Kling, Julia; Poliako , Se ge
A icle
Facebook, he EU and Russia's wa : Challenges o
mode a ing au ho i a ian news
In e ne Policy Re iew
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Alexande on Humbold Ins i u e o In e ne and Socie y (HIIG), Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Kling, Julia; Poliako , Se ge (2025) : Facebook, he EU and Russia's wa :
Challenges o mode a ing au ho i a ian news, In e ne Policy Re iew, ISSN 2197-6775, Alexande
on Humbold Ins i u e o In e ne and Socie y, Be lin, Vol. 14, Iss. 3, pp. 1-38,
h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2025.3.2036
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Volume 14 |
Facebook, he EU and Russia’s wa :
Challenges o mode a ing au ho i a ian
news
Julia Kling Uni e si y o Passau
Se ge Poliako Uni e si y o Ams e dam
DOI: h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2025.3.2036
Published: 11 Sep embe 2025
Recei ed: 3 Feb ua y 2025 Accep ed: 20 May 2025
Funding: This a icle has ecei ed unding om he Eu opean Resea ch Council (ERC)
unde he Eu opean Union’s Ho izon 2020 esea ch and inno a ion p og amme (G an
Ag eemen No. 819025). I is pa o he ERC consolida o p ojec on ‘The
Consequences o he In e ne o Russia’s In o ma ional In luence Ab oad’
(www. usin o m.uni-passau.de/en).
Compe ing In e es s: The au ho has decla ed ha no compe ing in e es s exis ha
ha e in luenced he ex .
Licence: This is an open-access a icle dis ibu ed unde he e ms o he C ea i e
Commons A ibu ion 3.0 License (Ge many) which pe mi s un es ic ed use,
dis ibu ion, and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly
ci ed. h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/3.0/de/deed.en
Copy igh emains wi h he au ho (s).
Ci a ion: Kling, J., & Poliako , S. (2025). Facebook, he EU and Russia’s wa :
Challenges o mode a ing au ho i a ian news. In e ne Policy Re iew, 14(3).
h ps://doi.o g/10.14763/2025.3.2036
Keywo ds: Social ne wo king si es, Facebook, Russia, P o-K emlin P opaganda,
In o ma ional in luence
Abs ac : Social ne wo king si es a e becoming an inc easingly impo an channel o he
ansna ional ansmission o in o ma ion. Howe e , hei ole as in e media ies o au oc a ically
con olled in o ma ion en i onmen s eaching audiences ou side he au oc a ic coun y's bo de s
has no been ex ensi ely s udied. This s udy in es iga es he consequences o Russia’s ull-scale
in asion o Uk aine on Russia’s Russian-language news ecosys em on Facebook, which, as o June
2025, mos ly includes s a e p opaganda ha a ge s p edominan ly an audience ou side o Russia.
Analysing da a om Me a's C owd angle API, encompassing 646,230 unique pos s om 2,791
public Facebook spaces, i ocuses on he dis ibu ion o Russia’s op 72 Russian-language news
domains (c i ical/unc i ical owa ds he ongoing wa ) six mon hs be o e and a e he in asion
( om 24 Augus 2021 o 24 Augus 2022). The esul s indica e a signi ican decline in pos s
con aining unc i ical news domains pos -in asion. Ne e heless, unc i ical news domains con inue
o be dissemina ed mo e widely han c i ical ones, indica ing a pe sis ence o Russian s a e
p opaganda isibili y on Facebook. The s udy highligh s he complexi ies o pla o m go e nance,
speci ically wi h ega ds o he implemen a ion o EU policies on non-EU social ne wo king si es,
Facebook's limi ed e o s o demo e Russian s a e-aligned news and calls o g ea e a en ion o
egional language con ex s in con en mode a ion.
Issue 3
In oduc ion
As o June 2025, Russia’s ull-scale wa agains Uk aine is s ill ongoing and being
waged h ough he s a egic use o mili a y and media powe (Rodge s & Lanosz-
ka, 2023). Be o e he ull-scale wa , ex an esea ch indica ed ha audiences esid-
ing ou side o Russia consumed news con en no only om he coun y's o eign
news media bu also om Russian-language domes ic ones, pa icula ly in he o -
me So ie coun ies (see, e.g., Ro a u, 2018; Vihalemm, Juze o ics, & Leppik,
2019), bu also in “Wes e n” coun ies, such as Ge many (e.g., Golo a, 2020).
Speci ically, Russian-s a e-aligned Russian-language domes ic news ou le s ha e
u ilised Facebook o dissemina e in o ma ion unc i ical o Russia’s poli ical leade -
ship p ima ily o o eign audiences (Kling, 2022).
Russia’s ull-scale in asion led o se e al measu es po en ially a ec ing he dis-
semina ion o he coun y’s news con en on Facebook. Fi s , he Council o he Eu-
opean Union (EU) (2024) has banned he sp ead o con en ied o "K emlin-
backed disin o ma ion ou le s" (n.p.) in he EU s a ing in Ma ch 2022. Russia’s
main o eign b oadcas e s, RT and Spu nik we e es ic ed immedia ely a e he
s a o he in asion (ea ly Ma ch 2022), ollowed by he domes ic news ou le s
es i. u and c. u in June 2022.1Second, Facebook closed down ad e isemen and
mone isa ion op ions o Russian s a e-con olled media sho ly a e he s a o
he in asion. This limi ed hei abili y o p omo e con en , a ac new audiences,
and gene a e e enue on he pla o m. As a esul , he g ow h and in luence o
hese ou le s on Facebook we e likely educed. Also, Facebook labelled some
Russian news ou le s as “s a e-con olled”, a label ha was ound o signi ican ly
educe he each o a ec ed pos s (Ague i e al., 2022). A e he EU sanc ions’ im-
plemen a ion, Facebook, mo eo e , slowly es ic ed accoun s a ilia ed wi h he
EU-sanc ioned ou le s o use s in he EU (Me a, 2022). This measu e addi ionally
likely educed he dissemina ion o con en om a ec ed news ou le s. Thi d, he
Russian Minis y o Jus ice classi ied Me a as an “ex emis o ganiza ion”, esul ing
in i s access being blocked by he coun y's In e ne Se ice P o ide s (ISPs). I is
es ima ed ha , as a consequence, Facebook los i s e enue in Russia, accoun ing
o "1.5% o Me a's ad e ising dolla s" and a loss o abou USD 4.7 million pe day
(B own, 2022) as o Ma ch 2022. Ne e heless, despi e his, pe sonal usage o
Facebook in Russia emains pe missible and he pla o m can s ill be accessed
h ough a ious means, such as Vi ual P i a e Ne wo ks (VPNs). Also, domes ic
1. Th oughou 2022, also o he Russian-language domes ic news ou le s we e blocked (in Decembe
2022, 1 . u, n . u and en. we e sanc ioned by he EU), howe e , his blockage was no consid-
e ed in his s udy as i happened only a e Augus 2022.
2 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
news ou le s, including s a e-con olled ones, a e heo e ically pe mi ed o u ilise
he ne wo k o he dissemina ion o hei con en wi hou he use o Facebook’s
comme cial ools, wi h no legal es ic ions.
While Facebook has p e iously implemen ed bans on s a e-con olled accoun s in
esponse o mili a y iolence, such as i s p ohibi ion o accoun s associa ed wi h
he Myanma mili a y ollowing i s seizu e o s a e con ol in Feb ua y 2021 (Asso-
cia ed P ess, 2022), he e exis s no his o ical p eceden o his magni ude o mea-
su es aimed a egula ing he go e nance o con en om an au ho i a ian s a e
speci ically on Facebook wi hin he EU con ex . Ne e heless, o he bes o ou
knowledge, no academic s udy has ye ocused on he ole o Facebook as a s ake-
holde o Russia’s in o ma ional in luence h ough Russian-language news con en
since he s a o Russia’s ull-scale in asion.
To add ess his gap, his s udy ocuses on he change in he dis ibu ion o Russia’s
Russian-language news con en since he s a o Russia’s ull-scale in asion by
s udying he dis ibu ion o Uni o m Resou ce Loca o s (URLs) including 72 do-
mains o he op Russian-language news ou le s in Russia wi h a ying le els o
c i icism owa ds Russia's wa (c i ical [N=12]/unc i ical [N=60]) on Facebook's
public spaces (pages, g oups, and public p o iles) six mon hs be o e and a e he
commencemen o he in asion. The s udy uses da a om Me a's C owd angle Ap-
plica ion P og amming In e ace (API), which includes 646,230 dis inc pos s om
2,791 public Facebook spaces.
While he esul s e eal a signi ican dec ease in he numbe o pos s om Face-
book's public spaces con aining Russia's unc i ical news domains a e he s a o
he in asion, hey also show ha Facebook did no ully censo p o-K emlin con-
en in he Russian language. Speci ically, we ind ha Facebook did no label ou -
le s con olled by he Russian s a e in any o he way han h ough di ec owne -
ship which allowed unlabelled ou le s o con inue sp eading con en ha jus i ies
he wa . Also, based on he numbe o pos s con aining Russia’s news domains, un-
c i ical news domains we e s ill mo e isibly dissemina ed (157,641 pos s) com-
pa ed o c i ical news domains (45,090 pos s). Thus, ou s udy unde sco es he
complexi y inhe en in he go e nance o pla o ms2, wi h a pa icula ocus on
non-EU-based social ne wo king si es (SNSs)3, a p ime example o which is Face-
2. By pla o ms, we unde s and he “online, da a-d i en apps and se ices (e.g., Facebook Messenge ,
Google Sea ch, YouTube)” (Go wa, 2019, p. 856) o he companies ha deploy such se ices (e.g.,
Me a and Alphabe ).
3. By social ne wo king si es, we unde s and exclusi ely he social media pla o ms ha a e buil on
social ne wo ks (e.g., Facebook, Ins ag am, Russia’s VK).
3 Kling, Poliako
book. Ou indings demons a e ha such complexi y enables au oc acies, such as
Russia, o pe sis in he manipula ion o in o ma ion en i onmen s beyond hei
bo de s in hei domes ic language, despi e he implemen a ion o nume ous mea-
su es speci ically designed o coun e such beha iou .
In he con ex o he ongoing wa , con en egula ion policies by he EU, Facebook
and Russia emain ela i ely unchanged. The EU has imposed sanc ions on addi-
ional Russian news ou le s, while Facebook has ini ia ed a p ocess o elax i s
con en mode a ion policies s a ing om he US in Janua y 2025. Al hough Me a's
es ic ions linked o Russia's wa agains Uk aine emained unal e ed and un-up-
da ed since 2022, i is an icipa ed ha subsequen in es iga ions will yield analo-
gous ou comes conce ning he go e nance o news en i onmen s om au ho i a i-
an non-Anglophone language con ex s.
Ou pape is s uc u ed in he ollowing way. A e e iewing he li e a u e on SNSs
as in o ma ion in e media ies o au ho i a ian coun ies’ news, pa icula ly con-
ce ning Facebook, we p esen ex an indings on he sp ead o Russia’s p opaganda
on Facebook since he ull-scale in asion. Nex , we desc ibe ou me hodological
app oach, ollowed by ou indings. Finally, we discuss hese indings agains he
esea ch li e a u e on au oc a ic in o ma ion dissemina ion on SNSs and Russia’s
news ecosys em on he pla o m.
Facebook as a media o o au ho i a ian news en i onmen s
The dissemina ion o dis- and misin o ma ion, especially o igina ing om au ho i-
a ian s a es, ha e speech and inci ili y on SNSs has p omp ed democ a ic coun-
ies o discuss how o go e n pla o ms (Go wa, 2019), including hei “pla o m
powe ” (Naugh on, 2018) o e na ional a ai s. As Go wa (2019) sugges s, he go -
e nance o pla o ms is nego ia ed be ween di e en pa ies, including “pla o m
companies, use s, ad e ise s, go e nmen s, and o he poli ical ac o s” (Go wa,
2019, p. 854). SNSs ely p ima ily on hei in e na ional communi y guidelines and
e ms o se ice s anda ds as he basis o con en mode a ion (see Gillespie, 2018)
and depend on human and compu a ional ac o s o go e n in o ma ion (Ahn e al.,
2023). This p ac ice has been he subjec o conside able c i icism o adhe ing o
economic guidelines and popula i y, a he han o jou nalis ic s anda ds (see De-
Vi o, 2017; Nechush ai & Lewis, 2019). Also, among o he channels o disin o ma-
ion, such as ake websi es, he p ac ice has been c i icised o al e ing he low o
poli ical communica ion, he eby challenging democ a ic p ocesses and ci izens'
us in democ a ic ins i u ions (Benne & Li ings on, 2018).
4 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
Consequen ly, go e nmen s ha e exp essed a desi e o pla o ms o implemen
con en mode a ion egula ions ha a e mo e e ec i ely aligned wi h na ional
policies (e.g., he Digi al Se ice Ac [DSA] in he EU con ex ), and, hus, comply
be e wi h na ional poli ical speech egula ions (Ahn e al., 2023). Ne e heless,
as a gued by Ahn e al., (2023), he go e nance o ha m ul in o ma ion dis ibu ion
is s ill a ma e o ongoing nego ia ion. Fo example, in hei esea ch, hey ound
ha speci ically Facebook o mally adhe es wi h na ional policies o he Uni ed
S a es, Ge many, and Sou h Ko ea, bu cons an ly “s ee use s away om he local
sys ems and owa ds i s cen alized ope a ions” (Ahn e al., 2023, p. 1).
Russia’s use o SNSs o each o eign —p ima ily anglophone—audiences wi h
s a e-aligned p opaganda has eme ged as an impo an a ea o academic in e es
al eady be o e Russia’s ull-scale in asion o Uk aine. Fo example, ex an esea ch
has ex ensi ely s udied he ac i i ies o bo s and olls, such as he In e ne Re-
sea ch Agency (IRA), on Twi e , Facebook and Ins ag am (see, e.g., Bas os &
Fa kas, 2019; DiRes a e al., 2022; Do oshenko & Luki o, 2021; Golo chenko e al.,
2020) and he dissemina ion o con en om Russia’s o eign news ou le s, RT and
Spu nik, on Facebook (see Kuzne so a & Makho ykh, 2023).
Ne e heless, esea ch in his a ea emains unde ep esen ed in non-anglophone
con ex s whe e he ope a ional dynamics o he US-based pla o ms, such as Face-
book, mani es in dis inc i e ways and exe conside able in luence o e socio-po-
li ical phenomena. Illus a i ely, he UN ac - inding mission has s a ed ha Face-
book played a “signi ican ” (Human Righ s Council, 2018, p. 14) ole in he Ro-
hingya genocide in Myanma in 2017. In hei s udy, Sablosky (2021) documen ed
he pla o m’s de elopmen om i s ini ial ole as “a ool o democ a ic libe alisa-
ion” (p. 1017) o i s cu en s a us as “an ex a e i o ial poli ical au ho i y bese
wi h adical new no ma i e powe s” (p. 1021). Simila ly, in India (Facebook's
la ges ma ke based on he numbe o use s)4, Facebook has pe mi ed ha e
speech by he uling Hindu na ionalis Bha a iya Jana a Pa y (BJP) poli icians o
emain on i s pla o m in con a en ion o i s policies, o a oid o ending he BJP
in 2020 (Pu nell & Ho wi z, 2020).
The news media o au ho i a ian coun ies can in luence o eign audiences wi h an
au ho i a ian s a e's ision o domes ic and global poli ics. Fo ins ance, in 2014,
he Uk ainian go e nmen es ic ed Russian and p o-Russian news ou le s due o
he conce n ha hei con en could impac domes ic audiences’ “pe cep ions o
4. Acco ding o: h ps://www.s a is a.com/s a is ics/268136/ op-15-coun ies-based-on-numbe -o -
acebook-use s/
5 Kling, Poliako
eali y” (Szos ek & O lo a, 2024, p. 1). Based on su ey da a om Sep embe un il
Oc obe 2021, Szos ek & O lo a (2024) ound ha he use o es ic ed news ou -
le s was indeed linked o mis aken belie s abou he u h ulness o headlines and
lowe suppo o a democ a ic Uk aine. Ne e heless, a p esen , he e is a pauci y
o esea ch in es iga ing he ole o SNSs in gene al, and Facebook in pa icula , in
he ansna ional dissemina ion o non-Anglophone news con olled by au ho i a -
ian coun ies, such as Russia ( o a no able excep ion ela ed o Russia-based SNS
VK, see Golo a, 2020).
One o he ew s udies add essing he ansna ional each o Russia’s Russian-lan-
guage domes ic news has demons a ed, based on Facebook’s ma ke ing and ol-
lowe da a, ha Facebook se ed as a ansmission channel o s a e-aligned news
o audiences ou side o Russia jus one mon h be o e he s a o Russia’s ull-
scale in asion. This is e idenced by Kling’s (2022) inding ha 40% o he 50 op
Russian Russian-language domes ic news ou le s selec ed o he s udy (in Feb u-
a y 2022) had mo e han 50% o hei audience ou side o Russia, wi h he la ges
audiences ound in o me So ie coun ies.5The numbe o Facebook use s among
o me So ie coun ies migh di e , because Facebook has been less popula han
Russia’s SNSs, VK and Odnoklassniki in Cen al Asia (Reyaz, 2020), and some coun-
ies ook measu es o educe Russia’s in o ma ional in luence al eady be o e Rus-
sia’s ull-scale in asion ( o ins ance, Uk aine banned Russia’s SNSs in 2017 (Ro h,
2017)). Ne e heless, ac oss all o me So ie coun ies unde in es iga ion, Kling
(2022) ound ha Russia’s domes ic news ou le s unc i ical o Russia’s poli ical
leade ship had la ge audiences han c i ical ones. To con ibu e o his line o e-
sea ch, his s udy examines Facebook's ole in mode a ing he ansna ional dis-
semina ion o con en om he op Russian-language news ou le s in Russia (as o
May 2022) six mon hs in o Russia’s ull-scale wa .
Russia’s p opaganda on Facebook since he ull-scale in asion
P io o Russia’s ull-scale in asion o Uk aine, Facebook in Russia was pe cei ed
as a o um o bo h opposi ional and s a e-con olled en i ies. A ound he ime o
he ailed p o es s o 2011-2012 in Russia, Wes e n SNSs and Facebook in pa icu-
la , ha e been desc ibed as a “libe al-opposi ional echo chambe ” (Bod uno a e
al., 2021, p. 2932), which a guably played an impo an ole in nu u ing and gal-
5. Despi e exhibi ing linguis ic, cul u al, and poli ical di e si ies, some o he coun ies ha eme ged
ollowing he dissolu ion o he So ie Union con inued o be in luenced —poli ically, economically,
o cul u ally— by Russia. Fo example, Russia has hea ily in es ed in he each o i s media in he
o me So ie coun ies (Ro a u, 2018; Saa i, 2014). Also, se e al s a e-aligned news ou le s, such as
Pe yy Kanal, NTV, Komsomol’skaya P a da, and A gumen y i Fak y, ha e local e sions in some o me
So ie coun ies ( o ins ance, in Bela us, Kazakhs an, Ky gyzs an, and Moldo a).
6 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
anising he p o es (Bod uno a & Li inenko, 2013) agains he alsi ied pa lia-
men a y elec ions, and was linked o an inc eased awa eness o elec ion aud
(Reu e & Szakonyi, 2015). Ne e heless, when he Russian au ho i ies in Decem-
be 2014 asked o block pages ha allowed suppo e s o one o he opposi ion
leade s, he la e Alexei Na alny, o egis e o a p o es ally agains his imminen
c iminal con ic ion and ge ale s abou he e en , Facebook blocked access o his
page inside Russia and only a e a "huge ou c y in he Wes e n media" (Sano ich,
2017, p. 13) e used o block he new copies o he page.
E en be o e i was designa ed an ex emis o ganisa ion, Facebook was ne e he
sole pla o m o news dissemina ion in Russia. I aced s ong compe i ion om
domes ic pla o ms such as VK, as well as in e na ional se ices like YouTube and
Teleg am and also Me a’s own Ins ag am (due o i s isual o ma ). Howe e , Me a
s ands ou because i is he i s majo ech company o be o icially labelled as ex-
emis by he Russian au ho i ies, unlike Google, which con inues o ope a e
YouTube in he coun y a he ime o w i ing (June 2025). This makes Facebook a
p ime case s udy o examining how an au ho i a ian s a e exe s p essu e on
SNSs.
Russia’s ull-scale in asion o Uk aine led o a numbe o measu es po en ially a -
ec ing he dissemina ion o Russia’s news on Facebook un il Augus 2022 ( he
ime ame his s udy ocuses on) as ou lined in he in oduc ion. Applying he
DSA’s ules, he Eu opean Commission (2023) published a s udy on he dis ibu ion
o K emlin disin o ma ion ac oss majo SNSs o e almos a yea be o e and a e
he s a o he ull-scale in asion o Uk aine ( om Decembe 2021 o Decembe
2022). Speci ically o Facebook, i inds ha e en hough he each (subsc ibe
coun ) o selec ed p o-K emlin accoun s g ew, hei publishing ac i i y and use
engagemen dec eased signi ican ly. Simila ly, Okholm e al. (2024) show ha he
sha ing o URLs ela ed o Russia’s o eign news ou le s RT and Spu nik d opped in
Facebook’s inge communi ies. Ne e heless, p o-K emlin con en is accessible on
Facebook ou side he EU and emains accessible e en wi hin he EU o some ex-
en , as no ed by he Eu opean Commission (2023). Also, a pla o m implemen a-
ion s udy conduc ed by Glazuno a e al. (2023), spanning om Feb ua y o May
2022, e ealed ha he bans agains RT and Spu nik we e inconsis en ly imple-
men ed by Facebook ac oss a ious EU coun ies, he eby ende ing some EU
coun ies' use s mo e suscep ible o Russian p opaganda han o he s.
While he Eu opean Commission (2023) p o ides a comp ehensi e assessmen o
he e ec i eness o EU sanc ions agains selec ed Russian news ou le s, i does
no speci ically ocus on news ou le s, bu p e-selec ed SNS accoun s (including
7 Kling, Poliako
some news ou le s) dis ibu ing p o-K emlin con en . By doing so, he epo s ud-
ies di e en ypes o accoun s sp eading p o-K emlin p opaganda bu does no
conside he dissemina ion o con en om popula Russian Russian-language
news domains omi ing in o ma ion abou Russia’s in en ional a acks on he ci il-
ian popula ion o ci ilian objec s in Uk aine, as well as dissemina ing p o-K emlin
p opaganda. Mo eo e , he s udy does no conside he impac o he o he mea-
su es highligh ed in his s udy: Facebook’s labelling o speci ic news ou le s and
Russia’s legisla ion owa ds Me a. In o de o c ea e a di e en ia ed pic u e o he
impac o di e en measu es on he dis inc news ou le s, as well as o measu ing
hei impac on isibili y, we ask:
RQ1: Which o Russia’s news ou le s’ isibili y on Facebook was po en ially impac ed
by which o he highligh ed measu es ollowing Russia’s ull-scale in asion?
Fu he mo e, he Eu opean Commission (2023) did no compa e he dis ibu ion o
wa -unc i ical wi h wa -c i ical con en . By con as , in ou s udy, we di e en ia e
be ween “unc i ical” news ou le s as hose ei he omi ing u h ul in o ma ion
abou Russia’s wa a oci ies and/o in en ionally sp eading p o-K emlin p opagan-
da as compa ed o “c i ical” news ou le s, de ined as hose c i icising Russia’s wa .
The mos ob ious example o ou ca ego isa ion is he Bucha massac e, which
happened in Ma ch 2022. I a news ou le ques ioned Russia’s a my’s in ol emen
in he massac e o omi ed any in o ma ion on i , we classi ied i as “unc i ical”. I
an ou le p o ided in o ma ion abou i , such as e idence o Russia’s a my’s in-
ol emen o wi ness s a emen s, we classi ied i as “c i ical” (see he Appendix o
examples). The e o e, ou le s ha exp ess some c i icism o he Russian a my bu
s ill deny i s wa a oci ies we e classi ied as “unc i ical". The idea behind his ca e-
go isa ion was ha in o ma ion om “c i ical” ou le s could encou age eade s o
ques ion he e sion o e en s p o ided by he Russian au ho i ies and p opagan-
da.The compa ison o wa -unc i ical and wa -c i ical con en helps o unde s and
wha ype o con en Russian-speaking Facebook use s a e mo e likely o be ex-
posed o. We no e ha we do no conside he po en ial nega i e aming o URLs
o he analysis o his s udy, as we aim o ge a gene al pic u e o wha ype o
con en is mos isibly dis ibu ed ac oss he pla o m. Assuming ha p edomi-
nan ly K emlin-aligned ou le s a e a ge ed by he highligh ed measu es, we hy-
po hesise:
H1a: The isibili y o pos s including Russia’s unc i ical news domains on Facebook de-
c eased a e he s a o Russia’s ull-scale in asion.
H1b: The isibili y o pos s including Russia’s c i ical news domains on Facebook did
8 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
unc i ical domains a e colou ed in iole , > 50% unc i ical in g een, > 50% c i ical
in o ange and hose sha ing exclusi ely c i ical domains in blue. Ne wo k il e ed
o deg ee ≥ 5.
The igu e shows ha he majo i y o he ampli ie spaces sha ed bo h unc i ical
and c i ical news domains in hei pos s (662 unique public spaces, 42,703 unique
pos s), ollowed by hose sha ing exclusi ely unc i ical news domains (565 public
spaces, 23,365 unique pos s). The numbe o spaces sha ing exclusi ely c i ical do-
mains is he smalles (39 public spaces, 1,294 unique pos s). Thus, we may con-
clude ha unc i ical news domains we e o e all mo e isibly sha ed ac oss he
ampli ie spaces on Facebook six mon hs in o Russia’s ull-scale wa . Howe e , we
also ind ha he ampli ie spaces sha ing exclusi ely c i ical news domains a -
ac ed he highes a e age engagemen (1,17 a e age o al engagemen ) and
subsc ibe coun (85,790 a e age subsc ibe coun ). See Figu e 2 in he Appendix
o an o e iew o desc ip i es.
In Figu e 1, he public spaces clus e ed closely oge he ep esen ins ances whe e
he same domains we e sha ed equen ly be ween he spaces. I a space is a he
away, he e a en' many sha ing connec ions be ween ha space and o he clus-
e s o spaces. E en hough he c i ical and unc i ical spaces seem o be connec ed
h ough he spaces sha ing bo h domain ypes, he igu e highligh s ha he e is
s ill a dis inc communi y o spaces sha ing exclusi ely c i ical news domains and
spaces sha ing exclusi ely unc i ical ones. The la ges ci cles can be ound in he
cen e o he ne wo k highligh ing ha ampli ie spaces sha ing bo h unc i ical
and c i ical news domains sha ed he la ges numbe o news URLs du ing he i s
six mon hs o he ull-scale wa . The 10 la ges ampli ie spaces by he numbe o
unique pos s a e plo ed in Figu e 4 o he Appendix.
Conclusion
Nego ia ing con en mode a ion on Facebook
This s udy aims o con ibu e o he esea ch li e a u e ocusing on he complexi y
o pla o m go e nance (Go wa, 2019), pla o m powe (Naugh on, 2018) ac oss
di e en na ional con ex s (Ahn e al., 2023), and he go e ning o con en by
SNSs (DeVi o, 2017; Gillespie, 2018). Speci ically, i in es iga es he ole US-based
SNS Facebook plays as an in o ma ion in e media y o Russia’s Russia-language
news con en , hus, beyond he Anglophone con ex (Abhishek, 2021; Sablosky,
2021). The indings demons a e how SNSs acili a e au ho i a ian egimes’ con ol
(in his case, Russia) o e in o ma ion lows eaching audiences beyond hei bo -
15 Kling, Poliako
de s (Golo a, 2020; Kling, 2022). E en a e he implemen a ion o se e al mea-
su es o educe he au ho i a ian coun y’s in o ma ional in luence on he pla o m,
his con ol pe sis s.
Speci ically, we ind ha he measu es in oduced by Facebook and s a e ac o s
( he EU and Russia) since he s a o Russia’s ull-scale wa led o a signi ican de-
c ease in he numbe o a e age pos s by Russia’s unc i ical news domains (H1a).
Howe e , his impac is bes explained by he implemen a ion o a mix u e o all
highligh ed measu es, no solely he EU’s o Facebook’s measu es as we ind a dis-
c epancy be ween wha is labelled by Facebook and wha is sanc ioned by he EU
(RQ1). Facebook's de ini ion o "s a e-con olled" is based on hei undisclosed p o-
cedu e, implemen ed globally, as hei o he means o in e nal con en mode a ion
(Ahn e al., 2023). Howe e , Russia’s p opaganda ou le s a e owned no only by he
s a e bu also by co po a ions and oliga chs close o Vladimi Pu in (Schimp össl &
Yabloko , 2017). These ou le s also shape an unc i ical iew o Russia’s wa a oci-
ies by ei he omi ing in o ma ion o ac i ely p opaga ing p o-K emlin na a i es.
Con a y o Facebook’s o icial s a emen s abou he wa (Me a, 2022), ou indings
sugges ha hei e o s o demo e Russian-language unc i ical news con en a e
limi ed. Based on he numbe o pos s, unc i ical news domains we e s ill app oxi-
ma ely h ee imes mo e sha ed han c i ical ones du ing he i s six mon hs o
he wa (RQ2). Hence, Facebook use s could s ill be exposed o p o-K emlin con-
en . One eason o his lack o in ol emen migh be linked o he Russian lan-
guage being less p io i ised and Facebook’s lack o engagemen wi h egional ex-
pe s. Acco ding o Facebook whis leblowe F ances Haugen (Popli, 2021), he
company has his o ically unde in es ed in non-English languages, which ecei e “a
iny ac ion” (n.p.) o he secu i y sys ems ha English ecei es. As o he engage-
men wi h egional expe s, Facebook claims ha i has been “wo king wi h hi d-
pa y ac -checke s in he egion” (Me a, 2022, n.p.) wi hou disclosing who hese
ac -checke s a e. Facebook’s s a emen claimed ha he company has expanded
“ hi d-pa y ac -checking capaci y in Russian and Uk ainian languages ac oss he
egion” (Me a, 2022, n.p.). Howe e , he s a emen does no cla i y i hi d-pa y
ac -checke s we e hi ed bo h in Russia and in Uk aine o ou side he egion and i
Uk ainian ones we e also esponsible o ac -checking (media) ex s in Russian. As
o June 2025, Facebook s opped i s hi d pa y ac -checking p og amme in he US
(Me a, 2025) and ne e upda ed hei s a emen abou he ongoing wa (Me a,
2022). Ano he eason migh be he unique si ua ion o Facebook losing he Russ-
ian ma ke . This si ua ion is incompa able o Facebook's e o s o censo p opa-
ganda in he Global Sou h, whe e some o i s la ges ma ke s a e loca ed (Ab-
16 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
hishek, 2021). The company may no eel compelled o dec ease Russian-language
con en , e en i i con ains p opaganda, as he ma ke is no longe p o i able. Con-
sequen ly, we conclude ha a leas six mon hs in o Russia’s ull-scale wa , Face-
book con inued o enable Russia’s in o ma ional con ol on he pla o m.
Visibili y o unc i ical news on Facebook
Wi h ega ds o Russia’s news ecosys em on Facebook, we ind ha e en hough
less unc i ical news domains ci cula e in pos s ac oss he pla o m a e he s a
o he ull-scale wa , as a whole, hey a e s ill mo e isibly dissemina ed han c i i-
cal ones (RQ2). This ollows ex an esea ch indings be o e he ull-scale wa on
he dominance o unc i ical publics in he Russian media landscape, which was
no ed by Li inenko & Toep l (2019) and also by Kling (2022) jus one mon h be-
o e Russia’s ull-scale in asion. Ou inding may also be in e p e ed as a measu e
o "success" s emming om he new legisla ion in Russia aimed a supp essing
c i ical iewpoin s by c iminalising dissen ega ding he wa (McCa hy e al.,
2023).
E en hough he ampli ie spaces publishing exclusi ely c i ical and unc i ical
news domains a e di ided (RQ3), hey also seem connec ed h ough he public
spaces sha ing bo h domain ypes. Du ing he i s six mon hs o he ull-scale wa ,
unc i ical news domains we e no jus published by exclusi ely “unc i ical” ampli i-
e spaces, bu also se ed as a e e ence o e en s happening in Russia and he
e i o ies o Uk aine occupied by Russia o “c i ical” spaces. This could show ha
he Russian s a e is g adually domina ing access o in o ma ion abou i s a med
o ces, as wa -c i ical ou le s canno send hei jou nalis s o he Russian on -
lines, so hey mus ely ei he on da a om unc i ical media o on open-sou ce da-
a. In o he wo ds, while he si ua ion on he Uk ainian on line is epo ed no
only by Uk ainian media bu also by acc edi ed o eign jou nalis s, he majo i y o
in o ma ion om he Russian on lines comes om Russia’s unc i ical ou le s. This
could be an explana ion o he dominance o ampli ica ion spaces publishing bo h
c i ical and unc i ical news domains du ing he i s six mon hs o he wa .
Ne e heless, he ampli ie spaces sha ing mos ly (mo e han 50%) c i ical news
domains and he ones sha ing exclusi ely c i ical domains a e smalle as a whole
(318 unique spaces) han hei coun e pa s sha ing p edominan ly o exclusi ely
unc i ical news domains (949 unique spaces). This con adic s an ea lie a gumen
by schola s who ha e desc ibed Russia’s Facebook as a “libe al-opposi ional echo
chambe ” (Bod uno a e al., 2021, p. 2932). As we show in Figu e 1, unc i ical am-
pli ica ion spaces a e ei he no isola ed om unc i ical news o ma ginal which is
17 Kling, Poliako
in line wi h he a gumen o B uns (2021), calling he “echo chambe ” an “ill-de-
ined me apho ” (p. 34) o inc easing pola isa ion in socie y and poli ics. As e i-
denced by ou indings ha he numbe o pos s con aining c i ical news domains,
some o which could be aligned wi h he libe al-opposi ional ca ego y in 2011
(Bod uno a e al., 2021), did no d op signi ican ly a e he s a o Russia’s ull-
scale in asion, wa -c i ical ou le s ha e no been a ec ed by he measu es ollow-
ing he in asion (H1b). Consequen ly, he e is no eason o doub ha hei in lu-
ence on Facebook has emained since he s a o he ull-scale in asion. This is
also e idenced by he highe a e age engagemen (0.77 a e age engagemen by
ampli ie space) and subsc ibe coun s (52,976 a e age subsc ibe coun by ampli-
ie space) o c i ical and majo i y c i ical ampli ie spaces compa ed o unc i ical
and majo i y unc i ical ones (0.31 a e age engagemen by ampli ie space, 25,677
a e age subsc ibe coun by ampli ie space).
Limi a ions and u u e esea ch
This s udy ocused exclusi ely on he la ges public spaces sha ing Russia’s op
Russian-language news domains on Facebook du ing a speci ic ime ame ( om 24
Augus 2021 o 24 Augus 2022) based on C owd angle da a. As no ed in he
Me hod sec ion, he collec ed da a is limi ed o Facebook’s public spaces o a spe-
ci ic ollowe size and he s udy’s conclusions a e, hus, no necessa ily applicable
o Facebook’s p i a e en i onmen s (e.g., closed g oups, p i a e p o iles and mes-
saging) and smalle public spaces du ing ano he pe iod. Classi ying ampli ie
spaces by hei hema ic and egional ocus is beyond he scope o his s udy and
will be add essed in ollow-up esea ch.
Addi ionally, ou esea ch ocuses on he en i onmen s eme ging om he sha ing
o pos s con aining Russia’s op Russian-language news domains and discusses he
isibili y o speci ic domain ypes (wa -c i ical/wa -unc i ical) ha ci cula e ac oss
Facebook. As a esul , his s udy does no explici ly add ess coun e -a i udinal
sha ing – pos s including domains no in a suppo i e bu c i ical way. We can as-
sume ha he unc i ical domains sha ed by public spaces whe e mo e han 50% o
he sha ed domains we e c i ical a e such spaces. Howe e , we a gue ha by sha -
ing hese unc i ical news domains, hese spaces also con ibu e o he isibili y o
unc i ical news on Facebook.
O e all, his s udy p o ides insigh s in o he ole o SNSs as media o s o au ho i-
a ian s a e-con olled in o ma ion en i onmen s du ing a mili a y con lic , high-
ligh ing he in e wined pla o m go e nance sha ed be ween SNSs and na ional
au ho i ies. Ou indings may be pa ly ans e able o o he SNSs ha ha e hei
18 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
own in e es s and con en mode a ion policies (e.g., China’s TikTok and Elon
Musk’s X), as hey highligh he complexi ies ha a ise as a esul o policies aimed
a educing an au ho i a ian s a e's in luence. Consequen ly, ou me hodology can
be adap ed o o he languages, pa icula ly in ins ances whe e Facebook is no
longe able o mone ise he na ional ma ke .
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Appendix
Addi ional in o ma ion on coding public spaces as (un-) c i ical
He e is an o e iew o de ailed c i e ia based on which he wo au ho s o he
a icle ca ego ised he domains in o c i ical and unc i ical owa ds Russia’s wa
agains Uk aine.
C i ical:
C i icism o Russia’s poli ical leade ship, i s wa and wa a oci ies agains Uk aine.
Keywo ds: Bucha, Uk aine, wa
Example pos s wi h Bucha in pos message:
22 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
Example 1. Pos om c i ical news ou le Mediazona in which he killing o
esiden s in Bucha is epo ed. T ansla ion: "They said, le him lie, hey did no bu y
hei own": es imonies o one execu ion in Bucha. THIS MESSAGE (MATERIAL)
WAS CREATED AND (OR) DISTRIBUTED BY A FOREIGN MASS MEDIA ACTING AS A
FOREIGN AGENT, AND (OR) BY A RUSSIAN LEGAL ENTITY ACTING AS A FOREIGN
AGENT. Bucha is a small ci y in he Kyi egion, which has al eady become a
symbol o wa a oci ies commi ed by he Russian a my in Uk aine. Hund eds o
23 Kling, Poliako
Bucha esiden s we e killed in a mon h, some o hem we e o u ed. Publishe o
"Mediazona" Pe Ve zilo wen o he ci y and eco ded he es imonies o
Alexande Melnichuk's neighbou , who became one o he ic ims o he Russian
mili a y. Las accessed (3 May 2024): h ps://www. acebook.com/
100064284724047/pos s/4938797682824327/
Example 2. Pos om c i ical news ou le TJou nal (TJ) which epo s on mass
killings in Bucha. T ansla ion: Mass mu de s in he ci y o Bucha a e he main opic
o ecen days a ound he wo ld and, appa en ly, a u ning poin in he con lic
be ween Russia and Uk aine. On TJ, he main hing is abou wha happened: how a
24 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
FIGURE 8: Compa ison o he a e age engagemen , numbe o unique pos s and accoun subsc ibe
coun by news domain a e he s a o Russia’s ull-scale in asion by he le el o c i icism owa d
he wa (c i ical [N=12] and unc i ical [N=59])
31 Kling, Poliako
Compa ison o he numbe o unique pos s and public spaces, a e age engagemen and
accoun subsc ibe coun by accoun c i icism g oup (c i ical, majo i y c i ical, majo i y
unc i ical, unc i ical) a e he s a o Russia’s ull-scale in asion
32 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
FIGURE 9: he op en news domains by o al unique pos coun and a e age engagemen by
domain six mon hs in o Russia’s ull-scale in asion. O e all, he indings show ha he mos sha ed
URLs a e by numbe o pos s p edominan ly om unc i ical news domains, excep o eign
33 Kling, Poliako
b oadcas e s oboda.o g and Russian exile news websi e meduza.io. By con as , he anking o news
domains by a e age o al engagemen shows ha c i ical news domains, such as s oboda.o g and
meduza.io gained mo e engagemen on a e age han Russia’s s a e-aligned news ou le s n . u and
1 . u.
FIGURE 10: Top en domes ic news domains six mon hs in o Russia’s ull-scale wa agains Uk aine
by o al pos coun and a e age engagemen by domain
34 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
FIGURE 11: O e iew o op en ampli ie spaces by numbe o unique pos s
Table 1
O e iew o sampled Russia’s op news domains by con en mode a ion measu es and
le el o c i icism (c i ical/ unc i ical)
NEWS DOMAIN
(N = 72)
EU
SANCTIONS
(UNTIL AUGUST 2022,
N = 4)
“RUSSIA STATE-SPONSORED” LABEL ON
FACEBOOK
(AS OF OCTOBER 2023, N=15)
FACEBOOK LABELLED
AS
"EXTREMIST
ORGANISATION"
(SINCE MARCH 2024,
N=64)
osnmedia. u X
solenka.in o X
sm.news X
no os i l. u X
ng. u X
dni. u X
eadaily.com X
a gumen i. u X
opco . u X
p o ile. u X
35 Kling, Poliako
NEWS DOMAIN
(N = 72)
EU
SANCTIONS
(UNTIL AUGUST 2022,
N = 4)
“RUSSIA STATE-SPONSORED” LABEL ON
FACEBOOK
(AS OF OCTOBER 2023, N=15)
FACEBOOK LABELLED
AS
"EXTREMIST
ORGANISATION"
(SINCE MARCH 2024,
N=64)
adiokp. u X
za a. u X
uk aina. u X X
egnum. u X
og. u* X
o -online. u X
b m. u X
z. u X
idus. u X
mk. u X
in e ax. u X
pnp. u X X
y o.news X
business-
gaze a. u X
opwa . u X
news. u X
u a.news X
s p essa. u X
inosmi. u X X
amble . u X X
p a da. u X
ai . u X
gaze a. u X X
z ezda. u X X
ia. u X X
5- . u X
360 . u X
36 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
NEWS DOMAIN
(N = 72)
EU
SANCTIONS
(UNTIL AUGUST 2022,
N = 4)
“RUSSIA STATE-SPONSORED” LABEL ON
FACEBOOK
(AS OF OCTOBER 2023, N=15)
FACEBOOK LABELLED
AS
"EXTREMIST
ORGANISATION"
(SINCE MARCH 2024,
N=64)
g. u X X
ass. u X X
bc. u X
komme san . u X
eado ka.news X
iz. u X
li e. u X
kp. u X
edomos i. u X
jou nal. u* X
len a. u X X
holod.media*
heins. u*
zona.media* X
he- illage. u* X
meduza.io*
ayga.in o* X
bbc.com/ ussian*
dw.com/ u*
s oboda.o g*
cu en ime. *
o bes. u X
ia an. u** X
na ion-news. u** X
ussian. .com X X X
adiospu nik. ia. u X X X
adiospu nik. u X X
37 Kling, Poliako
NEWS DOMAIN
(N = 72)
EU
SANCTIONS
(UNTIL AUGUST 2022,
N = 4)
“RUSSIA STATE-SPONSORED” LABEL ON
FACEBOOK
(AS OF OCTOBER 2023, N=15)
FACEBOOK LABELLED
AS
"EXTREMIST
ORGANISATION"
(SINCE MARCH 2024,
N=64)
1 . u X X
es i. u X X X
smo im. u X X
c. u X X
n . u X
en. X
sa g ad. X
mos eg oday. u X
No e. News domains ca ego ised as c i ical a e ma ked wi h * (n = 12). News
domains ha ing been banned by Facebook al eady be o e he s a o Russia’s ull-
scale in asion o Uk aine a e ma ked wi h **.
Fo he news ou le Spu nik, we conside ed bo h adiospu nik. ia. u and
adiospu nik. u as sepa a e domains which should be bo h EU-sanc ioned.
In e es ingly, while adiospu nik. ia. u was ound o be labelled on Facebook and
no accessible in Ge many as o Oc obe 2023, adiospu nik. u was no ound
labelled and also accessible in Ge many a ha ime.
38 In e ne Policy Re iew 14(3) | 2025
