Alenezi, Danah Ali
A icle
US ebalance s a egy o Asia and US-China i al y in Sou h
China Sea om he pe spec i e o he o ensi e ealism
Re iew o Economics and Poli ical Science (REPS)
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Cai o Uni e si y, Cai o
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Alenezi, Danah Ali (2024) : US ebalance s a egy o Asia and US-China i al y in
Sou h China Sea om he pe spec i e o he o ensi e ealism, Re iew o Economics and Poli ical
Science (REPS), ISSN 2631-3561, Eme ald, Bingley, Vol. 9, Iss. 2, pp. 102-115,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/REPS-10-2019-0132
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US ebalance s a egy o Asia and
US-China i al y in Sou h China
Sea om he pe spec i e o he
offensi e ealism
Danah Ali Alenezi
Depa men o Economics and Poli ical Science, Cai o Uni e si y, Giza, Egyp
Abs ac
Pu pose –This s udy aims o examine he nexus o he US ebalance s a egy o Asia and he US–China
i al y in he Sou h China Sea (SCS) om he pe spec i e o he o ensi e ealism heo y.
Design/me hodology/app oach –The s udy depends on he desc ip i e app oach ha deals wi h he
analysis and desc ip ion o he phenomenon. Also, he s udy uses he quali a i e me hod o analyze he
p ima y sou ces conce ning he ebalance.
Findings –The s udy has ound ou esul s: fi s , he ebalance s a egy o Asia is a comp ehensi e
s a egy o con ain China’s ise. Second, China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS since 2008 has been he main
d i e o launching he ebalance. Thi d, o ensi e ealism p esen s a con enien analysis o unde s and he
ebalance, China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS, and he US–China i al y in he SCS. Fo h, SCS is one o he
mos impo an enues o he US–China i al y o global hegemony.
Resea ch limi a ions/implica ions –Limi ed o he pe iod om 2009 o 2016. The Obama E a.
O iginali y/ alue –This s udy highligh s he cen ali y o he SCS in he US–China global i al y ha has
no been ye well esea ched.
Keywo ds Ri al y, Global hegemony, O ensi e ealism, Rebalance o Asia
Pape ype Resea ch pape
1. In oduc ion
The implica ions o China’s ise we e g ea ly deba ed. The o ensi e ealis s con end ha
China is a e isionis powe a he han a s a us quo powe as he libe als claim. I seeks o
be a egional powe in Asia. O ensi e ealism main ains ha he balance o powe in he
in e na ional sys em in a cons an change. This change encou ages he e isionis powe o
pu sue he egional hegemony ha acili ies he global hegemony so as o secu e i s
su i al. The e o e, he o ensi e ealism holds ha he ise o a po en ial egional
hegemony would no be peace ul a all. Because he dominan powe in he in e na ional
sys em will s i e ha d o unde mine ha po en ial egional hegemony so as o secu e i s
su i al as a global dominan .
© Danah Ali Alenezi. Published in Re iew o Economics and Poli ical Science. Published by Eme ald
Publishing Limi ed. This a icle is published unde he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion (CC BY 4.0)
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legalcode
REPS
9,2
102
Recei ed 6 Oc obe 2019
Re ised 18 Decembe 2019
Accep ed 14 Janua y 2020
Re iew o Economics and Poli ical
Science
Vol. 9 No. 2, 2024
pp. 102-115
Eme ald Publishing Limi ed
e-ISSN: 2631-3561
p-ISSN: 2356-9980
DOI 10.1108/REPS-10-2019-0132
The cu en issue and ull ex a chi e o his jou nal is a ailable on Eme ald Insigh a :
h ps://www.eme ald.com/insigh /2631-3561.h m
In his speech be o e he Aus alian pa liamen on No embe 17, 2011. P esiden Obama
decla ed he ebalance s a egy o Asia. Obama desc ibed he s a egy as a b oad shi o he
USA’s a en ion om he Middle Eas o Asia-Pacific gi en he huge geos a egic
significance o he la e o he US p io i ies. Rebalance s a egy consis ed o h ee main
elemen s, economic, diploma ic and mili a y/secu i y. The la e , by which he USA will
unde ake a la ge-scale edeploymen o i s mili a y powe in Asia-Pacific and es ablish new
secu i y alliances has g ea ly sugges ed ha ebalance was designed o con ain China’s ise
in Asia. Especially, since he financial global c isis in 2008, he global balance o powe has
g adually become il ed in a o o China. On he o he hand, his shi in he balance o
powe g ea ly cla ifies why China since 2008 has ans o med i s s a egy in he Sou h
China Sea (SCS) o a clea o ensi e s a egy in which was in ensified unde p esiden Xi
Jinping.
Thus, his s udy seeks o analyze he nexus o he US ebalance s a egy o Asia and
China’s s a egy in he SCS om he pe spec i e o o ensi e ealism. In his espec , he
s udy examines whe he China is a e isionis powe o a s a us quo powe , and he
significance o he SCS in his ega d. The s udy also examines whe he he ebalance is
a con ainmen s a egy agains China’s ise, and he significance o he SCS in his
ega d oo.
2. Offensi e ealism: ideas and hypo heses
In his book, The T agedy o G ea Powe Poli ics. John Mea shime o e ed he o ensi e
ealism heo y o challenge he de ensi e ealism. While he de ensi e ealism holds ha
he main goal o s a es is o maximize i s powe o secu i y so as o secu e hei su i al.
The o ensi e ealism a fi ms ha he maximiza ion o powe is o hegemony a he
han he secu i y o secu e hei su i al in he ana chy sys em. Thus, he de ensi e ealism
has a mo e op imis ic ision han he o ensi e ealism o he in e na ional sys em because
i holds ha he secu i y is abundan .
The ocus o he o ensi e ealism only on he i al y among he g ea powe s in he
in e na ional sys em. Mea sheime (2001), he i al y among he g ea powe s o
hegemony is a cons an ea u e in he in e na ional sys em. Because o his hegemony
he bes way o secu e hei su i al (Mea sheime , 2001,p.29).In hisway, he
o ensi e ealism holds a pessimis ic ision o he in e na ional sys em. Because he
i al y among he g ea powe o hegemony is endless. Whe e he g ea powe s o ced
pe manen ly o adop o ensi e and expansionis mili a y s a egies whene e possible
o secu e hei su i al (Wong, 2016, p. 41). These s a egies would be con ainmen o
p e en i e wa s o o sho e balance o unde mine he po en ial h ea ening powe
(Goswami, 2013,p.7).
The o ensi e ealism p esen s fi e hypo heses o p o e ha he pu sui o he hegemony
is he ideal way o he g ea powe s o secu e hei su i al:
H1. The ana chy o he in e na ional sys em. The o ensi e ealism akes a mo e se e e
iew on he ana chy han he es o he ealism heo ies. Whe e he o ensi e
ealism a gues ha he absence o a cen al go e nmen in he in e na ional sys em
no only o ce he s a es o maximize hei powe bu also s imula es he s a es o
exploi any oppo uni ies o acqui e powe a he expense o he o he s a es.
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H2. G ea powe s possess some o he o ensi e mili a y capabili ies o des oy each
o he . In his ega d, he in e nal balance and he o ensi e s a egies among he
s a es a e a pe sis ed p ocess.
H3. S a es canno be absolu ely su e o he o he s’in en ions, pa icula ly wi h
possessing he o ensi e capabili ies. The o ensi e ealis s con end ha he
expec ing o a good in en ion o he o he s a es pe manen ly is un easonable and
impossible unce ain because he leade s always lie.
H4. G ea powe is a ional ac o s. Whe e he goal o su i al o ces hem o be e y
cau ious when de eloping hei o ensi e s a egies.
H5. Su i al is he main goal o he g ea powe s (Mea sheime , 2001, pp. 45-46;
Nguyen, 2018, p. 10).
In addi ion, he a o emen ioned, he hallma k o o ensi e ealism lies in i s ocus on he
balance o powe in he in e na ional sys em. Whe e i holds ha he main ai o he
balance o powe in he in e na ional sys em is he pe sis en change gi en he pe sis en
change o he s a es’capabili ies oo. Meanwhile, he o ensi e ealism main ains ha he
in e na ional sys em is ull o dissa isfied o e isionis g ea powe s in which su ely will
exploi he change o he balance o powe o challenge he dominan o achie e he global
hegemony (Mea sheime , 2001, p. 2). The e o e, he o ensi e ealis s buil hei p edic ion
abou he ine i abili y o he US–China i al y based on he u h o he balance o powe .
They hold ha he US global hegemony is excep ional and empo a y in he in e na ional
sys em. While China’s comp ehensi e capabili ies a e s eadily ising and has a powe ul
desi e o be a egional hegemony in Asia as i a e isionis powe (Goswami, 2013, p. 9). The
u h o he shi in he balance o powe g ea ly suppo s ha he ebalance is a new s age in
he i al y in he in e na ional sys em be ween he USA and China.
3. Offensi e ealism, China’s ise and he Sou h China Sea
3.1 Offensi e ealism and China’s ise
The o ensi e ealis s, including Mea sheime , paid much a en ion in hei wo k mo e han
o he s did on China’s ise and i s implica ions on he US global hegemony.
China’s ise has been much deba ed be ween he ealis s and he libe als. The main
deba e ega ding China’s ise e ol ed a ound his ques ion, does China’s ise ac ually
peace ul? While he libe als hold ha since China had accep ed o wo k wi hin he libe al
economic sys em led by he USA in he 1990s. I has become a s a us quo powe because i
finally emb aced he libe al alues, as well as he e a e many ac o s suppo peace o
China’s ise such as i s non-impe ial his o y and he peace ulness o he Con ucian
eachings. On he o he hand, he o ensi e ealis s main ain ha China’s ise would be no
peace ul because o i a e isionis powe (Teixei a, 2018, pp. 25-26). The o ensi e ealism
coun s on he his o ical na a i e o he ising powe o jus i y ha China is a e isionis
powe . Whe e he his o y indica es ha he ising powe usually is a e isionis powe seeks
o challenge he dominan such as Nazi Ge many and Japan p io o he second wo ld wa
(Bjälls and, 2014, p. 8). Acco ding o Mea sheime (2014), despi e i s libe al discou se and
he slogan o he peace ul ise. China is a e isionis powe seeks o be a egional hegemony
in Asia, and al e he balance o powe in i s a o by imposing a “Chinese Mon oe” o expel
he USA om Asia. In his espec , he also a gues ha he con inua ion o he huge a es o
china’s economy will ine i ably be ansla ed in o mili a y migh . Such migh well gal anize
China o egional hegemony in Asia comple ely. This egional hegemony will also enable
China o expand i s p esence globally, including mili a ily, e en in a eas o he USA’s s ong
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influence o p esence. Mo eo e , i will enable i o impose i s e ms on egional dispu es
(Mea sheime , 2014).
In ac , he e a e many e idences suppo Mea sheime ’s p edic ions. Fo ins ance, in
e ms o he shi in he balance o powe . A guably, he h ee decades o he g owing
economic de elopmen placed China as he second la ges economy in he wo ld. The
economic es ima ions asse ha China’s economy would be he numbe one by 2020 (Logan,
2013, p. 2). Howe e , he mos impo an ly, China since he 2000s, has been ansla ing his
economic powe o mili a y migh and global influence. Fo ins ance, China ipled i s
mili a y spending du ing he pe iod om 2000 o 2011 (Mislan, 2017). In ac , his huge
spending on mili a y powe means he comp omise he balance o powe in Asia in a o o
China. On he o he hand, i gi es an indica ion ha China ac ually seeks o be a egional
hegemony.
The asse i eness and s ic ness o China’s o eign policy, pa icula ly in he SCS since
2008, a e ano he impo an indica ion o he Mea sheime ’s p edic ions. Mo eo e , China’s
o eign policy since 2008 has become a mo e s ingen in many flashpoin s issues wi h he
USA such as clima e change, No h Ko ea, Taiwan and I an (Ande son and Cha, 2017,
pp. 605-606).
3.2 China’soffensi e s a egy in he Sou h China Sea and egional hegemony in Asia
3.2.1 Sou h China Sea and China’s egional hegemony in Asia. The o ensi e ealis s,
Mea sheime included, main ain ha China’s asse i e beha io in he SCS is he main
indica o ha China is a e isionis powe ha seeks o be a egional hegemony in Asia. In
his ein, SCS plays a i al ole in China o achie e egional hegemony.
China’s egional hegemony hea ily depends on i s economic powe . In his ein, SCS
wi h i s huge ese es o oil and na u al esou ces. In addi ion, mos o China’s ade passes
he SCS, including oil shipmen s, plays an essen ial ole in China’s egional powe (F a el,
2011, p. 296). On he o he hand, China’s s ong oo hold in he SCS secu es an expansion o
he Chinese ma i ime maneu e in he Asian seas. This expansion will enable China o
domina e he Asian economy and he ade ou es in Asia, as well as esol e i s so e eign y
dispu es, including in he Sou h and Eas China Seas based on i s own e ms. Mos
impo an ly, i will enable China o ex end i s influence beyond Asia o achie e global
hegemony (Kun ic, 2015, pp. 250-251). In addi ion, China’s na al powe ul p esence in he
SCS will g ea ly shi he o al mili a y balance o powe in China’s a o . (Rol and Agnew,
2016, p. 253). Fo hese easons, SCS is e y i al o China o achie e ull egional
hegemony. This u h is e y e iden om China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS since 2008.
3.2.2 China’soffensi e s a egy in he Sou h China Sea. China had long had a s a egy o
p ese e i s claims in he SCS. Howe e , his s a egy was p ominen ly de ensi e. In 2002,
China signed on he Decla a ion on he Conduc o he Pa ies in he SCS. In which s ipula ed
o p e en he ac ions leading o escala ing he conflic s in he SCS. A guably, since 2008,
China’s s a egy in he SCS has become p ominen ly o ensi e. Whe e i ex emely iola ed
he decla a ion h ough e y asse i e o iolen policies. Fo ins ance, in 2008 China has
dis up ed Vie nam’s oil explo a ion cables. Mo eo e , i h ea ened o he fi s ime o expel
he Ame ican oil companies ope a ing on he coas o Vie nam (DeLisle, 2016, pp. 146-147;
Widian and A imadona, 2018,p.92).
The mos impo an ly, in 2008 China has submi ed he nine-dash line map o he UN, o
a fi m i s exclusi e manda e on almos 90 pe cen o he dispu ed Islands wi h he claiman
s a es based on law ul and his o ical claims. In 2009, China has o ficially deemed he map as
i s o ficial ma i ime bounda ies in SCS (Nach e al., 2018, p. 80). B oadly speaking, he map
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has spa ked he china o ficial’s one o conside ing SCS as a “co e in e es ”since 2010, which
eflec s he co e o China’s new o ensi e s a egy in he SCS (Lan eigne, 2019).
Fu he mo e, China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS did no exclude he USA. In 2009,
Chinese essels agg essi ely maneu e ed he USNS impeccable and he USNS ic o ious
when hey we e on a ou ine su eillance ope a ion in he SCS. China wan ed h ough he
wo inciden s o challenge he Uni ed Na ions Con en ion on he Law o he Sea UNCLOS,
and he US mili a y ac i i ies in he SCS, in pa icula , he US su eillance p og am
(Co desman, 2014, p. 484; Lan eigne, 2019). In ac , China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS
since 2008 suppo s he o ensi e ealism’s accoun , especially ega ding he impac o he
change o he balance o powe on he beha io o he e isionis powe . On he o he hand,
i unde pins he o ensi e ealis s’p edic ions in which asse ha China is a e isionis
powe . In addi ion o, SCS is e y i al o China o achie e egional hegemony. The e o e,
he ebalance as a con ainmen s a egy o he dominan (USA) owa ds China is logical
acco ding o he o ensi e ealism’s accoun .
3.2.3 Xi Jinping’soffensi e s a egy in he Sou h China Sea. P esiden Xi Jinping
cons i u es a u ning poin in he his o y o China’s o eign policy. He came o he powe
bea ing an i e e sible de e mina ion o compe e o he supe io i y o he in e na ional
sys em.
Since 2013, Xi Jinping has been a emp ing o achie e he ull egional hegemony in Asia
h ough, o example, he Silk Road ini ia i e and he Asian In as uc u e In es men Bank
(A aka, 2016, p. 80). This e idence ende s he SCS is he main pilla o Xi Jinping o achie e
he egional hegemony. Mo on asse ed ha china’s endea o o he egional and global
leade ship unde Xi Jinping makes i impe a i e o he hegemony o he SCS a any cos .
Wi hou his hegemony, o ins ance, China would ha e no a global na al powe , which
essen ial o China o be a supe powe (Mo on, 2016, p. 910). Tha is, why; Xi Jinping has
adop ed a e y o ensi e s a egy in he SCS embodied in h ee e y asse i e and
expansionis policies:
3.2.3.1 Expansion o China’s ma i ime p esence and in ensi e powe p ojec ion in he
Sou h China Sea. The fi s clea indica ion o China o expand i s ma i ime p esence in he
SCS was disclosed in he China de ense whi e pape The Di e sified Employmen o China’s
A med Fo ces o 2013. In which s ipula ed ha China’s ma i ime o ces mus expand hei
asks and s a egies o p o ec China’s so e eign ma i ime in e es s (The Di e sified
Employmen o China’s A med Fo ces, 2013). China’s Mili a y S a egy o 2015. Has also
e ealed China’s endea o o a wide ma i ime p esence in he SCS o p o ec i s co e
so e eign ma i ime in e es s (China’s Mili a y S a egy, 2015). In ac , he wo documen s
ha e shown Chinese de e mina ion o “unde mine he US na al p esence o de e i om
u he in e en ion on China’s so e eign islands in he SCS, which is ein o ced by a
ebalancing s a egy”(Boje, 2016, p. 35). Tha is why in 2013 China has es ablished an ai
de ense iden ifica ion zone on Senkaku Island. (Ham e al., 2016, pp. 13-14). Also, in
Decembe China had sen o he fi s ime ai c a ca ie Liaoning in he SCS. In he same
yea , China issued a dec ee o assemble all he na al en i ies in one adminis a i e body
di ec ly supe ised by he go e nmen (B ode ick, 2015, p. 6). Fu he mo e, In Feb ua y
2016, China had se up Ad anced HQ-9 su ace- o-ai missiles in he dispu ed Island Woody
in he SCS. In May and Augus 2016, China held wo majo mili a y exe cises in he SCS o
powe p ojec ion. Mo eo e , China inc eased he dozens o comba essels and pa ol ships
in he SCS o a mo e domina ion and powe p ojec ion (Ande sen and Pe y, 2017, pp. 25-27;
Babbage, 2017, p. 20).
3.2.3.2 Bullying and imposi ion o de ac o policy. Bullying agains he dispu ed s a es
like p e en ing hei ships om fishing and he ope a ing ac i i ies in he dispu ed islands;
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has become since 2013 a delibe a ed app oach by China o impose i s so e eign y on i s
claims in he SCS as de ac o (Zhang, 2017, pp. 443-444). Howe e , he mos dange ous
bullying o China was agains he in e na ional law, when i ejec ed on he ule o he
Pe manen Cou o A bi a ion, in he SCS case on July 12, 2016, which comple ely nullified
china’s his o ical and legal claims in he SCS, pa icula ly unde he nine-dashed map. The
cou issued a unanimous decision unde UNCLOS. Thus, China’s esponse o he decision
has confi med i s high a ogance agains in e na ional legi imacy and law, whe e i
conside ed he decision is null and no binding o China. I is wo h o no e ha China signed
on UNCLOS in 1992, and claims ha i is a esponsible s a e in he in e na ional communi y
(F ench, 2017, pp. 49-53).
3.2.3.3 Reclama ion and build he a ificial islands. Reclama ion and build he a ificial
islands o he expansionis policy is he mos dange ous policy o china o igh en i s con ol
o e he dispu ed islands o a bes o s eng hen i s so e eign y claims unde he nine-
dashed map. The expansionis policy conside s also kind o bullying and he imposi ion o
de ac o policy. Howe e , China usually jus ifies i unde se e al p e ex s. Fo ins ance, he
dispu ed s a es, especially he Philippines, Vie nam and Malaysia ha e also unde aken
eclama ion ac i i ies. Anyhow, since 2013, China unde ook unp eceden ed eclama ion
ac i i ies, especially on Sp a ly and Pa acel a olls. Du ing 2013-2015 China has managed o
eclaim mo e han 3,200 ac es o he co al ee s in Sp a ly and o he a olls o o ming mega
a ificial islands. Mos impo an ly, China uses hese a ificial islands o upg ade i s mili a y
si ua ion in SCS. Whe e since 2015, i has p oceeded o supply he a ificial Islands wi h
ad anced mili a y capabili ies such as ada s, an i-ai c a and ai s ips (Lunn and Lang,
2016, pp. 14-16; Zhang, 2017, pp. 445-446; B ode ick, 2015, p. 5). The u h is ha Xi Jinping’s
o ensi e s a egy in he SCS has shown ha SCS plays an impo an ole in his endea o o
egional hegemony. On he o he hand, his s a egy p o es ha SCS ac ually he co e o he
US–China i al y o global hegemony. Thus, ebalance g ea ly ocused on unde mining
China’s s a egy in he SCS.
4. Rebalance, China’s ise and he Sou h China Sea
4.1 Rebalance and China’s ise
The ques ion o he ebalance as a con ainmen s a egy di ec ed o China’s ise has been
much deba ed. In his discou se be o e he Aus alian pa liamen on No embe 17, 2011,
Obama s essed on a cons uc i e ela ionship wi h China wi hin he ebalance he also
welcomed o he peace ul ise o China (Obama, 2011). Hilla y Clin on also asse ed ha in
he a icle in o eign a ai s magazine Oc obe 2011 (Clin on, 2011). Pane a in Decembe
2012 penned an impo an a icle abou he ebalance in which he emphasized he iews ha
a gue he ebalance is mainly o con ain China a e no sound whe e he cons uc i e and
s able mili a y ela ionship wi h China is essen ial wi hin ebalance (Pane a, 2012). I seems
ha he US o ficials a emp ed as much as possible o deny ha he ebalance is a
con ainmen s a egy. Ne e heless, when conside ing he ime and he loca ion o he
ebalance, as well as i s ocus on he huge edeploymen o he US mili a y powe in Asia-
Pacific, and o ming o new secu i y alliances. We find ha he ebalance is a con ainmen
s a egy agains China’s ise, acco ding o he logic and p edic ions o o ensi e ealism.
The o ensi e ealism holds ha he shi in he balance o powe s imula es he
e isionis powe o achie e he egional hegemony in which impe a i e o he global
hegemony. Con e sely, he exis ing dominan will s i e s ongly o unde mine he
e isionis powe ’s endea o o be a egional hegemony. In his ein, he o ensi e ealism
a gues ha p ac ically he global hegemony as a physical o mili a y expansion is
impossible o be achie ed by any supe powe . Howe e , he g ea powe s can secu e he
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supe io i y in he in e na ional sys em h ough achie ing he ull egional hegemony in i s
egional su oundings, as well as wo ks s ongly and pe manen ly o p e en any po en ial
powe o be a egional hegemony. In ac , he p e ious analysis g ea ly explains he ime
and he loca ion o he ebalance, hence, he ebalance is a con ainmen s a egy agains
China’s ise. Whe e i s loca ion in Asia in which China since 2008 has been a emp ing o
domina e i because o he shi in he balance o powe . F om his obse a ion o US his o y,
Mea sheime a gues ha he USA did no absolu ely accep a egional hegemony. I
a emp ed s ongly o unde mine i o p ese e i s global posi ion. Fo ins ance, he US
in e ened in he Second Wo ld Wa o unde mine Nazi Ge many and Japan. Likewise, i
adop ed a con ainmen s a egy o unde mine he So ie Union’s powe . Thus, he asse s
ha he USA will ne e accep ha China is a egional hegemony in Asia and will a emp
s ongly o con ain o unde mine i in Asia (Mea sheime , 2001,p.4;Mea sheime , 2014). In
his espec , DOD documen : Sus aining US Global Leade ship: P io i ies o 21s Cen u y
De ense o 2012. Has ied be ween he Asia-Pacific and he con inua ion o US global
leade ship, as well as e e ed o China as a po en ial i al ha comp omises he US
economic and secu i y in e es s in Asia (DOD, Sus aining US Global Leade ship, 2012).
Addi ionally, he Na ional Secu i y S a egy o 2015. Has acknowledged he compe i ion
wi h China in which en ails he con inua ion o US s ong leade ship h ough enhancing he
US mili a y p esence (Na ional Secu i y S a egy o he Uni ed S a es o Ame ica, 2015).
As o , he mili a y/secu i y elemen o he ebalance, i has also consis en wi h he
o ensi e ealism’s logic ega ding he balance s a egies o he g ea powe s. The o ensi e
ealism cha ac e izes he balance in which he balance bea s di ec ly he bu den o
main aining he balance o powe . This s a egy e y clea in he huge mili a y
edeploymen o he ebalance o unde mine China’s ise. On he o he hand, he o ensi e
ealism indica es o he o sho e balancing, in which he balance o ges wide alliances o
balancing and comba wi h he h ea ening powe i necessa y. This s a egy e y clea also
om he la ge scale o he US secu i y alliances ha included he mos Asian coun ies
hos ile o China like India, and he SCS coun ies. In ac , Mea sheime p edic ed o he US
o sho e balancing because o he g owing ea s o he Asian coun ies om China’s ise
(Mea sheime , 2001, pp. 156-157; Mu ay, 2015, p. 11; Sco , 2018, p. 20). The e o e, he
mili a y/secu i y elemen o he ebalance clea ly a ge ed o unde mine China’s ise in Asia,
especially i s mili a y powe and p esence. In his ein, Cohen and Wa d (2013), con end ha
China’s ising powe , especially i s mili a y powe will ine i ably lead o weaken he US
supe io i y in Asia, acco dingly i s global hegemony. Acco ding o hem, he US ma i ime
powe wi hin ebalance is he basic o con ain china (Cohen and Wa d, 2013). Ross (2012)
also a gues ha i is a e y clea ha he mili a y/secu i y axis o ebalance gea ed o
con ain China’s ise. Indeed, he g owing ise o China in Asia has la gely doubled he
suspicions o he US’s allies abou he US’s eadiness o abili y o ace China (Ross, 2012).
Agains he backd op, we can conclude ha he ebalance is ac ually a con ainmen s a egy
gea ed o China’s ise. Howe e , he mos impo an ly in his ega d is o ocus on he
s a egic significance o he SCS o he US global hegemony. In ac , SCS g ea ly explains
he nexus o he US global hegemony and ebalance.
4.2 Sou h China Sea and US global hegemony
As no ed ea lie , China’s domina ion in he SCS is impe a i e o achie e he egional
hegemony, especially unde Xi Jinping. Howe e , o he USA, unde mining China’s
ambi ions in he SCS does no only lie only in p e en ing China om being a egional
hegemony bu also he mos impo an ly is o p ese e i s global hegemony. This logic,
which he au ho ag ees wi h, sugges s ha China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS since 2008
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has been he bigges mo e o he Obama adminis a ion o launch he ebalance. In 2009,
Je ey Bade s a ed China’s ema kable escala ion in he SCS o ces he USA o de elop a
new comp ehensi e policy in Asia (F a el, 2014, pp. 4-5). Fu he mo e, in 2012, he US–
China Economic and Secu i y Re iew Commission indica ed ha he Chinese p essu es o
impose i s p i a e in e p e a ion on he eedom o na iga ion in he SCS would unde mine
he US mili a y p esence in Asia (S e ens, 2013,p.99).
US has long been enjoying a ma i ime supe io i y in he SCS. Also, i jus ifies his na al
p esence based on he p inciple o he eedom o na iga ion o UNCLOS. Indeed, his
supe io i y secu es o he USA a lo o i al s a egic in e es s essen ial o p ese e i s global
hegemony. Economically, he SCS ep esen s one o he main passage o US comme ce in
which an es ima ed one billion annually. On he o he hand, he SCS con ains huge ese es
o oils, gas and na u al esou ces. Addi ionally, he SCS coun ies a e a big ma ke o US
goods and in es men s. On he s a egic and mili a y le el, he SCS is a i al passage o he
US mili a y ships o a el o he mos impo an si es o Ame ican influence and in e es s
such as he Indian Ocean, he A abian Gul and Cen al Asia. Fu he mo e, he US powe ul
p esence in he SCS secu es o con ain i s po en ial ad e sa ies o compe i o s such as
Russia, India and China o cou se. Addi ionally, he USA has o he significan in e es s in
he SCS, such as, p ese ing i s secu i y commi men s o i s allies in pa icula , Japan and
Sou h Ko ea, as well as con aining he adicalism (Gonçal , 2018, p. 29; Hussain and
Tabbasum, 2014, pp. 4-5; F a el, 2014, pp. 2-3).
The p e ious ac s, significan ly unde pins why China’s o ensi e s a egy in he SCS
cons i u es he bigges h ea o he US global hegemony. Hence, he ebalance was launched
on his basis. The e a e analyses ejec ing on his logic. Fo ins ance, Shulong (2014)
con ends ha he escala ing si ua ion in he SCS since 2008 has been jus he US’s p e ex o
jus i y he ebalance o con ain China’s ise (Shulong, 2014). Howe e , in all cases, i was
des ined o he SCS o be c ucial o he US–China i al y o he global hegemony.
5. Elemen s o ebalance and China con ainmen
5.1 Mili a y elemen
5.1.1 Expand and edeploymen o he US ma i ime powe in he eas and wes o Asia. The
ma i ime powe has cons i u ed he co e o he mili a y s a egy o ebalancing. In he
con ex o launching he ebalance, he head o he US na al powe , Admi al Jona han
G eene , has highligh ed h ee main asks o he US na al: fi s , deploymen and s a ioning
o a mo e o he na al uni s in Asia-pacific. Second, p omo ing he capabili ies o hese uni s
o be p epa ed o any upcoming wa . Finally, enhance he na al mili a y coope a ion wi h
he allies in Asia-Pacific, as well as es ablish new o he pa ne ships (Fu gacz, 2014,
pp. 107-108). The fi s phase o he expanding ma i ime deploymen in Asia-Pacific was he
edeploymen o he US ma ine co ps in he Aus alian s a egic bases o e looking he
Pacific Ocean in 2011. In addi ion, s a ioning se o new comba essels in Singapo e’s coas
(Sou hga e, 2017, p. 5). Also, wi hin he ebalance, DOD e-p ocessed subma ines in he
Indian Ocean, Sou h Ko ea and he Philippines o be eady o “c uise missile a ack
su aced”(Su e e al.,2013, p. 7).
Du ing he Annual Shang i-La Dialogue June 2012, sec e a y o de ense, Leon Pane a,
s a ed ha “in he con ex o ebalance, he US ma i ime will be edeployed be ween he
A lan ic and Pacific Ocean 60/40 pe cen in a o o he Pacific by 2020, ins ead o he
p e ious 50/50 pe cen o bo h.”He also added, “in he coming yea s, he DOD will inc ease
o numbe s o ai c a s, subma ines, comba essels and he numbe s o na al maneu e s in
he Pacific”(Pane a, 2012). I seems om Pane a’s s a emen s ha he aim is o unde mine
any po en ial g ow h o China’s ma i ime p esence in he Pacific, as well as he SCS. In
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