Zou, Hailiang; Huang, Simei
A icle
Ou side CEOs' hesi ancy owa d en i onmen al esponsibili y and
he go e nance ole o boa d social capi al: E idence om pollu ion-
in ensi e i ms in China
Adminis a i e Sciences
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
MDPI – Mul idisciplina y Digi al Publishing Ins i u e, Basel
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Zou, Hailiang; Huang, Simei (2025) : Ou side CEOs' hesi ancy owa d
en i onmen al esponsibili y and he go e nance ole o boa d social capi al: E idence om
pollu ion-in ensi e i ms in China, Adminis a i e Sciences, ISSN 2076-3387, MDPI, Basel, Vol. 15,
Iss. 5, pp. 1-24,
h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/admsci15050162
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/321306
S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen
Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den.
Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle
Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich
machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen.
So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen
(insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en,
gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do
genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e.
Te ms o use:
Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal
and schola ly pu poses.
You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o
exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he
in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public.
I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en
Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise
u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence.
h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/
Recei ed: 12 Ma ch 2025
Re ised: 17 Ap il 2025
Accep ed: 24 Ap il 2025
Published: 27 Ap il 2025
Ci a ion: Zou, H., & Huang, S. (2025).
Ou side CEOs’ Hesi ancy Towa d
En i onmen al Responsibili y and he
Go e nance Role o Boa d Social
Capi al: E idence om Pollu ion-
In ensi e Fi ms in China.
Adminis a i e Sciences,15(5), 162.
h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/
admsci15050162
Copy igh : © 2025 by he au ho s.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Swi ze land.
This a icle is an open access a icle
dis ibu ed unde he e ms and
condi ions o he C ea i e Commons
A ibu ion (CC BY) license
(h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/
licenses/by/4.0/).
A icle
Ou side CEOs’ Hesi ancy Towa d En i onmen al Responsibili y
and he Go e nance Role o Boa d Social Capi al: E idence om
Pollu ion-In ensi e Fi ms in China
Hailiang Zou and Simei Huang *
SILC Business School, Shanghai Uni e si y, Shanghai 201800, China; [email p o ec ed]
*Co espondence: [email p o ec ed]
Abs ac : While ou side chie execu i e o ice s (CEOs) a e o en iewed as ca alys s o
s a egic change compa ed o hei inside coun e pa s, his s udy e eals hei po en ial
o unde mine i ms’ en i onmen al esponsibili y. In eg a ing agency heo y wi h social
capi al heo y, we in es iga e whe he and how boa d-le el social capi al can mode a e
he sus ainabili y isks associa ed wi h ou side CEO succession. Using a panel da ase o
989 pollu ion-in ensi e Chinese i ms om 2010 o 2022, we apply p opensi y sco e ma ch-
ing (PSM) o educe endogenei y in CEO succession decisions, ollowed by ixed-e ec s
eg essions. The empi ical esul s show ha ou side CEOs, pa icula ly du ing hei ea ly
enu e, a e mo e likely o p io i ize sho - e m inancial pe o mance o e en i onmen al
goals—due o limi ed i m-speci ic knowledge and heigh ened ex e nal p essu e. Howe e ,
ex e nal boa d social capi al (e.g., ies o go e nmen and indus y associa ions) enhances
esou ce access and pos -appoin men accoun abili y, while in e nal social capi al (e.g.,
co-wo king expe ience among di ec o s) es ablishes common no ms ha acili a e s a egic
con inui y. This s udy posi ions boa d social capi al as a ela ional go e nance mechanism
ha complemen s o mal o e sigh . The indings con ibu e o succession and en i onmen-
al esea ch by linking execu i e o igin o sus ainabili y ou comes and p o ide p ac ical
guidance on le e aging boa d ne wo ks o suppo leade ship ansi ions.
Keywo ds: ou side CEO; en i onmen al esponsibili y; boa d social capi al
1. In oduc ion
As China in ensi ies en i onmen al en o cemen h ough ini ia i es such as he En i-
onmen al P o ec ion “F on unne ” Sys em (2015) and he Blue-Sky P o ec ion Campaign
(2018–2020), pollu ion-in ensi e i ms ace a leade ship dilemma: balancing en i onmen al
esponsibili y wi h inancial pe o mance. This ension in ensi ies du ing CEO ansi ions,
when s a egic adjus men s, sho - e m pe o mance p essu e, and heigh ened s akeholde
expec a ions inc ease he complexi y o decision-making.
A key dimension o CEO succession lies in whe he he new leade is p omo ed om
wi hin o hi ed ex e nally, aising he ques ion o whe he ou side CEOs a e mo e hes-
i an abou en i onmen al esponsibili y han inside CEOs. While ou side CEOs o en
d i e s a egic change (Ka ae li & Zajac,2013), inno a ion (Cucculelli,2018), and i m
pe o mance (Geo gakakis & Ruig ok,2017), hey ypically lack i m-speci ic expe ise
(Cummings & Kno ,2018), his o ical con ex , and he s akeholde ne wo ks equi ed
o add ess en i onmen al issues. As a esul , hey ace a s eepe lea ning cu e. Mo e-
o e , sho - e m pe o mance p essu es om sha eholde s (Hu zschen eu e e al.,2012;
D. Li e al.,2017) may push ou side CEOs owa d symbolic compliance (e.g., g eenwashing)
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/admsci15050162
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 2 o 24
a he han subs an i e en i onmen al in es men s. This end migh be magni ied in
China, whe e en i onmen al ini ia i es a e gene ally posi i ely ela ed o i m pe o mance
(Akba e al.,2021;Gao e al.,2023;J. Wang e al.,2021;X. Zhang e al.,2023), bu impose
immedia e inancial cos s (Song e al.,2017), leading in es o s o p io i ize p o i abili y o e
sus ainabili y (Guo e al.,2020;J. Meng & Zhang,2022). The e o e, we posi ha ou side
CEOs a e less engaged in en i onmen al esponsibili y han in e nally p omo ed CEOs.
The boa d, as a co e go e nance mechanism o o e sigh and esou ce p o ision,
has been widely s udied h ough cha ac e is ics such as boa d independence (Al es,2023;
De Villie s e al.,2011), boa d di e si y (O ij e al.,2021;Zhu & Shen,2016), and in e lock
e ec s (Ding e al.,2021;Maswadi & Am an,2023). Recen s udies highligh he impo -
an go e nance ole o boa d social capi al (Ga cía-Gómez e al.,2023;Jeb an e al.,2022;
Regue a-Al a ado & B a o-U quiza,2022). In his s udy, we p opose ha boa d social
capi al may shape he ole o ou side CEOs because i can e ec i ely elie e agency p ob-
lems (Hoi e al.,2019;Ja akhadze e al.,2016). D awing on social capi al heo y, we a gue
ha boa ds ope a e as ela ional ne wo ks ha acili a e s a egic coo dina ion (Adle &
Kwon,2002) and cons ain ou side CEO disc e ion (Hoi e al.,2019;Saue wald e al.,2016),
leading o be e s a egic decisions (Tian e al.,2011). Ex e nally, ies o egula o s, indus y
associa ions, and pee i ms imp o e in o ma ion access (Adle & Kwon,2002;P e e &
Salancik,2015;Tian e al.,2011;Z. Wang e al.,2019) o acili a e candida e sc eening and
impose accoun abili y h ough s akeholde isibili y and benchma king p essu es (Baah
e al.,2021;Konadu e al.,2020). In e nally, di ec o s’ sha ed expe ience os e s aci knowl-
edge and o ganiza ional memo y (Abbas e al.,2024;Adle & Kwon,2002;Inkpen & Tsang,
2016;P e e & Salancik,2015;Wood e al.,2021), which p o ide he in o ma ional ounda-
ion o s a egic con inui y. These expe iences also cul i a e in o mal no ms ha shape
beha io al expec a ions and ein o ce alignmen wi h long- e m goals. In China’s ela ional
go e nance con ex , hese e ec s a e ampli ied by collec i is alues and ecip oci y-based
expec a ions. Acco dingly, boa d social capi al complemen s o mal o e sigh and helps
mi iga e he en i onmen al isks associa ed wi h ou side CEO appoin men s.
While p io esea ch has examined he inancial ou comes o ou side CEO succession
(G. Chen & Hamb ick,2012;Geo gakakis & Ruig ok,2017), i s implica ions o non- inancial
domains such as en i onmen al esponsibili y emain unde explo ed. Mo eo e , ew
s udies conside how go e nance mechanisms, such as boa d social capi al, may bu e
hese e ec s, pa icula ly in eme ging ma ke con ex s.
This s udy aims o examine whe he ou side-appoin ed CEOs a e less commi ed
o en i onmen al esponsibili y han inside-p omo ed ones and how boa d social capi al
mode a es his ela ionship. To es ou hypo heses, we cons uc a panel da ase o 989 A-
sha e lis ed i ms in pollu ion-in ensi e indus ies in China, co e ing he pe iod om 2010
o 2022. We employ PSM o add ess po en ial selec ion bias in CEO appoin men s and use
ixed-e ec s eg essions o es ima e he main and mode a ing e ec s. This s udy con ibu es
o CEO succession and en i onmen al go e nance esea ch by e ealing ou side CEOs’
hesi a ion abou en i onmen al esponsibili y. I explo es how i ms balance sho - e m
p essu es wi h long- e m commi men s h ough in e nal alignmen and ex e nal ne wo ks,
highligh ing he ole o boa d social capi al in eme ging economies.
2. Li e a u e Re iew
2.1. CEO In luence on En i onmen al Responsibili y
CEO cha ac e is ics shape i ms’ en i onmen al s a egies. P io s udies epo mixed e -
ec s o CEO succession: some sugges i enhances co po a e sus ainabili y ini ia i es (Be na d
e al.,2018;Gu e al.,2021), while o he s ind no signi ican link (X. H. Meng e al.,2013). The
in luence o CEO powe and enu e is simila ly nuanced—powe ul CEOs may ei he suppo
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 3 o 24
o neglec en i onmen al e o s (F ancoeu e al.,2021;Gull e al.,2023), and longe enu e
ends o dampen en i onmen al pe o mance (Khan e al.,2020). In con as , newly appoin ed
CEOs ocus mo e on en i onmen al ini ia i es as a s a egy o build epu a ions ea ly in hei
enu e (Al-Shae e al.,2023).
Backg ound-speci ic expe ise eme ges as a key ac o . CEOs wi h en i onmen al
expe ise mi iga e liabili y and imp o e en i onmen al pe o mance (X. Li e al.,2024;
Walls & Be one,2017). B oade educa ion (e.g., MBA deg ees) and unc ional expe ience
(e.g., esea ch and de elopmen [R&D], inance, ma ke ing) enhance CEOs’ inno a ion and
insigh capaci y o align sus ainabili y wi h s akeholde expec a ions (H. Huang e al.,2023;
Shahab e al.,2020;Zhou e al.,2021). In e na ional exposu e links o be e sus ainabili y
pe o mance by ans e ing ad anced p ac ices om global ma ke s (Quan e al.,2021;
Y. Wang e al.,2022).
2.2. Ou side CEO Succession: S a egic Ca alys o Dis up i e Fo ce?
The choice be ween inside and ou side CEO succession hinges on s a egic con ex .
Fi ms op o ou side CEOs o d i e s a egic change (Jalal & P ezas,2012), o e come
pe o mance c ises (Ba on e al.,2011;Jalal & P ezas,2012), o compensa e o weak
in e nal alen pools (Ag awal e al.,2006). Ou side s b ing no el knowledge (Cucculelli,
2018;Ramachand an,2018) and signal s a egic enewal o in es o s (Connelly e al.,2016).
Howe e , om an agency heo y lens, ou side s may p io i ize pe sonal in e es s o e
hose o he i m (Da idson e al.,2002).
Empi ical e idence is di ided in o compe ing pe spec i es. On one hand, compa ed
o inside CEOs embedded in social ne wo ks ha en ench s a egic ine ia (Ka ae li &
Zajac,2013), ou side CEOs dis up ine ia h ough no el amewo ks (Cucculelli,2018;
Ramachand an,2018) and possess ich expe ience (e.g., engagemen wi h boa d di e si y)
o enhance pe o mance (Geo gakakis & Ruig ok,2017). On he o he hand, ou side CEOs
o en exace ba e in o ma ion asymme y (Y. Zhang,2008) and dis up o ganiza ional s abil-
i y (Y. Zhang & Rajagopalan,2004), which may ampli y pe o mance ola ili y (Quigley
e al.,2019). Thei limi ed i m-speci ic expe ise impedes inno a ion as i hinde s e icien
esou ce alloca ion (Cummings & Kno ,2018).
2.3. Boa d Social Capi al
The boa d unc ions bo h as a moni o ing body (agency heo y) and a s a egic esou ce
p o ide ( esou ce dependence heo y). I is in luenced by social capi al, which e e s o he
ela ional asse s embedded in di ec o s’ in e nal and ex e nal ne wo ks (Haynes & Hillman,
2010;Hillman & Dalziel,2003;Kim & Cannella,2008). Social capi al heo y desc ibes
wo in e dependen dimensions: ex e nal (“b idging”) capi al—de i ed om in e locking
di ec o ships and indus y ies—and in e nal (“bonding”) capi al— oo ed in sha ed enu e
and no ms among di ec o s (Abbas e al.,2024;Adle & Kwon,2002;Inkpen & Tsang,2016;
Kim & Cannella,2008;P e e & Salancik,2015;Tian e al.,2011;Wood e al.,2021).
2.3.1. Boa d Ex e nal Social Capi al
Boa d ex e nal social capi al se es as a s a egic channel o esou ce acquisi ion and
go e nance e ec i eness. By holding cen al posi ions in hese ne wo ks, boa ds os e
collabo a ion and esou ce mobiliza ion (Z. Wang e al.,2019) while a ac ing eli e di ec-
o s who s eng hen moni o ing (Saue wald e al.,2016). In e locking di ec o a es p o ide
aluable in o ma ion lows ha suppo CEOs in R&D decisions (H. L. Chen e al.,2013)
and inancial planning (Jeb an e al.,2022;Kim & Cannella,2008;Pé ez-Cale o e al.,2016).
Indus y-embedded ies deepen indus y-speci ic expe ise (Ko & Misangyi,2008), d i ing
i m g ow h (Ko & Sunda amu hy,2009), inno a ion (Kla ne e al.,2020), and en i onmen-
al managemen (Shui e al.,2022). These ne wo ks also p omo e s a egic alliances (Bicen
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 4 o 24
e al.,2021), ad anced managemen p ac ices (Ba oso-Cas o e al.,2011), and secu e c i ical
inancial capi al (Uzzi & Gillespie,2002). Howe e , he bene i s a e in luenced by CEO powe :
while ex e nal ies mi iga e co po a e social esponsibili y (CSR) gaps (Fe a is e al.,2024),
powe ul CEOs may co-op hese ne wo ks o supp ess CSR ini ia i es (Mu akin e al.,2018).
In addi ion, ex e nal ies en ail go e nance ade-o s: mul iple di ec o ships lead o
ole o e load, educing moni o ing e ec i eness (Fich & Shi dasani,2006), while poli ically
embedded boa ds migh supp ess CSR disclosu e o p o ec epu a ional in e es s (Maswadi
& Am an,2023;Ramón-Llo ens e al.,2019). No ably, while powe ul CEOs exploi ex e nal
connec ions o expand inancial disc e ion (Saue wald e al.,2016), obus ex e nal capi al con-
s ains manage ial oppo unism by limi ing CEO en ex ac ion (Hoi e al.,2019), mi iga ing
c ash isks (Jeb an e al.,2022), and ele a ing CSR epo ing s anda ds (Regue a-Al a ado &
B a o-U quiza,2022).
2.3.2. Boa d In e nal Social Capi al
Boa d in e nal social capi al enhances go e nance e icacy by os e ing us and co-
hesion. These “bonding” ies imp o e he quali y o s a egic ad ice (Tian e al.,2011)
and educe coo dina ion cos s, se ing as a c ucial compensa o y esou ce when ex e nal
ne wo ks a e cons ained (Ba oso-Cas o e al.,2016). Sha ed no ms and alues p omo e
aligned expec a ions and commi men s among di ec o s, helping o mi iga e agency p ob-
lems such as excessi e CEO e u ns (Hoi e al.,2019;Saue wald e al.,2016). Howe e ,
hese bene i s may be weakened when powe ul CEOs manipula e in o ma ion lows o
in luence moni o ing no ms o se e hei own in e es s (Saue wald e al.,2016).
While in e nal cohesion gene ally mi iga es agency isks, excessi e amilia i y o
boa d homogenei y isks s a egic ine ia (Haynes & Hillman,2010) and g oup hink
(D. A. Ha is & Hel a ,2007). Some s udies link dense in e nal ies o heigh ened s ock
c ash isks (Jeb an e al.,2022). None heless, such dys unc ions emain ma ginal in p ac ice
due o limi ed boa d in e ac ion equency, eme ging only when in e nal social capi al
eaches excep ionally high le els (Ba oso-Cas o e al.,2016).
3. Hypo hesis De elopmen
3.1. Ou side CEOs and En i onmen al Responsibili y
Ou side succession is cha ac e ized by heigh ened in o ma ion asymme y and mis-
aligned incen i es (Peppe & Go e,2015). Unlike inside CEOs, whose ca ee pa hs a e
aligned wi h long- e m o ganiza ional goals, ou side CEOs o en ace p essu e o deli e
immedia e inancial ou comes. To mi iga e agency isks, boa ds commonly impose sho -
e m me ics (Y. Zhang & Rajagopalan,2010), which may lead ou side CEOs o p io i ize
sho - e m inancial pe o mance a he expense o long- e m en i onmen al sus ainabili y—
an e ec u he ein o ced by in es o expec a ions (J. Meng & Zhang,2022;Y. Zhang &
Rajagopalan,2010). Mo eo e , ea ly- enu e insecu i y exace ba es his endency, di e ing
esou ces om en i onmen al ini ia i es owa d immedia e inancial gains.
Inside CEOs a e embedded in s ong ela ional ne wo ks, including ies wi h p e-
decesso s, di ec o s, and key s akeholde s, which enhance hei commi men o exis ing
s a egic p io i ies. These ela ional ies os e no ma i e accoun abili y, inc easing he
cos s associa ed wi h de ia ing om sus ainabili y commi men s. Gi en ha social ne -
wo k embeddedness is a key d i e o execu i es’ commi men o social esponsibili y
(Chahine e al.,2019,2021;Mu akin e al.,2018;L. Wang e al.,2023), ou side CEOs lacking
such connec ions ypically ace less p essu e o uphold en i onmen al commi men s. They
end o ha e g ea e s a egic lexibili y, which may lead o he e mina ion o downsizing
o en i onmen al esponsibili y ini ia i es.
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 5 o 24
E ec i e en i onmen al go e nance necessi a es di e se expe ise o na iga e ope a-
ional complexi ies and egula o y unce ain ies. Howe e , ou side hi es o en expe ience
a compe ency gap, as hei p io manage ial expe ience may no align wi h he i m’s
speci ic en i onmen al challenges. E en high-pe o ming ou side CEOs may s uggle o
in eg a e en i onmen al conside a ions in o co po a e s a egy, as success in p e ious oles
does no gua an ee an unde s anding o he ocal i m’s unique en i onmen al needs. In
con as , inside CEOs can le e age o ganiza ional memo y and aci knowledge (Y. Zhang
& Rajagopalan,2010) o p omo e sus ainable en i onmen al go e nance.
Hypo hesis 1. Ou side CEOs exhibi lowe en i onmen al esponsibili y han inside CEOs.
3.2. Boa d Social Capi al as a Go e nance Mode a o
3.2.1. Ex e nal Boa d Social Capi al: Resou ce Access and Accoun abili y
Boa ds endowed wi h s ong ex e nal social capi al shape CEO beha io s h ough
access o s a egic esou ces and accoun abili y mechanisms.
Du ing CEO selec ion, ex e nal social capi al p o ides boa ds wi h exclusi e and
up- o-da e insigh s in o po en ial candida es (Tian e al.,2011). Gi en he con iden ial
na u e o CEO hi ing decisions, in o ma ion om us ed sou ces, such as eli e connec ions,
is pa icula ly aluable. These ex e nal ies ac as a “window” o he b oade pe spec i e,
o e ing epu a ional insigh s and s a egic in o ma ion (Pe y & Peye ,2005;P e e &
Salancik,2015), enhancing i m alue (Pe y & Peye ,2005) and educing scanning cos s.
Di ec o s wi h c oss-indus y expe ience a e be e equipped o make in o med hi ing
decisions (Tian e al.,2011), while epu a ional signals help il e ou candida es p one o
symbolic compliance. This educes in o ma ion asymme y (Fogel e al.,2018), aligning he
in e es s o he new CEO and he boa d (Wie sema e al.,2018).
CEO e alua ion is a specialized go e nance unc ion equi ing indus y-speci ic ex-
pe ise and p i ileged access o s a egic da a—compe encies uniquely held by he boa d
(Cha an,2005). Di ec o s wi h ex e nal ies a e be e posi ioned o de elop his expe ise
(Tian e al.,2011); hei b oade unde s anding o co po a e s a egy, execu ion, and pe o -
mance me ics enables hem o se clea s anda ds o new hi es. In he pos -appoin men
phase, boa ds wi h s ong ex e nal social capi al can ins i u ionalize en i onmen al ac-
coun abili y. Fi s , hey ac i a e epu a ional eedback loops by benchma king en i on-
men al pe o mance agains indus y leade s and exposing CEOs o sc u iny om ex e nal
s akeholde s (Baah e al.,2021;Konadu e al.,2020). Second, hey ansla e ex e nal ma -
ke signals in o measu able incen i e s uc u es ied o en i onmen al ou comes. This
p omo es long- e mism by embedding en i onmen al esponsibili y in o pe o mance
e alua ion amewo ks.
Simul aneously, ex e nal social capi al imp o es i ms’ access o esou ces such as
g een subsidies o egula o y suppo , which can educe he inancial bu den o ea ly-s age
sus ainable ini ia i es. By s aying a uned o e ol ing policy egimes, s akeholde expec-
a ions, and indus y inno a ions, ex e nally connec ed boa ds enhance en i onmen al
adap abili y and educe s a egic unce ain y aced by ou side CEOs.
Hypo hesis 2. The nega i e ela ionship be ween ou side CEOs and en i onmen al esponsibili y
is a enua ed when boa ds possess highe ex e nal social capi al.
3.2.2. In e nal Boa d Social Capi al: In e nal Cohesion o S a egic Con inui y
In e nal social capi al suppo s s a egic con inui y h ough in o ma ion suppo . Di ec-
o s’ long co-wo king expe ience enhances boa d e ec i eness by os e ing aci knowledge
ans e and deep unde s anding o each membe ’s compe encies, enabling e icien in o ma-
ion lows and in eg a ion (Haynes & Hillman,2010). Fo ou side CEOs, such in e nal capi al
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 6 o 24
is he main channel o unde s anding he i m’s unique s a egic challenges—a ask poo ly
se ed by seconda y da a sou ces. Du ing leade ship ansi ions, boa ds lacking co-wo king
expe ience may issue gene ic manda es misaligned wi h he i m’s needs, whe eas cohesi e
boa ds le e age ins i u ional memo y o apidly ans e decision insigh s (Tian e al.,2011).
By embedding newcome s in he i m’s ‘s a egic DNA’, hey accele a e CEO lea ning cu es
and educe implemen a ion isks o en i onmen ini ia i es.
Beyond knowledge sha ing, in e nal social capi al shapes execu i e beha io h ough
sha ed expec a ions and in o mal pee in luence. Di ec o s wi h s ong in e nal bonds end
o sha e a collec i e iden i y and implici expec a ions, educing unce ain y and ansac ion
cos s (Ahea ne e al.,2014). These sha ed no ms allow boa ds o p essu e CEOs o align wi h
long- e m en i onmen al commi men s (D. A. Ha is & Hel a ,2007;P e e & Salancik,2015).
Cohesi e boa ds may e en impose in o mal penal ies o ac ions ha de ia e om expec ed
beha io s, such as excluding CEOs om c i ical decisions (L. Zhang e al.,2011), he eby
ein o cing sus ainabili y no ms.
In e nal cohesion is pa icula ly impo an when ou side CEOs, d i en by pe o mance-
based incen i es and p essu e o quick esul s, may p io i ize sho - e m inancial a ge s.
Howe e , cohesi e boa ds p omo e a uni ied, long- e m s ance on en i onmen al esponsi-
bili y p ac ices. By suppo ing such ini ia i es wi h delayed e u ns, he boa d helps embed
sus ainabili y goals in o he i m’s s a egic agenda, he eby alle ia ing agency conce ns
and ensu ing go e nance con inui y (Hoi e al.,2019).
Hypo hesis 3. The nega i e ela ionship be ween ou side CEOs and en i onmen al esponsibili y
is a enua ed when boa ds possess highe in e nal social capi al.
Figu e 1p esen s he heo e ical amewo k ha in eg a es he p oposed hypo heses.
Adm. Sci. 2025, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 o 25
expec a ions, and indus y inno a ions, ex e nally connec ed boa ds enhance en i on-
men al adap abili y and educe s a egic unce ain y aced by ou side CEOs.
Hypo hesis 2. The nega i e ela ionship be ween ou side CEOs and en i onmen al esponsibili y
is a enua ed when boa ds possess highe ex e nal social capi al.
3.2.2. In e nal Boa d Social Capi al: In e nal Cohesion o S a egic Con inui y
In e nal social capi al suppo s s a egic con inui y h ough in o ma ion suppo . Di-
ec o s’ long co-wo king expe ience enhances boa d effec i eness by os e ing aci
knowledge ans e and deep unde s anding o each membe ’s compe encies, enabling
efficien in o ma ion lows and in eg a ion (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). Fo ou side CEOs,
such in e nal capi al is he main channel o unde s anding he i m’s unique s a egic
challenges—a ask poo ly se ed by seconda y da a sou ces. Du ing leade ship ansi-
ions, boa ds lacking co-wo king expe ience may issue gene ic manda es misaligned wi h
he i m’s needs, whe eas cohesi e boa ds le e age ins i u ional memo y o apidly ans-
e decision insigh s (Tian e al., 2011). By embedding newcome s in he i m’s ‘s a egic
DNA’, hey accele a e CEO lea ning cu es and educe implemen a ion isks o en i on-
men ini ia i es.
Beyond knowledge sha ing, in e nal social capi al shapes execu i e beha io
h ough sha ed expec a ions and in o mal pee in luence. Di ec o s wi h s ong in e nal
bonds end o sha e a collec i e iden i y and implici expec a ions, educing unce ain y
and ansac ion cos s (Ahea ne e al., 2014). These sha ed no ms allow boa ds o p essu e
CEOs o align wi h long- e m en i onmen al commi men s (D. A. Ha is & Hel a , 2007;
P effe & Salancik, 2015). Cohesi e boa ds may e en impose in o mal penal ies o ac ions
ha de ia e om expec ed beha io s, such as excluding CEOs om c i ical decisions (L.
Zhang e al., 2011), he eby ein o cing sus ainabili y no ms.
In e nal cohesion is pa icula ly impo an when ou side CEOs, d i en by pe o -
mance-based incen i es and p essu e o quick esul s, may p io i ize sho - e m inancial
a ge s. Howe e , cohesi e boa ds p omo e a uni ied, long- e m s ance on en i onmen al
esponsibili y p ac ices. By suppo ing such ini ia i es wi h delayed e u ns, he boa d
helps embed sus ainabili y goals in o he i m’s s a egic agenda, he eby alle ia ing
agency conce ns and ensu ing go e nance con inui y (Hoi e al., 2019).
Hypo hesis 3. The nega i e ela ionship be ween ou side CEOs and en i onmen al esponsibili y
is a enua ed when boa ds possess highe in e nal social capi al.
Figu e 1 p esen s he heo e ical amewo k ha in eg a es he p oposed hypo heses.
Figu e 1. Theo e ical amewo k.
En i onmen al Responsibili y
In e nal Boa d Social Capi al
—In e nal Cohesion o S a egic Con inui y
Ou side CEO
Ex e nal Boa d Social Capi al
—Resou ce Access and Accoun abili
y
Figu e 1. Theo e ical amewo k.
4. Resea ch Design
4.1. Samples and Da a
This s udy uses a panel da ase o Chinese A-sha e lis ed i ms (2010–2022). Da a on
CEO u no e , inancials, and en i onmen pe o mance a e p ima ily sou ced om he
China S ock Ma ke and Accoun ing Resea ch (CSMAR) da abase, wi h da a o ou side
CEOs no included in CSMAR manually collec ed om eliable online sou ces such as
company websi es and disclosu e pla o ms. The sample is es ic ed o i ms in pollu ion-
in ensi e indus ies based on he 2012 indus y classi ica ion issued by he China Secu i-
ies Regula o y Commission (see Table 1 o indus y dis ibu ion). This ocus enhances
cons uc alidi y, as en i onmen al ou comes in hese indus ies a e subjec o s ic e
disclosu e equi emen s and a e mo e likely o e lec CEO-le el s a egic decisions. A e
excluding i ms wi h missing da a o hose labeled as ST/PT, he inal sample comp ises
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 7 o 24
8395 i m-yea obse a ions om 989 i ms, documen ing 926 CEO successions (213 ou side
and 713 inside).
Table 1. Indus y dis ibu ion.
Code Ca ego y Fi ms wi h Ou side CEOs
B6–B11 Mining and mine al esou ce ex ac ion 18
C15, C17–C19, C22 Manu ac u ing ood, appa el, and pape p oduc s 51
C25–C32, D44
Manu ac u ing and p ocessing chemicals, me als, and ene gy
144
4.2. Va iables
Dependen Va iable
En i onmen al Responsibili y
Re e ing o Hen i and Jou neaul (2008), en i onmen al esponsibili y (ER) is measu ed
ac oss h ee dimensions: g een managemen , g een in es men , and g een ou comes (sum in
Table 2). Each i em is selec ed based on p io s udies, including en i onmen al in o ma ion
disclosu e (X. H. Meng e al.,2013), en i onmen al ce i ica ion (M. Wang e al.,2021), g een
aining (Ya i e al.,2021), en i onmen al in es men s (R. Li & Ramana han,2020), en i on-
men ally desi able was e ea men (Ríos & Picazo-Tadeo,2021), and eco- iendly p oduc
inno a ion (A ena e al.,2018). Disclosu e is sco ed as ollows: 2 o quan i a i e disclo-
su e, 1 o gene al men ion, and 0 o no disclosu e (X. H. Meng e al.,2013;Wiseman,1982;
Zeng e al.,2010).
Table 2. Measu emen s o en i onmen al esponsibili y.
Dimensions I ems
G een managemen
Disclosu e o en i onmen al in o ma ion in CSR epo s
ISO 14001 ce i ica ion
G een in es men En i onmen al educa ion and aining
G een ini ia i es and in es men
G een ou comes Was ewa e , ai emissions, and solid was e ea men
Eco- iendly p oduc ion, pa en s and echnologies
This disclosu e-based measu e is commonly used in esea ch on Chinese i ms (D. Li
e al.,2017;J. Meng & Zhang,2022;X. H. Meng e al.,2013;Zeng e al.,2010), whe e long-
e m, i m-le el en i onmen al pe o mance da a emain limi ed. While disclosu e da a
may pa ly e lec symbolic compliance, hei s uc u ed o ma and b oad a ailabili y o e
a p ac ical and compa able basis o measu ing en i onmen al engagemen ac oss i ms
and o e ime. To educe po en ial bias, we dis inguish be ween gene al and quan i a i e
disclosu e in he sco ing scheme. Addi ionally, we conduc obus ness checks using each
subdimension sepa a ely (see Sec ion 5.5.1).
Independen Va iables
Ou side CEO
An Ou side CEO is de ined as a CEO who joined he i m wi hin 2 yea s p io o
succession, coded as 1; o he wise, i is coded as 0 (D. Ha is & Hel a ,1997;Zhu & Shen,2016).
Boa d Social Capi al
Ex e nal boa d social capi al (Ex_socialcapi al) is measu ed as he a io o he o al
numbe o ex e nal di ec o ships held by a i m’s boa d membe s o he boa d’s o al size.
By no malizing he numbe o ex e nal di ec o ships by boa d size, his measu e accoun s
o in e - i m a ia ion in boa d composi ion and ensu es compa abili y ac oss i ms. I
e lec s he ex en o which boa d membe s hold concu en posi ions on he boa ds o o he
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 8 o 24
i ms, indica ing he boa d’s s uc u al embeddedness in he b oade in e -o ganiza ional
ne wo k. This p oxy ollows p io esea ch ha measu es boa d social capi al h ough
di ec o s’ ex e nal appoin men s (Ba oso-Cas o e al.,2016;Kiel & Nicholson,2006). I
o e s a eplicable and scalable measu e o ex e nal s uc u al connec edness sui able o
la ge-sample empi ical s udies.
In e nal boa d social capi al (In_socialcapi al) is de ined based on he sha ed wo king
expe ience o he boa d o di ec o s (Tian e al.,2011). Consis en wi h p e ious esea ch
(Ba kema & Sh y ko ,2007;Tian e al.,2011), i is calcula ed as he di ec o s’ o e lapping
boa d enu es, using he ollowing o mula whe e u
i
is he e m o o ice o he i- h di ec o ,
and nis he numbe o imes u
i
and u
j
a e compa ed pai wise. This app oach cap u es he
s uc u al amilia i y among boa d membe s, which e lec s he deg ee o in e nal cohesion
and us .
enu e o e lap =
1
nijminuiuj(1)
Con ol Va iables
We inco po a e con ol a iables ela ed o CEO a ibu es, i m cha ac e is ics, and
ex e nal ac o s. CEO age is included, as he young end o p io i ize sus ainabili y
(Shahab e al.,2020). CEOs’ educa ion and g een expe ience shape hei en i onmen
s a egy (Hu & Shi,2025;R. Huang & Wei,2023;X. Li e al.,2024;Zhou e al.,2021). CEO-
chai man duali y—a p oxy o CEO powe —has been associa ed wi h i ms’ en i onmen al
pe o mance (F ancoeu e al.,2021). Fi m size is added as la ge i ms in es mo e in ESG
due o economies o scale and s akeholde expec a ions (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick e al.,2023).
S a e owne ship (SOE) is included due o policy suppo and s ong en i onmen al com-
mi men s (K. Zhang e al.,2023). Le e age (Le ) cap u es inancial isk, as CEO u no e
is mo e common in inancially dis essed i ms (Jos a nd & Sau ne ,2008). The g ow h
a e o ope a ing income (G ow h) a ec s esou ce and capabili y alloca ion (O’Cass & Sok,
2014), po en ially in luencing co po a e en i onmen al impac . F ee cash low and Ins i u-
ional owne ship (INST) a e conside ed, as hey sepa a ely a ec manage ial disc e ion and
impose p essu e on CSR (X. Chen e al.,2016;Ha jo o e al.,2017). Regional ma ke iza ion
(Ma ke ) and he He indahl–Hi schman Index (HHI) cap u e he egula o y landscape
and ma ke dynamics. Yea and Indus y accoun o mac oeconomic and sec o al ac o s.
Table 3p o ides a iable measu emen s.
Table 3. Summa y o Va iables.
Va iable Measu emen
Dependen Va iable
En i onmen al esponsibili y he na u al loga i hm o sco es based on g een managemen , g een
in es men , and g een ou comes
Independen Va iables
Ou side CEO a bina y a iable se o 1 i he CEO has p io execu i e expe ience in an
ex e nal i m wi hin 2 yea s o being hi ed; 0 o he wise.
In e nal boa d social capi al o e lapping e ms o he boa d o di ec o s
Ex e nal boa d social capi al he a io o he o al ex e nal di ec o ships held by a i m’s di ec o s o i s
boa d size
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 15 o 24
Adm. Sci. 2025, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 o 25
N 8066 8066 8066 8066 856 856 856 856
adj. R2 0.182 0.184 0.185 0.209 0.140 0.149 0.143 0.144
No e. S anda d e o s in pa en heses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figu e 4. Mode a ing Effec Diag am: Ex e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
Figu e 5. Mode a ing Effec Diag am: In e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
5.4. Pos Hoc Tes s
As ou side CEOs a e ypically expec ed o p io i ize sho - e m pe o mance ea ly in
hei enu e, we analyzed i m inancial pe o mance (ROE) in he h ee yea s ollowing
succession. Resul s in Table 10 show consis en imp o emen s in ROE (model 1: β = 0.8380,
p < 0.01; Model 2: β = 0.4004, p < 0.1; Model 3: β = 0.2214, p < 0.1), indica ing sho - e m
inancial gains. Howe e , his imp o emen is no mi o ed by en i onmen al esponsi-
bili y, which shows a sligh decline du ing he same pe iod. These esul s sugges a ade-
off whe eby ou side CEOs p io i ize sho - e m inancial me ics o e longe - e m sus-
ainabili y goals.
Table 10. Reg ession esul s o ou side CEO on ROE.
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROE
+1
ROE
+2
ROE
+3
Ou side CEO 0.8380 *** 0.4004 * 0.2214 *
(0.2229) (0.2427) (0.1185)
CEO Age −0.2558 −0.4845 −0.3602
(0.3577) (0.3848) (0.3334)
Educa ion −0.0160 0.1465 −0.0103
(0.3146) (0.3402) (0.2766)
Duali y −0.0191 −0.0147 −0.0590
(0.1140) (0.1233) (0.1054)
G een expe ience −0.3275 * −0.2468 −0.4514 ***
(0.1670) (0.1722) (0.1643)
Fi m size −0.6208 *** −0.6429 *** −0.6572 ***
(0.0459) (0.0481) (0.0427)
SOE −0.3422 *** −0.3883 *** −0.3560 ***
(0.1187) (0.1222) (0.1114)
Figu e 4. Mode a ing E ec Diag am: Ex e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
Adm. Sci. 2025, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 o 25
N 8066 8066 8066 8066 856 856 856 856
adj. R2 0.182 0.184 0.185 0.209 0.140 0.149 0.143 0.144
No e. S anda d e o s in pa en heses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figu e 4. Mode a ing Effec Diag am: Ex e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
Figu e 5. Mode a ing Effec Diag am: In e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
5.4. Pos Hoc Tes s
As ou side CEOs a e ypically expec ed o p io i ize sho - e m pe o mance ea ly in
hei enu e, we analyzed i m inancial pe o mance (ROE) in he h ee yea s ollowing
succession. Resul s in Table 10 show consis en imp o emen s in ROE (model 1: β = 0.8380,
p < 0.01; Model 2: β = 0.4004, p < 0.1; Model 3: β = 0.2214, p < 0.1), indica ing sho - e m
inancial gains. Howe e , his imp o emen is no mi o ed by en i onmen al esponsi-
bili y, which shows a sligh decline du ing he same pe iod. These esul s sugges a ade-
off whe eby ou side CEOs p io i ize sho - e m inancial me ics o e longe - e m sus-
ainabili y goals.
Table 10. Reg ession esul s o ou side CEO on ROE.
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROE
+1
ROE
+2
ROE
+3
Ou side CEO 0.8380 *** 0.4004 * 0.2214 *
(0.2229) (0.2427) (0.1185)
CEO Age −0.2558 −0.4845 −0.3602
(0.3577) (0.3848) (0.3334)
Educa ion −0.0160 0.1465 −0.0103
(0.3146) (0.3402) (0.2766)
Duali y −0.0191 −0.0147 −0.0590
(0.1140) (0.1233) (0.1054)
G een expe ience −0.3275 * −0.2468 −0.4514 ***
(0.1670) (0.1722) (0.1643)
Fi m size −0.6208 *** −0.6429 *** −0.6572 ***
(0.0459) (0.0481) (0.0427)
SOE −0.3422 *** −0.3883 *** −0.3560 ***
(0.1187) (0.1222) (0.1114)
Figu e 5. Mode a ing E ec Diag am: In e nal Boa d Social Capi al.
5.4. Pos Hoc Tes s
As ou side CEOs a e ypically expec ed o p io i ize sho - e m pe o mance ea ly in
hei enu e, we analyzed i m inancial pe o mance (ROE) in he h ee yea s ollowing
succession. Resul s in Table 10 show consis en imp o emen s in ROE (model 1:
β
= 0.8380,
p< 0.01; Model 2:
β
= 0.4004, p< 0.1; Model 3:
β
= 0.2214, p< 0.1), indica ing sho - e m
inancial gains. Howe e , his imp o emen is no mi o ed by en i onmen al espon-
sibili y, which shows a sligh decline du ing he same pe iod. These esul s sugges a
ade-o whe eby ou side CEOs p io i ize sho - e m inancial me ics o e longe - e m
sus ainabili y goals.
Table 10. Reg ession esul s o ou side CEO on ROE.
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROE +1 ROE +2 ROE +3
Ou side CEO 0.8380 *** 0.4004 * 0.2214 *
(0.2229) (0.2427) (0.1185)
CEO Age −0.2558 −0.4845 −0.3602
(0.3577) (0.3848) (0.3334)
Educa ion −0.0160 0.1465 −0.0103
(0.3146) (0.3402) (0.2766)
Duali y −0.0191 −0.0147 −0.0590
(0.1140) (0.1233) (0.1054)
G een expe ience −0.3275 * −0.2468 −0.4514 ***
(0.1670) (0.1722) (0.1643)
Fi m size −0.6208 *** −0.6429 *** −0.6572 ***
(0.0459) (0.0481) (0.0427)
SOE −0.3422 *** −0.3883 *** −0.3560 ***
(0.1187) (0.1222) (0.1114)
F ee cash low 0.0215 0.0381 0.0142
(0.2085) (0.2093) (0.1967)
G ow h 0.2331 *** 0.1509 0.2600 ***
(0.0884) (0.1005) (0.0843)
Le e age 0.3502 −0.0056 0.6091 ***
(0.2285) (0.2416) (0.2118)
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 16 o 24
Table 10. Con .
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ROE +1 ROE +2 ROE +3
INST 1.8287 *** 2.0055 *** 1.9301 ***
(0.2377) (0.2569) (0.2176)
Ma ke 0.0324 0.0293 0.0751
(0.2695) (0.2767) (0.2505)
HHI 3.4842 0.2373 5.3920 ***
(2.2057) (0.6448) (1.9876)
Yea /Indus y YES YES YES
Cons an 15.0554 *** 16.6057 *** 15.9584 ***
(4.8910) (4.8864) (4.6034)
N 856 732 623
adj. R20.290 0.270 0.300
No e. S anda d e o s in pa en heses, * p< 0.1, *** p< 0.01.
5.5. Robus ness Tes
5.5.1. Subg oup Reg ession
As men ioned, en i onmen al esponsibili y is measu ed using g een managemen
(GM), g een in es men (GI), and g een ou comes (GO). To u he alida e he esul s, we
conduc a subg oup eg ession analysis. Table 11 p esen s he esul s o en i onmen al
esponsibili y in he i s and second yea s a e ou side CEO succession. I indica es
ha ou side CEO educes all h ee me ics (model 1:
β
=
−
0.1136, p< 0.01; Model 2:
β
=
−
0.0751, p< 0.05; Model 3:
β
=
−
0.1128, p< 0.05; Model 4:
β
=
−
0.1014, p< 0.05; Model
5: β=−0.1824, p< 0.01; Model 6: β=−0.1244, p< 0.05), u he suppo ing Hypo hesis 1.
Table 11. Subg oup eg ession.
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GM +1 GM +2 GI +1 GI +2 GO +1 GP +2
Ou side CEOs −0.1136 *** −0.0751 ** −0.1128 ** −0.1014 ** −0.1824 *** −0.1244 **
(0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0557) (0.0560) (0.0580) (0.0569)
CEO Age 0.1387 0.1807 ** 0.0765 0.1879 0.2593 0.2773 *
(0.0906) (0.0904) (0.1607) (0.1615) (0.1672) (0.1642)
Educa ion 0.0399 0.0105 0.1117 0.0309 0.1178 0.1074
(0.0713) (0.0712) (0.1266) (0.1272) (0.1316) (0.1293)
Duali y −0.0523 * −0.0265 −0.0595 0.0265 −0.1196 ** −0.0585
(0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0509) (0.0511) (0.0529) (0.0520)
G een expe ience 0.1138 *** 0.0720 * 0.0580 −0.0212 0.1828 ** 0.0821
(0.0436) (0.0436) (0.0774) (0.0778) (0.0805) (0.0791)
Fi m size 0.0753 *** 0.0673 *** 0.1339 *** 0.1448 *** 0.1700 *** 0.1645 ***
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0201)
SOE 0.0322 0.0503 * 0.0854 0.1505 *** 0.1038 * 0.1244 **
(0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0525) (0.0528) (0.0546) (0.0537)
F ee cash low −0.0199 −0.0426 −0.1219 −0.0744 −0.0925 −0.1227
(0.0484) (0.0483) (0.0859) (0.0864) (0.0894) (0.0878)
G ow h −0.0454 ** −0.0276 −0.0320 −0.0079 −0.0795 * −0.0412
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0414) (0.0406)
Le e age −0.1428 *** −0.1552 *** −0.2369 ** −0.3113 *** −0.3288 *** −0.3690 ***
(0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0946) (0.0950) (0.0984) (0.0966)
INST 0.1519 *** 0.1037 * 0.3708 *** 0.1978 * 0.3098 *** 0.2309 **
(0.0583) (0.0582) (0.1035) (0.1039) (0.1076) (0.1057)
Ma ke −0.0239 −0.0041 0.1332 0.1753 0.0191 0.0213
(0.0675) (0.0674) (0.1198) (0.1204) (0.1246) (0.1224)
HHI −0.4356 *** −0.4194 *** 0.0509 0.1728 −0.6056 ** −0.5219 *
(0.1517) (0.1514) (0.2692) (0.2705) (0.2800) (0.2750)
Yea /Indus y YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons an −0.0134 0.4562 −0.3137 −2.0790 −1.1171 −0.4505
(1.1381) (1.1361) (2.0198) (2.0296) (2.1007) (2.0632)
N 856 732 856 732 856 732
adj. R20.138 0.108 0.139 0.142 0.172 0.149
No e. S anda d e o s in pa en heses, * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 17 o 24
5.5.2. Lagged Models ( + 2)
To u he examine he mode a ing e ec , we es whe he he esul s emain obus
when analyzing en i onmen al esponsibili y in he second yea a e ou side CEO succession.
The answe is yes, as shown in Table 12 (model 2:
β
= 0.0122, p< 0.05; Model 4:
β
= 0.0055,
p< 0.1), which u he suppo ed Hypo heses 2 and 3. These checks s eng hen he c edibili y
o ou conclusions.
Table 12. The mode a ing ole o boa d social capi al (DV = ER +2).
Va iable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ER +2 ER +2 ER +2 ER +2
Ou side CEO −0.1260 *** −0.1270 *** −0.1180 ** −0.1068 **
(0.0439) (0.0438) (0.0461) (0.0541)
Ex_socialcapi al 0.0012 −0.0005
(0.0021) (0.0022)
In_socialcapi al 0.0013 0.0024 *
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Ou side CEO ×Ex_socialcapi al 0.0122 **
(0.0048)
Ou side CEO ×In_socialcapi al 0.0055 *
(0.0033)
CEO Age 0.2325 * 0.2294 * 0.2195 * 0.3205 ***
(0.1251) (0.1247) (0.1256) (0.1196)
Educa ion 0.0740 0.0776 0.0681 −0.0112
(0.0967) (0.0964) (0.0969) (0.0946)
Duali y −0.0267 −0.0264 −0.0220 −0.0295
(0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0386) (0.0382)
G een expe ience 0.0949 0.0946 0.0942 −0.0142
(0.0598) (0.0596) (0.0600) (0.0586)
Fi m size 0.0819 *** 0.0799 *** 0.0809 *** 0.0806 ***
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152)
SOE 0.1195 *** 0.1246 *** 0.1261 *** 0.1404 ***
(0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0400) (0.0384)
F ee cash low −0.0759 −0.0895 −0.0777 −0.0069
(0.0710) (0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0641)
G ow h −0.0438 −0.0461 −0.0442 0.0001
(0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0295)
Le e age −0.2152 *** −0.2201 *** −0.2189 *** −0.1071
(0.0739) (0.0736) (0.0736) (0.0699)
INST 0.2378 *** 0.2463 *** 0.2260 *** 0.2928 ***
(0.0779) (0.0777) (0.0781) (0.0743)
Ma ke 0.0153 0.0108 0.0114 0.1507 *
(0.0921) (0.0918) (0.0918) (0.0858)
HHI −0.5089 ** −0.5014 ** −0.4972 ** −0.1630
(0.2137) (0.2130) (0.2142) (0.1997)
Yea /Indus y YES YES YES YES
Cons an 0.9693 0.9992 0.8719 1.2382
(1.6393) (1.6420) (1.6384) (1.6389)
N 732 732 732 732
adj. R20.148 0.148 0.147 0.154
No e. S anda d e o s in pa en heses, * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
6.1. Discussion
This s udy p o ides empi ical e idence on how ou side CEO succession in luences
i ms’ en i onmen al esponsibili y. Consis en wi h ou heo e ical expec a ion g ounded
in agency heo y (Da idson e al.,2002;J. Meng & Zhang,2022;Peppe & Go e,2015;Y.
Zhang & Rajagopalan,2010), we ind ha ou side CEOs a e associa ed wi h lowe le els o
en i onmen al esponsibili y. The pos hoc analysis shed ligh on he s a egic p io i ies o
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 18 o 24
ou side CEOs. The obse ed imp o emen in ROE, alongside a decline in en i onmen al
esponsibili y, sugges s a ade-o in s a egic ocus ollowing ou side CEO succession.
To es ablish legi imacy and signal compe ence, ou side CEOs may ocus on inancial
me ics ha a e mo e isible, ex e nally moni o ed, and ied o sho - e m e alua ions.
In con as , en i onmen al ini ia i es, which o en equi e longe ime ho izons and a e
less di ec ly a ibu able o CEO ac ions, end o ecei e less a en ion. The esul s echo
p io indings in he co po a e go e nance li e a u e ha associa e leade ship ansi ions
wi h inc eased sho - e mism (Guo e al.,2020;J. Meng & Zhang,2022;Peppe & Go e,
2015;Y. Zhang & Rajagopalan,2010), bu i u he e eals how such endencies mani es in
sus ainabili y domains.
Ou esul s hen unde sco e he go e nance ole o boa d social capi al in shaping
pos -succession ou comes. Speci ically, ex e nal boa d social capi al enhances in o ma ional
anspa ency and s akeholde accoun abili y by acili a ing access o ex e nal esou ces,
while in e nal boa d social capi al p omo es s a egic con inui y h ough sha ed no ms
and di ec o cohesion. Toge he , hese mechanisms help mi iga e he nega i e e ec s o
ou side CEO succession on en i onmen al esponsibili y. The esul empi ically alida es
he unc ional dis inc ion be ween hese wo dimensions, highligh ing ha boa ds wi h
g ea e social capi al a e be e equipped o o se isks a ising om leade ship ansi ion,
he eby ein o cing p io esea ch on he go e nance ole o social capi al (Hoi e al.,2019;
Jeb an e al.,2022;Regue a-Al a ado & B a o-U quiza,2022;Saue wald e al.,2016).
While he coe icien s o ou side CEOs a e no la ge in absolu e e ms, hey emain
subs an i ely meaning ul gi en he log- ans o med na u e o he dependen a iable.
Fo example, he coe icien o
−
0.1024 in Table 8(Model 1) implies an app oxima e
10.24% educ ion in en i onmen al esponsibili y. In pollu ion-in ensi e indus ies, whe e
en i onmen al disclosu es ace heigh ened sc u iny om egula o s and in es o s, modes
pe cen age changes e lec ma e ial shi s in execu i e beha io s. These esul s a i m he
p ac ical signi icance o he obse ed e ec s.
Taken oge he , hese indings p o ide a mo e nuanced unde s anding o how lead-
e ship ansi ions in e ac wi h boa d go e nance o in luence sus ainabili y ou comes,
pa icula ly wi hin ansi ional ins i u ional con ex s.
6.2. Theo e ical Con ibu ions
Fi s , his s udy ad ances he unde s anding o CEO succession’s ole in en i on-
men al s a egy, pa icula ly in ansi ional economies. While p io s udies sugges ha
CEO o igin in luences inno a ion (Cucculelli,2018;Ramachand an,2018) and s a egy
change (Ka ae li & Zajac,2013;Y. Zhang & Rajagopalan,2010), i s speci ic impac on
en i onmen al esponsibili y emains unde explo ed. Exis ing e idence appea s o be
con ex -dependen . Fo ins ance, a s udy based in F ance inds ha ou side CEOs a e
mo e a en i e o sus ainabili y pe o mance han inside successo s (Be na d e al.,2018).
Howe e , such indings may no gene alize o eme ging ma ke s such as China, whe e
en i onmen al conce ns o en ake a backsea o inancial impe a i es (J. Meng & Zhang,
2022). Agency heo y p esen s con lic ing conclusions: while ou side CEOs may engage
in imp ession managemen o signal e ec i e and e hical leade ship (Ma quis & Tilcsik,
2016), hey may also p io i ize sho - e m e u ns o e en i onmen al goals o demons a e
hei alue o sha eholde s (D. Li e al.,2017). This s udy con i ms he nega i e impac
o ou side CEOs on en i onmen al esponsibili y, adding nuance o exis ing heo e ical
deba es. I also o e s insigh in o how compe ing pe o mance logics in luence execu i e
decision-making du ing leade ship ansi ions.
Second, i e ines agency heo y by showing ha ou side successo s ampli y agency
conce ns in sus ainabili y leade ship. Compa ed o inside CEOs, who end o be mo e
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 19 o 24
embedded in i m-speci ic ou ines and ela ional s uc u es, ou side CEOs ace g ea e
p essu e o deli e sho - e m esul s due o hei limi ed o ganiza ional amilia i y and
ex e nal legi imacy conce ns. This ex ends agency heo y beyond owne ship and com-
pensa ion s uc u es by inco po a ing ela ional and con ex ual ac o s ha in luence CEO
decision-making in domains equi ing long- e m commi men .
Thi d, i ex ends he heo e ical lens o boa d social capi al by cla i ying i s dis inc
go e nance unc ions in execu i e succession. Ex e nal boa d social capi al acili a es selec-
ion and e alua ion p ocesses by acili a ing access o s a egic in o ma ion, epu a ional
signals, and s akeholde expec a ions. In e nal boa d social capi al enhances s a egic
alignmen by enabling knowledge suppo and no ma i e ein o cemen . They may se e
as a ge ed go e nance le e s du ing pe iods o s a egic dis up ion. By b idging CEO
succession, boa d go e nance, and sus ainabili y esea ch, his s udy con ibu es o a mo e
con ex -sensi i e unde s anding o co po a e en i onmen al s a egy.
6.3. P ac ical Con ibu ions
This s udy highligh s he impo ance o i ms s a egically managing CEO succession,
balancing he need o leade ship enewal wi h long- e m sus ainabili y commi men s.
Nomina ion commi ees should es ablish o e sigh p o ocols ha in eg a e sus ainabili y
audi s in o CEO pe o mance e alua ions, wi h a pa icula ocus on en i onmen al me ics.
This alignmen can help ensu e ha incoming leade s a e accoun able no only o inancial
ou comes bu also o en i onmen al p og ess.
Fo ou side CEOs, who ypically ace a s eepe lea ning cu e due o limi ed i m-
speci ic amilia i y, s uc u ed onboa ding is essen ial. Men o ship p og ams ha pai new
CEOs wi h expe ienced di ec o s can acili a e he ans e o ins i u ional knowledge and
sus ainabili y p io i ies. Addi ional onboa ding p ac ices, such as a ge ed b ie ings on
ESG expec a ions and s akeholde engagemen ou ines, may also accele a e alignmen
wi h he i m’s en i onmen al agenda.
Policymake s can play a suppo i e ole by in oducing ins i u ional sa egua ds o
mi iga e sho - e mism d i en by leade ship ansi ions. This could in ol e manda ing
en i onmen al disclosu es in CEO ansi ion epo s and o e ing incen i es o i ms
ha main ain consis en sus ainabili y in es men s h ough pe iods o leade ship change.
Fu he mo e, c oss-indus y pla o ms o eco-inno a ion sha ing can equip new CEOs
wi h p ac ical knowledge o add ess sec o -speci ic en i onmen al challenges.
6.4. Limi a ions and Fu he Resea ch
This s udy has se e al limi a ions.
Fi s , i ocuses on Chinese i ms, whe e ins i u ional ea u es such as s a e in luence,
ela ional go e nance, and cul u ally oo ed no ms may shape bo h agency p oblems and
he ole o boa d social capi al. These con ex -speci ic condi ions may limi he gene -
alizabili y o he indings o coun ies wi h di e en go e nance en i onmen s. Fu u e
esea ch could adop c oss-na ional compa a i e app oaches o examine how ins i u ional
and cul u al di e ences in luence he ela ionship be ween CEO o igin, boa d go e nance,
and en i onmen al s a egy.
Second, he sample is es ic ed o pollu ion-in ensi e indus ies, which na ows
he scope o he indings. Fi ms in less egula ed o se ice-o ien ed sec o s may exhibi
di e en pa e ns in CEO succession and en i onmen al go e nance. Fu u e esea ch could
examine whe he he obse ed ela ionships hold ac oss a b oade se o indus ies.
Thi d, boa d social capi al is measu ed using s uc u al p oxies based on di ec o s’
connec ions and sha ed enu e. While his app oach enables consis ency and compa abili y
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 20 o 24
in la ge-sample s udies, i does no cap u e ie s eng h o ela ional quali y. Fu u e esea ch
could employ mo e nuanced indica o s o e lec in e pe sonal dynamics wi hin he boa d.
Las ly, he s udy ocuses on he sho - e m e ec s (3–5 yea s pos -succession) o ou -
side CEOs on en i onmen al esponsibili y wi hou assessing he long- e m impac . Fu u e
esea ch may explo e whe he educed en i onmen al esponsibili y ac s as a media ing
mechanism in luencing b oade ou comes such as inancial pe o mance o i m compe i-
i eness. Such an inqui y would con ibu e o a mo e comp ehensi e unde s anding o he
e ec s o execu i e succession.
Au ho Con ibu ions: Concep ualiza ion, H.Z.; me hodology, H.Z., S.H.; so wa e, S.H.; alida ion,
S.H.; o mal analysis, S.H.; da a cu a ion, S.H.; w i ing—o iginal d a p epa a ion, S.H.; w i ing—
e iew and edi ing, S.H., H.Z.; isualiza ion, S.H.; unding acquisi ion, H.Z. All au ho s ha e ead
and ag eed o he published e sion o he manusc ip .
Funding: This esea ch was unded by he Na ional Na u al Science Founda ion o China g an
numbe 71972125.
Ins i u ional Re iew Boa d S a emen : No applicable.
In o med Consen S a emen : No applicable.
Da a A ailabili y S a emen : Da a a e a ailable om he co esponding au ho upon eques .
Con lic s o In e es : The au ho s decla e no con lic s o in e es .
Re e ences
Abbas, A., Ekowa i, D., Suha iadi, F., & Anwa , A. (2024). Human capi al c ea ion: A collec i e psychological, social, o ganiza ional
and eligious pe spec i e. Jou nal o Religion and Heal h,63(3), 2168–2200. [C ossRe ]
Adle , P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2002). Social capi al: P ospec s o a new concep . Academy o Managemen Re iew,27(1), 17–40. [C ossRe ]
Ag awal, A., Knoebe , C. R., & Tsoulouhas, T. (2006). A e ou side s handicapped in CEO successions? Jou nal o Co po a e Finance,12(3),
619–644. [C ossRe ]
Ahea ne, M., Lam, S. K., & K aus, F. (2014). Pe o mance impac o middle manage s’ adap i e s a egy implemen a ion: The ole o
social capi al. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,35(1), 68–87. [C ossRe ]
Akba , A., Jiang, X., Qu eshi, M. A., & Akba , M. (2021). Does co po a e en i onmen al in es men impede inancial pe o mance o
Chinese en e p ises? The mode a ing ole o inancial cons ain s. En i onmen al Science and Pollu ion Resea ch,28(41), 58007–58017.
[C ossRe ] [PubMed]
Al-Shae , H., Albi a , K., & Liu, J. (2023). CEO powe and CSR-linked compensa ion o co po a e en i onmen al esponsibili y: UK
e idence. Re iew o Quan i a i e Finance and Accoun ing,60(3), 1025–1063. [C ossRe ]
Al es, S. (2023). CEO duali y, ea nings quali y and boa d independence. Jou nal o Financial Repo ing and Accoun ing,21(2), 217–231.
[C ossRe ]
A ena, C., Michelon, G., & T ojanowski, G. (2018). Big egos can be g een: A s udy o CEO hub is and en i onmen al inno a ion. B i ish
Jou nal o Managemen ,29(2), 316–336. [C ossRe ]
Aus in, P. C. (2011). Op imal calipe wid hs o p opensi y-sco e ma ching when es ima ing di e ences in means and di e ences in
p opo ions in obse a ional s udies. Pha maceu ical S a is ics,10(2), 150–161. [C ossRe ]
Baah, C., Opoku-Agyeman, D., Acquah, I. S. K., Agyabeng-Mensah, Y., A um, E., Faibil, D., & Abdoulaye, F. A. M. (2021). Examining he
co ela ions be ween s akeholde p essu es, g een p oduc ion p ac ices, i m epu a ion, en i onmen al and inancial pe o mance:
E idence om manu ac u ing SMEs. Sus ainable P oduc ion and Consump ion,27, 100–114. [C ossRe ]
Ba kema, H. G., & Sh y ko , O. (2007). Does op managemen eam di e si y p omo e o hampe o eign expansion? S a egic
Managemen Jou nal,28(7), 663–680. [C ossRe ]
Ba on, J. M., Chulko , D. V., & Waddell, G. R. (2011). Top managemen eam u no e , CEO succession ype, and s a egic change.
Jou nal o Business Resea ch,64(8), 904–910. [C ossRe ]
Ba oso-Cas o, C., Villegas, M. M., & Pé ez-Cale o, L. (2011). Boa d in luence on a i m’s in e na ionaliza ion. Co po a e Go e nance: An
In e na ional Re iew,19(4), 351–367. [C ossRe ]
Ba oso-Cas o, C., Villegas-Pe iñan, M. M., & Casillas-Bueno, J. C. (2016). How boa ds’ in e nal and ex e nal social capi al in e ac o
a ec i m pe o mance. S a egic O ganiza ion,14(1), 6–31. [C ossRe ]
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 21 o 24
Be na d, Y., Goda d, L., & Zouaoui, M. (2018). The e ec o CEOs’ u no e on he co po a e sus ainabili y pe o mance o F ench
i ms. Jou nal o Business E hics,150, 1049–1069. [C ossRe ]
Bicen, P., Hun , S. D., & Madha a am, S. (2021). Coope i i e inno a ion alliance pe o mance: Alliance compe ence, alliance’s ma ke
o ien a ion, and ela ional go e nance. Jou nal o Business Resea ch,123, 23–31. [C ossRe ]
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E., B ooks, R., & Do, H. X. (2023). ESG and i m pe o mance: The ole o size and media channels. Economic
Modelling,121, 106203. [C ossRe ]
Chahine, S., Fang, Y., Hasan, I., & Mazboudi, M. (2019). En enchmen h ough co po a e social esponsibili y: E idence om CEO
ne wo k cen ali y. In e na ional Re iew o Financial Analysis,66, 101347. [C ossRe ]
Chahine, S., Fang, Y., Hasan, I., & Mazboudi, M. (2021). CEO ne wo k cen ali y and he likelihood o inancial epo ing aud. Abacus,
57(4), 654–678. [C ossRe ]
Cha an, R. (2005). Boa ds ha deli e : Ad ancing co po a e go e nance om compliance o compe i i e ad an age. John Wiley & Sons.
Chen, G., & Hamb ick, D. C. (2012). CEO eplacemen in u na ound si ua ions: Execu i e (mis) i and i s pe o mance implica ions.
O ganiza ion Science,23(1), 225–243. [C ossRe ]
Chen, H. L., Ho, M. H. C., & Hsu, W. T. (2013). Does boa d social capi al in luence chie execu i e o ice s’ in es men decisions in
esea ch and de elopmen ? R&D Managemen ,43(4), 381–393. [C ossRe ]
Chen, X., Sun, Y., & Xu, X. (2016). F ee cash low, o e -in es men and co po a e go e nance in China. Paci ic-Basin Finance Jou nal,37,
81–103. [C ossRe ]
Connelly, B. L., Ke chen, D. J., J ., Ganglo , K. A., & Shook, C. L. (2016). In es o pe cep ions o CEO successo selec ion in he wake o
in eg i y and compe ence ailu es: A policy cap u ing s udy. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,37(10), 2135–2151. [C ossRe ]
Cucculelli, M. (2018). Fi m age and he p obabili y o p oduc inno a ion. Do CEO enu e and p oduc enu e ma e ? Jou nal o
E olu iona y Economics,28, 153–179. [C ossRe ]
Cummings, T., & Kno , A. M. (2018). Ou side CEOs and inno a ion. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,39(8), 2095–2119. [C ossRe ]
Da idson, W. N., Nemec, C., Wo ell, D. L., & Lin, J. (2002). Indus ial o igin o CEOs in ou side succession: Boa d p e e ence and
s ockholde eac ion. Jou nal o Managemen and Go e nance,6, 295–321. [C ossRe ]
De Villie s, C., Naike , V., & Van S aden, C. J. (2011). The e ec o boa d cha ac e is ics on i m en i onmen al pe o mance. Jou nal o
Managemen ,37(6), 1636–1663. [C ossRe ]
Ding, H., Hu, Y., Yang, X., & Zhou, X. (2021). Boa d in e lock and he di usion o co po a e social esponsibili y among Chinese lis ed
i ms. Asia Paci ic Jou nal o Managemen ,39, 1287–1320. [C ossRe ]
Fe a is, A., Golgeci, I., A slan, A., & San o o, G. (2024). Unde s anding he link be ween subsidia y CEOs and co po a e social
esponsibili y in eme ging ma ke s: Mode a ing ole o social capi al. Business E hics, he En i onmen & Responsibili y,33(1), 80–93.
[C ossRe ]
Fich, E. M., & Shi dasani, A. (2006). A e busy boa ds e ec i e moni o s? The Jou nal o Finance,61(2), 689–724. [C ossRe ]
Fogel, K., Jandik, T., & McCumbe , W. R. (2018). CFO social capi al and p i a e deb . Jou nal o Co po a e Finance,52, 28–52. [C ossRe ]
F ancoeu , C., Lakhal, F., Gaaya, S., & Saad, I. B. (2021). How do powe ul CEOs in luence co po a e en i onmen al pe o mance?
Economic Modelling,94, 121–129. [C ossRe ]
Gao, Y., Nie, Y., & Ha si, T. (2023). No all s akeholde s a e equal: Co po a e social esponsibili y a iabili y and co po a e inancial
pe o mance. Business E hics, he En i onmen & Responsibili y,32(4), 1389–1410. [C ossRe ]
Ga cía-Gómez, C. D., Za e iae a, M. A., Ki pishchiko , D., & López-I u iaga, F. J. (2023). Boa d social capi al in an eme ging ma ke :
Do di ec o s’ connec ions a ec co po a e isk- aking? Bo sa Is anbul Re iew,23(5), 1173–1190. [C ossRe ]
Geo gakakis, D., & Ruig ok, W. (2017). CEO succession o igin and i m pe o mance: A mul ile el s udy. Jou nal o Managemen S udies,
54(1), 58–87. [C ossRe ]
Gu, Y., Ho, K.-C., Yan, C., & Gozgo , G. (2021). Public en i onmen al conce n, CEO u no e , and g een in es men : E idence om a
quasi-na u al expe imen in China. Ene gy Economics,100, 105379. [C ossRe ]
Gull, A. A., Hussain, N., Khan, S. A., Mush aq, R., & O ij, R. (2023). The powe o he CEO and en i onmen al decoupling. Business
S a egy and he En i onmen ,32(6), 3951–3964. [C ossRe ]
Guo, M., Kuai, Y., & Liu, X. (2020). S ock ma ke esponse o en i onmen al policies: E idence om hea ily pollu ing i ms in China.
Economic Modelling,86, 306–316. [C ossRe ]
Ha jo o, M., Jo, H., & Kim, Y. (2017). Is ins i u ional owne ship ela ed o co po a e social esponsibili y? The nonlinea ela ion and i s
implica ion o s ock e u n ola ili y. Jou nal o Business E hics,146, 77–109. [C ossRe ]
Ha is, D. A., & Hel a , C. E. (1997). Speci ici y o CEO human capi al and compensa ion. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,18(11), 895–920.
[C ossRe ]
Ha is, D. A., & Hel a , C. E. (2007). The boa d o di ec o s as a social ne wo k: A new pe spec i e. Jou nal o Managemen Inqui y,16(3),
228–237. [C ossRe ]
Haynes, K. T., & Hillman, A. (2010). The e ec o boa d capi al and CEO powe on s a egic change. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,
31(11), 1145–1163. [C ossRe ]
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 22 o 24
Hen i, J.-F., & Jou neaul , M. (2008). En i onmen al pe o mance indica o s: An empi ical s udy o Canadian manu ac u ing i ms.
Jou nal o En i onmen al Managemen ,87(1), 165–176. [C ossRe ]
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boa ds o di ec o s and i m pe o mance: In eg a ing agency and esou ce dependence pe spec i es.
Academy o Managemen Re iew,28(3), 383–396. [C ossRe ]
Hoi, C. K. S., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2019). Does social capi al mi iga e agency p oblems? E idence om Chie Execu i e O ice (CEO)
compensa ion. Jou nal o Financial Economics,133(2), 498–519. [C ossRe ]
Hu, W., & Shi, S. (2025). CEO g een backg ound and en e p ise g een inno a ion. In e na ional Re iew o Economics & Finance,97, 103765.
[C ossRe ]
Huang, H., Chang, Y., & Zhang, L. (2023). CEO’s ma ke ing expe ience and i m g een inno a ion. Business S a egy and he En i onmen ,
32(8), 5211–5233. [C ossRe ]
Huang, R., & Wei, J. (2023). Does CEOs’ g een expe ience a ec en i onmen al co po a e social esponsibili y? E idence om China.
Economic Analysis and Policy,79, 205–231. [C ossRe ]
Hu zschen eu e , T., Kleindiens , I., & G ege , C. (2012). How new leade s a ec s a egic change ollowing a succession e en : A c i ical
e iew o he li e a u e. The Leade ship Qua e ly,23(5), 729–755. [C ossRe ]
Inkpen, A. C., & Tsang, E. W. (2016). Re lec ions on he 2015 decade awa d—Social capi al, ne wo ks, and knowledge ans e : An
eme gen s eam o esea ch. Academy o Managemen Re iew,41, 573–588. [C ossRe ]
Jalal, A. M., & P ezas, A. P. (2012). Ou side CEO succession and i m pe o mance. Jou nal o Economics and Business,64(6), 399–426.
[C ossRe ]
Ja akhadze, D., Fe is, S. P., & F ench, D. W. (2016). Social capi al, in es men s, and ex e nal inancing. Jou nal o Co po a e Finance,37,
38–55. [C ossRe ]
Jeb an, K., Chen, S., & Zhang, R. (2022). Boa d social capi al and s ock p ice c ash isk. Re iew o Quan i a i e Finance and Accoun ing,
58(2), 499–540. [C ossRe ]
Jos a nd , P., & Sau ne , Z. (2008). Financial dis ess, co po a e con ol, and managemen u no e . Jou nal o Banking & Finance,32(10),
2188–2204. [C ossRe ]
Ka ae li, A., & Zajac, E. J. (2013). When do ou side CEOs gene a e s a egic change? The enabling ole o co po a e s abili y. Jou nal o
Managemen S udies,50(7), 1267–1294. [C ossRe ]
Khan, T. M., Gang, B., Fa eed, Z., & Yasmeen, R. (2020). The impac o CEO enu e on co po a e social and en i onmen al pe o mance:
An eme ging coun y’s analysis. En i onmen al Science and Pollu ion Resea ch,27(16), 19314–19326. [C ossRe ]
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2006). Mul iple di ec o ships and co po a e pe o mance in Aus alian lis ed companies. Co po a e
Go e nance: An In e na ional Re iew,14(6), 530–546. [C ossRe ]
Kim, Y., & Cannella, A. A., J . (2008). Towa d a social capi al heo y o di ec o selec ion. Co po a e Go e nance: An In e na ional Re iew,
16(4), 282–293. [C ossRe ]
Kla ne , P., P obs , G., & Useem, M. (2020). Opening he black box: Unpacking boa d in ol emen in inno a ion. S a egic O ganiza ion,
18(4), 487–519. [C ossRe ]
Konadu, R., Owusu-Agyei, S., La ey, T. A., Danso, A., Adomako, S., & Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2020). CEOs’ epu a ion, quali y
managemen and en i onmen al inno a ion: The oles o s akeholde p essu e and esou ce commi men . Business S a egy and
he En i onmen ,29(6), 2310–2323. [C ossRe ]
Ko , Y. Y., & Misangyi, V. F. (2008). Ou side di ec o s’ indus y-speci ic expe ience and i ms’ liabili y o newness. S a egic Managemen
Jou nal,29(12), 1345–1355. [C ossRe ]
Ko , Y. Y., & Sunda amu hy, C. (2009). Expe ience-based human capi al and social capi al o ou side di ec o s. Jou nal o Managemen ,
35(4), 981–1006. [C ossRe ]
Li, D., Zhao, Y., Sun, Y., & Yin, D. (2017). Co po a e en i onmen al pe o mance, en i onmen al in o ma ion disclosu e, and inancial
pe o mance: E idence om China. Human and Ecological Risk Assessmen : An In e na ional Jou nal,23(2), 323–339. [C ossRe ]
Li, R., & Ramana han, R. (2020). Can en i onmen al in es men s bene i en i onmen al pe o mance? The mode a ing oles o
ins i u ional en i onmen and o eign di ec in es men . Business S a egy and he En i onmen ,29(8), 3385–3398. [C ossRe ]
Li, X., Guo, F., & Wang, J. (2024). A pa h owa ds en e p ise en i onmen al pe o mance imp o emen : How does CEO g een
expe ience ma e ? Business S a egy and he En i onmen ,33(2), 820–838. [C ossRe ]
Liu, X. (2023). Fea o lose? An analysis o CEO successo s’ decision-making ega ding R&D in ensi y based on beha io al agency
heo y. Asian Business & Managemen ,22(1), 403–430. [C ossRe ]
Ma quis, C., & Tilcsik, A. (2016). Ins i u ional equi alence: How indus y and communi y pee s in luence co po a e philan h opy.
O ganiza ion Science,27(5), 1325–1341. [C ossRe ]
Maswadi, L., & Am an, A. (2023). Does boa d capi al enhance co po a e social esponsibili y disclosu e quali y? The ole o CEO
powe . Co po a e Social Responsibili y and En i onmen al Managemen ,30(1), 209–225. [C ossRe ]
Meng, J., & Zhang, Z. (2022). Co po a e en i onmen al in o ma ion disclosu e and in es o esponse: E idence om China’s capi al
ma ke . Ene gy Economics,108, 105886. [C ossRe ]
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 23 o 24
Meng, X. H., Zeng, S. X., Tam, C. M., & Xu, X. D. (2013). Whe he op execu i es’ u no e in luences en i onmen al esponsibili y:
F om he pe spec i e o en i onmen al in o ma ion disclosu e. Jou nal o Business E hics,114, 341–353. [C ossRe ]
Mu akin, M. B., Khan, A., & Mih e , D. G. (2018). The e ec o boa d capi al and CEO powe on co po a e social esponsibili y
disclosu es. Jou nal o Business E hics,150, 41–56. [C ossRe ]
O’Cass, A., & Sok, P. (2014). The ole o in ellec ual esou ces, p oduc inno a ion capabili y, epu a ional esou ces and ma ke ing
capabili y combina ions in i m g ow h. In e na ional Small Business Jou nal,32(8), 996–1018. [C ossRe ]
O ij, R. P., Rehman, S., Khan, H., & Khan, F. (2021). Is CSR he new compe i i e en i onmen o CEOs? The associa ion be ween
CEO u no e , co po a e social esponsibili y and boa d gende di e si y: Asian e idence. Co po a e Social Responsibili y and
En i onmen al Managemen ,28(2), 731–747. [C ossRe ]
Peppe , A., & Go e, J. (2015). Beha io al agency heo y: New ounda ions o heo izing abou execu i e compensa ion. Jou nal o
Managemen ,41(4), 1045–1068. [C ossRe ]
Pe y, T., & Peye , U. (2005). Boa d sea accumula ion by execu i es: A sha eholde ’s pe spec i e. The Jou nal o Finance,60(4), 2083–2123.
[C ossRe ]
Pé ez-Cale o, L., Villegas, M. d. M., & Ba oso, C. (2016). A amewo k o boa d capi al. Co po a e Go e nance,16(3), 452–475.
[C ossRe ]
P e e , J., & Salancik, G. (2015). Ex e nal con ol o o ganiza ions—Resou ce dependence pe spec i e. In O ganiza ional beha io 2
(pp. 355–370). Rou ledge.
Quan, X., Ke, Y., Qian, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2021). CEO o eign expe ience and g een inno a ion: E idence om China. Jou nal o Business
E hics,182, 535–557. [C ossRe ]
Quigley, T. J., Hamb ick, D. C., Misangyi, V. F., & Rizzi, G. A. (2019). CEO selec ion as isk- aking: A new an age on he deba e abou
he consequences o inside s e sus ou side s. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,40(9), 1453–1470. [C ossRe ]
Ramachand an, I. (2018). T igge ing abso p i e capaci y in o ganiza ions: CEO succession as a knowledge enable . Jou nal o Knowledge
Managemen ,22(8), 1844–1864. [C ossRe ]
Ramón-Llo ens, M. C., Ga cía-Meca, E., & Puche a-Ma ínez, M. C. (2019). The ole o human and social boa d capi al in d i ing CSR
epo ing. Long Range Planning,52(6), 101846. [C ossRe ]
Regue a-Al a ado, N., & B a o-U quiza, F. (2022). The in luence o boa d social capi al on co po a e social esponsibili y epo ing.
Jou nal o In ellec ual Capi al,23(4), 913–935. [C ossRe ]
Ríos, A.-M., & Picazo-Tadeo, A. J. (2021). Measu ing en i onmen al pe o mance in he ea men o municipal solid was e: The case o
he Eu opean Union-28. Ecological Indica o s,123, 107328. [C ossRe ]
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The cen al ole o he p opensi y sco e in obse a ional s udies o causal e ec s. Biome ika,
70(1), 41–55. [C ossRe ]
Ryan, T. P. (2008). Mode n eg ession me hods (Vol. 655). John Wiley & Sons.
Saue wald, S., Lin, Z., & Peng, M. W. (2016). Boa d social capi al and excess CEO e u ns. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,37(3), 498–520.
[C ossRe ]
Shahab, Y., N im, C. G., Chen, Y., Ullah, F., Li, H. X., & Ye, Z. (2020). Chie execu i e o ice a ibu es, sus ainable pe o mance,
en i onmen al pe o mance, and en i onmen al epo ing: New insigh s om uppe echelons pe spec i e. Business S a egy and
he En i onmen ,29(1), 1–16. [C ossRe ]
Shui, X., Zhang, M., Sma , P., & Ye, F. (2022). Sus ainable co po a e go e nance o en i onmen al inno a ion: A con igu a ional
analysis on boa d capi al, CEO powe and owne ship s uc u e. Jou nal o Business Resea ch,149, 786–794. [C ossRe ]
Song, H., Zhao, C., & Zeng, J. (2017). Can en i onmen al managemen imp o e inancial pe o mance: An empi ical s udy o A-sha es
lis ed companies in China. Jou nal o Cleane P oduc ion,141, 1051–1056. [C ossRe ]
Tian, J., Haleblian, J., & Rajagopalan, N. (2011). The e ec s o boa d human and social capi al on in es o eac ions o new CEO
selec ion. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,32(7), 731–747. [C ossRe ]
Uzzi, B., & Gillespie, J. J. (2002). Knowledge spillo e in co po a e inancing ne wo ks: Embeddedness and he i m’s deb pe o mance.
S a egic Managemen Jou nal,23(7), 595–618. [C ossRe ]
Walls, J. L., & Be one, P. (2017). The powe o one o make a di e ence: How in o mal and o mal CEO powe a ec en i onmen al
sus ainabili y. Jou nal o Business E hics,145, 293–308. [C ossRe ]
Wang, J., Li, J., & Zhang, Q. (2021). Does ca bon e iciency imp o e inancial pe o mance? E idence om Chinese i ms. Ene gy
Economics,104, 105658. [C ossRe ]
Wang, L., Lin, Y., Jiang, W., Yang, H., & Zhao, H. (2023). Does CEO emo ion ma e ? CEO a ec i i y and co po a e social esponsibili y.
S a egic Managemen Jou nal,44(7), 1820–1835. [C ossRe ]
Wang, M., Liao, G., & Li, Y. (2021). The ela ionship be ween en i onmen al egula ion, pollu ion and co po a e en i onmen al
esponsibili y. In e na ional Jou nal o En i onmen al Resea ch and Public Heal h,18(15), 8018. [C ossRe ] [PubMed]
Wang, Y., Qiu, Y., & Luo, Y. (2022). CEO o eign expe ience and co po a e sus ainable de elopmen : E idence om China. Business
S a egy and he En i onmen ,31(5), 2036–2051. [C ossRe ]
Adm. Sci. 2025,15, 162 24 o 24
Wang, Z., McNally, R., & Lenihan, H. (2019). The ole o social capi al and cul u e on social decision-making cons ain s: A mul ile el
in es iga ion. Eu opean Managemen Jou nal,37(2), 222–232. [C ossRe ]
Wie sema, M. F., Nishimu a, Y., & Suzuki, K. (2018). Execu i e succession: The impo ance o social capi al in CEO appoin men s.
S a egic Managemen Jou nal,39(5), 1473–1495. [C ossRe ]
Wiseman, J. (1982). An e alua ion o en i onmen al disclosu es made in co po a e annual epo s. Accoun ing, O ganiza ions and Socie y,
7(1), 53–63. [C ossRe ]
Wood, D. J., Mi chell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & B yan, L. M. (2021). S akeholde iden i ica ion and salience a e 20 yea s: P og ess, p oblems,
and p ospec s. Business & Socie y,60(1), 196–245. [C ossRe ]
Ya i, E., Tehseen, S., & Haide , S. A. (2021). Impac o g een aining on en i onmen al pe o mance h ough media ing ole o
compe encies and mo i a ion. Sus ainabili y,13(10), 5624. [C ossRe ]
Zeng, S., Xu, X., Dong, Z., & Tam, V. W. (2010). Towa ds co po a e en i onmen al in o ma ion disclosu e: An empi ical s udy in China.
Jou nal o Cleane P oduc ion,18(12), 1142–1148. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, K., Pan, Z., Jana dhanan, M., & Pa el, I. (2023). Rela ionship analysis be ween g eenwashing and en i onmen al pe o mance.
En i onmen , De elopmen and Sus ainabili y,25(8), 7927–7957. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, L., Ji, W., Tao, J., & Wang, Q. (2011). Who shall lea e? How CEO p e e ence and powe a ec execu i e u no e in Chinese
lis ed companies. Co po a e Go e nance: An In e na ional Re iew,19(6), 547–561. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, X., Le, Y., Meng, Q., & Teng, X. (2023). G een en ep eneu ial o ien a ion and inancial pe o mance in Chinese i ms: The ole
o s akeholde engagemen and g een abso p i e capaci y. Co po a e Social Responsibili y and En i onmen al Managemen ,30(3),
1082–1095. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, Y. (2008). In o ma ion asymme y and he dismissal o newly appoin ed CEOs: An empi ical in es iga ion. S a egic Managemen
Jou nal,29(8), 859–872. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, Y., & Rajagopalan, N. (2004). When he known de il is be e han an unknown god: An empi ical s udy o he an eceden s and
consequences o elay CEO successions. Academy o Managemen Jou nal,47(4), 483–500. [C ossRe ]
Zhang, Y., & Rajagopalan, N. (2010). Once an ou side , always an ou side ? CEO o igin, s a egic change, and i m pe o mance.
S a egic Managemen Jou nal,31(3), 334–346. [C ossRe ]
Zhou, M., Chen, F., & Chen, Z. (2021). Can CEO educa ion p omo e en i onmen al inno a ion: E idence om Chinese en e p ises.
Jou nal o Cleane P oduc ion,297, 126725. [C ossRe ]
Zhu, D. H., & Shen, W. (2016). Why do some ou side successions a e be e han o he s? The ole o ou side CEOs’ p io expe ience
wi h boa d di e si y. S a egic Managemen Jou nal,37(13), 2695–2708. [C ossRe ]
Disclaime /Publishe ’s No e: The s a emen s, opinions and da a con ained in all publica ions a e solely hose o he indi idual
au ho (s) and con ibu o (s) and no o MDPI and/o he edi o (s). MDPI and/o he edi o (s) disclaim esponsibili y o any inju y o
people o p ope y esul ing om any ideas, me hods, ins uc ions o p oduc s e e ed o in he con en .
