Kliem , Ha mu
A icle — Published Ve sion
The na u e and signi icance o he poli ical ideal o he
Rule o Law: Hayek, Buchanan, and beyond
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Sugges ed Ci a ion: Kliem , Ha mu (2024) : The na u e and signi icance o he poli ical ideal o he
Rule o Law: Hayek, Buchanan, and beyond, Kyklos, ISSN 1467-6435, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 77, Iss.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The na u e and signi icance o he poli ical ideal o
he Rule o Law: Hayek, Buchanan, and beyond
Ha mu Kliem
Ins i u ional and Beha io al Economics, Jus us
Liebig Uni e si ä , Giessen, Ge many
Co espondence
Ha mu Kliem , Ins i u ional and Beha io al
Economics, Jus us Liebig Uni e si ä , Giessen,
Ge many.
Email: ha mu .kliem @ -online.de
Abs ac
Hayek and Buchanan endo sed Böhm's “p i a e law socie y”
as exp essi e o he ideal o a go e nmen o laws, and no o
men. Bu hey also acknowledged ha among he many, he
en o ceabili y o legal cus om, adjudica ion, and legisla ion
mus be poli ically gua an eed by a s a e. Due o una oidable
s a e-in ol emen , isks o excessi e en -seeking and
au ho i a ian a bi a y go e nmen loom la ge once “ ules o
ule change”enable sophis ica ed o ms o uling by law.
E en i in WEIRDS (Wes e n, Educa ed, Indus ialized, Rich,
Democ a ic, Socie ies) legal ules a e enac ed, modi ied, and
de oga ed exclusi ely acco ding o legal “ ules o ule
change,” he p e alence o he key a ibu es o “gene ali y,
ce ain y, and equali y o en o cemen ”o he Rule o Law is
in no way gua an eed. —The pape add esses his and he
ole, na u e, and signi icance o cons aining uling by law
h ough p ac icing he “poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law”.
1|INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In his lec u es on “The Poli ical Ideal o he Rule o Law,”F. A. . Hayek s a es ha he Rule o Law is “no a ule o
he law bu a ule abou he law, a me a-legal doc ine, o a poli ical ideal”(Hayek, 1955/2014, p. 163).
1
To be
1
This a icle appea s in Kyklos as pa o a ilogy o pape s (-, he wo o he s being Sugden, 2024 and Vanbe g, 2024) p esen ed a a symposium a he
Jus us-Liebig-Uni e si y Giessen in 2022 in commemo a ion o he 40 h anni e sa y o awa ding hono a y doc o al deg ees o F.A. . Hayek and
J.M. Buchanan o hei seminal wo k on he poli ical economy and philosophy o Cons i u ional Democ acy.
Recei ed: 31 May 2024 Re ised: 23 June 2024 Accep ed: 26 June 2024
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12407
This is an open access a icle unde he e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion-NonComme cial-NoDe i s License, which
pe mi s use and dis ibu ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly ci ed, he use is non-comme cial and no
modi ica ions o adap a ions a e made.
© 2024 The Au ho (s). Kyklos published by John Wiley & Sons L d.
1084 Kyklos. 2024;77:1084–1102.
wileyonlinelib a y.com/jou nal/kykl
poli ically p e alen in a conc e e socie y, a poli ical ideal like ha o he Rule o Law mus be “p ac iced”by su i-
cien ly many, su icien ly in luen ial membe s o ha socie y (Ma silius o Padua, 2005). Only hen can an ins i u ional
speci ica ion o law show “key a ibu es”o he Rule o Law like “gene ali y, ce ain y, and equali y o en o cemen ”
(Caldwell as edi o in Hayek, 42/2014, p. 12)
2
; and, only hen can he legal con en ions o a conc e e socie y gua an-
ee Da id Hume's h ee “na u al laws”o “ he s abili y o possession, i 's ans e ence by consen and he pe o -
mance o p omises”((Hume, 1739), Bk III, p ii, sec.12).
3
Tha he h ee abs ac equi emen s o “Humean na u al law”mus be ul illed by he speci ic legal con en ions
o a socie y o enable exchange, di ision o labo and specializa ion in a poli ically de-poli icized “p i a e law socie y”
(Böhm, 1966)isno a ma e o con en ion bu o empi ical laws.
4
The co esponding echnological knowledge o
how he abs ac equi emen s can be ul illed is based on empi ical hypo heses.
5
Whe he o no he mul iple social
o ganiza ional o ms (ma ke s, i ms, clubs e c.) ha may a ise in a p i a e law socie y a e o be deemed desi able is,
howe e , no a ma e o empi ical knowledge. I is a ma e o alue judgmen s and decision making (H. Albe ,
1985).
6
Subsequen ly, Hayek's and Buchanan's poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law is used wi hou u he ado as a eposi-
o y o e alua i e s anda ds o assessing al e na i e echnologies o “ uling by law.”The ocus is no on he ends
bu a he on he means o uling by law (Robbins, 1933) which akes place h ough he applica ion o “ ules o ule
change”in adjudica ion and legisla ion.
7
On he la e , Hayek makes a undamen al ema k
8
:
Legisla ion, he delibe a e making o law, has jus ly been desc ibed as among all in en ions o man
he one augh wi h he g a es consequences, mo e a - eaching in i s e ec s e en han i e and
gun-powde . Unlike law i sel , which has ne e been ‘in en ed’in he same sense, he in en ion o
legisla ion came ela i ely la e in he his o y o mankind. I ga e in o he hands o men an ins umen
o g ea powe which hey needed o achie e some good, bu which hey ha e no ye lea ned so o
con ol ha i may no p oduce g ea e il.
((Hayek, 2022), CW, ol. 19, pp. 97–98))
In iew o po en ial abuses o legal powe s o ule change and he isks o pu suing he poli ical ideal o he Rule
o Law, Hayek ended o p e e “ ule change by adjudica ion”o e “ ule change by legisla ion.”
9
Buchanan endo sed
legisla ion bu was also deeply conce ned ha wi hou b oad suppo o he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law in soci-
e y ules o ule change could u n in o “weapons o legal mass des uc ion.”
Hayek and Buchanan we e bo h in luenced by b oadly Kan ian ideals. Hayek hough ha legal e olu ion in
WEIRD socie ies had p eceded and inspi ed Kan . Fo him, expe iencing o ms o he Rule o Law came i s , and
2
B uce Caldwell, he edi o o Hayek's lec u es, speaks o “ he ule o law as a me a-p inciple.”This seems a he ague bu ela ed concep s a e as ague:
“o ien a ion s a emen s”in social p ac ices (Homans, 1967), “ opical hinking in he law”(Viehweg, 1993), “ ules o humb”in a ional decision-making
(Gige enze , 1997) e c.
3
D i ing on he le side o he s ee may do as well as using he opposi e side as long as he e is a single ocal side.
4
Hume speaks o “na u al laws”((Hume, 1739), Bk III, p .ii, sec12) no as a subsc ibe o adi ional “na u al law” heo y. Qui e o he con a y he applies
he a he common s a egy o au ho s o use he es ablished e ms o hei opponen s wi h a new meaning. In doing so, Hume was implici ly claiming ha
he could cap u e all ele an aspec s ha he adi ionalis s a ibu ed o “na u al law”wi hou hei me aphysical and me a-e hical liabili ies.
5
To pu i sligh ly di e en ly, ha hese h ee condi ions mus be ul illed by conc e e con en ions, is oo ed in “human na u e”due o gene al empi ical
physical, psychological, and biological laws o na u e.
6
Tha he o dolibe al suppo e s o Böhm's ideal o a p i a e law socie y seem bliss ully unawa e o i s undamen al simila i y o Humean na u al law shows
i sel when an elec onic sea ch o “Hume”in “The Ox o d handbook o o dolibe alism”(Bieb iche e al., 2022) e u ns no loca ions e e ing o Hume.
7
The p oblem o so-called “pa adoxes o sel -amendmen ”(Sube , 1990) a ises om such ules. I is exace ba ed by he ac ha in p inciple he ules o
ule change can be applied o hemsel es; o a pa icula ly simple p esen a ion o such s uc u es, see Ho s ad e (1986, essay nomic).
8
The s a emen is inspi ed by s unning ema ks o he same e ec in Ge man legal heo y ((Reh eld , 1951), 67–68). I an icipa es a he amous pa allel
ema ks in (Ha , 1961).
9
Bu Hayek also ema ks ha “ hough he much lauded lexibili y o he common law may ha e been a ou able o he ise o he Rule o Law so long as
gene al opinion ended in ha di ec ion, he common law also shows, I am a aid, less esis ance o i s decay once ha igilance is elaxed which alone can
keep libe y ali e.”(Hayek, 1955/2014), CW, ol.15, p. 146). Hayek la e p opaga ed cou -like legisla i e bodies hope ully less ulne able o poli ical en -
seeking (Hayek, 1979). On Hayek's iews in ela ion o hose o o he au ho s, see e.g. he in oduc ion o “Law, Legisla ion, and Libe y”(Hayek, 2022),
CW, ol. 19, p. xxx ii) by he edi o Je emy Shea mu (on Hayek and Leoni) while Be olini (2019) commen s on Hayek, Buchanan, and Leoni.
KLIEMT 1085
abs ac e hical ideals like he ca ego ical impe a i e second —as a esul a he han o iginal cause o he ise o
WEIRDS.
10
Buchanan hough o p inciples o democ a ic con ac a ianism as “ ela i ely absolu e absolu es”
((Buchanan, 1999), CW, ol.1, pp. 442–454) and hoped ha he in eg a ion o such a p io i p inciples in o he poli i-
cal ideal o he Rule o Law migh imp o e how adjudica ion and legisla ion a e exe cised.
11
Subsequen ly, di e ences be ween Hayek and Buchanan a e acknowledged bu hei basic poli ical ideal o he
Rule o Law is econs uc ed as undamen ally he same. Sec ion 2 lays ou a ske ch o he possible ole o a ional
belie s, a ional expec a ions, and delusions in c ea ing and sus aining legal cus oms. Sec ion 3 in okes Poppe 's
unduly neglec ed concep o “p o ec ionism”((Poppe , 2020), ch 6) in econs uc ing he ela ionship be ween he
igh s' p oducing, ax- inanced p o ec i e agency o he s a e, and he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law. Sec ion 4 sug-
ges s ha despi e Hayek's and Buchanan's own misguided ejec ions o “conse a ism”and “posi i ism,” hei cen-
al poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law should be econs uc ed no only as implying “p o ec ionism”bu also as
implying “analy ic legal posi i ism”and “analy ic legal conse a ism.”On he basis o hese econs uc ions,
Sec ion 5 summa ily cha ac e izes Hayek's and Buchanan's iews as “Rule o Law Conse a ism.”
2|CUSTOM KING OF ALL
In his “The Republic o Belie s: A New App oach o Law and Economics,”Kaushik Basu seeks o de elop a new
“app oach o law, oo ed in game heo y, [ o; H.K.] …gi e us an unde s anding o how a socie y becomes law-abid-
ing”((Basu, 2018), 4). Basu dese es o be quo ed somewha mo e ex ensi ely no only as an eminen Law and
Economics schola bu also as he o me Chie Economis o he Wo ld Bank
12
:
Go don B own, o me B i ish p ime minis e , is belie ed o ha e said ((Wo ld Bank, 2017), p. 95), ‘In
es ablishing he ule o law, he i s i e cen u ies a e always he ha des .’Go don B own's
obse a ion is o en ea ed as a joke, bu i is no . I makes he impo an poin ha o he law o
de elop oo s and he ule o law o p e ail equi es o dina y people o belie e in he law; and o
belie e ha o he s belie e in he law. Such belie s and me a belie s can ake e y long o ge
en enched in socie y.
((Basu, 2018), 4)
Basu's book shows ha looking a he ins i u ionaliza ion o law h ough he window o a ional choice heo y
and belie o ma ion can be o g ea es heu is ic alue o heo y o ma ion. Bu om an empi ical poin o iew, he
belie in he explana o y powe o a ional choice heo y may well be based on common illusions o economis s. In
ac , one may eel eminded o wha William J. Be ns ein has o say abou he delusions o c owds in gene al
13
:
When [Da ius] was king o Pe sia, he summoned he G eeks who happened o be p esen a his cou ,
and asked hem wha hey would ake o ea he dead bodies o hei a he s. They eplied ha hey
would no do i o any money in he wo ld. La e , in he p esence o he G eeks, and h ough an
in e p e e , so ha hey could unde s and wha was said, he asked some Indians, o he ibe called
Calla iae, who do in ac ea hei pa en s' dead bodies, wha hey would ake o bu n hem. They
10
“Kan 's …celeb a ed ‘ca ego ical impe a i e’is indeed li le mo e han an ex ension o he ield o mo als o he basic idea unde lying he Rule o Law.”
((Hayek, 2014), 146)
11
The ‘Bu-Kan ian’ oo s o ‘Buchan ianism’(Kliem , 61) can be ound in Vining (1956, i s pa , in pa icula p. 19).
12
To i s g ea c edi , he Wo ld Bank has cul i a ed an ongoing in e es in he Rule o Law, see e.g., Legal Vice P esidency, Wo ld Bank (2003) and Wo ld
Bank (2017). I seems i ing ha Hayek's o iginal lec u e “ he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law”was p esen ed in 1955 a a bank as well, namely he
na ional bank o Egyp .
13
Re e ing o “He odo us, The His o ies. Bal imo e: Penguin Books 1954, 190–191”.
1086 KLIEMT
u e ed a c y o ho o and o bade him o men ion such a d ead ul hing. One can see by his wha
cus om can do, and Pinda , in my opinion, was igh when he called i ‘king o all’.
((Be ns ein, 2021), 9,)
A e his, Be ns ein makes his cen al poin abou a ionali y and a ionaliza ion:
The G eeks, a e all, we e an iqui y's in ellec uals, and Da ius mus ha e been ickled o box hei
he o ical ea s. His unspoken messages o he G eeks: You may be he mos lea ned among human-
kind, bu you a e jus as i a ional as he es o us; you a e simply be e a a ionalizing jus why,
despi e all e idence o he con a y, you a e s ill igh .
((Be ns ein, 2021), p.9)
14
Tha Be ns ein d aws a en ion o he delusions and no only o he celeb a ed wisdom o c owds seems jus i-
ied. Bu when he asc ibes o Da ius he unspoken messages, ha he G eeks a e “jus as i a ional as he es o us”
only “be e a a ionalizing jus why,” he empi ically minded social scien is o ou days may ha e second hough s.
Social scien is migh eel emp ed o e o mula e he a ional belie o ma ion ha Basu in okes in his explana ion
o he wo kings o he law, as unspoken message o economic a ional choice heo is s as ollows:
You may be he mos lea ned among social heo is s, bu you a e jus as i a ional as he es o us;
you a e simply be e a a ionalizing jus why, despi e all e idence o he con a y, you a e s ill igh .
In pa icula , game heo e ic a ional choice explana ions o obse able eal-wo ld beha io seem so a away
om e idence-based explana ions, ha Reinha d Sel en as one o he leading heo is s o pu e game heo y pu i
ou side empi ical science p ope . He spoke o i as a kind o “ heology o a ionali y”o “ a ionology”(Sel en,
1999).
15
In any e en , i seems unclea why becoming commi ed o a cus om wi hou a su icien a ional eason should
no me ely be non- a ional a he han i a ional in he pejo a i e sense o he e m.
16
Mo eo e , exp essing a com-
mi men o a speci ic a bi a y cus om by decla ing ha a i al cus om would no be adop ed “ o any money in he
wo ld”can be an ins umen ally a ional ac unde ce ain condi ions. Likewise, demanding no “ o men ion such a
d ead ul hing,”qui e independen ly o he epis emic s a us o he exp essed con en , can, depending on pu pose,
also be ins umen ally a ional (in pa icula i demanding i is a low-cos ac ).
17
Relying on a b oad concep ion o ins umen al a ionali y one can shed ligh no only on ancien cus oms bu
also on p ac ices o ou imes. Fo example, in he mode n Uni ed S a es, when decla ing allegiance o he poli ical
ideal o he Rule o Law people s a e ha i is held “ o be sel -e iden , ha all men a e c ea ed equal, ha hey a e
endowed by hei C ea o wi h ce ain unalienable Righ s, ha among hese a e Li e, Libe y and he pu sui o Hap-
piness.”
18
I seems ha e en hose US ci izens who nei he belie e ha a C ea o , no ha unalienable igh s exis ,
no ha hei indi idual ac s in hese ega ds a e causally signi ican can wi hou i a ionali y epea o mulas like he
p eceding in i ualized exp essi e speech ac s. E en Hobbes as one o he i s i no he i s heo is who
14
As opposed o his olde splendid book on exchange (Be ns ein, 2009), in his ecen book Be ns ein is ocusing on he da k side o la ge numbe s'
in e ac ion and he delusions a he han he wisdom o c owds as celeb a ed, e.g., in (Su owiecki, 2005).
15
Tha in pa icula Bayesian upda ing o belie s on which game heo is s end o ely may be comple ely oo hless agains delusiona y con en is shown in
(M. Albe , 2017). The only il e s disc imina ing agains a bi a y a ionaliza ions may be p ac ical ins i u ional ones, see H. Albe (2010) and M. Albe
(2011).
16
I depends s ongly on whe he we classi y as i a ional wha canno be suppo ed deduc i ely by easons ha hemsel es a e al eady a ionally jus i ied
o whe he we lea e oom o some kind o non-deduc i e a ionali y, see on his M. Albe (2011,2022), H. Albe (1985), and Musg a e (1993). Fo a
his o y o science accoun ele an he e (Woo on, 2016) and o i s ela ion o “analy ical conse a ism,”see B ennan and Hamlin (2004,2016).
17
The con en could be comple ely ic i ious and exp essing i collec i ely insigni ican . See o mo e on “exp essi e a ionali y,”(B ennan & Buchanan,
1984; B ennan & Lomasky, 1993), and o he ela ed “economy o es eem”(B ennan & Pe i , 2004).
18
See he Decla a ion o Independence, h ps://www.a chi es.go / ounding-docs/decla a ion.
KLIEMT 1087
consequen ly applied he model o homo economicus o “ a ionalize”human ac ion ac oss he boa d, el o ced o
acknowledge in his la e yea s — ha “… he powe o he migh y ha h no ounda ion bu in he opinion and belie o
he people”((Hobbes, 1990), 16).
In sum, he p eceding seems o indica e ha con ic ions and poli ical ideals, e en i hey may seem as a bi a y
as he une al cus oms o he G eeks and he Calla iae, may become so deeply en enched ha hey appea as i mly
g ounded as a e laws o logic o o na u e.
19
In he Republic o Belie s, he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law —like
ancien une al cus oms —may be suppo ed by (quasi-) eligious and o he i es. Bu his suppo need no be i a io-
nal e en i he e a e no su icien a ional easons o wha is suppo ed. In cases like he poli ical ideal o he Rule o
Law, cus om may come i s (logically and imewise), a ionaliza ion and a ionali y second.
3|RULE OF LAW, PROTECTIONISM, AND RIGHTS
The e canno be he Rule o Law wi hou laws, bu he e can be laws ha iola e he s anda ds o he Rule o Law. The e
can be law wi hou a s a e, bu i akes a s a e o see o i ha he key a ibu es o “gene ali y, ce ain y, and equali y o
en o cemen ”o he Rule o Law a e gua an eed on he le el o indi idual ci izens. —Again, a ske ch o a p ominen his-
o ical na a i e su ices o illus a e he p eceding ema ks and o p epa e he g ound o u he discussion.
3.1 |Ruling by law —poli icized and de-poli icized
The na a i e o “‘Njal's Saga”(Cook, 1997) desc ibes a legal con es in medie al Iceland sho ly a e 1,000 CE.
Compa ed wi h ad anced socie ies —e en o he ime — he Icelandic socie y was small. Bu i was complex and
la ge in compa ison wi h so-called p imi i e socie ies o i s own and ou ime. The e was a a he complex legal o de
among a popula ion o mo e han 50.000 housand inhabi an s. Excep o he “law speake ”who —suppo ed by a
ci cle o a ending “expe s”—would ehea se legal ules and p eceden s a he annual Thing, no specialized o gani-
za ion o go e nance exis ed.
20
Bu he e was an o al adi ion and a ule-based o de o law wi hou a s a e.
Impe sonal legal ules played a ole in legal dispu es bu whe he and how hey a ec ed beha io depended on
pe sonal ela ions. I ha dly in luenced he beha io o hose ci izens who el unde an o e whelming pe sonal du y o
ake sides wi h a pa icula pa y o a conc e e legal con es . Bu on he beha io o “bys ande s”who we e only unde
he in luence o he law and no o du ies o pe sonal loyal y, wha he law “said”could exe some in luence.
21
Iceland being an island, ex e nal h ea s o in asion we e negligible in he ele an pe iod.
22
The ensuing ana chi-
cal equilib ium in he “closed sys em”was akin o he oligopolis ic equilib ium among so e eign na ions unde “ ules
o in e na ional law.”
23
As in in e na ional poli ics among so e eign s a es, he ela ions be ween indi iduals –as
19
And, e en i lacking he analy ical o empi ical u h o laws o logic o o na u e. E en belie s ha a e embedded in he co-e olu iona y p ocesses o
“genes, mind, and cul u e”(Lumsden & Wilson, 1981) and a e pa o he sec e o he success o ou species (Hen ich, 2016,2020) may be based on
delusions.
20
See o gene al “popula ”su eys o social o ganiza ional o ms (Diamond, 2012; Hen ich, 2016,2020; Pinke , 2012). Fo an an h opological accoun o
“scaling up”((Hen ich, 2020), ch 3) and, o cou se, ((Hume, 1739), Bk III, pa ii, chap 7) wi h i s clea analysis o commons' p oblems in la ge g oups. The
ela ed li e a u e is huge, e.g., om a poli ical heo y poin o iew (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013), poli ical his o y (Fukuyama, 2012), e olu iona y
psychology (G eene, 2013), on commons p oblems ((Os om, 1990), and elying on (Taylo , 1976)).
21
In consequence, he size and he s eng h o coali ions o suppo e s o he con es an s in legal dispu es would po en ially depend on he impe sonal
ules o law.
22
Fo mo e on a de ensi e s a e ha keeps ou in e nal and ex e nal h ea s o ana chical law, see Kliem (2015) e e ing o de Jasay (1998) and Jasay
(2011).
23
The po en ial unc ional equi alence o he s a us quo o a Hobbesian ana chy equilib ium wi h a sys em o s abili y o possession is cen e s age in some
o Buchanan's wo k, e.g., Buchanan (1999, CW, ol. 7), see also Buchanan and Bush (1973). On “di ided so e eign y”in in e na ional law (Pa el, 2014); o
game heo y backg ound, see Taylo (1976).
1088 KLIEMT
desc ibed by he Saga –we e cha ac e ized by con inuous “ne wo king”and coali ion o ma ion e o s.
24
In conse-
quence, Icelandic ana chy was as “poli icized”as he in e na ional ela ions o ou days a e unde “in e na ional law.”
O he han in a p ope ly wo king “de-poli icized”Rule o Law sys em, unde Icelandic law, indi iduals could in hei
indi idual capaci ies p ac ically ne e ely exclusi ely on he legal me i s o hei claims bu had o ely on he poli ics
o mobilizing an en o cing coali ion.
25
No e, ha he o de ed ana chy on Iceland was poli icized on he le el o indi idual ela ions because i lacked
he poli ical ins i u ion o a s a e. Fo , only i he e is a ac ual poli ical monopoly o he use o c edible h ea s o io-
lence, can hose in con ol o ha powe con e i s use on indi iduals. Only i backed by he collec i e monopoly can
indi iduals s and hei g ound in a pa icula choice agains o he indi iduals o coali ions he eo .
26
In sum, one can ha e law wi hou a s a e bu canno ha e Rule o Law wi hou a s a e. The (impe sonal) “gene -
ali y, ce ain y, and equali y o en o cemen ”o legal ules o indi iduals ha is demanded by Hayek's and
Buchanan's poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law canno —a leas no among he many —be ealized wi hou a s a e. I
akes s a e-sponso ed poli ics o “d i e ou poli ics” om in e -indi idual legal ela ions, belie s, and expec a ions.
27
3.2 |F om ideal demands o Poppe ian eal p o ec ionism o legal igh s
Like Hayek and Buchanan wi h whom he sha ed a ealis ic iew o he o igins and wo kings o s a e powe , Ka l
Poppe endo sed he s a e as an ins umen o ealizing poli ical ideals like ha o he Rule o Law.
28
He belie ed
ha he s a e should p o ec “ he eedom o he ci izens as equally as possible”((Poppe , 2020), 105).
Poppe insis ed ha he so-called “p o ec i e s a e”when doing wha i should do does no me ely p o ec wha
exis s independen ly o i . The p o ec i e s a e p oduces indi idual libe ies:
Al hough he poli ical heo y which I call p o ec ionism …is undamen ally a libe al heo y, I hink ha
he name may be used o indica e ha , hough libe al, i has no hing o do wi h he policy o s ic
non-in e en ion (o en, bu no qui e co ec ly, called ‘laissez- ai e’). Libe alism and s a e-
in e e ence a e no opposed o each o he . On he con a y, any kind o eedom is clea ly impossible
unless i is gua an eed by he s a e.
((Poppe , 2020), 106)
29
Tha “any kind o eedom is clea ly impossible unless i is gua an eed by he s a e”seems empi ically co ec i
we hink o p o ec ions o indi idual eedom in la ge-scale in e ac ions. As was al eady emphasized in he p eceding
discussion o Icelandic o de ed ana chy, only a de ac o monopoly on he ul ima e use o iolence can bes ow —
along ce ain legally de ined dimensions o social in e ac ion —equal blocking powe on each indi idual wi hin “a
24
Compa able o he law in Icelandic ana chy, he ules o in e na ional law exe a causal in luence on cu en a ai s bu nobody would doub ha —due
o he lack o a global monopolis —en o cemen emains h ough and h ough poli ical. Those who like An hony de Jasay (e.g. in Jasay, 58) hink abou
ana chy in e ms o de-poli iza ion should hink wice: he e may be law in ana chy, bu —excep o e y small g oups — he e will be poli ics, oo.
25
Equilib ium concep s ha in ol e pe sonal playe s and equilib ium concep s ha allow o playe s o med o coali ions o pe sons come o mind he e —
inclusi e he ela ion be ween so-called co-ope a i e (no all mo es explici ) and non-co-ope a i e game heo y (all mo es explici ); see o mo e on his
(Gü h & Kliem , 2007).
26
Whe he he monopolis as a co po a e ac o will h ough i s agen s do wha i should acco ding o he ules o law, o cou se, depends on whe he o
no he monopolis is “co up ed”in e nally.
27
A s a e monopoly o he use o o ce will always c ea e isks o poli ical abuse con olled only by o ces in an ul ima ely “ana chical equilib ium.”Almos
supe luous o men ion (Tullock, 1993), (C. K. Rowley e al., 1988) (K uege , 1974). Ye , no e also he a gumen o “ he e u n o he ee- ide ”(Jasay,
1989).).
28
Tha he i s s a e-like o ganiza ions mus ha e been “p o ec ion acke s”se ing as ins umen s o ex e nal wa a e and o in e nal en -ex ac ion does
no imply ha his s a e o a ai s mus pe sis , see No h e al. (2013). Poppe (2020) ocuses on he his o y o ideas conce ning he ole o s a es. He
neglec s he eal social-e olu iona y (Hayek) as well as he ic ious eleological “as i ”explana ions (Buchanan) o s a e o de s.
29
Poppe 's “The open socie y and i s enemies”((Poppe , 2020), i s published in 1945) was w i en mo e o less a he same ime and ou o he same
deep conce ns abou he sus ainabili y o he Rule o Law as Hayek's “The oad o se dom”((Hayek, 2008), i s published in 1944). The eedom Poppe is
hinking o is ha o indi iduals as eme ges unde he Rule o Law.
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cons i u ion o libe y.”
30
Only wi h a monopoly backing hem, indi iduals can –as he poli ical ideal o he Rule o
Law demands –equally and sepa a ely igge i esis ible s a e suppo on hei side agains ce ain o ms o (collec-
i e o indi idual [non-s a e]) ac ion o o he s.
31
3.2.1 | Ideal abs ac demands a e no conc e e igh s
Ideal heo ies o igh s ocus p ima ily on easons o demanding ha indi idual igh s be p o ec ed while ea ing
p oblems o supplying igh s as seconda y issues. Ye ,
easons o wishing he e we e such hings as igh s, a e no igh s; a eason o wishing ha a ce -
ain igh we e es ablished, is no ha igh –wan is no supply –hunge is no b ead.
((Ben ham, 1843), ana chical allacy II)
Tha e hical heo is s o all imes seem o be pa icula ly p one o commi wha Ben ham classi ied as an “ana -
chical allacy”when aising hei a p io i demands is unsu p ising. Ye , economis s seem no be e han e hicis s
when hey eel en i led o assume ha social ins i u ional ac s exis , simply because abs ac economic heo ies
demons a e ha ully a ional ac o s would a ionally b ing abou hose ins i u ional ac s.
32
A e all, such abs ac
demons a ions
equi e, i hey a e o be poli ically in o ma i e, elabo a ion in o s a emen s abou pa icula conc e e
people doing hings o o he people
((Geuss, 2008), p. 24).
33
No e ha he need o such an elabo a ion exis s comple ely independen ly o whe he he e is objec i e knowl-
edge o “p ac ical no ms and alues.”Ins i u ional ealiza ion would be necessa y e en i non-empi ical (a p io i)
knowledge o igh and w ong would be accessible and could be desc ibed in alue judgmen s ha a e ue in he
sense o co esponding o (“alleged”) ac s.
In sho , igh s do no “ge ”p o ec ed simply because i is known o be objec i ely “ igh ”i hey be p o ec ed.
I is an issue o g ea es in e es how o ge he “p o ec ion job”done.
34
3.2.2 | The ule o law, uncondi ional igh s, and he wel a e s a e
Fo subsc ibe s o “ igh s uni e salism,”humans “ha e” igh s because hey a e membe s o ou species. Bu e en
legal sys ems o WEIRDS ha e e in hei legal ules o human igh s o o “human digni y”abs ac ly and
30
O cou se, he claim ha a ac ual monopoly is in place does no imply he claim ha i canno be challenged, i is me ely claimed ha i is
o e whelmingly unlikely ha a challenge will succeed. To p e en ha coun e ailing powe agains exe cising a igh can be success ully mobilized,
indi idual igh s' p o ec ion equi es s a e-sponso ed collec i e ac ion a he han inac ion (o “laissez- ai e”). Empowe ing all indi iduals in some ega ds
equi es disempowe ing all o he s in some ega ds.
31
In Icelandic o de ed ana chy, he e could be no claims by which indi iduals could igge agen s o he s a e monopolis o ake p o ec i e ac ion on hei
indi idual behal simply because he e was no s a e. In hei suppo , o he s we e ac ing in hei indi idual capaci ies a he han as legally empowe ed
agen s o a s a e.
32
The e can be law wi hou a s a e. Bu Ben ham is co ec ha , wi hou a s a e, indi idual igh s in he ull sense ha empowe s indi iduals o claim hem
in hei indi idual capaci ies canno exis among he many.
33
Like Geuss, as an ou side , Gaus as an inside o a ional choice app oaches was pa icula ly c i ical o ideal heo ies (Gaus, 2016).
34
The con en o p o ec ions is no only o he ma ia o in e es bu e en mo e so o adhe en s o he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law.
1090 KLIEMT
uni e sally canno supply hei en o cemen se ices o all membe s o humankind wi h “gene ali y, ce ain y, and
equali y o en o cemen .”
35
As a ma e o ac , gua an ees o igh s can be p edic ably en o ced in gene al and equal ways only o membe s
o conc e e so e eign WEIRDS.
36
In sligh ly di e en e ms, access o p o ec i e se ices p o ided (“p oduced”)by
he s a e-sponso ed legal s a o a pa icula WEIRD socie y is gua an eed i and only i condi ions o ci izenship a e
ul illed. Ci izenship is g an ed a e accep ance in o he communi y condi ional on “bi h,”“ olun a y immig a ion,”
o “coe ced abduc ion (sla e y).”
37
Though all pa icula igh s ha a e componen s o ci izenship may concei ably
be olun a ily alienable unde Rule o Law, he e mus be some igh s ha an indi idual communi y-membe canno
be legally dep i ed o .
38
In pa icula , ce ain minimal p o ec ions o “due p ocess”mus no be condi ional on pa ic-
ula pas , p esen , o u u e abili y and willingness o pay o se ice.
39
O he han in case o a club, he poli ical ideal
o he Rule o Law also o bids equi ing a quid p o quo in e u n o he minimal p o ec i e se ice gua an ees ha
a e cons i u i e o membe ship in he poli ical communi y.
40
In conc e e WEIRDS he “key a ibu es”o he Rule o Law, “gene ali y, ce ain y, and equali y o en o cemen ”
mani es hemsel es in well-speci ied Uncondi ional Basic Righ s, UBRs. Many classical libe als migh in ui i ely hink
he e only o gua an eed access o legal p o ec ions o so-called “nega i e igh s”and no claims o a sha e o some
“pie”which a e o en e e ed o as “posi i e igh s.”Ye , on he undamen al le el o c ea ing igh s, he dis inc ion
be ween such nega i e and posi i e igh s b eaks down: Acco ding o p o ec ionism, bo h kinds o igh s mus be
p oduced by he s a e in a coe ci e p ocess o egula ion and edis ibu ion.
41
E en highly con es ed Uncondi ional Basic Income, UBI, is wi h espec o egula o y and edis ibu i e
a ibu es in he same ca ego y as o he s a e-sponso ed uncondi ional igh s. Tha UBRs a e in kind while UBI is in
cash, is ue, ye , he “in kind—in cash”di e ence is epheme al as compa ed o he essen ial aspec s o coe ci e
edis ibu ion and egula ion ha UBI and UBR ha e in common as coe ci e ax inanced gua an ees.
42
3.3 |In sho sum, p o ec ionism, and he ule o law
The igh s' p oducing ac i i ies o he s a e a e monopolis ically coe ci e. They a e ax- inanced, egula o y, and
edis ibu i e. The e is simply no s a e ha is no a wel a e s a e o so s. Wi hin a p o ec ionis app oach o igh s, he
so-called nigh wa chman and he nanny-s a e a e no ca ego ically dis inc al e na i es bu ex emes on a con inuum
o “ igh s p oducing”wel a e s a es.
43
As econs uc ed he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law is a wel a e s a e ideal
35
On easibili y issues in gene al, see B ennan and Pe i (2005) and Hamlin and S emplowska (2012). On he essen ial ole o “b idge p inciples”like
“ough p esupposes can”(e.g., (H. Albe , 1985)).
36
Due o his quasi-Kan ian con ac a ianism, one migh ha e second hough s conce ning Buchanan he e, see Vanbe g (2022). Ye , con a y o wha
Buchanan's ideal no ma i e indi idualism seems o imply, poli ical Buchan ianism always p esupposes a conc e e g oup o ci izens deciding in he shadow
o assumed indi idual e o powe o membe s o a conc e e g oup (e.g., a so e eign na ion) Buchanan (CW, 24, ol. 3). .
37
Though Buchanan (1965) is he ounding documen o he heo y o clubs (Co nes & Sandle , 1996), Buchanan's and Tullock's (CW, 24, ol. 3) poli ical
con ac a ianism assumes indi idual e o powe and exogenously de e mined membe ship in a communi y.
38
People can be bo n in o ci izenship. Unde Rule o Law, hey may ha e he igh o olun a ily o ego ci izenship al oge he bu unde he Rule o Law
ce ain elemen a y p o ec ions mus no be wi hheld o hem. I goes wi hou saying ha capi al punishmen is p oblema ic e en i igh s o ai ial, e c.,
a e complied wi h.
39
The os acism p ac iced in classical A hens does me ely show ha he hen and he e p e ailing legal sys em was no exp essi e o wha is unde s ood
he e as he “poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law.”
40
To some ex en , he mos basic legal gua an ees a e mean o acc ue, independen ly o compliance wi h he ules o he law (unless a cou decided
o he wise). I seems one o he ea u es o he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law ha e en he se ial kille caugh wi h a smoking gun is endowed wi h
ce ain gua an ees ha mus no be wi hheld.
41
Wi h espec o he “sins”o egula ion and edis ibu ion so-called “nega i e”UBRs a e comple ely analogous o a che ypical sha e- igh s like he
gua an eed access o minimum housing, basic ood, clo hing, escue se ices in eme gencies, e c.
42
See on UBI in Buchanan and Hayek e y ins uc i ely (Leh o & Meadowc o , 2021), o he analogous a gumen o UBR (Kliem , 1993) and on he
necessi y o a conjoin app oach o axing and spending (B ennan and Buchanan, cap. 8 o CW ol.9 o (Buchanan, 1999)).
43
Ins i u ionalized coe ci e ax unded schemes ha o e uncondi ional claims o mone a y weal h and schemes ha o e claims o se ices and goods
deli e ed in kind can be p o ided on a socie y-wide la ge scale only by he s a e using i s undamen al coe ci e powe o ax, o edis ibu e and o
egula e. So, all dis inc ions a e dis inc ions in he se o (wel a e) s a es; pe haps bes o de ed incomple ely along wo dimensions ( egula ion, e-
dis ibu ion).
KLIEMT 1091
ha he e is some inhe en con lic be ween a sys em o case law and he ideal o he Rule o Law.
Since unde case law he judge cons an ly c ea es law, he p inciple ha he me ely applies p e-
exis ing ules can unde ha sys em be app oached e en less pe ec ly han whe e he law is codi ied.
((Hayek, 2014), p. 146)
So, o in oke ano he cliché, in case o he ela ionship be ween he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law hings a e
in p ac ice mo e complica ed han we migh suspec in heo y.
5|SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLITICAL IDEAL OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HAYEK,
BUCHANAN, AND BEYOND
A e in oducing he poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law as a p ac ice o dealing wi h ules o law a he han i sel a
ule o law, (1) i was sugges ed o pe cei e ha p ac ice as an example o he adi ional concep o a cus om, (2).
Hayek's and Buchanan's cen al iews on he na u e o he Rule o Law we e econs uc ed and (mos ly) endo sed as
cus om-based, con en ionalis , igh -based and p o ec ionis (3). In pa (4), he signi icance o Hayek's and
Buchanan's poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law o p esen p ac ices o adjudica ion and legisla ion was discussed wi h
special emphasis on adjudica ion. C i icisms o Hayek's and Buchanan's own c i icisms o wha hey unde s ood by
“conse a ism”and “posi i ism”we e o e ed. In consequence, i was sugges ed ha on he basis o adequa e ana-
ly ic concep s o conse a ism and legal posi i ism, Hayek’and Buchanan's poli ical ideal o he Rule o Law should
be in e p e ed as (analy ic) Rule o Law Conse a ism.
Beyond his we may no e ha in WEIRD socie ies, he Rule o Law is p esen ly unde siege because ci izens mix
up he poli ical ideals o “Rule o Law”and o “Democ acy.”Like Hayek and Buchanan, ci izens o WEIRDS oday
seek a new “ e lec i e equilib ium”(Rawls, 1951,1971). They mus come o e ms wi h he ac ha due o he
ascen o democ a ic ideals, Cons i u ional Democ acies ha e become a less sa e place o he Rule o Law.
To go back o he poli ical wisdom o he Fede alis s ((Hamil on e al., 2001) and o make se ious e o s o
enew and enla ge i wi h ins i u ional economic me hods and insigh s (Eichenbe ge & F ey, 1999) may be he bes
way o going beyond poli ical ideals like Hayek's and Buchanan's Rule o Law Conse a ism.
Since I pe sonally eel ha he Rule o Law in WEIRDS is he g ea es o all achie emen s o human ci iliza ion
he p ima y ask o he ins i u ional poli ical economis mus be ha o making conc e e ins i u ional p oposals o
ende ing WEIRDS and he Rule o Law mo e esilien and sus ainable. Hayek and Buchanan de o ed much o hei
wo k o his ask. “Rocking on he po ch along wi h me as his long ime c i ic”Buchanan once in a while summed up
ou mos basic common con ic ion o he me i s o he Rule o Law laconically: “Be e in he Wes !”
* I hank Michael Bau mann and Daniel Nien ied o c i icisms o a o me e sion o his pape . Un il
his un imely demise o ‘ he g ea lib a y abo e’in he summe o 2022, Geo ey B ennan and I ha e
been wo king on a join book “on exchange”( imely o he Adam Smi h yea ) o which his pape
p o ides some backg ound. Two yea s hence, I eel like inishing o good wha had been basically in-
ished Ma ch 2022. Hope ully he inal p oduc will appea in ‘local lib a ies down he e and unde ’ o
ep esen Geo ey's spi i among ‘wo ldly philosophe s’.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
1098 KLIEMT
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Da a sha ing is no applicable o his a icle as no da ase s we e gene a ed o analysed du ing he cu en s udy.
ORCID
Ha mu Kliem h ps://o cid.o g/0000-0002-4778-2017
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73
The ele an li e a u e o he opic o his pape is oo ex ended o be co e ed sa is ac o ily. I should like o men ion ha , a e a i s e sion o his
pape had been inished in 2022 a book leng h ea men on “Law's Rule”appea ed w i en by one o he leading philosophical-legal heo is s o ou ime
(Pos ema, 2022). This book as well as ea men s o he ule o law like e.g. (Wald on, 2020) and (Ma a all, 2003) dese e a sepa a e discussion.
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