguely de ined socio-
economic and poli ical indica o s: ype A, he capi al ci y Mapu o; ype B,
he la ges p o incial capi als besides Mapu o; ype C, he capi als o all o he
p o inces as well as wo o he ci ies; ype D, ci ies ha a e pa icula ly ele-
an o he local de elopmen o b oade egions; and ilas, owns ha do no
quali y o ca ego y D (MAEFP, 2016, 28). Acco ding o he MAEFP, a ound
one hi d o he Mozambican popula ion li es in municipali ies. Mo eo e ,
⁵ These 53 municipali ies include all o he coun y’s 23 ci ies and 30 ou o 68 owns (MAEFP, 2016).
In heo y, he es ablishmen o new municipali ies should be based on echnical a gumen s ollowing he
o icial policy, pu sued since 1997, o g adualismo (Buu , 2009). Howe e , he decision abou whe e o
c ea e new municipali ies has been iden i ied o be la gely d i en by poli ical easons and FRELIMO’s
incen i e o a ou i s own s ongholds and a oid po en ial loss o poli ical powe (Fo quilha, 2016).

88 A min on Schille
60% o Mozambique’s GDP and 85% o i s iscal e enues a e gene a ed in
municipali ies (MAEFP, 2016, 26),
Law numbe 1/2008 (A . 17; República de Moçambique, 2008b) and
dec ee numbe 63/2008 (República de Moçambique, 2008a) de ine he is-
cal compe encies o he municipali ies a he ime his s udy was unde -
aken. The mos p ominen axes a e he municipal poll ax (Impos o
Pessoal Au á quico—IPA), he municipal p ope y ax (Impos o P e-
dial Au á quico—IPRA), he municipal p ope y ansac ion ax (Impos o
Au á quico de SISA—IASISA), and he municipal ehicle ax (Impos o
Au á quico sob e Veículos—IAV). I is impo an o highligh ha disc e-
iona y e enue policy is limi ed. A signi ican ly la ge deg ee o disc e ion
can be exe cised in he ealm o non- ax e enue—meaning ees, se ice
cha ges, ines, and sho - e m loans— han when i comes o axes, o which,
in mos cases, gene al p inciples a e de e mined acco ding o na ional law
(Wo ld Bank, 2014, 109).
As is he case in many A ican coun ies (see Moo e e al., 2018, 159),
al hough municipali ies ha e se e al ins umen s wi h which o gene a e
hei own e enue, hey a e highly dependen on in e go e nmen al ans-
e s.On a e age, ans e s ep esen wellabo e65%o e enue.In eali y, his
numbe isp obablymuchhighe asa ailablein o ma ion ends ocome om
bigge ci ies wi h mo e capable adminis a ion and highe e enue po en ial.
In hissense, heweigh o ans e sisespeciallyhighwheni comes omunic-
ipali ies o ype D, wi h a le el a ound 90% (Ilal and Weime , 2017;Weime
and Ca ilho, 2017, 88).
Da a quali y and a ailabili y a e poo in Mozambique, bu agg ega ing he
e idence omindi idualcases udiessugges s ha municipal e enuepo en-
ial is highly unde exploi ed (Chimunuane e al., 2010b;2010a;Boex, 2011;
Nguenha e al., 2012;2017;Weime , 2012;Bunk e al., 2017;Weime and
Ca ilho, 2017).
Poli ically, Mozambique is a highly pola ized coun y. I s poli ical se le-
men can be conside ed oha eg aduallyshi edo e ecen decades owa ds
mo e exclusion and cen aliza ion o powe and esou ces. A he same ime,
compe i ion be ween ac ions wi hin he uling coali ion has inc eased, as
well as among he opposi ion, which is a om uni ed.⁶ A he na ional le el,
FRELIMO has been in powe since 1994. A he municipal le el, howe e ,
opposi ion pa ies ha e been able o win some municipal elec ions, held in
⁶ See ex ensi e analysis o he his o ical de elopmen o he poli ical se lemen in Mozambique in
Macuane e al. (2018).
T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 89
1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018 (MAEFP, 2016, 7).⁷ Since 2009, he Mo i-
men o Democ á ico de Moçambique (MDM), which e ol ed om wi hin
RENAMO, has been challenging he coun y’s bipa isan poli ical sys em.⁸
In he municipal elec ions o 2013, which RENAMO boyco ed, MDM won
hemajo i yo o esin ou municipali iesloca edin heno hand hecen e
o Mozambique (Bei a, Quelimane, Nampula, and Gu ué), whe eas FRE-
LIMO won he emaining 49 municipali ies. In 2018, RENAMO pa icipa ed
again in he local elec ions. MDM su e ed a ema kable loss o o es and
only kep con ol o i s s onghold Bei a. RENAMO won in eigh munici-
pali ies, including in big in luen ial ci ies such as Nampula, Quelimane, and
Nacala.⁹ FRELIMO s ill domina es in he as majo i y o municipali ies. I s
powe base was con i med again in he 2019 p esiden ial elec ion in which
i eached a suppo o a ound 73% o he elec o a e, al hough i egula i ies
we e denounced.¹⁰
O e all, his sec ion has o e ed some backg ound o he pola iza ion o
he poli ical sys em in Mozambique as well as he iscal a chi ec u e wi hin
which he municipali ies ope a e. I also highligh s ha local e enue po en-
ial emains highly unde used. Toge he , hese ea u es indica e he ele ance
o explo ing wha leads municipali ies o pu sue local e enue mobiliza ion
in gene al and e enue ba gaining wi h hei ci izens in pa icula .
4.3 Me hodological app oach
The na u e o his s udy is explo a i e. The main goal is o unde s and be e
wha ac o s igge local go e nmen s o engage in e enue ba gaining wi h
ci izens and how hey do i . To answe hese ques ions, 101 semi-s uc u ed
in-dep h in e iews we e conduc ed wi h a ange o s akeholde s. The lis
o in e iewees includes municipal go e nmen o icials, municipal admin-
is a o s, s a om na ional minis ies and agencies, ci il socie y ac o s,
in e na ional dono s, and academic expe s. The in e iews we e conduc ed
inMapu o(wi hna ionalexpe s)andin11municipali iesbe weenFeb ua y
and May 2017.¹¹
⁷ A he na ional le el, he i s democ a ic p esiden ial and pa liamen a y elec ions ook place in
1994 and a e held egula ly e e y i e yea s (Be elsmann S i ung, 2016, 7). In all p esiden ial and
pa liamen a y elec ions, FRELIMO gained he majo i y o he o es.
⁸ Fo u he de ails conce ning he eme gence o he MDM pa y, see Maihack and Plagemann (2010).
⁹Comissão Nacional de Eleições (2018).
¹⁰ Fo ins ance, by he Eu opean Union Elec ion Obse a ion Mission (2019).
¹¹ In e iews we e conduc ed by all membe s o he p ojec ‘The Poli ical Economy o Local Taxa ion
in Mozambique’, lis ed in he acknowledgmen s.
90 A min on Schille
Table 4.2 Municipali ies selec ed as cases o he compa a i e analysis
Municipali y P o ince Type o municipali y Poli ical leade ship a he
local le el (as o 2017)
Ma ola Mapu o B Aligned
Inhambane Inhambane C Aligned
Maxixe Inhambane D Aligned
Bei a So ala B Non-aligned
Dondo So ala D Aligned
Quelimane Zambézia C Non-aligned
Nacala Nampula C Aligned
Monapo Nampula Vila Aligned
Pemba Cabo Delgado C Aligned
Xai-Xai Gaza C Aligned
Vilankulo Inhambane Vila Aligned
No e: Aligned equals uled by FRELIMO; non-aligned equals uled by MDM.
The municipali ies we e selec ed based on he di e se cases selec ion s a -
egy (Geo ge and Benne , 2005, 83). Hence, in o de o assu e maximum
a ia ion in he a iables o in e es , he sample includes municipali ies
om di e en p o inces, cha ac e ized by di e en le els o adminis a-
i e capaci y, poli ical compe i ion, and poli ical alignmen (See Table 4.2).¹²
Adminis a i e capaci y is p oxied by he ype o municipali y, wi h ci ies o
ype B being conside ed o ha e he highes capaci y, while ype D munic-
ipali ies and so-called ilas ha e he lowes (see he p e ious sec ion o
in o ma ion on legal basis o he di e en ypes o ci ies). Municipali ies a e
conside edalignedi hemunicipali yisgo e ned by hesamepa yinpowe
a he na ional le el (FRELIMO).¹³ Poli ical compe i ion is measu ed by he
ma gin o ic o y in he municipal elec ions o iden i y s ongholds e sus
mo e compe i i e poli ical en i onmen s.
In 2019, local elec ions ook place in Mozambique. As his was a e
he da a collec ion, hese elec ion esul s could no be conside ed; how-
e e , he wo municipali ies labelled as ‘non-aligned’ in his s udy emained
as such a e he 2019 elec ions.¹⁴ Also, he le el o poli ical compe i-
ion and he dis ibu ion o poli ical powe emained simila in all o he
¹² I is also impo an o unde line ha p ac ical issues, including accessibili y, secu i y conce ns, and
da a a ailabili y be o e he in e iew phase, also a ec ed he case selec ion. We pa icula ly ely on da a
p o ided by GIZ (2017).
¹³ A he ime o da a collec ion, ou ou o a o al o 53 municipali ies we e go e ned by opposi ion
pa ies. Two o hem (Bei a and Quelimane) a e ep esen ed in he sample.
¹⁴ In Quelimane, RENAMO won wi h 59% o he o e, while in Bei a, MDM won again wi h 48% o
he o e (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 2018).
T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 91
municipali ies included in he sample. Pa icula ly no ewo hy was ha in
Nacala, RENAMO egained powe by a small ma gin and ha in he dis-
pu ed municipali ies o Monapo and Ma ola, FRELIMO won bu wi h a e y
na ow ma gin. This u he ein o ces he idea ha hese we e pa icula ly
compe i i e en i onmen s a he ime o his da a collec ion.
In all municipali ies, in e iews we e held wi h he same se o ac o s.¹⁵ In
e ms o poli icians, he mayo and (some imes o ) he councillo o inance
we e con ac ed. The municipal assembly, including membe s om di e -
en poli ical pa ies, was also app oached. In he adminis a ion, he head o
inances o e enue and a membe o he b oade e enue eam we e in e -
iewed.Inmos cases,suppo om hedono o ganiza ionwashelp ulwhen
makingcon ac wi h hein e iewees.Alesss anda dized app oachwas used
o con ac CSOs. In mos cases, he ini ial con ac was h ough dono s o
esea ch pa ne s in Mozambique. The semi-s uc u ed in e iews we e un
based on guidelines de eloped o speci ic ypes o ac o s.¹⁶ Topics add essed
included pe cep ions abou he unding si ua ion o he municipali y, chal-
lenges in exploi ing e enue po en ial and he deg ee o which e enue is
an issue o public deba e, and in o ma ion on ac i i ies o each ou o ci -
izens and explain o hem how e enue sys ems wo k and how money is
spen ,aswellas hedeg ee owhichpoli icalconside a ionsa ec hein e ac-
ion be ween local go e nmen s and ci izens ega ding e enue ma e s. All
in e iewees we e asked o hei consen and assu ed con iden iali y. No -
mally, wo esea che s om he eam pa icipa ed in he in e iew. In he as
majo i y o he cases, a ansla o was in ol ed.
4.4 Iden i ied igge s and s a egies o e enue
ba gaining
4.4.1 T igge s o pu sue local ax collec ion: Pe cei ed
e enue p essu e and poli ical compe i ion
The analysis o he in e iew ma e ial s ongly indica es ha he e a e wo
majo igge s ha explain he p edisposi ion o municipal go e nmen s o
engage in e enue ba gaining: he un eliabili y o he iscal ans e sys em
and poli ical compe i ion.
¹⁵ You can ind an o e iew o he in e iew pa ne s by municipali y and ype o ac o in he Appendix
(Tables 4.A1 and 4.A2).
¹⁶ Guidelines can be p o ided upon eques .
98 A min on Schille
be e p econdi ions o ba gaining in he u u e. In e ms o owne ship
and sus ainabili y, i is ques ionable whe he municipal go e nmen s we e,
in mos cases, he main ini ia o s o in o ma ion and ou each ac i i ies.
Ra he han he municipali ies hemsel es, i seems ha hi d pa ies—
dono s and na ional-le el ins i u ions—play a c ucial ole in acili a ing
and ini ia ing measu es.²⁶ Examples o his include he success ul coo dina-
ion o ci il socie y h ough local commi ees such as SAMcoms in Pemba
(I101, CSO ep esen a i e in Pemba), he in oduc ion o a social audi in
Inhambane (I43) wi h he help o MASC (Fundação Mecanismo de Apoio
à Sociedade Ci il— he Founda ion Suppo Mechanism o Ci il Socie y),
and an in o ma ion campaign abou he municipal poll ax (IPA) launched
in Maxixe ha was concep ualized by na ional minis ies (I53, membe o
Maxixe municipal assembly). In he case o pa icipa o y budge ing in Nam-
pula and Quelimane, his eliance on dono s esul ed in he cancella ion o
he whole p og amme once he municipali y was supposed o use i s own
unds ins ead o dono money o implemen ou each measu es (I8, dono
employee).
The e ec i eness o he measu es is also doub ul. Al hough in e iewees
in all municipali ies s a ed ha ou each ac i i ies should con inue, and con-
side ed hem aluable, mos in e iewees indica e ha he ac i i ies did no
ha e any clea measu able impac on he ax cul u e and le el o engagemen
o ci izens. Only e y ew we e con iden in a ibu ing a posi i e e ec o
hese ini ia i es and could name conc e e examples o successes (e.g. I47, I55,
and I67; public adminis a o s and membe s o he municipal assemblies in
Maxixe, Bei a, and Dondo).
The limi ed success o he measu es highligh s a p econdi ion o e enue
ba gaining ha is commonly igno ed. The municipal go e nmen migh be
open o ba gaining, bu i e enue p o ide s lack a minimum o ganiza ional
powe , hey will no only ha e a weak ba gaining posi ion (see Chap e 2),
bu hey will also be unable o engage in e enue-ba gaining p ocesses in a
meaning ul manne .
As such, he e is only e y li le anecdo al e idence o a sys ema ic o gani-
za ion o in e es s among ci izens o discuss e enue ma e s a he municipal
le el. CSOs a e pe cei ed o exe only e y limi ed in luence on munic-
ipal policymaking, pa icula ly in he e enue a ea, e en when suppo ed
in he municipali ies when explici ly asked whe he hey conside ha municipal iden i ies a e e ol ing
o e he yea s, as well he knowledge o ci izens abou he di ision o esponsibili ies be ween le els o
go e nmen .
²⁶ In pa icula , his poin was made s ongly in in e iews wi h dono employees (I2 and I8) and CSOs
(I43, I58, and I79) as well as membe s o municipal assemblies (I60, I75, and I82) in aligned and non-
aligned municipali ies.

T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 99
by dono s. Reasons ci ed a e mos ly connec ed o lack o o ganiza ional
s eng h and hema ic expe ise. In ac , suppo ing doub s abou hones y
in he alleged openness o engage in e enue ba gaining by some municipal-
i ies, some in e iewees desc ibed cases whe e municipali ies we e unwilling
o coope a e wi h hem as soon as CSOs s a ed o engage mo e in ensi ely
in public inance opics.²⁷
All in all, municipali ies implemen many ou each ac i i ies ha could
se e as an in i a ion o s a he p ocess o e enue ba gaining. Howe e , he
e ec i enessin e mso p o idingpla o ms o inclusi e e enueba gaining
seems o be ques ionable. Beyond ha , e en whe e municipali ies migh be
hones ly willing o engage in such p ocesses, i seems ha he p econdi ions
a e no in place o meaning ul e enue ba gaining o eme ge since CSOs
as hi d pa ies coo dina ing and agg ega ing ci izen’s demands, wishes, and
a gumen s lack he o ganiza ional capaci y o ul il hese oles.
4.5 Conclusion
This chap e has explo ed ac o s ha igge e enue ba gaining be ween
municipal go e nmen s and ci izens. Fu he mo e, i has analysed he s a e-
gies hey use o app oach ci izens. In his ega d, he g ea es con ibu ion o
his chap e is in going beyond e enue collec ion and pe o mance owa ds
unde s anding wha leads municipali ies o engage in e enue ba gaining.
This is an essen ial s ep o de eloping a mo e nuanced unde s anding o ac-
o s ha explain di e ences in p edisposi ion o e enue ba gaining ac oss
municipali ies as well as p econdi ions equi ed o meaning ul e enue
ba gaining o ake place.
The esul s indica e ha poli ical compe i ion and pe cei ed un eliabili y
o he ans e sys em s ongly incen i ize municipali ies o engage in e -
enue ba gaining. The in e iew ma e ial also shows ha he na a i e abou
he ele ance o e enue ba gaining is p esen in almos all municipali ies.
Conc e e ini ia i es a e mo e o en named in municipali ies cha ac e ized by
high poli ical compe i ion, al hough hey exis in all. Howe e , hese e o s
a e pe cei ed by ci il socie y o be signi ican ly lowe , ega dless o whe he
he municipali y is aligned wi h he cen al go e nmen o no .
²⁷ Dono employees aised his issue epea edly (in pa icula , I2 and I8). Also, CSOs hemsel es
claimed his in bo h aligned and non-aligned municipali ies (e.g. I43, I58, and I79).
100 A min on Schille
These esul s unde line ha he openness o go e nmen will be insu i-
cien o igge meaning ul e enue ba gaining. Openness is a necessa y, bu
ce ainlyno asu icien condi ion.Ba gainingimplies heengagemen o wo
sides. Hence, ei he he indi idual e enue p o ide s o a leas he CSOs—
as he hi d pa y coo dina ing he oices o he e enue p o ide s—mus
be su icien ly o ganized o pu posi ely in e ac wi h he local go e nmen s.
Cu en ly, in Mozambique, he ci il socie y a he municipal le el is oo weak
o ul il his ole. As a esul , e en i we assume ha municipal go e nmen s
a ehones lyopen os a ing e enue-ba gainingp ocesses,whichisdoub ul
as dono s seem he s onges d i e s o hese ini ia i es, he scope o e -
enue ba gaining o eme ge and ha e majo impac s on he mic o-le el iscal
con ac is small.
Mo e en a i ely, a ques ion ha de i es om he esul s and would
dese e u he sc u iny is he po en ial pa adox ha he e o s o na ional
go e nmen s o manipula e ans e sys ems o disad an age municipali ies
go e ned by opposi ion pa ies migh , unde ce ain ci cums ances, ha e he
opposi e e ec han he one expec ed. In his line, he addi ional iscal p es-
su e migh igge a s eng hening o he mic o-le el iscal con ac s be ween
hese local go e nmen s and hei ci izens and, he eby, pu hese e y same
municipalgo e nmen sinabe e poli icalposi ionin hemidand long e m
as well as, mo e gene ally, inc ease he poli ical salience o hese municipal-
i ies. Wang (2017) desc ibes how China depoli icized i s public inance o
disincen i ize he ac i i y o local poli ically ac i e social g oups. The analy-
sis in his chap e would sugges ha in a somewha e e se logic, pu ing
e enue p essu e on he municipali ies con olled by he poli ical opposi-
ion migh encou age he in e ac ion be ween socie y and local go e nmen ,
imp o ing hei ela ionship and po en ially leading na ional go e nmen
o ace p oblems o legi imacy. F om a e enue-ba gaining pe spec i e, i is
impo an o no e ha he po en ially associa ed poli ical pola iza ion migh
sub e any possibili y o b oad-based iscal con ac s be ween cen al go -
e nmen and he b oade socie y a he na ional le el, c ea ing he pa adox
ha a s onge iscal con ac a he local le el weakens he na ional one.
The esul sp esen ed in hischap e alsoha e ele an policyimplica ions.
In pa icula , hey send a clea wa ning. Schola s and in e na ional dono s
ha e p oposed e enue collec ion o ha e a go e nance di idend o s a e
building and go e nmen –ci izen ela ionships (Chap e 1; see also Moo e,
2015;P icha d, 2015). The analysis shows ha e en i go e nmen s a e will-
ing o ac i ely app oach and engage wi h ci izens, he desi ed ou comes
will only ake place i he coun e pa , he ci izens, a e able o meaning ully
engage in he ba gaining p ocess. This implies ha dono s need o app oach
T igge s and s a egies o e enue ba gaining 101
hisissue omamo eholis icpe spec i e. Re enuecollec ionbased on mo e
inclusi e e enue ba gaining demands mo e han inc easing he echnical
and adminis a i e capaci y o go e nmen s and mo e han pushing go e n-
men o o mally o e he channels. S eng hening ci il socie y in his ield,
ins i u ionally and in e ms o echnical capaci y a ound iscal issues, is a
leas equally ele an .
4.6 Appendix
Table 4.A1 O e iew o in e iew
pa ne s by municipali y
Bei a 9
Dondo 9
Inhambane 7
Ma ola 7
Maxixe 8
Monapo 8
Nacala 6
Pemba 7
Quelimane 9
Vilankulo 4
Xai-Xai 10
No e: 17 in e iews we e held wi h indi iduals
wo king a he na ional le el.
Table 4.A2 O e iew o in e iew pa ne s by ype o ac o
Local adminis a ion 26
Municipal assembly 27
Municipal go e nmen 14
CSO (incl. communi y leade s) 16
Dono s 12
Na ional expe s (incl. academics and o icial o minis ies) 6
Acknowledgemen s
This chap e p esen s pa o he esul s o he p ojec ‘The Poli ical Economy
o Local Taxa ion in Mozambique’, implemen ed wi hin he con ex o he 52nd
Pos g adua e T aining P og amme o he Ge man Ins i u e o De elopmen and
102 A min on Schille
Sus ainabili y (IDOS)— o me ly Deu sches Ins i u ü En wicklungspoli ik/ Ge -
man De elopmen Ins i u e (DIE). The esea ch was unded by he Minis y o
Economic Coope a ion and De elopmen (BMZ). Membe s o he esea ch eam
included, beyond he au ho , Saida Bunk, Sal ado Fo quilha, Dominique Klawonn,
Jona han K ull, Alina Sennewald, Con ad S einhilbe , and Juliane on Boeselage .
Thei undamen al con ibu ion o his analysis is g a e ully acknowledged. The
au ho and p ojec membe s also wish o hank he pa ne s: Ins i u o de Es u-
dos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), P ojec P og ama de Boa Go e nação Financei a
(Ge man De elopmen Coope a ionin Mozambique), andAssociaçãoNacionaldos
Municípios de Moçambique (ANAMM). Wi hou hei suppo , his esea ch would
no ha e been possible.
Special hanks go o Ka ha ina Hübne , Amandio Jaque e, Edua do Nguenha,
Be nha d Weime , Michael Sambo, Be na dino An ónio, S e an Leide e , Ch is ian
on Haldenwang, and Julia Leininge o hei help ul ideas, commen s, and sup-
po . The p ojec eam is also g a e ul o he indispensable suppo o a la ge eam
o ansla o s, as well as all he adminis a i e suppo p o ided by he di e en pa -
ne ins i u ions in Ge many and Mozambique. Finally, I wan o hank Anne Me e
Kjae , Ma ianne Ul iksen, Ane Ka oline Bak, Odd Helge Fjelds ad, and all o he pa -
icipan s o he ECPR Join Sessions Wo kshop ‘The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining’
o hei eedback on p e ious e sions o his chap e .
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5
Tax e o ms in Tanzania
Whe e and how a e comp omises nego ia ed?
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami
5.1 In oduc ion
The hen Tanzanian Finance Minis e , D Phillip Mpango, caused up oa in
Pa liamen whenhep oposed,du ing hep esen a iono he2016/2017bud-
ge , ‘ heamendmen o he IncomeTaxAc ,Cap332,wi ha iew o emo ing
income ax exemp ions on MPs’ g a ui y in o de o p omo e equi y and ai -
ness in axa ion’.¹ The Membe s o Pa liamen om bo h sides o he loo
‘we e no eady o accep he idea’.² And hey we e no he only ones o ge
upse ha June o 2016. The go e nmen p oposed a ange o ax e o ms
a ge ing a wide a ie y o axpaye s, he eby se ing in mo ion p o es s and
a emp s o e e he e o m p oposals. Hence, he spa e o ax e o ms was
a unique oppo uni y o s udy he subsequen e enue ba gaining be ween
go e nmen anddi e en e enuep o ide s,allowingus oexplo eques ions
such as how and whe e a e e enue p o ide s engaging wi h he go e nmen
a ound ax e o ms, does he go e nmen a imes comp omise on i s ini ial
p oposal, and wha a e he mic o-le el iscal con ac ou comes?
We selec ed ou cases whe e we, based on he heo e ical amewo k in
Chap e 2, assumed ha e enue p o ide s and go e nmen would engage in
nego ia ions o e ax e o m (see Msami e al., 2022). The cases a e: he MPs
who saw axes in oduced on hei e i emen bene i s; he secu i y o ces
whose du y- ee shops we e abolished; he ou ism sec o , which ceased o
bene i om VAT exemp ions on se ices o e ed; and he anspo sec o ,
whe e VAT was imposed on auxilia y se ices. Because he heo e ical ame-
wo k in Chap e 2 does no heo ize whe e and how he ba gaining p ocesses
¹ See Tanzania’s The Ci izen newspape : h ps://www. heci izen.co. z/ anzania/news/na ional/mps-
gang-up-agains - axa ion-o - hei -send-o -package-2558092 (accessed 16 June 2022).
² Ibid.
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami, Tax e o ms in Tanzania. In: The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining
in A ica. Edi ed by: Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
© Ox o d Uni e si y P ess (2024). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192868787.003.0005
Tax e o ms in Tanzania 107
ac ually un old, we explo e how a ge ed e enue p o ide s and go e nmen ³
engage in nego ia ions; ha is, wha s a egies a e used o con ince/win o e
he o he pa y. Fu he mo e, we con ibu e o he axa ion li e a u e by
s udying he ole o ins i u ional se ings—wha we e m a enas—in acil-
i a ing ba gaining. We iden i y h ee a enas whe e e enue p o ide s and
go e nmen ac o s engage in ba gaining: public, bu eauc a ic, and poli ical.
Findings omou ieldwo k (see Msamie al.,2022 o he ullin-dep hanal-
ysis) sugges ha he public a ena comp ises ew ins i u ionalized spaces o
dialogue, which makes engagemen s be ween e enue p o ide s and go e n-
men con lic ual and comp omise unlikely. Ins ead, in he bu eauc a ic and
poli ical a enas, whe e mo e o mal and in o mal ins i u ions allow o s uc-
u ed, epea ed, and us ed ela ionships o de elop, he e enue p o ide s
a e mo e likely o push he go e nmen o comp omise on he ini ial ax
p oposal.Hence, iscalou comeso e enueba gainingmaybeless hano ig-
inally an icipa ed in policy p oposals, al hough ax e o ms also igge be e
o ganiza ion o e enue p o ide s and he building o ela ionships be ween
s a e and socie al ac o s.
5.2 A enas and s a egies o e enue ba gaining
The ( e-)in oduc ion o ax by go e nmen can cause ini ial p o es s and
eac ions om e enue p o ide s (see Chap e 1). Howe e , as Moo e (2007,
16) a gues, ‘any ealis ic unde s anding [o he ax ba gaining] p ocesses
equi es ha we go beyond he ini ial eac ion o axa ion o each ype o
ac o and ake in o accoun he ways in which hey hen in e ac , whe he
con lic ingly, coope a i ely, o in mo e complex ways’. The na u e o hese
in e ac ions is in o med by ins i u ions, which he axa ion li e a u e no es
as c ucial in o ming e enue ba gaining. Le i (1988) a gues ha ins i u ions
can acili a e ba gaining by educing ansac ion cos s and enabling less con-
on a ional o ms o ba gaining. P icha d (2015), in his seminal con ibu-
ion on con ex ual ac o s shaping ax ba gaining, highligh s how ins i u ions
shape he easibili y o ax ba gaining by allowing axpaye s o engage wi h
go e nmen in cons uc i e ways. Essen ially, ins i u ions—such as e ec-
i e pa liamen a y p ocesses, o ums o engagemen , and in o mal ela ions
based on us and ba gaining—a e spaces o dialogue whe e comp omises
³ Al hough we consis en ly e e o he ‘go e nmen ’ in his chap e , we unde s and he go e nmen
wi hin he poli ical se lemen app oach o consis o he inne ci cles a ound he p esiden , ha is, he
uling eli e.
114 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami
poli ical ci cles. Addi ionally, as he o ce is—by i s e y na u e—a hie a chi-
cal and sec e i e o ganiza ion, i is expec ed o be well o ganized and ha e a
powe ul leade ship (The kildsen and Bou gouin, 2012). Thus, om a col-
lec i e ac ion pe spec i e, he secu i y o ce can speak om one common
p e e ence posi ion.
In sum, he ou cases sha ed he expe ience o being a ge ed by he go -
e nmen in he 2016 ax e o ms. The ou ism and anspo sec o s aced
he in oduc ion o VAT paymen s, MPs’ g a ui y paymen was axed, and he
secu i y o ces’ pe k o du y- ee shops was abolished. The s a k su p ise o
being a ge ed o ax paymen s igge ed immedia e eac ions om he e -
enue p o ide s (excep he secu i y o ces) and se in mo ion a ba gaining
p ocess.
5.3.1 The ou ism sec o
Be o e he 2016 ax e o m p oposal, he main a enas in which discussions
ook place be ween he go e nmen and he ou ism sec o we e he poli ical
and bu eauc a ic a enas du ing he na ional budge p ocesses and h ough
he pa liamen a y s anding commi ee esponsible o ou ism. The ou ism
sec o , ep esen ed by he Tanzania P i a e Sec o Founda ion (TPSF) and
TCT (Tou ism Con ede a ion o Tanzania), was able o lobby o a con inu-
ous VAT exemp ion o he sec o .
I was he e o e a su p ise when he Minis e o Finance announced he
in oduc ion o VAT du ing he budge session o 2016/17 in June 2016. A e
he budge session whe e he VAT was in oduced, he main a ena o engage-
men was in he pa liamen a y s anding commi ee on ou ism. Du ing he
mee ingsbe ween heTCT and heTPSF ononehand and hes andingcom-
mi ee o he Pa liamen on he o he , he ou ism sec o s akeholde s sough
o e oke he decision. In helobbyingp ocess, he membe s o heTPSF me
o mally wi h he s anding commi ee and in o mally wi h some membe s
pushing hei case. Despi e e o s by he TCT and o he ou ism s akehold-
e s, unde he umb ella o he TPSF, he go e nmen wen ahead wi h i s
decision.
A e he in oduc ion o VAT and he endo semen by Pa liamen , he
main o um o exchange mo ed o he public a ena, and he ba gaining
became an agonis ic. The ou ism sec o used he media o make hei case
and d um up popula suppo (The Ci izen, 2016a). I claimed ha i was no
unwilling o pay axes bu a gued ha he in oduc ion o VAT would ha e
an ad e se e ec on i s compe i i eness. The go e nmen used he media o

Tax e o ms in Tanzania 115
a nish he ou ism sec o ’s epu a ionby saying ha heydidno wan opay
axes (Daily News, 2016). The deba e in he media became hea ed, and pa s
o he ou ism sec o acknowledged ha cons an ly a acking he Minis y o
Tou ism in he newspape s was no cons uc i e. The P esiden closed he
deba e by saying ha he VAT would s ay, e en i i a ec ed he numbe o
ou is s isi ing Tanzania nega i ely (The Ci izen, 2016b).
La e in 2016, TCT con inued o push he go e nmen o econside
e e sing he decision. This ime, he TCT w o e o he Minis e o Tou ism
o ask o a mee ing o discuss he case and each a mu ual unde s anding.
While he go e nmen accep ed his mee ing, i ne e ook place. Howe e ,
he ou ism sec o con inued o each ou and sough o es ablish dialogue
wi h he budge commi ees and o he s akeholde s like Tanzania Re enue
Au ho i ies (TRA) by a elling om Da es Salaam o he capi al, Dodoma.
In he i s hal o 2017, he TCT was in i ed o make a p esen a ion o he
Pa liamen on he p i a e-sec o pe spec i e o he ou ism indus y. Du -
ing he semina , he budge pa liamen a y commi ees lea n mo e abou he
ou ism indus y and how a e ainmen o he VAT would a ec he sec o .
Pe sons we in e iewed in he sec o (see Msami e al., 2022) explained how
he p esen a ion o ma e ial and e idence-based ad ocacy opened dialogue
a he o malmee ingaswellasmo ein o malcon e sa ions wi hpa liamen-
a ians wan ing o know mo e. These kinds o dialogues in which di e en
s akeholde s in he sec o engaged wi h he go e nmen we e ins umen al
in he conside a ions o emo e some o he axes in he sec o om he
inancial yea 2017/18.
Table 5.2 p o ides a schema ic summa y o he case o e enue ba gain-
ing be ween he ou is sec o and he go e nmen in Tanzania. Ini ially,
he ela ionships be ween he go e nmen and he o ganiza ions ep esen -
ing he ou ism sec o we e amicable and ook place in o mal ins i u ions
such as he budge and pa liamen a y commi ees. Howe e , he go e n-
men ’s announcemen o in oduce VAT su p ised he sec o , and ba gaining
mo ed o he public a ena and u ned mo e con lic ual. Despi e p essu e
h ough media s o ies, he go e nmen did no change i s mind. O e he
ollowing mon hs, he ou is sec o e-engaged wi h go e nmen o icials in
he poli ical a ena, which allowed hem o p esen hei case and plea o a
econside a ion o how he VAT was implemen ed. The go e nmen did no
wai e he VAT bu o e ed a comp omise by speci ying ha ax au ho i ies
would no impose VAT on licences and ees, which hey had done since he
VAT was in oduced. Hence, he ba gaining ended wi h a mic o-le el iscal
con ac , al hough he e enue ou come was lowe han ini ially an icipa ed,
as he go e nmen wai ed some VAT paymen s by he sec o .
Table 5.2 Summa y o he ou ism sec o case
Sequence A enas S a egies Policy ou come
Be o e announcemen June
2016 Poli ical a ena: oice in budge and
pa liamen a y commi ees Dialogue and nego ia ion ⇒Ag eemen o pos pone
in oduc ion o VAT
Be ween announcemen and
app o al by Pa liamen Poli ical a ena Lobby pa liamen a ians ⇒Go e nmen unwilling
o change policy
A e app o al by Pa liamen ;
second hal o 2016 Public a ena: use o media Non-comp omising s a egies: ac ics o
blame and c i icism in he media by bo h
pa ies
Howe e , also some comp omising
s a egies: e.g. w i ing o minis e asking o
dialogue (al hough mee ings did no
ma e ialize)
⇒Go e nmen unwilling
o change policy
La e 2016 and i s hal o 2017 Poli ical a ena e-es ablished somewha :
Mee ings wi h minis ies / budge
commi ee
⇒( e-)engagemen in o ums o
exchange
Comp omise and in luence:
S a egies by ou is sec o :
– engage wi h di e en s akeholde s in
Dodoma (build ela ionships)
– sha e in o ma ion on impo ance o
and impac on he sec o
– ques ion legali y o VAT
implemen a ion
S a egies by uling eli e:
– lis en and o e dialogue (budge
commi ee)
– b ing in o he go e nmen
s akeholde s
⇒Cla i ica ion: no VAT on
licences and ees
Tax e o ms in Tanzania 117
5.3.2 The anspo sec o
The anspo sec o co e s he p o ision o passenge o eigh anspo ,
whe he scheduled o no , by ail, pipeline, oad, wa e , o ai and associa ed
ac i i ies such as ca go handling, s o age, e c. Gi en he a ious subsec o s,
o ganiza ions, and companies ha comp ise i , he sec o as a whole is no
always well o ganized.⁸ As in he ou ism sec o , he go e nmen in oduced
ax e o ms ha a ec ed he anspo sec o .⁹ In addi ion o he sec o ’s
non-pa icipa ion in he decision, he iming and he expec ed has y imple-
men a ion o he e o ms caugh membe s by su p ise. The apid pace wi h
which he go e nmen mo ed om he p oposal phase o inco po a ing
e o ms in he 2016/17 inance bill denied he sec o ime and space o mobi-
lize a coali ion agains he ax e o ms. In addi ion o educing he olume
o impo s and ansi ed ca go, he e o ms p ecipi a ed a p ice wa among
anspo e s as he ansi ed ca go sec o s uggled o emain ope a ional.
Inc eased licence ees o ced he closu e o many small and medium-scale
anspo e s. Thus, while he indus y con inued o po ay a collec i e and
cohesi e ex e nal on , he e we e in e nal disag eemen s.
Upon lea ning o he e o ms on 1 July 2016, one o he sec o ’s ep esen-
a i es, he Tanzania Associa ion o T anspo e s (TAT), con ened a se ies
o mee ings wi h membe s, clien s, and a ilia es—including he eigh o -
wa de s’ associa ion (TAFFA) and he uck owne s’ associa ion (TATOA)—
o es ablish he scale o likely impac , a common posi ion, and a s a egy
o engaging he s a e o add ess hei conce ns. O p ima y conce n was
he maximum ime an impo e had o clea hei goods wi hou incu ing
addi ional po and handling cha ges (wha age and s o age) ha would
inc emen ally ha e an impac on he amoun o VAT incu ed. A he mee -
ings, membe s ag eed o ad ance wo majo posi ions: eques a mo a o ium
on new cha ges and pe i ion o an inc ease in maximum allowable ime o
clea goods om he e ised 14 days o a leas 90 days.
The es ablishmen o a sec o al common posi ion on he e o ms p o ided
he TAT wi h a manda e o ind a comp omise wi h he au ho i ies. Howe e ,
a suppo ing coali ion had o be es ablished disc ee ly a he han h ough
open channels, as senio minis y o icials we e wa y o being seen as o e ly
siding wi h he p i a e sec o in i s agi a ion agains he go e nmen . TAT
was o ced o ely on in o mal app oaches o p esen i s ini ial case, which
in ol ed di ec bu disc ee pe sonal appeals by one o i s membe s o he
⁸ Fo an in e es ing accoun o he limi a ion o collec i e ac ion in he anspo sec o , see Rizzo
(2017).
⁹ Fo de ails on he ax e o ms see Msami e al. (2022).
118 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami
minis e and his pe manen sec e a y. I was also indica ed in in e iewees
ha hese mee ings in ol ed exchange o money o suppo . Thus, he TAT
was o ced o co-op he minis y, which hen guided i in how oengage wi h
he powe ul budge and anspo pa liamen a y s anding commi ees. The
TAT also claimed ha i had o u nish paymen s o p ominen membe s o
hese commi ees (as well as a ew p ominen opposi ion MPs) in exchange
o hei suppo .
Collec i ely, he pu chase o suppo allowed he TAT o es ablish a pow-
e ul coali ion o ac o s capable o heaping and sus aining p essu e on he
easu y. One o he coali ion’s i s ac s was la ge-scale awa eness-building
o he ad e se e ec s o he e o ms on he anspo sec o . This was done in
collabo a ion wi h he TAFFA and he TPSF. Awa eness-building occu ed
h ough media b ie ings, in e iews on na ional p in and digi al media, as
well as audio and ele ision—wi h mul iple appea ances by he TAT’s op
o icials. Th ough i s membe s and ne wo ks, he TAT succeeded in in lu-
encing he na ional media o publicize i s cause adequa ely. A key elemen
in i s media s a egy was ha o dina y Tanzanians would lose hei jobs
due o loss o business and decline in impo olumes. The TAT’s message
was simple: he e o ms we e hu ing na ional li elihood and p ide. This
did s ike a cho d wi h he au ho i ies as hey mo ed o eassu e he pub-
lic and neighbou ing landlocked coun ies o he iabili y o he po o Da
es Salaam.
In Ma ch 2017, he TAT, along wi h o he membe s o he TPSF, was
in i ed by he T easu y op esen hei casea ase ieso p e-budge a y mee -
ingsin ol ingpa liamen a y commi eesand hego e nmen in Dodoma. A
he mee ings, only he TAT and he ou ism lobby we e gi en subs an ial ime
o p esen hei cases, mainly because hey— h ough hei media engage-
men s in he public a ena—we e a he o e on in complaining abou he
in oduc ion o VAT, which would educe hei compe i i eness and a ec
he na ional economy due o loss o jobs and e enues. I appea s ha he
e u n o hepoli icalandbu eauc a ica enasinwhich heTATcouldp esen
de ails on he implica ions o he VAT o he sec o caused he go e nmen o
wai e VAT cha ges on ancilla y se ices, and he 2017/18 Finance Ac passed
in July 2017 con i med he e isions o he e o ms sough by he TAT.
Summing up (see Table 5.3), he in oduc ion o VAT and o he ax cha ges
cameasasu p ise o he anspo sec o .Ini ially, he sec o waspoo lyo ga-
nized and lacked a uni ied oice in i s in e ac ions wi h he go e nmen , bu
he ax e o m p omp ed he sec o o o ganize and ind a common posi ion
h ough he TAT. The sec o was able o gain inc eased access o he poli -
ical a ena by buying suppo in he bu eauc a ic a ena and ia a success ul
Tax e o ms in Tanzania 119
Table 5.3 Summa y o he anspo sec o case
Sequence/ imeline A enas S a egies Policy ou come
A announcemen
(July 2016) In oduc ion o ax a
su p ise ⇒no access
o poli ical a ena
Righ a e
announcemen
(July–Sep 2016)
Gaining access o
bu eauc a ic a ena Sec o es ablishes
in e nal collabo a ion
and buys access o
side-lined minis y
Sep 2016–Ma 2017 Public a ena Awa eness-building
in he media
No 2016–June 2017 Inc eased access o
poli ical a ena
(in i ed by easu y)
Di ec nego ia ion in
disc ee mee ings
⇒wai ing VAT
cha ges on
ancilla y se ices
public campaign in he news media. Thus, a mic o-le el iscal con ac was
eached, al hough he go e nmen would ecei e less e enue han ini ially
an icipa ed.
5.3.3 The membe s o pa liamen
The uling pa y, CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—‘Pa y o he Re olu ion’),
has since he incep ion o mul i-pa y elec ions in 1995 accoun ed o 71–
93%(cu en lyabou 93%) o MPs. Theopposi ion,comp ising ou poli ical
pa ies, has la gely p esen ed i sel as a uni ied block o coun e i s mino i y
posi ion. In June 2016, as pa o he go e nmen ’s push o e o m he ax sys-
em, he go e nmen p oposed o wai e ax exemp ions on MPs’ g a ui ies,
meaning ha MPs would pay 30% in ax o hei g a ui y paymen a he end
o hei i e-yea e m.Thiscases udydocumen s he e enueba gaining ol-
lowing he ax p oposal, which led o a comp omise: wai e s o exemp ions
on g a ui y paymen s would be a 5% le y ( a he han 30% ax), and i would
ake e ec in 2020 a e he end o he cu en pa liamen a y e m.
S akeholde s in ol ed in g a ui y ax e o ms we e adaman ha he ba -
gaining ou come ep esen ed a poo comp omise, wi h majo concessions
gi en by he go e nmen . Appa en ly, he mo i e behind a emp s o ax MPs
s emmed om he uling pa y’s loss o pa liamen a y sea s, inc easing cos s
o elec ions, and he need o weaken he inancial base o opposi ion MPs.
Howe e , due o mul i-pa y ep esen a ion, he go e nmen had o disguise
hese a emp s a weakening pa liamen a y democ acy by imposing he ax

120 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami
on he uling pa y’s own MPs. This caused c oss-pa y mobiliza ion agains
he ax, wi h MPs on bo h sides o he poli ical di ide adop ing c ea i e
s a egies o agi a e agains e o ms.
The MPs ealized ha hey could no easily ind s ong popula suppo
due o pas public opposi ion o hikes in MPs’ sala ies and g a ui y pay-
men s, i s in 2009 and hen in 2014. Consequen ly, MPs sough o in luence
public opinion mo e disc ee ly in wo p incipal ways: CCM MPs empha-
sized ha hei g a ui ies and allowances p o ided ou -o -pocke assis ance
o hei cons i uen s, whe eas opposi ion MPs publicly endo sed he e o ms
and challenged he go e nmen o ex end hem o he exemp ed g a ui ies o
o he poli ical eli es, no ably he P esiden and he P ime Minis e .¹⁰ While
he o me s a egy sough o highligh he p oduc i e uses o g a ui ies and
he bu den acing indi idual MPs, he la e challenged he each and legi -
imacy o he e o ms. These measu es back i ed, howe e , as he p esiden
e ealed his ea nings and indica ed his willingness o be axed. Riding on a
wa e o a ou able public opinion, he p esiden appealed o public suppo
o e o ms by highligh ing he disc epancies in ea nings be ween MPs and
o dina yTanzanians,u gingMPs o li eby hei poli icalp omiseso se ing
o dina y Tanzanians by acquiescing o he p oposed e o ms.
No be de e ed, MPs enlis ed he suppo o he powe ul eligious and
ci il socie y communi y, keenly awa e o he mobiliza ion powe s o mainly
eligious bodies, owing o hei con ibu ion o social se ices as well as he
s ong eligious alues o he Tanzanian socie y. The head o he powe ul
pa liamen a y budge commi ee o e ed concessions o eligious g oups by
sugges ing a e ision o p oposed ax a es o he g oups in e u n o hei
suppo in igh ing he g a ui y ax e o ms. Facing he p ospec o an unde-
si ed alliance be ween MPs and ci il socie y, he go e nmen swi ly mo ed
o placa e eligious g oups by p oposing a main enance o exemp ions o he
eligious and ci il socie y communi y.
This le MPs in a di icul posi ion, unable o mobilize suppo om any
legi ima e ex e nal cons i uency. Facing a lack o op ions, MPs h ea ened o
wield a collec i e e o by ejec ing he 2016/17 inance bill. The p esiden
Magu uli e alia ed by h ea ening he use o cons i u ional powe s o bypass
Pa liamen and/o dissol ei andcallagene alelec ion. Wi hinCCM, senio
igu es we e wa y o he inancial and poli ical consequences o esh elec-
ions and appealed o he council o elde s, consis ing o pas pa y chai men
and sec e a y gene als, who helped con ey a message o he p esiden o a
¹⁰ h ps://en.igihe.com/news/ anzania-leade s-g a ui y- o -income- ax;h ps://www.ippmedia.com/
sw/makala/wabunge-ccm-wali yogeuka-mbogo-kodi-ya-kiinua-mgongo.
Tax e o ms in Tanzania 121
nego ia ed comp omise. This was eached wi h a downwa d e ision o he
ax a e om 30 o 5%, escindmen o in ended ax e o ms on allowances,
and pos ponemen o applica ion o axes un il 2020.
In sum (see also Table 5.4), MPs we e no able o speak wi h one oice,
e en hough he majo i y was agains he ax e o m. Engaging wi h he poli -
ical leade ship in he public a ena, bo h CCM and opposi ion MPs we e
con on a ional bu used di e en a gumen s o appeal o he public. How-
e e , he s a egy o using media s o ies back i ed when he P esiden p o ed
unwilling o make any concessions. Mo eo e , an a emp ed alliance wi h
ci il socie y o ganiza ions p o ed unsuccess ul. In he end, i was in he
poli ical a ena ha he e enue p o ide s we e able o each a comp omise
wi h he go e nmen . The MPs collec i ely h ea ened o e o he budge ,
he eby—as wi h he anspo sec o — e ealing he impo ance o mobi-
lizing collec i e ac ion. Ne e heless, i appea s ha in o mal ins i u ions
and ela ions wi hin he CCM pa y’s inne ci cles we e decisi e in enabling
MPs o push he p esiden o so en his ini ial s and. Once again, as wi h
Table 5.4 Summa y o he MP case
Sequence A ena S a egies Policy ou come
Ini ial
p oposal
(2016)
Public a ena Use o media
– CCM MPs emphasize hei
ou -o -pocke assis ance o
cons i uencies
– Opposi ion MPs challenge
o e o m o be ex ended
o o he s in he uling eli e
P esiden e alia es in media o
ge public suppo ⇒No change
La e hal
o 2016 Public/poli ical
a ena MPs seek alliance wi h ci il
socie y, i.e. eligious g oups
(possibly due o s a egic
poli ical posi ions/knowledge)
Go e nmen makes sepa a e
ag eemen s wi h eligious g oups
⇒No change (bu o
ci il socie y
main enance o
exemp ions)
Fi s hal o Poli ical a ena O e : h ea o ejec inance bill
2017 Co e : Key CCM membe s seek
o con ince P esiden o gi e
concessions
⇒Go e nmen gi es
concessions, al hough
policy emains (5%
ins ead o 30%, and
by 2020)
122 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Lucas Ka e a, and Jamal Msami
he ou ism and anspo sec o s, a mic o-le el iscal con ac was eached,
al hough he go e nmen comp omised i s ini ial s and.
5.3.4 The secu i y o ces
The a my, police, and p ison o ces comp ise a la ge sha e o ci il se an s
in Tanzania, and he o ces a e s ong poli ically because hei de o ion o
na ional se ice and na ional secu i y is conside ed e y impo an (URT,
2016). The secu i y o ces had been bene i ing om du y- ee shops ope a -
ing a he Tanzania Peoples’ De ence Fo ce, Police and P isons’ ba acks and
selling a ange o p oduc s, bo h du ables and non-du ables, a p ices ha
excluded bo h VAT and excise du y. Legally, only membe s o he Tanzania
Peoples’ De ence Fo ce, Police Fo ce, and he P ison Se ice had access o
heshops,bu misusewaswidesp ead,causinglosso go e nmen e enue.In
addi ion, i is claimed ha senio o icials sold goods om he du y- ee acil-
i ies in o he shops a cheap p ices in un ai compe i ion wi h o he ade s
paying VAT. This beha iou c ea ed di icul business en i onmen s o hose
complying wi h he ax laws.
The e we e pe sis en public complain s abou he misuse o du y- ee
shops, and he business communi y c i icized he un ai compe i ion.¹¹ Con-
cu en ly, in i s p epa a ion o he 2016/17 budge , which was cha ac e ized
by VAT e o ms in many sec o s, he go e nmen saw an oppo uni y o
e o m he ax exemp ions o du y- ee shops and announced emo al o he
exemp ions o he inancial yea 2016/17. Compensa ion was in oduced in
he o m o an addi ional sala y paymen , a la a e o TZS 100,000/mon h
o all soldie s ega dless o ank. This amoun was expec ed o co e he
cos s o axes ha a my membe s now had o pay in he shops. Acco d-
ing o he Minis e o Finance and Planning du ing he budge speech o
2016/17, he go e nmen conside ed his he bes a ge ing mechanism while
also a oiding misuse.
I is di icul o ully de ec wha happened, bu i is p obable ha his case
in ol ed a p e-emp i e concession by he go e nmen o coun e possible
opposi ion o he ax. A guably, he e was also in o mal ba gaining be ween
go e nmen and op-le el o icials in he secu i y o ces, who may ha e been
mo e in e es ed in a solu ion bene i ing he o ces b oadly. A leas , i is
in e es ing o no e ha lowe -le el membe s o he secu i y o ces we e posi-
i e abou he new compensa ion scheme, whe eas mid- ange senio o icials
¹¹ h ps://www. heci izen.co. z/ anzania/news/na ional/no-mo e- ax-exemp ions- o -mili a y-shops-
-2557650
Tax e o ms in Tanzania 123
Table 5.5 Summa y o he secu i y o ces case
Sequence A ena S a egies Policy ou come
Be o e p oposal Public
a ena Public ou c y and complain s by
business sec o s p o ide
legi imacy o e o m o du y- ee
shops
Poli ical
a ena Al hough ha d o obse e
di ec ly, go e nmen gi es
p e-emp i e concession, ei he in
ag eemen wi h op a my o icials
o on i s own
⇒p e-emp i e
concession
Announcemen
o p oposal Public
a ena Tax e o m o dispu ed a my
ba acks announced
⇒ ax e o m, bu
compensa o y scheme
in oduced a he same
ime
we e mo e c i ical (Msami e al., 2022). Pe haps his is no su p ising, as a la
paymen would be p opo ionally mo e luc a i e a lowe sala y le els.
To sum up (see also Table 5.5), he gene al mo e by he go e nmen o
e o m he ax sys em as well as public conce ns abou he misuse o du y-
ee shops u ged he go e nmen o emo e ax exemp ions. Howe e , he
secu i y o ces a e clea ly o such poli ical impo ance ha he go e nmen
p e-emp ed any upse s by in oducing a compensa o y scheme despi e he
inancial implica ions o ax mobiliza ion. While senio o icials dec ied he
changes as hey had been bene i ing disp opo iona ely om he exemp-
ions, hei in luence did no coun e possible ag eemen s made be ween
op-le el o icials and he go e nmen o he gene al suppo o he new
scheme among low-le el membe s in he secu i y o ces. In addi ion, he
public a ena was no a place o engagemen be ween e enue p o ide and
go e nmen as hey had o he a enas o dialogue. Ins ead, public deba es
ga e he go e nmen ’s ax e o ms some legi imacy as i made he go e n-
men appea p oac i e in dealing wi h a widely ecognized p oblem. Again,
he inal comp omise was mos likely se led in he poli ical a ena, al hough
we canno p o e his due o he sec e i e ela ions be ween he a my and he
go e nmen : ei he he go e nmen came up wi h a compensa ion scheme
i sel , o i was ag eed in consul a ion wi h op-le el o icials.
5.4 Case compa ison and conclusion
In his chap e , we con ibu e o he unde s anding o how and when e -
enue ba gaining leads o di ec go e nmen concessions, and we ha e an
130 Odd-Helge Fjelds ad and Lise Rakne
he Big Fou global accoun ing and p o essional se ices i ms,⁴ as well as
a o me depu y commissione gene al o he Tanzania Re enue Au ho i y.
Indi idualbusinesspeoplealsolobbied o hei speci icin e es s.Inaddi ion,
public-sec o agencies, he Minis y o Ag icul u e, and he minis y espon-
sible o ou ism mobilized agains he bill. The lobbyis s a gued ha he
aboli ion o exemp ions would make he coun y una ac i e o in es o s
and lea e Tanzanian companies uncompe i i e in domes ic and egional
ma ke s.
Wo king oge he in a conce ed ashion, business associa ions and o he
lobby g oups succeeded. E en hough he go e ning pa y, he CCM, holds
a majo i y o e in Pa liamen (Bunge) and he bill had been d a ed by a
echnical eam appoin ed by he go e nmen , he VAT Ac ha he P esi-
den signed in Janua y 2015 ein oduced many exemp ions ha had been
abolishedin hed a billand es o ed o heMinis e o Financesomedisc e-
iona y powe o g an u he exemp ions. A membe o he VAT echnical
eam in he Minis y o Finance desc ibed he new ac as ‘old wine in a new
bo le’.⁵
Analysing hep ocessleadingup o henewVATAc 2014,ou s udymakes
h ee con ibu ions. Fi s , i shows ha ax lobbying in Tanzania has become
be e o ganized and coo dina ed h ough he la ge business associa ions,
some imes unde he umb ella o he Tanzania P i a e Sec o Founda ion.
Thei capaci y o collec i e ac ion has been s eng hened and con ibu ed
o shaping he abili y o business g oups o make demands o he go e n-
men (P icha d, 2015). In he con ex o he VAT Ac 2014, well-o ganized
associa ions we e able o mobilize mo e powe ully o hei demands, pa ly
by engaging p o essional ax consul an s and lobbyis s o p omo e hei posi-
ion o pa liamen a ians and senio go e nmen o icials. The enhanced ole
o he in e na ional accoun ing and consul ancy i ms in e enue ba gaining
in Tanzania is a e lec ion o he impo ance o lobbying and he subs an ial
esou ces spen on in luencing policymake s and legisla o s. P o essional ax
ad iso s wi h in-dep h knowledge o he ax legisla ion a ge hei lobby-
ing owa ds in luen ial s akeholde s, including pa liamen a ians and public
agencies who would be a ec ed by he p oposed legisla ion.
⁴ The Big Fou a e he wo ld’s ou la ges in e na ional p o essional se ices ne wo ks, o e ing audi ,
ax, consul ing, ad iso y, ac ua ial, co po a e inance, and legal se ices. O de ed by size hey a e P ice-
wa e houseCoope s (PwC), Deloi e, E ns & Young (EY), and KPMG. In 2012, hey had a combined
u no e o USD112 billion, wi h 2,800 o ices and o e 700,000 employees wo ldwide. All ou compa-
nies ha e businesses in o e 150 coun ies (based on in o ma ion published in he o icial global websi es
o he i ms PwC, Deloi e, EY, and KPMG).
⁵ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 11 Ma ch 2015.

Lobbying in ax policymaking: The case o VAT e o m in Tanzania 131
Second, he s udy adds impo an nuances o ou unde s anding o leg-
isla i e pe o mance in single- and dominan -pa y egimes. Desc ip ions
o A ican legisla u es in he popula p ess and academic wo ks o en
depic hese ins i u ions as uni o mly weak and inconsequen ial o poli ical
and policy ou comes. Howe e , ecen schola ly wo k challenges his iew
(Opalo, 2019;Collo d, 2019). This esea ch unde lines how in dominan
pa y egimes,pa liamen a yins i u ionsplayasigni ican ole,aspa liamen
has become an impo an ba gaining a ena be ween powe ul poli ical eli es
and he execu i e; see Chap e 2 o his olume). Tanzania is conside ed one
o hemos ins i u ionalized dominan one-pa y egimes in A ica(Nyi abu,
2002;Mo se, 2014;Collo d, 2019). As i is an ins i u ionalized, dominan -
pa y s a e, i could be assumed ha once go e nmen is uni ed, he e is e y
li le oom o lobbying Pa liamen . A guably, as a uni a y ac o , we would
expec e o ms app o ed by he execu i e o be app o ed by Pa liamen wi h
ela i e ease, in con as o less ins i u ionalized poli ical sys ems cha ac e -
ized by poli ical al e na ions and deins i u ionalized pa y sys ems (Rakne
and S åsand. 2013;Opalo, 2019). Howe e , in connec ion wi h he VAT
e o m,we ind ha hego e nmen was no able oins uc indi idualmem-
be s o pa liamen who p o ed ecep i e when con on ed by an inc easingly
p o essional g oup o lobbyis s. In Tanzania, du ing he pas decade, poli i-
cal eli es ha e sough o en ench hei ba gaining powe h ough legisla i e
e o ms, c ea ing he ins i u ional esou ces needed o be e ex ac bene-
i s om he execu i e. The ba gaining p ocess behind he 2014 VAT Ac is
illus a i e o he complexi ies o implemen ing ax e o ms in con ex s o
mul iple in e es s (see also Chap e 5 on e enue-ba gaining p ocesses in
Tanzania ha include a mul iplici y o ac o s and s a egies).
Thi d, ou s udy challenges he a gumen ha b ibe y is he p e e ed way
o in luence policy decisions in de eloping coun ies whe eas lobbyism is
mo e common in ich coun ies (Ha s ad and S ensson, 2011). Ou s udy
shows ha his is an o e simpli ica ion ha does no e lec how policy in lu-
encing ac ually akes place in poo , weakly egula ed coun ies. Lobbyism
migh be mo e p e alen han p e iously assumed in he li e a u e (Fjeld-
s ad and Johnsøn, 2017). When in e es g oups g ow in in luence, companies
and business associa ions may de elop a p e e ence o lobbyism o e co -
up ion. Ou analysis o he implemen a ion o he VAT e o m in Tanzania
shows ha he e a e nume ous en y poin s o lobbying. Ha ing escala ed
in he pe iod a e 2000, eli e ba gaining a ound policy e o m in Tanzania
now in ol es p i a e-sec o inancie s who con es o pa liamen a y sea s,
und MPs’ campaigns, and lobby in an ad hoc, issue-based manne (Collo d,
2019, 219).
132 Odd-Helge Fjelds ad and Lise Rakne
The analysis d aws on indings om esea ch ca ied ou in Tanzania du -
ing he pe iod 2014–2016. We analyse he de elopmen o he VAT Ac , om
he p ocess s a ed in Decembe 2012, o he p esen a ion o he d a bill in
Pa liamen in May 2014, h ough o i s inal o e in Pa liamen in No embe
2014, and i s inal signing by he Execu i e in Decembe 2014. Ou main
sou ces o da a a e: (i) ca e ul eading o he VAT bill (d a May 2014),
he amended bill (No embe 2014), and he VAT Ac (Decembe 2014); (ii)
in e iews wi h ep esen a i es o he business communi y, indi idual busi-
ness people, pa ne s o he Big Fou in e na ional accoun ancy and ad iso y
companies, domes ic ax p ac i ione s, IMF ep esen a i es, s a o he Min-
is y o Finance and he Tanzania Re enue Au ho i y (TRA), and sec o
in e es s; and (iii) epo s and newspape a icles collec ed o he pe iod
Decembe 2012–June 2016. Ou indings esona e wi h o he case s udies
in his book, and, as such, con ibu e o subs an ia ing and elabo a ing he
heo e ical amewo k.
The emainde o he chap e is di ided in o i e sec ions. In he nex
sec ion, he VAT e o m is p esen ed. The hi d sec ion explo es he condi-
ions ha igge ed he VAT- e o m ini ia i e and p o ided en y poin s o
e enue ba gaining. The lobbying p ocess and i s o ganiza ion a e examined
in he ou h sec ion. The i h sec ion discusses he ou come o he e enue
ba gaining as e lec ed in he new VAT Ac . A concluding sec ion comple es
he chap e ’s analysis.
6.2 The case: Backg ound o he VAT e o m
VAT was implemen ed in Tanzania in July 1998, ad ised by and wi h ech-
nical assis ance om he IMF.⁶ The VAT was expec ed o b oaden he ax
base, leading o subs an ial inc ease in ax e enue wi hou dis o ing in es -
men decisions. Wi h ew exemp ions and ze o- a ings, he o iginal VAT
Ac o 1997 was pe cei ed by he IMF and in e na ional ax ad iso s as a
‘bes p ac ice model’ o VAT design in a de eloping-coun y con ex . Sub-
sequen de elopmen s, howe e , de ia ed om he ha model.⁷ When he
new ac was in oduced in 1998, i was es ima ed ha VAT would gene a e
e enues equi alen o 6% o GDP. Howe e , he VAT egime was g adually
unde mined by exemp ions, and e enues ne e exceeded 4.5% o GDP.
⁶ As ea ly as 1991, in oduc ion o VAT was p oposed by a Tax Commission appoin ed by he go e n-
men (Uni ed Republic o Tanzania, 1991, chap e 12). Howe e , be o e 1997 li le p og ess was made in
his a ea.
⁷ In e iew wi h senio o ice , Resea ch and Policy Depa men , TRA HQ (membe o he VAT
Technical Team), Da es Salaam, 11 Ma ch 2015.
Lobbying in ax policymaking: The case o VAT e o m in Tanzania 133
O e ime, amendmen s o he Ac inco po a ed an expanding numbe
o exemp ions and ze o- a ings o goods and se ices and o pe sons en i-
led o ecei e exemp supplies. Some o hese exone a ions we e p omo ed
by he Tanzania In es men Cen e (TIC) in o de o a ac in es men s.
Gene ous ax incen i es g an ed o mul ina ional companies, especially in
ag icul u e and ex ac i e sec o s such as mining, led domes ic en e p ises
o lobby o ax exemp ions o adjus o he pe cei ed un ai ness o he ax
egime.⁸ The VAT Ac p o ided disc e ion and hence a space o domes ic
companies o eques o exemp ions. The Minis e o Finance had powe
o g an exemp ions and could channel eques s o exemp ions h ough he
Task Fo ce on Tax Re o m (composed o ep esen a i es om he public and
p i a e sec o s), a p ocess ha made i ela i ely easy o add exemp ions.⁹
O he minis ies and go e nmen agencies we e also in ol ed in ax poli-
cymaking. F agmen ed policymaking and bu eauc a ic compe i ion made i
easy o in e es g oups and indi iduals o lobby o hei in e es s.¹⁰ Acco d-
ing o Ali Mu u uki,aleadingbusinessowne in hecoun y,a‘ ax-incen i es
indus y de eloped o ad ise clien s on how o legally access incen i es’.¹¹ The
Big Fou became a big pa o his indus y.
The nume ous exemp ions and ze o- a ed goods and se ices compli-
ca ed he unde lying VAT s uc u e, caused complexi y in he ax sys em,
and added o widesp ead leakages h ough he many oppo uni ies o abuse
and a oidance. This also had ad e se e ec s on e enue gene a ion. By 2012,
Tanzania anked among he coun ies wi h lowes VAT p oduc i i y among
he Sou he n A ican De elopmen Communi y (SADC) and Eas A ican
Communi y (EAC) coun ies. An IMF aide-mémoi e om 2012 desc ibes
heTanzanianVAT egimeas ollows: ‘The e e -expandinglis o p e e ences
has de e io a ed VAT ax base. Tax exemp ions o inpu s add o ax cascading
and nume ous ax elie es se iously unde mine VAT e enue p oduc i i y’
(K elo ee al., 2012, 46).By2012,senio manage sin heMinis y o Finance
and he (Tanzania Re enue Au ho i y) TRA ecognized ha he VAT egime
needed e o m.¹² The Minis e consul ed he IMF, an IMF mission was pu
⁸ By he end o 2014, 80 pe cen o he s a egic in es o s g an ed ax exemp ions by he Tanzania
In es men Cen e we e domes ic companies. In e iew wi h Di ec o o In es men Facili a ion, TIC,
Da es Salaam, 17 No embe 2014.
⁹ In e iew wi h wo senio o ice s, Resea ch and Policy Depa men , TRA-HQ, Da es Salaam, 11
Ma ch 2015.
¹⁰ In e iew wi h IMF ep esen a i e, Da es Salaam, 25 Augus 2014.
¹¹ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 10 No embe 2014. The la e Ali Mu u uki was a co- ounde and chai man
o he CEO Round able o Tanzania, a policy-dialogue o um ha b ings oge he mo e han a hund ed
CEOs o leading companies in Tanzania.
¹² In e iews wi h membe s o he VAT Technical Team om he Minis y o Finance and he TRA,
Da es Salaam, 11 Ma ch 2015.
134 Odd-Helge Fjelds ad and Lise Rakne
in mo ion, and ex e nal VAT consul an s we e engaged. A echnical e o m
eam composed o s a om he Minis y o Finance, he Tanzania Re enue
Au ho i y, and he O ice o he A o ney Gene al was es ablished. Acco d-
ing o he IMF, he o iginal VAT egime in Tanzania om 1997 was almos
‘ ex book’, bu some s uc u al ea u es a ec ed i s in en ions nega i ely o e
ime and con ibu ed o he low ax- o-GDP a io. Two p oblems we e no ed:
(i) poo ly s uc u ed e unds (paid la e, lea ing businesses cash s apped,
legi imizing he ‘c y o exemp ions’),¹³ and (ii) he s a ed aim o p o id-
ing incen i es o o eign capi al (FDI). Amendmen s o he VAT Ac o 1997
in oduced manyexemp ionsandze o- a ings o in e media e inpu s o a -
ious indus ies and sec o s, o iginally in ended in pa o wo k a ound ax
e und p oblems, in pa o enhance in es men and p o ec he local ma -
ke , and in pa o educe he ax bu den on consume s and some sec o s,
especially ag icul u e (K elo e e al., 2012).
6.3 The VAT- e o m ini ia i e and condi ions ha
igge ed e enue ba gaining
While e enue conce ns played a majo ole in he ini ia ion o he VAT-
e o m p ocess, he e o m was also igge ed by p essu e om a ious
s akeholde s demanding mo e ax ai ness. The excessi e VAT exemp ions
we e ou inely lamen ed by ci il socie y g oups, Membe s o Pa liamen , as
wellas heCon olle andAudi o Gene al(CAG), who inhis a ious epo s
poin ed o he inc easing and escala ing exemp ions (IMF, 2008;Uwazi,
2010;TRA, 2011;Ndungu u, 2012;CAG, 2013;IFC, 2013).¹⁴ The ex ensi e
disc e iona y powe o he Minis e o Finance o g an exemp ions was also
no ed as a majo p oblem by all pa ies. Based on ecommenda ions om he
IMF, p essu e om he in e na ional dono communi y as well as inc easing
p essu e om he main opposi ion pa y Chadema, he Pa liamen ’s Pub-
lic Accoun s Commi ee (PAC) in 2012 di ec ed he Con olle and Audi o
Gene al o conduc a special audi o he exemp ions o asce ain whe he he
wai e s we e bene icial o he coun y.
In 2013, he go e nmen decided o de elop a new VAT Ac and es ab-
lished a echnical e o m eam o lead his wo k. The eam was composed
¹³ In Tanzania, like in many o he many A ican coun ies, i may ake se e al mon hs, and some imes
up o a yea , o p ocess e und claims (Ca e , 2013).
¹⁴ In an in e iew in The Eas A ican (8 Feb ua y 2014), M Rakesh Rajani, di ec o o he ci il socie y
o ganiza ion Twaweza Eas A ica, ques ioned he go e nmen ’s commi men o e iew he exemp ions,
saying he job should ake less han six mon hs o accomplish, bu ha he go e nmen had been d agging
i s ee .
Lobbying in ax policymaking: The case o VAT e o m in Tanzania 135
o s a om he Minis y o Finance, he Tanzania Re enue Au ho i y, and
he O ice o he A o ney gene al, wi h suppo om an ex e nal VAT expe
ec ui ed by he IMF. Du ing 2013 and 2014, a new VAT bill was d a ed.
Acco ding o he IMF esiden ep esen a i e in Tanzania, he o iginal d a
was e y ambi ious, almos aiming o be a ‘pe ec VAT Ac wi h e y lim-
i ed numbe o exemp ions’.¹⁵ The new bill included a ew exemp ions and
ze o- a ings ( ood and basic necessi ies), bu all special elie s o named
bodies we e abolished (URT, 2014a). The d a bill emo ed he disc e-
iona y powe o he Minis e o Finance o g an and modi y ax exemp ions
(ibid., 88). The bill s ipula ed ha exemp ions be app o ed by Pa liamen
and ha new exemp ions should be c ea ed o modi ied by Pa liamen only.
The d a VAT Bill was sen o Pa liamen om he Minis y o Finance
in May 2014.
The wo k leading up o he d a bill was un by he echnical e o m eam
suppo ed by he IMF. Acco ding o a membe o he echnical eam, he
mul i-s akeholde Task Fo ce on Tax Re o m ‘was no consul ed since i was
seen as being pa o he p oblem’.¹⁶ The i s e sion o he bill was d a ed
by a echnical expe engaged by he IMF. The ea e , he Tanzanian VAT
Technical Team made some ‘imp o emen s o he d a ac du ing i s hal
o 2014 o make i be e i he Tanzanian con ex ’.¹⁷ The IMF’s esiden ep-
esen a i e con i med ha he Tanzanian eam did no ake on boa d all
ecommenda ions om he IMF, claiming hey would no wo k in he Tanza-
nia con ex .¹⁸ In his p ocess, he echnical eam also had consul a ions wi h
some Cabine membe s.
Acco ding o membe s o he echnical eam, an ea ly d a o he VAT
bill was sen o he Con ede a ion o Tanzania Indus ies (CTI), he Oil and
Gas Associa ion o Tanzania (OGAT), he Tanzania Pe oleum De elopmen
Co po a ion (TPDC), he Tanzania P i a e Sec o Founda ion (TPSF), and
he Big Fou . Howe e , acco ding o he TPSF, no consul a ions ook place
p io o he bill being p esen ed o Pa liamen in May 2014.¹⁹ Conceding his
poin , he IMF ep esen a i e e e ed o he d a ing o a bill as a a he
closed p ocess, whe e echnical assis ance and ou side o ces a e somewha
limi ed in hei inpu s: ‘By Tanzanian s anda ds he e we e some consul-
a ions, bu consul a ions could ha e been made be e , mo e widely, and
¹⁵ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 27 Oc obe 2015.
¹⁶ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 11 Ma ch 2015.
¹⁷ In e iew wi h membe s o he echnical eam, Da es Salaam, 11 Ma ch 2015.
¹⁸ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 27 Oc obe 2015.
¹⁹ In e iews wi h Ali Mu u iki (CEO Round able Tanzania), 10. No embe 2014; La hi a Sykes (CEO
Ho el Associa ion o Tanzania), 19 Ma ch 2015; and Edwa d Fu aha (Resea ch and Policy Manage ,
TPSF), 27 Oc obe 2015.

136 Odd-Helge Fjelds ad and Lise Rakne
in ol ed mo e in e es g oups o example om he p i a e sec o ’.²⁰ He u -
he e lec ed ha : ‘IMF had expec ed ha he Cabine would app o e he
May 2014 Bill and ag ee on he Bill be o e i was sen o he Bunge. This did
no happen. The line minis ies—especially ou ism and ag icul u e—we e
no awa e ha heexemp ions o hei sec o shadbeen emo edand eac ed
when hey saw he bill’.²¹
I is no su p ising ha di e en s akeholde s hold di e en iews when
desc ibing a consul a ion p ocess ha happened some ime back, a p ocess
wi h which a leas one pa y ( he p i a e sec o ) was unhappy. Howe e ,
based on e idence acqui ed h ough in e iews wi h key s akeholde s, i is
e iden ha he p ocess o d a ing he 2014 VAT bill was nei he pa icipa-
o yno consul a i e.Keys akeholde sin hep i a esec o we eno p ope ly
consul ed, and some Cabine membe s and minis ies, especially Tou ism
and Ag icul u e, had no been p o ided wi h adequa e in o ma ion abou he
sho - e m consequences o he p oposed changes o he VAT Ac . The ac
ha he Pa liamen ’sBudge Commi eesen hed a bill back o heCabine
o a ed a ing adds c edence o he a gumen ha s akeholde consul a ions
we e limi ed in he i s s age o d a ing he VAT bill.
The abo e analysis illus a es ha e enue ba gaining can be igge ed by
e o ms d a ed by echnoc a ic go e nmen s a (o ex e nal ac o s) asked
wi h how o inc ease e enue. The case u he illus a es ha such ‘ ech-
noc a ic e o ms’ ha e dis inc limi s, as s akeholde s who ha e no been
consul ed in he ini ial s ages o a e o m may seek o in luence he design
o he e o m be o e i is inally abled as an ac .
6.4 Poli ical se lemen and a enas o e enue
ba gaining
The poli ical se lemen in Tanzania is oo ed in a s ong ins i u ionalized
pa y domina ing he pa liamen upheld and legi imized h ough i s ies
o he coun y’s business eli es (Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006;Babeiya, 2011;
G ay, 2018).²² The uling pa y he Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)²³ has
go e ned Tanzania since independence wi h ema kable s abili y (Phillips,
2010;Coulson, 2013;Lo chie, 2014). Whe eas legal e o ms ha e o icially
²⁰ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 27 Oc obe 2015.
²¹ In e iew wi h IMF ep esen a i e, Da es Salaam, 27 Oc obe 2015.
²² The CCM’s majo i y posi ion does no include Zanziba , whe e he opposi ion is s ong. The main
opposi ion pa y in mainland Tanzania, Chadema, has succeeded in winning a numbe o subna ional
elec ions since 2010 in se e al o he majo ci ies, including Da es Salaam and A usha.
²³ Chama Cha Mapinduzi means ‘Pa y o he Re olu ion’ in English.
Lobbying in ax policymaking: The case o VAT e o m in Tanzania 137
de ached he pa y om he s a e, mos s a e ins i u ions a e s ill in o mally
linked beha iou ally o he uling pa y. The lack o sepa a ion be ween
he s a e and he pa y (Makulilo, 2008) makes he CCM a s a e-pa y o a
pa y-s a e.Thepa y emains he‘pa yo choice’ o anyoneseekingapoli -
ical ca ee (The kildsen and Bou gouin, 2012). As no ed by one Tanzanian
desc ibing he CCM’s likelihood o winning he 2005 elec ions, ‘CCM has i s
oo s e e ywhe e . . . . I has aken up all he ea h. The e is no oom o o he
pa ies og ow’(Phillips,2010,109).Signalling he ulingpa y’scon olo e
comme cial business, Babeiya (2011, 95) a gued ha : ‘The use o h ea s also
con inues o gua an ee CCM much suppo om he business communi y as
businesspe sons ea ep ession i hey do no suppo he incumben pa y’.
Wi h economic libe aliza ion, he CCM’s abili y o e ain cen alized con-
ol o e weal h accumula ion began o un a el due o a combina ion o
economic decline, g owing in o maliza ion, co up ion, and, ul ima ely, eco-
nomiclibe aliza ion(Kiondo,1994;Mmuya,1998;Babeiya,2011).Asa gued
by Collo d (2019), Tanzania’s changing economy saw CCM leade s adop
a new pa e n o poli icized accumula ion, one cha ac e ized by ad hoc
connec ions be ween an expanded p i a e-sec o eli e and a ious ac ional
ne wo kswi hin heCCMi sel .Businessowne so Asiano iginwon woou
o ou by-elec ions be ween 1992 and 1995, an unp eceden ed occu ence in
Tanzania (ibid., 118). Despi e he CCM’s dominan posi ion and execu i e
dominance, Babeiya (2011, 97) a gues ha indi idual MPs’ in luence elies
hea ily on p i a e esou ces in hei elec ion campaigns, and hei indi idual
esou ces a e shaping o ing beha iou : ‘The powe o he pu se is cu en ly
one o he icke s o pass he nomina ion and elec ion es in bo h pa y and
in a-pa y compe i ions’. Co esponding o he ea lie discussion o go -
e nmen cap u e, a guably his cul u e o p i a e weal h shaping elec o al
ou comes, businesspeople a e en u ing in o poli ical ca ee s, sugges ing a
s ong link be ween business and poli ics (see Chap e 9 o his olume).
The poli ical se lemen ou lined abo e could be expec ed o ha e yielded
a di e en ou come o he VAT e enue-ba gaining p ocess. In a s a e whe e
onepa y domina es,holdinga majo i y o hepa liamen a y sea s,wewould
no expec a law endo sed by he go e nmen o be al e ed by lobbying o
ea men in Pa liamen .Howe e , because indi idual MPs ely hea ily on
esou ces and business suppo o inance hei elec o al campaigns, he VAT
bill was suscep ible o changes du ing he o e in Pa liamen . Du ing he ba -
gaining p ocess, he d a bill was subs an ially eshaped. Fo ins ance, many
i ems ha a e e e ed oas‘VATable’ in heMay2014Bill a eexemp edin he
VAT Ac passed inPa liamen inNo embe 2014.Whilecen alac o singo -
e nmen , pa icula ly in he Minis y o Finance and he Tanzania Re enue
138 Odd-Helge Fjelds ad and Lise Rakne
Au ho i y, and in he pa liamen a y opposi ion, NGOs, he media, and some
dono shada gued o asimpli iedVAT Ac wi had as ically educed exemp
lis , Tanzania ended up almos in ‘s a us quo’.
In e iewswi hbo hmembe so he echnicald a ing eamand ep esen-
a i es om he p i a e sec o es ablished ha he d a bill o May 2014 was
me wi h p o es s om he p i a e sec o .²⁴ The p i a e sec o a gued ha he
d as ic emo alo exemp ionswouldimply se e echallenges o hebusiness
en i onmen in Tanzania. Fo he p i a e sec o , he key issue was iscal p e-
dic abili y. They a gued, o ins ance, ha he ou ism sec o needed mo e
ime o adjus . The Pa liamen Budge Commi ee demanded mo e consul-
a ions due o wha i o be conside ed weaknesses and sho alls in he d a
bill. Public hea ings on he VAT bill s a ing in Augus 2014 led o ex en-
si e lobbying, especially o exemp ions, and amendmen s o he bill. The
deba e ha ook place in he Cabine as he bill was e u ned sugges s ha he
Cabine had no ully g asped he implica ions o he emo al o exemp ions
o he p i a e sec o and some line minis ies. The Cabine was no uni ed.
Some minis ies, in pa icula hose o Ag icul u e and o Na u al Resou ces
and Tou ism, we e much in a ou o ax exemp ions o en e p ises in hei
espec i e sec o s. The Minis e esponsible o ou ism pe sonally lobbied
o exemp ions in Pa liamen .
Membe s o he main business associa ions, he IMF, he TRA, and he
Minis y o Finance all con i med in in e iews ha lobbying ga he ed
momen um a e he d a ed bill was p esen ed o Pa liamen in May 2014.
Howe e , ini ial a emp s o ensu e ha he new VAT Ac a oided he p ob-
lems o exemp ions and loopholes associa ed wi h he p e ious ac did no
succeed. IMF ini ially sugges ed ha Pa liamen should be in ol ed in de el-
oping he new ac , in o de o educe exemp ions and sensi ize MPs on he
cos s o exemp ions. Howe e , as Pa liamen only became in ol ed la e in
he p ocess when he bill was p esen ed o a o e, he oppo uni y o build
a common unde s anding in Pa liamen on he cos s o exemp ions was los .
This again le Pa liamen open o lobbying du ing he pe iod a e he d a
bill was p esen ed o he legisla u e. As a esul , pa adoxically, conside ing
ha he deba e abou he new VAT Ac s a ed wi h opposi ion MPs pub-
licly shaming he VAT exemp ions inhe en in he amended VAT Ac o 1997,
Pa liamen did no eme ge as a cons i uency a ou ing educing exemp ions.
The claim ha MPs we e being lobbied indi idually by ep esen a i es o
he p i a e sec o was con i med by he p i a e sec o . As Edwa d Fu aha
²⁴ In e iews wi h ep esen a i es omTPSF,12No embe 2014 and 27 Oc obe 2015;manage s om
TRA, 14 No embe 2014 and 11 Ma ch 2015; and o icials om he Minis y o Finance, 11 Ma ch 2015.
Lobbying in ax policymaking: The case o VAT e o m in Tanzania 139
o he TPSF said a he ime, ‘Indi idual membe s who do no know issues
a e no mally made o unde s and issues in he p ocess o lobbying’.²⁵ A ypi-
cal s a egy would be o s a wi h gene al issues ha ouch e e yone (such as
VAT imposed on une al se ices) and use hese as e idence o he impac s o
hed a billo May2014i implemen ed.Thedi ec lobbyingo MPswasalso
con i med by public-sec o ep esen a i es. Acco ding o a senio TRA man-
age : ‘MPs lis en o oo many lobby g oups . . . . Alloca ion o esponsibili y
is p oblema ic . . . . MPs a e swayed by he Big Fou and TPSF. . . .… Clea ly,
go e nmen shouldha e done hei ownexplana ion,aspoli icianswe emis-
led by lobbyis s.’²⁶ While ax p ac i ione s om KMPG claimed ha KMPG
had no been in ol ed in he lobbying o MPs, hey ne e heless conceded
ha ex ensi e lobbying o indi idual MPs had aken place and ha ‘ he
exemp ions a e all back and he d a VAT bill has gone h ough a comple e
o e haul’.²⁷
The VAT law changed conside ably be ween i s submission o Pa liamen
o deba e in May 2014 and he inal o e in No embe . Lobbying agains
he VAT bill was coo dina ed by TPSF owa ds membe s o he Budge Com-
mi ee. They also had mee ings wi h he Minis y o Finance, p esen ing he
p i a e sec o ’s posi ion. Much o his lobbying was done by ax expe s om
PwC engaged by he TPSF. Acco ding o La hi a Sikes, ep esen a i e o he
Ho els Associa ion o Tanzania (HAT), PwC and he TPSF we e p esen in
Dodoma o lobby MPs.²⁸ She a gued, howe e , ha hey did no pay b ibes o
MPs: ‘We wen o Dodoma and a gued ou case’. This obse a ion is impo -
an and sugges s ha i is oo simplis ic o expec ha businesses will p e e
o b ibe a he han lobby i bo h s a egies can achie e he same goal. While
i is di icul o subs an ia e ha lobbying ook p ecedence o e b ibe y, he
ise o la ge, easonablywell-o ganized business associa ions,combined wi h
s ic e pe cei ed en o cemen o in e na ional legisla ion and con en ions
agains co up ion, lead us o en a i ely conclude ha lobbying was consid-
e ed a p e e ed s a egy by heTanzanian businesssec o . A guably, ‘ e enue
ba gaining’ ook a numbe o o ms. The deba e a ound he VAT Ac wi -
nessed li le di ec b ibe y. Ins ead, ba gaining was done h ough se e al
channels,includingindi iduallobbyingwhe ecompaniesac ed in hei indi-
idual capaci y, by indi idual business associa ions such as he HAT, and by
coo dina ed e o s by he TPSF.
²⁵ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 27 Oc obe 2015.
²⁶ In e iew wi h senio manage in TRA, 14 No embe 2014.
²⁷ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 18 Ma ch 2015.
²⁸ In e iew, Da es Salaam, 19 Ma ch 2015.
242 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
I ish aid
USAID
Ga es Founda ion
GOT
UN agencies
Sida
DFID
IDA
Fiscal yea s
USD (million)
2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18
Figu e 11.1 PSSN inancing ends by dono s.
Sou ce: TASAF.
expe ise, echnical assis ance, and acili a ion. Finally, he unding by he
Wo ld Bank (IDA³ in he igu e) is la gely h ough loans (Ul iksen 2019).
As men ioned, al hough he PSSN and he p eceden pilo p og ammes
we e dono unded om he beginning, i was decided ha he PSSN should
be ully go e nmen inanced by 2020 when a new phase o he p og amme
(PSSN II) would be implemen ed. In he mean ime, i was ag eed in 2015
ha he go e nmen should co e a ound a hi d o he budge pe yea — he
inancial equi emen s we e es ima ed a USD 300 million pe yea , wi h he
obliga ions di ided be ween he go e nmen (USD 100 million), de elop-
men pa ne s (USD 100 million), and c edi om he Wo ld Bank (USD 100
million).⁴ In p ac ice, he inancial equi emen s as well as he go e nmen ’s
ac ual con ibu ion we e downscaled. Fo ins ance, he es ima ed amoun
equi ed o he ope a ion o he PSSN be ween July 2015 and June 2016
was se o app oxima ely USD 170.7 million. O his, he go e nmen ini-
ially commi ed o pay ou USD 44 million (TZS 70 billion) o he PSSN
om he 2015/2016 na ional budge , he eby co e ing 25.7% o he es i-
ma edp og ammecos s o ha pe iod.Howe e , in heend, hego e nmen
only con ibu ed USD 7 million, which ep esen s only 4.1% o he o e all
p og amme cos s and only 15.9% o he go e nmen ’s ini ial commi men
(URT e al., 2016). Thus, in 2016, he go e nmen ’s con ibu ions we e lowe
han an icipa ed. Mo eo e , a he ime, he e was much unce ain y abou
he go e nmen ’s long- e m inancial commi men s as he go e nmen did
³ IDA, sho o he In e na ional De elopmen Associa ion, is pa o he Wo ld Bank and has he
objec i e o igh ing ex eme po e y.
⁴ As in o med by TASAF in 2016.

Who should pay? 243
Table 11.2 PSSN— unding equi emen s and a ailable unds 2016–2020.
2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
CCT cos s 126,720,000 126,720,000 126,720,000 126,720,000
PW cos s 26,285,714 26,285,714 26,285,714 26,285,714
Li elihoods 660,000 713,000 713,000 713,000
Ins . s eng hening and
op. cos s 12,503,000 12,503,000 12,503,000 12,503,000
TOTAL 166,168,714 166,221,714 166,221,714 166,221,714
AVAILABLE FUNDS
Balance om p e ious
yea 12,156,607
IDA-Addi ional
inancing 100,263,388 99,736,612
DFID 28,000,000 26,000,000 18,000,000 17,000,000
Go e nmen o
Tanzania 7,000,000
Sida 17,200,000 17,500,000 17,500,000 17,500,000
Ga es Founda ion 893,720 1,966,620 908,860
UN Agencies 655,000
USAID 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
TOTAL 166,168,714 150,203,232 41,408,860 39,500,000
Financing Gap (16,018,482) (124,812,854) (126,721,714)
Sou ce: URT e al. (2016, 10–11)—join e iew conduc ed by he Uni ed Republic o Tanzania (URT),
Wo ld Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, DFID, and Sida.
no p o ide i s implemen ing body (TASAF) wi h any clea indica ion o
i s inancial suppo o he PSSN p og amme (see Table 11.2), o he han
commi ing o 2016/2017 he same (low) unds as o he p e ious budge
yea .
Du ing ou ieldwo k, i was no o iously di icul o ge a clea pic u e o
he inancing o he PSSN p og amme. This was in pa because he e we e
se e al new dono s con ibu ing in a a ie y o ways. Howe e , in 2017, he
es ima es ecei ed sugges ed ha he go e nmen ’s own inancial con ibu-
ion s ill amoun ed o abou only 4% o he ull p og amme cos s.⁵ Thus,
a ound 2017, he Tanzanian go e nmen had no li ed up o i s inancial
⁵ Acco ding o TASAF o icials, he end o 2017 (p edic ed) inancing o he ull PSSN p og amme
implemen a ions andsa USD749.3million. Thego e nmen o Tanzaniawill con ibu eUSD30million
(= 4%). The es o he unding will come om he ollowing sou ces: IDA: USD 420 million (o iginal
c edi USD 220 million, addi ional inancing USD 200 million); DFID: USD 170 million; SIDA: USD
85 million; O ganiza ion o Pe oleum Expo ing Coun ies (OPEC): USD 16.5 million; USAID: USD
10.0 million; I ish Aid: USD 10 million; Bill and Melinda Ga es Founda ion: USD 4.01 million; and UN
Agencies: USD 3.6 million.
244 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
commi men s, and he e we e good easons o doub ha i would do so in
he u u e. As an anonymous go e nmen o icial in o med us:
The go e nmen was expec ed o g adually ake o e he unding by 100% in 2020.
I do no see ha happening. E e y yea he go e nmen has been budge ing o
PSSN . . . howe e , disbu semen is ano he hing.
The dono s con inued o push he go e nmen o inc ease i s inancial com-
mi men s, and he nego ia ions became pa icula ly hea ed a ound 2017 and
2018 when he new phase (PSSN II) was on he able. Nego ia ions we e di -
icul , in pa due o he con lic ing p e e ences o he Tanzanian go e nmen
and he de elopmen pa ne s, as we explain in he ollowing sec ion.
11.4 Con lic ing p e e ences
In 2015, he Tanzanian go e nmen ag eed o g adually ake o e unding o
hePSSN, pa ly becausekey poli iciansandbu eauc a sin go e nmen we e
pe suaded ha he p og amme could educe po e y (Ul iksen, 2019). Tha
was also he yea ha a new p esiden (s ill o he uling pa y, CCM) was
elec ed. La e⁶ P esiden John Magu uli became known o his p oduc i is
e hos and cen aliza ion o decision-making (Cheeseman e al., 2021), which
changed he go e nmen ’s posi ion on he social p o ec ion p og amme. The
new P esiden emphasized ha d wo k and had a s ong dislike o ‘handou s’
(Page , 2021). In addi ion, wi h he P esiden ’s cen aliza ion o powe , he
policy coali ion o domes ic echnoc a s and de elopmen pa ne s ha had
ini ially d i en he in oduc ion o he PSSN (Ul iksen, 2019) became less
in luen ial. Ins ead, he discou se in he go e nmen a la ge swung in a ou
o hose scep ical o cash ans e s and away om he p oponen s o he p o-
g amme (Jacob and Pede sen, 2018). These de elopmen s make ou case
s udy e en mo e in e es ing and ele an . Du ing he pe iod in ocus, 2016–
2018, he con as ing posi ion o he go e nmen is-à- is he dono agencies
became e en mo e p onounced, he nego ia ions consequen ly mo e di i-
cul , and he abili y o ind a comp omise e en mo e ema kable. Howe e ,
as p esen ed in he ollowing, he wo pa ies’ p e e ences di e ed a he
ou se . The Tanzanian go e nmen did no ega d he PSSN as a p io i y,
whe eas he dono s we e, unsu p isingly, suppo i e o i . These con as ing
p e e ences played in o he nego ia ions o he new phase o he p og amme
(PSSN II) as explo ed in sec ion 11.5.
⁶ P esiden Magu uli died in Ma ch 2021, a e ou pe iod o analysis.
Who should pay? 245
11.4.1 The p e e ences o he Tanzanian go e nmen
Al hough he Tanzanian go e nmen had ag eed o he PSSN p og amme,
he e was a eeling ha he p og amme i ed poo ly wi h he i h go -
e nmen ’s de elopmen p io i ies. The CCT componen in pa icula was
c i icized, and he condemna ion became mo e p onounced unde P esiden
Magu uli, who came o powe in No embe 2015. As one sou ce explains:
The CCT does no ma ch wi h he ideology o he uling pa y and he philosophy o
economic de elopmen . P o iding ee money o he ma ke economy mus c ea e
ic ion, and he majo i y did no ag ee i was he igh way o go. This [ he p o-
g amme] aises he ques ion o sus ainabili y and dependency. This p ojec design
was no om inside bu d i en by he hinking o he unde [ he Wo ld Bank].
(Go e nmen o icial)
The hesi a ion owa ds he CCT came la gely om a gene al belie ha cash
ans e s will no help people ou o po e y. The e had been complain s ha
e en bene icia ies o he public wo ks componen ound i ha d o imp o e
hei si ua ion because he daily wages a e e y low. Many did no eel hey
saw angible esul s.
The eeling is ha he e is so much money gi en wi h li le o no impac . This
c ea es esis ance. I know o a Regional Commissione who said e y openly ha
he doesnʼ wan TASAF people a his o ice. Bu I also hink such people a e less
in o med abou he p og amme.
(Expe )
The e was also scep icism owa ds handing ou ‘ ee money’, and nega i e
s o ies on he misuse o cash ans e s lou ished. The media e ela ions o
‘ghos bene icia ies’— ha some PSSN bene icia ies we e no poo (enough)
o be pa o he p og amme— aised e en mo e public misgi ings abou he
PSSN.⁷ Al hough he numbe s o ‘ghos bene icia ies’ we e de e mined o be
small (a ound 55,000 ou o 5.4 million), he public a en ion magni ied his
scep icism among poli icians. P esiden Magu uli, who came o powe on
an an i-co up ion s ance (Page , 2021), was pa icula ly ocal ega ding his
ese a ions abou he PSSN p og amme.
Cash ans e s i ed poo lywi h heP esiden ’s slogan‘hapakazi u’, which
oughly ansla es o ‘he e is only wo k’. The P esiden was conce ned wi h
po e y, bu in achie ing de elopmen , he emphasized he impo ance o
⁷Kennedy (2016);Makene (2016);The Gua dian (2017b).
246 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
p oduc i i y and in as uc u e whe e people mus li hemsel es ou o
po e y h ough en ep eneu ship and ha d wo k. As one sou ce explains:
I donʼ hink he go e nmen will ake o e he Wo ld Bank suppo o he PSSN
gi en he hapa kazi u ideology. To suppo his [claim], one may ecall he ecen
d ough scena io whe eby he cu en go e nmen e used o suppo [gi e ee
ood o] people who we e s a ing.
(Expe )
Fu he mo e,asmaybe emembe ed, when he go e nmen commi edi sel
o he PSSN p og amme, he e we e champions in he go e nmen ha suc-
cess ully ad oca ed o he p og amme despi e some scep icism abou cash
ans e s and long- e m sus ainabili y (Ul iksen, 2019). Wi h he adminis-
a ion unde P esiden Magu uli, hese champions we e ei he no longe in
go e nmen o silenced:
To a la ge ex en , he P esiden ʼs s ance is likely o in luence o he go e nmen
leade s. When a p esiden like Magu uli says no o pu ing money in o he PSSN
p og amme, who a e you o say yes o ice e sa? I is ob ious his in e es
is mo e on cons uc ion. He is, he e o e, limi ing any champions, pa icula ly
wi hin he go e nmen , who would ha e aised hei oices on behal o he poo
bene icia ies.
(Expe )
Thus, al hough he e had been ese a ions owa ds cash- ans e p o-
g ammes in Tanzania in he pas , he scep icism inc eased and become mo e
ocal. This may, in pa , explain he go e nmen ’s limi ed inancial commi -
men . Ano he issue is he gene al cons ain o inancial esou ces, which
caused he go e nmen o a o d he p og amme low p io i y in e ms o
inancial disbu semen s.
Being a lowe -middle-income coun y, Tanzania has limi ed inancial
esou ces and many u gen needs and policy a eas ha equi e a en ion.
Consequen ly, i is no su p ising ha all s akeholde s we in e iewed men-
ioned esou ce cons ain s as a gene al challenge acing all sec o s. This
is also suppo ed in go e nmen documen s; o example, in he Fi e-Yea
De elopmen Plan 2016/17–2020/21 (URT, 2016, 15) i is s a ed ha inade-
qua e inancing(unde undinganddelayo disbu semen s)isakeychallenge
impac ing nega i ely on he implemen a ion o de elopmen plans in he
coun y. Howe e , he Tanzanian go e nmen also spends less on social
p o ec ioncompa ed oo he coun iesin he egion(Ajwade al.,2018).The
Who should pay? 247
esou ce en elope was u he igh ened by loan epaymen s and high ecu -
en cos s.Thus, some in e iew sou ces explained ha Tanzania wasobliged
o epay se e al Wo ld Bank/IMF loans ha we e aken a ound 2012/13, and
ha abou one hi d o go e nmen e enue was o epaying loans. Ano he
p io i y named h ough in e iews was o pay sala ies o public se an s (a
bo h cen alandlocalle els, as wellaswi hin hesocial se ices, e.g. o each-
e s), which abso bs a la ge bulk o he budge . Ne e heless, e en wi hin he
exis ing unds a ailable, o he a eas ook p io i y. Fo ins ance, one in e -
iewee a gued ha he go e nmen was pa icula ly esou ce cons ained
because he coun y had o ully und he gene al elec ions in 2015 (dono s
ha e, in he pas , unded la ge pa s o he elec ion cos s), which impac ed
di ec ly on he PSSN p og amme:
The e was a ime whe e he budge o PSSN was aken o due o elec ion
expenses. Ne e heless, his has no la gely impac ed he p og amme because
PSSN componen s we e no olled ou a one ime bu a he g adually.
(Go e nmen o icial)
The go e nmen , e en mo e so wi h he new P esiden , also p io i ized
in as uc u e and cons uc ion, and i Wo ld Bank loans we e o be aken,
i should be o such a eas and no o he PSSN whe e he Wo ld Bank had
al eady commi ed unds. As a sou ce explained:
The go e nmen is s ill in a high need o so loans o be aken o he cons uc ion,
in as uc u e, and o he p oduc i e and economic ac i i ies. I he Wo ld Bank
is willing o gi e loans o in es men in in as uc u e, hen we will ake [ hem].
Those a e he loans we a e looking o .
(Go e nmen o icial)
Wi hin he social sec o , he ecen ly in oduced p o isions o ee educa ion
o ensu e ha child en om poo amilies ge an educa ion, and ee heal h
p o ision o child en unde i e and he elde ly abo e 70 yea s, we e p io i y
a eas o he P esiden . Some sou ces a gued ha his made he PSSN e en
less ele an han be o e:
E idence om he TASAF [pilo cash- ans e p og amme] showed inc eased
schoolen olmen ,bu hego e nmen is nowad oca ing ha he e is ee- eeedu-
ca ion and says his is a mo e e ec i e way o imp o e educa ion han he TASAF
p og amme.
(Go e nmen o icial)

248 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
The new go e nmen has come wi h he policy o ee educa ion and [is] pushing
o ee manda o y heal h insu ance especially o he poo and aged, which we e
he main a gumen s o he c ea ion o he TASAF. Now, wha is he sepa a ion
be ween he wo [PSSN and educa ion and heal h se ices]?
(Go e nmen o icial)
In ac , he p e iously men ioned scep icism owa ds cash ans e s clea ly
played a ole, no jus in e ms o gi ing he PSSN lowe p io i y han o he
policy a eas bu also in a guing ha o he p og ammes would be mo e e ec-
i e in add essing po e y. A cen ally placed go e nmen o icial wi hin he
Minis y o Finance’s Po e y E adica ion Depa men wen o g ea leng hs
o explain o us he ad an ages o sa ings and in es men schemes ha could
encou age poo ci izens o do ‘p oduc i e’ ac i i ies:
I wish I could p omo e he sa ings p og ammes. I hink he CCT is no sus ain-
able; I donʼ hink i is he igh way o go. I we ge mo e money om dono s, we
can con inue wi h he CCT bu minimize i while pu ing mo e ocus on p oduc i e
p og ammes.
(Go e nmen o icial)
In sum, heTanzaniango e nmen wasscep icalo hePSSN, pa icula ly he
cash- ans e componen , and ound o he social p og ammes mo e i ing
o hei de elopmen plans. This con as ed wi h he dono s’ p io i izing he
PSSN and desi ing o he go e nmen ake owne ship.
11.4.2 The p e e ences o he dono s
The dono communi y in Tanzania, as in many o he low-income A ican
coun ies, had high ega d o social p o ec ion p og ammes such as he
PSSN:
PSSN is one o he mos e ec i e and la ges social p o ec ion p og ammes in
A ica. I is well managed and is making a huge impac . The p og amme is also
s ong in ha i is implemen ed h ough he go e nmen sys em a he han
h ough a pa allel dono sys em.
(Dono ep esen a i e)
Whe eas he Wo ld Bank ini ia ed he PSSN, o he dono s s a ed o sup-
po he p og amme due o i s po e y- educing po en ial. In a w i en
Who should pay? 249
communica ion, a dono ep esen a i e p o ided his explana ion, ollowing
his ques ion om he au ho s:
Au ho s: Is you a ionale o suppo ing he PSSN due o i s abili y o educe
po e y o (/and) as pa o [you coun yʼs] s a egy o expand social p o ec-
ion/social secu i y/social igh s?
Dono ep esen a i e: I is mainly he i s a ionale, ha is o educe po e y
and also ha we belie e i will con ibu e o be e lea ning ou comes o chil-
d en, no leas gi ls (as you may know, he p og amme has condi ions ela ed o
school a endance), and also ha i will con ibu e o employmen and income
among he poo es ( h ough he public wo ks componen )— hese a e esul s ha
a e emphasized in ou coun y s a egy.
While aid agencies see he alue o he PSSN, hey wan ed he go e nmen o
ake owne ship o ensu e i s long- e m sus ainabili y. I was also a gued ha
he PSSN would be a o dable:
The inancial commi men should be o he long e m, and we belie e ha domes-
ic inancingispossible in helong un.They cana o di bu need omake he igh
decision and o e ime g adually ake o e om he dono s.
(Dono ep esen a i e)
Howe e , as explained, he Tanzanian go e nmen was hesi an o p io i ize
unds o he PSSN, and his pu he dono agencies in a icky posi ion. While
wan ing o ensu e ha he p og amme was no dono dependen , and he e-
o e wan ing he go e nmen o ake o e he p og amme, he aid agencies
we e also awa e ha i would be di icul o ( h ea en o) pull ou , gi en he
suppo ha poo and ulne able households ecei e:
We ha e con inued wi h he suppo e en i we donʼ see much coming om
he go e nmen ʼs side, because we unde s and ha pulling ou ou inancing
has a di ec e ec on he poo and ulne able people who bene i om he
p og amme.
(Dono ep esen a i e)
Thus, he go e nmen and aid agencies had con lic ing p e e ences wi h
espec o he PSSN, which caused di icul nego ia ions. As one dono ep-
esen a i e pu i : ‘The ela ionship is no always easy. Bo h sides ha e hei
own ision, mission, and p io i ies o social p o ec ion’. Gi en he go e n-
men ’s limi ed in e es in he PSSN as compa ed o o he issues, one migh
250 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
ask why i hen commi ed o he p og amme in he i s place. One sou ce
o e ed an explana ion:
I is a adi ion o he go e nmen o commi when dono s ask i o do so. The
go e nmen says yes, and hey jus de aul ; his goes ac oss all sec o s. The go -
e nmen doesnʼ eel any liabili y o ha .
(Expe )
Wha e e he easons, he s a us in he pe iod o ou s udy (2016–2018) was
ha he Tanzanian go e nmen was uns eadily o li e up o i s inancial com-
mi men s o he PSSN p og amme. In he ollowing, we explo e how he
go e nmen anddono communi y sough opush h ough hei p e e ences.
Thisengagemen becameespecially hea ed du ing2018whe e hedesignand
u u e inancing o he PSSN II we e nego ia ed.
11.5 Re enue ba gaining: Who should pay?
The ollowing analysis explo es he ba gaining be ween he Tanzanian go -
e nmen and in e na ional aid agencies o e he p og amme design o he
PSSN II and he disbu semen o unds. We show how he Tanzanian go -
e nmen sough o in luence he design o he p og amme o be e i
i s p io i ies, pa icula ly by educing he impo ance o he cash- ans e
elemen . While he in e na ional dono s we e able o main ain a s ong cash-
ans e elemen in he PSSN II, hey we e unable o hold he go e nmen o
i s ea lie commi men s ega ding disbu semen o unds.
11.5.1 P og amme design
The i s phase o he PSSN p og amme was se o un h ough o 2019. Thus,
o ou pe iod o analysis, ba gaining inc easingly e ol ed a ound he con-
inua iono hep og amme(i.e.PSSNII).As men ioned,P esiden Magu uli
had been highly scep ical abou he cash- ans e elemen o he PSSN, and
his s ong public eac ions a ec ed he ela ionship be ween he go e nmen
and he de elopmen pa ne s.
Fo ins ance, in July 2017, he P esiden ha shly c i icized cash ans-
e s, and he wen so a as o o de an immedia e s op o he p o ision o
cash ans e s o e ugees in Tanzania.⁸ Al hough, he did no men ion any
⁸The Gua dian (2017a).
Who should pay? 251
speci ic names, his c i icism seemed o be poin ed a o ganiza ions o e -
ing humani a ian aid o e ugees in Tanzania, including he Wo ld Food
P og amme and he Uni ed Na ions High Commissione o Re ugees.⁹ In
ano he inciden , owa ds he end o 2017, he go e nmen e used a he
ele en h hou o sign a memo andum o unde s anding (MoU) wi h I ish
Aid ha would o he wise ha e secu ed addi ional unds o he PSSN. The
eason gi en was ha he go e nmen p e e ed inances o be di ec ed o
he new PSSN II, wi h mo e ‘p oduc i e’ componen s, han o he exis ing
p og amme domina ed by he CCT (in e iew wi h go e nmen o icials).
The u n-a ound caused con usion in he dono communi y and le se -
e al Tanzanian go e nmen o icials emba assed as hey we e in ol ed in
he leng hy p ocess o de eloping he MoU and keenly awa e o dono und-
ing cycles ha encou aged disbu semen s o be made wi hin he calenda
yea .
The P esiden subsequen ly di ec ed he TASAF o e iew he PSSN and
o conside some e isions o he design o he PSSN II (in e iew wi h go -
e nmen o icials). Consequen ly, in Augus 2018, an al e na i e p og amme
design documen o he PSSN II was ci cula ed. In he al e na i e design,
he cash- ans e componen was almos en i ely emo ed and he ocus was
ins ead p edominan ly on public wo ks and p oduc i e inclusion (i.e. ain-
ingandcoaching oenhancepa icipan s’sa ingsandp oduc i eac i i ies).¹⁰
In go e nmen discou se, heal e na i edesignwasno achangeo heen i e
PSSN bu me ely a change in p io i ies o he di e en p og amme compo-
nen s so ha he ocus was less on he ‘was e ul’ cash ans e s and mo e
on he o he ‘p oduc i e’ componen s (in e iew wi h go e nmen o icials).
This was, howe e , in s ong con as o he de elopmen pa ne s’ iews o
he PSSN II in which hey ega ded cash ans e s as essen ial:
In case he e will be huge changes wi hin he PSSN, we will need o eassess he
p og amme and ou commi men o inancing i . Ou in e es is o keep he pe -
cen age a ios [o he p og amme componen s] as hey a e cu en ly. . . . Dono s
would esis money going away om he cash ans e as i is essen ial o he o he
componen s, a leas as a s a -up.
(Dono ep esen a i e)
A his poin , in Augus 2018, a possible comp omise be ween he go e n-
men and de elopmen pa ne s seemed unlikely. Howe e , in he mon hs
ha ollowed, he go e nmen slowly came a ound and seemed o accep
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ As we ha e been in o med h ough con e sa ions wi h s akeholde s.
258 Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, Flo a Myamba, and Cons an ine Geo ge
The Gua dian. 2017a. ‘JPM ells Bu undian e ugees o “go home”’. 21 July.
The Gua dian. 2017b. ‘TASAF in line o o e haul as JPM eyes ano he “boil”’. 13
Janua y.
Ul iksen, M. S. 2019. ‘Pushing o Policy Inno a ion: The F aming o Social P o-
ec ion Policies in Tanzania’. In The Poli ics o Social P o ec ion in Eas e n and
Sou he n A ica, edi ed by S. Hickey, T. La e s, M. Niño-Za azúa, and J. Seek-
ings, pp. 122–147. Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/oso/
9780198850342.003.0005.
URT. 2016. Na ional Fi e-Yea De elopmen Plan 2016/17–2020/21: Nu u ing
Indus ializa ion o Economic T ans o ma ion and Human De elopmen . Da es
Salaam: Minis y o Finance and Planning.
URT. 2018. Tanzania Social Ac ion Fund, P oduc i e Social Sa e y Ne , Phase Two
(PSSN II): P og am Design Documen . P epa ed by Go e nmen P ojec P epa a-
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12
B oke ed iscal con ac s
Shi ing ba gaining posi ions o Senegalʼs in o mal
comme cial sec o
Ane Ka oline Bak
12.1 In oduc ion
In his chap e , I ace h ee decades o e enue ba gaining in Senegal’s in o -
mal comme cial sec o . D awing on he li e a u e on he in eg al ole o
b oke s in Senegal (e.g. Boone, 1992;Blundo, 2006;Beck, 2008;Go lieb,
2017,2022), I ocus on b oke s’ in luence on e enue-ba gaining p ocesses
and speci ically hei ou comes. I ind ha wha essen ially become b oke ed
iscal con ac s¹ can be explained by shi s in he ela i e ba gaining posi ions
o he uling eli es is-à- is he in o mal comme cial sec o and hei b o-
ke s, in pa icula UnionNa ionaledesComme can s e Indus iels du Sénégal
(UNACOIS).²
Du ing he 1990s, ecu ing a emp s a axing he in o mal sec o
we e esis ed by ac o s in he in o mal comme cial sec o , o ganized by
UNACOIS, and aided by a agmen ed uling coali ion and weak uling
eli es. In he 2000s, suppo o he in o mal comme cial sec o was poli ically
impo an o P esiden AbdoulayeWade’s e o o( e)consolida e he uling
coali ion. While an in o mal sec o ax was ins alled, i la gely emained a ax
on pape and no in p ac ice. Howe e , an o ganiza ional agmen a ion o
he in o mal comme cial sec o in he 2000s weakened i s ba gaining posi-
ion is-à- is he uling eli es in he 2010s, and he e o e, in he pas decade,
in o mal comme cial ac o s’ iscal bu den has inc eased wi h se e al new ax
ins umen s and en a i e expansions in ax collec ion.
¹ Tha is, iscal con ac s whe e an in e media y is sine qua non in he nego ia ion and upholding o he
con ac e ms.
² UNACOIS changed i s name in 2007 o UNACOIS-JAPPO. I e e o he o ganiza ion as UNACOIS
in he beginning o he chap e and o UNACOIS-JAPPO when discussing he la e pe iod.
Ane Ka oline Bak, B oke ed iscal con ac s. In: The Poli ics o Re enue Ba gaining in A ica. Edi ed by: Anne Me e Kjæ ,
Ma ianne S. Ul iksen, and Ane Ka oline Bak, Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. © Ox o d Uni e si y P ess (2024).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192868787.003.0012
260 Ane Ka oline Bak
I show ha o unde s and he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o he uling
eli e and e enue p o ide s (as heo ized in he heo e ical amewo k in
Chap e 2), we should s udy hei changing ba gaining powe s in pa allel.
In Senegal, luc ua ions in he uling coali ion shape he esou ces and ba -
gaining powe o he uling eli es. On he o he side, he ba gaining powe
o UNACOIS as a b oke is condi ioned on i s abili y o o ganize and ep e-
sen bo h small and la ge ade s in he in o mal comme cial sec o , bu i s
poli ical in luence is also condi ioned by uling coali ion luc ua ions c ea -
ing poli ical openings. The chap e demons a es he ins umen al alue o
a long- e m his o ical app oach and he impo ance o ecognizing he dis-
inc ole o b oke s when s udying e enue ba gaining in clien elis poli ical
se lemen s, in Senegal and beyond.³
The analysis is based on da a collec ed om se e al ield esea ch s ays
be ween 2017 and 2022, including a su ey o in o mal s ee endo s,
ax-collec ion da a, newspape a icles, in e iews wi h o me and cu en
employees in he ax adminis a ion and ep esen a i es om he o mal and
in o mal economy, and epo s and analyses o Senegal’s in o mal comme -
cial sec o .
12.2 Senegalʼs in o mal comme cial sec o
A e he ag icul u al sec o , he comme cial sec o is pe haps Senegal’s mos
impo an economic sec o . Including bo h o mal and in o mal businesses,
i accoun s o 40.3% o he economic u no e and employs 32.8% o all
wo ke s (ANSD, 2017, 33, 42). Focusing on he in o mal (non-ag icul u al)
sec o , ade and comme ce p o ide p ima y employmen o mo e han
one million Senegalese ac oss u ban and u al a eas (ANSD, 2019, 121).
The in o mal comme cial sec o p o ides 66% o he in o mal economy’s
u no e (ANSD, 2017, 24, 34), bu he ax con ibu ions o he in o mal
comme cial economy a elimi ed. Be ween 2004 and 2007, he in o mal com-
me cial sec o con ibu ed on a e age 16.4% o o al di ec business income
axes (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012, 60). Mo e ecen ly, a epo s a ed ha
Senegal’s en i e in o mal economy con ibu es a ound 3% o ax e enues
(DPEE, 2018).
In o mal businesses a e de ined by he absence o o mal accoun -keeping
due o lack o ei he skill o will. While economic ac o s a e no egis-
e ed unde he dominan cen al go e nmen ax schemes such as company
³ B oke s he e is a guably compa able o he hi d pa ies ha Beach (Chap e 10) desc ibes o be
in ol ed in e enue ba gaining in Togo.
B oke ed iscal con ac s 261
income ax, alue-added axa ion(VAT),o wi hholding axes o employees,
e en he smalles endo s pay a ange o axes, ees, and le ies (Bak,
2019;ILO, 2020) as elsewhe e in A ica (Moo e, P icha d, and Fjelds ad,
2018, ch. 7).
Senegal’s in o mal comme cial sec o is inc edibly di e se, comp ising
s ee -le el endo s and ade business owne s (in F ench, espec i ely
ma chands ambulan s and comme can s), all wi h some so o ixed s uc-
u e (Mbaye e al., 2014). Some ha e a able on he side o he oad, some
ha e a p ope shop (in a s uc u ed ma ke o in a building), and some la ge
in o mal ade s impo and sell o smalle in o mal e aile s. The o me
mos ly unc ion on a day- o-day basis, he la e g oup is egis e ed and each
has a business iden i ica ion numbe (Numé o d’Iden i ica ion Na ionale
des En ep ises e Associa ions, hence o h NINEA) which gi es access o
adminis a i e p ocedu es, banking, and, no leas , impo and expo .
The e a e as o e laps be ween Senegal’s o mal and in o mal economies.
Mos o mal businesses engage in some in o mal ac i i ies (Ma aing and
Sow, 1999;G e en, 2017;Mbaye, Benjamin, and Gueye, 2017;Ekomié
e al., 2020), which is made possible by poo coo dina ion and limi ed
c oss- e e encing be ween he NINEA da abase, Senegal’s ax au ho i ies
(Di ec o a e Géné ale des Impô s e Domaines, hence o h DGID), and Cus-
oms (ILO, 2020, 30). Fo a long ime, Cus oms did no di e en ia e be ween
o mal and in o mal business (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012, 59), making i
possible o be a egis e ed business wi hou paying axes, and o impo
goods, pay cus oms, and sell he goods in la ge e ail ne wo ks while emain-
ing e ec i ely in o mal, ha is, no egis e ing as axpaye s o decla ing
p o i s o he DGID. This is a key eason why la ge, ich ade s can eside
ou side he ax ne .
I is hus di icul , and no e y use ul, o apply a na ow de ini ion o he
in o malsec o ,no od awaha dconcep ualdis inc ionbe ween he o mal
and he in o mal economies. Ins ead, i is impe a i e o unpack and unde -
s and he sec o ’s dynamics empi ically and, especially, he ole and in luence
o b oke s in e enue ba gaining.
12.2.1 In o mal sec o b oke s and he implica ions
o iscal con ac s in Senegal
Senegal’s in o mal comme cial sec o includes small and la ge e enue
p o ide s wi h di e se ades and o en di e ging in e es s. The e o e,
unioniza ion and membe ship o business associa ions a e i al sou ces o
262 Ane Ka oline Bak
o ganiza ional and iscal ba gaining powe . When unions and business asso-
cia ions, o e ec i ely hei leade s, si down a he imagina y nego ia ion
able, hey b ing he o ganiza ional ba gaining powe gi en by he po en-
ial mobiliza ion o he e enue p o ide s hey ep esen , as well as poli ical
and social capi al ha many o hei membe s o en do no enjoy. The o ga-
niza ions and hei leade s nego ia e o b oke on behal o hei membe s
ega ding issues such as ax. As shown in his chap e , one business asso-
cia ion, UNACOIS, has been cen al in e enue ba gaining on behal o
Senegal’s in o mal comme cial sec o (see also Thioub, Diop, and Boone,
1998). Concep ualizing UNACOIS’s ole as b oke helps us unde s and i s
a ying in luence on e enue-ba gaining ou comes o e he yea s, which,
I a gue, is a cen al explana o y ac o o he e olu ion in in o mal sec o
axa ion.
B oke s a e de ined as hi d-pa y in e media ies who u ilize hei powe ,
o engi enbyala gene wo kandgoodconnec ions, o acili a eanexchange
be ween wo o he pa ies. Some schola s see b oke s as cen al ac o s in
o e buying who p o ide exclusi e access o goods and se ices in coun ies
whe eci izen–poli icianlinkagesa emo eclien elis han p og amma ic(see
e.g. Ki schel and Wilkinson, 2007;S okes e al., 2013;Go lieb, 2017;Be en-
scho , 2019). O he s see b oke s as signi ican ac o s posi ioned a he aul
lines be ween s a e and ci izens, aiding in needs ansla ion and policy imple-
men a ion in weak s a es (Mosse and Lewis, 2006;Blundo and Le Meu ,
2008;Bie schenk and Oli ie de Sa dan, 2014). I ocus on so-called o gani-
za ional b oke s (Holland and Palme -Rubin, 2015), which a e compa able
o in e es g oups bu di e in hei con ol o e wha is exchanged be ween
membe s and s a e ac o s (Sco , 1972, 95; Blundo and Le Meu , 2008).
B oke s balance in e es s in wha is essen ially a h ee-way ela ionship
and nego ia ion. Fi s , hey ha e o conside s a e ac o s’ in e es s; espond-
ing o and accommoda ing hem is impe a i e o b oke s o main ain hei
p i ileged access and po en ial in luence. Second, o ganiza ional b oke s in
pa icula ha e o ca e o hei membe s’ social, collec i e, and o ganiza-
ional in e es s (Holland and Palme -Rubin, 2015). B oke s may ep esen
collec i e in e es s o al uis ic easons o o keep membe s sa is ied, and
i hey ail o do his, membe s could sanc ion hem, o example by s ip-
ping hem o hei powe o by lea ing he o ganiza ion. Thi d, b oke s ha e
in e es s and can exploi hei exclusi e posi ion o gain en s, pa onage,
o o he goods (S okes e al., 2013). Fo business associa ions, leade s a e
o en success ul businesspeople and a e likely o b ing hei pe sonal busi-
ness in e es s o he nego ia ion able, which could con lic wi h hose o hei
membe s.
B oke ed iscal con ac s 263
The ac o balancing hese in e es s implies ha b oke ed iscal con ac s,
which some imes esul om e enue ba gaining, migh se e di e se se s o ,
some imes con lic ing, in e es s. B oke s may exploi hei exclusi e posi ion
o p o i mo e han hei membe s, who may ecei e limi ed in o ma ion.
Howe e , he e is a s ong elemen o in e dependence be ween b oke s
and he e enue p o ide s hey ep esen . While b oke s can p o ide la ge
g oups o e enue p o ide s wi h o ganiza ional powe and poli ical oice,
he s eng h o b oke s’ ba gaining posi ion is-à- is uling eli es is la gely
dependen on he ex en o hei ne wo k and he abili y o mobilize i . I
b oke s ail in balancing in e es s and lea e hei membe s dissa is ied, hei
o ganiza ional ba gaining powe and hei ba gaining posi ion can be unde -
mined. The ollowingsec ionsdesc ibe UNACOIS’sbalancingac in e enue
ba gaining ega ding axa ion o Senegal’s in o mal comme cial sec o , how
i changed o e ime, he consequences o UNACOIS and he b oade g oup
o e enue p o ide s, and he ou comes o e enue ba gaining.
12.3 Th ee decades o e enue ba gaining
The ollowing analysis includes case s udies o he a emp s in he 1990s o
gene alizeVAT o hein o malsec o ; headop iono hein o malsec o ax,
con ibu ionglobaleunique(CGU)in2004andi s e o msin 2006, 2012,and
2019; and he adop ion o ad ance paymen s on impo ed goods in 2012 and
2019 a ge ing la ge in o mal impo e s. These cases ep esen ini ia i es ha
we e implemen ed wi h he key objec i e o inc ease axa ion o he in o mal
comme cial sec o .
12.4 The 1990s: A emp s a gene alizing axa ion
Economicchangesin he1970s and1980scausedanin o maliza iono Sene-
gal’s economy.⁴ Fi s , he e was a s ong mo e owa ds a Senegaliza ion o
comme ce o compe e wi h long-es ablished, o eign-owned i ms, while he
o me ly ai ly well- unc ioning p oduc i e o mal sec o s su e ed unde
poo and inc easingly cen alized poli ical managemen (Thioub, Diop, and
Boone, 1998, 70–71). The mid ’80s we e cha ac e ized by economic eces-
sion, which only wo sened as he in e na ional inancial ins i u ions (IFIs)
⁴ I ely he e on Thioub e al. (1998), who aced changes in Senegal’s poli ical economy in he wake
o economic libe aliza ion, including how i mani es ed in ins ances o e enue ba gaining ( hough no
concep ualizing as such).

264 Ane Ka oline Bak
pushed h ough s uc u al adjus men p og ams (SAPs). As economic libe -
aliza ion p o ided new en oppo uni ies, and capi al in he in o mal sec o
g ew compe i i e, a new g oup o sel -made capi alis s eme ged, and he
business class b oadened (Thioub, Diop, and Boone, 1998). Combined, he
in o maliza ionandlibe aliza iono heeconomyna owed he ax basecon-
side ably. The IFIs p essu ed he Senegalese go e nmen led by P esiden
Abdou Diou o expand axa ion o he in o mal economy, which became a
key eason o he go e nmen ’s con inuous a emp s a gene alizing VAT o
he in o mal sec o s.
The go e nmen ’s i s a emp was in la e 1989, when VAT and cus om
du y a es oge he inc eased by 5–6%. In eac ion, ade s in Daka closed
hei shops and s opped all business ac i i y in he capi al (Boone, 1994;
Thioub, Diop, and Boone, 1998). In he wake o his success ul ac ion, UNA-
COIS o med wi h he pu pose o ep esen ing his new, la gely in o mal
business class o p o ec in o mal economy in e es s, and UNACOIS came
o lead he o ganized opposi ion agains he go e nmen ’s ollowing a emp s
o inc ease axa ion o he in o mal economy. The second a emp , in 1991,
o apply VAT o he in o mal comme cial sec o me simila opposi ion. In
1993, UNACOIS eac ed o nego ia ions ega ding VAT and dis ibu ion
monopolies by h ea ening, among o he hings, o s op impo and expo .
In esponse o he inal a emp in 1995–1996, UNACOIS called o he
well-known ope a ion illes mo es (ope a ion dead ci ies). The shu -down
o comme ce in all majo ci ies ailed, bu he ope a ion demons a ed he
po en ialo ganiza ionalpowe o UNACOIS, i s capaci yo collec i eac ion,
and i s geog aphical each. Ul ima ely, he ade s succeeded in coun e ing
he egime’s a emp s a axing he in o mal economy.
12.4.1 A agmen ed uling coali ion and he c ea ion
o a s ong b oke
The ins ances o e enue ba gaining in he 1990s did no end in a b oke ed
iscal con ac : hey did no es ablish a posi i e exchange o in o mal sec-
o axa ion o public se ices, no did hey seem o end in a de il’s deal
whe e non- axa ion was exchanged o poli ical suppo (Tendle , 2002; see
also Chap e 2). I any hing, non- axa ion was exchanged o main enance
o comme ce, economic ac i i y, and social o de . As elabo a ed in wha ol-
lows, wo condi ions a guably explain his ou come: a poo and inc easingly
agmen ed uling coali ion, and he making o UNACOIS as b oke o an
o ganized in o mal comme cial sec o .
B oke ed iscal con ac s 265
The Pa i Socialis e de Sénégal (PS) had been in powe since indepen-
dencein1960basedona ulingcoali ionbuil a oundclose ela ionsbe ween
he poli ical and economic eli es. The uling coali ion was cha ac e ized by
a domes ic business class ha was deeply dependen on en oppo uni ies
gi enby he ulingeli esandawide- eachingpoli icalmachinesecu ingelec-
ion ic o ies (Boone, 1992;Thioub, Diop, and Boone, 1998). This domes ic
businessclass emainsla gely ied o he s uc u eso eligiousb o he hoods,
especially he Mou ides, whose weal h and capi alis s eng h we e buil du -
ing colonial imes (C uise O’B ien, 1971;Diop and Diou , 1990;Boone,
1992;Villalón, 1995;Golub and Hansen-Lewis, 2012;Ko e , 2021). The
SAPs and economic libe aliza ion coupled wi h poo poli ical managemen
diminished he economic esou ces o he uling eli es. Though P esiden
Diou had made s ides o cen alize and consolida e his powe du ing he
1980s and 1990s (Diop and Diou , 1990), he s uc u al economic changes
limi ed he esou ces a ailable o dis ibu e pa onage and main ain he eli-
gious g oups’ unc ion in he poli ical machine (Boone, 1990;Young and
Kan é, 1991;Scha e , 1998;Ko e , 2021). Hence, he ounda ion o he ul-
ing coali ion wi he ed, and he coali ion became agmen ed as elsewhe e in
A ica du ing hese yea s (Whi ield e al., 2015).
Among e enue p o ide s in he in o mal comme cial sec o , he ins ances
o e enue ba gaining p omp ed mobiliza ion and o ganiza ion. Unde he
condi ions o an inc easingly agmen ed uling coali ion, po en ial e enue
p o ide s in he in o mal comme cial sec o became an impo an suppo
g oup. Mo eo e , UNACOIS was able o u ilize i s o ganiza ional powe o
posi ion i sel as a b oke be ween he wo and inc ease i s poli ical in lu-
ence. This es ablished a ela i ely s ong ba gaining posi ion o he e enue
p o ide s is-à- is he uling eli es (see Table 2.1, Chap e 2). The e o e,
when p o es s and s ikes pa alyzed Senegal’s economy, he Diou egime was
p essu ed o accommoda e he po en ial e enue p o ide s and abandon i s
a emp s a expanding i s ax e o .
12.5 The 2000s: Ins alla ion and e o m o he in o mal
sec o ax
In 2004, a ax e o m was passed, which included he ins alla ion o he
con ibu ion globale unique (CGU), an annual ax on in o mal economy
ac i i ies applied o ade s wi h a u no e below 50 million XOF (app ox.
€76,000), and se ice p o ide s wi h a u no e below 25 million XOF
266 Ane Ka oline Bak
(app ox. €38,000).⁵ The CGU subs i u ed and syn hesized se e al axes,
including income ax on indus ial and comme cial p o i s, VAT, and he
business ax, pa en e. The CGU was calcula ed based on es ima ed u no e
wi h ixed amoun s o paymen s acco ding o 20 u no e b acke s. The ax
b acke s a ied be ween he ade and se ice sec o s. Fo ade s, he e ec-
i e ax a es a ied be ween 1.5 and 9% and inc eased p og essi ely wi h he
le el o u no e (UNACOIS, 2012).⁶
The mo i a ion o he uni ied ax scheme was o ease he ac o paying
axes, c ea e a i s iscal acquain ance be ween in o mal economic ac o s
and ax au ho i ies, and p omo e ax compliance.⁷ The CGU is an in o mal
economy ax because, al hough decla a i e, i does no equi e p o ision o
inancial s a emen s. Business owne s need o egis e , make yea ly decla a-
ions, and pay acco dingly. I is p ima ily decla a i e in heo y, hough. Fo
he mos pa , he ax is collec ed by a g oup o o icials who ou he ma ke s
once a yea ( ax inspec o 3, Daka , 26 Feb ua y 2018; municipal employee,
Daka , 1 Ma ch 2018). They assess u no e s based on endo s’ goods and
collec he ele an amoun o ax. Hence, he CGU is e ec i ely as much a
p esump i e as a decla a i e egime.
The CGU ep esen s a i s b oke ed iscal con ac be ween he in o -
mal comme cial sec o and he uling eli es, acili a ed by UNACOIS, who,
acco ding o he na a i e o he CGU, p oposed i . This has been s a ed
publicly by he DGID (APS, 2013) and in in e iews wi h a UNACOIS ep-
esen a i e (Daka , 23 Feb ua y 2018) and a DGID ep esen a i e (Daka ,
20 Feb ua y 2018). Al hough igh ing gene aliza ion o VAT in he ea ly ’90s,
UNACOIS had p oposed an ins umen ha p omo es in o mal sec o ax-
a ion, a leas on pape . Howe e , in he wake o he adop ion o he CGU
in 2004, UNACOIS c i icized he ax b acke s o being ou o sync wi h
he ade s’ means (Sud Quo idien, 2004;Ba y, 2004) and claimed ha i
had no been consul ed in he o mula ion o he inal ax b acke s (ibid.).
No hing came o hese p o es s in 2004, bu he ax b acke s became he
ocal poin o subsequen e enue ba gaining and se e al e o ms o he
CGU. In 2006, ollowing consul a ion wi h UNACOIS (UNACOIS, 2012),
he ixed amoun s we e lowe ed o he 15 highes b acke s bu inc eased
o he ou h- and i h-lowes .⁸ Fo he highes b acke , he educ ion was
no able: om 4,200,000 XOF (app ox. €6,407) o 1,500,000 XOF (app ox.
⁵ Loi no. 2004-12 du 6 é ie 2004 modi ian ce aines disposi ions du Code Géné al des Impô s.
⁶ See Appendix, Table 12.A1 o o e iew o he CGU calculus and i s e o ms.
⁷ Expose des mo i s, Loi no. 2004-12 du 6 é ie 2004.
⁸ See Appendix, Table 12.A1 o o e iew o CGU e o ms.
B oke ed iscal con ac s 267
€2,290). Fu he mo e, he ax scale was spli in wo: one o ade s dealing
in ood p oduc s and cemen , and one wi h ma kedly lowe axa ion o all
o he ade s. Fu he e o ms o he CGU in 2013 and 2018 will be discussed
la e .
12.5.1 The balancing ac
Du ing i s i s decade, he CGU was bu a con ac on pape , and e y ew
businesses we e en olled. In 2004, 2,663 i ms we e e ec i ely subjec o he
CGU, and in 2007, he numbe was 4,970 (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012, 60 )
compa ed o 281,000 in o mal economic en i ies in 2003 in Daka alone
(DPS, 2003) and an es ima ed 774,000 (non-ag icul u al) en i ies ac oss
Senegal (ANSD, 2013, 16). While he o al e enue collec ed om he CGU
doubled be ween 2004 and 2007, he a e age ax collec ion pe i m ell, and
e enue om he CGU did no exceed 1.5 billion XOF (app ox. €2.3 mil-
lion), which equals less han 1% o o al di ec axes collec ed (Benjamin and
Mbaye, 2012, 60). By 2012, e enue collec ions had allen o 0.7 billion XOF
(app ox. €1.1 million) (Sy, 2016). Based on i s limi ed each in o he in o -
mal sec o , he iscal ou come o he CGU was negligible in e ms o e enue
collec ion and expe ienced ax bu den. In addi ion, s ee -le el endo s will,
when asked, mos likely say ha hey ne e ha e hea d o he CGU, and ha
hey pay he pa en e (e en hough hei paymen eceip s ac ually say CGU).⁹
The ins alla ion and poo implemen a ion o he CGU can be explained,
a leas in pa , by he in e es s o hen P esiden Abdoulaye Wade and UNA-
COIS’s balancing ac . The agmen a ion o he uling coali ion in he 1990s
inc eased poli ical compe i ion leading up o Senegal’s p esiden ial elec ion
in2000.The ewas ealunce ain yabou elec ion esul s(Beck, 2008,7),and
in he coun y’s i s ans e o powe , he Pa i Démoc a ique Sénégalais
(PDS) and i s leade , Abdoulaye Wade, ook o e om PS. In he wake o
his elec ion, P esiden Wade sus ained his p esiden ial powe by ca e ing
o eligious leade s and ( e)c ea ing a enues o pa onage inanced in pa
by la ge-scale co up ion, o example a ound public ende s (Beck, 2008,
223 ; Mbow, 2008;Kelly, 2012). He econsolida ed he uling coali ion and
ensu ed cen alized powe and con ol o cen al s a e ins i u ions (Dumon
and Kan é, 2019). Mo eo e , he openly wooed people whose basic li elihood
was secu ed by wo king in o elying on he in o mal economy (Dankoco
⁹ In a su ey by Go lieb (2022), only 6% o i ms had hea d abou he CGU. Au ho ’s in e iews
and ocus g oups wi h in o mal ac o s co obo a ed his (e.g. ocus g oup wi h p esiden s om i e
associa ions ep esen ing in o mal comme cial p o essions, Daka , 30 Ma ch 2022).
274 Ane Ka oline Bak
Fo he CGU, he numbe o axpaye s egis e ed and decla a ions
inc eased be ween 2012 and 2022. In 2013, he e we e 2,035 CGU decla a-
ions (Go lieb, 2022), which almos doubled be ween 2012 and 2019, and
hen ose by mo e han 50% in he wo ollowing yea s. Be ween 2012 and
2019, he e enue collec ed om CGU likewise ose om 0.72 (Sy, 2016) o
0.89 billion XOF (app ox. €1.5 billion) (Table 12.1). As shown in Table 12.1,
collec ions ose equally wi hin he much sho e pe iod be ween 2019 and
2021 o 1.15 billion XOF (app ox. €1.75 million).
The da a in Table 12.1 should be complemen ed wi h da a on e enue col-
lec ed by eams ha isi ma ke a eas once a yea . In 2021, 29,372 axpaye s
we e eached, paying in o al 1,531,197,361 XOF (app ox. €2.3 million),²²
which means ha many mo e axpaye s a e eached han hose egis e ed. In
ac , hese ou s collec mo e e enue han is collec ed h ough decla a ions,
e en hough an a e age axpaye pays 52,131 XOF (app ox. €80), which is
lowe han he a e age ax paymen s made by egis e ed axpaye s.²³ S ill, he
sum o p esump i e and decla a i e axpaye s comp ises only a small sha e
o he in o mal comme cial sec o .
Despi e an inc ease in axpaye s and ax e enue unde he CGU, hey
emain low in absolu e e ms. The 2.68 illion XOF (app ox. €4.1 mil-
lion) equals 0.1% o he p ojec ed ax collec ions o 2021 o 2.56 illion
XOF (app ox. €3.9 billion), and in eal e ms, he cu en e enue does no
exceed ha o 2008 (Go lieb, 2022). Howe e , in e iews wi h ep esen a-
i es om he in o mal and o mal economies conduc ed in Ma ch 2022
sugges ha bo h smalle and la ge comme cial businesses ha e expe ienced
asigni ican inc ease in iscal bu den. Thiswas men ioned, also unp omp ed,
by se e al in e iewees (e.g. ep esen a i e CNES, Daka , 29 Ma ch 2022;
ep esen a i e om UNACOIS-JAPPO, 1 Ap il 2022).
Fo he Acomp e BIC, i was only possible o ob ain da a o he mos ecen
yea s, e en hough i has been in place since 2012. As shown in Table 12.2,
Table 12.1 CGU, 2019–2021
Regis e ed
axpaye s
Decla a ions Re enue collec ed (XOF)
2019 3,991 889,093,121
2020 5,889 1,024,570,010
2021 18,206 6,487 1,149,220,868
Sou ce: DGID (Daka , Ma ch 2022).
²² Called Paiemen s pa An icipa ion, which means ad ance paymen s bu is in p ac ice a lump-sum
paymen . Da a p o ided by he DGID (Daka , Ma ch 2022).
²³ This can be asc ibed o he legal s ipula ion o a maximum lump-sum paymen o 100,000 FCFA.

B oke ed iscal con ac s 275
Table 12.2 Acomp e su
lʼimpo a ion (XOF)
2018 7.7 billion
2019 8.4 billion
2020 9.0 billion
Sou ce: DGID (Daka , Ma ch 2022).
he e enue collec ed by his ins umen inc eased be ween 2018 and 2020.
As he PCF has only been in place since Sep embe 2021, i is s ill oo ea ly o
ob ain da a o a he ime o w i ing his chap e . One in e iewee in he
DGID called PCF ‘a s ep’ owa ds egula ing he iscal p oblem posed by
he in o mal sec o ( ax inspec o 4, Daka , 22 Ma ch 2022); ano he said
ha he p elimina y da a sugges ha he PCF is secu ing new e enue ( ax
inspec o 2, Daka , 18 Ma ch 2022), while a ep esen a i e o UNACOIS
a gued ha his was no he case (Daka , 1 Ap il 2022).
12.7 Conclusion
As elsewhe e, axa ion o he in o mal economy has ecei ed much poli i-
cal a en ion in Senegal. F om a e enue-ba gaining pe spec i e, in o mal
economy axa ion is qui e peculia : I applies o la ge pa s o he popula-
ion bu gene a es ela i ely limi ed ax e enues; axed in o mal ac o s o en
expe ience a high iscal bu den compa ed o hei means, and mos o en,
ecei e a limi ed e u n o public o semi-public goods compa ed o ac o s in
he o mal sec o (Pimhidzai and Fox, 2012;Rogan, 2022). A c i ical s and
in he ax and go e nance li e a u e ques ions he global e o o expand
in o mal economy axa ion by highligh ing equi y issues (P icha d, 2018;
Dube and Casale, 2019;Rogan, 2019), ques ioning he po en ial economic
gains (Moo e, P icha d, and Fjelds ad, 2018;Moo e, 2022), and emphasiz-
ing he complexi y o his o ical expe iences, social ins i u ions, and powe
ela ions ha such axa ion plays in o (Tendle , 2002;Kjæ , 2009;Meaghe
and Lindell, 2013;P icha d and an den Boogaa d, 2017;Meaghe , 2018).
Thischap e con ibu es o hiss ando esea chin woways.Fi s ,i illus-
a eshow ounpack hedynamicsandpoli icso in o maleconomy axa ion.
The in o mal economy comp ises many sec o s each wi h hei economic
s uc u es, each hei o ganiza ional and poli ical dynamic, and each hei
kinds and le els o axa ion.²⁴ As heo ized in Chap e 2, economic ac o s
²⁴ See e.g. Chap e 3 in his olume.
276 Ane Ka oline Bak
om di e en sec o s migh be o mo e o less iscal and poli ical impo ance
o he uling coali ion. To deepen he analysis, his chap e ocuses on one o
Senegal’smos economicallyimpo an sec o s: hein o malcomme cialsec-
o . T acing h ee decades o e enue ba gaining wi h his sec o , he chap e
demons a es he explana o y powe o his olume’s heo e ical amewo k:
om s ong and success ul esis ance agains axa ion o a b oke ed iscal
con ac wi h li le e ec i e axa ion, and, ecen ly, o an expansion in he ax
po olio and an inc eased iscal bu den el by he sec o . The e olu ion is
linked o he changing ba gaining powe and, in pa icula , shi s in he el-
a i e ba gaining posi ions o he uling eli es is-à- is he e enue p o ide s
and, in pa icula , hei b oke , UNACOIS. To my knowledge, his chap e is
he i s long- e m s udy o poli ics o axa ion in Senegal, bo h in ela ion o
he in o mal economy and b oadly.
The second majo con ibu ion o his chap e is ha i highligh s he
consequences o he b oke ed na u e o iscal con ac s be ween in o mal
economic ac o s and uling eli es. In clien elis se ings, as wi h all i e case
coun ies in his olume, i is impe a i e o conside he in luence o b oke s
in e enue ba gaining, especially when esea ching axa ion o he in o mal
economy ha includes a la ge g oup o small, o en poli ically ma ginalized,
economicac o s.He e,b oke smus balance hedi e seando encon lic ing
se s o in e es s. Fu he mo e, as an inhe en ea u e o clien elism, compe i-
ion o access o en s and side deals, also in e nally in o ganiza ions, c ea es
ensions and equen o ganiza ional agmen a ion, such as was he case
o UNACOIS.²⁵ These condi ions became de e minan o hei ba gain-
ing powe , which, in u n, had consequences o he b oke ed iscal con ac
be ween he uling eli es and Senegal’s in o mal comme cial sec o .
²⁵ Thanks o Ca he ine Boone o poin ing his ou .
12.8 Appendix
Table 12.A1 O e iew o CGU e o ms 2004–2019
2004 2006 2012 2019
Sub- egimes Two sub- egimes:
1. se ice p o ide s
2. ade s
Th ee sub- egimes:
1. se ice p o ide s
2. ade s o ood
p oduc s and cemen
3. ade s o o he
p oduc s
Th ee sub- egimes:
1. se ice p o ide s
2. ade s o ood p oduc s
and cemen
3. ade s o o he
p oduc s
Two sub- egimes:
1. se ice p o ide s
2. ade s
Th eshold Se ice p o ide s:
XOF 25,000,000
T ade s:
XOF 50,000,000
Se ice p o ide s:
XOF 25,000,000
T ade s:
XOF 50,000,000
All sub- egimes:
XOF 50,000,000 Bo h sub- egimes:
XOF 50,000,000
Numbe o u no e
b acke s Bo h sub- egimes: 20 All sub- egimes: 20 Se ice p o ide s: 5
Bo h ca ego ies o ade s: 3 Bo h sub- egimes: 1
Tax le els Se ice p o ide s:
XOF 10,000–3,000,000
T ade s:
XOF 5,000–4,200,000
Se ice p o ide s:
XOF 10,000–2,000,000
T ade s o ood p oduc s
and cemen :
XOF 5,000–1,250,000
T ade s o o he p oduc s:
XOF 5,000–1,500,000
Se ice p o ide s:
4–8%
T ade s o ood p oduc s and
cemen :
1–2.8%
T ade s o o he p oduc s:
2–3.8%
Se ice p o ide s:
5%
T ade s:
2%
278 Ane Ka oline Bak
Acknowledgemen s
I am g a e ul o commen s p o ided by Anne Me e Kjæ , Ma ianne S. Ul iksen,
Ca he ine Boone, Jessica Go lieb, Lau ence Ma aing, he Taxa ion in A ica panel
a ASA 2020,and colleagues omAa husUni e si y, heUni e si yo Sou he nDen-
ma k, and he Poli ical Se lemen s and Re enue Ba gains in A ica p ojec . Ama h
Mbaye and Mohamed Seydina Mbaye p o ided in aluable esea ch assis ance in
Senegal. Reg e ully, his p ojec did no , as ini ially planned, u n in o a join p ojec
wi h he la e P o esso Fa ou Gueye om Uni e si é Cheikh An a Diop de Daka
(UCAD). May she es in peace.
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13.1.2 Findings on p ocesses
Once e enue ba gaining is se in mo ion, how do cases o e enue ba -
gaining e ol e? We make he ollowing ou indings ha highligh how
ba gaining posi ions can change, how ba gaining p ocesses e ol e, and he
ou comes a which hey e en ually a i e: (1) o ganiza ional impo ance
ma e s mo e han po en ial e enue con ibu ions; (2) e enue ba gaining
can build c oss-sec o alliances and ba gaining powe ; (3) elec ions shi
he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o e enue p o ide s and uling eli es; and
(4) a enas o ba gaining ma e o s a egies and iscal con ac ou comes.
13.1.2.1 O ganiza ional impo ance ma e s mo e han po en ial
e enue con ibu ions
In his book, we examine in andem he in luence o e enue p o ide s’ o ga-
niza ional and iscal impo ance o hei ba gaining posi ions is-à- is he
uling eli es. O ganiza ional impo ance is igh ly associa ed wi h he con-
cep o holding powe in he poli ical se lemen heo y, and esea ch has
demons a ed how uling eli es’ need o poli ical suppo explains a ia ions
in policy ou comes ac oss coun ies and wi hin coun ies ac oss sec o s. The
powe ha ac o scangainbasedon hei iscalimpo ance o he ulingeli es
has ecei ed less a en ion in his li e a u e. We a gue ha i is necessa y o
add a e enue dimension o he concep o holding powe and emphasize
iscal impo ance as an impo an sou ce o ba gaining powe o e enue
p o ide s. This allows us o examine he impo ance ha uling eli es asc ibe
o iscal conce ns in compa ison wi h he need o poli ical suppo .
Wha we ind is ha a e enue p o ide ’s po en ial iscal con ibu ion o
he e enue base, e en when po en ially la ge, ma e s less han he e enue
p o ide ’s poli ical impo ance. Ac oss he cases o e enue ba gaining, ul-
ing eli es p o e o be keenly awa e o he ole o g oups o e enue p o ide s
as suppo ing ac ions in he uling coali ion. Fo example, he uling pa -
ies in Tanzania and Uganda e y clea ly p io i ized he pa y’s own poli ical
campaigns o e go e nmen e enue when hey allowed big businesses ax
exemp ions (Chap e 9). In Tanzania, he go e nmen also a oided p o es s
om he secu i y o ces, an impo an ac ion, by p e-emp i ely in oduc-
ing a compensa o y payou a he ime when he VAT exemp ions o a my
shops we e emo ed (Chap e 5). While he emo al o he du y- ee shops’
exemp ions ha dly imp o ed e enue mobiliza ion, he go e nmen was able
o change an unpopula and misused bene i wi hou upse ing he poli ically
impo an secu i y o ces. In Togo, he go e nmen comp omised on i s e -
enue po en ial by in ol ing he local Chie in imp o ing ax collec ion in his
a ea (Chap e 10). Tha he Chie assis ed ax collec o s om he a -away

Conclusion: The poli ics o e enue ba gaining in A ica 291
capi al, conside ed as o eigne s in he a ea, in axing he ci izens was an ap
solu ion o imp o e ax e enue; howe e , in e u n o he pe mission o
collec e enue, ax bene i s we e gi en o he Chie , a poli ical ac o well
wo h being on good e ms wi h. Fu he mo e, he case s udy om Mozam-
bique is an in e es ing, hough no uncommon, example o how he iscal
base can be manipula ed poli ically o a ou municipali ies led by he uling
pa y; hough wi h he unin ended consequence o s o ing up e enue e o s
in municipali ies led by opposi ion pa ies wi h po en ial posi i e e ec s on
local go e nance downs eam (Chap e 4).
Rein o cing hepoin ha poli icalclou ismo eimpo an han iscalmus-
cle, wo di e gen and nega i e cases o iscal con ac s demons a e wha
happens in a coun e -scena io whe e e enue p o ide s could p o ide la ge
iscal con ibu ions bu enjoy li le o ganiza ional impo ance o he ul-
ing coali ion. In Uganda, he go e nmen s ood i m agains mul ina ional
oil companies (MNCs) (Chap e 8). This was possible because oil MNCs
a e no pa o impo an domes ic ac ions whose suppo he uling eli es
dependon,whilea hesame ime, hemoney e ie ed omMNCs’wind all
axes could be used o main ain he uling coali ion. In Tanzania, a yea -
long e enue-ba gaining p ocess be ween in e na ional aid agencies and he
go e nmen o e inancing he con inua ion o a cash- ans e p og amme
endedwi h hego e nmen s illno unding hemainpa o hep og amme,
despi e i s ea lie commi men s o do so (Chap e 11). These indings a e
signi ican because o he endency o assume ha big inancial con ibu-
o s such as dono s o MNCs also enjoy conside able poli ical in luence.
These case s udies imply ha his is no necessa ily he case and demon-
s a e he need o u he esea ch on he nexus and ela i e impo ance o
in e na ional e sus domes ic ac o s in e enue ba gaining.
While ou obse a ion ha poli ics ma e s may appea sel -e iden , he
inding is ele an because o he analy ical basis om which i is de i ed.
As we disagg ega e ac o s and pay a en ion o he a ie y o poli ical, eco-
nomic, and o ganiza ional sou ces o e enue p o ide s’ ba gaining powe ,
we a e able o analyse he compa a i e signi icance o hese di e en sou ces
o powe . We can show no only ha holding powe ma e s o e enue ba -
gaining, bu also how i can change du ing he p ocess, as we elabo a e in he
ollowing sec ion.
13.1.2.2 Re enue ba gaining can build c oss-sec o alliances
and ba gaining powe
In Chap e 2, we heo ize ha he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o e enue
p o ide s is-à- is uling eli es in luence e enue ba gaining, bu s ess ha
he ba gaining posi ions should no be assumed s a ic. While i is necessa y
292 Ane Ka oline Bak, Anne Me e Kjæ , and Ma ianne S. Ul iksen
o assess he ini ial ba gaining posi ions o unde s and he condi ions unde
which e enue ba gaining eme ges, we sugges ha ba gaining powe , and
wi h i he ela i e ba gaining posi ions, is likely o shi as ba gaining p o-
cesses e ol e. This p oposi ion is con i med by he case s udies in his book.
The empi ical chap e s show ha e enue p o ide s’ ba gaining powe is
o en s eng hened as e enue ba gaining p og esses.
In some cases, ba gaining powe changed when a go e nmen ’s ini ia i e
o inc ease axa ion pushed a g oup o e enue p o ide s o coope a e be e
in o de o gain a oo hold in he nego ia ions. Fo ins ance, he ac o s in
Tanzania’s anspo sec o ha e di e se needs and demands and ha e o en
been in compe i ion wi h each o he , bu in esponse o he go e nmen ’s
push o e o m axes, hey uni ied(Chap e 5).In hecaseo he2014VATAc
in Tanzania, business associa ions and o he lobby g oups c ea ed alliances
and wo ked owa ds eshaping he VAT Ac in acco dance wi h hei own
in e es s (Chap e 6).
In o he cases, ba gaining powe was s eng hened when a a ge ed g oup
o e enue p o ide s was able o c ea e alliances wi h non-sec o s akehold-
e s o go assis ance om ex e nal o hi d pa ies. This happened in cases
whe e he e enue p o ide s p o ed hemsel es unable o mobilize su i-
cien ly o coun e o pu p essu e on he go e nmen . In he case o Ugandan
ag icul u al axes, a me s’ associa ions ini ially we e agains he announced
annulmen o VATexemp ionsonag icul u alinpu sbu wi hou muchnoise
(Chap e 7). Howe e , when aligning wi h o he associa ions such as a la ge
umb ella associa ion o ci il socie y g oups, hei ba gaining powe was
s eng hened. In Tanzania, in o mal women ade shadlong held g ie ances
bu we eonlyable oen e in odialoguewi hlocalgo e nmen o icialswhen
assis ed by ci il socie y o ganiza ions (Chap e 3).
In hese cases, he e enue p o ide s a e ac ually o ganized in ma ke asso-
cia ions, adeunions,o o he associa ions,whichin heo ybols e scapaci y
o collec i e ac ion. Howe e , o en hese o ganiza ions su e om poo
unding due o lack o paying membe s o low membe ship ees and ely
hea ilyon unding om a iousdomes ico ex e nalsponso s.Fu he mo e,
i can happen ha such o ganiza ions a e o n by con lic s among membe s
aiming o pu sue hei indi idual business in e es s. In Senegal, UNACOIS
was ini ially a acili a o o he in o mal comme cial sec o o o ganize and
esis axa ion (Chap e 12). Howe e , he di e ging in e es s be ween, on
one hand, he iches and mos in luen ial membe s, and on he o he , s ee
endo s led o o ganiza ional agmen a ion. E en ually, his weakened he
ba gaining posi ion o UNACOIS as well as he b oad g oup o e enue
p o ide s is-à- is he uling eli es. This case is ep esen a i e o a mo e
Conclusion: The poli ics o e enue ba gaining in A ica 293
gene al poin : in compe i i e clien elism, he cons an con es o access o
en s and special deals is likely o con inuously s i di isions and challenge
b oad sec o alliances, such as hose in he abo e-men ioned example o he
Tanzanian anspo sec o .
13.1.2.3 Elec ions shi he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o e enue
p o ide s and uling eli es
Elec ions a e by now egula and ins i u ionalized e en s ac oss A ica, e en
in non-democ a ic coun ies. In se e al o ou case s udies, he holding
o elec ions explici ly o implici ly a ec ed he e enue-ba gaining p ocess.
Mos no ably, we ind ha elec ions can shape he cou se o he e enue-
ba gaining p ocess by shi ing he ela i e ba gaining posi ions o e enue
p o ide s is-à- is he uling eli e. Fo ins ance, elec ions a e cos ly o he
uling eli es, as hey equi e e enue o un campaigns as well as o mobi-
lize suppo and o deli e p omised public goods (as elabo a ed in Chap e
2). A he same ime, elec ions a e poli ical windows ha may gi e disg un-
led g oups o ci izens an oppo uni y o aise hei g ie ances (as no ed in
Chap e 1; Bleck and an de Walle, 2018). This implies ha du ing elec ion
imes, heba gainingposi iono ulingeli esisweakened, whichmayp omp
hem o be mo e willing o gi e in o demands aised in e enue-ba gaining
p ocesses. In Uganda, o example, elec ions inc eased he ela i e ba gain-
ing powe o ag icul u al e enue p o ide s who had he capaci y o mobilize
o es, which mean ha a me s we e able o b ing up g ie ances du ing
elec ion campaigns, whe e hey we e mo e likely o be hea d (Chap e 7).
In bo h Uganda and Tanzania, poli ical candida es a e dependen on p i a e
dona ions o inance hei elec o al campaigns, which weakens he ba gain-
ing posi ions o candida es is-à- is he e enue p o ide s dona ing money.
These shi ing ba gaining posi ions a e likely o enable e enue p o ide s o
nego ia e a ou able ax deals a e elec ions (Chap e 9).
Ou indings esona ewi h esea cha guing ha elec ionsenhance heba -
gaining powe o o e s and can hus d i e he suspension o axes (Tendle ,
2002;Kjæ and The kildsen, 2012;P icha d, 2018;Bak and The kildsen,
2022).We add heimpo an aspec ha e enueba gaininga oundelec ions
s i sno only o e sa la ge,bu alsospeci icg oupso e enuep o ide swho
ha e he means o di ec ly p o i om compe i i e elec ions.
13.1.2.4 A enas o ba gaining ma e o s a egies and ba gaining
ou comes
In his book we ha e sough o mo e away om he imagina y ba gaining
ablebypayingpa icula a en ion o hespacesinwhich e enueba gaining
294 Ane Ka oline Bak, Anne Me e Kjæ , and Ma ianne S. Ul iksen
ac ually akes place. Re enue ba gaining akes place mainly in h ee a enas:
hepoli ical, he bu eauc a ic, and he public. In he ollowing,we desc ibe in
de ail wha hese h ee a enas look like, how hey shape e enue-ba gaining
p ocesses, and he s a egies ha he nego ia ing pa ies pu sue o na iga e
hem.
When we alk abou he poli ical a ena, we e e o o mal and in o mal
spaces alike. The o mal poli ical a ena includes pa liamen , pa liamen a y
commi ees, and cabine minis e s. The in o mal poli ical a ena e e s o
mo e exclusi e mee ings (o some imes phone calls) wi h poli icians o wi h
powe ul indi iduals who may o may no ha e an o icial pos . They can
be membe s o he p esiden ial inne ci cle o p esiden ial ad iso s. This
unde s anding closely ollows he p emise ha poli ics in clien elis poli i-
cal se lemen s is no limi ed o ei he o he wo spaces. In ac , he case
s udies show ha e enue ba gaining occu s in he wo a enas in pa allel,
and/o mo es be ween hem. Likely because he poli ical a ena is whe e
decision-making powe lies, his is whe e e enue p o ide s end o be he
mos success ul in p omo ing hei demands in e enue ba gaining.
In mos cases, e enue ba gaining occu s in he o mal poli ical a ena. In
he case o he 2014 VAT e o m in Tanzania, he business sec o s made a
conce ed e o o lobby MPs o main ain VAT exemp ions, and succeeded
o a la ge ex en in wa e ing down he e o m by hese means (Chap e 6).
Ano he example comes om he anspo and ou ism sec o s in Tanzania,
who we e only able o ge go e nmen concessions once hey had ( e-)gained
access o key poli ical commi ees and ask o ces whe e hey could p esen
hei case and hei demands (Chap e 5). In he Tanzanian example, access
o he poli ical a ena was pa ly ensu ed by building con ac s in he line
minis ies. Hence, one way o b eak in o he poli ical a ena was h ough he
bu eauc a ic one.
Though using hese o icial channels, e enue p o ide s also seek o build
and u ilize hei pe sonal connec ions o powe ul indi iduals, o en in pa -
allel. The close o he inne ci cles o he uling eli e e enue p o ide s
ge , he mo e success ul hey will be in p omo ing hei in e es s. Many e -
enue p o ide s, whe he p o es ing agains ax e o s o seeking o ob ain ax
exemp ions, y o access he p esiden di ec ly. This is a p io i y exp essed
by in e iewees engaged in ba gaining ac oss he cases. O en, hey d aw on
wha e e connec ions hey ha e o ge he p esiden ’s a en ion, ei he in o -
mally o o mally h ough o ums such as he p esiden ial ound able in
Uganda (Chap e 7). In he case whe e he Senegalese business associa ion
UNACOIS was p o es ing agains a new ax ins umen , a ep esen a i e is
quo ed in a news a icle as s a ing ha hey we e no in e es ed in mee ing
Conclusion: The poli ics o e enue ba gaining in A ica 295
ax inspec o s (Chap e 12). Ins ead, UNACOIS wan ed o alk o ele an
minis e s o , al e na i ely, he head o Senegal’s ax adminis a ion.
As a empo a y ye egula poli ical a ena, elec ions p o e o be an
impo an condi ion o e enue ba gaining. Fi s , in he angible sense
ha campaign allies and mee ings gi e o e s oppo uni ies o access and
di ec ly con on poli icians wi h conce ns o dissa is ac ions o e axa ion
(Chap e 7). Second, in he mo e nebulous sense ha poli ical candida es’
and he uling eli es’ need o campaign unding combined wi h unde -
egula ion o campaign inancing p o ides a somewha legi ima e space o
na ow, exclusi e ba gaining be ween candida es and po en ial campaign
dono s (Chap e 9).
Besides se ing as a channel h ough which o access he poli ical a ena,
as men ioned abo e, he bu eauc a ic a ena is also a space whe e e enue
ba gaining akes place. The bu eauc a ic a ena e e s o line minis ies o
o he s a e agencies. In his a ena, e enue p o ide s seek o in luence hei
ax liabili ies o o p o es a ce ain ax. They, o example, w i e le e s o
he minis e in ques ion, o con ac he au ho i y cha ged wi h collec ing a
ax o ee o wi h he legal manda e o gi e indi idual exemp ions. This was
he case when Ugandan dai y a me s p o es ed agains a ax on milk sales
(Chap e 7). Se e al o he e o ms o he in o mal sec o ax in Senegal hap-
pened h ough con inuous consul a ions be ween he ax adminis a ion and
UNACOIS, who o a ime was he main ep esen a i e o he in o mal com-
me cialsec o .I isimpo an ono e ha some imes,ou comeso ba gaining
ha akesplacein hebu eauc a ica ena iskbeingchallenged andsub e ed
as hey en e hepoli icala ena.Thee en ualdilu iono he2014VAT e o m
in Tanzania is a case in poin (Chap e 6).
When e enue ba gaining akes place in he public a ena, e enue
p o ide s and s a e ac o s communica e in he media and/o a public e en s.
This a ena is he u hes away om he uling eli e. Ou case s udies show
ha such ba gaining o en p o es unsuccess ul and can quickly u n con-
lic ual, wi h opposing pa ies ha dening hei s andpoin in hei e o s o
gain public suppo . P esiden Magu uli and his go e nmen ’s eac ion o he
MPs’ ou c y in he Tanzanian media is a clea example o his; he con lic
escala ed as he p esiden ook a ha de line (Chap e 5). In Senegal, in o -
mal ade s wen on s ike and ‘killed he economy’, i s o h ee days and
hen la e o an addi ional day, as a esponse o he pe cei ed lack o s a e
esponsi eness. This was a s a egic mo e o implica e he wide popula ion
in he e enue-ba gaining p ocess (Chap e 12). Thus, despi e enhancing
he dis ance be ween he ba gaining pa ies, he public a ena can be ins u-
men al o e enue p o ide s and s a e ac o s alike in building ba gaining

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