Ga cía, Is ael; Hayo, Be nd
A icle — Published Ve sion
The in luence o poli icians' sex on poli ical budge cycles:
An empi ical analysis o Spanish municipali ies
Economics & Poli ics
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
John Wiley & Sons
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Ga cía, Is ael; Hayo, Be nd (2024) : The in luence o poli icians' sex on poli ical
budge cycles: An empi ical analysis o Spanish municipali ies, Economics & Poli ics, ISSN
1468-0343, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 37, Iss. 1, pp. 243-270,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/ecpo.12318
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Re ised: 26 June 2024
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Accep ed: 28 Augus 2024
DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12318
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The in luence o poli icians' sex on poli ical
budge cycles: An empi ical analysis o
Spanish municipali ies
Is ael Ga cía
1,2
|Be nd Hayo
1
1
Uni e si y o Ma bu g, Ma bu g,
Ge many
2
Thünen Ins i u e, B aunschweig,
Ge many
Co espondence
Be nd Hayo, Ma bu g Cen e o
Ins i u ional Economics (MACIE),
School o Business and Economics,
Uni e si y o Ma bu g, D‐35032
Ma bu g, Ge many.
Email: [email p o ec ed]
Abs ac
Does a poli ician's sex in luence poli ical budge cycles
(PBCs)? We answe his ques ion using a sample o
Spanish municipali ies om he Mad id egion o he
pe iod 2010–2019. The Mad id egion has a homoge-
nous se o budge ules ha allow consis en ca ego-
iza ion o budge expendi u e i ems as ei he “man-
da o y”o “non‐manda o y”public se ices. A e
di e en ia ing be ween smalle and la ge munici-
pali ies, gende in luence is s udied along wo dimen-
sions: he mayo 's sex and he sha e o women in
go e nmen . Ou indings include, in ega d o man-
da o y spending in smalle municipali ies, ha gende ‐
balanced go e nmen s induce PBCs. In la ge munici-
pali ies, when he sha e o women in go e nmen is
abo e 60%, elec o al spending is inc eased by up o 10%
o an a e age municipal budge o manda o y spend-
ing, and up o 2.2% o non‐manda o y. These indings
a e gene ally suppo ed in a mixed‐gende close elec-
ion analysis.
KEYWORDS
gende , iscal policy, local poli icians, Mad id egion, poli ical
budge cycles, signaling mechanism, Spanish municipali ies
Economics Poli ics. 2025;37:243–270. wileyonlinelib a y.com/jou nal/ecpo
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243
This is an open access a icle unde he e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion‐NonComme cial License, which pe mi s use,
dis ibu ion and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly ci ed and is no used o comme cial pu poses.
© 2024 The Au ho (s). Economics & Poli ics published by John Wiley & Sons L d.
1|INTRODUCTION
The las decade has wi nessed a ising sha e o emale poli icians, leading o a g owing body o
esea ch on he e ec his has had on s e eo ypes, public opinion, and policy choices. Empi ical
e idence shows ha g ea e emale ep esen a ion in poli ics imp o es he o e all quali y o
poli icians by inc easing he pool o quali ied emale poli icians and d i ing ou less compe en
males (Besley e al., 2017; O'B ien & Rickne, 2016). Men and women a e known o ha e
di e en policy p e e ences, especially in ega d o social, heal h, and educa ion spending (Aid
& Dallal, 2008; Aid e al., 2006; Be occhi, 2011). Thus, i is o en assumed in he li e a u e ha
hose spending ca ego ies a e pa icula ly a o ed by emale poli icians. Bagues and Campa
(2021) call hese ypes o budge i ems “ emale”expendi u es. Empi ical e idence suppo ing
his conjec u e is mixed, howe e , as only a ac ion o s udies on his opic ind ha emale
poli ical ep esen a ion ma e s o di e en policy choices (Hessami & da Fonseca, 2020).
The poli ical economy li e a u e sugges s ha be o e an elec ion, incumben poli icians seek
o in luence o e pe cep ions o hei compe ence and/o p e e ences by means o iscal policy.
These elec ion‐induced iscal policy cycles a e known as “poli ical budge cycles”(PBCs). Since
Rogo (1990), many au ho s ha e assumed a scena io in which o e s a e dissa is ied wi h
high‐spending go e nmen s, and hus incumben s who adop mo e expansiona y iscal policies
may be punished a he han ewa ded (Buchs & Soguel, 2022). In his se ing, incumben s
signal hei compe ence by adjus ing he budge in he p e‐elec ion pe iod so ha speci ic
p e e ed i ems ecei e (new o addi ional) unding (B ende & D azen, 2013; D azen &
Esla a, 2010).
In his con ex , i seems impo an o know which budge i ems o e s p e e so as o
p ope ly assess whe he incumben poli icians a e, indeed, manipula ing expendi u e on hese
i ems wi h he aim o in luencing o e pe cep ions. In he empi ical li e a u e, he classi i-
ca ion o budge i ems as “ isible”o alued by o e s appea s o be somewha subjec i e and
con ex speci ic. On he one hand, some s udies, such as Ve gne (2009) and Veiga e al. (2017),
ind ha be o e elec ions, unds a e shi ed om in es men expendi u es owa d cu en
expendi u es. On he o he hand, D azen and Esla a (2010) and Repe o (2018) epo ha
oppo unis ically a ge ed expendi u es a e mo e o en associa ed wi h in as uc u e de el-
opmen p ojec s: oads, schools, wa e plan s, hospi als, and he like. Fu he mo e, spending
a eas he li e a u e conside s “ emale”a e no easily ca ego ized in e ms o “ isibili y,” o
example, a budge i em labeled “educa ion”may con ain unds o school cons uc ion, ha is,
in as uc u e in es men , as well as unds o eache sala ies, ha is, cu en expendi u e.
We s udy he in luence o gende on PBCs by di e en ia ing be ween “manda o y se ices,”
ha is, budge i ems ha mus be p o ided by each municipali y, and “non‐manda o y se -
ices,” ha is, se ices he municipali y is no equi ed o p o ide. Using “manda o y se ices”
a oids he p oblem o ha ing o decide, mo e o less a bi a ily, which budge i ems a e
“ isible”o mo e likely o be alued by emale poli icians and whe he such poli icians ac ually
ha e he capaci y o al e hem. In addi ion, “manda o y se ices”lend hemsel es swell o
elec o al manipula ion, as local poli icians can claim ull c edi o hem (Bueno, 2023).
Mo eo e , we do no use inal budge da a as a p oxy o he p o ision o public goods, which is
s anda d p ocedu e in he PBC ield. Ins ead, aking an app oach we belie e is mo e in line
wi h he heo e ical PBC amewo k, we use he ini ial budge as a signaling mechanism
di ec ed a o e s.
Acce u a and P o e a (2022) and O dine e al. (2023) a e he only wo ks o examine he
elec o al mo i es behind gende di e ences in spending. Howe e , he li e a u e on gende
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di e ences in public policy does no dis inguish be ween elec o al and non‐elec o al pe iods
(Cha opadhyay & Du lo, 2004; Clo s‐Figue as, 2011; Fe ei a & Gyou ko, 2014). The e a e
se e al easons why he beha io o emale poli icians may di e be ween elec o al and non‐
elec o al yea s, and why hei engagemen in RBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies may di e om ha o
men. On he one hand, women appea o ha e s onge p e e ences o edis ibu ion and
equali y (Alesina & La Fe a a, 2005; Co neo & G üne , 2002), o be mo e isk‐a e se and less
compe i i e (C oson & Gneezy, 2009; Gneezy e al., 2009), and o be associa ed wi h less
co up ion and less oppo unism (B ollo & T oiano, 2016; Dolla e al., 2001). On he o he
hand, he e is e idence o he same le el o oppo unism as obse ed o male poli icians
(Gangadha an e al., 2019; O dine e al., 2023). Es e e‐Vola and Bagues (2012) and Casas‐A ce
and Saiz (2015) p o ide e idence ha in Spain, be o e he in oduc ion o gende quo as, he e
was disc imina ion agains emale poli icians by pa y leade s. As a consequence, emale pol-
i icians, who end o be mo e isk‐a e se and mo e conce ned wi h he nex elec ion han
u u e ones (O dine e al., 2023), may ha e el he need o signal hei compe ence much mo e
s ongly han was he case o hei male coun e pa s. This a gumen is especially ele an o
he mos isible igu e o go e nmen — he mayo .
Budge s a e gene ally app o ed by simple majo i ies and i hus seems possible ha PBC‐
ela ed spending could depend on he ela i e sha es o men and women in go e nmen . Also,
in municipal‐le el policymaking, mayo s in e ac in ensi ely wi h he local council, making i
plausible ha he in luence o he mayo 's sex may be condi ional on he sha e o emale
councilo s. Thus, we s udy he e ec o a mayo 's sex condi ional on he sha e o women in
go e nmen .
To s udy PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies a he municipal le el, we use da a om he Mad id egion
(Comunidad Au ónoma de Mad id) o he pe iod 2010–2019. Municipali ies in he Mad id
egion a e subjec o a homogenous se o budge ules, which allow consis en ca ego iza ion o
budge expendi u e i ems as ei he o “manda o y”o “non‐manda o y”public se ices. No e
ha 2010–2019 was a pe iod o iscal aus e i y, cha ac e ized by balanced local budge s and
cons ain s on o al expendi u es due o O ganic Law 2012. The e o e, du ing his pe iod, PBC‐
ela ed ac i i ies could no be accomplished by manipula ing de ici s o o al spending; ins ead,
incumben s had o ely on budge composi ion o signal hei compe ence and/o p e e ences.
In Ma ch 2007, he Equali y Ac amended Spanish elec o al law by in oducing gende ‐
balanced candida e lis s. The Equali y Ac posi ioned Spain among he g oup o coun ies wi h
ising sha es o emale poli icians and i has he addi ional ad an age o allowing us o em-
pi ically es he in luence o gende on PBCs.
Ou analysis is based on annual municipal da a om he Mad id egion o e he pe iod
2010–2019, which we s udy using a dynamic panel‐da a amewo k and, as a obus ness es , a
eg ession discon inui y design. When condi ioning he analysis on wo impo an gende
dimensions, emale mayo and sha e o women in go e nmen , we ind e idence o PBC‐
ela ed spending. Fo smalle municipali ies, we disco e ha gende ‐balanced go e nmen s
engage in PBC‐ ela ed beha io in e ms o manda o y spending. In he case o la ge muni-
cipali ies, we ind signi ican gende ‐ ela ed di e ences in bo h—manda o y and non‐
manda o y expendi u es. In con as o p e ious indings, balanced go e nmen s do no p e-
en PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies. Fu he mo e, emale‐domina ed go e nmen s end o engage in
oppo unis ic budge manipula ion by inc easing elec o al spending up o 10% o o al ex-
pendi u es. O e all, ou analysis sugges s ha gende ‐balanced councils, as manda ed by he
Equali y Ac , do no appea o p e en elec o al budge manipula ion, nei he in smalle no
la ge municipali ies. Qui e o he con a y, we ind e idence ha inc easing he sha e o
GARCÍA and HAYO
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245
women in go e nmen abo e 60% inc eases local poli icians' PBC‐ ela ed beha io . Hence, in
con as o some claims in he li e a u e, unde speci ic ci cums ances, emale poli icians can
beha e as oppo unis ically as males.
Some s udies o Spanish municipali ies, such as Cabalei o‐Casal and Buch‐Gómez (2020)
and Bagues and Campa (2021), epo limi ed (o no) gende impac o emale poli icians on
social spending. O he s udies show ha emale mayo s end o be mo e complian wi h legal
es ic ions on deb , inancial sus ainabili y (Cabalei o‐Casal & Buch‐Gómez, 2018; He nández‐
Nicolás e al., 2018), and budge s abili y, especially in he p esence o a gende ‐balanced
council as manda ed by he Equali y Ac (Balague ‐Coll & I ano a‐Tone a, 2021; Na a o‐
Gale a e al., 2017).
Ou esul s do no co obo a e hese indings in he li e a u e, ha is, we ind, condi ional
on emale mayo s, ha go e nmen composi ion in line wi h he Equali y Ac inc eases PBC
spending, bu only in smalle municipali ies. In la ge ones, a go e nmen composi ion in line
wi h he Equali y Ac is indis inguishable om a male‐domina ed go e nmen and only when
he go e ning body becomes emale‐domina ed, we ind elec o al‐mo i a ed spending in
manda o y and non‐manda o y se ices.
The emainde o he a icle is o ganized as ollows: Sec ion 2 e iews he ela ed li e a u e.
Sec ion 3ou lines some heo e ical conside a ions. Sec ion 4 o mula es he empi ical s a egy.
Sec ion 5p esen s and discusses he esul s o ou analysis. Sec ion 6p o ides he conclusion.
2|LITERATURE REVIEW
The heo e ical li e a u e on PBCs begins wi h Rogo and Sibe (1988) and Rogo (1990), who
p opose models in which mo e compe en incumben s signal hei compe ence be o e elec ions
by highe public spending o by al e ing he budge o showcase “mo e isible”i ems. Shi and
S ensson (2006) and D azen and Esla a (2010) u he de elop his pe spec i e. See Ga cía and
Hayo (2021) o a mo e comp ehensi e discussion o he PBC li e a u e.
Ea lie empi ical li e a u e
1
(B ende & D azen, 2005; Pe sson & Tabellini, 2003; Shi &
S ensson, 2006) elies on coun y‐le el panel da a and agg ega ed iscal expendi u e o de ici
as he p ima y PBC indica o s. The ocus has now shi ed owa d a scena io in which o e s
p e e balanced iscal budge s, al hough, a he same ime, hey may ewa d high spending on
speci ic, “mo e isible,”i ems (B ende & D azen, 2013; Veiga e al., 2017; Ve gne, 2009).
Fu he mo e, i is now common o use da a om local go e nmen s a he han coun y‐le el
da a. Regional da a ha e a numbe o ad an ages. Fi s , i is di icul o con ol o all sou ces o
c oss‐coun y he e ogenei y, whe eas egions wi hin one coun y end o be subjec o simila
ins i u ional cons ain s and shocks. Second, using municipal da a subs an ially inc eases he
numbe o obse a ions o s udying PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies. Thi d, i is widely belie ed ha
ci izens a e mo e likely o moni o local go e nmen policies and ac ions han hey a e o
moni o highe ‐le el go e nmen ac ion. Mo eo e , speci ic g oups o o e s may be mo e
easily a ge ed a he local le el, meaning ha he dis inc ion be ween a ge ed and non‐
a ge ed expendi u es (o axes) and hei oppo unis ic manipula ion is mo e ele an a his
le el.
Poli icians' pe cep ion o “mo e isible”o a ge ed i ems appea s o be con ex speci ic. On
he one hand, some s udies, such as Ve gne (2009), Veiga e al. (2017), Mandon and Cazals
(2019), and Bueno (2023), ind ha p e‐elec o al spending shi s om in es men owa d
cu en expendi u es. On he o he hand, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001, 757) a gue ha
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“b ick and mo a ”expendi u es a e highly isible and bene icial o speci ic (and po en ially
la ge) g oups o o e s. In line wi h his, D azen and Esla a (2010), Repe o (2018), Giacobbe
e al. (2024), and Lau enschlage e al. (2024) epo ha oppo unis ically a ge ed expendi u es
a e mo e o en associa ed wi h in as uc u e de elopmen p ojec s, o example, oads,
schools, wa e plan s, hospi als, and he like.
Bas ida e al. (2013), Beni o e al. (2013a), Vicen e e al. (2013), Cabalei o‐Casal & Buch‐
Gómez, (2018,2021), and Balague ‐Coll and I ano a‐Tone a (2021) analyze local Spanish PBCs
in he con ex o iscal aus e i y. The s udies examine he e ec o elec ions on deb , budge
s abili y, and capi al expendi u e. The esea che s end o ind signi ican hikes in capi al
spending in p e‐elec o al yea s, condi ional on di e en poli ical a ibu es, o ins ance,
majo i y, go e nmen anspa ency, and pa y a ilia ion. Beni o e al. (2013b), Guillamón e al.
(2013), Beni o e al. (2017), and Cabalei o‐Casal and Buch‐Gómez (2020) analyze he e ec o
PBCs on cul u al, police, was e collec ion, and social municipal expendi u es, espec i ely.
Again, condi ional on poli ical and socioeconomic cha ac e is ics, hey all ind e idence o
elec o al manipula ion.
The sha e o emale poli icians has inc eased in ecen yea s, which, a leas o some ex en ,
is due o he in oduc ion o gende quo as. Empi ical indings show ha inc easing he
p esence o women in go e nmen (1) aises he pool o quali ied emale poli icians (O'B ien &
Rickne, 2016), (2) imp o es he quali y o all poli icians (Bal unai e e al., 2014; Besley
e al., 2017), (3) homogenizes educa ion le els o male and emale poli icians unde closed‐lis
p opo ional ep esen a ion (P o e a & Woodhouse, 2022), (4) inc eases elec o al pa icipa ion,
and (5) educes nega i e s e eo ypes abou women (De Paola e al., 2010,2014). The la e esul
is in line wi h he indings o Es e e‐Vola and Bagues (2012) and Casas‐A ce and Saiz (2015),
who show ha in Spain, be o e gende quo as, pa y leade s we e no maximizing elec o al
success, as hey included ewe women in he candida e lis s han o e s would ha e p e e ed.
Men and women hold dis inc ly di e en policy p e e ences. Be occhi (2011) inds ha
ex ending he anchise o women inc eases he size o go e nmen , due o highe expendi u es
on heal h, educa ion, and social issues (Aid & Dallal, 2008; Aid e al., 2006). Funk and
Ga hmann (2015) s udied Swiss su ey da a and disco e ed di e ing p e e ences be ween men
and women in speci ic a eas, such as heal h, de ense, en i onmen al issues, and wel a e
spending. Employing ep esen a i e su ey da a on Ge many, Hayo and Neumeie (2019) show
ha women a e ela i ely mo e opposed o iscal consolida ion han men. In addi ion, he e is
subs an ial e idence ha women ha e social p e e ences di e en han hose o men. Sleg en
and Heyndels (2019) show ha emale poli icians end o be mo e le ‐wing o ien ed. Fo
ins ance, women appea o ha e a s onge p e e ence o edis ibu ion and equali y han men
(Alesina & La Fe a a, 2005; Co neo & G üne , 2002). While Dolla e al. (2001) and B ollo and
T oiano (2016) ind ha g ea e emale ep esen a ion in go e nmen is associa ed wi h less
co up ion and less oppo unis ic beha io , Gangadha an e al. (2019) and O dine e al. (2023)
p esen e idence o a leas he same le el o oppo unism. Using a con olled expe imen
compa ing ma ilineal and pa ia chal communi ies, Ande sen e al. (2008) and Gneezy e al.
(2009) epo gende di e ences in compe i i e beha io and public good p o ision. In hei
e iew o he li e a u e on gende di e ences in economic expe imen s, C oson and Gneezy
(2009) conclude ha women a e no only less compe i i e bu also mo e isk‐a e se han men.
Following he easoning o O dine e al. (2023) and combining his wi h Di ich and Leipold's
(2014) inding ha men and women ha e di e en discoun a es, i is likely ha women iew
he poli ical a ena as mo e empo a y han men. In his case, he nex elec ion is mo e
impo an o emale poli icians han u u e elec ions. The e o e, gi en his di e en
GARCÍA and HAYO
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o ien a ion owa d he u u e and a highe deg ee o isk a e sion, emale poli icians may be as
oppo unis ically mo i a ed, o e en mo e so, han hei male coun e pa s o inc ease hei e‐
elec ion chances in he nex elec ion.
How gende in luences policymaking has become pa icula ly ele an in he empi ical li e a-
u e. Due o i s poli ical s uc u e and he a ailabili y o egional budge da a, India has ecei ed a lo
o a en ion in he las 20 yea s. Using a quasi‐expe imen al se up, Cha opadhyay and Du lo (2004),
Clo s‐Figue as, (2011,2012), and Bhalo a and Clo s‐Figue as (2014) p o ide e idence o gende
di e ences in budge expendi u es, pa icula ly hose aimed a heal h and educa ion, a eas adi-
ionally conside ed o special in e es o women. E idence o gende di e ences a he local le el is
ound in iche economies, oo. Besley and Case (2003), S ale yd (2009), Funk and Ga hmann
(2015), B aga and Sce ini (2017), Clay on and Ze e be g (2018), and Funk and Philips (2019)show
signi ican di e ences be ween male and emale poli icians when i comes o spending on childca e,
heal h, educa ion, and social assis ance. Howe e , Gaglia ducci and Pase man (2012), Fe ei a and
Gyou ko (2014), and Geys and Sø ensen (2019) epo ha inc easing hesha e o emale poli icians
has no impac on he composi ion o public spending. Acce u a and P o e a (2022) inde idence o
bo h scena ios. When hey analyze he ull elec o al e m, hey ind no spending di e ences be ween
male and emale mayo s. Howe e , once he elec o al imeline is accoun ed o , male mayo s appea
o be mo e likely o engage in p e‐elec o al spending on wha he au ho s belie e o be “mo e
isible”i ems. Howe e , mos o hese e ec s a e signi ican a only he 10% le el. Mo e ecen ly,
O dine e al. (2023) epo e idence ha women end o inc ease capi al spending while educing he
o al amoun o go e nmen spending. Fu he mo e, his is achie ed by educing alloca ions o i ems
ypically conside ed “mo e isible”in he PBC li e a u e, such as oads, public ligh ing, and was e
managemen , while lea ing una ec ed i ems conside ed as “ eminine.”
Gende di e ences a e also s udied using municipal da a in Spain. Cabalei o‐Casal and Buch‐
Gómez (2018)andHe nández‐Nicolás e al. (2018) show ha emale mayo s in Spain end o be
mo e complian wi h legal es ic ions on deb and inancial sus ainabili y, especially in he p esence
o a gende ‐balanced council as manda ed by he Equali y Ac (Na a o‐Gale a e al., 2017).
Howe e , Cabalei o‐Casal and Buch‐Gómez (2021) epo qui e he e e se: he e ec o emale
mayo s is e y limi ed and a g ea e sha e o emale councilo s wo sens iscal pe o mance.
Balague ‐Coll and I ano a‐Tone a (2021) condi ion he e ec o emale councilo s on he
mayo 's sex and conclude ha he combina ion o a emale mayo wi h an Equali y‐Ac ‐
complian council esul s in g ea e budge s abili y. Thei esul s also show ha in p e‐
elec o al yea s, emale mayo s a e less likely o engage in PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies. In a sample o
la ge Spanish municipali ies, which ecei e mo e media co e age in Spain, Cabalei o‐Casal and
Buch‐Gómez (2020) epo a limi ed gende ‐ ela ed impac on social spending. Bagues and
Campa (2021) s udied whe he he Equali y Ac had an e ec on he p opo ion o emale
councilo s and emale mayo s as well as on he composi ion o public inances. They employ a
eg ession discon inui y design a ound he 3000 and 5000 popula ion h esholds o check
whe he budge composi ion changes a ound he h eshold. They obse e no signi ican a i-
a ions in he size and composi ion o public inances, ega dless o council composi ion.
3|THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Recen PBC li e a u e in es iga es whe he local go e nmen incumben s use iscal policy, in he
o m o spending composi ion, o p o ide speci ic public goods and signal hei compe ence and/o
p e e ences o he elec o a e. Empi ical s udies in his li e a u e look a a numbe o PBC‐ ele an
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aspec s, such as e m limi s, go e no 's a ilia ion wi h he na ional pa y in powe , elec o al
calenda and poli ical cohesion, cha ac e is ics o pa ies and poli icians, deg ee o iscal
decen aliza ion, balanced budge ules, o e s' in o ma ion se , and he ole o emale mayo s and
councilo s. Despi e his wide ange o opics, we belie e ha he ex an li e a u e does no su -
icien ly conside wo impo an aspec s.
Fi s , gi en ha public isibili y o di e en budge i ems is he backbone o he heo e ical
and empi ical li e a u e, i is su p ising ha mos o his li e a u e does no dis inguish be ween
he di e en s ages o he budge p ocess (Ga cía & Hayo, 2021). S anda d p ocedu e is o use
inal budge da a in he o m o he amoun o money a local go e nmen spends on di e en
budge i ems. This ype o da a is ela i ely comp ehensi e and easy o collec , wo use ul
cha ac e is ics o applied wo k.
This s anda d p ocedu e, howe e , implici ly assumes ha inal budge da a a e a good
p oxy o ac ual public goods p o ision. Illus a ing why his could be p oblema ic, B ad o d
e al. (1969) decompose he p oduc ion o public se ices in o wo s ages: (i) he go e nmen
uses a ec o o p ima y inpu s o p oduce wha he au ho s call “di ec ly p oduced”ou pu s,
and (ii) hese di ec ly p oduced ou pu s a e ans o med in o obse able ou comes. Thus, he
go e nmen uses mone a y and non‐mone a y esou ces (inpu s) o p o ide di ec ly p oduced
ou pu s, condi ional on he go e nmen 's alloca i e and echnical e iciency and a ec o o
en i onmen al ac o s. Finally, indi idual ci izens consume he inal ou come, which is a
unc ion o di ec ly p oduced ou pu and en i onmen al ac o s. Hence, ci izen wel a e depends
on he inal ou come, and his ou come is no solely de e mined by public se ice p o ide s (De
Wi e & Geys, 2011).
The local go e nmen e iciency li e a u e acknowledges his complexi y and ocuses on he
i s s age, in which basic inpu s a e ans o med in o di ec ly p oduced ou pu s (Na bón‐Pe piñá
& De Wi e, 2018a,2018b). Gi en hei non‐ma ke na u e, budge expendi u es and e enues a e
he mos common p oxies o municipal esou ces employed in local se ice p o ision. As
emphasized by Na bón‐Pe piñá and De Wi e (2018b) and Aiello and Bonanno (2019), he
ans o ma ion o public inpu s in o inal ou comes is no s aigh o wa d, as en i onmen al
in luences can ha e a la ge impac on he e iciency o he p o ided municipal se ices. Rosen
and Fulle on (1977, 433) hus conclude ha i is p oblema ic o use expendi u es on local public
bene i s as a measu e o he quan i y and quali y o local public se ices “because o he
un enable assump ion ha ou pu can be measu ed by expendi u es on inpu s.”Aabe ge and
Langø gen (2003, 129) ag ee, “The lack o adequa e measu es o public ou pu is a majo
p oblem in he analysis o demand o public se ices. Using expendi u e as a p oxy o ou pu ,
which elies on he assump ion on cons an p ices, is ob iously in con lic wi h eali y.”D azen
and Esla a (2010, 41) also allow o he possibili y ha go e nmen policy migh no a ec
indi iduals' consump ion o he public good.
The second impo an aspec , hus a igno ed in he ele an li e a u e, is ha classi ying
budge i ems as “mo e isible”o “ alued by o e s”appea s highly con ex speci ic. Rogo
(1990, 21) w i es ha “ he incumben leade has an incen i e o bias p e‐elec ion iscal policy
owa d easily obse ed consump ion expendi u es, and away om go e nmen in es men .”
Qui e he e e se is a gued by D azen and Esla a (2010, 45), who s a e ha “in Colombia,
oppo unis ic a ge ed expendi u es a e mo e o en associa ed wi h in as uc u e de elopmen
p ojec s.”The li e a u e e iew p esen ed in Sec ion 2demons a es ha empi ical indings a e
all o e he map; some o he s udies epo a shi in p e‐elec o al spending owa d mo e
cu en expendi u es, whe eas o he s p o ide empi ical e idence o oppo unis ically a ge ed
in es men expendi u es. The e is no e en any e idence o clea egional pa e ns ha would
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allow us o conclude ha , o example, in Region A, budge i em 1 is conside ed “mo e isible,”
whe eas budge i em 2 is “mo e isible”in Region B.
We do no use inal expendi u es o measu e public good ou pu , no do we engage in an
a bi a y ca ego iza ion o wha is, o is no , a “mo e isible”budge i em. As o public goods
p o ision, we conside he ini ially p oposed budge as a signaling mechanism di ec ed a
o e s. Acco ding o he li e a u e on local go e nmen e iciency in public goods p o ision,
ac ual ou comes a e s ongly in luenced by laws and highe ede al le els as well as by pas
budge decisions (A onso & Fe nandes, 2006,2008; Balague ‐Coll e al., 2007,2019; Bosch
e al., 2012). Al hough he ini ial budge is somewha subjec o hese in luences oo, i is much
less cons ained and can be e ised igh up un il he inal budge is adop ed. Mo eo e , he
ini ial municipal budge is published be o e he ac ual budge pe iod, hus allowing incumben s
o signal hei u u e policy s ance. Hence, in con as o measu ing public good ou pu based
on backwa d‐looking inal budge da a, he ini ial budge can be unde s ood as a o wa d‐
looking ype o signal o he ollowing budge pe iod, one ha e eals he p e e ences and/o
compe ence o incumben s h ough hei choice o u u e iscal policies. As a gued by D azen
(2001, 101–102), iscal manipula ion can ha e a signi ican e ec on o es wi hou necessa ily
a ec ing ac ual economic ac i i y. And inally, ypically, i is he ini ial budge ha is epo ed
on and discussed by he media, whe eas inal budge da a a e gene ally a ailable only wi h
conside able delay and a e a ely subjec o ex e nal sc u iny.
2
This could be impo an , as he
media plays a signi ican ole in communica ing budge da a o he gene al public (Ga cía &
Hayo, 2021). Indeed, municipal‐le el poli ical deba es a e ypically based on he ini ial budge ,
no on he inal one.
In mos decen alized coun ies, municipali ies a e equi ed o p o ide a minimum o
se ices, he s anda ds o which a e de e mined by he highe ‐le el go e nmen . Such ex-
e nally equi ed minimum se ices ha e iscal p io i y o e he es o he se ices p o ided a
he municipal le el (Balague ‐Coll e al., 2013,2019; Kalb e al., 2012). By using “manda o y
se ices”as a spending ca ego y, we do no ha e o a bi a ily decide which budge i ems a e
“mo e isible”and/o mo e likely o be alued by emale poli icians o whe he such poli icians
can ac ually in luence hese i ems and claim c edi o hese i ems (Bueno, 2023). The la e
poin is emphasized by Geys and Sø ensen (2019, 3), who no e ha highe le els o go e nmen
impose subs an ial ins i u ional and budge a y cons ain s on he local le el. Mo eo e ,
spending a eas conside ed in he li e a u e o be “ emale”a e no always so easily also ca e-
go ized as “mo e isible.”
In Spain, local go e nmen s a e esponsible o a signi ican numbe o asks. The Spanish
Cons i u ion g an s municipali ies a no able deg ee o budge au onomy and lexibili y, bu i is
also e y speci ic abou wha se ices mus be p o ided. Depending on hei popula ion, mu-
nicipali ies mus p o ide di e en le els o basic se ices
3
:
•All municipali ies: public ligh ing, ceme e ies, was e collec ion, public cleaning, d inking
wa e supply, sewe sys em, access o u ban a eas, oad su acing, and ood and d ink
con ol.
•Municipali ies wi h mo e han 5000 inhabi an s: all o he abo e, plus public pa ks, public
lib a ies, and ma ke and was e managemen .
•Municipali ies wi h mo e han 20,000 inhabi an s: all o he abo e, plus ci il de ense, social
wo k, i e sa e y, spo s acili ies, and slaugh e houses.
•Municipali ies wi h mo e han 50,000 inhabi an s: all o he abo e, plus public anspo and
en i onmen al p o ec ion.
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–In smalle municipali ies: Male go e nmen , 64%; Balanced go e nmen , 36%.
–In la ge municipali ies: Male go e nmen , 32%; Balanced go e nmen , 65%; and Female
go e nmen , 3%.
Hence, go e nmen s become mo e gende ‐balanced wi h inc easing municipali y size.
Howe e , he e a e only a ew emale‐domina ed go e nmen s, and hese a e solely ound in
la ge municipali ies.
In ou discussion o he eg ession ables, we ocus on he es ima ion esul s ela ing o
“manda o y”and “non‐manda o y”expendi u e. Table 1(Panel a) shows he es ima ed e ec s
o smalle municipali ies.Focussing on manda o y spending (Column 2), we ind a s a is ically
signi ican inc ease in manda o y spending when an elec ion akes place. Compa ed o he
TABLE 1 Elec o al‐gende e ec s in mayo ‐ es ic ed sample.
(1) (2) (3)
All Manda o y Non‐manda o y
Panel a: Municipali ies wi h less han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −8.20 −20.22 11.29
(28.75) (26.71) (18.56)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 163.34** 126.48*** 40.72
(70.13) (46.20) (53.49)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Obse a ions 445 445 445
Panel b: Municipali ies wi h mo e han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −30.94** −31.19** 1.79
(15.04) (15.32) (8.33)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen −13.50 −28.70 21.56*
(29.19) (29.19) (12.96)
Female s. Male go e nmen 81.45* 62.38 24.64**
(43.78) (41.93) (12.44)
Female s. Balanced go e nmen 94.96** 91.08** 3.08
(38.05) (37.35) (5.35)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Obse a ions 460 460 325
No e: The mayo ‐ es ic ed sample is comp ised o hose municipali ies in which he mayo elec ed du ing he 2011 and 2015
elec ions was always o he same sex, ha is, he municipali y was un by ei he a male mayo o a emale mayo . Coe icien s
a e ob ained om he iple in e ac ion be ween Elec ion–Female mayo –Women in go e nmen es ima ed in Suppo ing
In o ma ion S1: Table A4 (Panel a) and Suppo ing In o ma ion S1: Table A5 (Panel b). Clus e ‐ obus s anda d e o s a e used
(clus e s: numbe o municipali ies). *, **, and *** indica e signi icance a a 10%, 5%, and 1% le el, espec i ely.
GARCÍA and HAYO
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a iable combina ion Male go e nmen wi h Male mayo , he combina ion o Balanced go -
e nmen wi h Female mayo leads o highe elec o al spending o almos €130 pe capi a. The
a e age spending o smalle municipali ies is €1,362 pe capi a; hus, he PBC‐ ela ed a e age
e ec is almos 10% o o al expendi u e. I is impo an o no e ha his e ec esul s om he
a iable combina ion Female mayo and Balanced go e nmen . In Suppo ing In o ma ion S1:
Table A4 (Column 2), we see ha he combina ion o Female mayo wi h Male go e nmen
educes elec o al spending by mo e han 5% o o al expendi u es. Tu ning o non‐manda o y
spending, in Column 3 o Table 1, we ind no signi ican elec o al e ec s.
Fo manda o y spending, a highe sha e o women in go e nmen seems o be conduci e o
inc easing PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies. This sugges s ha a high numbe o women in go e nmen
induces emale mayo s o ac in elec o ally mo i a ed ways in hose a eas ha a e he p ima y
ocus o he municipali y.
Panel b p esen s he e ec s obse ed in la ge municipali ies.Focussing on manda o y
spending (Column 2), we no e he eme gence o PBC‐ ela ed spending when compa ing he
a iables Female go e nmen and Balanced go e nmen .La ge municipali ies, on a e age,
spend €984 pe capi a, esul ing in a PBC‐ ela ed a e age e ec o €92 pe capi a, which
cons i u es 10% o o al expendi u es. I is also in e es ing o compa e he a iables Male
go e nmen and Balanced go e nmen in elec ion yea s. The poin es ima es show ha he
o me spends mo e han he la e , sugges ing ha a mo e balanced gende composi ion could
educe PBC‐ ela ed manda o y spending. Howe e , he e ec is imp ecisely es ima ed, so we
should no pu oo much ai h in i .
Tu ning o non‐manda o y spending (Column 3), we ind ha Balanced and Female go -
e nmen inc eases elec o al spending compa ed o Male go e nmen by €22 and €24 pe capi a,
espec i ely, accoun ing o mo e han 2% o o al spending. As p e iously a gued, poli icians in
la ge communi ies end o ha e mo e oom o manipula e non‐manda o y spending, which
makes up a la ge pa o hei budge and is less egula ed han manda o y spending. Howe e ,
he amoun is mo e modes han in “manda o y spending,”which is in line wi h he c edi ‐
claiming iew posi ed by Bueno (2023).
Hence, as he sha e o women in go e nmen inc eases, we obse e an elec o ally mo i a ed
hike in manda o y spending in bo h smalle and la ge municipali ies. Fo non‐manda o y
spending, he di e ence is only ound in la ge municipali ies when compa ed wi h Male
go e nmen . These indings sugges ha , unde speci ic ci cums ances, emale mayo s can
exhibi oppo unis ic beha io , which is simila o ha epo ed o male mayo s in o he
s udies (Balague ‐Coll & I ano a‐Tone a, 2021; Cabalei o‐Casal & Buch‐Gómez, 2018; and
Acce u a & P o e a, 2022).
In Sec ion 4.3, we a gued ha he mayo 's sex is unlikely o be endogenous. Howe e , o
add ess any emaining doub s abou he exogenei y o his a iable, we ocus on he subsample
o close elec ions and apply a eg ession discon inui y design. The a ionale is ha elec ions
won by a su icien ly na ow ma gin a e e y simila o elec ions los by a na ow ma gin and
he e o e, whe he a mayo is male o emale is due o chance. Since Spanish municipal
councils a e elec ed using pa y‐lis p opo ional ep esen a ion, we ollow he app oach de-
eloped by Cu o‐G au e al. (2018) o compu e he unning a iable ha de ines a close
elec ion. As we ha e collec ed in o ma ion on he go e ning body o each municipali y, we a e
able o calcula e he exac numbe o o es needed o he go e ning body o lose he majo i y o
sea s in he local council. Ou unning a iable is de ined as he minimum numbe o o es o
he go e ning body o lose he majo i y o sea s, di ided by he o al numbe o o es. Fu -
he mo e, we ocus on mixed‐sex aces, which is he s anda d app oach o es ima ing gende
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GARCÍA and HAYO
e ec s in he li e a u e on close elec ions (Acce u a & P o e a, 2022; Bagues & Campa, 2021;
Cu o‐G au e al., 2018).
Focusing on he municipali ies whe e he elec ion was won/los by 5 pe cen age poin s (pp)
o ewe , Table 2p esen s he same es ima es as epo ed in Table 1. The choice o he 5pp
bandwid h is a comp omise be ween he “op imal”bandwid h based on he p ocedu e p o-
posed by Calonico e al. (2014), and a su icien ly small ma gin o be plausibly conside ed a
“close elec ion.”Since he “op imal”bandwid h ends o be la ge han 5pp, Suppo ing
In o ma ion S1: Table A8 se s ou he es ima es when we inc ease he bandwid h o 10pp. We
ind ha he esul s a e gene ally obus .
TABLE 2 Elec o al‐gende e ec s in close elec ion sample (5pp bandwid h).
(1) (2) (3)
All Manda o y Non‐manda o y
Panel a: Municipali ies wi h less han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −17.44 −5.35 −12.20
(25.41) (26.66) (18.11)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 207.29*** 415.38*** −224.43***
(35.58) (25.33) (48.72)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Bandwid h (pe cen ) 5.00 5.00 5.00
Obse a ions 72 72 72
Panel b: Municipali ies wi h mo e han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −9.88 −3.80 −14.12
(17.60) (19.81) (21.45)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 74.55 96.26** −61.75
(46.03) (45.04) (41.85)
Female s. Male go e nmen 125.93** 125.56*** −28.22
(41.52) (35.84) (38.88)
Female s. Balanced go e nmen 51.38 29.30 33.53
(35.52) (37.61) (27.89)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Bandwid h (pp) 5.00 5.00 5.00
Obse a ions 129 129 96
No e: The close elec ion sample is comp ised o hose municipali ies in which he di e ence in o es be ween he go e ning
coali ion and he opposi ion is equal o less han 5pp. Coe icien s a e ob ained om he iple in e ac ion be ween Elec ion–
Female mayo –Women in go e nmen . Clus e ‐ obus s anda d e o s a e used (clus e s: numbe o municipali ies). *, **, and
*** indica e signi icance a a 10%, 5%, and 1% le el, espec i ely.
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Fo smalle municipali ies and manda o y spending, Panel a o Table 2shows ha he
magni ude o he gende e ec is abou €415 pe capi a (31% o o al budge spending).This
e ec is h ee imes la ge han he co esponding e ec compu ed in Table 1, whe e we
conside ed all elec ions. Focusing on non‐manda o y spending in Column 3, we ind a s a is-
ically signi ican dec ease in elec ion yea s amoun ing o 15% o o al expendi u e. In smalle
municipali ies, he hike in manda o y spending in elec ion yea s is pa ly inanced by a
educ ion in non‐manda o y spending. In la ge municipali ies, Panel b o Table 2, he e is a
signi ican ly posi i e e ec o manda o y spending. The magni ude o he e ec is €96 and
€125 pe capi a (10% and 13% o o al expendi u e). In e ms o size, his e ec is compa able o
ha ound in Table 1, bu now i is appa en when compa ed o he a iable Male go e nmen .
Tu ning o non‐manda o y spending, in Column 3 o Table 2, we ind no signi ican elec o al
e ec s.
5.2 |Robus ness
Ou main esul s depend hea ily on he heo e ical discussion in Sec ion 3, pa icula ly on he
use o he ini ial budge as a signaling mechanism and he classi ica ion o budge i ems as
“manda o y”o “non‐manda o y.”To imp o e he compa abili y o ou esul s wi h he ex-
is ing li e a u e, we will eplica e ou main es ima ions using he inal budge ins ead o he
ini ial budge .
Table 3(Panel a) displays he es ima ed e ec s o smalle municipali ies.We obse e a
s a is ically signi ican inc ease in manda o y spending (Column 2) when an elec ion akes
place, which is now smalle in magni ude and in s a is ical signi icance compa ed o Table 1.
The a e age spending o smalle municipali ies is €1301 pe capi a, esul ing in an a e age PBC‐
ela ed e ec o 8% o o al expendi u es, which is lowe han in he speci ica ions using ini ial
budge da a. The esul s o non‐manda o y spending, in Column 3 o Table 3, a e consis en
wi h Table 1.
Panel b p esen s he e ec s obse ed in la ge municipali ies.Focusing on manda o y
spending (Column 2), we see he eme gence o PBC‐ ela ed spending, no only when com-
pa ing Female go e nmen wi h Balanced go e nmen , bu also when compa ing Female go -
e nmen wi h Male go e nmen . On a e age, la ge municipali ies spend €943 pe capi a,
esul ing in a PBC‐ ela ed e ec anging om €92 o €97 pe capi a, which accoun s o almos
10% o o al expendi u es. Mo ing on o non‐manda o y spending (Column 3), we ind no
signi ican e ec s.
Replica ing he analysis wi h inal budge da a e eals a clea ela ionship be ween sig-
naling, inal spending, and he p o ision o “manda o y se ices.”Howe e , “non‐manda o y
se ices”a e mo e lexible, and he e o e, mo e easily used o signaling pu poses. “Manda o y
spending”can se e as a ool o local poli icians o gain o e suppo , which may explain i s
ele ance when using bo h ini ial and inal budge da a (Bueno, 2023). Ne e heless, “non‐
manda o y spending”can also ac as a signaling de ice, especially in an en i onmen whe e
ci izens' pe cep ions o go e nmen compe ence a e ela i ely ce ain (C ombach &
Bohn, 2024; D azen, 2001).
We ocus on he subsample o close elec ions and employ a eg ession discon inui y design
o eplica e he es ima ion p esen ed in Table 2using inal budge da a.
The esul s o “manda o y spending”(Column 2) exhibi a simila pa e n o hose in
Table 2. In e es ingly, he magni ude o he e ec is hal ed o smalle municipali ies and
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doubled o la ge municipali ies. The e seems o be an unequal e ec o elec o al compe i-
i eness ha depends on he social en i onmen (Gangadha an e al., 2019).
Ou classi ica ion o se ices as “manda o y”o “non‐manda o y”was based on he Spanish
Cons i u ion. Howe e , he dis inc ion be ween “mo e isible”and “less isible”expendi u es
may also be use ul, especially when compa ing ou esul s wi h he exis ing li e a u e. We
es ima e ou model using he disagg ega ed componen s o he expendi u e side o he budge
as dependen a iables. Fo b e i y, we p esen he ables in Suppo ing In o ma ion S1:
Table A6 o smalle and Suppo ing In o ma ion S1: Tables A7 and A8 o la ge
municipali ies.
Fo smalle municipali ies (Suppo ing In o ma ion S1: Table A6), we obse e he unc-
ioning o he signaling mechanism (Panel a) h ough Public U ili ies and Social Se ices, as seen
TABLE 3 Elec o al‐gende e ec s in he mayo ‐ es ic ed sample using inal budge da a.
(1) (2) (3)
All Manda o y Non‐manda o y
Panel a: Municipali ies wi h less han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion 4.07 18.31 −12.80
(44.04) (26.07) (29.45)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 85.75 105.77* −3.93
(76.11) (60.28) (76.84)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Obse a ions 457 457 457
Panel b: Municipali ies wi h mo e han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −1.25 −3.23 5.39
(14.29) (13.77) (8.22)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen −11.42 5.13 −20.12
(33.40) (32.89) (12.52)
Female s. Male go e nmen 71.37 97.67** −22.85
(50.60) (41.20) (19.16)
Female s. Balanced go e nmen 82.79** 92.54*** −2.72
(42.23) (30.96) (16.83)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Obse a ions 460 460 325
No e: The mayo ‐ es ic ed sample is comp ised o hose municipali ies in which he mayo elec ed du ing he 2011 and 2015
elec ions was always o he same sex, ha is, he municipali y was un by ei he a male mayo o a emale mayo . Coe icien s
a e ob ained om he iple in e ac ion be ween Elec ion–Female mayo –Women in go e nmen es ima ed in Suppo ing
In o ma ion S1: Table A4 (Panel a) and Suppo ing In o ma ion S1: Table A5 (Panel b). Clus e ‐ obus s anda d e o s a e used
(clus e s: numbe o municipali ies). *, **, and *** indica e signi icance a a 10%, 5%, and 1% le el, espec i ely.
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in Columns 2 and 3, which a e highe in elec ion yea s. I is impo an o emphasize ha public
u ili ies a e he mos basic and c ucial componen o “manda o y spending”and i is in his
a ea ha small municipali ies alloca e mos o hei esou ces. This pa e n is also e iden when
using inal budge da a (Panel b). Con e sely, a gende ‐balanced go e nmen signals an
inc ease in Social Se ices ha does no ma e ialize in he inal budge . An in e es ing e ec can
be ound in spending on Go e nmen Adminis a ion, which is signaled o be educed and ye ,
when looking a inal budge da a, he e is a no able inc ease in elec ion yea s.
In Suppo ing In o ma ion S1: Tables A7 and A8, we epo he e ec s o “mo e isible”
spending ca ego ies in la ge municipali ies o planned and inal budge da a. The esul s in
Columns 1 and 5 show ha in elec ion yea s, Female go e nmen s signal an inc ease in
spending on Public Sa e y and Roads, which is also e lec ed in ac ual spending. These wo
i ems a e gene ally conside ed o be “mo e isible”in he PBC li e a u e and, as componen s o
“manda o y spending,”a e ela i ely easy o a ibu e o he local go e nmen . Thus, he
combina ion o “ isibili y”and “a ibu able o municipal policy”makes hem a ac i e o
local poli icians in e es ed in PBC‐ ela ed ac i i ies. Con e sely, o he “manda o y se ices,”
such as Land ill Was e,Cleaning, and Lib a ies, a e signaled in he planned budge bu no in
he inal budge . Somewha puzzling is he inding ha Social Se ices (Column 8) is educed by
Female go e nmen s in bo h he ini ial and inal budge s. This expendi u e is conside ed o be o
in e es o emale poli icians and is manda o y o municipali ies wi h mo e han 20,000 in-
habi an s. We suspec ha his i em is no su icien ly isible and is he e o e used o com-
pensa e o he inc ease in expendi u es on he mo e PBC‐a ac i e i ems such as Public Sa e y
and Roads. Finally, i ems ela ed o he ope a ing cos s o he municipali y, such as Cul u e
P omo ion,Spo s P omo ion,T anspo Adminis a ion,In o ma ion,Go e nmen Adminis-
a ion, and Deb , a e gene ally less disc e iona y and a e ei he no used in PBCs o a e sligh ly
educed in bo h signaling and inal spending.
Es ima ion esul s o a mo e “classic”PBC app oach a e se ou in Suppo ing In o ma ion
S1: Table A9. In his case, we do no spli he sample based on municipali y size. In Suppo ing
In o ma ion S1: Table A10, he es ima es gi e he imp ession as i elec o al manipula ion was
unde aken solely by eso ing o manda o y spending. Con as ing he esul s o all muni-
cipali ies wi h hose se ou in Table 1, we conclude ha classi ying municipali ies by size and
ca ego izing budge i ems as manda o y o no e eals o he wise hidden PBC‐ ela ed in luences
o emale poli icians (Table 4).
We also pe o m a ba e y o addi ional obus ness es s. Rega ding he es ima ion me hod
and possible ou lie s, esul s emain unchanged when using he “Ki ie ”es ima o , excluding
Mad id p ope as a municipali y, and con olling o he age and educa ion o membe s o he
go e ning body.
14
Abo e, we a gue ha all ha ma e s is he o es o he go e ning body
because budge s a e app o ed by a simple majo i y in he council, which is why we ocus on he
gende composi ion o he council's go e ning body. Howe e , he ex an li e a u e bases i s
esul s on o al council composi ion and, hence, we use he a iable Sha e o women in he o al
council as a obus ness es . Theo e ically, he compe ing hypo heses a e whe he emale
councilo s ma e o PBC‐ ela ed ac i i y due o hei in luence on (1) gene al poli ical deba es
in he council o (2) go e nmen budge decisions. We disco e ha Sha e o women in he o al
council shows ew signi ican e ec s, mos o which a e gene ally in line wi h he esul s we
ob ained based on emale go e nmen councilo s. Hence, we conclude ha wha ma e s o
PBC‐ ela ed ac i i y is he sha e o women in go e nmen , ha is, Hypo hesis (2), and no he
o al sha e o women on he council.
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6|CONCLUSION
Using a da a se on Spanish municipali ies, we in es iga e gende di e ences in PBC‐ ela ed
ac i i ies. In con as o he ex an li e a u e, we do no s udy he in luence o mayo gende , o
emale ep esen a ion on municipal councils, in isola ion. Ins ead, we ake a look a di e en
gende combina ions o bo h he mayo and council. Indeed, we depa om he li e a u e in a
leas h ee impo an aspec s: (1) by using he composi ion o he ini ial budge as a signaling
mechanism di ec ed a o e s, ins ead o using he inal budge composi ion as a p oxy o
ou pu , (2) by a oiding he a bi a y ca ego iza ion o “ isible”o p e e ed budge i ems and
TABLE 4 Elec o al‐gende e ec s in close elec ion sample (5pp bandwid h) using inal budge da a.
(1) (2) (3)
All Manda o y Non‐manda o y
Panel a: Municipali ies wi h less han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion 39.49 27.96 4.89
(34.09) (30.90) (15.94)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 118.53*** 70.06* 8.44
(32.86) (40.19) (48.61)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Bandwid h (pp) 5.80 5.80 5.80
Obse a ions 81 81 81
Panel b: Municipali ies wi h mo e han 5000 inhabi an s
Elec ion −13.68 −3.66 −30.46
(46.39) (32.50) (28.24)
Balanced s. Male go e nmen 310.59** 229.30* −79.89
(157.38) (119.96) (82.30)
Female s. Male go e nmen 245.15** 221.40** −110.61
(113.76) (80.16) (68.12)
Female s. Balanced go e nmen −65.45 −7.90 −30.71
(84.91) (58.10) (48.76)
Municipali y and Yea FE Yes Yes Yes
Con ols Yes Yes Yes
Bandwid h (pp) 5.00 5.00 5.00
Obse a ions 129 129 96
No e: The close elec ion sample is comp ised o hose municipali ies in which he di e ence in o es be ween he go e ning
coali ion and he opposi ion is equal o less han 5pp. Coe icien s a e ob ained om he iple in e ac ion be ween Elec ion–
Female mayo –Women in go e nmen . Clus e ‐ obus s anda d e o s a e used (clus e s: numbe o municipali ies). *, **, and
*** indica e signi icance a a 10%, 5%, and 1% le el, espec i ely.
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ins ead classi ying expendi u es acco ding o a clea budge a y ule, and (3) by concen a ing
on he sha e o emale go e nmen councilo s.
To s udy PBC‐ ela ed spending a he municipal le el, we use da a om he Mad id egion
(Comunidad Au ónoma de Mad id) o he pe iod 2010–2019. The Mad id egion is subjec o a
homogenous se o budge ules ha allow consis en ly ca ego izing budge expendi u e i ems
as ei he “manda o y”o “non‐manda o y”public se ices. Fu he mo e, 2010–2019 was a
pe iod cha ac e ized by balanced local budge s and cons ain s on o al expendi u es due o
O ganic Law 2012. The e o e, du ing ha pe iod, PBCs could no longe be a ec ed ia
manipula ion o de ici s o o al spending; ins ead, incumben s in e es ed in manipula ing he
budge o hei ad an age had o ely on budge composi ion o signal hei compe ence and/o
p e e ences. Addi ionally, in Ma ch 2007, he Equali y Ac in oduced gende ‐balanced can-
dida e lis s o Spanish elec o al law. The Equali y Ac has posi ioned Spain among he g oup o
coun ies wi h ising sha es o emale poli icians and has he added ad an age o allowing us o
empi ically es he in luence o gende di e ences on policymaking and PBCs.
Condi ional on poli icians’sex, we ind obus e idence o PBC‐ ela ed spending in
elec ion yea s. In smalle municipali ies wi h a emale mayo , gende ‐balanced go e nmen s
inc ease manda o y spending by almos 10% o o al spending. In la ge municipali ies, emale
mayo s in conjunc ion wi h a emale‐domina ed go e nmen , end o engage in oppo unis ic
manipula ion by inc easing elec o al spending. On a e age, his esul s in 10% highe spending
on manda o y budge i ems and 2% highe spending on non‐manda o y budge i ems. Thus, we
would in e p e hese e ec s as no able. Mo eo e , ou obus ness analysis based on close
elec ions and a eg ession discon inui y design sugges s ha he magni ude o he gende e ec
may be up o h ee imes la ge .
We also ind ha , by eplica ing he analysis wi h inal budge da a, “manda o y se ices”
end o be mo e obus han “non‐manda o y se ices.”“Manda o y se ices”a e easie o
a ibu e o municipal policy, and hus local poli icians ha e an incen i e o use hem bo h as
signaling de ices and o ac ual changes in he se ice p o ided (Bueno, 2023). In con as ,
“non‐manda o y se ices”a e mo e lexible and he e o e mo e sui able o signaling pu poses.
We obse e a no able deg ee o o e lap be ween i ems gene ally conside ed as “mo e isible”in
he PBC li e a u e and hose ha we ca ego ize as componen s o “manda o y spending.”In
pa icula , we ind ha expendi u es on Secu i y and Roads appea o be manipula ed o PBC‐
ela ed pu poses. Bo h a e isible and manda o y i ems and hey a e bo h signi ican when
using planned (signaling) and inal budge da a (ac ual spending). Fo o he i ems, we ind
mo e he e ogenei y be ween signaling and inal spending by he local go e nmen .
Ou analysis challenges he es ablished opinion ha emale mayo s a e gene ally less
oppo unis ic han male ones. We also ind ha he in luence o hose women councilo s who
suppo he cu en go e nmen is mo e impo an han he o al sha e o emale councilo s,
he indica o used in he ex an li e a u e. Mo eo e , ou e idence does no suppo he con-
clusion ha gende ‐balanced councils a e able o p e en elec o al budge manipula ion.
Since we p esen e idence ha women may beha e oppo unis ically e en in highly com-
pe i i e si ua ions, ou esul s a e in line wi h Gangadha an e al. (2019) and O dine e al.
(2023) and s and in con as o indings ha women appea o be less compe i i e and/o
oppo unis ic han men (B ollo & T oiano, 2016; C oson & Gneezy, 2009). Ou conclusions also
show ha in an en i onmen o pa y disc imina ion agains women (Bagues & Campa, 2021;
Casas‐A ce & Saiz, 2015; Es e e‐Vola & Bagues, 2012), emale mayo s, as he mos isible
igu es o he go e nmen , migh ha e ound hemsel es in a posi ion whe e hey had o signal
hei compe ence much mo e s ongly han did hei male colleagues. This seems o be
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especially ele an when he sha e o women in go e nmen inc eases abo e 60% making he
go e ning body emale‐domina ed.
A limi a ion o ou s udy is ha we do no analyze whe he he poli icians' RBC‐ ela ed
s a egies we e success ul in inc easing he p obabili y o e‐elec ion. Ou ocus is solely on he
ansmi e pa o he signaling p ocess, and we do no conside he ecep o . In a ecen pape ,
Beni o e al. (2023) ind ha in imes o c isis, go e nmen s ha we e able o con ey he
imp ession o mo e manage ial abili y o p o ide public goods, ha e a highe p obabili y o
being e‐elec ed. Combining his poli ical ansmission channel wi h he gende pe spec i e
could be a ui ul a enue o u he esea ch.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The da a ha suppo he indings o his s udy a e a ailable in Open Ag a a h ps://doi.o g/10.
3220/DATA20240910130608-0. These da a we e de i ed om he ollowing esou ces a ailable in
he public domain: Minis e io de Hacienda: Consul a p esupues os y liquidaciones de EELL (h ps://
se icios elema icosex .hacienda.gob.es/SGFAL/CONPREL). Banco de da os municipal de la
Comunidad de Mad id (h ps://ges iona.comunidad.mad id/des an/AccionLlamadaA bolDes an_
dw .icm? ipoA bol=almudena). Minis e io del in e io : Resul ados elec o ales (h ps://in oelec o al.
in e io .gob.es/es/elecciones-celeb adas/ esul ados-elec o ales/).
ORCID
Is ael Ga cía h p://o cid.o g/0000-0003-0303-9325
Be nd Hayo h p://o cid.o g/0000-0001-9037-4513
ENDNOTES
1
Recen ly, se e al pape s ha e been published ha ocus on he o e all budge balance and use c oss‐coun y
da a. Jankůand Libich (2019), Ky iacou e al. (2022), and C ombach and Bohn (2024) show a de e io a ion o
he iscal balance in elec ion yea s, when o e s a e less in o med, hey ha e highe discoun a es and when
hey a e unce ain abou he ac ual compe ence o he go e nmen .
2
An excep ion o his s a emen is big in as uc u e p ojec s, o which he inal cos s o public p o ision a e
much highe han he planned ones and ha he e o e aise ques ions o poo planning and was e o public
unds.
3
Acco ding o Law 27/2013 (Decembe 27, 2013), ood and d ink con ol, ma ke s, and slaugh e houses a e
no pa o manda o y minimum se ices om he 2015 budge onwa ds. The social wo k ca ego y has been
s ongly modi ied. Be o e his law, municipali ies we e esponsible o p o iding social se ices. A e he
e o m, compulso y municipal in e en ion is no longe , s ic ly speaking, a se ice, bu a simple iden i i-
ca ion o needs. Al hough s ill a manda o y se ice, he ex en and scope o social wo k conduc ed a he
municipal le el is now highly limi ed.
4
Municipali ies wi h 250 (o less) inhabi an s use an open‐lis sys em.
5
Swee ing (2009) p o ides a de ailed discussion o he mayo 's ole in Spain.
6
The Spanish e i o ial o ganiza ion consis s o egions (Comunidades Au ónomas), p o inces (P o incias),
and municipali ies (Municipios). Each egion has one o mo e p o inces, and p o inces con ain mul iple
municipali ies. Municipali ies a e equi ed o p o ide some manda o y se ices based on hei popula ion
(see Sec ion 3). The non‐manda o y se ices a e p o ided by ei he he egional o cen al go e nmen .
A icle 36 o he local adminis a i e law s a es ha he p o incial adminis a ion is in cha ge o coo dina ing
GARCÍA and HAYO
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265
and es ablishing hose municipal manda o y se ices. Acco ding o he e i o ial adminis a ion, i is pos-
sible ha wo simila ly sized municipali ies ha belong o he same egion bu a e loca ed in di e en
p o inces could ha e di e en s anda ds o manda o y se ices. Mad id is a egion wi h only one p o ince
and, consequen ly, he e canno be any a iabili y in municipal manda o y se ices.
7
Acco ding o he Spanish S a is ical Ins i u e, in 2019, ou o 8131 municipali ies, 83% had less han 5000
inhabi an s, and 5% had mo e han 50,000 inhabi an s.
8
h ps://se icios elema icosex .hacienda.gob.es/SGFAL/CONPREL
9
All expendi u e i ems in ou s udy a e manda o y o municipali ies wi h 50,000 o mo e inhabi an s;
he e o e, hey canno be used o he es ima ion o non‐manda o y spending in Column 3 o Suppo ing
In o ma ion S1: Table A5.
10
h p://ges iona.mad id.o g/des an/Inicio.icm?enlace=almudena
11
This a iable is cons uc ed based on in o ma ion p o ided by ax au ho i ies (as he main inpu ), plus
in o ma ion abou ea nings, weal h, en s (capi al and non‐capi al), social paymen s, and ans e s in each
municipali y. The weigh o each componen is adjus ed acco ding o di e en ac o s, such as he numbe o
households, numbe o decla an s, age o popula ion, pe cen age o en s om non‐wo king ea nings, and a
socioeconomic indica o o each municipali y.
12
h p://www.in oelec o al.mi .es/in oelec o al/min/
13
When a pa y does no ha e an absolu e majo i y and a coali ion is no eached, he whole council is
conside ed he go e ning body.
14
Resul s a e a ailable on eques .
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