Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study

Schnelle, Tim
A icle — Published Ve sion
Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional
change? A compa a i e s udy
Cons i u ional Poli ical Economy
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Sp inge Na u e
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Schnelle, Tim (2024) : Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change?
A compa a i e s udy, Cons i u ional Poli ical Economy, ISSN 1572-9966, Sp inge US, New Yo k, NY,
Vol. 36, Iss. 3, pp. 376-399,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
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ORIGINAL PAPER
Cons i u ional Poli ical Economy (2025) 36:376–399
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1
Abs ac
I has o en been claimed ha i cons i u ions a e no complied wi h, hey will be
changed. Because an ine ec i e cons i u ional con ac is a bad con ac , a lack
o en o cemen should induce cons i u ional e o m. This pape empi ically es s
his conjec u e based on a da ase o 170 coun ies om 1950 o 2018. The esul s
indica e ha he size o he de ju e/de ac o gap has no e ec on he likelihood o
cons i u ional change as such. Howe e , a e di e en ia ing be ween amendmen s
and eplacemen s as dis inc modes o cons i u ional e o m, he esul s imply ha
non-compliance obus ly inc eases he p obabili y o cons i u ional eplacemen
only. This ela ionship is p ima ily d i en by an implemen a ion gap ega ding po-
li ical and ci il igh s. Expec ed mode a ing e ec s o in e pe sonal us and ci il
socie y o ganiza ions as ca alys s o success ul ci il e o m mo emen s canno
be empi ically suppo ed. O e all, his has impo an consequences o he w i e s
o u u e cons i u ions. I e o me s desi e longe i y o hei new cons i u ional
amewo k, hey mus be awa e ha u opian p omises may back i e by p o oking
a quick eplacemen o hei ules.
Keywo ds Cons i u ional change · Cons i u ional compliance · De ju e-de ac o
gap · Collec i e ac ion
JEL classi ica ion H11 · H73 · K10 · K42 · O57 · P48 · P51
Accep ed: 20 June 2024 / Published online: 25 July 2024
© The Au ho (s) 2024, co ec ed publica ion 2024
Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional
change? A compa a i e s udy
TimSchnelle1
Tim Schnelle
[email p o ec ed]
1 Uni e si y o Hambu g, Hambu g, Ge many
1 3
Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
1 In oduc ion
Du abili y is o en conside ed o be a de ining ai o cons i u ions (Raz, 1998).
Howe e , hese documen s a e subs an ially sho e -li ed han many would assume
(Lo enz & Seemann, 2009). Fo ins ance, he Dominican Republic al eady li es unde
i s 34 h sup eme law. In gene al, he a e age li e expec ancy o na ional cons i u ions
is only 19 yea s (Elkins e al., 2009). O he cons i u ions – such as ha o India,
which is mo e han 70 yea s old – may exis o long pe iods o ime bu a e amended
so o en ha hey basically es ablish a di e en legal sys em han ha o which hey
ini ially laid he g oundwo k (Albe , 2019). Bu why do some cons i u ions emain
subs an ially unchanged o decades while o he s a e equen ly amended o h own
ou al oge he ? Few s udies ha e quan i i ely analyzed his ques ion and in es iga ed
he de e minan s o cons i u ional change on a la ge scale (Hayo & Voig , 2010).
Mo eo e , he exis ing esea ch p ima ily emphasizes he e ec s o speci ic ins i u-
ions (e.g. judicial e iew) o ex e nal e en s (e.g. a med con lic s) on cons i u ional
e o m (Neg e o, 2017). This pape add esses his sho coming by in es iga ing a
u he de e minan ha may se e o induce cons i u ional change – namely, ha o
non-compliance.1
Cons i u ional compliance is i sel a concep ha only ecen ly en e ed he sci-
en i ic deba e in compa a i e cons i u ional economics (Voig , 2021). I is usually
de ined as he de ju e/de ac o gap be ween o mal cons i u ional gua an ees and hei
ac ual implemen a ion (Gu mann e al., 2024; also see Law & Ve s eeg, 2013). Mos
o he exis ing empi ical esea ch on his opic analyzes ac o s conduci e o compli-
ance which is o en jus i ied in e ms o economic p ospec s o human igh s p o ec-
ion (Gu mann e al., 2021). Howe e , non-compliance may also ha e signi ican
poli ical e ec s beyond ha o poo igh s en o cemen . Mos impo an ly, en o ce-
men could be a necessa y condi ion o – o a leas a p omo o o – cons i u ional
s abili y (Ginsbu g e al., 2009). As Dennis Muelle o mula es i : “I i becomes
appa en ha i [ he ideal o a sel -en o cing con ac ] has no been achie ed, [ hen]
he ci izens can exe cise hei ul ima e so e eign y and ew i e he cons i u ional con-
ac ” (Muelle , 1996, p. 72–73). Simila ly, Weingas (2006) s a es ha i execu i es
egula ly ansg ess hei legal bounda ies, hen cons i u ions will be changed. This
pape aims o empi ically es his es ablished conjec u e.
The pape is s uc u ed in six sec ions. Following he in oduc ion, he second sec-
ion e iews he exis ing li e a u e on cons i u ional change and compliance. Sec ion
h ee es ablishes he pape ’s heo e ical ounda ions, om which he hypo heses o
be es ed a e de i ed. Sec ion ou desc ibes he da a and es ima ion app oach, while
he esul s o his analysis a e p esen ed in sec ion i e. Finally, sec ion six concludes
and de i es possible implica ions o u u e cons i u ion-make s.
1 The e ms o mal and w i en cons i u ion a e used in e changeably and de ine he de ju e cons i u ion
o a coun y. Bo h cons i u ional change and compliance e e o he o mal cons i u ion only as his is he
only e e ence poin he wo concep s can easonably be applied o in an empi ical analysis. Acco dingly,
h oughou his pape “cons i u ional change” exclusi ely e e s o changes made o he w i en ex o a
cons i u ion.
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377
T. Schnelle
2 Li e a u e Re iew
2.1 Compa a i e cons i u ional change
As o now, he e is no empi ical esea ch explici ly connec ing cons i u ional compli-
ance and change. Hence, his sec ion is di ided in o wo sepa a e o e iews o he
exis ing li e a u e. The i s p esen s analyses o cons i u ional change, eplacemen ,
and amendmen . The second pa summa izes he empi ical li e a u e on cons i u-
ional compliance.
A guably, he seminal con ibu ion ega ding he de e minan s o cons i u ional
endu ance is om Elkins e al. (2009). Dis inguishing be ween design and en i-
onmen al ac o s hey ind ha inclusi eness, lexibili y, and speci ici y leng hen
cons i u ional li e. Ex e nal e en s only ha e a modes impac on he haza d o
eplacemen . Some excep ions a e neighbo ing cons i u ional e en s, egime ansi-
ions, and ex a-cons i u ional leade ship changes, all ha ing a nega i e e ec on a
cons i u ion’s longe i y. Clea ly inspi ed by his s udy, Neg e o (2012) ollows a
simila empi ical app oach and ocuses on one o he global “ho spo s” o cons i-
u ional change, i.e. La in Ame ica. Mo eo e , he is he i s o sys ema ically di -
e en ia e be ween eplacemen s and amendmen s in a la ge-N s udy. He inds ha
eplacemen s a e mo e likely in he case o cons i u ional c ises, i he igidi y o he
documen p e en s change h ough amendmen , and i he poli ical sys em concen-
a es powe in a small numbe o posi ions. The p obabili y ha an amendmen will
be adop ed inc eases along wi h he leng h and de ail o he cons i u ional ex . Mo e-
o e , amendmen s become mo e likely i a low igidi y o amendmen ules is pai ed
wi h a low deg ee o pa y agmen a ion. Hence, he choice be ween amendmen
and eplacemen is mainly a unc ion o o mal (in-) lexibili y and he ype o shock.
While ce ain e en s call o a cons i u ional e-s a , p essu es caused by in e nal
shi s o powe a e usually sol ed h ough amendmen .
In addi ion o Neg e o’s s udy, cons i u ional amendmen s ha e ecei ed a en-
ion by a hos o o he schola s (Jensen e al., 2022; Lu z, 1994; Lo enz, 2005; Tse-
belis, 2021). Mos p ominen ly, a ple ho a o s udies has sough o de elop a single
quan i a i e index o cons i u ional igidi y (Ancka & Ka onen, 2002; Lijpha ,
2012; Lu z, 1994; Tsebelis, 2021). Un o una ely, hei esul s a e mixed, and he p o-
posed indices a e a ely applicable ou side he con ex o which hey we e de eloped
(Lo enz, 2005). The only obus ly con i med de e minan o amendmen equency
is he leng h o he documen (Fe ejohn, 1997; Lu z, 1994; Tsebelis & Na di, 2016).
The incapabili y o empi ically es and con i m a mo e complex heo y o amend-
men led Albe (2019) o he conclusion ha any e o o quan i y amendmen ease
mus necessa ily ail. Ne e heless, wo ecen s udies ad en u ed new a emp s om
di e en di ec ions. On he one hand, Tsebelis (2021) inc eased complexi y by con-
s uc ing an index based on e o-playe heo y. A ailable o 49 coun ies, his index
no only inco po a es all acks o amendmen bu also he con igu a ion o poli ical
pa ies. On he o he hand, Ginsbu g and Mel on (2015) abandon he ins i u ional
app oach al oge he and a gue ha i is simply he “amendmen cul u e” which is he
undamen al d i e o he ac ual amendmen a e. Bo h s udies ind empi ical suppo
o hei espec i e a gumen s, which u he muddies he wa e . O e all, his pe sis-
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
en he e ogenei y in esul s sugges s ha Rasch’s (2003) wen y-yea -old diagnosis
is s ill co ec – he empi ical ela ionship be ween amendmen ease and he ac ual
a e o in a-cons i u ional change is indeed e y enuous.
Focusing on changes o one speci ic o mal ins i u ion, Hayo and Voig (2010)
s udy he o m o go e nmen . D awing om c oss-sec ional da a o 169 coun-
ies hey ind ha geog aphical ac o s and colonial his o y a e cen al p edic o s
o changes in he o m o go e nmen . Mo eo e , hey iden i y se e al a iables
including pa y compe i ion, knowledge di usion, a med con lic s, and he ex en
o democ a iza ion, ha explain such shi s. In a ollow-up pape he same au ho s
ind ha he likelihood o a swi ch owa ds p esiden ialism is especially high when
a leade dies o na u al causes while in o ice o e i es due o illness (Hayo & Voig ,
2013).
2.2 Cons i u ional compliance
While he ield o compa a i e cons i u ional change has ecei ed sizable a en ion
o e he las 20 yea s, sys ema ic esea ch on compliance wi h cons i u ional ules
is s ill in i s in ancy (Voig , 2021). This is su p ising because ew coun ies ac ually
mee he high s anda ds p omised in hei cons i u ion while i is also known ha de
ac o ins i u ions ma e mo e o he ac ual e ec s on e.g. economic ou pu han he
de ju e ex (Feld & Voig , 2003; Voig e al., 2015).
The i s pape ho oughly desc ibing he gap be ween cons i u ional ex and
eali y is om Law and Ve s eeg (2013), who clus e coun ies acco ding o hei
cons i u ional comp ehensi eness and igh s implemen a ion. While he e a e some
democ a ic o e pe o me s like Aus alia ha e ec i ely deli e mo e igh s han
hey o mally p omise, he g oup o unde pe o me s o “sham cons i u ions” exclu-
si ely coun s non-democ a ic egimes.
Since hen, mos o he li e a u e has ea ed cons i u ional compliance as a depen-
den a iable. Ginsbu g e al. (2011) s udy he obse ance o cons i u ional e m
limi s. They expec hese ules o be mo e s enuously complied wi h han o he
p o isions, because hey de ine clea ocal poin s which should be simple o he
ci izens o iden i y and he e o e make public coo dina ion agains eneging poli ical
au ho i ies easie . They ind some e idence ha e m limi s a e indeed complied wi h
mo e eliably han o he p ocedu al ules, a leas in consolida ed democ acies. Ye ,
hey also show ha among hose leade s eaching hei o mally de ined e m limi ,
mo e han 20% o e s ay. Following a simila a ionale, a pape on cons i u ional
budge cons ain s shows ha anspa ency and moni o ing inc ease hei e ec i e-
ness (Blume & Voig , 2013). Fu he mo e, se e al s udies indica e ha shock e en s
like a med con lic s and success ul coups dec ease compliance (Chou agun a e al.,
2024; Gu mann & Voig , 2023; Me elska-Szaniawska, 2021). Ye ano he po en ial
de e minan o compliance s udied by Gu mann e al. (2023) a e he indi idual cha -
ac e is ics o poli ical leade s. Acco ding o hei analysis o 943 poli ical leade s
be ween 1950 and 2010, educa ion, poli ical expe ience, mili a y backg ound, he
way o en y in o o ice and membe ship in ex eme le -wing pa ies all a ec he
de ju e/de ac o gap obse ed in hei sample. In an a emp o iden i y possible sa e-
gua ds agains cons i u ional backsliding and p o ec coun ies om poo leade ship,
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T. Schnelle
Gu mann and Voig (2023) ind ha only ew p o isions can e ec i ely de e leade s
om eneging. Acco ding o hei main model including 157 coun ies, he deg ee o
espec o he cons i u ion is la gely de e mined by he egula i y o en ance in o
go e nmen and he p e ious le el o compliance. In ano he s udy, Gu mann e al.
(2021) show ha deeply en enched cul u al aspec s co ela e wi h he size o he
cons i u ional implemen a ion gap. In pa icula , mo e indi idualis ic and less hie a -
chical socie ies end o expe ience signi ican ly highe le els o compliance.
While i emains con es ed which speci ic ins i u ions a e mos salien o acili a -
ing compliance, wo desc ip i e pa e ns seem o be well es ablished. Fi s ly, democ-
acy clea ly has a posi i e e ec on he o e all le el o compliance (e.g. Gu mann &
Voig , 2023; Me elska-Szaniawska, 2021). These indings squa e wi h he desc ip i e
clus e ing by Law and Ve s eeg in o o e pe o ming democ a ic and sham au ho i a -
ian cons i u ions. Simila ly, na ion-s a ehood is posi i ely ela ed o cons i u ional
compliance (G ajzl e al., 2024). Secondly, Chil on and Ve s eeg (2015) ind ha
g oup igh s a e mo e likely o be implemen ed han indi idual igh s. Thei p oposed
explana ion holds ha in he case o cons i u ional iola ion, ba ie s o collec i e
ac ion a e lowe among al eady o ganized in e es g oups, he eby inc easing he
expec ed cos s o non-compliance o execu i es.
Gi en he di e si y o s udies men ioned abo e, i seems ha we al eady ha e a
a he sophis ica ed unde s anding o he de e minan s o he de ju e/de ac o gap
wi h ega d o cons i u ional igh s (Voig , 2021). Howe e , li le is known abou he
e ec s o cons i u ional compliance. While he e a e a gumen s connec ing compli-
ance wi h lowe unce ain y ega ding he expec ed beha io o poli ical au ho i ies
which should lead o highe in es men and be e economic de elopmen (Gu mann
e al., 2021; Voig , 2021), he poli ical e ec s o a widening de ju e/de ac o gap ha e
no ga ne ed signi ican a en ion. This pape a emp s o shed some ligh on his
empi ical blind spo .
3 Theo y
3.1 Non-compliance and e o m
Cons i u ional non-compliance is usually unde s ood as he gap be ween ex and
eali y (Voig , 2021). No e, ha compliance is hus no synonymous o he ule o
law. B oadly unde s ood, he la e p inciple demands ha he same ules apply o all
membe s o socie y. I , howe e , a cons i u ion allows o unequal ea men o di -
e en gende s, compliance can s ill be high, bu ule o law would clea ly be iola ed
(Gu mann e al., 2021). Hence, compliance is a pu ely desc ip i e concep cap u ing
he de ju e/de ac o gap a he cons i u ional le el.
The idea o linking compliance o cons i u ional s abili y (as opposed o cons i u-
ional change) is no no el bu has been an implici assump ion in many heo e ical
deba es. Fo ins ance, Weingas (2005) no es ha cons i u ions ail whe e poli icians
all sho o he p omises made in he cons i u ion and iola e ci izens’ igh s. Conse-
quen ly, cons i u ions a e likely o be changed unless hey e ec i ely de e he execu-
i e om ansg essing he law. Simila ly, i has been a gued ha some cons i u ions
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
li e longe han o he s because hey a e sel -s abilizing in ha hey “c ea e incen i es
o all ele an ac o s o abide by he ules” (Jacobi e al., 2015, p. 601).
One way o a ionalize hese conjec u es is o apply he compliance amewo k
de eloped by Voig (2021). In his cos -bene i model, compliance is a unc ion o he
incen i es aced by an execu i e. The incen i e s uc u e is de e mined by he p es-
ence o e o playe s (legisla u e, cou s e c.), he na ional public and o eign ac o s.
When making decisions, execu i es weigh he bene i s and cos s o non-compliance
– conside a ions ha a e shaped by con ex ual ac o s and, c i ically, by cons i u-
ional design. Hence, a la ge gap be ween cons i u ional ex and de ac o implemen-
a ion indica es ha he cu en p o isions impose insu icien cos s on a eneging
go e nmen . The in ui i e esponse o his issue would be o sha pen hose p o isions
by ew i ing he cons i u ion (see Muelle , 1996; Weingas , 2006).2
Con e sely, one migh a gue ha non-compliance as such need no induce cons i-
u ional change. Fi s , cons i u ional e o m can be a e y di icul ask. The ecen
his o y o Chile shows ha e en when he e is widesp ead ag eemen on he need
o change, dispu e o e i s subs ance can s ill p e en success. While in a plebisci e
in Oc obe 2020 a as majo i y (78%) o Chilean o e s ag eed o eplace he 1980
Pinoche cons i u ion, he i s d a was ejec ed by 62% o he people in a e e en-
dum in 2022 (La ain e al., 2023). Second, i he ele an ac o s a e able o ag ee on a
di e en implici se o ules o a c i ical g oup bene i s om a eneging go e nmen ,
he e is oom o an “equilib ium” wi h low compliance and no cons i u ional change.
This a gumen may be explici ly ele an o au ho i a ian egimes, whe e cons i u-
ions a e p ima ily used as ools o “window-d essing” is-à- is he in e na ional
communi y while he ac ual ules o he poli ical game a e implici (Ginsbu g, 2020a;
Ginsbu g & Simpse , 2014). Thi d, compliance is only pa ially a consequence o
“bad go e nmen ”. The p e iously ci ed li e a u e sugges s ha many con ex ual ac-
o s like colonial o igin, con lic s, and cul u e a ec he compliance le el. Mo eo e ,
cons i u ions may simply become ou da ed due o social changes wi hin socie y. In
hese cases, non-compliance could be a popula ly suppo ed al e na i e o cons i u-
ional change. I amendmen ules a e oo igid and eplacemen is no easible op ion
o symbolic easons, non-compliance may be a subs i u e o cons i u ional change
a he han a de e minan he eo (Huq & Ginsbu g, 2018).
Despi e hese conce ns, he e is some hing o he idea o connec ing o mal cons i-
u ional change wi h a lack o law en o cemen – e en i he link be ween non-compli-
ance and e o m may no be as di ec as sugges ed and in ol e mul iple mechanisms.
Addi ionally, Congle on (2011) al eady ound some quali a i e e idence among
Wes e n democ acies o an e olu iona y endency owa d e icien Cons i u ional-
ism whe e poo design choices o he pas ha e subsequen ly been eplaced. The e
2 To each a highe le el o compliance, e o me s could also simply emo e hose cons i u ional p omises
ha a e no complied wi h. Ob iously, his is no he in en ion behind he a gumen . Ci izens ha e a sub-
s an i e in e es in igh s p o ec ion. They will he e o e no simply gi e up on o malized igh s o he
sake o a be e compliance sco e. To alle ia e conce ns ha i is ac ually he emo al o igh s om he
cons i u ion ha na ows he de ju e/de ac o gap, I checked how cons i u ional changes a ec ed 14 basic
igh s po en ially co e ed by a cons i u ion. O he 2056 changes (amendmen s and eplacemen s) in he
sample, only 2.3% educed he numbe o o malized igh s.
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381
T. Schnelle
seems o be no p ima acie eason why his inding should no ex end o o he coun-
ies as well. Hence, he i s hypo hesis s a es:
H1 Non-compliance inc eases he p obabili y o cons i u ional change.
3.2 Replacemen s e sus amendmen s
Replacemen s and amendmen s ha e o en been unde s ood as subs i u es o each
o he (Bu gess, 1890; Ginsbu g, 2020b). In line wi h his adi ion, he i s hypo h-
esis ea s any o m o cons i u ional change alike. Howe e , his simpli ica ion may
be inapp op ia e in he gi en con ex . Ins ead, p edic ions should dis inguish be ween
he wo s anda d modes o cons i u ional e o m – amendmen and eplacemen .
Albe (2019) highligh s h ee ways o di e en ia e he wo: a p ocedu alis , a
ex ual and a con en -based app oach. Acco ding o he i s de ini ion, changes a e
called amendmen s i he ac o s claim o ha e ollowed he o mal amendmen ules,
and eplacemen s o he wise. The ex ual app oach unde s ands any change wi hin he
same codi ied documen as an amendmen , while all o he changes a e eplacemen s.
Finally, he con en -based de ini ion conside s whe he a o mal change p ese ed
legal con inui y. I he new p o isions un coun e o he ideas and spi i o he o -
me cons i u ion, his coun s as a discon inui y in a coun y’s legal his o y and should
he e o e be conside ed as a eplacemen e en i e o me s ha e ollowed he o icial
amendmen ules (Albe , 2019). The la e app oach migh heo e ically be he mos
p ecise one, bu is imp ac ical o la ge-N analyses. The ex ual app oach, howe e ,
has been ejec ed o being o e ly simplis ic (Le inson, 1995, p. 25). The e o e, I ol-
low he s anda d li e a u e and op o he p ocedu al de ini ion o amendmen s and
eplacemen s (see Elkins e al., 2009).
The idea o dis inguish be ween amendmen s and eplacemen s is based on wo
a gumen s. Fi s , hey send di e en signals and di e in scope. Amendmen s y
o p ese e con inui y and usually only make ine adjus men s, while eplacemen s
highligh he beginning o some hing new and signal a poli ical e-s a (Neg e o,
2012). Non-compliance means ha a cons i u ion ails o deli e on wha has been
p omised o he people. Symbolically s essing con inui y unde he imp ession o
ailu e and making mino adap a ions only is unlikely o calm he public. Mo eo e ,
as he mos basic law, cons i u ions lack any ex e nal mechanisms o hei imple-
men a ion – a p oblem O deshook (1992, p.137) coined as he “mys e y o en o ce-
men ”. Hence, e e y cons i u ion a leas pa ially elies on i s pe cei ed legi imacy o
exe in luence on he beha io o ac o s. Replacemen appea s o be a mo e sui able
ool o ees ablish hese alues, as i allows poli ical decision-make s o lea e he
ignominious pas behind. Second, he ac o s in ol ed in amendmen p ocedu es a e
usually no he ones su e ing mos om non-compliance, i.e. he ci izens.3 Acco d-
ing o da a om he Compa a i e Cons i u ions P ojec led by Elkins and Ginsbu g
3 Ci izens will especially su e om non-compliance whe e cons i u ional igh s a e conside ed. The e-
o e, he discussion is mos ly conce ned wi h “subs an i e compliance” wi h he igh s sec ion as opposed
o “p ocedu al compliance” wi h he ules o decision-making.
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
(2022), only abou 10% o cons i u ions allow ci izens hemsel es o p opose amend-
men s.4 A he same ime, hose capable o amending he cons i u ion (especially he
execu i e) bene i om he cu en ly loose incen i e s uc u e. In sum, hose objec -
ing o subs an i e non-compliance lack he ools o amendmen , while hose capable
o in e nal e o m lack he in e es o pu sue i . Ins i u ional op imiza ion aiming a
be e igh s en o cemen om wi hin a cons i u ional sys em hus seems unlikely.
Ins ead, he people mus exe cise hei cons i uen powe as he ul ima e so e eign o
ge id o hei “sham cons i u ion” (Law & Ve s eeg, 2013).5 The ollowing hypo h-
eses ake up on hese poin s:
H2 Non-compliance inc eases he p obabili y o eplacemen .
H3 Non-compliance has no e ec o he p obabili y o amendmen .6
3.3 Cons i u ional change and collec i e ac ion
S a ing wi h H2, his holds ha eplacemen s should only happen i ci izens can
c edibly h ea en o exe cise hei e olu iona y powe . This will only be he case
whe e hey can o e come he collec i e ac ion p oblem (Olson, 1965; Weingas ,
1997). Since nobody can be excluded om he bene i s o an imp o ed cons i u ion,
ci izens ha e li le eason o join cos ly p o es s o con ibu e o he d a ing p ocess
i o he s a e willing o do so on hei behal (see Golds one, 1994). Mo eo e , ci i-
zens will only pa icipa e and in es in opposi ion i hey expec many o he s o do
he same because o he wise he success p obabili y and expec ed e u ns a e insu -
icien ly high. Thus, a second p oblem is he unce ain y abou he ac ions o ellow
ci izens (Had ield & Weingas , 2014). Inco po a ing collec i e ac ion in o he heo y
he e o e implies ha he link be ween non-compliance and eplacemen should be
mode a ed by ac o s which help o educe unce ain y be ween ci izens and mi iga e
he emp a ion o ee- iding.
One such ca alys o collec i e ac ion a e ci il socie y o ganiza ions (CSO),
which educe incen i es o ee- iding by spli ing he decision-making p ocess o
joining he e o m mo emen in o wo s ages. In he i s s age, ci izens decide o join
a CSO. In he second s age, CSOs mus coo dina e o o ganize join p o es s. As he
numbe o ac o s a bo h s ages is ela i ely small, ee- ide s can be punished mo e
easily. As a consequence, he h ea o e olu ion is mo e c edible he mo e CSOs
exis in a coun y (Golds one, 1994).
4 On he o he hand, since 1950 ci izens ha e been di ec ly in ol ed in cons i u ional eplacemen h ough
popula e e endum in abou 35% o he cases conside ed (Ginsbu g e al., 2009).
5 Since he people d aw hei powe as ul ima e so e eign om he h ea o e olu ion which is common
o bo h au oc acies and democ acies, i is no necessa y o dis inguish be ween egime ypes in he analysis.
6 The s a emen o H3 ollows om he heo e ical a gumen . As one o he anonymous e iewe s poin ed
ou co ec ly, his is econome ically no co ec and should ead “non-compliance has a posi i e e ec
on amendmen s” o be es able by s anda d s a is ical signi icance es s. Howe e , his would con use he
eade because i s a es he con a y o he heo y. I hank he e iewe o poin ing his ou .
1 3
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T. Schnelle
con ex ual ac o s o a poli y in o accoun , so i s s ong posi i e e ec is no su p ise.
The absence o signi ican main e ec s in Columns (5) and (6) also explain why H1
had o be ejec ed: As a ound 90% o all cons i u ional changes in he sample a e
amendmen s, he eg ession esul s in Columns (1) and (2) a e la gely d i en by hese
in a-cons i u ional changes. Thus, dis inguishing be ween amendmen s and eplace-
men s was indeed necessa y o disen angle he di e en implica ions o compliance
on ypes o cons i u ional change.
5.2 Replacemen and collec i e ac ion
Hypo heses H4 and H5 a e es ed by adding in e ac ion e ms o non-compliance and
he espec i e mode a o s o he model as speci ied in Eq. (1). Fo ma ginal e ec s
o es imable o he ime-in a ian us index, he second model uses andom-e ec s
(RE) a he han ixed-e ec s (FE). No ably, he coe icien s a e s uc u ally simila
in he RE- and he FE-model, so eso ing o RE does no sys ema ically a ec he
es ima ion. The es ima ion esul s a e displayed in Fig. 1 as plo ed ma ginal e ec s
o non-compliance a gi en le els o CSO and us , espec i ely.
As indica ed by Fig. 1(a) and he co esponding eg ession Table A2 (in he appen-
dix), he ma ginal e ec o non-compliance on he eplacemen p obabili y sligh ly
dec eases wi h he CSO index. Ne e heless, he in e ac ion e ec is no signi ican ly
di e en om ze o and H4 mus be ejec ed. Almos iden ical esul s a e obse ed
wi h espec o he mode a ing in luence o us . Ini ially, he nega i e slope in
Fig. 1(b) seems o sugges ha non-compliance may in ac ma e mo e in low us
socie ies. This would con adic he heo y which posi ed ha eplacemen isk will
be highe unde a non-complian go e nmen in high- us coun ies. Howe e , he
in e ac ion e m in column (3) o Table A2 is again insigni ican . Hence, he g aphical
e idence o non-compliance being mo e e ec i e in low us coun ies is only en a-
i e and should no be o e s a ed. Consequen ly, H5 is also ejec ed.
Fig. 1 Ma ginal e ec s o compliance on eplacemen o gi en le els o he CSO and us index No e
G aphs plo he es ima ed ma gins wi h 75% con idence in e als o non-compliance a gi en le els
o CSO and us . Es ima ions based OLS eg ession wi h coun y-clus e ed s anda d e o s; es ima ion
esul s o he eg essions a e displayed in columns (2) and (3) o Table A2. All igu es we e c ea ed
using STATA
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
5.3 Model ex ension – disagg ega ing compliance
The main model’s non-compliance index is a ca ch-all measu e which does no di -
e en ia e be ween he a ec ed igh s a eas. Howe e , he e a e easons o belie e
ha ce ain igh s iola ions a e conside ed o be a mo e se e e b each o he ules
han o he s. Fo ins ance, he en o cemen o p ope y igh s migh be c ucial o a
s able cons i u ional sys em as p ope y owne s end o be mo e poli ically ac i e
and in luen ial (Eche e ia, 1997; Yode , 2020). I hese powe ul ac o s a e a ec ed
by a de ju e/de ac o gap, his may pose a g ea e isk o ins abili y han he poli ical
supp ession o a weak o poo ly o ganized ma ginalized g oup. Al e na i ely, non-
compliance migh be mo e di icul o ag ee on in some a eas because he p ecise
meaning o ce ain igh s is mo e con es ed and less anspa en . This in u n should
con ibu e o he collec i e ac ion p oblem and educe he likelihood o success ul
e o m mo emen s (see Ginsbu g e al., 2011; Had ield & Weingas , 2014).
To shed some ligh on hese conjec u es, I e- an he eg essions using he ou
sub-indices o he main compliance index p o ided by Gu mann e al. (2024). The
poli ical igh s sub-index (cc_poli ) quan i ies compliance wi h he eedom o asso-
cia ion, assembly and he igh o o m pa ies. Basic eedoms such as he igh o
li e and he p ohibi ion o sla e y and o u e a e conside ed by cc_basic. The p op-
e y igh s and ule o law sco e (cc_p op) e lec s p i a e p ope y igh s, judicial
independence, equali y be o e he law and he ule o law i sel . Finally, he ci il
igh s measu e (cc_ci il) co e s ee media, speech and mo emen , as well as eli-
gious eedom (Gu mann e al., 2024). The co ela ion be ween he ou indices lies
be ween 0.6 and 0.8. The es ima ion app oach is iden ical o he main model. Compli-
ance a iables a e again ecoded in o a measu e o non-compliance (i.e. mul iplied
wi h − 1) o ease in e p e a ion. Resul s a e epo ed in Table 3.
The coe icien s epo ed in Table 3 sugges ha he link be ween non-compliance
and eplacemen s ound in he main model is p ima ily d i en by a de ju e/de ac o
gap in e ms o poli ical and ci il igh s. Bo h esul s a e ema kable, as he wo sub-
indices co e exac ly hose igh s ha seem o be p econdi ions o success ul popu-
la e o m mo emen s. I he eedom o associa ion (poli ical libe y) and media
eedom (ci il libe y) a e supp essed, coo dina ion among ci izens o p essu e o
ins i u ional change should be especially di icul . S ill, hese a e he ac o s which
make ex a-cons i u ional e o m h ough eplacemen mo e a he han less likely.
6 Conclusion
Many au ho s ha e claimed ha cons i u ions will be changed i hey a e ine ec i e
(Jacobi e al., 2015; Muelle , 1996; Weingas , 2005, 2006). This pape es s his claim
on a la ge sample o 170 coun ies o e almos 70 yea s. Al hough he empi ical s a -
egy does no allow o making s ong causal claims, i does shed some ligh on he
alidi y o he hypo heses. Cons i u ional change as such is no mo e likely i he gap
be ween de ju e and de ac o is la ge. Howe e , a lack o igh s en o cemen obus ly
inc eases he p obabili y o cons i u ional eplacemen . This e ec is mode a ed by
social us which enables ci izens o coo dina e be e and p essu e o e o m. Mo e-
1 3
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T. Schnelle
o e , by disagg ega ing he compliance measu e i is possible o iden i y implemen-
a ion gaps ega ding poli ical and ci il igh s as he mos impo an d i e s o he
e ec . The e o e, he esul s o e all suppo he hypo hesis ha a lack o compliance
wi h cons i u ional igh s has he po en ial o des abilize cons i u ional sys ems and
inc ease he isk o hei eplacemen .
Gi en he inc easing alue a ibu ed o cons i u ional con inui y his has impo -
an implica ions o cons i u ion-w i e s (see Oli e & Fusa o, 2011). I hey assign
an inhe en alue o cons i u ional s abili y and wan hei ins i u ional amewo k
o emain du able, e o me s should be ca e ul wi h g an ing igh s ha canno be
en o ced o implemen ed. This especially conce ns posi i e igh s such as he igh o
ecei e an educa ion, which many coun ies in he de eloping wo ld simply canno
p o ide due o limi ed inancial esou ces. This s udy shows ha such implemen a-
ion gaps inc ease he isk o eplacemen , which is o en a augh a ai wi h unp e-
(1)
eplace
(2)
eplace
(3)
eplace
(4)
eplace
(5)
eplace
non-
compliance
poli
0.007* 0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
non-
compliance
basic
0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
non-
compliance
p op
0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
non-
compliance
ci il
0.009** 0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
lexibili y -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
age_log 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
d ans 0.059* 0.060* 0.060* 0.059* 0.059*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
a ans 0.099** 0.099** 0.099** 0.100** 0.100**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
con lic 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
con agion 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.043
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Obse a-
ions
7927 7927 7927 7927 7927
No. o
Coun ies
167 167 167 167 167
R20.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032
Table 3 Disagg ega ed non-
compliance and cons i u ional
eplacemen
Fixed-e ec s OLS eg ession
coe icien s wi h coun y-
clus e ed s anda d e o s
in pa en heses; dependen
a iable as indica ed in column
heade ; all non-compliance
a iables, lexibili y, and age_
log a e lagged by one pe iod;
obse a ions a e coun y-yea s;
*: 0.1, **: 0.05, ***: 0.01
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
dic able ou comes (Els e , 1995, 2000, 2018). S ill, one migh a gue ha e o me s
should a o making changes o hei cons i u ions i doing so is likely o imp o e he
quali y o hei implemen a ion. Howe e , one o he de ining ai s o eplacemen s
is ha hey place e e y hing back on he able while amendmen s only ques ion and
change single p o isions (Albe , 2019). Re o me s could hus a o op imizing
amendmen s bu may no wan o push hei luck and isk a wholesale ewo k o hei
ins i u ional design. Cons i u ion-w i e s should hus be awa e ha making many u o-
pian p omises may back i e by p o oking a quick eplacemen .
Appendix
See Tables A1, A2 and A3.
Table A1 Main model using he V-Dem compliance index
(1)
conchange
(2)
eplace
(3)
amend
non-compliance V-Dem 0.004 0.013*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
lexibili y 0.207*** -0.008 0.215***
(0.056) (0.015) (0.052)
age_log 0.018** 0.018*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008)
d ans 0.053 0.058* -0.005
(0.051) (0.031) (0.043)
a ans 0.074 0.100** -0.026
(0.074) (0.048) (0.047)
con lic -0.003 0.011 -0.015
(0.018) (0.008) (0.019)
con agion 0.073 0.056* 0.017
(0.070) (0.032) (0.070)
Obse a ions 8106 8106 8106
No. o Coun ies 170 170 170
Wi hin R20.021 0.032 0.018
Fixed-e ec s OLS eg ession coe icien s wi h coun y-clus e ed s anda d e o s in pa en heses;
models (1) uses conchange, model (3) uses eplace and model (5) uses amend as he dependen a iable;
a iables non-compliance V-Dem, lexibili y, and age_log a e lagged by one pe iod; obse a ions a e
coun y-yea s; *: 0.1, **: 0.05, ***: 0.01
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393
T. Schnelle
Table A2 CSOs and us as po en ial mode a o s
(1)
eplace
(2)
eplace
(3)
eplace
non-compliance 0.008** 0.006 0.010**
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
CSO -0.024
(0.022)
non-compliance*CSO -0.006
(0.016)
us -0.043
(0.029)
non-compliance* us -0.016
(0.024)
lexibili y -0.008 -0.008 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009)
age_log 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
d ans 0.060* 0.059* 0.080*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044)
a ans 0.099** 0.102** 0.176**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.076)
con lic 0.011 0.012 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
con agion 0.052 0.053* 0.041
(0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Obse a ions 8106 8100 4353
No. o Coun ies 170 170 87
R20.031 0.031 0.046
OLS eg ession coe icien s wi h coun y-clus e ed s anda d e o s in pa en heses; model (1) and (2) use
ixed-e ec s, model (3) uses andom-e ec s; he dependen a iable in all models is eplace; model (1)
is he baseline model as in Eq. (1); model (2) addi ionally in e ac s non-compliance wi h CSO; model
(3) addi ionally in e ac s non-compliance wi h us ; a iables non-compliance, CSO, lexibili y, and
age_log a e lagged by one pe iod; obse a ions a e coun y-yea s; *: 0.1, **: 0.05, ***: 0.01
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Non-compliance as a de e minan o cons i u ional change? A…
Supplemen a y In o ma ion The online e sion con ains supplemen a y ma e ial a ailable a h ps://doi.
o g/10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1.
Acknowledgemen s I am hank ul o S e an Voig , Ve a T oege and Dylan Johnson o commen s on
p e ious d a s o his pape . Addi ionally, I hank wo anonymous e iewe s o hei help ul sugges ions
on my heo e ical and empi ical sec ions.
Table A3 Va iables, coding and sou ces
Va iable Coding Sou ce
age_log Loga i hm o he numbe o yea s a cons i u ional sys em
has been in place
Elkins and Ginsbu g
(2022)
amend Dummy a iable coded 1 i he e was an amendmen in ha
yea , 0 o he wise
Elkins and Ginsbu g
(2022)
a ans Dummy a iable coded 1 i he e was a swi ch o au oc acy;
0 o he wise
Bjø nsko and Rode
(2020)
conchange Dummy a iable coded 1 i a new o in e im cons i u ion is
p omulga ed, 0 o he wise
Elkins and Ginsbu g
(2022)
con lic Dummy a iable coded 1 i he e was an a med con lic in-
ol ing he go e nmen o he espec i e coun y wi h mo e
han 25 ba le- ela ed dea hs in a gi en yea ; gene a ed om
a iables “in ensi y_le el”, “yea ” and “loca ion” in UCDP/
PRIO A med Con lic Da ase 22.1
UCDP/PRIO A med
Con lic Da ase
22.1; Gledi sch e al.
(2002)
con agion Sha e o coun ies wi hin he same egion which expe-
ienced cons i u ional ailu e in ha yea ( he obse ed
coun y i sel excluded)
Elkins and Ginsbu g
(2022) and egional
classi ica ion by
Teo ell and Had-
enius (2005)
CSO Co e ci il socie y index om he Va ie ies o Democ acy
P ojec ( 2xcs_ccsi)
V-Dem Da ase Ve -
sion 13; Coppedge
e al. (2023)
d ans Dummy a iable coded 1 i he e was a swi ch o democ-
acy; 0 o he wise
Bjø nsko and Rode
(2020)
lexibili y Numbe o amendmen s di ided by he numbe o yea s a
cons i u ional sys em has been in place
Elkins and Ginsbu g
(2022)
non-compliance To al compliance sco e om he Compa a i e Cons i u ional
Compliance Da abase
cc_ o al∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
basic
Compliance sub-index in he a ea o basic igh s
cc_basic∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
ci il
Compliance sub-index in he a ea o ci il igh s
cc_ci il∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
L&V
Al e na i e compliance sco e om he CCCP using he
agg ega ion o mula om Law and Ve s eeg (2013)
cc_ o al_l ∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
poli
Compliance sub-index in he a ea o poli ical igh s
cc_poli ∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
p op
Compliance sub-index in he a ea o p ope y igh s and he
ule o law
cc_p op ∗−1
Gu mann e al.
(2024)
non-compliance
V-Dem
Compliance index om he Va ie ies o Democ acy P ojec
2ex escon ∗−1
V-Dem Da ase Ve -
sion 10; Coppedge
e al. (2023)
us P oduc o us le el ( esponden s answe ing “Mos people
can be us ed”) and us adius (as es ima ed in Delhey e
al. (2011)
Wo ld Values Su ey
Wa es 1–7; Hae p e
e al. (2022)
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395

T. Schnelle
Au ho con ibu ions T. Schnelle was he p incipal au ho o his pape .
Funding This esea ch p ojec is unded by he Deu sche Fo schungsgemeinscha (DFG) GRK 2503.
Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
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