Bu ke-Whi e, William; Williams, Benjamin Gwyn
Wo king Pape
Geopoli ical ambi ions and ule con es a ions in space
go e nance
CIGI Pape s, No. 317
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Cen e o In e na ional Go e nance Inno a ion (CIGI), Wa e loo, On a io
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Bu ke-Whi e, William; Williams, Benjamin Gwyn (2025) : Geopoli ical ambi ions
and ule con es a ions in space go e nance, CIGI Pape s, No. 317, Cen e o In e na ional
Go e nance Inno a ion (CIGI), Wa e loo (On a io)
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CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025
Geopoli ical Ambi ions
and Rule Con es a ions
in Space Go e nance
William Bu ke-Whi e and
Benjamin Gwyn Williams
CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025
Geopoli ical Ambi ions
and Rule Con es a ions
in Space Go e nance
William Bu ke-Whi e and
Benjamin Gwyn Williams
Abou CIGI
The Cen e o In e na ional Go e nance Inno a ion (CIGI) is an independen ,
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in Wa e loo, Canada, CIGI has ecei ed suppo om he Go e nmen o
Canada, he Go e nmen o On a io and ounde Jim Balsillie.
À p opos du CIGI
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du Canada, du gou e nemen de l’On a io e de son onda eu , Jim Balsillie.
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Table o Con en s
i Abou he Au ho s
i Ac onyms and Abb e ia ions
1 Execu i e Summa y
1 In oduc ion
3 The Exis ing F amewo k o Space Go e nance
10 Di e ging S a egies o Space Go e nance
17 The Road Ahead
19 Wo ks Ci ed
i CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
Abou he Au ho s
William (Bill) Bu ke-Whi e is a CIGI senio ellow,
an in e na ional lawye and a poli ical scien is . He
is a leading expe on US o eign policy, mul ila e al
ins i u ions and in e na ional law. He esea ches
and w i es on he ela ionships be ween law and
poli ics in in e na ional a ai s and has expe ise
on he design and implemen a ion o complex
global go e nance solu ions ha in ol e mul iple
coun ies, in e na ional ins i u ions and mul ila e al
legal egimes. He has signi ican egional expe ise
on Russia, Eas e n Eu ope and La in Ame ica.
F om 2014 o 2019, Bill se ed as he inaugu al
di ec o o Pe y Wo ld House, he Uni e si y o
Pennsyl ania’s in e disciplina y in e na ional
a ai s ins i u e. Building Pe y Wo ld House
om he g ound up, Bill es ablished a cu ing-
edge policy hink ank embedded wi hin Penn’s
academic communi y and ec ui ed s a , acul y
and isi ing policy ellows om ac oss he globe.
F om 2011 o 2014, he se ed as he depu y dean o
he Uni e si y o Pennsyl ania Ca ey Law School.
He holds bo h a bachelo ’s and law deg ee om
Ha a d Uni e si y, and a doc o a e in in e na ional
ela ions om he Uni e si y o Camb idge, whe e
he was a Fulb igh Schola . He has se ed as isi ing
p o esso a he Heb ew Uni e si y o Je usalem,
Ha a d Law School, he Moscow S a e Ins i u e o
In e na ional Rela ions and Mo id Uni e si y in I an.
Benjamin (Ben) Williams is an associa e in
in e na ional a bi a ion a Wilme Cu le
Picke ing Hale and Do LLP in London, England.
P e iously, he was Thou on Fellow a he Uni e si y
o Pennsyl ania Ca ey School o Law, whe e he
comple ed an LLM deg ee. He p e iously p ac ised
in e na ional dispu e law a Clea y Glo lieb
S ein & Hamil on in London. He holds a mas e ’s
deg ee om he Uni e si y o Camb idge and a
bachelo ’s deg ee om Du ham Uni e si y.
Ac onyms and
Abb e ia ions
BDS BeiDou Posi ioning and
Na iga ion Sys em
CCP Chinese Communis Pa y
DoD Depa men o De ense
ESA Eu opean Space Agency
GPS Global Posi ioning Sys em
ILRS In e na ional Luna Resea ch S a ion
ISO In e na ional O ganiza ion
o S anda diza ion
ISS In e na ional Space S a ion
NASA Na ional Ae onau ics and
Space Adminis a ion
OST Ou e Space T ea y
PRC People’s Republic o China
SSA space si ua ional awa eness
STM space a ic managemen
UNGA Uni ed Na ions Gene al Assembly
USSR Union o So ie Socialis Republics
1Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
Execu i e Summa y
Du ing he Cold Wa , space explo a ion se ed
as a o um o global powe s o compe e agains
one ano he in a ace o knowledge, powe
and p es ige. Space go e nance — he se ing
o in e na ional ules on echnology, secu i y
and accoun abili y—acco dingly became a
hea ily con es ed issue. In d a ing ag eemen s
and ounding ins i u ions, key playe s sough
o display hei diploma ic p owess and ha e
a hand in c ea ing he “ ules o he game.”
This pape conside s how space go e nance
amewo ks — la gely unchanged since he
1980s— a e likely o a e in mode n imes. The
pape maps he cu en go e nance landscape,
be o e analyzing ecen de elopmen s in he space
policies o he Uni ed S a es, he People’s Republic
o China (PRC) and he Russian Fede a ion. In doing
so, he au ho s a gue ha exis ing go e nance
sys ems a e no longe i o pu pose. Ins ead, eal
change is necessa y o accoun o he comme cial,
echnological and mili a y in e es s ha a e
eme ging in andem wi h a new geopoli ical o de .
The pape concludes wi h ecommenda ions and
iden i ies oppo uni ies o global powe s o de elop
a e ised and mos obus go e nance egime.
In oduc ion
Wi h he launch o Spu nik in 1957, space
explo a ion became he new on ie o esea che s
and scien is s wo ldwide. As coun ies compe ed
o secu e esou ces and de elop echnology,
he challenge also ook on a decidedly poli ical
dimension. Agains he backd op o he Cold Wa ,
he Uni ed S a es and he So ie Union came o see
ambi ious space p og ams as a i al componen
o na ional iden i y and na ional secu i y. Bu
mo e b oadly, he no el y o space explo a ion
also p esen ed an oppo uni y o coun ies o
asse hemsel es in a ield en i ely un egula ed
by in e na ional no ms. Acco dingly, he “Space
Race” became no only he de ining scien i ic
unde aking o a gene a ion, bu also a high-p o ile,
seemingly neu al o um in which ideologically
opposed powe s could es hei s eng hs and
app oaches o go e nance (Kha chenko 2007).
In he almos 70 yea s ha ha e ollowed, small
s eps and gian leaps alike ha e been aken o
ealize he scien i ic po en ial and geopoli ical
signi icance o ou e space. In addi ion o
a o ding a be e unde s anding o he uni e se,
space-based echnologies ha e ans o med ou
knowledge o Ea h, guided esea ch on wa e
cycles and ai quali y and p o ided aluable
in o ma ion on en i onmen al sus ainabili y.1
Sa elli e echnology has also shaped he
de elopmen o comme cial in e es s in a wide
ange o indus ies, including elecommunica ions,
na iga ion, ene gy and a ming (Elle beck 2022).
E en in some less con en ional applica ions,
space has come o ha e a signi ican impac .
Fo example, in he medical sphe e, esea ch
conduc ed in space has aided ou unde s anding
and ea men o Alzheime ’s disease, cance and
os eopo osis, among o he condi ions (Space
S a ion Resea ch In eg a ion O ice 2022).
On a geopoli ical le el, oo, space explo a ion
has con inued o play a signi ican ole, bo h
in ideological compe i ion and especially in
in e na ional secu i y. Sa elli e na iga ion
sys ems— such as he Uni ed S a es’ Global
Posi ioning Sys em (GPS) and Russia’s Global
Na iga ion Sa elli e Sys em — p o ide posi ioning
and a ge in o ma ion o mili a y use s a ound
he wo ld. Sa elli e image y echnology simila ly
p o ides c i ical in o ma ion o na ional
in elligence agencies, and he enewed es ing o
di ec ascen , kine ic ene gy an i-sa elli e weapons
signi ies ha space will likely d i e inno a ion
in mode n wa a e and may see new o ms o
mili a y con lic (S a ling-Daniels and Massa 2024).
While his elemen o he Space Race be ween he
Uni ed S a es and Russia pe sis s, new challenge s
ha e en e ed his con es , and he cou se o
he ace o knowledge, powe and p es ige is
apidly shi ing. The all o he So ie Union in
he ea ly 1990s g ea ly diminished Russia’s space
explo a ion capaci y. Despi e a b ie esu gence
o Russian in luence in he ea ly 2000s, economic
malaise, a wa o agg ession wi h Uk aine and
coo dina ed economic sanc ions ha e limi ed
Russia’s domes ic space p og am and na owed i s
ocus o mili a y applica ions (Fous 2023). Bo h he
PRC and India ha e eme ged as new con ende s
o ac ion and in luence, ha ing inc eased hei
go e nmen spending on mili a y and ci il
1 Seewww.unoosa.o g/oosa/en/bene i s-o -space/en i onmen .h ml.
2CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
space p og ams by 23 pe cen and 36 pe cen ,
espec i ely, in he pas yea ( he Uni ed S a es
is a 18 pe cen , o e e ence) (Space Founda ion
2022). The PRC, in pa icula , has inc eased he
pace o i s space p og am d ama ically; hough
he coun y is only esponsible o a ound 1,000
o he 7,500 sa elli es cu en ly in o bi , i is
p ojec ed o launch an addi ional 26,000 sa elli es
by 2029 o i al he US company SpaceX, which
has p ojec ed he use o a simila numbe o
sa elli es as pa o i s S a Link ini ia i e.
Wi h Russian in luence ading as he PRC and
India ha e assumed mo e isible oles, he Uni ed
S a es has shi ed i s app oach om managed
compe i ion wi h Russia o an asse ion o
global dominance in space capabili ies. To da e,
he as majo i y o sa elli e ac i i ies in space
a e he esul o Ame ican p og ams, and since
he ini ial g ound-b eaking achie emen s o
he USSR in he la e 1950s and ea ly 1960s, he
Uni ed S a es has gene ally led space- ela ed
scien i ic inno a ion. None heless, he pas 20
yea s ha e seen he Uni ed S a es pi o away
om go e nmen -sponso ed ac i i y and owa d
p i a e en e p ises de eloping and deploying space
esou ces. Unde he Obama adminis a ion, he
Uni ed S a es op ed agains a Na ional Ae onau ics
and Space Adminis a ion (NASA)-enginee ed
space shu le successo in a ou o comme cially
con ac ed c ewed launches (Ma son 2010).
The esul ing Comme cial C ew P og am ook
nea ly a decade o p oduce a successo o he
space shu le; howe e , he long- e m esul has
been a massi e educ ion in he cos o payload
deploymen (H. W. Jones 2018). The launch cos
o he p i a ely de eloped Falcon X is oughly
one- hi d o ha equi ed o he nex cheapes
pla o m, he Russian Soyuz launch ehicle (ibid.).
This cu en ly un i alled space capaci y has pu
he Uni ed S a es in a cen al posi ion no only
o domina e space esou ces bu also o shape
he no ms and ins i u ions go e ning space.
Ye , despi e ema kable scien i ic achie emen and
he ise o geopoli ical ensions, space go e nance
has seen e y li le change since he Cold Wa .
As is se ou in g ea e de ail below, he cu en
go e nance amewo k o space-based ac i i y
can be aced o a small numbe o ea ies signed
in he 1960s and 1970s, when space s ill seemed
mo e a sphe e o p es ige han one whe e powe
and in e na ional coope a ion we e iable. These
ea ly ag eemen s include, mos no ably, he Ou e
Space T ea y (OST) o 1967,2 which p o ides b oad
p inciples o guide na ional space p og ams. Fo
example, co e p inciples in he OST include ha
space explo a ion ough o be conduc ed peace ully,
in he spi i o in e na ional coope a ion and
o he bene i o humankind as a whole. O he
ea ies adop ed du ing his pe iod p o ide baseline
ules and p inciples o speci ic aspec s o space
explo a ion, including he sa e e u n o as onau s
om space, he egis a ion o space-based objec s
and s a e esponsibili y o damage caused by
deo bi ing space objec s on hei e u n o Ea h.
S a ing in he 1980s, an e a o mul ila e al ea y
making came o an end. Indeed, since ha ime,
while membe s o he in e na ional communi y
ha e en e ed in o ag eemen s ega ding speci ic
space p ojec s ( o example, he cons uc ion
and ope a ion o he In e na ional Space
S a ion [ISS] and, mo e ecen ly, he A emis
Acco ds), he e has been no de elopmen o he
mul ila e al ea y egime p o iding no ms and
ules o space go e nance. As echnologies ha e
imp o ed, new playe s ha e en e ed he scene,
and new space- ela ed na ional in e es s ha e
been iden i ied. S agna ion in no m-se ing has
esul ed in a shockingly unde de eloped se o
ules o go e ning human ac i i ies in space.
Agains his echnological, poli ical and
go e nance backg ound, signi ican gaps ha e
eme ged in he exis ing in e na ional legal ules
o space go e nance ha mus be add essed i
con lic among g ea powe s is o be managed
and coope a ion acili a ed. The Uni ed S a es,
Russia and he PRC ha e each iden i ied co e
na ional in e es s in space and de eloped dis inc
s a egic app oaches o ill hese go e nance
gaps. Unde de eloped legal ules, combined
wi h compe i ion o shape he u u e con en
o hose ules, a e a ecipe o con lic . Bo h
he ins i u ional s uc u es and subs an i e
legal egimes o space go e nance will p o e
consequen ial o g ea -powe con es a ion and
he e ec i e use o space esou ces in he yea s
ahead. To ha end, bo h enewed a en ion
and a new app oach owa d in e na ional
space go e nance a e u gen ly needed.
2 T ea y on P inciples Go e ning he Ac i i ies o S a es in he Explo a ion
and Use o Ou e Space, including he Moon and O he Celes ial
Bodies, 27 Janua y 1967, Res 2222 (XXI), UNTS 610 (en e ed in o o ce
10 Oc obe 1967) [OST], online: <www.unoosa.o g/oosa/en/ou wo k/
spacelaw/ ea ies/in oou e space ea y.h ml>.
9Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
include, o example, sa elli es such as he US
SOLRAD sys em, commonly used o s udy X- ays
and sola ac i i ies bu capable o in e cep ing
adio wa es (delle Fa e 2023). S a es ha e aken
adically di e en app oaches o how hese
dual-use echnologies should be egula ed, as
well as he in o ma ion ha should be p o ided
o he in e na ional communi y abou hem.
In addi ion, he ex en o go e nmen monopoly
o e space p og ams e sus he au onomy o
p i a e ac o s in space has become inc easingly
con es ed. Du ing he o iginal d a ing o he
OST, he Uni ed S a es and he USSR we e deeply
di ided on he app op ia e ole o p i a e ac o s
in space ac i i ies, he con ol o space-based
esou ces and he comme cial use o space. While
many o hese issues we e ne e ully esol ed,
So ie delega es insis ed on OST p o isions ha
s ipula ed di ec s a e esponsibili y o space
ac i i ies unde aken by associa ed p i a e en i ies.
This “p i a e ac i i y bu public esponsibili y”
comp omise emains in place oday (Hobe,
Schmid -Tedd and Sch ogl 2015). Mo e ecen ly, he
Uni ed S a es has es ablished a e y pe missi e
domes ic legal egime o p i a e ac ion in space
and appea s o be seeking o in e na ionalize ha
app oach. In con as , he PRC’s e e -inc easing
in es men s in space ha e been di ec ed p ima ily
h ough a s a e-go e ned p og am in ended o
ensu e so e eign con ol o space p og ams.
Finally, on a s uc u al le el, deba es — bo h
exp essed and implied — pe sis o e he o ms and
ins i u ions o space go e nance. The iews o g ea
powe s di e ge as o whe he space explo a ion
should be go e ned by a g adually e ol ing se ies
o non-binding p inciples and no ms, o whe he
he in e na ional communi y should ins ead look
o ein o ce he mul ila e al ea y a chi ec u e, a
dicho omy ha o e simpli ies he si ua ion (Uni ed
Na ions 2023). The e a e eal conce ns wi h bo h
app oaches. Speci ic echnical and na ow ea y
ules may no p oduce consensus o may become
ou da ed e en be o e hey en e in o o ce. A
na u al c ys alliza ion o ules h ough e ol ing
s a e p ac ice and opinio ju is may be he mos
e ec i e no m-c ea ion mechanisms in a ield
e ol ing so apidly (ibid.). Ye he de elopmen o
ules h ough g adual e olu ion may p e e ence
he in e es s o pa icula ly ac i e coun ies,
ne e gene a e unambiguous and en o ceable
legal doc ines, and inc ease he po en ial o
con inuing no m con es a ion o e ime (ibid.).
Sha ed In e es s and
Possibili ies o Collabo a ion
E en in ligh o ising g ea -powe compe i ion,
sha ed use o he space domain gene a es
common in e es s o many s a es, a ound which
coope a ion appea s bo h necessa y and po en ially
ui ul. Common in e es s may d i e oppo uni ies
o collabo a ion ac oss a numbe o issues,
including he acking o in e na ional ac i i ies,
o e sigh mechanisms, accoun abili y o acciden s
and he managemen o en i onmen al ha ms.
E en among space i als, he managemen o
space deb is is a p essing a ea o common in e es .
Schola s and go e nmen o icials alike conside
space deb is — any o m o human-made ma e ial
in space no se ing a p oduc i e pu pose10 —
o be he mos signi ican h ea o he space
en i onmen .11 The conce n is well ounded.
E en i no addi ional objec s we e launched in o
space, he cu en numbe o abandoned, inac i e
sa elli es and o he space deb is makes collisions
be ween space objec s ine i able (Uni ed Na ions
2023b). As his deb is con inues o o bi , he a e
o collision becomes e e g ea e and, wi hou
in e en ion, will esul in an impassable a ay o
deb is.12 Ul ima ely, i ge ing ou side he deb is
bel becomes impossible, space access i sel
may be denied. Space deb is also p esen s o he
secu i y h ea s. An un acked, un egula ed body
o space objec s c ea es ipe oppo uni ies o
co e sa elli es o weapon sys ems o hide wi hin
hese deb is ields (Imbu gia 2011). Inc easingly
dense bands o space deb is also ha e he
po en ial o dis up imaging, communica ions
and mili a y in elligence sa elli es (ibid.).
Rela ed o he space junk p oblem, he inc easing
numbe o space objec s aises he impo ance o
space si ua ional awa eness (SSA) da a ha eco ds
ac i i ies in space and he mo emen s o space
objec s (Kennewell and Vo 2013). Scien is s acking
space objec s ha e aised conce ns a ound he
lack o a ailable in o ma ion on hese objec s and
he impo ance o access o SSA da a in a oiding
collisions in an e e -mo e-c owded nea -Ea h
10 See www.esa.in /Space_Sa e y/Space_Deb is/Abou _space_deb is.
11 Reducing space h ea s h ough no ms, ules and p inciples o
esponsible beha iou s, UNGAOR, 76 h Sess, Supp No 99/d, UN Doc
A/76/50 (2021).
12 See www.spacesa e ymagazine.com/space-deb is/kessle -synd ome/.
10 CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
o bi .13 An e ec i e SSA ne wo k equi es eadily
a ailable, accu a e in o ma ion on he whe eabou s
and ajec o ies o space objec s, which, in u n,
equi es s anda ds o he egis a ion and acking
o hese objec s. Despi e gene al ules se ou in he
Regis a ion T ea y, he collec ion o egis a ion
and acking in o ma ion has been inconsis en
ac oss coun ies and ha da a is o en sha ed
only h ough bila e al, a he han mul ila e al,
mechanisms (Hi chens 2023). These da a gaps c ea e
disc epancies be ween in o ma ion ha is a ailable
o di e en coun ies, he eby inc easing he isks
o nea -Ea h-o bi collisions. Fo example, he e
a e signi ican di e ences in he da a measu ed,
eco ded and sha ed by he US S a egic Command
Space Su eillance Ne wo k, he ESA’s SSA p og am
and he Russian Mili a y Space Su eillance
Ne wo k. All space-ac i e coun ies would be be e
o wi h mo e anspa ency and da a sha ing.
O he mechanisms o ensu ing he sa e y and
sus ainabili y o objec s in o bi also “p esen
e y eal po en ial o collabo a ion.”14 Such
measu es, e med space a ic managemen (STM),
ypically build on he da a collec ed as pa o
SSA acking ini ia i es, bu go a s ep u he in
se ing ou conc e e ac ion plans o p omo ing
he sa e ope a ion and, whe e applicable, e u n
o space objec s om o bi . These include sa e y
and sus ainabili y s anda ds o all space-based
ac i i ies. Again, STM is oo ed in ea ies om
he 1960s and 1970s, which, gi en he Cold Wa
ocus on manned space ligh , was conce ned
p ima ily wi h he sa e e u n o as onau s.
Today, despi e sha ed in e es s, he lack o a
comp ehensi e and binding legal amewo k
go e ning STM leads o signi ican a ia ion in
na ional STM p ac ices (Ba bano 2022). Cu en ly,
he Uni ed S a es is he only coun y o ha e
adop ed a o mal STM amewo k o i s na ional
ac i i ies.15 The e may well be oppo uni ies o
he ha moniza ion o STM and he de elopmen o
new no ms ha ex end beyond “me e knowledge
o objec s in o bi ” o exp essly add ess sa e y and
sus ainabili y p inciples (Sada and Siegel 2022).
13 US, Space Si ua ional Awa eness: Key Issues in an E ol ing Landscape,
116 h Cong, 2020, online: <www.cong ess.go /e en /116 h-cong ess/
house-e en /LC65655/ ex ?s=1& =9>.
14 Seeh ps://de ence-indus y-space.ec.eu opa.eu/eu-space/space- a ic-
managemen _en.
15 Ibid.
Di e ging S a egies o
Space Go e nance
While he Cold Wa e a was de ined by ie ce
compe i ion be ween he Uni ed S a es and he
USSR on many on s, a leas in he ealm o
space go e nance, bo h coun ies we e b oadly
commi ed o a sha ed mul ila e al p ocess o he
de elopmen and ins i u ionaliza ion o no ms and
ules unde he auspices o he Uni ed Na ions.
This sha ed app oach o go e nance — i no o
he ules hemsel es — bounded compe i ion
and c ea ed common g ound on which non-
o e lapping in e es s could be ad anced. Today,
howe e , h ee g ea powe s — he Uni ed
S a es, he PRC and Russia — as well as se e al
o he in e es ed s a es, such as he Eu opean
Union, India and Japan — a e con es ing bo h
he app op ia e ules o ou e space and he
go e nance ins i u ions h ough which hose
ules a e de eloped and implemen ed. This new
con ex lacks gua d ails o manage compe i ion
o o - amps o de-escala e con lic s ha may
a ise. Wi h key powe s ha ing a es ed in e es in
bo h he ules and p ocess o space go e nance,
he e is a signi ican dange ha unbounded
compe i ion could po en ially lead o con lic .
The Uni ed S a es
US space s a egy has bo h a subs an i e
and s uc u al objec i e. Subs an i ely, he
Uni ed S a es seeks o p omo e he ole o
p i a e ac o s in space ac i i ies, ou sou cing
adi ionally so e eign unc ions o key p i a e
pa ne s. S uc u ally, he Uni ed S a es seeks
o le e age i s exis ing dominance in o de
o en ench go e nance no ms and ules ha
a ou US in e es s be o e compe i o s can
en ench ules ha sui hei own in e es s.
These US objec i es ook oo du ing he decline
o he So ie Union in he 1990s. F om ha poin
onwa d, he Uni ed S a es has ound i sel in a
posi ion o p imacy in space ac i i y and, hough
imes ha e changed, he coun y has la gely
main ained his dominance. As o May2022, he
Uni ed S a es is esponsible o nea ly 63 pe cen
o all sa elli es cu en ly in o bi and, as home
o SpaceX, is p ojec ed o con inue o bene i
om his imbalance in he immedia e u u e
(Buchholz 2023; Lip on and Ba ba o 2024). In
11Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
ecen yea s, he Uni ed S a es has a icula ed
i s app oach o space go e nance in h ee key
documen s: he 2020 Na ional Space Policy
(Execu i e O ice o he P esiden 2020), he
2021 Uni ed S a es Space P io i ies F amewo k
(The Whi e House 2021) and he 2022 Na ional
Secu i y S a egy (The Whi e House 2022). No ably,
hese domes ic ins umen s ha e allowed he
Uni ed S a es o ame i s own app oaches
unbu dened by mul ila e al amewo ks.
The 2020 Na ional Space Policy makes clea he
US p io i iza ion o comme cial ac o s in space: “A
obus , inno a i e, and compe i i e comme cial
space sec o is he sou ce o con inued p og ess
and sus ained Uni ed S a es leade ship in
space. The Uni ed S a es emains commi ed o
encou aging and acili a ing he con inued g ow h
o a domes ic comme cial space sec o ha is
globally compe i i e, suppo s na ional in e es s,
and ad ances Uni ed S a es leade ship in he
gene a ion o new ma ke s and inno a ion-d i en
en ep eneu ship” (Execu i e O ice o he P esiden
2020). Indeed, he policy makes he p omo ion o
comme cial in e es s he p ima y US goal: “[Goal
1: The Uni ed S a es shall] p omo e and incen i ize
p i a e indus y o acili a e he c ea ion o new
global and domes ic ma ke s o Uni ed S a es
space goods and se ices, and s eng hen and
p ese e he posi ion o he Uni ed S a es as he
global pa ne o choice o in e na ional space
comme ce” (ibid.). The 2020 Na ional Space Policy,
along wi h hese o he s a emen s, has allowed
he Uni ed S a es o ame a long-s anding p io i y
ha ne e gained signi ican ac ion in he
con ex o he OST: p i a e, comme cial space
ac i i y. Fo example, US suppo o p i a e
ac i i y in space p omp ed a “hea ed deba e”
(Hobe, Schmid -Tedd and Sch ogl 2015) du ing
he nego ia ions o he OST. The esul was he
inclusion o p o isions in he OST ha p o ided
some acknowledgemen o a ole o p i a e ac o s
in space p ojec s: a icle VI o he OST and a icles I
and II o he Liabili y Con en ion en isage p i a e
ac o s engaging in space ac i i ies, ensu ing
s ic liabili y and imposing s ong esponsibili y
obliga ions on hos s a es.16 Ye , in he OST, hese
16 In pa icula , a icle VI o he OST p o ides: “S a es Pa ies o he T ea y
shall bea in e na ional esponsibili y o na ional ac i i ies in ou e space,
including he moon and o he celes ial bodies, whe he such ac i i ies a e
ca ied on by go e nmen al agencies o by non-go e nmen al en i ies,
and o assu ing ha na ional ac i i ies a e ca ied ou in con o mi y
wi h he p o isions se o h in he p esen T ea y.” A icles I and II o he
Liabili yCon en ion ea i m hisposi ion.See OST, sup a no e 2, a VI.
p i a e ac o s ob iously we e o play a seconda y
ole o na ional go e nmen s, and hei igh s
and obliga ions we e ne e clea ly de ined.
The US commi men o p i a e space ac i i ies has
g own e e mo e p ominen as comme cializa ion
has become inancially p o i able. F om he
ea ly 2000s, businesses ha e been explo ing he
possibili y o mining and ec ea ional en u es
in space and ha e epea edly called o g ea e
go e nmen suppo (Shae 2016). The inancial
esou ces a ailable o hese p i a e en i ies ha e
also p o en o be a powe ul incen i e: SpaceX
is es ima ed o ha e gene a ed a e enue o
US$4.6billion om i s space p ojec s in 2022 alone,17
while Boeing’s e enue ac oss i s space, ae onau ics
and de ence di isions is alued a US$22.3 billion
o he same pe iod.18 In 2015, lobbying e o s by
in e es ed business pa ies spu ed he passage
o Ti le IV o he Comme cial Space Launch
Compe i i eness Ac , pu suan o which US
ci izens a e en i led o own, use and sell esou ces
ob ained in he cou se o space eco e y ope a ions
(T onche i 2016). This is a clea case whe e
mul ila e al ea y amewo ks a e challenged by
US na ional ac ion. The US acknowledgemen o
p i a e p ope y igh s o e space-based esou ces
in domes ic law appea s p ima acie o un coun e
o a icle II o he OST (O’B ien 2020a), which
p o ides ha “ou e space, including he moon and
o he celes ial bodies, is no subjec o na ional
app op ia ion by claim o so e eign y, by means
o use o occupa ion, o by any o he means.”19
The 2020 US policy documen ein o ces he US
commi men o c ea ing oom o p i a e ac o s
o pu sue comme cial oppo uni ies in space by
exp essly making hem he p ima y means o
US space e o s. In a sec ion i led “Comme cial
Space Guidelines,” he policy ins uc s heads o
17 See h ps://sac a.com/c/spacex/#:~: ex =Click%20he e%20 o %20
ou %20SpaceX, o%20%244.6B%20in%202022.
18 See www.boeing.com/company/abou -bds#ancho 1.
19 This ex amoun s o he ull language o a icle II o he OST and is
suppo ed u he by he ex o a icle I, which eads: “The explo a ion
and use o ou e space, including he moon and o he celes ial bodies,
shallbeca iedou o hebene i andin hein e es so allcoun ies,
i espec i eo hei deg eeo economico scien i icde elopmen ,and
shall be he p o ince o all mankind. Ou e space, including he moon
and o he celes ial bodies, shall be ee o explo a ion and use by all
S a es wi hou disc imina ion o any kind, on a basis o equali y and in
acco dance wi h in e na ional law, and he e shall be ee access o all
a easo celes ialbodies.The eshallbe eedomo scien i icin es iga ion
in ou e space, including he moon and o he celes ial bodies, and
S a es shall acili a e and encou age in e na ional co-ope a ion in such
in es iga ion.” See OST, sup a no e 2, a I.
12 CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
go e nmen agencies o “de elop Go e nmen
space sys ems only when in he na ional
in e es and no sui able o cos -e ec i e
Uni ed S a es comme cial o , as app op ia e,
in e na ional comme cial capabili y o se ice
is a ailable o could be a ailable in ime o
mee Go e nmen equi emen s” (Execu i e
O ice o he P esiden 2020). In line wi h his
s a egy, he US go e nmen has in eg a ed
p i a e en i ies in o i s SSA amewo k. Fo
example, he Depa men o De ense (DoD) is
explo ing he use o SSA da a om comme cial
companies, which can p o ide senso co e age
in poli ically sensi i e o inaccessible egions
and ack smalle objec s han DoD senso s.
Today, NASA undamen ally elies on p i a e
companies o space missions (Ba dan 2024).
Tu ning om subs ance o s uc u e, while
he Uni ed S a es o en leads he de elopmen
o space no ms h ough domes ic legal and
egula o y p ocesses, i also seeks o le e age
i s exis ing dominance o in e na ionalize hose
no ms. No ably, i has done so no h ough
adi ional mul ila e al amewo ks, bu a he
h ough minila e al ag eemen s and olun a y
commi men s. The Uni ed S a es has sough
o globalize i s own app oaches in se e al key
a eas, including an i-sa elli e es ing and he
c ea ion o in e na ional SSA amewo ks. The
Uni ed S a es was he i s coun y o commi
o e ain om an i-sa elli e missile es ing,
ollowing Russia’s con o e sial an i-sa elli e
missile es in No embe 2021. A he behes o
he Uni ed S a es, o he coun ies ha e ollowed
sui , including Canada. The Uni ed S a es emains
open o wo king mo e b oadly wi h a ange o
pa ne s, pa icula ly when i is in a posi ion
o shape he no ms in ques ion. US suppo
o a UN Gene al Assembly (UNGA) esolu ion
in Decembe 2022, encou aging all na ions o
e ain om an i-sa elli e missile es s, is a case
in poin . Addi ionally, he Uni ed S a es sha es
collision-wa ning echnology wi h majo space
playe s, including he PRC, and has mo e han
170 SSA-sha ing ag eemen s wi h pa ne s
ac oss academia, in e na ional go e nmen al
o ganiza ions, p i a e en i ies and a ious na ions.
A he co e o US space diplomacy, howe e , is
no new mul ila e al ag eemen s, bu a he a
se ies o bila e al commi men s — no ably, he
A emis Acco ds — ha undamen ally e lec
a dis inc US iew o space go e nance. The US
S a e Depa men desc ibes he A emis Acco ds
as he “cen e piece o Uni ed S a es’ ci il space
diplomacy.”20 The acco ds a e bila e al ag eemen s
wi h selec in e na ional pa ne s conce ning he
Uni ed S a es’ p oposed space ac i i ies on he
Moon. The p oposals hemsel es a e ex ensi e,
including plans o es ablish a pe manen human
p esence on he Moon and use his Moon s a ion
as a base o human missions o Ma s (The Whi e
House 2017). Mo e b oadly, howe e , he acco ds
ep esen a s a egic e o o in e na ionalize and
conc e ize se e al key elemen s o an in e na ional
space o de unde US leade ship. The US decision
o use hese Moon- ela ed ac i i ies ag eemen s
o shape b oade space-go e nance no ms e lec s
he US ecogni ion o a unique diploma ic le e age
poin . Moon- ela ed ac i i ies hold signi ican
in e na ional appeal, wi h bo h key pa ne s and
compe i o s i ching o pu sue hei own luna
in e es s. India, Is ael, Japan and he PRC ha e all
ini ia ed unmanned explo a ions on he Moon,
while he ESA has announced an ambi ious “Moon
Village” p ojec o i s own ( on de Dunk 2020).
The A emis Acco ds seek o exploi he s a egic
oppo uni y o ad ance a US ision o in e na ional
space no ms, ela ed o he Moon and beyond.
In pa icula , sec ion 9 o he acco ds calls o
signa o y s a es o “p ese e” Apollo landing si es
and hose o obo ic luna missions — so-called
ou e space he i age si es21 — while sec ion 11
es ablishes exclusi e “sa e y zones” a ound he
newly p oposed A emis mission a eas, os ensibly
on he basis o p e en ing ha m ul in e e ence
(ibid.).22 Though he language o hese p o isions
appea s o be g ounded in he OST, i o e s an
in e p e a iono some p inciples ha may no
be sha ed by all s a es. The A emis Acco ds
ad ance a US ision o limi ed so e eign claims
20 See www.s a e.go /bu eau-o -oceans-and-in e na ional-en i onmen al-
and-scien i ic-a ai s/a emis-acco ds.
21 See A emis Acco ds, 13 Oc obe 2020 (no ye en e ed in o o ce),
online: NASA <www.nasa.go /wp-con en /uploads/2022/11/
A emis-Acco ds-signed-13Oc 2020.pd >. Sec ion 9.1 eads in ull: “The
Signa o ies in end o p ese e ou e space he i age, which hey conside
ocomp isehis o icallysigni ican humano obo iclandingsi es,
a i ac s, spacec a , and o he e idence o ac i i y on celes ial bodies in
acco dance wi h mu ually de eloped s anda ds and p ac ices.”
22 Ibid. Sec ion 11.7 eads, in pa : “In o de o implemen hei obliga ions
unde he Ou e Space T ea y, he Signa o ies in end o p o ide
no i ica iono hei ac i i iesandcommi ocoo dina ingwi hany
ele an ac o o a oid ha m ul in e e ence. The a ea whe ein his
no i ica ionandcoo dina ionwillbeimplemen ed oa oidha m ul
in e e enceis e e ed oasa‘sa e yzone.’Asa e yzoneshould
be he a ea in which nominal ope a ions o a ele an ac i i y o an
anomalous e en could easonably cause ha m ul in e e ence.”
13Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
o ex a e es ial esou ces and e i o ies (O’B ien
2020b). Sec ion 10 o he acco ds goes e en u he ,
allowing o he u iliza ion and ex ac ion o space
esou ces by p i a e en i ies. Opponen s ha e c i icized
hese p o isions o b eaking — o ew i ing — he
no ms o he exis ing mul ila e al amewo k. Secu ing
mining and ex ac ion igh s, o example, con a enes
a icleXI o he Moon T ea y, which es ablishes ha
he Moon and i s esou ces a e he “common he i age
o all mankind.” O cou se, he Moon T ea y i sel is
con es ed, and he PRC, Russia and he Uni ed S a es
a e no pa ies he e o. Th ough he A emis Acco ds,
he Uni ed S a es is pushing ahead o in e p e (and
pe haps eshape) he legal egime in i s own in e es
h ough mo e limi ed minila e al ag eemen s (ibid.).
The A emis Acco ds may well become he
go e nance amewo k o u u e luna explo a ion
and exploi a ion, in pa , because he Moon T ea y
ne e a ac ed a signi ican numbe o a i ica ions.
A he ime o hei announcemen in Oc obe 2020,
he A emis Acco ds had se en signa o ies. By 2024,
ha numbe has isen o 43 coun ies, including 21 in
Eu ope, as well as India and Japan. While he acco ds
do se e impo an subs an i e pu poses, hey can
also be unde s ood as an a emp by he Uni ed S a es
o le e age i s echnological capabili ies, his o ical
dominance and p omise o he A emis p ojec s o
es ablish an expanded — o e en al e na i e — se
o p inciples unde pinning space go e nance. Seen
h ough his lens, he Uni ed S a es’ use o a less o mal
ulemaking p ocess is an impo an one. In choosing
no o engage in an expansion o exis ing ag eemen s
h ough he Uni ed Na ions, he Uni ed S a es has
made a clea choice o less o mal go e nance h ough
which i belie es g ea e con ol can be asse ed.
The PRC
As a esul o i s ex ao dina y economic and poli ical
ise in he pas decade, he PRC has become a mo e
asse i e in shaping a wide ange o in e na ional
no ms and ins i u ions. Cas ing aside he ad ice o
ea ly pa y leade s o main ain a low global p o ile,
Chinese P esiden Xi Jinping has ins ead decided ha
he momen o China o assume global leade ship
on i s own e ms has a i ed. In his 2017 ema ks a
he nine een h Pa y Cong ess, Xi no ed ha “ ends
o global mul ipola i y” a e “su ging o wa d” and
p omp ing “changes in… he in e na ional o de .” As
“ ela i e in e na ional o ces a e becoming mo e
balanced,” he a gued ha China mus s and eady o
become “a global leade in e ms o comp ehensi e
na ional powe and in e na ional in luence” (Funaiole
and Glase 2017). In conjunc ion wi h hese s a emen s,
China has doubled down on i s suppo o adi ional
in e na ional diploma ic amewo ks, including he
Uni ed Na ions, whe e i is now he second-la ges
con ibu o o bo h he o ganiza ion’s egula budge
and i s peacekeeping budge (ChinaPowe 2017).
This newly asse i e o eign policy is e iden ac oss
all o he PRC’s in e na ional endea ou s, including i s
space p og am. In ligh o his new asse i eness, he
PRC’s space policy con ains wo b oad elemen s. Fi s ,
i has in es ed hea ily in de eloping i s domes ic space
capabili ies, bo h as pa o he Chinese Communis
Pa y’s (CCP’s) b oade “na ional eju ena ion”
he o ic and as a means o ensu ing ha he PRC has
he echnological capaci y o compe e bo h mili a ily
and economically. Second, d awing on i s new ound
geopoli ical s eng h, he PRC is inc easingly u ning
o mul ila e al in e na ional amewo ks, such
as he Uni ed Na ions, o p omo e i s ideological
ision o he u u e o space-based ac i i ies.
In he lead-up o he nine een h Pa y Cong ess in
2017, he PRC a icula ed i s space policy. In 2016,
he In o ma ion O ice o he S a e Council o he
People’s Republic o China (2016) published he
“Whi e Pape on China’s Space Ac i i ies,” in which
he PRC commi ed o “build[ing] China in o a space
powe in all espec s,” so ha he coun y would be
capable o d i ing independen inno a ion, conduc ing
high-le el scien i ic esea ch, p omo ing economic
de elopmen and gua an eeing na ional secu i y. The
whi e pape iden i ies space de elopmen as a sou ce
o “suppo o he ealiza ion o he Chinese D eam
o he enewal o he Chinese na ion,” signalling a
g owing ocus on space p og ams as p ime ma ke s
o p ide, p ominence and e en so e eign y (ibid.).
Towa d he end o 2021, he PRC issued a second
whi e pape ha ei e a ed hese p io i ies, s essing
no only he impo ance o de eloping domes ic
echnological capabili ies and in e nal legal go e nance
amewo ks, bu also “sa egua ding he cen al ole o
he Uni ed Na ions in managing ou e space a ai s”
(In o ma ion O ice o he S a e Council o he People’s
Republic o China 2022). Akin o US-So ie space
compe i ion du ing he Cold Wa , he PRC is pu suing
space powe as a symbol o na ional p es ige, wi h he
goal o achie ing he CCP’s ambi ion o becoming a
leading wo ld powe by 2049 (Pollpe e e al. 2020).
The PRC is well on i s way o achie ing hese goals,
ha ing made conside able p og ess on i s space agenda
since 2016. I was he hi d na ion o success ully land
on he Moon in 2013 and became he i s o make a
con olled landing on he Moon’s a side in 2019. So
a , he PRC is he only coun y (o he han he Uni ed
14 CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
S a es) o land a obo ic o e on Ma s, and i is
aiming o pu humans on he Moon and Ma s in
he nex 10 yea s (Phys.o g 2023). The Chinese S a e
Council’s 2021 whi e pape ea i ms he impo ance
o a “jou ney owa ds s ong space p esence” and
highligh s se e al majo achie emen s, including
207 comple ed launch missions om 2016 o
2021, a di e si ica ion o launch ehicle se ices,
sa elli e emo e-sensing, communica ions and
na iga ion sys ems, as well as manned spacec a
de elopmen (In o ma ion O ice o he S a e
Council o he People’s Republic o China 2022).
In line wi h hese objec i es ied o he
s eng hening o na ional p es ige, he 2021 whi e
pape also seeks o pu he PRC a he cen e
o global ne wo ks o space science esea ch,
ea u ing he mode niza ion o space go e nance
and in e na ional coope a ion. I exp essly links
he PRC’s space de elopmen o P esiden Xi’s
policy p oposals o a “global communi y o a
sha ed u u e,” wi h Beijing a i s cen e (ibid.). The
PRC iews space p ojec s and space go e nance
as oppo uni ies o consolida e geopoli ical
alliances and achie e independence om US-
con olled ne wo ks and sys ems. C i ical o his
objec i e is China’s independen access o space
and space-based echnologies, which can be
o e ed o i s pa ne coun ies as an al e na i e
o US-con olled op ions. Fo example, he PRC’s
success ul de elopmen and cons uc ion o he
BeiDou Posi ioning and Na iga ion Sys em (BDS)
in 2020 g ea ly educed i s eliance on he GPS
de eloped and main ained by he Uni ed S a es,
and opened up oppo uni ies o compe i ion. The
PRC ad e ises he BDS as pa o i s “In o ma ion
Silk Road” unde he b oade Bel and Road
Ini ia i e, o e ing BDS as a ee and open sys em o
o he coun ies (Goswami 2020). The PRC p esen ly
seeks o exploi space echnologies, such as he
BDS, o expand i s economic, diploma ic and
poli ical le e age wi h coun ies in Cen al Asia,
Sou heas Asia and he Middle Eas (Zhang 2020).
As pa o i s s ong emphasis on space- ela ed
echnological de elopmen and domes ic capaci y
building, he PRC’s s a e-led app oach has, in
ecen yea s, inc easingly accommoda ed and
encou aged public-p i a e pa ne ships on space
explo a ion, uelled by he ecogni ion ha
comme cial space ligh is key o achie ing s a egic
ad an age and sus ained g ow h in he long e m.
In 2023, comme cial launches cons i u ed nea ly 40
pe cen o he PRC’s o al launches, wi h a success
a e o 96 pe cen . Va ious p i a e companies
ha e en e ed he PRC’s space indus y, wi h each
specializing in a di e en echnology, anging om
ocke launche s o sa elli e manu ac u ing and
se ices (Liu 2024). In 2024, comme cial space ligh
was w i en in o he S a e Council’s annual Repo
on he Wo k o he Go e nmen o he i s ime,
signalling he CCP’s esol e o “ os e new g ow h
engines” in he space sec o (In o ma ion O ice
o he S a e Council o he People’s Republic o
China 2024). The PRC’s decision o u he expand
and in es in he comme cial space indus y is no
su p ising gi en apid US comme cial successes,
such as S a link, which ha e he po en ial o
quickly educe he a ailabili y o low-Ea h o bi
o u u e launches by o he s a es. F om he
PRC’s pe spec i e, he mili a y and s a egic
implica ions o SpaceX simply canno be igno ed,
and Beijing has buil up domes ic capabili ies
o enable las ing g ow h in he space ealm,
including h ough comme cial space ac i i y.
Inhe en in he PRC’s epu a ional and poli ical
objec i es in space is an e o o s uc u e space
go e nance ules. While no an o iginal a chi ec
o he Cold Wa -e a ea ies, he PRC has quickly
eme ged as an in e na ional ulemake on space-
ela ed issues. The PRC’s e o s ha e la gely
ocused on mul ila e al se ings, pa icula ly
he Uni ed Na ions, whe e i belie es i wields
in luence h ough unique sou ces o legi imacy.
In ecen yea s, o example, he PRC has ei he
solely o join ly made p oposals o o ed in a ou
a he UNGA on issues including he p e en ion
o an a ms ace in ou e space, anspa ency
and con idence-building measu es, and no i s
placemen o weapons in ou e space — e en i i
has no made such commi men s i sel . (Qisong and
Nishan 2021). Responding o UNGA Resolu ion75/36
in 2020, he PRC’s Pe manen Mission o he Uni ed
Na ions s a ed ha i “s ands eady” o wo k wi h
o he membe s a es and seeks “p ac ical and
e ec i e solu ions agains space secu i y h ea s,”
especially an a ms ace in space whe e he secu i y
o all humankind hangs in he balance (Pe manen
Mission o he People’s Republic o China o he
UN 2021). The PRC’s ep esen a i es a he Uni ed
Na ions ha e also called ou coun ies, such as he
Uni ed S a es, o hei pu po ed unwillingness
o “subjec hei mili a y capabili ies in ou e
space o subs an i e es ic ions” by e using o
nego ia e o legally binding ins umen s o p e en
an a ms ace in space (Uni ed Na ions 2023a).
15Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
The PRC’s eliance on UN amewo ks s ands in
con as o he US bila e al and minila e al app oach.
PRC commen a o s ha e aised signi ican conce ns
abou he US-led A emis Acco ds, c i icizing bo h he
US unde s anding o so e eign p inciples in space,
as well as i s p oposals o p i a e p ope y and
ex ac ion igh s (Ji, Ce ny and Pilie o 2020). Though
Chinese o icials ha e no commen ed di ec ly on he
A emis p oposals, he PRC has announced plans wi h
Russia o he cons uc ion o a i al In e na ional
Luna Resea ch S a ion (ILRS) based on p inciples
somewha di e en om hose o he Uni ed S a es
(Bilal 2024; Wu 2023). The join Chinese-Russian
p oposals cen e a ound s a e-sponso ed and s a e-
managed missions ha would conduc esea ch on
he Moon using esou ces in si u. In con as , he
A emis Acco ds, while co e ing in si u use o space
esou ces, also allow o emo al o esou ces o o he
bodies (A. Jones 2021). Mapped agains he cu en
landscape o space go e nance, he ILRS p ojec
would i nea ly wi hin he mul ila e al amewo ks
es ablished in he 1970s, ein o cing a he han
ejec ing he p inciples o he OST. The PRC’s e o s
o globalize his app oach, howe e , ha e gained
limi ed ac ion. Beyond Russia, only Pakis an and
he Uni ed A ab Emi a es ha e backed he p oposal,
while alks wi h na ions om he ESA ha e s alled.
The PRC asse s a iew o space go e nance consis en
wi h exis ing, bu pe haps ou da ed, in e na ional legal
no ms and oo ed in mul ila e al p ocesses. Ye i has
been c i icized o no li ing up o hese p inciples.
The US Depa men o De ense’s cong essionally
manda ed epo (2022) on PRC mili a y and secu i y
de elopmen s no es he coun y’s “dogged pu sui
o space supe io i y” and con inued in es men s
o imp o e i s mili a y space capabili ies despi e
public ad ocacy o he peace ul use o ou e space
(E win 2022). While he PRC has no openly es ed i s
an i-sa elli e abili ies since 2007, Pen agon o icials
belie e ha i has expe imen ed wi h o he o ensi e
capabili ies ha can dis up sa elli es in o bi . Gi en
ha supe io i y and ulemaking a e baked in o bo h US
and PRC space-go e nance objec i es, compe i ion and
mu ual c i icisms appea ine i able in he yea s ahead.
Russia
While he Uni ed S a es’ and China’s app oaches
o space go e nance migh bes be cha ac e ized
as maximiza ion o bo h secu i y and comme cial
in e es s ( he o me ) and enhancing egional in luence
and global p es ige ( he la e ), he co e o he Russian
Fede a ion’s a i ude owa d space go e nance is
mili a y ad an age.
Since he all o he So ie Union, Russia has ound
bo h i s echnological and diploma ic capabili ies
in he space ealm g ea ly diminished. Al hough a
pe iod o economic g ow h and coope a ion wi h he
Wes in he ea ly 2000s allowed o some pos -So ie
ad ances in space- a ing capaci y, pa icula ly by
i ue o he ISS p ojec (O’Callaghan 2020; Zak 2016),
Russia’s g owing diploma ic isola ion and na ional
mili a iza ion ha e b ough coope a ion o a hal
(T oiano ski, Nechepu enko and Hopkins 2021). The
illegal annexa ion o C imea in 2014 and in asion
o Uk aine in 2022, along wi h esul an sanc ions
egimes, ha e dep i ed Russia o he esou ces and
geopoli ical s anding necessa y o expand i s space
goals, de elop comme cially iable space p og ams
and shape new go e nance e o s (A. Jones 2023).
Adding o Russia’s woes, i s space p og am has
been ma ed by signi ican ailu es. Obse e s ha e
no ed h ee leakage inciden s on he Soyuz c ewed
spacec a in 2018 and 2022 and he P og ess MS-21
ca go spacec a in 2023, which collec i ely sugges
signi ican quali y con ol issues plaguing Russian
spacec a manu ac u e s (Skibba 2023). Mos
ecen ly, he ailu e o he Luna-25 mission o make
a con olled landing on he Sou h Pole o he Moon
has con ibu ed o he pe cep ion ha Russia’s space
capabili ies ha e been g ea ly educed. Repo s sugges
ha hese ailings a e la gely he esul o geopoli ical
e en s, and hey ha e ad e se consequences o he
Russian economy and manu ac u ing capabili ies. In
he case o he luna explo e , epo s sugges ha
es ic ions on sales by EU manu ac u e s led o he
use o subs anda d componen s (The Associa ed P ess
2023). E en ela i ely s aigh o wa d echnologies
— Russia’s equi alen o GPS, o example — a e
un eliable. Almos all o Russia’s posi ioning
sa elli es a e now pas hei se ice li es and s a ing
o ail (Swope and Young 2024). To supplemen
insu icien Russian sa elli e communica ions
capabili ies, Russian oops allegedly use illici ly
p ocu ed S a link e minals in Uk aine (ibid.).
No su p isingly, Russia’s declining space capabili ies
ha e empe ed i s ambi ions, in luence and s a egy.
Lo y goals and expansi e ambi ions ha e gi en way
o a space p og am a mo e ocused on mili a y and
secu i y objec i es, including h ough coope a ion
wi h like-minded s a es, especially he PRC. As he
Russian Fede a ion’s 2021 Na ional Secu i y S a egy
no es: “Space and in o ma ion spaces a e being ac i ely
de eloped as new a eas o wa a e” (P esiden o he
Russian Fede a ion 2021, 3). As a esul , Russia commi s
o “s eng hening he leading posi ions achie ed by he
16 CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
Russian Fede a ion and compe i i e ad an ages
in… he ocke and space indus y,” so as o ensu e
“ he in e es s o he Russian Fede a ion ela ed
o he de elopmen o ou e space” (ibid., 24).
Beyond hese s a ed na ional secu i y objec i es
in space, Russia con inues o mili a ize i s space
p og am (Vidal and P i alo 2023). In Ap il 2022,
hen-head o Roscosmos, Dmi y Rogozin, s a ed
ha “in he cu en si ua ion, Roscosmos has had
o become a much igid s uc u e [sic], wo king
i s o all o he bene i o de ence and secu i y
o he coun y” (Yachmenniko a 2022). Some
wo mon hs la e , ha ing los his posi ion a
Roscosmos, Rogozin pos ed mo e candid commen s
o X ( o me ly Twi e ), aming Russia’s space
ac i i ies as unde unded when compa ed o US
e o s: “We alloca ed $2.5 billion ( o Roskosmos,
while) he ci ilian budge o NASA is $25 billion
and he ci ilian budge a SpaceX is equal o ha
a Roskosmos, and ha is no coun ing ens o
billions o dolla s alloca ed annually o e e ishly
deploying US sys em o he con ol o he en i e
plane . In wo- h ee yea s, we will ha e o de s
o magni ude mo e dense US command, con ol
and a ge ing sys em” (Zak 2024, 32). While
Russia has championed mo emen s o p e en
he weaponiza ion o space, i s ac ual conduc
appea s o ad ance he mili a iza ion o space. US
news agencies ha e epo ed on US in elligence
su ounding Russian plans o a nuclea space
weapon designed o incapaci a e sa elli es (Ba nes
e al. 2024). Russia’s 2021 an i-sa elli e es agains
a decommissioned So ie communica ions sa elli e
demons a ed he coun y’s mili a y capabili ies
in space, no wi hs anding OST commi men s o
he exclusi ely peace ul pu sui o space ac i i ies
(Vidal and P i alo 2023). Despi e ou c y om
he in e na ional communi y, Russian De ence
Minis e Se gei Shoigu con i med ha he es
had aken place, cha ac e izing i as a ou ine
ope a ion o a “cu ing-edge u u e weapon
sys em” designed o s eng hen Russia’s de ence
agains US a emp s o a ain “comp ehensi e
mili a y ad an age” in space (Sanka an 2022a).
Pe haps ecognizing i s mo e limi ed in luence
on issues o space go e nance, Russia’s s a egic
app oach has shi ed and na owed in he pas
i e yea s. While Russia s ill is a space powe
o be eckoned wi h, i has inc easingly elied
upon pa ne ships wi h he PRC o expand
i s in luence. Russia and he PRC sha e many
common in e es s and s a egies — e en i amed
somewha di e en ly — ha ha e acili a ed
coope a ion in shaping go e nance egimes.
This coope a ion was pe haps mos e iden in a
join s a emen by P esiden Vladimi Pu in and
P esiden Xi on he sidelines o he Beijing 2022
Win e Olympics. A signi ican po ion o he
s a emen was dedica ed o Russian and Chinese
space policy, and called o in e na ional e o s
unde Russian and PRC leade ship o “p e en
he weaponiza ion o space and an a ms ace
in ou e space” (P esiden o Russia 2022).
Like he PRC, he Russian Fede a ion sees he
Uni ed Na ions and o he mul ila e al amewo ks
as he mos p omising a enues o ad ance hei
isions o space go e nance and a means o
coun e balance US in luence. The 2022 join PRC-
Russia s a emen calls o in e na ional coope a ion
on space ma e s, and u ges “nego ia ions o
conclude a legally binding mul ila e al ins umen
based on he Chinese-Russian d a ea y on he
p e en ion o placemen o weapons in ou e
space and he use o h ea o o ce agains space
objec s” (ibid.). The Russian Fede a ion, o en
wi h PRC suppo , has sough o use he Uni ed
Na ions o ad ance i s space go e nance in e es s
in a bid o coun e hose o he Uni ed S a es. In
2008, Russia and China p oposed a d a ea y —
e e ed o in he 2022 join s a emen — which
included a comple e ban on he use o mili a y
applica ions o space echnology.23 Al hough he
p oposal was iewed as an expansion o exis ing
OST p o isions conce ning he peace ul explo a ion
o space and ban on nuclea weapons o mass
des uc ion, no consensus was ul ima ely eached
ega ding i s adop ion (P ess and in o ma ion
eam o he Delega ion o he UN in Gene a 2022).
Mo e han 15 yea s la e , in ea ly 2024, he Uni ed
S a es and Japan — ac ing on US in elligence
ha Russia was engaging in he de elopmen o
nuclea weapons o use in space — in oduced a
UN Secu i y Council esolu ion calling o a ban on
23 No ably, hede ini iono “weapon”unde a icle1(c)o hed a ea y
ispa icula lyb oad:“ he e m‘weaponsinou e space’meansany
de ice placed in ou e space, based on any physical p inciple, specially
p oduced o con e ed o elimina e, damage o dis up no mal unc ion
o objec s in ou e space, on he Ea h o in i s ai , as well as o elimina e
popula ion,componen so biosphe ec i ical ohumanexis enceo in lic
damage o hem” (P ess and in o ma ion eam o he Delega ion o he
UN in Gene a Delega ion o he EU o he UN in Gene a P ess Team
2022). See D a T ea y on he P e en ion o he Placemen o Weapons
in Ou e Space, he Th ea o Use o Fo ce agains Ou e Space Objec s,
2 Feb ua y 2008 (no ye en e ed in o o ce), online:
<www.m a.go .cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/
kj ywj_665252/202406/ 20240606_11405272.h ml>.
17Geopoli ical Ambi ions and Rule Con es a ions in Space Go e nance
bo h nuclea weapons and he de elopmen o such
weapons in space. Russia e oed he esolu ion,
a guing ha Wes e n coun ies we e simply
“che y-picking” weapons o mass des uc ion
ou o all o he weapons o “camou lage hei
lack o in e es ” in p e en ing mili a y ac i i y
in ou e space mo e gene ally (Uni ed Na ions
2024). Ins ead, he Russian Fede a ion esubmi ed
i s own 2008 d a ea y o p e en an a ms
ace in space, which he Uni ed S a es, in u n,
e oed. China abs ained om he US esolu ion
bu o ed in a ou o Russia’s (Swope and Young
2024). Ul ima ely, hen, while he Uni ed Na ions
con inues o be Russia’s p e e ed o um o space
go e nance, he e o s uc u e — as well as Russia’s
own hypoc i ical and o he UN membe s’ a guably
disingenuous ac ions — has limi ed i s success.
While Russia and he PRC commi ed o a
“no-limi s” pa ne ship in 2022 and ha coope a ion
has ma e ialized in diploma ic ci cles, i has ye o
be ansla ed in o deepening echnical coope a ion.
The PRC’s ambi ions and ecen accomplishmen s
ha e as ly ou paced Russian esou ces and
cu en capabili ies, leading o he p ospec ha
Russia may ind i sel g owingly elian on he PRC
o echnology in he u u e (Vidal and P i alo
2024). E en when he wo na ions ha e con e ged
on space-based endea ou s, mu ual e o s ha e
been mos ly limi ed o non-mili a y applica ions
(such as hei join ILRS ini ia i e), and he PRC
has hus a e ained om public coope a ion on
mili a y space p og ams. Russia and he PRC ha e
announced a join e o o cons uc a sa elli e-
based ea ly ballis ic missile-de ec ion sys em,
which may he ald a new e a o coope a ion (ibid.).
I could be said ha Russia’s space and space-
go e nance ambi ions ha e been humbled in
ecen yea s. Ye , a leas in he mili a y domain,
Russia emains a o midable ac o wi h bo h
s ong aspi a ions and capabili ies. I con inues
o use mul ila e al ins i u ions o wha can
bes be desc ibed as disingenuous a emp s
o condemn he deploymen o space-based
weapons sys ems and hwa consensus-building
e o s among o he ac o s. As a pe manen
membe o he UN Secu i y Council, Russia
will con inue o exe ou sized in luence in his
enue, which may d i e he Uni ed S a es u he
in he di ec ion o in o mal ag eemen s and
minila e al coope a ion. Indeed, Russia’s win
app oach o enhancing mili a y de elopmen
e o s while seeking o le e age es igial
geopoli ical in luence in es ablished in e na ional
ins i u ions has led some commen a o s o
a gue ha Russia’s cu en app oach o space
policy almos amoun s o a e u n o Cold Wa -
e a s a egies (Sanka an 2022b). The ma ked
di e ence, howe e , is Russia’s signi ican ly
diminished ole on he wo ld s age mo e gene ally.
Acco dingly, alignmen s, pa ne ships and po en ial
dependence on he PRC will also shape Russia’s
objec i es and s a egies and ampli y i s oice
on go e nance issues, while limi ing i s s a egic
lexibili y o ake independen posi ions.
The Road Ahead
This pape has ou lined he con ou s o a new
geopoli ical landscape and i s implica ions o space
go e nance. Al hough he Cold Wa “Space Race”
has un i s cou se, space go e nance is quickly
e-eme ging as a o um o global powe s o asse
hei echnological and diploma ic p owess. The
legal egimes c ea ed in he 1970s a e no longe
adequa e o add ess he p esen p ac ical eali ies
o space ac i i ies, much less manage g ea -powe
compe i ion. Much is a s ake o he g ea powe s
now and in he u u e as hey seek o shape he
ou comes o hese go e nance challenges; he e is
e e y eason o expec he issue o con inuously
ise in p ominence on na ional policy-making
agendas. As a esul , a simul aneous con es o bo h
no ms and go e nance p ocesses has eme ged.
Fo he Uni ed S a es, space p esen s a comme cial
and diploma ic oppo uni y o no only p omo e
i s concep ion o comme cial in e es s, bu o also
consolida e i s in e na ional alliances and engage
in ulemaking mo e aligned wi h i s in e es s.
The PRC is eady o capi alize on i s eme ging
global powe s a us, building on i s echnological
capaci y o enhance p o ile, p es ige and p o i .
Ye , o da e, i has been unable o moun a se ious
challenge o US go e nance p ocesses o build a
b oade consensus o i s ision o so e eign y
beyond Ea h’s o bi . Though Russia’s lus e has
aded, i con inues o asse i s posi ions on space
issues and has he capaci y o bo h ad ance
i s own mili a y in e es s and o hwa o mal
law-making p ocesses wi h which i disag ees.
This compe i ion will likely be las ing, wi h he
o ces d i ing inc eased ensions among g ea
18 CIGI Pape s No. 317 — Ma ch 2025 • William Bu ke-Whi e and Benjamin Gwyn Williams
powe s unlikely o ade. As coun ies pu sue
di e gen go e nance s a egies, global consensus
is ou o each, and he con es a ion o bo h
go e nance no ms and p ocesses will endu e. In
ha con ex , he c i ical ques ion is whe he limi ed
coope a ion on key issues, such as space deb is,
can be achie ed and how o go abou doing so. The
cu en geopoli ical en i onmen is no conduci e
o he d a ing o a new and all-encompassing
mul ila e al ea y in he s yle o he o iginal OST.
No only does he in e na ional communi y appea
o lack he poli ical will o engage in he d a ing
p ocess, bu also he echnological demands and
na ional in e es s in space a e so a ied ha i is
unlikely consensus could be achie ed. Russia and
he PRC may y, bu hese e o s will lounde .
A mo e p omising pa h — likely o be pu sued by
he Uni ed S a es on one side and Russia and he
PRC on he o he — is o inc ease pa icipa ion
in dis inc minila e al ulemaking exe cises.
Expanding he ci cle o pa icipa ing s a es
may cemen no ms, enhance legi imacy and
deepen coope a ion among like-minded s a es.
Bo h sides in his p ocess a e likely o seek new
pa ne s, wi h he Uni ed S a es a emp ing o
di e si y he coun ies included in i s coali ion
and Russia and he PRC looking o o he s o
join hei al e na i e app oach. Like-minded
g oupings, such as he G oup o Se en o BRICS
(B azil, Russia, India, China, Sou h A ica, I an,
Egyp , E hiopia and he Uni ed A ab Emi a es),
could eme ge as mo e o midable nego ia ing
o a. Unde his model, middle powe s may be
able o play an ou side ole, o e ing neu al
g ound o comp omise o ad ancing no m-
building ou side o geopoli ical con es a ion.
A minili e al app oach o ulemaking ca ies
bo h oppo uni ies and isks. I has he po en ial
o allow he con inued de elopmen o bo h
ules and go e nance p ocesses despi e poli ical
compe i ion. I may allow expe imen a ion and
no m en ep eneu ship in which new ideas a e
ied, es ed and adop ed. Bu minila e alism
uns he isk o a mo e pe manen ac u e in
he space go e nance a chi ec u e, wi h some
coun ies ollowing one se o ules and o he s
ano he . In he sha ed en i onmen o ou e
space, coun ies ope a ing unde di e en ules
may lead o con lic o e en ca as ophe.
In e na ional s anda ds-se ing o ganiza ions
and ela ed en i ies may also eme ge as poin s
o con es a ion whe e he PRC, Russia and he
Uni ed S a es look o embed hei p e e ed ules o
go e nance app oaches in mo e o mal s anda ds.
In a bes -case scena io, such ins i u ions may se e
as neu al, subjec -limi ed o a o in e na ional
ule se ing. Fo example, s anda ds associa ed
wi h he ISO migh be applied ac oss space
p ojec s om A emis o SpaceX sa elli es o he
ILRS. In o he ci cums ances, s anda ds-se ing
o ganiza ions may simply be ende ed ine ec i e
in ligh o geopoli ical con es a ion. In a wo s -
case scena io, hese ins i u ions migh be co-op ed
by s a es on ei he side o he go e nance di ide,
he eby limi ing hei b idging po en ial. Beyond
hese minila e al app oaches likely o domina e
space go e nance in he yea s ahead, he e may
be a ew subs an i e a eas whe e alignmen
o na ional in e es s makes b oade consensus
mo e plausible, pe haps e en h ough o mal
ea y-making p ocesses. Fi s , gi en geopoli ical
ensions and apid echnological ad ancemen s,
he no ma i e commi men o he OST o banning
nuclea weapons in space mus be ea i med. The
p ocedu al ba les be ween he Uni ed S a es and
Russia on his issue mus be o e come, pe haps
h ough a neu al hi d coun y pu ing o wa d
a esolu ion o i s own ha d aws on bo h he
US and Russian posi ions. Second, egis a ion,
sus ainabili y and echnical issues could p oduce
a su icien le el o common in e es o d i e new
ulemaking p ocesses. Thi d, i he Uni ed S a es
succeeds in ca ing ou a mo e signi ican ole
o comme cial ac o s in space, new mechanisms
a e needed o ensu e ha hese comme cial
ac i i ies emain consis en wi h he OST’s ul ima e
commi men o secu ing space o he in e es s
o humankind. Mos in e es ingly, pe haps, he
PRC’s ecen mo e owa d comme cial space
ac i i ies could c ea e an unexpec ed alignmen
o US and PRC in e es s — in ension wi h hose
o Russia — o de elop mo e pe missi e no ms
o p i a e comme cial space ac i i ies.
Acknowledgemen s
The au ho s wish o hank Mochen Ma,
William Powe s, Vincen Wang and Huixuan
Zeng o hei in aluable esea ch suppo .
