Mejino-Lopez, Juan; Wol , Gun am B.
A icle
Boos ing he Eu opean De ence Indus y in a Hos ile
Wo ld
In e economics
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Mejino-Lopez, Juan; Wol , Gun am B. (2025) : Boos ing he Eu opean De ence
Indus y in a Hos ile Wo ld, In e economics, ISSN 1613-964X, Sciendo, Wa saw, Vol. 60, Iss. 1, pp.
34-39,
h ps://doi.o g/10.2478/ie-2025-0007
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In e economics 2025 | 1
34
Fo um
Juan Mejino-Lopez and Gun am B. Wol
Boos ing he Eu opean De ence Indus y in a Hos ile Wo ld
© The Au ho (s) 2025. Open Access: This a icle is dis ibu ed unde he
e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion 4.0 In e na ional License
(h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/).
Open Access unding p o ided by ZBW – Leibniz In o ma ion Cen e
o Economics.
In e economics, 2025, 60(1), 34-39
JEL: F52, F53, F12
DOI: 10.2478/ie-2025-0007
Juan Mejino-Lopez, B uegel, B ussels, Belgium.
Gun am B. Wol , Uni e si é Lib e de B uxelles;
and B uegel, B ussels, Belgium.
Wa has e u ned o Eu ope. As he e is no clea end in
sigh o he wa in Uk aine, he ques ion o a mamen s has
become o cen al impo ance. Failing o de e Russia, o
o suppo Uk aine adequa ely, would lea e Eu ope a a
majo s a egic disad an age o decades o come. Wol
e al. (2024) showed ha Russian mili a y indus ial ca-
paci ies ha e inc eased signi ican ly in he las wo yea s.
P oduc ion o key weapon sys ems now exceeds he
le els o Russian ma e ial losses in Uk aine.1 The Uni ed
S a es’s op gene al in Eu ope has es ima ed ha Russian
mili a y p oduc ion ou paces ha o he combined Wes
(Ca oli, 2024). Fo example, he es ima ed ha Russia now
p oduces and e u bishes mo e han 1,000 anks pe yea ,
by a su passing he combined p oduc ion o all Wes -
e n coun ies. Wol e al. (2024) e en sugges ha Russia
p oduces up o 1,500 anks pe yea . Ca oli (2024) also
es ima ed ha Russia now has a subs an ially g ea e ca-
paci y han a he beginning o he wa in 2022, despi e
i s signi ican losses. To achie e his massi e p oduc ion
boos , Russia has sys ema ically inc eased i s spending
on a mamen s. Russia now spends 30% o i s budge on
i s mili a y, ising o 40% i domes ic secu i y cos s a e
ac o ed in. Spending is now es ima ed o be abo e $120
billion pe yea . In pu chasing powe pa i y e ms, his
spending is subs an ially la ge and close o ha o he
Eu opean Union.
While Eu ope and he combined Wes in p inciple ha e
he esou ces o ou pe o m Russia because o hei la g-
e GDP, he mobilisa ion o iscal esou ces and he com-
mi men o s ay he cou se on a longe - e m basis is s ill
lagging. Eu opean de ence spending has inc eased sub-
s an ially in he las ew yea s; howe e , a e yea s o un-
de in es men , i will ake ime o p oduc ion capaci ies
o be b ough online and o s ocks o inc ease again. Fig-
1 A he same ime, Russia is also incu ing subs an ial losses o ma e ial.
u e 1 shows Eu opean Union de ence spending (including
pe sonnel, ope a ional and mili a y equipmen spending)
and spending on mili a y equipmen . Wi h alling de-
ence spending since he end o he Cold Wa , budge s
o equipmen spending became ex emely small, wi h
on a e age only 0.3% o GDP dedica ed o i . Fo many
yea s, Ge many in pa icula in es ed only a e y small
p opo ion o i s de ence spending in mili a y equipmen .
Acco ding o NATO igu es, he sha e was only a ound
13% un il 2019, compa ed o 25% in F ance. I was no
un il 2022 and 2023 ha he sha e o in es men in de-
ence equipmen inc eased signi ican ly. Howe e , Ge -
many emains behind he Uni ed Kingdom and he US. In
Poland, spending on equipmen now e en exceeds 50%
o o al de ence spending. In 2024, eigh NATO coun ies
(se en EU coun ies and Canada) did no each he mini-
mum o e all de ence spending a ge o 2% o GDP. This
includes I aly and Spain, he hi d and ou h la ges EU
economies.
Fiscal da a shows ha go e nmen s ha e been able o
adjus de ence budge s in esponse o he wa , and hese
inc eased budge s ha e also ansla ed in o la ge budg-
e s o equipmen pu chases. Wol e al. (2024) docu-
men ed a subs an ial inc ease in mili a y p ocu emen
in Ge many, in pa icula om Sep embe 2023 o June
2024. Ye , o de ed quan i ies emain small, especially
when compa ed o Russian ou pu o o los capabili ies
in he las ew decades (Wol e al., 2024). O de ed quan-
i ies a e also ela i ely low in F ance and o he key Eu o-
pean coun ies.
The new EU Commissione o De ence and Space s a -
ing in la e 2024 will ha e o squa ely ace he main chal-
lenges o push o he cos -e ec i e and apid ea ma-
men o Eu ope, ideally based on a sha ed s a egic anal-
ysis. Toge he wi h he EU’s op o eign policy o icial, he
High Rep esen a i e o he Union o Fo eign A ai s and
Secu i y Policy, he new Commissione o De ence and
Space mus deli e a whi e pape on he u u e o Eu o-
pean de ence iden i ying inancing and capabili y needs
in de ence.
The mission le e om he Eu opean Commission P esi-
den U sula on de Leyen is ambi ious: he whi e pape
shall ame “a new app oach o de ence and iden i y in-
es men needs o deli e ull-spec um Eu opean de-
ence capabili ies based on join in es men s, eadying
he EU and Membe S a es o he mos ex eme mili a y
con ingencies” (Eu opean Commission, 2024a).
ZBW – Leibniz In o ma ion Cen e o Economics 35
Fo um
Figu e 1
De ence spending and spending on mili a y
equipmen in he EU
% o GDP
No es: “De ence spending” e e s o o al EU27 de ence expendi u e om
1989-2023 and de ence spending by EU NATO membe s in 2024. “Equip-
men spending” e e s o spending by EU NATO membe s. The Czech
Republic, Sweden and Finland a e no included o 2009-2013 because
o una ailabili y o da a. EU membe s Aus ia, Cyp us, I eland and Mal a
a e no NATO membe s.
Sou ce: Wol e al. (2024).
Figu e 2
Sel -p opelled howi ze cos pe uni and annual
p oduc ion capaci y
No e: P oduc ion capaci y pe yea should be conside ed a lowe bound
es ima e.
Sou ce: B uegel, based on in o ma ion eleased by companies and spe-
cialised p ess in e ms o pu chase ag eemen s and deli e y da es. Con-
ac he au ho s o de ails.
Why a Eu opean de ence ma ke would make sense
Eu opean go e nmen s o de ela i ely small quan i ies o
weapons and ammuni ion. As a esul , i is di icul o ben-
e i om economies o scale, which would in p inciple lead
o as e and cheape p oduc ion and highe p oduc ion
numbe s. This is also he esul o a agmen ed ma ke o
de ence p oduc s, in which each EU coun y o de s sepa-
a ely. Fo example, i he p ocu emen o a ille y shells is
no bundled and s anda ds di e sligh ly, o i mili a ies ai-
lo sys ems o unique na ional c i e ia ha do no subs an-
ially e lec mission equi emen s, hen na ional indus ies
will emain he main p oduce s o he needs o na ional
a mies and will p oduce in ela i ely small quan i ies a
ela i ely high cos . Scale economies esul om indus ial
p oduc ion p ocesses ha equi e la ge-scale pu chasing.
Mo eo e , go e nmen s need o commi o e he long e m
o buy ce ain quan i ies, in o de o indus y o in es in
p oduc ion capaci ies. To illus a e he ela ion be ween
scale and p ice, Figu e 2 shows he ela ion be ween p ices
and uni s p oduced pe yea o selec ed howi ze s. Eu o-
pean p oduc ion emains low while p ices a e among he
highes , possibly indica ing he lack o scale.
Towa ds a de ence indus ial s a egy
The Commissione o De ence and Space will ha e o
build on his plan and de elop a easible s a egy. Fo his,
a ealis ic and concep ual unde s anding o he speci ic
cha ac e is ics o de ence indus ial policy is necessa y.
Ad ancing mili a y indus ial policy is a complex endea ou
in any coun y. Figu e 3 concep ualises he dual goals o de-
ence indus ial policy. I aims o c ea e he ma e ial means
needed o de e opponen s, enable mili a y ope a ions
ab oad and suppo allies such as Uk aine. These goals
a e de ined by a coun y’s secu i y and de ence policy. Bu
indus ial policy goals, and in pa icula elec o al p e e -
ences, also de e mine objec i es such as job c ea ion, local
de elopmen and b oade inno a ion aims. Ma ying hese
wo sepa a e ypes o objec i es is al eady di icul a he
na ional le el, whe e local de elopmen goals migh no be
aligned wi h economic e iciency o secu i y a ge s.
Designing a de ence indus ial policy a he EU le el is
complica ed e en mo e by he ins i u ional sepa a ion
be ween indus ial policies and secu i y and de ence
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.2
1,4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
To al de ense spending
Mili a y equipmen spending
To al de ense spending Mili a y equipmen spendin
g
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
2024
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
2014
2018
2022
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Million eu os
Panze haubi ze
2000 (Ge many)
K9 Thunde
(Sou h Ko ea)
2S22 Bohdana
(Uk aine)
CAESAR a ille y
howi ze (F ance)
Zuzana-2
howi ze
(Slo akia)
RCH-155 sel
p opelled howi ze
(Ge many)
2S19 Ms a-S
(Russia)
M109 (US)
Figu e 3
Concep ualising de ence/mili a y indus ial policy
Sou ce: B uegel.
Secu i y and de ence policy Indus ial policy
De e ence o a oid wa
Mili a y indus ial policy
In e en ions ou side EU
Mili a y suppo Uk aine
Jobs, inno a ion,
g ow h, local
de elopmen
In e economics 2025 | 1
36
Fo um
policies. EU decision-make s a e esponsible o many
aspec s o indus ial policy ulemaking (s a e aid, compe-
i ion, cohesion), o en wi h a signi ican and leading ole
o he Eu opean Commission. Howe e , secu i y and de-
ence policy is la gely a na ional compe ence (Leona d e
al., 2019) and he mos ele an coope a ion amewo k is
and emains NATO.
When i comes o de ining s a egic in e es s in secu i y
and de ence, he EU is a om eaching a clea , sha ed
unde s anding. A he EU le el, he e is some coo dina-
ion and a so-called “s a egic compass” – an ac ion plan
o s eng hen EU secu i y and de ence policy – has been
app o ed (EU Ex e nal Ac ion Se ice, n. d.). Ye , he se-
cu i y in e es s o EU membe s a es a e, and emain, di -
e en . Al hough Russia’s mili a y h ea is g owing, i is
s ill pe cei ed as much less wo ying in some pa s o he
EU han o he s. This lack o sha ed s a egic in e es will
ob iously a ec he wo k o he new Commissione o
De ence and Space and o he High Rep esen a i e o he
Union o Fo eign A ai s and Secu i y Policy.
The EU ea ies make clea ha na ional go e nmen s
la gely e ain he compe ence o indus ial policies and
ma ke -design ques ions in he de ence/secu i y ield. Fo
example, A icle 346 (2) o he T ea y on he Func ioning o
he EU (TFEU; 2012) s ipula es ha
any Membe S a e may ake such measu es as i
conside s necessa y o he p o ec ion o he essen-
ial in e es s o i s secu i y which a e connec ed wi h
he p oduc ion o o ade in a ms, muni ions and wa
ma e ial; such measu es shall no ad e sely a ec he
condi ions o compe i ion in he in e nal ma ke ega d-
ing p oduc s which a e no in ended o speci ically
mili a y pu poses.2
Ne e heless, in p ac ice, he EU is al eady in ol ed a many
le els in de ence ma ke s and de ence coope a ion, and has
been able o o e come poli ical and legal obs acles.
Why Eu ope needs o build i s domes ic de ence
indus ial base
A co e p ac ical ques ion o Eu opean policymake s is he
ex en o which hey wan o a ou Eu opean p oduce s
2 This does no p e en he EU om ha ing a secu i y and de ence
policy, howe e , wi h he TFEU o eseeing in A icle 2(4) ha “The Un-
ion shall ha e compe ence, in acco dance wi h he p o isions o he
T ea y on Eu opean Union, o de ine and implemen a common o -
eign and secu i y policy, including he p og essi e aming o a com-
mon de ence policy”. Ye , he Eu opean de ence s a egy, such as he
s a egic compass, ce ainly does no ca y he same weigh as NATO
o na ional s a egies.
when p ocu ing weapons and ammuni ion a he na ional
le el. The e is a s a egic in e es in building up an indus-
y ha can p o ide well- unc ioning and ull-spec um
a mamen s o he a mies o EU coun ies. Commission
P esiden U sula on de Leyen has p omo ed he sim-
ple p inciple ha on de ence, “Eu ope mus spend mo e,
spend be e , spend Eu opean”, as well as no ing ha he
o hcoming p oposals in he whi e pape on he u u e o
Eu opean de ence should espond o “ he mos ex eme
mili a y con ingencies”, sugges ing ha she endo ses he
pa adigm shi o boos ing domes ic indus ial capaci ies
by assigning o i mili a y p ocu emen and ou pu plan-
ning, in o de o add ess he EU’s unde in es men and
p oduc ion gaps (Eu opean Commission, 2024a).
The basic idea is ha inc easing he demand o weapons
de eloped and p oduced in he EU will s eng hen he Eu-
opean de ence and echnology indus ial base, leading
o g ea e s a egic au onomy. Such a mo e is e en mo e
impo an a a ime when he US mili a y indus ial base
is acing di icul ies in su icien ly amping up p oduc ion.
Jones (2024) a gued ha he wa in Uk aine has shown
he de iciencies o he US de ence indus ial base and
ha he US would no be p epa ed o a con lic in Tai-
wan. Mo eo e , a p e e ence o Eu opean supplie s will
be e en mo e p onounced i NATO comes unde s ain
du ing he second T ump Adminis a ion. Finally, an a gu-
men o a Eu opean p e e ence is ha he mili a y indus-
y can ha e some posi i e inno a ion e ec s on he wide
economy.
Howe e , he e a e h ee impo an coun e a gumen s
agains a Eu ope- i s s a egy. Fi s , a Eu opean p e e -
ence in a ms pu chases migh lead o slowe han nec-
essa y a i al o some c i ical weapon sys ems. Second,
Eu opean p e e ence could also lead o he pu chase o
weapon sys ems ha a e in e io o he bes a ailable
on he wo ld ma ke , especially i he e is no addi ional
g ow h in he indus y. Thi d, Eu opean p e e ence could
esul in paying highe p ices o weapon sys ems ha
could be p oduced mo e cheaply elsewhe e.
Gi en he poli ical e-o ien a ion o he Uni ed S a es un-
de Donald T ump, a build-up o he Eu opean de ence
indus ial base appea s wa an ed. Mo eo e , he e is a
clea p ac ical eason why Eu ope needs o u he boos
i s domes ic indus y: he capaci y limi s o he US indus-
ial base.
To be e unde s and US capaci ies, Bu ilko e al. (2024)
examined speci ically he p oduc ion and sales o wo
majo weapons sys ems ep esen ing high-end capabili-
ies ha a e cen al o NATO and Eu ope’s de e ence o
Russia: Pa io ai de ence missiles and F-35 igh e je s.
ZBW – Leibniz In o ma ion Cen e o Economics 37
Fo um
Russia is a pee compe i o wi h la ge land o ces, a size-
able ai o ce including he mos mode n ( i h gene a-
ion) igh e je s, an in eg a ed ai de ence ne wo k and a
as a senal o long- ange p ecision muni ions (Wol e
al., 2024). High-end capabili ies a e essen ial o NATO
and Eu ope o mee he Russian challenge. Bu ilko e al.
(2024) show ha la ge sha es o US-p oduced weapons,
such as shells o anks and a ille y as well as ai de ence
missiles and hei componen s, a e cu en ly being sold
o Eu ope and Is ael. I T ump wan s o e-calib a e US
de ence sales, o example o inc ease domes ic s ock-
piles o o inc ease supplies o allies in Asia, hen Eu ope
could ace sho ages in a ms a ailabili y. The US o eign
mili a y sales (FMS) da a3 documen s a o al o 1,119 Pa i-
o missiles sold unde i e con ac s since Russia’s in a-
sion o Uk aine in Feb ua y 2022. This numbe is sepa a e
om and does no include all he missiles sen om US
s ockpiles o Uk aine as hese can be p o ided h ough
eme gency aid p ocedu es. Bu ilko e al. (2024) also
show ha deli e y delays o F35 ha e subs an ially gone
up wi h mo e han 90% o deli e ies coming la e in 2023.
Towa ds a join app oach o Eu opean de ence
I has become u gen o mo e beyond he cu en piece-
meal app oach o Eu opean de ence. The o hcoming
whi e pape on he u u e o Eu opean de ence needs o
spell ou how p oduc ion capaci y will be inc eased, how
cos s will be educed, how Eu ope will s eng hen i s main
mili a y- echnological capabili ies and how he necessa y
iscal esou ces will be mobilised. These a e majo ac-
o s in a wa o a i ion such as ha in Uk aine. Wa s o
a i ion a e he no m be ween pee compe i o s, implying
ha he Russian h ea o he EU p esen s he same p ob-
lem se as is cu en ly un olding in Uk aine. The EU whi e
pape will need o ake posi ions on he main ade-o s
and be speci ic o make apid p og ess. The ollowing ele-
men s will be c ucially impo an o achie e hese goals.
Focus on unding o de ence
Achie ing scale and cos e ec i eness equi es unds,
bo h o demand and supply.
On he demand side, he iscal cons ain s aced by Eu-
opean coun ies a ec he c edibili y o go e nmen s’
long- e m commi men s. This is he case wi h Ge many’s
medium- e m budge a y planning o de ence (Wol e
al., 2024) and o he EU coun ies wi hou clea poli ical
3 The da a co e s FMS con ac s since 2008. I es ic s he mili a y
sales ag eemen s o hose signed a e Russia’s in asion o Uk aine
(Feb ua y 2022). See h ps://www.dsca.mil/majo -a ms-sales/a -
chi e-da e.
majo i ies and wi h unce ain budge a y p ospec s (e.g.
F ance and Spain). On na ional unding, iscal ules could
incen i ise deb issuance o pay o de ence spending
bu his could aise deb sus ainabili y conce ns (Pench,
2024).
Exemp ing om iscal limi a ions some spending o EU-
ag eed de ence p io i ies migh be a way o wa d. Ex-
pensi e in es men s wi h EU-wide impac , such as ai
de ence, could be inanced h ough EU deb (S einbach
& Wol , 2024). The deba e on he nex EU budge cycle
( om 2028 in o he mid-2030s) will be an oppo uni y o
p io i ise such in es men s. Fo he EU as a whole, in-
c eases in de ence spending o he nex i e yea s will
ha e o amoun easily o €500 billion i Eu ope wan s o
shed i s dependence on he US secu i y umb ella.
On he supply side, some weapon companies and pa -
icula ly small and medium-sized en e p ises s ill ace
inancing cons ain s (Eu opean Commission, 2024b).
Imp o ing access o inance o hese companies should
be a p io i y. Ins i u ions such as he Eu opean In es men
Bank should econside a cu en p ohibi ion on p o id-
ing inancial suppo o de ence-only p ojec s. This would
also gi e a posi i e signal on de ence in es men o he
o e all inancial sec o (D aghi, 2024). Mo e b oadly, he
nega i e s igma ha de ence companies a e s ill con-
on ed wi h among in es o s and ci il socie y needs o
be p io i ised, so ha unding can each no only he big
de ence companies bu also mid-sized companies and
s a -ups, which a e essen ial o inno a ion and he mass
p oduc ion o d ones, coun e -d one sys ems and elec-
onic-wa a e and in elligence-ga he ing solu ions.
Push back agains economic na ionalism while
add essing secu i y conce ns
We ecommend he mo e-in eg a ed ma ke s app oach
a he han a wa economy. Ma ke s end o be mo e e i-
cien han go e nmen s in alloca ing esou ces, wi h go -
e nmen s ha ing a clea ole o play add essing ma ke
ailu es. Howe e , achie ing ma ke in eg a ion is di icul .
I is ha d o limi he scope o economic na ionalism in
he EU because he EU ea ies (A icle 346(2) TFEU) ex-
plici ly allow coun ies o de ia e om single ma ke ules
o secu i y easons. To enable g ea e ma ke in eg a ion,
legi ima e secu i y conce ns need o be add essed, o
example h ough secu i y ea ies among majo p oduce
coun ies, es ablishing igh s and sa egua ds.
Fos e ing a poli ical ag eemen among key coun ies o
inc ease join pu chases, possibly wi h pooled unds, is
necessa y o educe unwa an ed na ional biases in mili-
a y p ocu emen . While he e ha e been EU-le el e o s
In e economics 2025 | 1
38
Fo um
on join p ocu emen ( he Eu opean De ence Indus y Re-
in o cemen h ough common P ocu emen Ac , EDIRPA),
hese a e a he small. The EDIRPA budge o example
was se a €310 million, which is minimal, e en compa ed
o he app oxima ely €25 billion in equipmen p ocu e-
men by Ge many in 2024. The Ma ch 2024 Eu opean
De ence Indus ial S a egy p oposal looks se o ace
simila inancial cons ain s (Wol , 2024). Na ional p o-
cu emen o ices will issue di e en speci ica ions e en
o he same basic p oduc . Beyond he e o m o na ional
p ocu emen o ices, mo e join EU p ocu emen , o ex-
ample h ough he Eu opean De ence Agency, could lead
o g ea e ma ke in eg a ion.
Mo eo e , despi e being a global s anda d-se e , he
EU plays no ole in s anda ds o weapons. As a conse-
quence, weapons p oduc ion is agmen ed and mo e ex-
pensi e han necessa y and in e ope abili y is low, com-
plica ing logis ics and unde mining comba e ec i eness.
EU coun ies ha e p o ided Uk aine wi h en di e en
howi ze ypes and cu en ly manu ac u e i e di e en
e sions e sus only one in he US (D aghi, 2024). While
NATO has es ablished s anda disa ion ag eemen s o a -
ille y, hese a e clea ly no en o ced. En o cemen by he
EU o NATO s anda disa ion ag eemen s in EU coun ies
could hus u he con ibu e o ma ke in eg a ion.
F agmen ed EU expo ules could unde mine ma ke in-
eg a ion.4 Cu en ules on a ms- ela ed expo s, bo h
wi hin and ou side he EU, would bene i om mo e solid
legal unde pinning in a di ec i e o egula ion wi h ans-
posi ion da es and/o en o cemen ools. This would en-
su e e ec i e s anda disa ion and g ea e alignmen o
na ional policies. To accoun o he isks ela ed o weak-
e e hical conside a ions while s anda dising expo ules,
pos -shipmen onsi e inspec ions (B omley e al., 2022)
en o ced by an EU agency could gua an ee a le el playing
ield ac oss EU coun ies.
Towa ds “in elligen Eu opean p e e ence” o mo e in-
no a ion and s a egic au onomy
The EU should a oid p ocu ing only Eu opean, bu he e a e
s a egic jus i ica ions o mo e p ocu emen om esiden
i ms.5 Such “in elligen Eu opean p e e ence“ can inc ease
indus y capabili ies and os e inno a ion while ein o cing
s a egic au onomy,6 bu i needs o accoun o compa a-
i e ad an ages and disad an ages. Fo some p oduc s,
4 Rules on expo s o Is ael o Saudi A abia highligh how such na ional
ules a e some imes used delibe a ely o poli ical pu poses and ex-
po p omo ion. Ha monised ules a he EU le el appea s he only
way o o e come such incen i es.
5 See, e.g. Calca a e al. (2023) o an academic discussion.
6 See, e.g. Ca e ley and Kaps ein (2023).
cheap and scaled-up p oduc ion emains o pa amoun im-
po ance (e.g. a ille y shells o Uk aine). P ocu ing a ms
om hi d coun ies emains pe ec ly easonable, espe-
cially i he secu i y o supply is high and in e ope abili y
wi h Eu opean sys ems can be easonably gua an eed.
Uk aine and i s de ence indus ial base a e o g ea im-
po ance o he EU de ence s a egy and could be ans-
o ma i e o he EU’s mili a y indus ial capaci y. Fo
many p oduc s, Uk aine is he cheapes p oduce , and
is also he mos inno a i e and ad anced (e.g. mode n
d one wa a e). The UK should also be conside ed an in-
eg al pa ne o he Eu opean de ence indus ial base.
Finally, as long as he EU emains dependen on he US
secu i y gua an ee, i needs o ca e ully calib a e how
building i s own de ence indus ial base will impac US
poli ical pe cep ions.
Supply chain secu i y
The EU could play a ole in secu ing de ence supply chains
by egula ly moni o ing and assessing isks o o e -de-
pendency. Since he s a o he wa in Uk aine, he Eu o-
pean Commission has disco e ed signi ican ulne abili-
ies, o example, in ela ion o he secu i y o he supply o
explosi es and p opellan s. I would be a na u al ole o he
EU o issue ale s on limi s in p oduc ion capaci ies. The
EU is awa e o he impo ance o assessing secu i y isks,
such as hose o dual-use echnologies. The EU economic
secu i y s a egy, o example, se s ou c i ical echnology
a eas and eques s isk assessmen s om membe s a es
(Eu opean Commission, 2023a, 2023b). The e exis , how-
e e , challenges in add essing hese issues (Chimi s e al.,
2024). Some o he compe ences equi ed emain a he
na ional le el – o ins ance, o eign policy esponsibili y –
making a common and e ec i e esponse mo e di icul .
Re e ences
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