Fuchs, Thomas
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Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness o li ing beings
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Sugges ed Ci a ion: Fuchs, Thomas (2025) : Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness o li ing beings,
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Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness oli ing beings
ThomasFuchs1
Recei ed: 7 Augus 2024 / Accep ed: 20 Decembe 2024 / Published online: 3 Feb ua y 2025
© The Au ho (s) 2025
Abs ac
In he ecological discou se on na u e and he en i onmen , he na u al side o
humans, which we expe ience as ou own co po eali y, plays ha dly any ole. To
add ess his de iciency, he pape p oposes he concep o con i iali y. I e e s o a
p ima y connec ion wi h he li ing en i onmen , con eyed h ough ou own sense o
ali eness and embodimen . The concep encompasses h ee in e connec ed aspec s:
1) An epis emological aspec , acco ding o which we can only ecognize o he li -
ing beings as such and dis inguish hem om inanima e hings h ough he expe-
ience o ou sha ed bodily exis ence; 2) A na u al-philosophical and ecological
aspec , which ela es o he undamen al in e dependence o all li ing beings and he
in e pene a ion o li e and he en i onmen ; 3) An e hical aspec , whe e ou kinship
and connec ion wi h li ing beings o m he basis o an a i ude o ca e and commi -
men owa ds hem. The h ee aspec s a e based on he same undamen al s uc u e,
namely he in e dependence o he li ing, bo h in subjec i e, phenomenal e ms, and
in objec i e, ecological e ms. A he same ime, hey a e g ounded in ou co po e-
ali y, which poin s o he ela ional na u e o ou exis ence, ou li e in ela ionships
and in ecological con ex s. In his way, he undamen al kinship o ou li ed bodies
wi h li ing na u e becomes he basis o an ecological e hic.
Keywo ds Con i iali y· Embodimen · In e dependence o li e· Ecology·
En i onmen al e hics
* Thomas Fuchs
[email p o ec ed]g.de
1 Clinic o Gene al Psychia y, Uni e si y Hospi al Heidelbe g, Voss-S . 4, 69115Heidelbe g,
Ge many
52
T.Fuchs
In man’s ela ions wi h animals, wi h lowe s, wi h he objec s o c ea ion, he e is
a g ea sys em o mo ali y as ye sca cely pe cei ed, bu des ined o be mo e and
mo e obse ed and o become he co olla y and complemen o human mo als.
Vic o Hugo (1895: 250).
1 In oduc ion
The ela ionship be ween humans and o he animals is cha ac e ized by a unda-
men al ambi alence: on he one hand, humans ha e always el a deep closeness
and kinship o o he c ea u es, which, since he beginning o hominiza ion,has
led hem o seek con ac and coexis ence wi h animals. Ye in he cou se o ci ili-
za ion, humans ha e inc easingly dis anced hemsel es om animals, o he poin
o c ea ing an an h opocen ic on ology in which hey ega ded hemsel es as he
“measu e o all hings”, he “pinnacle o c ea ion”, and celeb a ed he o e com-
ing o hei animal na u e as a iumph o eason.
In ea ly human his o y, he eeling o kinship mani es ed i sel in, e.g.,
o emism, in which a ibe iden i ied wi h a pa icula plan o animal, and la e ,
wi h he ansi ion o seden a iza ion, in close coexis ence wi h g azing and
domes ic animals. This eeling is s ill e iden oday in child en’s special a ini y
wi h animals, which appea humanized in ai y ales and which, om ea ly on,
hey u n in o hei pe s. By con as s, since he beginning o mode ni y, Wes -
e n cul u e has inc easingly iewedhumans in opposi ion o li ing na u e. The
dualism o body and mind, na u e and cul u e, a ec and eason le he li ing
no independen s a us; in mode n na u al science, li ing beings only appea ed
unde a mechanical aspec . As Desca es a ibu ed an immo al, a ional soul
only o humans, he amously conside ed animals o be soulless au oma ons whose
exp ession o pain was ame e mechanical eac ion; Ca esians subsequen ly used
his jus i ica ion o ca y ou la ge-scale i isec ion wi hou anes hesia. Since
indus ializa ion, coexis ence wi h animals has been inc easingly eplaced by
mechanized ood p oduc ion, which eached i s peak in indus ial ag icul u e and
ac o y a ming.
In he cou se o he ecological c isis, a change in ou ela ionship o na u e
and o he li ing beings now seems o be aking place. Cu en ends in bo h he
li e sciences and he humani ies a e con e ging in mo ing away om logos and
au onomy as dis inguishing ea u es o he “ a ionalanimal”; ins ead, he physis,
i.e. he bodily na u e and a ec i i y ha humans sha e wi h o he li ing beings,
is gaining signi icance. In 1984, he biologis Edwa d Wilson published his “bio-
philia” hypo hesis, acco ding o which humans eel an e olu iona y, inbo n a in-
i y “ o o he o ms o li e, an a ilia ion e oked, acco ding o ci cums ances, by
pleasu e, o a sense o secu i y, o awe, o e en ascina ion blended wi h e ul-
sion” (Wilson 1984, p. 360). Mo eo e , in embodied and enac i e cogni ion, he
li e-mind con inui y hesis has become well known, p ima ily a ibu ed o Hans
Jonas (1966) and la e aken up by Thompson (2007) and Di Paolo (2009), among
o he s. Acco ding o his hesis, e en he highes cogni i e abili ies o li ing
beings a e undamen ally cha ac e ized by p inciples ha a e al eady ound in
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Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness oli ing beings
he beha io o he simples li e o ms. In he enac i is iew, all le els o li ing
beings sha e he capaci y o “sense-making”, which is al eady ound in unicel-
lula o ganisms. This also b ings he kinship be ween humans and o he li ing
hings inc easingly in o ocus.
The aim o he ollowing e lec ions is o examine his kinship mo e closely
om a phenomenological, ecological and e hical pe spec i e. They a e based on
he assump ion ha i is abo e all ou own el and li ed co po eali y ha con-
nec s us wi h o he li ing beings. Fo as co po eal beings, we a e undamen ally
subjec o he same p ocesses o bi h, g ow h, espi a ion, nu i ion, d i e, age-
ing and dea h as hey a e. When we obse e a g oup o chee ahs in he s eppe o
a he d o eindee in he A c ic und a, we see li e in an en i onmen in which i
has made i s home and sus ains i sel , a wo ld ha p o ides i wi h space, ligh ,
ai and ood. Bu we also see li e in a wo ld in which i s uggles o su i e. We
eel how i b aces i sel agains he wind, wa ms i sel agains he cold, nou ishes
i sel in he was eland. We see and eel li e in i s agili y, exposu e, p eca ious-
ness and dange . We pe cei e all o his as such because we ou sel es a e ali e,
and because we li e wi h hese c ea u es on ea h, in a commonali y and in a
communi y o he li ing, which I e e o as con i iali y.
The e m comes om he La in con i e e, i.e. o li e oge he ; i s amilia meaning,
namely sociali y and chee ul oge he ness, de i es om he La in con i ium, o igi-
nally e e ing o a banque . I an Illich (1973) ga e he e m a socio-c i ical meaning, o
designa e o ms o li ing oge he in solida i y as opposed o he con inemen o indi-
iduals o indus ial p oduc i i y. Howe e , I use he e m in a wide sense, namely o
desc ibe he p ima y a ini y and kinship ha we eel wi h li ing beings in gene al, due
o sha ed bodily s uc u es, li e p ocesses and li e in e es s.1 Con i iali y in his sense
has h ee majo aspec s, which I will examine in wha ollows:
1. The i s aspec is an epis emological one and was o mula ed pa adigma icallyby
Hans Jonas: “Li e can be known only by li e” (Jonas 1966: 91). This is unda-
men al o ou ela ionship o li ing na u e: he ques ion o wha li e is canno
be sepa a ed om he expe ience o wha i is like o be a li ing being, and we
ou sel es ha e his expe ience as li ing, embodied beings. The biological, i.e.
scien i ic s udy and esea ch o he li ing can nei he ully explain no eplace
his expe ience. Con i iali y in his sense means ha only as ellow c ea u es,
om he expe ience o ou sha ed bodily exis ence, do we ecognize o he li ing
beings in hei sel hood and dis inguish hem om inanima e hings.
2. The second aspec is one o na u al philosophy and ecology: con i iali y can gi e
us insigh in o wha cha ac e izes li e and i s p ocesses, and how li ing hings
a e connec ed o each o he and o hei en i onmen . We sha e wi h o he li ing
beings no only he elemen a y condi ions o li e men ioned abo e. We sha e
wi h hem a ela ionship o he en i onmen ha is de e mined by me abolism,
exchange, embedding and niche o ma ion, i.e., by a ecip oci y and coupling ha
1 I al eady used he e m in his sense in my pape “Unde s anding Sophia? On human in e ac ion wi h
a i icial agen s (Fuchs 2024a, b), speci ically o show ha AI sys ems and obo s a e in p inciple no pa
o he communi y o li e wi h which we sha esen ience and expe ience.
54
T.Fuchs
does no allow us o hink o li ing beings wi hou ela ionali y. And inally, we
a e connec ed o o he li ing beings, plan s and animals h ough mu ual depend-
encies, gi e and ake, li ing om ood, i.e. li ing om o he li e. Con i iali y
desc ibes his ecological embedding and in e connec edness o all li ing which
makes up a comp ehensi e communi y.
3. The hi d aspec is an e hical one. The insigh ha we ecognize o he li ing
beings p ima ily because o ou kinship wi h hem, and ha we a e indissolubly
connec ed wi h hem h ough ecip ocal ela ionships— hese insigh s can become
he basis o a commi men h ough which we also ealize he in e connec edness
wi h all li e as ou esponsibili y. I he basis o ou ela ionship o li ing na u e
is a pa icipa o y, compassiona e ecogni ion, hen his also leads o an a i ude
o ca e and commi men owa ds ha na u e; an a i ude in which ou own expe i-
ence o co po eali y and ali eness becomes he basis o an ecological e hic.
To da e, he ecologically mo i a ed discou se on na u e does no add ess he
na u e o humans, inso a as we, qua body, a e na u e ou sel es. Whencon i iali y
is unde s ood asas “in e co po eali y”, howe e , ou embodimen can es ablish an
ecological e hic ha o e comes he sepa a ion o human cul u e and physical na u e.
Fo as embodied beings, we ou sel es a e pa o a na u e ha can hen no longe
be unde s ood as jus “ex ended ma e ” and exploi ed a will.2 Thus he key con-
ibu ion o he concep o con i iali y lies in i s in eg a ion o he h ee aspec s i
encompasses: he pa icipa o y concep o ecognizing he li ing is di ec ly ela ed
o i s on ological in e dependence and in e connec edness, which in u n o ms he
basis o he e hical esponsi eness we expe ience when we become awa e o his
in e connec edness. All h ee aspec s a e g ounded in ou bodily expe ience o li -
ing-wi h, which also means su e ing-wi h—i.e. ou con i iali y wi h he li ing.
In he ollowing, I will ake a close look a hese h ee aspec s.
2 Con i iali y: pe cei ing li e
Acco ding o he p e ailing iew o neo-Da winian biology, as ound in Richa d
Dawkins (1986, 1989), Dennis B ay (2009) and o he s, o ganisms a e ul ima ely
machines d i en by algo i hms and p og ams, and li e is no hing o he han in o -
ma ion p ocessing.3 Ou own expe ience o li e is qui e di e en , namely ha o a
2 Wi h a somewha simila aim, Donna Ha away has used he e m sympoiesis (= making oge he ) o
desc ibe he in e dependen p ocesses o c ea ing sha ed en i onmen s and associa ions be ween animals,
humans, g oups and communi ies. “Sympoiesis is a wo d p ope o complex, dynamic, esponsi e, si u-
a ed, his o ical sys ems. I is a wo d o wo lding-wi h, in company” (Ha away 2016, 58). Howe e , I
do no sha e he aim o comple ely dissol ing he bounda ies be ween human and animal, o ganism and
machine, physical and non-physical, no leas because esponsibili y o he ea h can only be assumed
by human beings, no by any o he species. Mo eo e , sympoiesis does no e e o he epis emological
aspec o pe cei ing li e, which I include in con i iali y.
3 “Wha lies a he hea o e e y li ing hing is no a i e, no wa m b ea h, no a ‘spa k o li e.’ I is
in o ma ion, wo ds, ins uc ions […]. I you wan o unde s and li e, don’ hink abou ib an , h obbing
gels and oozes, hink abou in o ma ion echnology.” (Dawkins 1986: 112) – See also G a en & Ridley
(2006).
55
Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness oli ing beings
spon aneous, sel -ac ing i ali y, a bodily dynamic ha mo es us, an elemen al d i e
and s i ing. I is he expe ience o ou bodily na u e as some hing ha p ecedes
ou conscious cogni ion and ac ion; some hing ha eme ges o i s own acco d, s i -
ing and becoming sensible; om which we i s become awa e o ou sel es, and o
which we owe ou exis ence.
Hans Jonas combined his expe ience wi h an epis emological a gumen ha
is di ec ed agains he educ ionism o he biosciences. No biologis could loca e
and esea ch he phenomenon o li e i he did no always al eady know om his
sel -expe ience as a li ing being wha li e is: namely, sel hood, sel -exp ession,
sel -mo emen , being-a e -some hing, in d i e, s i ing and pu pose ulness—in
one wo d: li e as subjec i i y. The Ge man physician Vik o on Weizsäcke also
e e ed o his inescapable s a ing poin o any science o he li ing:
In o de o esea ch he li ing, you ha e o pa icipa e in li e. One can a emp
o de i e he li ing om he non-li ing, bu his endea o has so a ailed.
One can also s i e o deny one’s own li e in science, bu his is a sel -decep-
ion. We ind li e as li ing hings ... science began wi h he awakening o ques-
ions in he mids o li e ( on Weizsäcke 1986: ).
Jonas encapsula es his up wi h he ph ase al eady men ioned: “Li e can be
known only by li e” (Jonas 1966: 91). Suppose we we e o look a an o ganism om
he pe spec i e o a disembodied and pu ely analy ical, ma hema ical mind –say,
a ma hema ician-God. Would we hen be able o ecognize he in e io i y and pu -
pose ulness o he o ganism? F om a disembodied, analy ical s andpoin , he o gan-
ism would be dissol ed in o a collec ion o objec i e physical–chemical e en s, and
all cha ac e is ics o an in e io i y, a “sel - ela ed au onomous en i y would, in he
end, ul ima ely appea as pu ely phenomenal, ha is, ic i ious” (ibid.: 78). As bod-
ily beings, howe e ,
we a e able o say wha no disembodied onlooke would ha e a cause o say-
ing: ha he ma hema ical God in his homogeneous analy ical iew misses he
decisi e poin — he poin o li e i sel : i s being sel -cen e ed indi iduali y,
being o i sel and in con aposi ion o all he es o he wo ld, wi h an essen-
ial bounda y di iding ‘inside’ and ‘ou side’ (ibid.: 79)
Fo Jonas, li e is ne e pu e ex e nali y, bu indispensable subjec i i y, and only
because we ou sel es a e li ing beings, h ough he “wi nessing” o ou own body,
do we ha e access o he li ing and a e able o pe cei e i as such.
So wha does his wi nessing o ou body, ou expe ience o li ing embodimen ,
consis o ? Embodimen has many dimensions and aspec s; howe e , a i s co e,
i can be ega ded as he elemen a y eeling o being ali e (Thompson and Va ela
2001, Thompson 2007: 161 .; Fuchs 2012). This expe ience consis s o wo compo-
nen s, which I would like o call i ali y o sen ience on he one hand and cona ion
on he o he .
56
T.Fuchs
1. Vi ali y o sen ience e e s o a con inuous bodily backg ound expe ience ha can
be desc ibed as a p e- e lec i e sel -awa eness o also as a co e a ec i e s a e,
wi h he hedonic poles o well-being and discom o , pleasu e and displeasu e.4 I
ini ially co esponds o a ague eeling o bodily exis ence o sen ience, bu when
i sp eads o he cu en li e si ua ion as a whole, i me ges in o he phenomena o
mood, a unemen o exis en ial eelings (Ra cli e 2008).
2. Cona ion ( om he La in cona us = impulse, u ge, s i ing) e e s o an elemen-
a y ene ge ic momen um ha mani es s i sel in d i e, impulse, u ge, and desi e,
and which ep esen s he undamen al d i ing o ce o he di ec ed mo emen
o he li ing being. He e, oo, we ind a pola i y, namely he ene ge ic poles o
ac i a ion and deac i a ion, igo and a igue.
The con inuous basis o expe ience, namely he undamen al sel -a ec ion o li e,
hus consis s o he pola i ies o pleasu e-displeasu e on he one hand and ac i a ion-
deac i a ion on he o he , and we eel bo h in ou li ed body.5 This is exac ly wha we
also pe cei e in o he li ing beings: hei sen ience—pleasu e, displeasu e, pain—as
well as hei s i ing, hei pu sui o goals—be i a ca chasing a mouse o an amoeba
mo ing o wa d wi h i s pseudopodia, g oping owa ds ood and inco po a ing i . “(…)
he e is always he pu posi eness o o ganism as such and i s conce n in li ing” (Jonas
1966: 90). Bu only a being ha is conce ned abou i sel can pe cei e his u ge, his
s i ing o sel -p ese a ion. Albe Schwei ze exp essed his in his amous sen ence:
“ I am li e ha wills o li e in he mids o li e ha wills o li e” (Schwei ze 1998: 156).
Con i iali y in his epis emic sense he e o e means ha we ecognize he li ing
in a sympa he ic way: as eeling and s i ing like ou sel es. This esul s om a com-
monali y o exp ession: he li ing shows i sel in i s bodily appea ance – as s i -
ing, leeing, seeking p o ec ion, a ac ing, de e ing, laun ing, a acking, e c. I was
again Jonas who emphasized his p ima y exp essi i y o he li ing:
I is pa o he in ui i e beholding o li e by li e and hus begins wi h he
accomplishmen s o animal pe cep ion, which is a uned o he accomplish-
men s o animal exp ession. […] Among he objec s o pe cep ion, neu ally
classed as ‘ hings,’ li ing hings as li ing a e pa amoun . Thei pe cep ion
in ol es emo ional disc imina ion – as p ey, oe, ellow membe o he species,
sexual pa ne , as amilia o un amilia , no ewo hy o negligible, ha mless,
h ea ening, o unde e mined – and is hus any hing bu neu al. I includes an
5 This concep ion o he eeling o li e also co esponds in some espec s o he ci cumplex model o
a ec i i y de eloped by Russell (1980, 2003), consis ing o he wo pola i ies men ioned abo e. Acco d-
ing o Russell, hey join ly cha ac e ize he “co e a ec ” as he a iable bu con inuous basis o expe i-
ence, namely “as a simple, non e lec i e eeling ha is an in eg al blend o hedonic (pleasu e–displeas-
u e) and a ousal (sleepy–ac i a ed) alues” (Russell 2003: 147).
4 The concep has a long his o y, da ing back a leas o he F ench philosophe Maine de Bi an (1766–
1824), who named i “sen imen de l’exis ence” ( eeling o exis ence) and desc ibed i as “a ague and
da k eeling a ached o any animal o o ganic li e” (Maine de Bi an 1995: 125; own ansl.); o a his o y
o he concep , see also Helle -Roazen (2007).
Mo e ecen ly, heneu oscien is s Damasio (1999) and Panksepp (1998) ha e desc ibed he co e a ec-
i e expe ience as “ he eeling o li e i sel , he sense o being” (Damasio 1995: 150), b ough abou by
he homeodynamic in e ac ion o subco ical b ain cen e s wi h he inne s a e o he body.
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Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness oli ing beings
ins inc i e amilia i y […] wi h he li ing beha io o which esponse is o be
made. The basis o his amilia i y is he communi y o animal na u e, and in
he case o in a-speci ic ela ions, he communi y o he species. […] Animal
li e is exp essi e, e en eage o exp ession. I displays i sel ; i has i s sign
codes, i s language; i communica es i sel . (Jonas 1971: 508 .).
This exp essi i y does no equi e he assump ion o an inne wo ld o a hidden
psychological s a e ha mani es s i sel only indi ec ly in ex e nal signs. Ra he , he
exp ession i sel is he holis ic appea ance o he li ing being in i s e y eeling and
s i ing. This esul s in an on ology o he exp essi i y o all li ing hings on ea h,
in which he human being pa icipa es, a sphe e o exp ession in which i is embed-
ded (Fische 2020: 19).
This epis emology o li e is in ob ious con as o he mode n concep o knowl-
edge ha guides he na u al sciences: he e, he subjec o knowledge has no hing
o do wi h i s objec . Fo Bacon o Desca es, knowledge o na u e means keeping
away om i , no being a ec ed by i , no mixing wi h i . Howe e , he e is ano he ,
pa icipa o y way o knowing, namely h ough co-enac men , bodily esonance and
sympa hy: when we hea a song, we sing along wi h i inwa dly; igu es ha we see
a e simul aneously el in kines he ic imp essionso mo emen , and he pu pose ul
mo emen o an animal owa ds an objec is also co-pe cei ed in ou own body.6
He e, oo, only a being ha is i sel in en on some hing can pe cei e his mo e-
men di ec ed owa ds goals. Cogni ion h ough sympa hy and bodily esonance hus
means a pa icipa ion in wha is ecognized, and his pa icipa ion p esupposes a
kinship be ween he ecognize and he ecognized: Wha animals a e, wha plan s
a e, is in p inciple no alien o us, because we know i om he inside.
Fo Hans Jonas, he an h opomo phism o his knowledge is no a disad an age
bu p ecisely he p e equisi e o ecognizing and pe cei ing li ing hings in hei
sel hood. O cou se, his pa icipa o y knowledge does no indica e how a we can
ex end he assump ion o sen ience and d i e o inc easingly simple li ing beings.
When a bac e ium mo es owa ds ood and away om ha m ul subs ances in chem-
o axis (Wadhams and A mi age 2004), i shows a udimen a y o m o disc imina -
ing, di ec ed ela ionship o he en i onmen . I gi es hese subs ances meaning o
i s su i al, hus displaying wha enac i ism calls sense-making, a cen al cha ac e -
is ic o li ing sys ems. I one obse es how simila ly unicellula amoebae use hei
oo -like cell ex ensions o eel hei way o e obs acles, wi hd aw again and he eby
explo e hei su oundings, one can bodily co-expe ience his simples o m o en i-
onmen al pe cep ion. Bu can he bac e ium and he amoeba also expe ience hei
assignmen s o meaning as pleasan o unpleasan , wi h di e en hedonic alence?
Opinions on his di e . On he one hand, he iew o biopsychism, which
asc ibes sen ience o all li ing beings and hus ul ima ely o plan s oo, is becoming
6 In p ima es, he mi o neu on sys em p o ides a neu onal componen o his (Gallese 2002; Rizzola i
& Sinigaglia 2008). As is well known, hese neu ons a e ac i a ed bo h when we ou sel es pe o m a
goal-di ec ed ac ion, such as eaching o an apple, and when we pe cei e he same ac ion in ano he
conspeci ic o p ima e. I is e y likely ha his neu al basis o bodily mimesis ex ends o mammals in
gene al (Panksepp 2011, Panksepp & Panksepp 2013), hough esea ch on his ishi he o spa se. In any
case, he e is an immedia e pe cep ion o di ec ed mo emen in li ing beings ha is no based on a sepa-
a e a ibu ion o goals o on he assump ion o an inne in en ion.
58
T.Fuchs
inc easingly popula (Cal o 2017; Cal o e al. 2021; Rebe e al. 2020). On he
o he hand, ep esen a i es o zoopsychism wan o a ibu e sen ience only o highe
animals. They gene ally e e o he ne ous sys em o he b ain and i s in eg a i e
capaci y as he decisi e p e equisi e o sen ience and e en mo e o sel -awa eness
(D aguhn e al. 2021; Ginsbu g and Jablonka 2021). S ill, i emains ques ionable
whe he his p ope y only applies o mammals, bi ds o ep iles, o whe he i can
also be ex ended o in e eb a es, which ha e a ne e ne wo k ins ead o a cen al
b ain. Sen ience seems o be ag ada ional phenomenon (God ey-Smi h 2016). Ye
he cu en s a e o compa a i e consciousness esea ch sugges s ha he e is no
uni o m scale on which species can simply be classi ied as mo e o less conscious.
Ra he , each species in ques ion seems o ha e i s own dis inc i e p o ile o con-
sciousness, which esul s om he di e en ia ion o pe cep ion, empo al in eg a-
ion, sel -awa eness, and o he componen s (Bi ch e al. 2020).
The e idence o and agains bio- and zoopsychism is so a inconclusi e, as
Thompson (2022) summa ized in a ecen pape . I will no explo e his di icul
ques ion in de ail he e, bu I would like o make a media ing sugges ion. E en i
we canno say o su e whe he amoebae o bac e ia eel some hing o no , we can
always unde s and li e om ou sel -awa eness minus consciousness, i.e. in a “p i a-
i e way”. This does no esul in a pu ely ex e nal iew o he li ing, as i i we e
a me ely physical sys em, because consciousness is p eceded by sen ience. We can,
o example, eel a sligh headache o hunge be o e we become consciously awa e
o hem. And when we do become ully awa e, we ealize ha we we e al eady hun-
g y be o e, wi hou being able o say wha ha hunge ac ually was like—simila ly
o how we some imes only no ice a la en , epe i i e sound once i s ops and silence
se s in. An expe ience only becomes ully conscious when i eaches a ce ain deg ee
o in ensi y o con as . Ne e heless, i was al eady ou expe ience be o ehand. So,
he e can be a eeling o s i ing ha is no ye conscious, bu is ne e heless no
simply physiological o subpe sonal.7 The decisi e ac o which connec s us wi h all
lowe animals is he enac men o li e ha has and shows hose endencies whe he
hey become conscious in a ying deg ees o no .
In he case o plan s, oo, we speak o young “shoo s” (in Ge man T iebe = u ges)
ha push ou o he ea h owa ds he ligh , jus as we eel he u ges o li e wi hin
ou sel es. I is simply ha he pu pose ul p ocesses in plan s ake place on a much
slowe ime scale han animal mo emen s.8 Thus, he will o li e, as Schwei ze
7 ThusI do no ag ee wi h Damasio’s iew o emo ion as a subpe sonal, pu ely physiological p ocess
(Damasio 1999), no wi h LeDoux’s con a y assump ion ha emo ions a e cogni i e, conscious con-
s uc ions in he p e on al co ex ha only exis in humans (LeDoux 2020). Ra he , emo ions a e eel-
ings ha also occu in animals in a ying deg ees o p e-conscious expe ience.
8 The con i ial pe cep ion o plan s can he e o e be deepened by obse ing hei de elopmen and
mo emen s in ime-lapse eco dings (see e.g. S a k 2008). He e hey a e shown in cons an , pu pose ul
mo emen as hey g ow, sp ead hei oo s, each o ligh and nu ien s, e ade p eda o s, e c. Pa icu-
la ly imp essi e a e ime-lapse eco dings o bean end ils “sea ching” o a b anch h ough con inuous
wis ing mo emen s un il hey encoun e esis ance and hen en wine hemsel es a ound i . On a mic o-
le el, hese mo emen s can be aced back o a complex mechanism o wa e - illed compa men s wi hin
he plan s alk. On a mac o-le el, howe e , i is ob ious ha hese mechanics se e a mo emen ha is
adequa ely desc ibed as a sea ching mo emen , namely om he poin o iew o he end il as a g owing
li ing being, wi hou ha ing o a ibu e a “psychological s i ing” o he plan .
65
Con i iali y: ou p ima y connec edness oli ing beings
can also ca e o o he li ing beings in an empa hic sense (Fische 2020). The o en-
dispu ed special posi ion o human beings in ela ion o all o he plan s and animals,
including o he p ima es, is ealized p ecisely h ough his a i ude o conce n and
esponsibili y.
Thus, on he one hand, he an h opocen ic humanism o he pas , iewing man
as he “pinnacle o c ea ion” and associa ed wi h he unlimi ed exploi a ion o he
ea h, is ce ainly no longe enable oday. A he same ime, i would be w ong o
h ow he baby ou wi h he ba hwa e and o conside humanism obsole e, as pos -
humanis s do. Because esponsibili y o he de elopmen o he ea h can only be
assumed by ha being which alone in he wo ld is capable o eedom and sel -
de e mina ion, and ha is he human being. A humanism o embodimen and con-
i iali y would gi e his esponsibili y a new ounda ion ha is be e equipped
agains an h opocen ism. Thus, an ecological ede ini ion o ou ela ionship o he
ea hly en i onmen can succeed i ou embodimen and ali eness a e a i s cen e —
his means, ou con i iali y wi h he na u al wo ld.
Funding Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
Da a a ailabili y I do no analyze o gene a e any da ase s, because his wo k akes a heo e ical app oach.
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