Fische , Ilan; A ashi, Shacked; Gi on, Lio
A icle
Subjec i e Game S uc u es: A beha io al game heo e ic analysis o
hidden pe cep ions and s a egic p ope ies unde lying he Is aeli-
Pales inian con lic
Games
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
MDPI – Mul idisciplina y Digi al Publishing Ins i u e, Basel
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Fische , Ilan; A ashi, Shacked; Gi on, Lio (2025) : Subjec i e Game S uc u es:
A beha io al game heo e ic analysis o hidden pe cep ions and s a egic p ope ies unde lying he
Is aeli-Pales inian con lic , Games, ISSN 2073-4336, MDPI, Basel, Vol. 16, Iss. 1, pp. 1-23,
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Ci a ion: Fische , I., A ashi, S., &
Gi on, L. (2025). Subjec i e Game
S uc u es: A Beha io al Game
Theo e ic Analysis o Hidden
Pe cep ions and S a egic P ope ies
Unde lying he Is aeli–Pales inian
Con lic . Games,16(1), 3. h ps://
doi.o g/10.3390/g16010003
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games
A icle
Subjec i e Game S uc u es: A Beha io al Game Theo e ic
Analysis o Hidden Pe cep ions and S a egic P ope ies
Unde lying he Is aeli–Pales inian Con lic
Ilan Fische * , Shacked A ashi and Lio Gi on
Depa men o Psychology, Facul y o Social Sciences, Uni e si y o Hai a, Hai a 3498838, Is ael;
[email p o ec ed] (S.A.); [email p o ec ed] (L.G.)
*Co espondence: i ische @psy.hai a.ac.il
Abs ac : He e, we apply a no el amewo k, e med Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs),
o unco e ing and analyzing hidden mo i a ions in ecological con lic s. SGSs enable
he examina ion o implici a i udes and mo i a ions wi hin indi iduals and g oups. We
elici ed SGSs om Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s be ween Ma ch 2019 and Feb ua y
2020 (app oxima ely h ee yea s be o e 7 Oc obe 2023), ying o answe he ques ions o
whe he Is aelis and Pales inians pe cei ed he con lic in a simila manne , whe he hey
ha e iden ical assessmen s o he associa ed payo s, and wha can be done o educe u u e
hos ili ies and a ain peace ul solu ions. The esul s e eal meaning ul di e ences be ween
he pa ies. Is aeli SGSs la gely e lec ed expec a ions o mu ually coope a i e ou comes,
while Pales inian SGSs exhibi ed ambi alence and a highe occu ence o con on a ional
expec a ions om bo h pa ies. App oxima ely 70% o Is aeli SGSs and 40% o Pales inian
SGSs we e ca ego ized as absolu ely s able games, indica ing ha a meaning ul po ion
o pa icipan s implici ly an icipa ed coope a i e and mu ually bene icial esolu ions. Ad-
di ionally, Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y wi h Is aelis we e
conside ably lowe han he pe cep ions o Is aeli pa icipan s, poin ing o meaning ul
gaps in he al e na i es each side was expec ing he o he side o choose. The discussion
highligh s he impo ance o enhancing subjec i e pe cep ions o simila i y and shaping
pa ies’ pe cei ed payo s uc u es as wo key pa hways o os e ing peace ul in e ac ions
in di e se social and poli ical con lic s.
Keywo ds: subjec i e game s uc u es; axonomy; subjec i e expec ed ela i e simila i y;
SERS; Is aeli–Pales ine con lic
1. In oduc ion
In e na ional dispu es a e ypically managed and con eyed by cen al au ho i ies,
which de ine disag eemen s, shape he public agenda, and d i e he use o diploma ic o
mili a y ac ions. Howe e , indi iduals li ing in con lic zones may hold pe cep ions ha di-
e ge om hose p omo ed by cen al au ho i ies. E en wi hin he same g oup, indi iduals
may expe ience subjec i e pe cep ions ha di e om hose o o he g oup membe s o he
iews exp essed by g oup ep esen a i es. Unde s anding hese indi idually cons uc ed
pe cep ions—pa icula ly hose de eloping wi hin p olonged, ongoing con lic s—can o e
aluable insigh s in o he unde lying dynamics o he con lic , i s po en ial ajec o ies,
and may sugges inno a i e app oaches o con lic esolu ion. P e ious esea ch has
p o ided pa icipan s wi h a p ede ined se o possible ou comes, asking hem o a e
hei p e e ences o u ili ies. Fo ins ance, Plous (1985) collec ed u ili y a ings o ou
Games 2025,16, 3 h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/g16010003
Games 2025,16, 3 2 o 23
p oposed ou comes ela ed o he a ms ace be ween he US and he So ie Union du ing
he Cold Wa . Simila ly, Ames e al. (2012) p esen ed Ame ican pa icipan s wi h ou
op ions desc ibing a US–China con lic , asking hem o indica e hei own p e e ences as
well as hose hey belie ed e lec ed he a e age Chinese ci izen’s pe spec i e. Hale y
e al. (2012) asked pa icipan s o ank he ou comes o wo-by- wo ma ices ep esen ing
nego ia ion scena ios. While hese me hods e ec i ely ocus pa icipan s’ a en ion on spe-
ci ic ou comes, hey do no allow o he elici a ion o ully subjec i e con lic pe cep ions,
which could hen be ans o med in o games and analyzed o mally.
To his end, we implemen ed a no el p ocedu e ha elici s implici s a egic pe -
spec i es om laypeople, equi ing no p io knowledge o expe ise (Fische e al.,2024),
and ansla es hem in o o mally de ined wo-by- wo game s uc u es. These esul ing
games, e med Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs), can hen be analyzed and classi ied
using a ious decision-making p inciples and game- heo e ic amewo ks.
To in es iga e he Is aeli–Pales inian con lic and e eal indi idual mo i a ions, we
sampled pa icipan s om Is ael, Gaza, and he Wes Bank. Da a collec ion occu ed
be ween 2018 and 2020 as pa o an in e na ional s udy applying game heo y while
aiming o unco e he oo s o con lic and wa ac oss di e en global dispu es. The esul s
e eal bo h commonali ies and di e ences in he pe spec i es o he wo popula ions,
sugges ing po en ial in e en ions ha may encou age coope a i e solu ions. Fu he mo e,
by compa ing explici s a emen s wi h implici game s uc u es, we e eal gaps be ween
hese pe spec i es and emphasize he impo ance o elici ing Subjec i e Game S uc u es
as a means o be e unde s and and esol e eal-li e con lic s.
Be o e de ailing he expe imen al p ocedu e, we b ie ly discuss: (i) he use o game
heo y as a amewo k o unde s anding and analyzing social in e ac ions, con lic , and
wa ; (ii) he calcula ion o wo ypes o expec ed alues ha guide decision-making unde
unce ain y; and (iii) he classi ica ion o games acco ding o wo axonomies: a e ised
e sion o he axonomy p oposed by Rapopo and Guye (1966), and a axonomy based on
he heo y o Subjec i e Expec ed Rela i e Simila i y (SERS; Fische ,2009,2012;Fische e al.,
2022;Fische & Sa ane ski,2023). Reade s amilia wi h some o he opics may wish o
skip hese sec ions and p oceed di ec ly o he desc ip ion o he ools and p ocedu es used
in his s udy. Also, eade s less in e es ed in applied game- heo e ic concep s may p e e o
go di ec ly o he sec ions de ailing indi idual s a emen s and pe cep ions o simila i y.
2. Game-Theo e ic Modeling as an Ins umen o Unde s anding and
Analyzing Social In e ac ions
Game heo y p o ides use ul ools o desc ibing and p edic ing social and economic
in e ac ions. Game ma ices desc ibe possible al e na i es o wo o mo e pa ies, and
associa e hem wi h expec ed payo s ha may be gained by each o he sides. Fo example,
he well-known P isone ’s Dilemma game (Flood,1958;Rapopo & Chammah,1965)
has been applied o model a ms aces, he ou b eak o wa (Axel od,1984;B ams,1993),
and he mo i a ion o pollu e and igno e he impac o clima e change (Ha din,1968;
Os om,1998;Fische e al.,2022). The basic wo-by- wo PD game p o ides each pa y
wi h wo al e na i es, ypically e e ed o as coope a ion and de ec ion. The possible
esul s a e desc ibed by ou di e en payo s, e med as ollows: Temp a ion (T), Rewa d
(R), Punishmen (P) and Sucke (S), whe e T > R > P > S (Figu e 1a). Examining he PD
game e eals se e al impo an s a egic p ope ies such as he exis ence o a dominan
s a egy o de ec ion, and a de icien Nash equilib ium a he in e sec ion o bo h dominan
s a egies (see Supplemen al Ma e ials—Basic decision c i e ia).
Games 2025,16, 3 3 o 23
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 o 22
a de icien Nash equilib ium a he in e sec ion o bo h dominan s a egies (see Supple-
men al Ma e ials—Basic decision c i e ia).
(a)
Coope a e De ec
Coope a e R, R S, T
De ec T, S P, P
T > R > P > S
(b)
Coope a e De ec
Coope a e 8, 8 0, 10
De ec 10, 0 1, 1
(c)
Coope a e De ec
Coope a e R, R S, T
De ec T, S P, P
T > R > S > P
(d)
Coope a e De ec
Coope a e 8, 8 1, 10
De ec 10, 1 0, 0
Figu e 1. Examples o wo-by- wo game ma ices, showing wo al e na i es o he ow and column
playe s and hei co esponding payo alues de i ed om simul aneous choice combina ions. Le
and igh alues in each cell indica e he playo s o he ow and column playe s, espec i ely. Panel
(a) depic s a gene ic P isone ’s Dilemma game, de ined by he inequali ies: T > R > P > S (and in some
expe imen s also 2R > S + T; Flood, 1958; Rapopo & Chammah, 1965). Panel (b) depic s a nume ic
example o he P isone ’s Dilemma game. Panel (c) depic s a gene ic Chicken game, de ined by he
inequali ies: T > R > S > P (Rapopo & Chammah, 1966). Panel (d) depic s a nume ic example o he
Chicken game.
2.1. The Compu a ion o Expec ed Values
Applying Expec ed Values (EVs; on Neumann & Mo gens e n, 2007) o games, such
as he PD game, combines he expec ed payo s associa ed wi h he choice o each speci ic
al e na i e wi h he es ima ed p obabili ies o he opponen choosing each al e na i e. In he
case o wo-by- wo games, he choice o one o he opponen ’s al e na i es is assigned a
p obabili y, p, while he o he al e na i e is assigned he complemen a y p obabili y o 1 −
p. Using he example o he PD game and assigning he p obabili y p o he p ospec s o he
opponen o coope a e allows o he compu ing he EV o each al e na i e. The EV associ-
a ed wi h own coope a ion is gi en by 𝑅𝑝 + 𝑆(1 − 𝑝), and he EV associa ed wi h own de-
ec ion is gi en by 𝑇𝑝 + 𝑃(1 − 𝑝) (Figu e 1a), le ing decision make s choose he al e na i e
wi h he highe EV.
Howe e , i has been shown ha when add essing human in e ac ions wi h an oppo-
nen in wo-by- wo games, assigning a p obabili y o he p ospec o he opponen o choose
a simila al e na i e o one’s own chosen al e na i e, ps (and he complemen a y p obabili y
o 1 − ps o he p ospec s o he opponen o choose a di e en al e na i e), allows o compu-
ing EVs ha be e co espond o ac ual human choices. This o m o EV compu a ion,
e med Subjec i e Expec ed Rela i e Simila i y (SERS), has been shown o p edic ac ual
human beha io in PD, Chicken, and Ba le o he Sexes games (Fische , 2009, 2012; Fische
& Sa ane ski, 2023, Figu e 1), and has been de eloped in o a heo e ical s a egy ha
Figu e 1. Examples o wo-by- wo game ma ices, showing wo al e na i es o he ow and column
playe s and hei co esponding payo alues de i ed om simul aneous choice combina ions. Le
and igh alues in each cell indica e he playo s o he ow and column playe s, espec i ely. Panel
(a) depic s a gene ic P isone ’s Dilemma game, de ined by he inequali ies: T > R > P > S (and in
some expe imen s also 2R > S + T; Flood, 1958; Rapopo & Chammah, 1965). Panel (b) depic s a
nume ic example o he P isone ’s Dilemma game. Panel (c) depic s a gene ic Chicken game, de ined
by he inequali ies: T > R > S > P (Rapopo & Chammah,1966). Panel (d) depic s a nume ic example
o he Chicken game.
2.1. The Compu a ion o Expec ed Values
Applying Expec ed Values (EVs; on Neumann & Mo gens e n,2007) o games, such
as he PD game, combines he expec ed payo s associa ed wi h he choice o each speci ic
al e na i e wi h he es ima ed p obabili ies o he opponen choosing each al e na i e. In
he case o wo-by- wo games, he choice o one o he opponen ’s al e na i es is assigned
a p obabili y, p, while he o he al e na i e is assigned he complemen a y p obabili y o
1−p
. Using he example o he PD game and assigning he p obabili y p o he p ospec s
o he opponen o coope a e allows o he compu ing he EV o each al e na i e. The EV
associa ed wi h own coope a ion is gi en by Rp +S(1
−
p), and he EV associa ed wi h
own de ec ion is gi en by Tp +P(1
−
p) (Figu e 1a), le ing decision make s choose he
al e na i e wi h he highe EV.
Howe e , i has been shown ha when add essing human in e ac ions wi h an op-
ponen in wo-by- wo games, assigning a p obabili y o he p ospec o he opponen o
choose a simila al e na i e o one’s own chosen al e na i e, p
s
(and he complemen a y
p obabili y o 1
−
p
s
o he p ospec s o he opponen o choose a di e en al e na i e),
allows o compu ing EVs ha be e co espond o ac ual human choices. This o m o EV
compu a ion, e med Subjec i e Expec ed Rela i e Simila i y (SERS), has been shown o
p edic ac ual human beha io in PD, Chicken, and Ba le o he Sexes games (Fische ,2009,
2012;Fische & Sa ane ski,2023, Figu e 1), and has been de eloped in o a heo e ical
s a egy ha maximizes playe s’ expec ed ou comes ac oss all wo-by- wo games (Fische
e al.,2013,2022;Fische & A ashi,2024).
Games 2025,16, 3 4 o 23
As in he classic EV calcula ions, SERS p edic s ha playe s choose he al e na i e wi h
he highe EV. Fo he PD example (whe e simila choices e e o bo h mu ual coope a ion
and mu ual de ec ion and a e assigned he p
s
p obabili y, and di e en choices e e o
bo h cases in which one o he playe s chooses o coope a e and he o he chooses o de ec ,
and a e he e o e assigned he p obabili y o 1
−
p
s
), a playe may, ei he o mally o
in ui i ely, compa e he EV o coope a ion wi h he EV o de ec ion and decide o coope a e
whene e Rp
s
+S(1
−
p
s
) > Pp
s
+T(1
−
p
s
). Fu he sepa a ing be ween pe cep ions o
he opponen ,p
s
, and he game’s payo s allows o he ew i ing o SERS’s decision ule as
ollows: coope a e whene e p
s
> (T
−
S)/(T
−
S+R
−
P), o he wise de ec . While he le
side o he inequali y desc ibes he pe cep ion o s a egic simila i y wi h he opponen ,
he igh side de ines a ixed h eshold alue o he game. Deno ing he payo a io by p
s
*
gene a es an ab idged decision ule ha s a es he ollowing: coope a e whene e p
s
>p
s
*,
and de ec whene e p
s
<p
s
*. Impo an ly, he p
s
* index is no only an ab idged o m
o w i ing, bu a c i ical es ima e o he ex en o coope a ion mo i a ed by each payo
ma ix. When p
s
* is su icien ly low, many opponen s may be ega ded as being su icien ly
simila o mo i a e he choice o he coope a i e al e na i e; in con as , a game wi h a high
p
s
* sugges s ha mos opponen s a e likely o be conside ed as insu icien ly simila , and
he e o e mo i a es he choice o he con on a ional al e na i e. In o he wo ds, games
wi h low p
s
* alues may be ega ded as mo e coope a i e han games wi h high p
s
* alues.
I has been shown ha while s a egic simila i y is a concealed ai , i s ex en may be
app oxima ed by a ious obse ed simila i y cues (Chie chia & Co icelli,2015;Fische ,2009,
2012;Toma e al.,2012). In he p esen s udy, we ask Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s
o assess wo simila i y es ima es: simila i y assigned o he o he pa y as a collec i e
g oup, and simila i y assigned o an indi idual associa ed wi h he o he pa y. While
g oup simila i y is expec ed o e lec common s e eo ypes and pe cep ions o he ou -
g oup (Banaji,2002), in e pe sonal simila i y is expec ed o e lec mo e idiosync a ic,
and he e o e mo e he e ogeneous, pe cep ions. Resea ch has shown ha pa icipan s
make mo e con on a ional choices while playing in e -g oup games han while playing
in e pe sonal games, e en when he payo s in bo h games a e iden ical (Bo ns ein &
Ben-Yosse ,1994).
2.2. Game Classi ica ions
While he P isone ’s Dilemma game used he e as an example is a well-known model
illus a ing s a egic p ope ies, i ep esen s jus one o many possible games, each wi h
unique s a egic cha ac e is ics. To iden i y meaning ul s a egic simila i ies and di e ences
be ween games, one mus examine and compa e hese p ope ies. Acco dingly, his s udy
elies on wo game classi ica ions: a e ised axonomy o wo-by- wo games based on
Rapopo and Guye (1966), and a SERS-based axonomy (Fische e al.,2024).
Rapopo and Guye ’s (1966) axonomy classi ies all s ic ly o dinal wo-by- wo games
(games in which he payo s o each playe a e ep esen ed by o dinal anks—1, 2, 3, 4, each
appea ing once o each playe ) in o en ca ego ies, cha ac e ized by an expec ed end-s a e
e e ed o as he na u al ou come (which e lec s a heo e ical expec a ion o he playe s o
choose an al e na i e ha op imizes hei payo s, see Supplemen a y Ma e ials—Rapopo
and Guye ’s Taxonomy o Two-by-Two Games). He e, we use a e ised and ab idged
axonomy, which g oups all games in o i e classes (Fische e al.,2024). This e ised
axonomy allows classi ying no only s ic ly o dinal games, bu all wo-by- wo games. The
e ised axonomy comp ises he ollowing i e game ca ego ies: (1) Absolu ely S able games,
in which bo h playe s can join ly ob ain hei maximal payo s. Such games a e ega ded as
no-con lic games. In o he wo ds, bo h pa ies easily and na u ally con e ge on a mu ually
bene icial solu ion. (2) S able/S ongly S able games, in which one o bo h playe s a e no
Games 2025,16, 3 5 o 23
sa is ied wi h he na u al ou come (because hey do no ob ain hei maximal payo ), ye
hey a e no able o in luence he ou come o he game by changing, o h ea ening o
change, hei choice. In o he wo ds, e en hough he e is no mu ually bene icial solu ion
whe e bo h playe s ob ain hei maximal payo , none o he playe s is mo i a ed o depa
om hei ini ial choice. (3) Non-S able games, in which one o bo h playe s a e no sa is ied
wi h he na u al ou come, ye he playe /s a e able o in luence he game’s ou come by
changing o h ea ening o change hei choice. In e ac ions modeled by hese games may
be ega ded as in ac able con lic s, since e e y ac ion aken by one o he playe s can be
answe ed wi h a coun e ac ion o he o he playe ad in ini um. (4) P isone s’ Dilemma
(PD)-like games
1
, in which nei he playe is sa is ied wi h he na u al ou come, ye hey a e
no mo i a ed o change hei choice. Unlike S able/S ongly S able games, he na u al
ou come o PD-like games is a Nash equilib ium bu no a Pa e o equilib ium
2
. In o he
wo ds, wo a ional playe s a e expec ed o ob ain a smalle payo han he payo join ly
a ailable o bo h o hem in ano he cell o he ma ix. (5) No Na u al Ou come games—in
his ca ego y, one o bo h playe s ha e no p e e ed choice. The e o e, he e is no p edic ed
choice o a leas one o he playe s, and consequen ly no expec ed ou come. Figu e 2
shows ma ix examples o all i e classes (see also Supplemen a y Ma e ials—Rapopo
and Guye ’s Taxonomy o Two-by-Two Games).
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 o 22
sa is ied wi h he na u al ou come (because hey do no ob ain hei maximal payo ), ye
hey a e no able o in luence he ou come o he game by changing, o h ea ening o
change, hei choice. In o he wo ds, e en hough he e is no mu ually bene icial solu ion
whe e bo h playe s ob ain hei maximal payo , none o he playe s is mo i a ed o depa
om hei ini ial choice. (3) Non-S able games, in which one o bo h playe s a e no sa is ied
wi h he na u al ou come, ye he playe /s a e able o in luence he game’s ou come by
changing o h ea ening o change hei choice. In e ac ions modeled by hese games may
be ega ded as in ac able con lic s, since e e y ac ion aken by one o he playe s can be
answe ed wi h a coun e ac ion o he o he playe ad in ini um. (4) P isone s’ Dilemma (PD)-
like games1, in which nei he playe is sa is ied wi h he na u al ou come, ye hey a e no
mo i a ed o change hei choice. Unlike S able/S ongly S able games, he na u al ou come
o PD-like games is a Nash equilib ium bu no a Pa e o equilib ium2. In o he wo ds, wo
a ional playe s a e expec ed o ob ain a smalle payo han he payo join ly a ailable o
bo h o hem in ano he cell o he ma ix. (5) No Na u al Ou come games—in his ca ego y,
one o bo h playe s ha e no p e e ed choice. The e o e, he e is no p edic ed choice o a
leas one o he playe s, and consequen ly no expec ed ou come. Figu e 2 shows ma ix ex-
amples o all i e classes (see also Supplemen a y Ma e ials—Rapopo and Guye ’s Tax-
onomy o Two-by-Two Games).
Absolu ely S able S able/S ongly S able Non-S able PD-like No Na u al Ou come
50, 50 0, 30
30, 0 20, 20
30, 30 50, 20
20, 50 0 , 0
30, 30 20, 50
50, 20 0, 0
20, 20 50, 0
0, 50 30, 30
50, 20 20, 50
20, 50 50, 20
50, 50 0, 20
20, 0 30, 30
20, 30 50, 20
0, 20 30, 0
0, 0 50, 30
30, 50 0, 0
20, 20 30, 0
0, 50 30, 30
50, 0 20, 20
50, 30 20, 50
Figu e 2. Example ma ices o he i e ca ego ies o he e ised and ab idged Rapopo and Guye
axonomy (Fische e al., 2024). In all ma ices, o he han he No Na u al Ou come games, he na u al
ou come is he op le cell. The op Absolu ely S able game is ypically e e ed o as he S ag Hun
game (Sky ms, 2001). The op Non-S able game is a Chicken game (Rapopo & Chammah, 1966). The
bo om Non-S able game is ypically e e ed o as Ba le o he Sexes (Rapopo , 1967). The op PD-
like game is a classic PD (Flood, 1958; Rapopo & Chammah, 1965). The op No Na u al Ou come
game is a Ma ching Pennies game (Budescu & Rapopo , 1994).
While he e ised Rapopo and Guye axonomy helps gain heo e ical insigh s, he
success o SERS in p edic ing beha io al choices (Fische , 2009, 2012; Fische e al., 2022;
Fische & Sa ane ski, 2023) sugges s also using i as a basis o a axonomy o games. As
men ioned abo e, SERS shi s he ocus om he payo s uc u e pe se o he in e ac ion
be ween he game’s payo s uc u e and he playe s’ pe cep ions o hei opponen ; speci -
ically, he p ospec s o bo h playe s making simila choices. The e o e, he SERS-based ax-
onomy dis inguishes be ween wo basic ypes o payo se s. Games in which he SERS-
based expec ed choices a y unde di e en pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y wi h he op-
ponen a e e e ed o as simila i y-sensi i e games. Games in which he SERS-based expec ed
choices do no a y unde di e en pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y wi h he opponen a e
e e ed o as non-simila i y-sensi i e games. Clea ly, some games can be simila i y-sensi i e
o one o he playe s and non-simila i y-sensi i e o he o he . The e o e, he SERS-based
Figu e 2. Example ma ices o he i e ca ego ies o he e ised and ab idged Rapopo and Guye
axonomy (Fische e al.,2024). In all ma ices, o he han he No Na u al Ou come games, he na u al
ou come is he op le cell. The op Absolu ely S able game is ypically e e ed o as he S ag Hun
game (Sky ms,2001). The op Non-S able game is a Chicken game (Rapopo & Chammah,1966).
The bo om Non-S able game is ypically e e ed o as Ba le o he Sexes (Rapopo ,1967). The
op PD-like game is a classic PD (Flood,1958;Rapopo & Chammah,1965). The op No Na u al
Ou come game is a Ma ching Pennies game (Budescu & Rapopo ,1994).
While he e ised Rapopo and Guye axonomy helps gain heo e ical insigh s,
he success o SERS in p edic ing beha io al choices (Fische ,2009,2012;Fische e al.,
2022;Fische & Sa ane ski,2023) sugges s also using i as a basis o a axonomy o
games. As men ioned abo e, SERS shi s he ocus om he payo s uc u e pe se o
he in e ac ion be ween he game’s payo s uc u e and he playe s’ pe cep ions o hei
opponen ; speci ically, he p ospec s o bo h playe s making simila choices. The e o e,
he SERS-based axonomy dis inguishes be ween wo basic ypes o payo se s. Games
in which he SERS-based expec ed choices a y unde di e en pe cep ions o s a egic
simila i y wi h he opponen a e e e ed o as simila i y-sensi i e games. Games in which he
SERS-based expec ed choices do no a y unde di e en pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y
wi h he opponen a e e e ed o as non-simila i y-sensi i e games. Clea ly, some games
can be simila i y-sensi i e o one o he playe s and non-simila i y-sensi i e o he o he .
Games 2025,16, 3 6 o 23
The e o e, he SERS-based axonomy di e en ia es be ween wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e
games,one-playe simila i y-sensi i e games, and wo-playe non-simila i y-sensi i e games.
The impo ance o his classi ica ion o analysis o games de i es om i s capaci y o
de e mine which games a e suscep ible o social and beha io al in e en ions, allowing o
he in luencing o he pa ies’ choices. Tha is, in luencing pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y
be ween he in e ac ing pa ies (in he p esen s udy—Is aelis and Pales inians) has he
po en ial o al e he expec ed ou come o simila i y-sensi i e games wi hou changing he
game’s ac ual payo s. See Supplemen a y Ma e ials—SERS-Based Taxonomy o Games o
a de ailed desc ip ion o he SERS-based classi ica ion. Figu e 3shows examples o games
associa ed wi h each o he ou classes o he SERS-based classi ica ion.
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 o 22
axonomy di e en ia es be ween wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games, one-playe simila i y-
sensi i e games, and wo-playe non-simila i y-sensi i e games.
The impo ance o his classi ica ion o analysis o games de i es om i s capaci y o
de e mine which games a e suscep ible o social and beha io al in e en ions, allowing o
he in luencing o he pa ies’ choices. Tha is, in luencing pe cep ions o s a egic simila i y
be ween he in e ac ing pa ies (in he p esen s udy—Is aelis and Pales inians) has he po-
en ial o al e he expec ed ou come o simila i y-sensi i e games wi hou changing he
game’s ac ual payo s. See Supplemen a y Ma e ials—SERS-Based Taxonomy o Games o
a de ailed desc ip ion o he SERS-based classi ica ion. Figu e 3 shows examples o games
associa ed wi h each o he ou classes o he SERS-based classi ica ion.
(a)
A B
A 20, 20 10, 10
B 15, 15 5, 5
(b)
A B
A 15, 20 20, 15
B 10, 10 5, 5
(c)
A B
A 15, 15 5, 20
B 20, 5 10, 10
(d)
A B
A 15, 15 20, 10
B 10, 20 5, 5
Figu e 3. Examples o he ou classes o he SERS-based classi ica ion. (a) depic s a ow playe -only
simila i y-sensi i e game. When assuming bo h playe s a e comple ely simila , and hus bo h a e ex-
pec ed o choose he same al e na i es (ei he AA o BB), he ow playe p e e s 20 o e 5, hence choos-
ing he op ow. Howe e , when assuming bo h playe s a e comple ely dissimila , and hus bo h a e
expec ed o choose opposi e al e na i es (ei he AB o BA), he ow playe p e e s 15 o e 10, and
hence chooses he bo om ow. Consequen ly, simila i y pe cep ions change he p e e ed al e na i e
o he ow playe . In con as , he column playe p e e s he le column unde bo h assump ions o
comple e simila i y and comple e dissimila i y (since 20 is p e e ed o e 5 o comple e simila i y,
and 15 is p e e ed o e 10 o comple e dissimila i y). Hence, simila i y pe cep ions do no change
he p e e ed al e na i e o he column playe . (b) depic s a column playe -only simila i y-sensi i e game,
as he ow playe p e e s he uppe ow unde bo h he assump ions o comple e simila i y and com-
ple e dissimila i y, while he column playe p e e s he le column unde he assump ion o comple e
simila i y, and he igh column unde he assump ion o comple e dissimila i y. (c) (also e med he
P isone ’s Dilemma game) depic s a wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e game. Bo h playe s p e e al e na i e
A unde he assump ion o comple e simila i y and al e na i e B unde he assump ion o comple e
dissimila i y. (d) depic s a wo-playe non-simila i y-sensi i e. Bo h playe s ha e he same p e e ences
unde he assump ion o comple e simila i y and he assump ion o comple e dissimila i y. No e ha
comple e simila i y and dissimila i y a e wo ex eme cases helping o easily de e mine he class o he
game. Ac ual simila i y pe cep ions may ob ain any alue be ween, and including, hese wo ex emes.
3. Me hods
Pa icipan s: One hund ed and o y-one Is aeli Jewish indi iduals (50% women, Mage
= 24.6, SD = 4.86), ec ui ed a an Is aeli uni e si y, pa icipa ed in he s udy in awa d o
academic c edi poin s o he equi alen o USD 20. Eigh y-six Pales inian indi iduals (47%
women, Mage = 36.7, SD = 11.97) om he Gaza S ip and he Wes Bank who isi ed Is ael
o pe sonal easons pa icipa ed in he s udy in awa d o he equi alen o USD 20. Da a
we e collec ed be ween Ma ch 2019 and Feb ua y 2020.
Figu e 3. Examples o he ou classes o he SERS-based classi ica ion. (a) depic s a ow playe -
only simila i y-sensi i e game. When assuming bo h playe s a e comple ely simila , and hus bo h
a e expec ed o choose he same al e na i es (ei he AA o BB), he ow playe p e e s 20 o e 5,
hence choosing he op ow. Howe e , when assuming bo h playe s a e comple ely dissimila , and
hus bo h a e expec ed o choose opposi e al e na i es (ei he AB o BA), he ow playe p e e s
15 o e 10, and hence chooses he bo om ow. Consequen ly, simila i y pe cep ions change he
p e e ed al e na i e o he ow playe . In con as , he column playe p e e s he le column unde
bo h assump ions o comple e simila i y and comple e dissimila i y (since 20 is p e e ed o e 5
o comple e simila i y, and 15 is p e e ed o e 10 o comple e dissimila i y). Hence, simila i y
pe cep ions do no change he p e e ed al e na i e o he column playe . (b) depic s a column playe -
only simila i y-sensi i e game, as he ow playe p e e s he uppe ow unde bo h he assump ions
o comple e simila i y and comple e dissimila i y, while he column playe p e e s he le column
unde he assump ion o comple e simila i y, and he igh column unde he assump ion o comple e
dissimila i y. (c) (also e med he P isone ’s Dilemma game) depic s a wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e
game. Bo h playe s p e e al e na i e A unde he assump ion o comple e simila i y and al e na i e
B unde he assump ion o comple e dissimila i y. (d) depic s a wo-playe non-simila i y-sensi i e. Bo h
playe s ha e he same p e e ences unde he assump ion o comple e simila i y and he assump ion
o comple e dissimila i y. No e ha comple e simila i y and dissimila i y a e wo ex eme cases
helping o easily de e mine he class o he game. Ac ual simila i y pe cep ions may ob ain any alue
be ween, and including, hese wo ex emes.
3. Me hods
Pa icipan s: One hund ed and o y-one Is aeli Jewish indi iduals (50% women,
M
age
= 24.6, SD = 4.86), ec ui ed a an Is aeli uni e si y, pa icipa ed in he s udy in awa d
o academic c edi poin s o he equi alen o USD 20. Eigh y-six Pales inian indi iduals
(47% women, M
age
= 36.7, SD = 11.97) om he Gaza S ip and he Wes Bank who isi ed
Is ael o pe sonal easons pa icipa ed in he s udy in awa d o he equi alen o USD 20.
Da a we e collec ed be ween Ma ch 2019 and Feb ua y 2020.
Games 2025,16, 3 7 o 23
3.1. Tools
Symbolic Quan i ica ion Tools (SQT): isual aids ha allow he pa icipan s o exp ess
quan i ies, using in ui i e pic o ial ep esen a ions ha do no necessi a e o mal nume ical
skills (Fische e al.,2024). The wo SQTs consis o a se ies o illus a ions, 24 showing
a ious depic ions o a ee, anging om a wo s condi ion (a ee wi h no lea es a all), o
a bes condi ion (a ee wi h a ich oliage); and 41 showing depic ions o a ja illed wi h
a ious po ions o a gold-colo ed subs ance. The ee and ja SQTs we e selec ed om
among six SQTs ha had been alida ed in a p eceding s udy, which associa ed each image
wi h a speci ic nume ical alue. They we e selec ed o inclusion in he p esen s udy due
o hei ela i ely high con e gen alidi y and he consis en ly pe cei ed in e als be ween
successi e illus a ions. See Figu e 4 o examples o he SQT illus a ions.
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 o 22
3.1. Tools
Symbolic Quan i ica ion Tools (SQT): isual aids ha allow he pa icipan s o exp ess
quan i ies, using in ui i e pic o ial ep esen a ions ha do no necessi a e o mal nume ical
skills (Fische e al., 2024). The wo SQTs consis o a se ies o illus a ions, 24 showing a -
ious depic ions o a ee, anging om a wo s condi ion (a ee wi h no lea es a all), o a
bes condi ion (a ee wi h a ich oliage); and 41 showing depic ions o a ja illed wi h a -
ious po ions o a gold-colo ed subs ance. The ee and ja SQTs we e selec ed om among
six SQTs ha had been alida ed in a p eceding s udy, which associa ed each image wi h a
speci ic nume ical alue. They we e selec ed o inclusion in he p esen s udy due o hei
ela i ely high con e gen alidi y and he consis en ly pe cei ed in e als be ween succes-
si e illus a ions. See Figu e 4 o examples o he SQT illus a ions.
0 11.7 15.5 33.6 43.1 66.3 89.1 100
0 12.5 27.5 40 55 67.5 85 100
Figu e 4. A ep esen a i e subse o he ee and ja illus a ions used as SQTs and hei associa ed
alues. The op alues co espond o he ee SQT images and he bo om alues o he ja SQT images.
3.2. P ocedu e
Pa icipan s we e welcomed by a esea ch assis an who spoke hei na i e language
(Heb ew o A abic) and asked i hey could spa e app oxima ely one hou o hei ime. All
pa icipan s we e shown and ead a desc ip ion o hei igh s as pa icipan s, assu ed o
ull anonymi y du ing and a e he s udy, and o hei igh o discon inue hei pa icipa-
ion wi hou any consequences. They we e hen sea ed in on o a compu e wi h dedica ed
so wa e ha p esen ed he ques ions and SQTs, and collec ed pa icipan s’ esponses.
The expe imen s a ed by men ioning he ongoing Is aeli–Pales inian con lic and ask-
ing he pa icipan s o sugges wo di e en /opposing and ealis ic cou ses o ac ion, i s
o hei own side (ei he Is aeli o Pales inian), and hen o he o he side (ei he Pales inian
o Is aeli). To assu e ha he meaning o opposing al e na i es was linguis ically and con-
cep ually comp ehended by A abic speaking pa icipan s, he A abic e sion also included
a sho example desc ibing wo cellphone companies conside ing how o ake o e a la ge
ma ke sha e, by examining opposing al e na i es (i.e., selling a a ai p ice o selling a a
lowe p ice han he compe i o ; p aising hei own p oduc o de aming he compe i o ).
No ice ha he ins uc ions did no explici ly men ion he e ms ‘coope a ion’ and ‘con on-
a ion’, hus a oiding induc ion o a speci ic aming ha migh no coincide wi h pa ici-
pan s’ genuine a i udes and easoning.
A e he pa icipan s de ined hei own al e na i es, he so wa e p esen ed he ou
combina ions gene a ed by each pa icipan ’s p o ided al e na i es, and asked pa icipan s
o lis h ee possible ou comes, expe iences, o emo ions ha a e likely o be expe ienced by he
pa icipan as a membe o his o he g oup (sepa a ely o each in e sec ion o al e na i es).
The same se o ou ques ions was epea ed while asking he pa icipan o desc ibe he
ou comes, expe iences, and emo ions he o he pa y is likely o expe ience. Nex , each o he
Figu e 4. A ep esen a i e subse o he ee and ja illus a ions used as SQTs and hei associa ed
alues. The op alues co espond o he ee SQT images and he bo om alues o he ja SQT images.
3.2. P ocedu e
Pa icipan s we e welcomed by a esea ch assis an who spoke hei na i e language
(Heb ew o A abic) and asked i hey could spa e app oxima ely one hou o hei ime. All
pa icipan s we e shown and ead a desc ip ion o hei igh s as pa icipan s, assu ed o ull
anonymi y du ing and a e he s udy, and o hei igh o discon inue hei pa icipa ion
wi hou any consequences. They we e hen sea ed in on o a compu e wi h dedica ed
so wa e ha p esen ed he ques ions and SQTs, and collec ed pa icipan s’ esponses.
The expe imen s a ed by men ioning he ongoing Is aeli–Pales inian con lic and
asking he pa icipan s o sugges wo di e en /opposing and ealis ic cou ses o ac ion,
i s o hei own side (ei he Is aeli o Pales inian), and hen o he o he side (ei he
Pales inian o Is aeli). To assu e ha he meaning o opposing al e na i es was linguis ically
and concep ually comp ehended by A abic speaking pa icipan s, he A abic e sion also
included a sho example desc ibing wo cellphone companies conside ing how o ake
o e a la ge ma ke sha e, by examining opposing al e na i es (i.e., selling a a ai p ice
o selling a a lowe p ice han he compe i o ; p aising hei own p oduc o de aming he
compe i o ). No ice ha he ins uc ions did no explici ly men ion he e ms ‘coope a ion’
and ‘con on a ion’, hus a oiding induc ion o a speci ic aming ha migh no coincide
wi h pa icipan s’ genuine a i udes and easoning.
A e he pa icipan s de ined hei own al e na i es, he so wa e p esen ed he ou
combina ions gene a ed by each pa icipan ’s p o ided al e na i es, and asked pa icipan s
o lis h ee possible ou comes,expe iences,o emo ions ha a e likely o be expe ienced
by he pa icipan as a membe o his o he g oup (sepa a ely o each in e sec ion o
al e na i es). The same se o ou ques ions was epea ed while asking he pa icipan
o desc ibe he ou comes, expe iences, and emo ions he o he pa y is likely o expe ience.
Nex , each o he wo SQTs was p esen ed and explained, explici ly p o iding examples
Games 2025,16, 3 8 o 23
o he bes and wo s ou comes and hei espec i e images (Figu e 4). A e he SQT
in oduc ion, each pa icipan was asked o sepa a ely conside he ou Is aeli–Pales inian
al e na i e in e sec ions (as p oposed by he pa icipan ), each p esen ed alongside he
h ee consequences (also p o ided by he pa icipan ), and o choose he SQT image ha
bes ep esen s he desi abili y o he si ua ion, once o he ee SQT and once o he ja
SQT. The p ocess was hen epea ed, asking he pa icipan o assess he desi abili y o he
ou al e na i e in e sec ions and hei espec i e h ee consequences while conside ing
he o he pa y (ei he he Is aeli o he Pales inian pa y). The nex couple o ques ions
add essed pa icipan s’ o ecas s, asking hem o iden i y which o he wo al e na i es
hey sugges ed ea lie o hei own pa y is mo e likely o be enac ed, and which o he
wo al e na i es hey sugges ed o he o he pa y is mo e likely o be enac ed by he o he
pa y. Nex , wo ques ions add essed pa icipan s’ subjec i e pe cep ions o simila i y wi h
he o he pa y. Fi s , pa icipan s we e asked o hink o a pe son who bes ep esen s
he o he side and indica e, using a slide , how simila his pe son is o hemsel es (i.e.,
in e pe sonal simila i y). Second, pa icipan s indica ed how simila he o he g oup is o
hei own g oup (i.e., g oup simila i y), again using a slide . Finally, basic demog aphic
in o ma ion was collec ed. Pales inian pa icipan s we e deb ie ed and ecei ed hei
pa icipa ion ee. Is aeli pa icipan s we e in i ed o a second session, aking place abou
a week la e , which allowed u he es ing he eliabili y o he SQT elici a ion me hod
3
(Fische e al.,2024). The da a we e collec ed be ween 2018 and 2020. See Figu e 5 o an
illus a ion o he p ocedu e.
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 o 22
wo SQTs was p esen ed and explained, explici ly p o iding examples o he bes and wo s
ou comes and hei espec i e images (Figu e 4). A e he SQT in oduc ion, each pa ici-
pan was asked o sepa a ely conside he ou Is aeli–Pales inian al e na i e in e sec ions
(as p oposed by he pa icipan ), each p esen ed alongside he h ee consequences (also p o-
ided by he pa icipan ), and o choose he SQT image ha bes ep esen s he desi abili y
o he si ua ion, once o he ee SQT and once o he ja SQT. The p ocess was hen e-
pea ed, asking he pa icipan o assess he desi abili y o he ou al e na i e in e sec ions
and hei espec i e h ee consequences while conside ing he o he pa y (ei he he Is aeli
o he Pales inian pa y). The nex couple o ques ions add essed pa icipan s’ o ecas s, ask-
ing hem o iden i y which o he wo al e na i es hey sugges ed ea lie o hei own pa y
is mo e likely o be enac ed, and which o he wo al e na i es hey sugges ed o he o he
pa y is mo e likely o be enac ed by he o he pa y. Nex , wo ques ions add essed pa ic-
ipan s’ subjec i e pe cep ions o simila i y wi h he o he pa y. Fi s , pa icipan s we e
asked o hink o a pe son who bes ep esen s he o he side and indica e, using a slide ,
how simila his pe son is o hemsel es (i.e., in e pe sonal simila i y). Second, pa icipan s
indica ed how simila he o he g oup is o hei own g oup (i.e., g oup simila i y), again
using a slide . Finally, basic demog aphic in o ma ion was collec ed. Pales inian pa ici-
pan s we e deb ie ed and ecei ed hei pa icipa ion ee. Is aeli pa icipan s we e in i ed
o a second session, aking place abou a week la e , which allowed u he es ing he eli-
abili y o he SQT elici a ion me hod
3
(Fische e al., 2024). The da a we e collec ed be ween
2018 and 2020. See Figu e 5 o an illus a ion o he p ocedu e.
Figu e 5. Illus a ion o he p ocedu e allowing he elici ing o Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs)
while using he ee SQT.
Figu e 5. Illus a ion o he p ocedu e allowing he elici ing o Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs)
while using he ee SQT.
Games 2025,16, 3 15 o 23
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 o 22
he Is aeli SGSs comp ise 72% absolu ely s able games and only 22% non-s able games, Pal-
es inian SGSs comp ise 41% absolu ely s able games and a a he equal p opo ion, 35%, o
non-s able games. Ou o he Is aeli absolu ely s able games, 95% e lec a mu ually coope -
a i e solu ion ha endows bo h pa ies wi h hei maximal expec ed payo . This p ope y
also holds o 93% o he Pales inian absolu ely s able games. The e o e, almos all elici ed
absolu ely s able games exp ess he expec a ion o a mu ually coope a i e solu ion. How-
e e , he gap in he p opo ions o absolu ely s able games be ween he pa ies (72% s.
41%) e eals meaning ul di e ences in he pe cep ion o he Is aeli-Pales inian con lic . No-
iceably, none o he pa ies end o pe cei e he in e ac ion as a PD-like game.
Is aeli sample
Pales inian sample
Figu e 9. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye
axonomy o games.
. Dis ibu ion o game ypes acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy
Fu he examining he SERS-based axonomy o all games, Figu e 10 shows ha abou
a hi d o all games in bo h samples a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games. Howe e , Is aeli
pa icipan s pe cei ed almos h ee imes as many Is aeli one-sided simila i y-sensi i e
games (26%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed Is aeli one-sided simila i y-
sensi i e games (9%). Also, Is aeli pa icipan s pe cei ed ewe Pales inian one-sided simi-
la i y-sensi i e games (27%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed Pales inian
one-sided simila i y-sensi i e games (43%). O e all, he dis ibu ions o SERS-based game
ypes e eal a signi ican di e ence be ween he pe cep ions o bo h pa ies (χ
2
= 19.47, p <
0.001).
Is aeli sample
Pales inian sample
Figu e 10. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy o
games.
Figu e 9. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye
axonomy o games.
. Dis ibu ion o game ypes acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy
Fu he examining he SERS-based axonomy o all games, Figu e 10 shows ha abou
a hi d o all games in bo h samples a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games. Howe e ,
Is aeli pa icipan s pe cei ed almos h ee imes as many Is aeli one-sided simila i y-
sensi i e games (26%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed Is aeli one-sided
simila i y-sensi i e games (9%). Also, Is aeli pa icipan s pe cei ed ewe Pales inian
one-sided simila i y-sensi i e games (27%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed
Pales inian one-sided simila i y-sensi i e games (43%). O e all, he dis ibu ions o SERS-
based game ypes e eal a signi ican di e ence be ween he pe cep ions o bo h pa ies
(χ2= 19.47, p< 0.001).
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 o 22
he Is aeli SGSs comp ise 72% absolu ely s able games and only 22% non-s able games, Pal-
es inian SGSs comp ise 41% absolu ely s able games and a a he equal p opo ion, 35%, o
non-s able games. Ou o he Is aeli absolu ely s able games, 95% e lec a mu ually coope -
a i e solu ion ha endows bo h pa ies wi h hei maximal expec ed payo . This p ope y
also holds o 93% o he Pales inian absolu ely s able games. The e o e, almos all elici ed
absolu ely s able games exp ess he expec a ion o a mu ually coope a i e solu ion. How-
e e , he gap in he p opo ions o absolu ely s able games be ween he pa ies (72% s.
41%) e eals meaning ul di e ences in he pe cep ion o he Is aeli-Pales inian con lic . No-
iceably, none o he pa ies end o pe cei e he in e ac ion as a PD-like game.
Is aeli sample
Pales inian sample
Figu e 9. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye
axonomy o games.
. Dis ibu ion o game ypes acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy
Fu he examining he SERS-based axonomy o all games, Figu e 10 shows ha abou
a hi d o all games in bo h samples a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games. Howe e , Is aeli
pa icipan s pe cei ed almos h ee imes as many Is aeli one-sided simila i y-sensi i e
games (26%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed Is aeli one-sided simila i y-
sensi i e games (9%). Also, Is aeli pa icipan s pe cei ed ewe Pales inian one-sided simi-
la i y-sensi i e games (27%) compa ed o Pales inian pa icipan s’ pe cei ed Pales inian
one-sided simila i y-sensi i e games (43%). O e all, he dis ibu ions o SERS-based game
ypes e eal a signi ican di e ence be ween he pe cep ions o bo h pa ies (χ
2
= 19.47, p <
0.001).
Is aeli sample
Pales inian sample
Figu e 10. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy o
games.
Figu e 10. Dis ibu ions o Is aeli and Pales inian SGSs acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy
o games.
Me ging wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games wi h own-side simila i y-sensi i e
games, sepa a ely o each pa y, shows ha 64% o he Is aeli SGSs a e simila i y-sensi i e
o he Is aeli side, and ha 76% o he Pales inian SGSs a e simila i y-sensi i e o he
Pales inian side. These ela i ely high pe cen ages poin o he impo ance o simila i y
pe cep ions, sugges ing ha in luencing he pa ies’ simila i y pe cep ions o each o he
may play a key ole in esol ing he con lic .
i.
Pe cei ed in e -g oup and in e pe sonal simila i y dis ibu ions
As men ioned abo e, pa icipan s p o ided wo ypes o simila i y pe cep ions, one
ha add esses he simila i y be ween he wo g oups, and one ha add esses he simila i y
be ween he pa icipan and a pe son he pa icipan conside s o be ep esen a i e o
Games 2025,16, 3 16 o 23
he o he g oup. Figu e 11 shows ha bo h in e -g oup and in e pe sonal simila i ies
epo ed by he Is aeli pa icipan s gi e ise o a a he homogeneous dis ibu ion, whe e
all simila i y le els (apa om ex emely high alues) a e equally ep esen ed. In con as ,
he dis ibu ions o Pales inian in e -g oup and in e pe sonal simila i ies a e cha ac e ized
by a la ge p opo ion, abou 40%, o ex emely low simila i y pe cep ions ( anging om 0
o 10, ou o 100); while he o he 60% o epo ed simila i y pe cep ions exhibi a a he
homogeneous dis ibu ion ac oss all o he simila i y le els.
Fo bo h g oups, in e -g oup and in e pe sonal simila i y assessmen s e eal iden ical
dis ibu ions (Figu e 11). The a e age Is aeli pa icipan s’ in e -g oup and in e pe sonal
simila i y es ima es a e 40.0 (SD = 25.04) and 39.4 (SD = 26.08), espec i ely; and he co ela-
ion be ween bo h measu es is = 0.55 (
(140)
=7.77, p< 0.001). The Pales inian pa icipan s’
in e -g oup and in e pe sonal simila i y es ima es a e 31.3 (SD = 30.60) and 36.7 (SD = 35.36),
espec i ely; and he co ela ion be ween bo h measu es is = 0.40 (
(85)
= 3.95, p< 0.001).
Compa ing he a e age epo ed simila i y es ima es o Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s
shows a signi ican di e ence o he in e -g oup simila i y (
(153)
= 2.22, p= 0.028; Cohen’s
d = 0.32), and no signi ican di e ence o he in e pe sonal simila i y measu e (
(141)
= 0.60,
n.s.; Cohen’s d = 0.09). Focusing on he in e -g oup con lic , we con inue he analyses by
using he in e -g oup simila i y measu e in SERS-based EV calcula ions.
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 o 22
Is aeli in e -g oup simila i y
Pales inian in e -g oup simila i y
Is aeli in e pe sonal simila i y
Pales inian in e pe sonal simila i y
Figu e 11. Repo ed simila i y dis ibu ions o all pa icipan s. N
Is aeli
= 141; N
Pales inian
= 86.
Figu e 12. Coope a i e and con on a ional p edic ed choices, de i ed om SERS-based EVs.
iii. A e aged SGSs g ouped by pe cei ed simila i y qua iles
Acco ding o SERS, (i) people wi h high simila i y pe cep ions o he opponen a e mo e
likely o coope a e han people wi h low simila i y pe cep ions, and (ii) people whose SGSs
ha e low simila i y h esholds a e mo e likely o coope a e han people whose SGSs ha e high
simila i y h esholds. This aises he ques ion o whe he he e exis s a beha io al link be-
ween bo h pe cep ions, whe e he same pa icipan s ha epo high simila i y le els wi h
he opponen also p o ide SGSs wi h low simila i y h esholds, and ice e sa. To answe his
ques ion, we spli he pa icipan s’ samples in o qua iles, acco ding o he epo ed simila -
i y pe cep ions. We hen calcula e he a e age SGSs sepa a ely o each simila i y qua ile,
and desc ibe each a e aged SGS in e ms o he wo axonomies and in e ms o he game’s
(own and opponen ) simila i y h esholds. No e ha qua iles a e calcula ed ac oss all
Figu e 11. Repo ed simila i y dis ibu ions o all pa icipan s. NIs aeli = 141; NPales inian = 86.
ii.
P edic ed choices acco ding o SERS
Examining he SGSs and he in e -g oup simila i y le el epo ed by each pa icipan
allows o he compu ing o wo SERS-based EVs (i.e., a coope a i e and a con on a ional
EV) and choosing he al e na i e wi h he highe EV, i s o he pa icipan ’s own pa y,
and hen o he opponen . No e ha he pe cei ed s a egic simila i y is ega ded he e as a
symme ic p ope y. The e o e, he epo ed p
s
o each pa icipan is used o calcula e one’s
own SERS-based expec ed alue as well as he opponen ’s SERS-based expec ed alue.
Games 2025,16, 3 17 o 23
Figu e 12 shows ha he p opo ion o Is aeli SERS-based coope a i e choices o hei
own (Is aeli) side is much highe (66%) han he Pales inian SERS-based coope a i e choices
o hei own (Pales inian) side (49%;
χ2
= 8.00, p< 0.01). Mo eo e , he p opo ion o Is aeli
SERS-based coope a i e choices o hei own (Is aeli) side is much highe (66%) han he
Pales inian SERS-based coope a i e choices o he o he (Is aeli) side (42%), esul ing in
a signi ican ly di e en dis ibu ion o coope a i e and con on a ional expec ed choices
(
χ2
= 9.86, p< 0.01). In o he wo ds, acco ding o SERS, Is aelis a e p edic ed o choose
mo e coope a i e choices han he Pales inians expec hem o choose. In con as , he
p opo ion o Pales inian SERS-based coope a i e choices o hei own (Pales inian) side
is lowe (49%) han he p opo ion o Is aeli SERS-based coope a i e choices o he o he
(Pales inian) side (58%). Howe e , he dis ibu ions o coope a i e and con on a ional
expec ed choices o he Pales inian side a e no signi ican ly di e en when compa ing he
Is aeli and Pales inian samples (χ2= 2.87, p= 0.09).
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 o 22
Is aeli in e -g oup simila i y
Pales inian in e -g oup simila i y
Is aeli in e pe sonal simila i y
Pales inian in e pe sonal simila i y
Figu e 11. Repo ed simila i y dis ibu ions o all pa icipan s. N
Is aeli
= 141; N
Pales inian
= 86.
Figu e 12. Coope a i e and con on a ional p edic ed choices, de i ed om SERS-based EVs.
iii. A e aged SGSs g ouped by pe cei ed simila i y qua iles
Acco ding o SERS, (i) people wi h high simila i y pe cep ions o he opponen a e mo e
likely o coope a e han people wi h low simila i y pe cep ions, and (ii) people whose SGSs
ha e low simila i y h esholds a e mo e likely o coope a e han people whose SGSs ha e high
simila i y h esholds. This aises he ques ion o whe he he e exis s a beha io al link be-
ween bo h pe cep ions, whe e he same pa icipan s ha epo high simila i y le els wi h
he opponen also p o ide SGSs wi h low simila i y h esholds, and ice e sa. To answe his
ques ion, we spli he pa icipan s’ samples in o qua iles, acco ding o he epo ed simila -
i y pe cep ions. We hen calcula e he a e age SGSs sepa a ely o each simila i y qua ile,
and desc ibe each a e aged SGS in e ms o he wo axonomies and in e ms o he game’s
(own and opponen ) simila i y h esholds. No e ha qua iles a e calcula ed ac oss all
Figu e 12. Coope a i e and con on a ional p edic ed choices, de i ed om SERS-based EVs.
iii.
A e aged SGSs g ouped by pe cei ed simila i y qua iles
Acco ding o SERS, (i) people wi h high simila i y pe cep ions o he opponen a e mo e
likely o coope a e han people wi h low simila i y pe cep ions, and (ii) people whose SGSs
ha e low simila i y h esholds a e mo e likely o coope a e han people whose SGSs ha e
high simila i y h esholds. This aises he ques ion o whe he he e exis s a beha io al link
be ween bo h pe cep ions, whe e he same pa icipan s ha epo high simila i y le els wi h
he opponen also p o ide SGSs wi h low simila i y h esholds, and ice e sa. To answe
his ques ion, we spli he pa icipan s’ samples in o qua iles, acco ding o he epo ed
simila i y pe cep ions. We hen calcula e he a e age SGSs sepa a ely o each simila i y
qua ile, and desc ibe each a e aged SGS in e ms o he wo axonomies and in e ms o
he game’s (own and opponen ) simila i y h esholds. No e ha qua iles a e calcula ed
ac oss all pa icipan s, ye a e age SGSs comp ise only alignable SGSs. Also no e ha 31%
o he Pales inian sample epo ed a simila i y le el o 0; he e o e, he lowe simila i y
qua ile comp ises mo e SGSs compa ed o he o he qua iles.
Figu e 13 shows ha all a e aged ma ices o bo h he Is aeli and Pales inian samples,
apa om he Pales inian lowes simila i y qua ile (Q1), a e absolu ely s able games
acco ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye ’s axonomy. Fo hese games, he maximal
payo s a e ea ned when bo h pa ies choose o coope a e. Only he Pales inian Q1 a e aged
SGS is a non-s able game, which is likely o mo i a e an in ac able con lic . Mo eo e , all
a e aged SGSs o bo h pa ies o all qua iles a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games,
meaning ha bo h pa ies’ s a egic simila i y pe cep ions a e c i ical o de e mining he
pa ies’ expec ed choices.
Games 2025,16, 3 18 o 23
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 o 22
pa icipan s, ye a e age SGSs comp ise only alignable SGSs. Also no e ha 31% o he Pal-
es inian sample epo ed a simila i y le el o 0; he e o e, he lowe simila i y qua ile com-
p ises mo e SGSs compa ed o he o he qua iles.
Figu e 13 shows ha all a e aged ma ices o bo h he Is aeli and Pales inian samples,
apa om he Pales inian lowes simila i y qua ile (Q1), a e absolu ely s able games ac-
co ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye ’s axonomy. Fo hese games, he maximal pay-
o s a e ea ned when bo h pa ies choose o coope a e. Only he Pales inian Q1 a e aged
SGS is a non-s able game, which is likely o mo i a e an in ac able con lic . Mo eo e , all
a e aged SGSs o bo h pa ies o all qua iles a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games,
meaning ha bo h pa ies’ s a egic simila i y pe cep ions a e c i ical o de e mining he
pa ies’ expec ed choices.
a. Is aeli Q1 mean ma ix
(11 pa icipan s, 22 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 78.0, 73.3 15.2, 52.4
Is . D 53.8, 16.9 26.2, 39.0
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0–0.20
Is ael ps* = 0.43
Pales ine ps* = 0.51
b. Is aeli Q2 mean ma ix
(22 pa icipan s, 44 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 87.5, 76.1 25.2, 42.1
Is . D 43.6, 21.4 21.8, 21.9
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.21–0.36
Is ael ps* = 0.22
Pales ine ps* = 0.28
c. Is aeli Q3 mean ma ix
(14 pa icipan s, 28 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 68.6, 61.9 23, 39.3
Is . D 33.5, 23.3 14, 20.6
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.37–0.59
Is ael ps* = 0.16
Pales ine ps* = 0.28
d. Is aeli Q4 mean ma ix
(20 pa icipan s, 40 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 85.6, 73.4 29.7, 48.5
Is . D 32.6, 21.8 17.2, 25.0
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.60–0.94
Is ael ps* = 0.04
Pales ine ps* = 0.36
e. Pales inian Q1 mean ma ix
(24 pa icipan s, 48 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 60.7, 88.3 32.9, 62.4
Is . D 68.6, 9.1 47.8, 5.2
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.00–0.00
Is ael ps* = 0.73
Pales ine ps* = 0.39
. Pales inian Q2 mean ma ix
(15 pa icipan s, 30 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 72.3, 74.7 38, 33.6
Is . D 48.2, 19.4 31.2, 15.0
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.01–0.22
Is ael ps* = 0.20
Pales ine ps* = 0.19
Games 2025, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 18 o 22
g. Pales inian Q3 mean ma ix
(20 pa icipan s, 40 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 59.4, 81.6 36.3, 60.8
Is . D 49.0, 18.4 39.6, 11.8
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.23–0.54
Is ael ps* = 0.39
Pales ine ps* = 0.38
h. Pales inian Q4 mean ma ix
(16 pa icipan s, 32 ma ices)
Pal. C Pal. D
Is . C 73.5, 75.6 23.9, 37.0
Is . D 48.5, 9.1 27.9, 7.3
Repo ed simila i y ange: 0.55–1.00
Is ael ps* = 0.35
Pales ine ps* = 0.29
Figu e 13. A e age SGSs g ouped by epo ed in e -g oup simila i y qua iles o Is aeli and Pales in-
ians pa icipan s.
As shown in Figu e 13, he simila i y h esholds o he Is aeli side s ic ly dec ease
ac oss he ou qua iles. The simila i y h eshold o hose who pe cei e low simila i y
wi h he Pales inians (Q1) is ps* = 0.43. Mo ing h ough he ma ices o Q2 o Q4 e eals a
g adual d op o ps* = 0.04. Compa ing hese simila i y h esholds wi h he co esponding
simila i y pe cep ions in each qua ile sugges s ha ps > ps* o all a e aged SGSs apa
om Q1 (whe e 0.2 < 0.43). The e o e, mos Is aeli pa icipan s a e expec ed o choose he
coope a i e al e na i e. Examining he Pales inian pa icipan s’ sample, e eals an oppo-
si e pa e n, whe e all a e aged SGSs excep Q4 a e cha ac e ized by ps < ps*, sugges ing
he choice o de ec ion o mos Pales inian pa icipan s.
5. Discussion
The p esen s udy examined he Is aeli–Pales inian con lic (as pe cei ed abou h ee
yea s p io o he ou b eak o he 2023 Gaza wa ). Ins ead o elying on schola ly o poli ical
iews, we applied a no el pa adigm ha allowed o elici ing implici con lic pe cep ions,
exp essed as Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs) om Is aeli and Pales inian laymen, equi -
ing no o mal quan i a i e backg ound o he pa icipan s. We hen applied se e al analy -
ical ools, allowing o unde lying subjec i e pe cep ions o he con lic o be conside ed.
Mo eo e , we ied o answe he ques ions o whe he Is aelis and Pales inians pe cei e
he con lic in a simila manne ; whe he hey ha e iden ical assessmen s o he associa ed
payo s; and mos c i ically—wha can be done o educe u u e hos ili ies and a ain peace-
ul solu ions?
The esul s show ha Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s di e ed in hei pe cep ions
o he con lic . Is aeli pe cep ions e lec ed a he coope a i e iews and he expec a ion o
mu ually coope a i e esolu ions, whe eas Pales inian pe cep ions e lec ed ambi alen a -
i udes, wi h a highe p opo ion o con on a ional expec a ions om bo h Is aelis and Pal-
es inians. Ini ial examina ion o pa icipan s’ sel - epo s showed ha mos Is aeli pa ici-
pan s epo ed coope a i e p edic ions o bo h sides (80% o Is aelis and 75% o Pales in-
ians), while Pales inian coope a i e and con on a ional expec a ions we e mo e e enly di-
ided (48% coope a ion o Is aelis and 55% o Pales inians).
Fu he analyzing pa icipan s’ elici ed SGSs showed ha he a e aged Is aeli and Pal-
es inian SGSs a e bo h classi ied as absolu ely s able games, which in heo y should mo i-
a e ully coope a i e in e ac ions. Ne e heless, examining he same payo s om he pe -
spec i e o SERS (Fische , 2009, 2012; Fische e al., 2022; Fische & Sa ane ski, 2023) e-
eals meaning ul and c i ical di e ences be ween he pa ies’ a e age ma ices. Al hough
bo h a e age ma ices a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games, he Is aeli ma ix has e y
Figu e 13. A e age SGSs g ouped by epo ed in e -g oup simila i y qua iles o Is aeli and Pales-
inians pa icipan s.
Games 2025,16, 3 19 o 23
As shown in Figu e 13, he simila i y h esholds o he Is aeli side s ic ly dec ease
ac oss he ou qua iles. The simila i y h eshold o hose who pe cei e low simila i y
wi h he Pales inians (Q1) is p
s
* = 0.43. Mo ing h ough he ma ices o Q2 o Q4 e eals a
g adual d op o p
s
* = 0.04. Compa ing hese simila i y h esholds wi h he co esponding
simila i y pe cep ions in each qua ile sugges s ha p
s
>p
s
* o all a e aged SGSs apa
om Q1 (whe e 0.2 < 0.43). The e o e, mos Is aeli pa icipan s a e expec ed o choose he
coope a i e al e na i e. Examining he Pales inian pa icipan s’ sample, e eals an opposi e
pa e n, whe e all a e aged SGSs excep Q4 a e cha ac e ized by p
s
<p
s
*, sugges ing he
choice o de ec ion o mos Pales inian pa icipan s.
5. Discussion
The p esen s udy examined he Is aeli–Pales inian con lic (as pe cei ed abou h ee
yea s p io o he ou b eak o he 2023 Gaza wa ). Ins ead o elying on schola ly o
poli ical iews, we applied a no el pa adigm ha allowed o elici ing implici con lic
pe cep ions, exp essed as Subjec i e Game S uc u es (SGSs) om Is aeli and Pales inian
laymen, equi ing no o mal quan i a i e backg ound o he pa icipan s. We hen applied
se e al analy ical ools, allowing o unde lying subjec i e pe cep ions o he con lic o be
conside ed. Mo eo e , we ied o answe he ques ions o whe he Is aelis and Pales inians
pe cei e he con lic in a simila manne ; whe he hey ha e iden ical assessmen s o he
associa ed payo s; and mos c i ically—wha can be done o educe u u e hos ili ies and
a ain peace ul solu ions?
The esul s show ha Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s di e ed in hei pe cep ions
o he con lic . Is aeli pe cep ions e lec ed a he coope a i e iews and he expec a ion
o mu ually coope a i e esolu ions, whe eas Pales inian pe cep ions e lec ed ambi alen
a i udes, wi h a highe p opo ion o con on a ional expec a ions om bo h Is aelis and
Pales inians. Ini ial examina ion o pa icipan s’ sel - epo s showed ha mos Is aeli
pa icipan s epo ed coope a i e p edic ions o bo h sides (80% o Is aelis and 75% o
Pales inians), while Pales inian coope a i e and con on a ional expec a ions we e mo e
e enly di ided (48% coope a ion o Is aelis and 55% o Pales inians).
Fu he analyzing pa icipan s’ elici ed SGSs showed ha he a e aged Is aeli and
Pales inian SGSs a e bo h classi ied as absolu ely s able games, which in heo y should
mo i a e ully coope a i e in e ac ions. Ne e heless, examining he same payo s om
he pe spec i e o SERS (Fische ,2009,2012;Fische e al.,2022;Fische & Sa ane ski,
2023) e eals meaning ul and c i ical di e ences be ween he pa ies’ a e age ma ices.
Al hough bo h a e age ma ices a e wo-playe simila i y-sensi i e games, he Is aeli ma ix
has e y low simila i y h esholds o p
s
* = 0.20 o he Is aeli side and p
s
* = 0.34 o he
Pales inian side, whe eas he simila i y h esholds o he Pales inian ma ix a e p
s
* = 0.45
o he Is aeli side, and p
s
* = 0.34 o he Pales inian side. In e p e ing hese alues equi es
compa ing hem wi h he pa ies’ simila i y pe cep ions o each o he . The a e age epo ed
in e -g oup simila i ies o he Is aeli and Pales inian pa ies a e
ps
= 0.40 and
ps
= 0.31,
espec i ely. The e o e, despi e bo h ma ices being a he iden ical, one may expec a
coope a i e choice made by he Is aeli side (since 0.40 > 0.20) ye a a he inconclusi e
endency o he Pales inian side (since 0.31 ≈0.34).
Examining he SGSs o indi iduals wi h di e en sel - epo ed con lic expec a ions
shows ha indi iduals om bo h samples who expec Is aeli coope a ion also p o ide
ma ices wi h e y low simila i y h esholds o he Is aeli pa y; while hose who expec ed
Is aeli con on a ion p o ided ma ices wi h high simila i y h esholds o he Is aeli pa y.
A simila pa e n, hough somewha less ex eme, is also obse ed when conside ing he
sel - epo ed con lic expec a ions and he simila i y h esholds o Pales inian pa icipan s.
In o he wo ds, indi iduals who epo ed expec ing coope a ion ha e a mo e coope a i e
Games 2025,16, 3 20 o 23
pe cep ion o he con lic s uc u e i sel (i.e., equi ing only a low le el o pe cei ed
simila i y wi h he opponen in o de o coope a e acco ding o SERS). In pa allel, hose
who epo con on a ional expec a ions ha e mo e con on a ional pe cep ions o he
con lic s uc u e (i.e., equi ing a high le el o pe cei ed simila i y wi h he opponen
in o de o coope a e). This pa e n is clea ly demons a ed by Pales inian pa icipan s
who p edic ed Is aeli con on a ion and p o ided SGSs wi h ex emely high simila i y
h esholds o he Is aeli pa y (p
s
* = 0.93), indica ing hei expec a ion ha he Is aeli
side is likely o choose con on a ion o almos all pe cei ed le els o simila i y wi h he
Pales inians (i.e., o all le els whe e p
s
< 0.93), p ac ically indica ing an o e whelming
expec a ion o Is aeli con on a ion.
Examining he SGSs’ game ypes acco ding o he e ised Rapopo and Guye axon-
omy (Fische e al.,2024;Rapopo & Guye ,1966) shows ha 70% o Is aeli pa icipan s’
SGSs a e absolu ely s able games, while only 40% o Pales inian pa icipan s’ SGSs a e
absolu ely s able games. Since absolu ely s able games a e likely o indica e an expec a ion
o mu ual coope a ion, his classi ica ion o games also poin s o a c i ical s a egic gap,
whe e many mo e Is aeli pa icipan s ( han Pales inian pa icipan s) expec ed a coope a i e
in e ac ion be ween he pa ies. No ice ha almos none o he pa icipan s ended o pe -
cei e he Is aeli–Pales inian con lic as a PD-like game, as al eady sugges ed o ecologically
alid con lic s (Johnson e al.,2002;No hco & Alexand o a,2015), and speci ically o
he Is aeli–Pales inian con lic (Rowley & Webb,2007).
Classi ying SGSs acco ding o he SERS-based axonomy shows ha 64% o he Is aeli
SGSs a e simila i y-sensi i e o he Is aeli side, and 76% o he Pales inian SGSs a e
simila i y-sensi i e o he Pales inian side. These ela i ely high p opo ions highligh he
impo an ole o simila i y pe cep ions in de e mining he con lic ’s ajec o y. Examining
he elici ed simila i y pe cep ions epo ed by he Is aeli pa icipan s e eals a a he
homogeneous dis ibu ion, whe e all simila i y le els (apa om ex emely high alues)
a e equally ep esen ed. In con as , he dis ibu ion o Pales inian simila i y pe cep ions is
cha ac e ized by a la ge p opo ion, abou 40%, o ex emely low simila i y pe cep ions,
anging om 0 o 10. This indica es ha many Pales inian pa icipan s a e likely o p e e
he choice o a con on a ional al e na i e. Calcula ing Is aeli and Pales inian SERS-based
EVs and assuming indi iduals choose he al e na i e wi h he highe EV e eals a highe
p opo ion o coope a i e choices (66%) o he Is aeli side han o he Pales inian side
(49%). In o he wo ds, acco ding o SERS, Is aelis we e somewha mo e likely han he
Pales inians o choose a coope a i e al e na i e.
Fu he spli ing pa icipan s’ samples in o qua iles, acco ding o he epo ed in e -
g oup simila i y pe cep ions, and calcula ing he a e age SGS simila i y h esholds o
each qua ile, shows ha he lowe he simila i y pe cep ion wi h he o he pa y, he highe
he simila i y h eshold o he game, bo h inc easing he mo i a ion o choose con on a ional
al e na i es. As shown, Is aeli pa icipan s in h ee epo ed simila i y qua iles (all bu
he lowes simila i y qua ile) we e mo i a ed o choose a coope a i e al e na i e, whe eas
Pales inian pa icipan s in h ee simila i y qua iles (all bu he highes simila i y qua ile)
we e mo i a ed o choose a con on a ional al e na i e.
O e all, he indings indica e di e ences in subjec i e pe cep ions o Is aeli and Pales-
inian pa icipan s. Is aeli a i udes ended o lean owa ds coope a ion, while Pales inian
a i udes exhibi mo e ambi alence and a g ea e inclina ion owa ds con on a ional ex-
pec a ions om bo h pa ies. Since Is aeli and Pales inian pa icipan s we e sampled well
be o e he 7 Oc obe 2023 a oci ies and he ollowing wa , he epo ed subjec i e a i udes
help elucida e he p econcep ions ha migh ha e con ibu ed o he ou b eak o hos ili ies
and o he Is aeli mispe cep ion o Pales inian a i udes. Clea ly he ou b eak o wa is
likely o ha e modi ied he pe cep ions o bo h pa ies; he e o e, he elici ed SGSs may
Games 2025,16, 3 21 o 23
no longe p o ide adequa e ep esen a ions o he cu en pa ies’ s a egic pe cep ions.
None heless, he esul s emphasize he c i ical ole o simila i y pe cep ions, which seem o
ha e played an impo an ole in de e mining he pa ies’ a i udes and expec a ions, so ha
e en pa icipan s wi h a he coope a i e pe cep ions o he con lic ( hose who p o ided
SGSs wi h ela i ely low simila i y h esholds) we e s ill expec ed o p e e con on a ional
al e na i es, due o hei low simila i y pe cep ions. This sugges s ha peace-building
e o s should ocus on enhancing pe cep ions o in e -g oup simila i y. While challenging,
his may be mo e achie able han al e ing ac ual o indi idually pe cei ed payo s uc u es.
Al hough nei he shi ing simila i y pe cep ions no modi ying ac ual o pe cei ed payo s
is easy, bo h s a egies o e pa hways o os e coope a ion and peace ul in e ac ions in he
Is aeli–Pales inian con lic as well as in o he social and poli ical con lic s.
Finally, wo cau ious ema ks a e wa an ed. (i) The s udy elied on a con enience
sample. Consequen ly, he wo g oups di e in e ms o pa icipan s’ a e age age. This
di e ence sugges s ha some o he obse ed di e ences may be a ibu ed o he highe
a e age age o he Pales inian sample. While Pe e son e al. (2020) ind ha poli ical
a i udes a e ema kably s able o e he long e m, hey also no e ha , when changes
do occu , hey a e mo e likely o e lec shi s om libe al o conse a i e a i udes. This
implies ha younge pa icipan s a e likely o display mo e libe al a i udes, which could be
associa ed wi h a highe p opo ion o absolu ely s able games, lowe simila i y h esholds,
and highe alues o elici ed simila i y pe cep ions. (ii) Clea ly, using wo-by- wo games
o model ecologically alid con lic s may o e simpli y he s a egic dynamics in ol ed.
Howe e , his modeling app oach ocuses pa icipan s on c i ical choices, highligh s he
di e ences be ween he pa ies, and p o ides a basic, s aigh o wa d ep esen a ion o he
con lic and i s possible esolu ions.
To conclude, we wish o emphasize he bene i s o shi ing om ex e nally imposed
game ma ices o subjec i ely pe cei ed in e ac ion s uc u es, as ep esen ed by SGSs.
This app oach allows o he analysis o he in e ac ions people pe cei e and espond o,
a he han he games hey a e expec ed o be playing.
Supplemen a y Ma e ials: The ollowing suppo ing in o ma ion can be downloaded a : h ps://
www.mdpi.com/a icle/10.3390/g16010003/s1, Figu e S1. Examples o he h ee classes o he
SERS-based axonomy o games, Re e ences Loomes and Sugden (1982), Nash (1950) and Rapopo
and Guye (1966) a e ci ed in he Supplemen a y Ma e ials.
Au ho Con ibu ions: Concep ualiza ion, I.F.; Me hodology, I.F., S.A. and L.G.; So wa e, L.G.;
Fo mal analysis, S.A. and L.G.; In es iga ion, I.F.; Da a cu a ion, S.A.; W i ing—o iginal d a p epa-
a ion, I.F. and S.A.; W i ing— e iew and edi ing, I.F. and S.A.; Supe ision, I.F.; Funding acquisi ion,
I.F. All au ho s ha e ead and ag eed o he published e sion o he manusc ip .
Funding: This esea ch was unded by he Is ael Science Founda ion, g an numbe 64015.
Da a A ailabili y S a emen : All da a a e a ailable on he Open Science F amewo k (OSF) h ps://
os .io/xw ud/? iew_only=db1913c30 3a42108e838e95 2d20e12 (accessed on 11 July 2024).
Con lic s o In e es : The au ho s decla e no con lic s o in e es .
No es
1
No e ha while he classic PD game equi es a s ic o de o he payo s, T > R > P > S (Flood,1958), in he ca ego y o PD-like
games we allow T = R o one o he playe s.
2
A cell which no playe is mo i a ed o lea e unila e ally while assuming he o he playe does no change his choice (i.e., a Nash
equilib ium), ye he e exis s ano he cell in which bo h playe s ob ain highe payo s (and he e o e he examined cell is no a
Pa e o equilib ium).
Games 2025,16, 3 22 o 23
3
Be ween session eliabili y o pa icipan s who we e judged o be alignable ac oss sessions was 7.08 (ou o 10), SD = 1.87. See
Fische e al. (2024) o he compu a ion o Ma ices S a egic Resemblance Index (MSRI) applied he e o assessing be ween
session eliabili y.
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au ho (s) and con ibu o (s) and no o MDPI and/o he edi o (s). MDPI and/o he edi o (s) disclaim esponsibili y o any inju y o
people o p ope y esul ing om any ideas, me hods, ins uc ions o p oduc s e e ed o in he con en .
