Ki a li, Osman Sab i; E an, Sab i A han
A icle — Published Ve sion
When o No Respond in Kind? Indi iduals’ Expec a ions
o he Fu u e and Thei Suppo o Recip oci y in Fo eign
Policy
Poli ical Beha io
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
WZB Be lin Social Science Cen e
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Ki a li, Osman Sab i; E an, Sab i A han (2024) : When o No Respond in Kind?
Indi iduals’ Expec a ions o he Fu u e and Thei Suppo o Recip oci y in Fo eign Policy, Poli ical
Beha io , ISSN 1573-6687, Sp inge , Be lin, Vol. 46, Iss. 2, pp. 1013-1035,
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h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s11109-023-09857-y
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When oNo Respond inKind? Indi iduals’ Expec a ions
o heFu u e andThei Suppo o Recip oci y inFo eign
Policy
OsmanSab iKi a li1,2 · Sab iA hanE an1
Accep ed: 4 Janua y 2023 / Published online: 16 Janua y 2023
© The Au ho (s) 2023
Abs ac
This pape in es iga es i indi iduals’ nega i e assessmen s o he u u e d i e
mic o-le el eluc ance o in e na ional coope a ion and ecip ocal beha io , a co e
p inciple o mul ila e alism. To es ou heo e ical expec a ions, we ield online su -
ey expe imen s on a sample o o e 3000 esponden s in he US and Tu key in
Oc obe –No embe 2020. The expe imen al esul s show ha on a e age, indi idu-
als a e ai ly sensi i e o a ge coun ies’ policy ac ions and a e inclined o ecip-
oca e when con empla ing whe he o inc ease con ibu ions o UN o consen o
bila e al ade libe aliza ion. Ye , u he analyses concu ha indi idual inclina ions
o ecip oca e a e subs an ially mode a ed by hei u u e expec a ions. Speci ically,
indi iduals who a e mo e pessimis ic abou hei ma e ial p ospec s emain ai ly
indi e en o he posi i e ac ions o o he coun ies, bu a e mo e likely o penalize
nega i e o eign policy ac ions by ecip oca ing in kind.
Keywo ds In e na ional coope a ion· Recip oci y· Public opinion· In e na ional
ins i u ions· T ade libe aliza ion
In oduc ion
Fo many obse e s o global poli ics, he ule-bound sys em o pos -wa wo ld
o de is unde s ain. A wa e o poli ical opposi ion agains in e na ional o ganiza-
ions (IOs) and egimes had been gaining ac ion in he las decade (e.g., Bea ce
Replica ion da a and documen a ion a e a ailable a h ps:// doi. o g/ 10. 7910/ DVN/ CCSETI.
* Osman Sab i Ki a li
[email p o ec ed]; osmansab [email p o ec ed]
Sab i A han E an
a han.e [email p o ec ed]
1 In e na ional T ade Depa men , Bogazici Uni e si y, Is anbul, Tu key
2 WZB, Be lin, Ge many
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
& Sco , 2019; Bö zel & Zü n, 2021). The ising mass pe cep ion ha many IOs
ha e ailed o pe o m and mee hei ounding objec i es p o ides ample oppo u-
ni ies o leade s, pa icula ly populis s, o mobilize na ionalis sen imen s agains
mul ila e alism, esul ing in new challenges agains bo h he inpu and ou pu legi i-
macy o coope a i e amewo ks. As De V ies e al. no e (2020), his g owing public
mobiliza ion agains IOs educes go e nmen s’ willingness o en e in o new mul i-
la e al egimes and h ea ens hei c edibili y when hey do so.
A co e ope a ing p inciple o in e na ional coope a ion is ecip oci y, which
e e s o “exchanges o oughly equi alen alues in which he ac ions o each
pa y a e con ingen on he p io ac ions o he o he s in such a way ha good
is e u ned o good, and bad o bad” (Keohane, 1986, p. 8). Unde ecip oci y,
ac o s ewa d he coope a i e—and penalize he uncoope a i e—ini ia i es o he
o he pa y. As each ac o assumes hei ac ions will be ecip oca ed by he o he
pa y, hey a oid uncoope a i e policies. Recip ocal beha io acili a es economic
exchanges, helps sus ain long- e m ansac ions and consequen ly yields e i-
ciency gains when incen i es o coope a e a e weak and en o cemen mechanisms
a e absen (Buchan e al., 2006; Feh e al., 1997).
This pape aims o explo e indi iduals’ inclina ion o ecip oca e in wo
domains o in e na ional coope a ion: con ibu ions o in e na ional o ganiza-
ions and bila e al ade ela ions. Theo e ically, we hypo hesize ha , on a e age,
ci izens a e sensi i e o he ac ions o o he coun ies when e alua ing p oposals
on ade and coope a ion h ough IOs. Ye , his gene al endency o ecip oca e
becomes mo e nuanced when linked o hei u u e economic assessmen s. We
a gue ha when ci izens expec in ensi ied esou ce compe i ion and sho ened
shadow o he u u e, hey would p e e immedia e—bu lowe —payo s gained
by de ec ing a he expense o long- e m— hough po en ially highe —bene i s
om ecip ocal coope a ion. Consequen ly, we p opose, he mo e pessimis indi-
iduals a e wi h ega ds o hei ma e ial well-being, he less likely hey a e o
alue ecip ocal beha io a he in e na ional le el. Though hese pessimis indi-
iduals will s ill ecip oca e agains he uncoope a i e o eign policy ac ions
o o he coun ies, hey will eac o coope a i e policy ac ions ei he by no
esponding in kind o by coun e ing wi h a hos ile esponse.
The empi ical analysis is based on da a ga he ed om an online su ey wi h
a no el expe imen al module conduc ed in la e 2020 on samples o o e 1500
adul esponden s each in he US and Tu key. The expe imen al design adop s
wo ac o ial igne es in which esponden s a e p esen ed wi h independen sho
scena ios ha desc ibe se e al coun ies’ decisions o possibly change hei con-
ibu ions o he UN and hei a i a es is-à- is su ey coun y expo s, espec-
i ely. A e each scena io, esponden s a e ques ioned on hei p e e ences o
hei coun y’s o eign policy ac ions wi h espec o hese wo policy domains.
Ou esul s show ha in gene al, indi iduals in bo h samples a e ai ly sensi i e
o o he coun ies’ policy ac ions and a e keen o ecip oca e in hei policy p e e -
ences. Howe e , hese wo coun y samples di e subs an ially on how hey espond
o posi i e and nega i e signals by o he coun ies. In he US, he su ey espond-
en s ewa d coope a i e beha io mo e han hey punish uncoope a i e beha -
io , whe eas he e e se is he case in Tu key. Fu he analyses concu ha hough
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
indi iduals’ ma e ial wo ies do no necessa ily educe hei suppo o coope a i e
amewo ks, hey subs an ially modi y esponden s’ ecip ocal mo i a ions. Speci i-
cally, indi iduals who a e pessimis ic abou hei u u e economic ou looks become
mo e likely o penalize a ge coun ies’ nega i e ac ions by ecip oca ing in kind (in
bo h expe imen s) and, less sensi i e owa d he coope a i e signals o o he coun-
ies (UN expe imen ).
Recip oci y andIndi idual P e e ences onFo eign Policy
A long-held adi ion on e hics s ipula es ha ecip oci y is one o he p e equisi es
o mo al beha io (Neusne & Chil on, 2008). Social psychologis s concu ha
humans end o ha e a mo al in ui ion o ecip oca e in hei social in e ac ions and
associa e ecip oci y wi h ‘ ai ness’ and ‘equi y’ (Feh & Gach e , 2000; Goulde ,
1960). Fo ins ance, people ha e an inclina ion o smile back when one smiles a
hem o e alia e when hey a e hi (e.g., Scha lemann e al., 2001).
An ex ensi e li e a u e on economic beha io es ablishes ha bo h nega i e eci-
p oci y—in ul ima um games (e.g., Ho man e al., 1996)—and posi i e ecip oc-
i y—in us o gi exchange games (e.g., McCabe e al., 1996)—condi ion indi-
iduals’ economic decisions. These s udies also ind ha in small, expe imen al
se ings, indi iduals display a g ea e inclina ion o penalize uncoope a i e beha io
han ewa d posi i e beha io (Cha ness & Rabin, 2000; Feh & Gach e , 2000).
Al hough ecip oci y may be a po en ac o in egula ing in e pe sonal ela ions,
when indi iduals e alua e o eign policy p oposals, hei inclina ion o ecip oca e
in esponse o o he coun ies’ ac ions may lose i s p ominence. On he one ex eme,
public sensi i i y o ce ain issue a eas such as human igh s o he en i onmen
may lead ci izens o a o no ma i ely d i en, uncondi ional policy op ions ega d-
less o he policy choices o o he coun ies. On he o he ex eme, ci izens may
e alua e in e na ional ela ions om he neo ealis lenses o Realpoli ik and e ain
om esponding in kind o he a o able policy ac ions o o he coun ies when hey
a e conce ned ha hei coun ies would end up ela i ely wo se o and/o he o he
pa y is pe cei ed as a h ea o na ional secu i y.
This public ambi alence owa d ecip oci y in o eign policy has been exposed
empi ically. In a conjoin expe imen on Swiss ci izens, Rudolph e al. (2019) show
ha o cope wi h he social and en i onmen al impac s o ansna ional business
ac i i y, ci izens p e e unila e al egula ions o home-coun y mul ina ional i ms
ope a ing ab oad, despi e hei compe i ion c ippling e ec s. Simila ly, in ano he
s udy, o e s in he US we e ound o igno e o he coun ies’ g een policies while
e alua ing hei home coun ies’ clima e change legisla ions (Tingley & Tomz,
2014).
On he o he hand, se e al s udies also concu ha indi iduals’ o eign policy
p e e ences a e closely in luenced by o he coun ies’ policy decisions, al hough no
necessa ily in coope a i e di ec ions. In bila e al con lic s, he public in democ acies
p e e s leade s o espond o an opponen ’s coope a i e o hos ile ac ions in he same
manne , hough hey a e wa y o ex eme esponses in ei he di ec ion (McGinnis
& Williams, 2001). Chil on (2015) inds ha o e s a e mo e likely o comply wi h
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
in e na ional laws on wa when hey expec ecip ocal beha io om he oppos-
ing pa y. Simila ly, Fla in and Nicke son (2009) no e ha when in o med on he
Ame ican p ac ice o o u e, esponden s become mo e ole an o o u e by o he
na ions. Wi h ega d o economic a ai s, Chil on e al. (2020) main ain ha in bo h
he US and China, esponden s a e mo e likely o disapp o e o o eign acquisi ions
i he o eign i m’s home coun y does no g an he same ype o access o o eign
companies.
Recip oci y andIndi idual A i udes onIOs andT ade
In e na ional o ganiza ions and ade ag eemen s a e wo mani es a ions o in e na-
ional coope a ion, and public suppo —o non-suppo — o hem de i e la gely
om common sou ces. A line o esea ch explains mic o-le el suppo o in e na-
ional ins i u ions and ade libe aliza ion by ocusing on idea ional disposi ions such
as cosmopoli anism (e.g., De Wilde e al., 2019), in e na ionalism (e.g., Kal enhale
& Mille , 2013), na ional p ide and h ea pe cep ions (e.g., McLa en, 2002), o eco-
nomic na ionalism (Cli e al., 2012). Acco dingly, indi iduals who a e cul u ally
open, younge , and hold mo e cosmopoli an and less na ionalis alues a e mo e
willing o u ilize coope a i e mechanisms and suppo ee ade and he delega ion
o decision-making capabili ies o IOs.
The second line sc u inizes he expec ed ego opic (Bea ce & Sco , 2019;
Gabel & Whi en, 1997) and socio opic bene i s (e.g.,Dellmu h & Tallbe g, 2015;
Mayda & Rod ik, 2005) o coope a ion. In a nu shell, ego opic explana ions posi
ha hose wi h highe ac o endowmen s in de eloped coun ies a e mo e likely o
consen o IOs and ade libe aliza ion because he li ing o ba ie s will inc ease
demand o hei skills, consequen ly making hem be e o . Socio opic explana-
ions concu ha suppo o ee ade and coope a ion h ough IOs is highly con in-
gen on indi iduals’ assessmen s o he po en ial poli ical o economic consequences
on hei communi ies ei he a he local o na ional le el.
Bo h o hese explana ions, ei he ocusing on idea ional disposi ions o economic
sel -in e es , s udy he p edic o s o indi idual suppo o coope a ion as a cons an
and la gely igno e he complex in e ac ions be ween pa icipa ing coun ies in shap-
ing popula opinion. Howe e , how s a es and hei o e s app oach coope a ion is
also a unc ion o how hei coun e pa s ac . An indi idual’s idea ional o ien a ion
o ma e ial sel -in e es migh posi i ely d i e hei gene al endo semen o global
go e nance; howe e , i pa ne coun ies de ec o exhibi ela i e gain-seeking
beha io , hen suppo o speci ic coope a ion could subs an ially e apo a e. This
s udy con ibu es o he li e a u e, he e o e, by explo ing he ex en o which o e s
e ise hei p e e ences on poli ical and economic coope a ion in esponse o o he
s a es’ ac ions and how indi idual-le el assessmen s mode a e hei esponse.
A he mac o le el, con ibu ions o in e na ional ins i u ions and ade libe ali-
za ion essen ially en ail collec i e ac ion p oblems. In he absence o en o cemen
mechanisms, he sel -in e es o any ac o is o de ec , ei he wi h he expec a ion o
ee iding, o minimize he isk o being exploi ed by he o he pa y. Recip oci y
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
pa ially helps o e come his dilemma; when assu ed o u u e in-kind esponse
om he o he pa icipan s, he incen i e o coope a e g ows, while he inclina ion o
de ec declines. As such, he p inciple o ecip oci y has cons i u ed a co e pilla o
he ounda ion o in e na ional ins i u ions and se ed as a key p inciple in bila e al
and mul ila e al ade libe aliza ion (e.g., Bagwell & S aige , 2001; Ruggie, 1992).
Policymake s do no ac in a acuum bu a e bound o ac wi hin he limi s o
public p e e ences. Speci ically, public opinion is ound o ha e a di ec impac on
IOs’ legisla i e decisions (Hagemann e al., 2017), he legi imacy and e ec i eness
o hei policies (Dellmu h & Tallbe g, 2015; Edwa ds, 2009), and he ype and
amoun o unding hey ecei e om dono s (Bay am & G aham, 2017). Simila ly,
elec o al p e e ences and sen imen s on a ious aspec s o in e na ional ade sub-
s an ially shape legisla i e o ing on ade policies (Hiscox, 2002; Milne & Tingley,
2011), he scope and dep h o nego ia ed ade ag eemen s (Young, 2017), and he
li ecycle o ade nego ia ions (Eliasson & Hue , 2018).1
The close associa ion be ween go e nmen ac ions and cons i uen p e e ences
indica e ha policymake s’ willingness o ecip oca e ano he coun y’s ac ions on
ma e s o o eign policy should be in line wi h o e s’ mo i a ions. Thus, ce e is
pa ibus, o e s a e expec ed o espond posi i ely o he coope a i e ac ions o o he
pa ies and push hei go e nmen s o e alia e o penalize non-compliance and
de ec ion.
Fi s , s a egically, policymake s and o e s alike would conside ecip oci y as
a sel -en o cemen mechanism o coope a i e a angemen s ha makes he p o i-
sion o public goods o UN egime o mu ual ade gains mo e likely. Mo eo e ,
in e na ional coope a ion en ails mul iple, obse ing playe s. The decision o non-
coope a ion in esponse o coope a i e signals by o he s can incu epu a ional cos s
o he home coun y and isk u u e e alia ion by o he coun ies. The p essu e o
coope a e would be pa icula ly p onounced i he home coun y has an ac i e p es-
ence in a ious IOs (Mi chell & Hensel, 2007).
Two, mo ally, ecip ocal beha io yields posi i e judgmen s abou he ai -
ness o a coun y’s in e ac ions wi h o he s (B u ge & Ra hbun, 2021; Powe s
e al., 2022). Resea ch has es ablished ha humans ha e a psychological p e e -
ence o ai ness and p e e decisions ha minimize inequi y in payo s (Feh &
Schmid , 1999). Conce ns o e ela i e con ibu ions and sha es a e pa icula ly
p onounced in he dis ibu ional se ings o IO membe ship and ade ag eemen s,
whe e asymme ical p o isions can no only shi he powe balance among
pa icipan coun ies, bu , equally impo an , aise conce ns o e i s equi y and
equali y o he ou come (e.g., Gowa & Mans ield, 2004; Yeung & Quek, 2022).
Hence, B u ge and Ra hbun show, when e alua ing ade ela ions, Ame icans’
a i udes a e o en d i en by a sense o ai ness, albei an egois ic one, acco ding
o which hey alue equal dis ibu ion o concessions and bene i s, bu oppose
ag eemen s ha lea e hei home coun y ela i ely behind (2021). The e o e,
1 Howe e , i should also be no ed ha some s udies ques ion he elec o al connec ion be ween ade
policy and o ing decisions (e.g., Guisinge , 2009) o demons a e ha he e ec s o indi idual ade
p e e ences on hei o ing beha io is condi ional on go e nmen policies (e.g., Ma gali , 2011).
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
indi iduals would be expec ed o a o balanced ag eemen s whe eby hei home
coun ies and o he pa ies con ibu e equally o IOs o deli e equally a o able
e ms o each o he . Following his line o hough , when pa ne coun ies signal
changes in hei posi ions—ei he posi i ely o nega i ely—indi iduals would be
inclined o ollow sui and ecip oca e o e conce ns o ai ness.
H1a Coope a i e (uncoope a i e) signals by o he coun ies inc ease (dec ease) o -
e s’ suppo o coope a ion h ough IOs.
H1b Coope a i e (uncoope a i e) signals by o he coun ies inc ease (dec ease) o -
e s’ suppo o coope a ion on ade.
Nex , we p opose, indi iduals’ a i udes on u he coope a ion and hei incli-
na ion o ecip oca e a e closely condi ioned by e alua ions o hei o hcoming
ma e ial p ospec s.
Indi iduals who hold nega i e assessmen s o hei economic u u es end o
de elop p o ec ionis a i udes o p o ec hemsel es and hei close ci cles (Jacobs
& Ma hews, 2012). When economic p edic ions a e bleak, o e s become mo e
sensi i e o budge a y expenses, how hei ax money is being spen , and whe he
domes ic go e nmen p og ams a e su icien ly p o ided o (Abbo & Jones,
2020; Peacock & Wiseman, 1961). The bene i s acc ued by pa icipa ing coun-
ies and hei public by coope a ing in in e na ional endea o s a e o en indi ec
and long e m. Mo eo e , mos ci izens a e poo ly in o med when i comes o
o eign a ai s and end o con la e a ious coope a i e amewo ks a he in e -
na ional scale (i.e., IOs o c oss-bo de lows) when hinking abou o eign policy
(Bea ce & Sco , 2019). Speci ically, hey a e o en naï e abou he ma e ial cos s
o in e na ional ins i u ions and coope a ion and g ossly o e es ima e how much
hei coun ies con ibu e o such endea o s (Dellmu h & Tallbe g, 2015; Guis-
inge , 2009; Pax on & Knack, 2008). Gi en ha lack o awa eness, when e alu-
a ing in e na ional coope a ion, hey end o ake cues om hei own pe sonal
economic si ua ions (Bea ce & Sco , 2019; Dellmu h e al., 2022).
Consequen ly, o ac o s wi h sho e ime ho izons, spending much-needed
esou ces on IOs o secu ing ade deals wi h ad e se e ec s on domes ic job
ma ke s a e iewed as less a o able op ions han alloca ing esou ces o p ess-
ing domes ic pu poses, such as bols e ing wel a e se ices o e i ing economic
g ow h ha would p o ide di ec , sho - e m bene i s. Fo ins ance, he li e a u e
on o eign aid shows ha du ing economic down u ns a home, dono s end o cu
back on aid (Dang e al., 2013). Such cu s a e o en demanded (and e en cham-
pioned) by o e s: public suppo o de elopmen coope a ion ypically plunges
when dono esponden s expe ience pe sonal inancial di icul ies (Hein ich e al.,
2016). Simila ly, du ing COVID-19, ci izens who we e wo ied abou he pan-
demic’s economic consequences we e much mo e likely o suppo aid cu s (Kob-
ayashi e al., 2021).
Pessimis ic ma e ial expec a ions may dampen indi iduals’ willingness o pay
o in e na ional coope a ion; howe e , how does his disinclina ion a ec hei
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
endency o ecip oca e? Recip oci y links oday’s ac ions o expec a ions o u u e
bene i s. When he game is played equen ly, ac o s ha e a g ea e incen i e o
coope a e because hey alue he u u e payo s om in e ac ions mo e han he
sho - e m bene i s. Bleak expec a ions abou he ma e ial condi ions change his
equa ion by sho ening he “shadow o he u u e” (Axel od & Keohane, 1985).
Unde unce ain y, when ac o s expec hei ela i e condi ions o de e io a e, hey
become mo e inclined o p e e sho - e m bene i s ha could be a ained oday by
de ec ing a he expense o long- e m—bu po en ially highe —gains ha could be
acqui ed om coope a ion. Simila ly, when ac o s ocus on maximizing hei sho -
e m payo s in p epa a ion o omo ow’s un a o able ci cums ances, he cos hey
associa e wi h de ec ion will be de alued. Consequen ly, he mo e nega i e o e s’
pe cep ion o hei ma e ial well-being a e, he less inclined hey will be o display
ecip ocal beha io .
Nega i e ma e ial expec a ions may also igge psychological mo i a ions ha
inhibi ecip ocal beha io . P e ious esea ch iden i ies equi y as a po en psycho-
logical mo i a ion ha d i es o eign policy posi ions among pa icula segmen s
o popula ions, and hese equi y-o ien ed indi iduals end o be mo e a en i e o
he cos s o coope a ion (Powe s e al., 2022). Following his line, we expec eco-
nomic wo ies o ampli y conce ns o e coun ies’ ela i e sha es o con ibu ions.
The equi y p inciple would dic a e ha alloca ions o common goods should be in
p opo ion o an ac o ’s capabili ies. I ac o s an icipa e hei ma e ial condi ions o
de e io a e, hence sh inking hei capabili ies, hey would likely ind a angemen s
ha ask pa ies o ecip oca e each o he ’s coope a i e ac ions as being un ai .
Howe e , ecip oci y is no necessa ily symme ical. Posi i e ecip oci y deno es
cases whe eby an ac o ’s a o able ac ion is ollowed by a a o able esponse by he
o he ac o , whe eas nega i e ecip oci y signi ies nega i e in e dependence, whe e
a hos ile ac ion is me by a hos ile eac ion by he o he pa y. When condi ioned
by posi i e ecip oci y, ac o s become mo e likely o coope a e i hey obse e he
o he membe s con ibu ing. When condi ioned by nega i e ecip oci y, ac o s a oid
de ec ion om coope a ion because hey an icipa e hei uncoope a i e beha io s o
be penalized by in-kind esponses om he o he pa y.
Empi ically, indi idual e alua ions on u u e ma e ial condi ions should yield
con as ing mic o-le el a i udes in esponse o o he coun ies’ posi i e and nega-
i e o eign policy signals. When o he coun ies signal coope a i e ac ions, o e s
wi h nega i e u u e assessmen s will conside ably de ia e om hose wi h posi i e
assessmen s. Gi en ha hey p e e immedia e, low- e u n gains o e long- e m,
high- e u n gains, we would expec hose wi h pessimis ic ma e ial expec a ions o
be mo e likely o de ec om coope a ion and no ecip oca e coope a i e beha -
io . Con e sely, when o he coun ies signal uncoope a i e beha io , o e s wi h
nega i e ma e ial assessmen s will be mo e likely o coun e de ec ion wi h non-
coope a ion compa ed o hose wi h posi i e expec a ions. F om his a gumen a ion,
we ex ac wo es able hypo heses on he mode a ing ole o u u e expec a ions on
ecip ocal beha io :
H2a Indi iduals wi h nega i e assessmen s o hei ma e ial p ospec s a e less likely
o ecip oca e coope a i e beha io by o he coun ies.
1020
Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
H2b Indi iduals wi h nega i e assessmen s o hei ma e ial p ospec s a e mo e
likely o ecip oca e uncoope a i e beha io by o he coun ies.
Expe imen al Design: Case Selec ion
Ou a gumen s may be limi ed by geog aphical scope condi ions. Ci izens migh
ha e a ying a ionales and willingness in displaying ecip ocal beha io in di e -
en coun y con ex s. Fo ins ance, in weake coun ies, de ec ion and ee- iding
could be mo e iable op ions o o se powe imbalances, pa icula ly when dealing
wi h s onge opponen s. Simila ly, he social cul u al no ms and sense o ai ness
embedded in di e en poli ies migh a ec he way indi iduals app oach he no m
ecip oci y. In se ings whe e in e pe sonal and ins i u ional us is weak, social
incen i es o uphold ecip ocal beha io a e gene ally less e ec i e (e.g., Ca lin
& Lo e, 2013). Despi e hese heo e ical possibili ies, wi h a ew excep ions (e.g.,
S oik e al., 2019), we lack e idence on he ex en o which he no m o ecip oci y
condi ions poli ical beha io in c oss-cul u al con ex s.
This s udy d aws da a om s uc u ally wo dissimila coun ies. The US and
Tu key di e subs an ially in e ms o poli ical egime, cul u e, de elopmen le el
as well as he le el o ins i u ional us owa d IOs. Despi e hei di e ences, poli i-
cians in bo h coun ies o en cue o e s abou o he coun ies’ policy ac ions when
mobilizing suppo o hei policy p e e ences on in e na ional obliga ions. Fo me
US P esiden T ump epe i i ely exp essed his us a ion wi h he unequal bu den
he US has o bea in inancing IOs. When esponding o he UN budge c isis in
2019, he announced “make all membe coun ies pay, no jus he Uni ed S a es.2”
This discou se on ecip oci y was e en mo e explici on US’ ade ela ions. In
2018, T ump decla ed ha “ om now on, we expec ading ela ionships o be ai
and o be ecip ocal.3” Simila ly, Tu kish P esiden E dogan has egula ly u ged o
a e ision o he Cus oms Union ag eemen wi h he EU on he g ounds o ai ness
and ecip oci y4 and blamed coun ies ha ail o pay hei membe ship dues in he
O ganiza ion o Islamic Coope a ion (OIC) o hei lack o uni y.5
The small-N o mac o-le el uni s in ou esea ch design does no allow us o es
compe ing explana ions on coun y-le el di e ences in o e s’ a i udes owa d eci-
p oci y. Fo such pu poses, la ge-N c oss-coun y designs wi h na ionally ep esen -
a i e samples would be needed. A he same ime, a aining simila ly obus ea -
men e ec s in wo highly dissimila coun y cases would indica e g ea e ex e nal
alidi y and b oade gene alizabili y o ou heo e ical a gumen s.
2 h ps:// eu. usa o day. com/ s o y/ news/ poli ics/ 2019/ 10/ 09/ donald- ump- dismi sses- uni ed- na io ns- de ic
i s- says- o he s- should- pay/ 39175 54002/.
3 h ps:// ump whi e house. a chi es. go / b ie i ngs- s a e men s/ p esi den - donald- j- ump- con on ing- chi-
nas- un ai - ade- polic ies/.
4 h ps:// www. swp- be lin. o g/ publi ca io ns/ p odu c s/ a bei spap ie e/ CATS_ Wo ki ng_ Pape _ N _5_
Do uk_ A bay. pd .
5 h ps:// www. hu i ye da ilyne ws. com/ e dog an- u ges- islam ic- leade s- o- pay- hei - dues- 97889.
1027
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
Table 2 Suppo o in e na ional coope a ion-mul ile el es ima es
Robus s anda d e o s in pa en heses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Baseline ca ego ies a e “keep
as is” o Policy ea men and “no in o ma ion” o signal sou ce ea men . Same eligion is Ch is ian
o he US, Muslim o Tu key
DV: Coope a ion Uni ed S a es Tu key
UN Vigne e T ade Vigne e UN Vigne e T ade Vigne e
Va iables Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
Dec ease 50% − 0.435*** 0.960*** − 0.370*** 1.266***
(0.067) (0.091) (0.059) (0.084)
Dec ease 10% − 0.194*** 0.467*** − 0.219*** 0.553***
(0.048) (0.082) (0.052) (0.062)
Inc ease 10% 0.401*** − 0.379*** 0.170** − 0.980***
(0.051) (0.079) (0.055) (0.066)
Inc ease 50% 0.708*** − 0.838*** 0.258*** − 1.940***
(0.066) (0.095) (0.059) (0.089)
Economic wo ies − 0.208*** − 0.058 − 0.136** − 0.009
(0.049) (0.040) (0.049) (0.035)
T us UN 0.573*** 0.460***
(0.039) (0.048)
F ee T ade 0.198***
(0.038)
T us MNCs 0.023
(0.034)
Same eligion 0.035 0.022 0.130 0.148
(0.072) (0.118) (0.077) (0.088)
Ally − 0.045 0.216 − 0.145* 0.283**
(0.077) (0.121) (0.068) (0.092)
Ri al 0.146 − 0.001 − 0.035 − 0.273**
(0.075) (0.118) (0.069) (0.090)
De eloped − 0.017 0.072 − 0.146* 0.296***
(0.076) (0.117) (0.073) (0.087)
Unde de eloped 0.171* 0.318** 0.081 − 0.159
(0.073) (0.114) (0.078) (0.099)
Mili a y S ong − 0.002 0.066 − 0.106 − 0.030
(0.075) (0.122) (0.070) (0.085)
Mili a y Weak 0.087 − 0.042 0.083 0.279**
(0.071) (0.116) (0.070) (0.088)
Demog aphic con ols Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cons an 4.754*** 5.385*** 6.023*** 6.143***
(0.305) (0.280) (0.385) (0.274)
Indi idual- igne e in e cep 0.30*** 0.25** 0.55*** 0.07
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05)
Obse a ions 5824 5824 6016 6041
Numbe o g oups 1456 1456 1512 1512
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
op ion when ea ed by “inc ease,” and “keep as is” op ion when ea ed by “keep as
is” signal.8
The esul s exhibi se e al pa e ns: One, he s onges e ec s on ecip o-
cal beha io is always caused by “keep as is.” When he o he coun ies signal no
changes in hei posi ions, o e s s ongly p e e o main ain he s a us quo in bo h
expe imen s and bo h coun ies. Second, pa icula ly when cued by “dec ease”
and “inc ease” ea men s, he inclina ion o ecip oca e is conside ably highe in
he ade expe imen han in he UN expe imen . Thi d, in pa allel o ou indings
on coope a ion, in he UN expe imen , he Ame ican esponden s a e signi ican ly
less likely o ecip oca e owa d nega i e (dec ease) signals and a e mo e likely o
ecip oca e owa d posi i e (inc ease) signals compa ed o he Tu kish esponden s.
Fou h, in con as , in he ade expe imen , o all h ee ypes o signals, compa ed
o he Ame ican sample, he Tu kish esponden s a e signi ican ly mo e likely o
emula e he pa ne signal.
We ha e shown ha esponden s a e gene ally sensi i e o he ac ions o pa -
ne coun ies and end o ecip oca e on ma e s o poli ical and economic coope a-
ion. Howe e , do u u e assessmen s a ec indi iduals’ endency o ecip oca e, as
hypo hesized in H2a and H2b?
Dec ease
Keep as is
Inc ease
Policy signal (3-ca )
.2 .4 .6 .8
US Tu key
UN Expe imen
Dec ease
Keep as is
Inc ease
.2 .4 .6 .8
US Tu key
T ade Expe imen
Fig. 2 P edic i e ma gins o policy signal (3 ca ego ies) on ecip oci y. The x-axis p esen s he p edic ed
ma gins o ca ego ical Policy signal ea men (3-ca .) on he dependen a iable, ecip oci y, o he US
and Tu key, based on mul ile el es ima es. Ho izon al lines indica e 95% obus con idence in e als
8 Co esponding eg ession ables on coun y-le el di e ences in ea men e ec s o bo h dependen
a iables a e a ailable in Online Appendix B2.
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
To es his, in Figu e3we plo he condi ional e ec s o he wo policy ea -
men s, “inc ease” and “dec ease,” on he ou come a iable, ecip oci y, ac oss he
ange o economic wo ies ( he co esponding eg ession esul s as well as mean-
compa ison es s a e in Online Appendix A-3 and A-4). Subs an ially, he plo es i-
ma es epo he p edic ed p obabili y o ecip oca ing o esponden s wi h di e en
economic expec a ions when manipula ed by posi i e o nega i e signals. In each
subg aph, he ed line deno es he sample mean o he ou come a iable.
The esul s show ha in line wi h ou hypo heses, posi i e and nega i e signals
exe signi ican ly di e ging e ec s o esponden s wi h economic wo ies. In bo h
expe imen s, hose who expec hei economic condi ions o imp o e ei he do no
eac di e en ly o he “inc ease” and “dec ease” signals o a e mo e likely o ewa d
posi i e signals han hey a e o punish nega i e signals (as in he case o Ame icans
who expec “somewha be e ” condi ions). Ye , we obse e he opposi e endency
among hose wi h pessimis ic economic assessmen s.
In he UN expe imen , when o he coun ies signal an inc ease in hei con i-
bu ions, only be ween 15 and 20% o hese pessimis indi iduals in ei he coun y
ecip oca e posi i ely and consen o highe con ibu ions. Howe e , when o he
coun ies cu hei con ibu ions, o e 43% choose o ollow sui and penalize de ec-
ion. Mo eo e , he pessimis ic indi iduals’ inclina ion o ecip oca e s a kly con-
as wi h hose o op imis s, as we p oposed. Fo ins ance, compa ed o Ame icans
Much be e
Somewha be e
Abou he same
Somewha wo se
Much wo se
Economic wo ies
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
US- UN
Much be e
Somewha be e
Abou he same
Somewha wo se
Much wo se
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Tu key- UN
Much be e
Somewha be e
Abou he same
Somewha wo se
Much wo se
Economic wo ies
.2 .4 .6 .8
US- T ade
Much be e
Somewha be e
Abou he same
Somewha wo se
Much wo se
.2 .4 .6 .8
Tu key- T ade
P edic i e Ma gins o Economic Wo ies wi h 95% CIs
Dec easeInc ease
Policy Signal
Fig. 3 P edic i e ma gins o economic wo ies condi ional on policy signal. The x-axis p esen s he p e-
dic ed ma gins o Economic wo ies on he dependen a iable, ecip oci y, o Inc ease and Dec ease
ca ego ies o Policy signal ea men , based on mul ile el es ima es. Ho izon al lines indica e 95% obus
con idence in e als. The ed line deno es sample mean
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
who expec “much be e ” economic condi ions, esponden s wi h “much wo se”
expec a ions a e 23.7% less likely o ecip oca e wi h inc eased con ibu ions, bu
30.6% mo e likely o ma ch “dec ease” signals, bo h signi ican a 0.001 le el. We
obse e a simila end among he Tu kish esponden s: Compa ed o he mos op i-
mis g oups, he mos pessimis s a e 8.6% (p- alue 0.051) less likely o espond o
posi i e (inc ease con ibu ions) signals, bu 17.6% (p- alue 0.002) mo e likely o
espond in kind owa d nega i e (dec ease) signals. Subs an ially, he esul s o he
UN expe imen lend ample e idence o bo h H2a and H2b.
Fo he ade scena io, a la gely symme ical pic u e eme ges. Wi h he excep-
ion o “somewha wo se” in he US, o hose wi h economic wo ies in bo h coun-
ies, he p edic ed p obabili y o ecip oca ing he posi i e signals o educed a i
ba ie s is signi ican ly lowe han he mean. Along he same line, when in o med
abou noncoope a ion— ha is ising a i s agains home coun y-, he same g oups’
p edic ed p obabili y o ecip oca ing ises o o e 50%. Equally in o ma i e, we
obse e signi ican ly di e en ea men e ec s be ween hose on he opposi e ends
o economic expec a ions. When cued wi h a posi i e “dec ease” ( ade ba ie s)
ea men , hese wo g oups do no di e in hei inclina ion o ecip oci y, unlike
wha we p oposed in H2a. Con e sely, con i ming wha we expec ed in H2b, when
cued by a nega i e “inc ease” ( a i s) ea men , hose who expec “much wo se”
condi ions a e signi ican ly mo e likely o ecip oca e han hose who expec “much
be e ” condi ions—by 12.5% in he US (p- alue = 0.11) and 21.8% in Tu key
(p- alue = 0.000).
In he Online Appendix A-5, we also cha he a e age ma ginal e ec s o eco-
nomic wo ies plo ed o each ca ego y o a ge ac ion. Fo he UN igne e, in
bo h samples, he ma ginal e ec o economic wo ies is posi i e and s a is ically
signi ican in educing con ibu ions by he a ge coun ies, as he 95% con idence
in e als do no c oss ze o. In o he wo ds, when o he coun ies educe hei UN
dues, each uni inc ease in economic pessimism signi ican ly inc eases he p obabil-
i y o he esponden s ecip oca ing and op ing o lowe con ibu ions. On he o he
hand, when o he coun ies inc ease hei dues—o keep hem as hey a e in he
US expe imen —economic pessimism educes he likelihood o ecip ocal beha -
io , and esponden s become c i ical o con ibu ing mo e. In he ade expe imen ,
he ma ginal e ec s o economic wo ies a e s a is ically signi ican o he a ge
ac ions o “inc easing” a i ba ie s; in he e en o ising ade disc imina ion
agains na ional expo s, economic pessimism makes esponden s mo e inclined o
e alia e.
These esul s es ablish ha indi iduals’ nega i e ma e ial assessmen s do no nec-
essa ily cause hem o ecip oca e less on a e age. In ac , when o he coun ies sig-
nal uncoope a i e beha io , hose wi h nega i e u u e assessmen s become mo e
likely o ecip oca e by displaying uncoope a i e beha io hemsel es, a inding
obus ly p esen in bo h issue a eas and bo h samples. Howe e , pessimis ic expec-
a ions a he mic o le el make indi iduals less sensi i e o he posi i e signals o
o he coun ies and hence less likely o ecip oca e as we p oposed and ound e i-
dence in ou UN expe imen . In o he wo ds, nega i e p ospec i e expec a ions
induce indi iduals o become mo e un o gi ing o nega i e ac ions and less gene -
ous owa d he a o able ac ions o o he coun ies.
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Signal Sou ce E ec s andRobus ness Checks
The signal sou ce ea men o ou expe imen al design allows us o in es iga e
he exac pa ne a ibu es ha sway o e s’ inclina ion o ecip oca e. We p e-
sen he indings o his complemen a y analysis in he Online Appendix (A-6).
The esul s show ha esponden s in bo h coun ies display signi ican ly posi-
i e a i udes owa d mili a ily weak and unde de eloped coun ies such ha
hey ei he a e less likely o penalize hei uncoope a i e beha io (US—bo h
expe imen s) o mo e likely o ewa d hei coope a i e beha io (Tu key— ade
expe imen ). Tu kish esponden s a e also mo e likely o ecip oca e he ac ions
o Muslim coun ies ha educe hei a i ba ie s. The a ying e ec s o coun-
y ypes on ecip ocal o eign policy p e e ences may be d i en by conce ns
o e equi y (i.e., a ying con ibu ions a e accep able as long as hey a e p opo -
ional o coun y capabili ies) o cul u al a ini y (in he Tu kish case). Cau ion
is wa an ed agains an o e -in e p e a ion o hese coun y e ec s, howe e , as
ou design does no allow us o iden i y he causal mechanisms on why espond-
en s a e mo e sensi i e o he signals o pa icula ypes o coun ies o e o h-
e s. Fu u e esea ch could p o ide g ea e illumina ion ia in es iga ion o signal
sou ce e ec s in d i ing inclina ion o ecip oca e, wi h mo e ine-g ained expe i-
men al designs cus omized o his pu pose.
Two obus ness checks a e pe o med. Fi s , o es H2a and H2b, we gauge indi-
iduals’ u u e assessmen s wi h an al e na i e ques ion, in which esponden s a e
asked how op imis ic hey a e abou hei u u es in gene al ( om 1 = ex emely
op imis ic, o 5 = ex emely pessimis ic), and e un he models using gene al pes-
simism da a and i s in e ac ion wi h he policy signal (A-7). Second, we epea ou
analyses on he ull sample including esponden s ha ailed he a en ion check
(A-8).9 Though some o he signi icance le els weaken, he esul s o bo h checks
a e ully in line wi h p e ious indings.
Addi ionally, we cons uc a a iable called s ic ecip oci y, which deno es
esponses ha only ma ch bo h he di ec ion and deg ee o he policy signal. 27.2%
o Ame icans and 18% o Tu ks in he UN expe imen , and 32.8% o Ame icans and
36.6% o Tu ks in he ade expe imen ollowed his s ic ly igid i - o - a s a -
egy. Nex , we sc u inize i p ospec i e economic assessmen s cause esponden s o
espond o o he coun ies’ signals by e alia ing wi h he exac same magni ude as
communica ed in he signal. In wo a ian s o ou expe imen s— he UN expe imen
in he US and he ade expe imen in Tu key— he esul s a e ex emely simila o
he esul s ob ained o elaxed ecip oci y. In he UN expe imen , Ame icans wi h
nega i e assessmen s a e less likely o mimic coope a i e signals, hough mo e so
owa d uncoope a i e signals. In he ade expe imen , Tu kish esponden s a e mo e
likely o penalize uncoope a i e signals by p e e ing he exac same e alia ion. In
9 This obus ness check was only o he Ame ican sample, as we do no ha e eco ded da a o hose
who ail he a en ion checks in he Tu kish su ey.
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Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
1 3
he o he wo a ian s, he esul s un pa allel o ou main indings, hough conside -
ably weake in deg ee and p esen only o speci ic subg oups.10
Conclusion
In his pape , we in es iga ed i ecip oci y mo i a es indi iduals’ p e e ences on
in e na ional coope a ion h ough IOs and on ade, and he ex en o which hese
p e e ences a e mode a ed by nega i e ma e ial expec a ions. Fo he empi ical anal-
ysis, we elied on da a acqui ed om wo ac o ial igne e expe imen s ielded wi h
o e 3000 esponden s in he US and Tu key. By manipula ing o he coun ies’ o -
eign policy decisions wi h espec o hei con ibu ions o he UN and a i a es
is-à- is su ey coun y expo s, andomly assigning pa icipan s in o a ious ea -
men g oups, and holding all o he a iables cons an , we we e able o isola e he
independen e ec s o he ea men condi ions.
The esul s exhibi he s ong p esence o ecip oci y in d i ing indi idual p e -
e ences wi h espec o in e na ional coope a ion. In bo h expe imen s, a subs an-
ial numbe o sample esponden s eac ed posi i ely o he coope a i e signals o
o he coun ies and nega i ely o uncoope a i e ones. A he same ime, he e we e
some a ia ions in how esponden s eac ed o posi i e and nega i e signals ac oss
coun y samples. In he US, he deg ee o ewa ding coope a i e beha io by o he
coun ies was g ea e han penalizing uncoope a i e signals. In Tu key in con as ,
esponden s we e mo e un o gi ing o de ec ion han hey we e o ewa ding g ea e
coope a ion.
When he mode a ing ole o indi iduals’ ma e ial assessmen s on hei inclina-
ion o ecip oca e a e sc u inized, we obse e ha bleak e alua ions o economic
u u e p oduced s ong shi s away om posi i e ecip oci y owa d nega i e eci-
p oci y. Speci ically, economic pessimism makes indi iduals signi ican ly mo e
likely o penalize a ge coun ies’ nega i e ac ions by esponding in kind while
impeding hem om esponding posi i ely o a ge s’ posi i e ac ions. These esul s
we e obus o bo h coun y samples.
Empi ically, we ound ha on wo issue domains, namely con ibu ions o he UN
and bila e al ade ela ions, indi idual o eign policy p e e ences a e subs an ially
impac ed by how o he coun ies ac . One po en ial policy implica ion o his ind-
ing is ha leade s can pe suade hei elec o a e on pa icula domains o in e na ional
coope a ion by cueing hem abou he ac ions o o he coun ies. Howe e , gi en ha
bleak expec a ions o he u u e make indi iduals less esponsi e o he posi i e sig-
nals o o he coun ies and mo e so o nega i e ones, populis leade s who seek o dis-
suade o e s om being pa o in e na ional communi y seem o ha e highe chances
o success han hose championing o deepe poli ical and economic in eg a ion.
10 Fo ins ance, in he UN expe imen , hose wi h somewha wo se expec a ions in Tu key a e signi i-
can ly mo e likely o ma ch uncoope a i e signals compa ed o somewha be e expec a ions, as we p o-
posed (6.5%, p- alue 0.001). Ye , we do no obse e any s a is ically di e en eac ion owa d dec ease
signals be ween hose wi h “much be e ” and “much wo se” expec a ions a 0.05 le el, e en hough he
e ec s a e in he hypo hesized di ec ion (4.9%, p- alue 0.116).
1033
1 3
Poli ical Beha io (2024) 46:1013–1035
Ou esul s con ibu e o he lou ishing li e a u e ha explo es he ole o beha -
io al no ms and social p e e ences in d i ing indi idual o eign policy a i udes (e.g.,
B u ge & Ra hbun, 2021; K eps & Maxey, 2017; Powe s e al., 2022; Yeung &
Quek, 2022). Speaking o his body o esea ch, ou indings sugges ha he e ec
o such no ms, i.e., ecip oci y, is no uni o m ac oss indi iduals, bu a he a y
based on hei u u e assessmen s. A he same ime, ou s udy iden i ies new a enues
o u u e esea ch. Though we assumed ha indi iduals’ assessmen s o hei own
ma e ial u u es a ec hei o eign policy a i udes by cueing hem abou he s a e o
he economy in gene al and he budge a y implica ions o in e na ional coope a ion,
u u e s udies could be e disen angle he ole o ego opic e sus socio opic dynam-
ics and shed mo e ligh on he economic and psychological mo i a ions. Fu he s ud-
ies can also explo e he ex en o which he leng h o ime ho izon and p e e ence
o immedia e payo s a enua e he inclina ion o ecip oca e posi i e signals. On a
b oade le el, ano he a enue o esea ch could be in es iga ions in o o he indi id-
ual-le el cha ac e is ics such as pe sonali y ai s, cogni i e biases, pa isanship, o
gene al o eign policy disposi ions ha may a ec he inclina ion o ecip oca e.
Supplemen a y In o ma ion The online e sion con ains supplemen a y ma e ial a ailable a h ps:// doi.
o g/ 10. 1007/ s11109- 023- 09857-y.
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Publishe ’s No e Sp inge Na u e emains neu al wi h ega d o ju isdic ional claims in published maps
and ins i u ional a ilia ions.
