New categories of conditional contribution strategies in the public goods game

Schä e , Klaudia; K ál, Ad ienn; Kun, Ádám
A icle
New ca ego ies o condi ional con ibu ion s a egies in
he public goods game
Games
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
MDPI – Mul idisciplina y Digi al Publishing Ins i u e, Basel
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Schä e , Klaudia; K ál, Ad ienn; Kun, Ádám (2025) : New ca ego ies o
condi ional con ibu ion s a egies in he public goods game, Games, ISSN 2073-4336, MDPI, Basel,
Vol. 16, Iss. 3, pp. 1-21,
h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/g16030022
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Ci a ion: Schä e , K., K ál, A., & Kun,
Á. (2025). New Ca ego ies o
Condi ional Con ibu ion S a egies in
he Public Goods Game. Games,16(3),
22. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/
g16030022
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A icle
New Ca ego ies o Condi ional Con ibu ion S a egies in he
Public Goods Game
Klaudia Schä e 1, Ad ienn K ál 1,2 and Ádám Kun 1,2,3,*
1Depa men o Plan Sys ema ics, Ecology and Theo e ical Biology, Eö ös Uni e si y,
H1117 Budapes , Hunga y
2Ins i u e o E olu ion, HUN-REN Cen e o Ecological Resea ch, H1121 Budapes , Hunga y
3Pa menides Cen e o he Concep ual Founda ions o Science, Pa menides Founda ion,
D82343 Pöcking, Ge many
*Co espondence: [email p o ec ed]
Abs ac : Human coope a ion is ubiqui ous and ins inc i e. We a e among he mos co-
ope a i e species on Ea h. S ill, esea ch mos ly ocuses on why we coope a e, ins ead
o unde s anding why some o us do no do so. The public goods game can be used o
map human coope a ion as well as o s udy ee iding. We acqui ed da a h ough an
online, unincen i ized ques ionnai e which p omp ed esponden s o choose how much o
an ini ial endowmen o con ibu e o a common pool. The esponden s con ibu ed, on
a e age, 54% o hei ini ial endowmen o he common pool. The usual ca ego iza ion
scheme o he elici ed condi ional con ibu ion pa e n disce ns uncondi ional ee ide s
who do no con ibu e i espec i e o he con ibu ions o o he s and calls e e yone a
condi ional coope a o who co ela es hei con ibu ion wi h ha o he o he s. Howe e ,
someone consis en ly o e ing less han he o he s should no be called a coope a o . Conse-
quen ly, based on he condi ional con ibu ion pa e ns among ou esponden s, we sugges
a eca ego iza ion o con ibu ion pa e ns in o he ollowing ca ego ies: uncondi ional
coope a o (1.5%), uncondi ional ee ide (10.6%), pe ec condi ional coope a o (42.6%),
hump-shaped con ibu o (0.7%), V-shaped con ibu o (0.4%), condi ional coope a o
(16.6%), condi ional ee ide (13.6%), condi ional con ibu o (6.4%), nega i e condi ional
con ibu o (0%), and o he s (7.6%). We only call someone a coope a o i he esponden a
leas ma ches o he s’ con ibu ion, and call e e yone consis en ly o e ing less a ee ide .
Fu he mo e, we ound no di e ence be ween he con ibu ions o women and men. No
co ela ion o con ibu ion wi h age, educa ional a ainmen , and size o he esiden ial
se lemen was ound. S uden s’ con ibu ions we e no di e en om non-s uden s’ con-
ibu ions. We ound a signi ican co ela ion o he con ibu ion o he common pool wi h
hype compe i i e o ien a ion (nega i e co ela ion) and he sel -assessed willingness o
ake isks in gene al (posi i e co ela ion).
Keywo ds: public goods game; public goods; p isone ’s dilemma; agedy o he commons;
s a egy me hod; coope a ion; condi ional coope a ion; ee ide ; olun a y con ibu ion
mechanism
1. In oduc ion
Coope a ion is one o he de ining cha ac e is ics o ou species (Bowles & Gin is,
2003;Kaplan e al.,2009;Rand & Nowak,2013). We a e s ill puzzled by his ac and
y o unde s and why. Much ink has been spilled on why o coope a e a all. I s ems
om he oo s o he e olu iona y heo y, which emphasizes sel ishness, and also om
Games 2025,16, 22 h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/g16030022
Games 2025,16, 22 2 o 21
he games we model coope a ion wi h. The public goods game (PGG), a o maliza ion o
he agedy o he commons (Ha din,1968), is a commonly employed amewo k. In his
game’s heo e ical si ua ion,
N
indi iduals independen ly and simul aneously decide on
con ibu ing o a common pool. Con ibu ions come om hei ini ial endowmen o , o
example, 10,000 mone a y uni s (o o he quan i iable esou ce). Wha e e hey e ain o
hemsel es is hei s. The mone a y uni s in he common pool yield a e u n p opo ional o
he in es ed amoun . The amoun in he common pool is mul iplied by
(1
< ≤N
), and
he esul ing sum is di ided equally among he
N
indi iduals. A mone a y uni e ained
is s ill one mone a y uni a he end o he day, bu a mone a y uni con ibu ed o he
common pool yields
/N
mone a y uni s (mean pe capi a e u n, MPCR). Howe e , o he s’
con ibu ions also yield he same o e e y o he indi idual. Mu ual coope a ion, i.e.,
con ibu ion o he whole ini ial endowmen o he common pool, is he Pa e o e icien
ou come yielding he highes o al payo o he whole g oup. I
>N
, a con ibu ion is
also he indi idually op imal beha io , bu we ocus on he case (1
< ≤N
) whe e he e is
a social dilemma. In his case, he yield is
/N<
1, and hus e e y indi idual can maximize
hei own payo by no con ibu ing, hence, no con ibu ion (no coope a ion) is he Nash
equilib ium o his si ua ion. S ill, i human subjec s ace such a si ua ion, hey usually
con ibu e be ween 40–60% o hei ini ial endowmen o he common pool (Ledya d,1995).
A one-sho endowmen o e s some glimpse in o why people coope a e. Some o he
di e ences be ween ou endencies o coope a e ha e a gene ic unde pinning (Hi aishi
e al.,2015;Me ins e al.,2011;Sch oede e al.,2013). This mani es s di ec ly o h ough
o he pe sonali y ai s ha in luence coope a ion (Guil oos & Ku z,2017;Sch oede
e al.,2015;Volk e al.,2012). The e a e also ex insic ac o s in luencing coope a ion.
Bo h b oad cul u e and indi idual economic eali y modi y coope a i e endencies. One
s udy (Lamba & Mace,2011) a gues ha i is indi idual economic eali ies ha de e mine
how much people a e willing o con ibu e o he public good: indi iduals expe iencing
economic ha dship con ibu e less. Howe e , cul u e (cul u al no ms) can ele a e le els
o coope a ion e en in he ace o ha dship (Os om,1990). An indi idualis wo ld iew
inc eases he p e alence o ee- iding, whe eas indi iduals wi h a mo e communi a ian
wo ld iew a e mo e o en (condi ional) coope a o s (Che y e al.,2017). A la ge household
educes he con ibu ion o he public good in India (Kuma & Kan ,2016) and in Thailand
(Ca pen e e al.,2004), bu inc eases i in Vie nam (Ca pen e e al.,2004), Colombia, and
Kenya (Ca denas e al.,2010). Cul u e seems o ha e an e ec on coope a ion (Gäch e
e al.,2010). The seminal pape by He mann e al. (2008) ocused he spo ligh on he
po en ial o cul u al di e ences in coope a i e beha io . The e a e cul u al compa isons
ha ind some di e ences (Ahmed & Salas,2009;Cadsby e al.,2007;Ca pen e e al.,2004;
Chaudhu i e al.,2006;He mann e al.,2008;Ishii & Ku zban,2008;Nishi e al.,2017), and
he e a e o he s ha ind none (He mann e al.,2008;Leibb and e al.,2015). On he o he
hand, he e could be di e ences e en wi hin a coun y (Bigoni e al.,2016;Eckel Ca he ine,
2015;Kamei,2012).
The s a egy me hod (Sel en,1967) o e s mo e insigh in o coope a i e beha io .
The e, expe imen e s ask pa icipan s how much hey would con ibu e o he public good
i hey knew he a e age con ibu ions o he o he pa icipan s. The s a egy me hod
is a good es ima o o people’s beha io gi en hei belie s abou o he s’ con ibu ions
(B and s & Cha ness,2011;Fischbache e al.,2012). The beha io al ypes a e s able o e
ime (Gäch e e al.,2022;Volk e al.,2012) (bu see (And eozzi e al.,2020)).
The con ibu ion schedules esul ing om he s a egy me hod ques ions a e pu
in o ca ego ies. The commonly used ulese o ca ego iza ion (Fischbache e al.,2001) is
as ollows:
•A ee ide is he one who always con ibu es 0, i espec i e o o he s’ con ibu ions.
Games 2025,16, 22 3 o 21
•
Acondi ional coope a o is one wi h a posi i e and signi ican (a 1% signi icance le el)
Spea man co ela ion wi h he in es men s o o he s.
•
Ahump-shaped o iangula (Fischbache e al.,2012) con ibu ion is he one ha
inc eases o abou 50% o he o he s’ con ibu ions; hen, he con ibu ion dec eases.
•
I an ou come does no all in o any o he abo e ca ego ies, hen i is
conside ed “o he ”
.
This ca ego iza ion, howe e , was based on a sample o jus 44 con ibu ion schedules
collec ed in a single s udy (Fischbache e al.,2001). While he de ini ion o ee ide s
and condi ional coope a o s was exac om he beginning, he de ini ion o hump-shaped
coope a o s was less clea . Fischbache e al. (2012) made he de ini ion mo e p ecise by
also equi ing he Spea man co ela ion o be signi ican o bo h he upwa d end and he
downwa d end.
Many pa e ns ha ha e su aced o e he yea s in o he s udies canno be ound
among hose o iginal ca ego ies. Fo example, while hump-shaped coope a o s we e
included, he opposi e—someone con ibu ing much in he beginning, educing hei
con ibu ion o a while, and hen inc easing i again (a V-shaped con ibu ion p o ile)—has
no been conside ed. Such a pa e n was epo ed by (Mulle e al.,2008) (1 ins ance) and
(G andjean e al.,2022) (1 ins ance).
Ano he new ca ego y is ha o nega i e coope a o s (Bu on-Chellew e al.,2016)
o coun e -condi ional coope a o s (Be gan ino e al.,2023) who, simila ly o condi ional
coope a o s, change hei con ibu ion based on he con ibu ions o o he s, bu o whom
he co ela ion is nega i e, i.e., hey con ibu e much when o he s do no , and hen dec ease
hei con ibu ion. They ound 6 (ou o 36) (Be gan ino e al.,2023) and 2 (ou o 72)
(Bu on-Chellew e al.,2016) subjec s exhibi ing such pa e ns. O he expe imen s ha e also
ound examples o such con ibu ion pa e ns: 2 ins ances in (Mulle e al.,2008),
1 ins ance
in (Kamei,2012), and one o wo ins ances in (G andjean e al.,2022).
Uncondi ional coope a o s as a sepa a e ca ego y ha e been p oposed many imes
(Bu on-Chellew e al.,2016;Ka ušˇcák & Miklánek,2023;Thöni & Volk,2018). I was
de ined as a non-ze o con ibu ion ha does no change wi h o he s’ con ibu ions. The
p oblem wi h his de ini ion is ha an indi idual always in es ing 10% would be labeled
as an uncondi ional coope a o as well as someone always in es ing he maximum amoun .
G andjean e al. (2022) inc eased he ba sligh ly. They only conside ed someone an
uncondi ional coope a o i hei mean con ibu ion was abo e 10% and he con ibu ions
we e wi hin he 5% s anda d de ia ion ange om he mean con ibu ion. S ill, someone
consis en ly con ibu ing 20% would be called an uncondi ional coope a o . One s udy
(Rus agi e al.,2010) only conside ed someone an uncondi ional coope a o (al uis ) i i
always con ibu ed he maximum amoun . Ano he s udy (Bigoni e al.,2019) was a bi
mo e pe missi e and included in i s al uis ca ego y anyone who always con ibu ed mo e
han 75%, i espec i e o o he s’ con ibu ions. A he lowe bound o uncondi ionally
in es ing 80%, such indi iduals would o e mo e han o he s wi h a low- o-medium
a e age in es men and would only all behind o he s wi h high in es men s.
As seen abo e, he es ablished de ini ion o ee ide s is oo es ic i e. We specula e
on he eason in he discussion. He e, we jus men ion ha people do no gene ally conside
a low in es men o be ai (Bauma d,2011;Feh & Schmid ,1999). Some au ho s allowed
1 mone a y uni ou o 20 o be con ibu ed o e all choices and s ill conside ed i o be
ee- iding (Makowsky e al.,2014;Rus agi e al.,2010). While he e can be po en ially mo e
indi iduals ca ego ized as ee ide s, i s ill does no sol e he p oblem o consis en ly low
con ibu ions. One s udy (G andjean e al.,2022) conside ed someone a ee ide i hei
con ibu ion was on a e age below 10%, while ano he s udy (Be gan ino e al.,2023) used
he cu o alue o 20%. Naga su e al. (2018), based on he s udy by (de Oli ei a e al.,
2015), on he o he hand, conside ed e e yone a sel ish playe whose con ibu ion ne e
Games 2025,16, 22 4 o 21
exceeded 25%. The e is a sub le di e ence be ween hese wo app oaches. The de ini ion
equi ing an a e age con ibu ion o no mo e han 10% o 20% also includes a pa e n in
which all con ibu ions a e 0, excep when e e yone else’s con ibu ion is he maximum
amoun , in which case his con ibu ion is ma ched. This can s ill be conside ed sel ish, bu
i is di e en om he case whe e one always gi es 20%.
F ee ide s (Bu lando & Guala,2005) and subpa condi ional coope a o s (Neugebaue
e al.,2009) d i e epea ed coope a ion downwa d. This beha io is sel ish, as hey con-
ibu e less han hey expec o he s o con ibu e. Lumping mos o hese oge he hides
impo an di e ences be ween he s a egies o indi iduals. The issue is no eally he
use o he Spea man co ela ion s. he Pea son co ela ion (Thöni & Volk,2018), he
nume ical alue o he co ela ion (G andjean e al.,2022), o he signi icance le el o he
said co ela ion (Rus agi e al.,2010). All con ibu ion pa e ns in Figu e 1ha e bo h he
Pea son co ela ion and he Spea man co ela ion abo e 0.89, and all a e highly signi ican
a p< 0.001. One s udy (And eozzi e al.,2020) dis inguished be ween pe ec condi ional
coope a o s and impe ec condi ional coope a o s. Pe ec condi ional coope a o s ma ch o he s’
con ibu ions exac ly, whe eas impe ec coope a o s include all o he condi ional coope -
a o s. Howe e , he e should be a dis inc ion made be ween hose no ma ching o he s’
con ibu ions and hose ha con ibu e e en mo e (compa e op igh and op cen e in
Figu e 1and bo om le and cen e wi h bo om igh ). Bu lando and Guala (2005) de ined
condi ional coope a ion as ha whe e “condi ional con ibu ion unc ions app oxima e he
‘pe ec ecip oca ion unc ion’, wi h a ma gin o a ia ion o
±
10%”. By ha de ini ion, he
pa e ns/p o iles in he op ow in Figu e 1would be conside ed as condi ional coope a o s
while he con ibu ion pa e ns in he bo om ow would no . Fischbache e al. (2001)
called he s a egy o no ma ching o he s’ con ibu ions as condi ional coope a ion wi h a
sel -se ing bias.Teyssie (2012) called hem low ecip oca o s, who ma ch he i s mo e ’s
con ibu ion only i i is no oo high.
Games2025,16,xFORPEERREVIEW4o 23


s udyby(deOli ei ae al.,2015),on heo he hand,conside ede e yoneasel ishplaye 
whosecon ibu ionne e exceeded25%.The eisasub lediffe encebe ween hese wo
app oaches.Thede ini ion equi ingana e agecon ibu iono no mo e han10%o 20%
alsoincludesapa e ninwhichallcon ibu ionsa e0,excep whene e yoneelse’s
con ibu ionis hemaximumamoun ,inwhichcase hiscon ibu ionisma ched.Thiscan
s illbeconside edsel ish,bu i isdiffe en  om hecasewhe eonealwaysgi es20%.
F ee ide s(Bu lando&Guala,2005)andsubpa condi ionalcoope a o s
(Neugebaue e al.,2009)d i e epea edcoope a iondownwa d.Thisbeha io issel ish,
as heycon ibu eless han heyexpec o he s ocon ibu e.Lumpingmos o  hese
oge he hidesimpo an diffe encesbe ween hes a egieso indi iduals.Theissueis
no  eally heuseo  heSpea manco ela ion s. hePea sonco ela ion(Thöni&Volk,
2018), henume ical alueo  heco ela ion(G andjeane al.,2022),o  hesigni icance
le elo  hesaidco ela ion(Rus agie al.,2010).Allcon ibu ionpa e nsinFigu e1ha e
bo h hePea sonco ela ionand heSpea manco ela ionabo e0.89,andalla ehighly
signi ican a p<0.001.Ones udy(And eozzie al.,2020)dis inguishedbe weenpe ec 
condi ionalcoope a o sandimpe ec condi ionalcoope a o s.Pe ec condi ionalcoope a o s
ma cho he s’con ibu ionsexac ly,whe easimpe ec coope a o sincludeallo he 
condi ionalcoope a o s.Howe e , he eshouldbeadis inc ionmadebe ween hoseno 
ma chingo he s’con ibu ionsand hose ha con ibu ee enmo e(compa e op igh 
and opcen e inFigu e1andbo omle andcen e wi hbo om igh ).Bu landoand
Guala(2005)de inedcondi ionalcoope a ionas ha whe e“condi ionalcon ibu ion
unc ionsapp oxima e he‘pe ec  ecip oca ion unc ion’,wi hama gino  a ia iono 
±10%”.By ha de ini ion, hepa e ns/p o ilesin he op owinFigu e1wouldbe
conside edascondi ionalcoope a o swhile hecon ibu ionpa e nsin hebo om ow
wouldno .Fischbache e al.(2001)called hes a egyo no ma chingo he s’
con ibu ionsascondi ionalcoope a ionwi hasel ‐se ingbias.Teyssie (2012)called hem
low ecip oca o s,whoma ch he i s mo e ’scon ibu iononlyi i isno  oohigh.

Figu e1.Diffe en condi ionalcoope a o s.The ople panelshowsape ec condi ional
coope a o .Thenex panelshowsacon ibu ionpa e ninwhichcon ibu ionsa econsis en ly10%
Figu e 1. Di e en condi ional coope a o s. The op le panel shows a pe ec condi ional coope a o .
The nex panel shows a con ibu ion pa e n in which con ibu ions a e consis en ly 10% less ( op
cen e ) o 10% mo e ( op igh ) compa ed o he pe ec condi ional coope a o . In he bo om ow, he
i s wo panels show condi ional ee ide s, and he igh mos one shows a condi ional coope a o .

Games 2025,16, 22 5 o 21
We need o men ion he eclassi ica ion o ca ego ies by Fallucchi e al. (2019). They
made a classi ica ion based on hie a chical clus e ing o con ibu ion ec o s. Thei new
ca ego ies included own-maximise s,s ong condi ional coope a o s,weak condi ional coope a o s,
uncondi ional coope a o s, and a ious (which is basically he “o he s” ca ego y). Own-
maximize s con ibu e ze o o ew okens (which is in line wi h he de ini ion o ee ide s).
S ong condi ional coope a o s ma ch he con ibu ions o o he s. Weak condi ional coope a o s,
on he o he hand, ma ch o he s’ con ibu ions o a mos hal he le el. Uncondi ional
coope a o s con ibu e he maximum amoun (o close o i ) o he public goods.
S a egies o playe s can be in e ed om he beha io obse ed in epea ed games.
While he s a egy space o he public goods game is as , he compa able s a egy space
o he p isone ’s dilemma (a wo-playe e sion o he PGG) is mo e manageable. The
s a egy equency es ima ion me hod (Dal Bó & F éche e,2011) can be employed o
disce n s a egies. In e es ingly, simple s a egies such as “always de ec ” (compa able o
uncondi ional ee ide s), “ i - o - a ” (s a by coope a ing and hen do wha he o he s
did in he p e ious ound, analogous o he pe ec condi ional coope a ion), and “g im”
(coope a e as long as he o he s coope a e, hen swi ch o ee iding) come ou equen ly
(Dal Bó & F éche e,2019;Rome o & Rosokha,2023). E en i mixed s a egies a e allowed,
playe s con e ge on hese simple s a egies (Rome o & Rosokha,2023).
He e, we o e a new classi ica ion scheme o he ou come o he s a egy me hod
(Fischbache e al.,2001;Sel en,1967). We measu ed he coope a i e endencies in Hunga y, a
high-income, o me socialis bloc coun y in Cen al–Eas e n Eu ope. While uncondi ional
con ibu ion in he PGG has al eady been epo ed (Czibo & Be eczkei,2010;Romano
e al.,2021), condi ional con ibu ion emains so a unexplo ed in he Hunga ian con ex .
Ac ually, s udies o his so a e cu en ly a ailable only om e y ew coun ies (Table 1),
as mos such esea ch has so a been limi ed o he USA, UK, Swi ze land, and Ge many.
F om he wide Cen al–Eas e n Eu opean egional con ex , da a in ol ing condi ional
con ibu ions has so a only been collec ed om he Czech Republic (Ka ušˇcák & Miklánek,
2023). Consequen ly, ou s udy also has he po en ial o add aluable da a o he wide
ques ion o how cul u e a ec s coope a i e endencies.
Table 1. Dis ibu ion o con ibu ion ypes om he li e a u e.
Condi ional F ee
Ride Hump-
Shaped Unc.
Coope a o Numbe o
Pa icipan s Coun y Re .
50 29.5 13.6 - 44 Swi ze land (Fischbache e al.,2001)
80.6 8.3 - - 36 USA (Koche e al.,2008)
41.7 36.1 11.1 - 36 Japan (Koche e al.,2008)
44.4 22.2 11.1 - 36 Aus ia (Koche e al.,2008)
38 35 15 1.6 60 UK (Mulle e al.,2008)
58.3 14.6 8.3 - 96 Colombia (Ma insson e al.,2009)
55.5 6.3 7.5 - 160 Russia (He mann & Thöni,2009)
55 23 12 - 140 Swi ze land (Fischbache & Gäch e ,2010)
34.0 11.5 2.95 2.2 679 E hiopia (Rus agi e al.,2010)
58.3 25.0 13.9 - 72 4(Volk e al.,2012)
55.0 22.9 12.1 1.4 140 Swi ze land (Fischbache e al.,2012)
69 15 - - 1488 Denma k (Thöni e al.,2012)
50.0 25.7 14.0 - 350 USA (Kamei,2012)
47.8 23.3 15.1 - 272 USA (Aimone e al.,2013)
62.5 4.2 8.3 - 48 Colombia (Ma insson e al.,2013)
50.0 4.2 8.3 - 48 Vie nam (Ma insson e al.,2013)
63.2 22.8 9.6 - 228 Ge many (Fischbache e al.,2014)
Games 2025,16, 22 6 o 21
Table 1. Con .
Condi ional F ee
Ride Hump-
Shaped Unc.
Coope a o Numbe o
Pa icipan s Coun y Re .
66.7 2- - 48 The Ne he lands
and Swi ze land (Da iel & Niki o akis,2014)
68 15 - - 1366 Denma k (Fosgaa d e al.,2014;Nielsen e al.,2014)
51 13.5 17.7 - 96 USA (Makowsky e al.,2014)
71.0 6.5 3.2 - 31 UK (Ca w igh & Lo e ,2014)
63 24 - - 128 Ge many (Ha ig e al.,2015)
43.6 24.8 - - 296 Japan (Hi aishi e al.,2015)
58.13 20.16 11.63 - 144 Ge many (Koche e al.,2015)
67. 8 15.5 4.0 - 174 UK (Abele & Nosenzo,2015)
54.4 6.5 6.5 15.2 46 Denma k (Fosgaa d & Pio esan,2016)
50 21 10 - 72 UK (Bu on-Chellew e al.,2016)
37.5 22.5 15.0 - 40 F ance (P ége e al.,2016)
81.7 6.7 6.7 - 36 Ge many (Bjö k e al.,2016)
73.6 16.9 6 - 201 USA 3(Che y e al.,2017)
49 9.5 4.5 4 299 China (Vollan e al.,2017)
59.7 25.6 -1- 592 UK (Cubi e al.,2017)
64 17 - - 444 UK (Gäch e e al.,2017)
48.9 26.6 - - 184 UK (Webe e al.,2018)
56.4 21.6 - - 227 Denma k (Naga su e al.,2018)
66 12 - 2 134 I aly (Bigoni e al.,2019)
67 21.6 7.5 - 134 I aly (And eozzi e al.,2020)
42 33 9 - 88 Czech Republic (Ka ušˇcák & Nikolaychuk,2023)
57.4 3.1 - - 3653 UK (Isle e al.,2021)
50 0 11.1 - 36 I aly (Be gan ino e al.,2023)
80 8 - - 703 USA (Gäch e e al.,2022)
76 10 - - 845 Swi ze land (Bu on-Chellew e al.,2022)
64.4 2 5.2 - 250 USA/UK (Bilancini e al.,2022)
50 30 5.2 - 192 F ance (G andjean e al.,2022)
57.6 12.0 12.6 - 192 Czech Republic (Ka ušˇcák & Miklánek,2023)
63.4 15.1 6.5 - 93 Ge many (G anulo e al.,2023)
55 11 22.6 - 106 USA (Webe e al.,2023)
52 22 18.2 - 88 UK (Webe e al.,2023)
48 8 28.7 - 80 Mo occo (Webe e al.,2023)
47 20 7 - 86 Tu key (Webe e al.,2023)
47.7 20.1 15.6 1.5 66 USA (Li & Noussai ,2024)
80.4 6.8 0.7 1.5 265 Hunga y This s udy
The pe cen ages o condi ional coope a o s, ee ide s, hump-shaped coope a o s (o iangula coope a o s), and
uncondi ional ull coope a o s a e gi en. The emaining pe cen age alls unde he “o he s” ca ego y, which is no
displayed he e— his ca ego y was no epo ed in he s udies.
1
The e we e iangula coope a o s in he sample,
bu oo ew, and so hese esponden s we e ca ego ized as “o he s”.
2
All non-coope a o s we e pooled in o he
“o he s” ca ego y. We canno dis inguish be ween he ca ego ies.
3
The expe imen was conduc ed ia Mechanical
Tu k, and so subjec s could come om any coun y.
4
The me hod only s a es ha he expe imen was conduc ed
in a Eu opean uni e si y.
2. Resul s
The esul s a e based on 265 esponses collec ed online in Hunga y. The ques ionnai e
was open o e e yone, bu mos esponden s we e uni e si y s uden s. The esponden s
we e asked abou hei uncondi ional con ibu ions and condi ional con ibu ions (ac-
co ding o he s a egy me hod) o a common pool. Fu he mo e, da a on demog aphics,
isk- aking a i udes, a i udes owa d compe i ion, and pe cei ed pas and p esen eco-
nomic s a us we e eco ded. The s udy was olun a y and unincen i ized. The e we e wo
ques ions assessing i he esponden unde s ood he game. Responses om hose co ec ly
answe ing bo h assessmen ques ions and hose ailing a leas one o hem did no di e
signi ican ly, and hus all esponses we e e ained (see Ma e ials and Me hods o de ails).
2.1. Uncondi ional Con ibu ion
The a e age uncondi ional con ibu ion o he common pool was 54%. The espon-
den s, mos commonly (34%), in es ed hal o hei ini ial endowmen o he common pool.
The second mos commonly in es ed amoun was he maximum (20%), ollowed by no
in es men (9%) (Figu e 2).
Games 2025,16, 22 7 o 21
Games2025,16,xFORPEERREVIEW7o 23
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
om hoseco ec lyanswe ingbo hassessmen ques ionsand hose ailinga leas one
o  hemdidno diffe signi ican ly,and husall esponseswe e e ained(seeMa e ials
andMe hods o de ails).
2.1.Uncondi ionalCon ibu ion
Thea e ageuncondi ionalcon ibu ion o hecommonpoolwas54%.The
esponden s,mos commonly(34%),in es edhal o  hei ini ialendowmen  o he
commonpool.Thesecondmos commonlyin es edamoun was hemaximum(20%),
ollowedbynoin es men (9%)(Figu e2).

Figu e2.F equencyo  hegi enin es men  o hecommonpoolamong he esponden s.
2.2.Condi ionalCon ibu ion
Acco ding o heo iginalca ego iza iono Fischbache e al.(2001)(see
In oduc ion),18(6.8%) esponden swe e ee ide s;4(1.5%)we euncondi ional
coope a o s;2we ehump‐shapedcon ibu o s(0.7%);213we econdi ionalcoope a o s(80.4%);
and26we econside ed obe“o he s”(9.8%)(see heg aphical ep esen a iono  he
s a egyo  esponden sinAppendixA).
Thehump‐shapedcoope a o s oundinou su ey(Figu e3)we emos ly a  om he
idealcase.Wealso oundoneexampleo aV‐shapedcon ibu ionpa e n,whichis he
opposi eo  hepa e nexhibi edbyahump‐shapedcoope a o .Thisunde sco es ha  he
de ec iono  a e a ian s equi esala ge samplesize,and heo iginalca ego iza ion
missedsomesuchpa e ns.

Figu e 2. F equency o he gi en in es men o he common pool among he esponden s.
2.2. Condi ional Con ibu ion
Acco ding o he o iginal ca ego iza ion o Fischbache e al. (2001) (see In oduc ion),
18 (6.8%) esponden s we e ee ide s; 4 (1.5%) we e uncondi ional coope a o s; 2 we e hump-
shaped con ibu o s (0.7%); 213 we e condi ional coope a o s (80.4%); and 26 we e conside ed
o be “o he s” (9.8%) (see he g aphical ep esen a ion o he s a egy o esponden s in
Appendix A).
The hump-shaped coope a o s ound in ou su ey (Figu e 3) we e mos ly a om he
ideal case. We also ound one example o a V-shaped con ibu ion pa e n, which is he
opposi e o he pa e n exhibi ed by a hump-shaped coope a o . This unde sco es ha he
de ec ion o a e a ian s equi es a la ge sample size, and he o iginal ca ego iza ion
missed some such pa e ns.
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
om hoseco ec lyanswe ingbo hassessmen ques ionsand hose ailinga leas one
o  hemdidno diffe signi ican ly,and husall esponseswe e e ained(seeMa e ials
andMe hods o de ails).
2.1.Uncondi ionalCon ibu ion
Thea e ageuncondi ionalcon ibu ion o hecommonpoolwas54%.The
esponden s,mos commonly(34%),in es edhal o  hei ini ialendowmen  o he
commonpool.Thesecondmos commonlyin es edamoun was hemaximum(20%),
ollowedbynoin es men (9%)(Figu e2).

Figu e2.F equencyo  hegi enin es men  o hecommonpoolamong he esponden s.
2.2.Condi ionalCon ibu ion
Acco ding o heo iginalca ego iza iono Fischbache e al.(2001)(see
In oduc ion),18(6.8%) esponden swe e ee ide s;4(1.5%)we euncondi ional
coope a o s;2we ehump‐shapedcon ibu o s(0.7%);213we econdi ionalcoope a o s(80.4%);
and26we econside ed obe“o he s”(9.8%)(see heg aphical ep esen a iono  he
s a egyo  esponden sinAppendixA).
Thehump‐shapedcoope a o s oundinou su ey(Figu e3)we emos ly a  om he
idealcase.Wealso oundoneexampleo aV‐shapedcon ibu ionpa e n,whichis he
opposi eo  hepa e nexhibi edbyahump‐shapedcoope a o .Thisunde sco es ha  he
de ec iono  a e a ian s equi esala ge samplesize,and heo iginalca ego iza ion
missedsomesuchpa e ns.

Figu e 3. Mino con ibu ion ypes: hump-shaped con ibu o s and V-shaped con ibu o s. The ex-
amples a e as ound in ou da ase . The g ay lines depic he quin essen ial o m o such con ibu ion
pa e ns and a e gi en as e e ence.
In his s udy, we obse ed no ins ances o nega i e coope a o s (Be gan ino e al.,2023;
Bu on-Chellew e al.,2016) who con ibu ed much when o he s did no , and hen educed
hei con ibu ions. We only ound ou ull coope a o s con ibu ing all hei ini ial
endowmen and ound no one uncondi ionally in es ing 80% o 90% o i .
We p oceeded wi h he de ini ion o ee ide s (sel ish playe s) which speci ies he
con ibu ion as ne e exceeding 25%, as p oposed by (de Oli ei a e al.,2015;Naga su e al.,
2018).
The e a e 113 (42.6%) pe ec condi ional coope a o s in ou sample. This can be consid-
e ed a ca ego y o i s own.
Games 2025,16, 22 8 o 21
2.3. Reca ego iza ion o Condi ional Con ibu ion S a egies
He e, we o e , based on he li e a u e, a new ca ego iza ion scheme. Pa e ns should
be ca ego ized in his o de ; i a pa e n ma ches mo e han one ule, hen i alls in o he
i s ca ego y whose c i e ion i ul ills.
•Uncondi ional coope a o s: con ibu ion is always highe han 75%.
•Uncondi ional ee ide s: con ibu ion is always below 25%.
•Pe ec condi ional coope a o s: con ibu ions ma ch he o he s’ con ibu ions exac ly.
•
Hump-shaped con ibu o s: he con ibu ion schedule has a maximum con ibu ion ha
is no a 0 o he maximum con ibu ions o o he s. The inc easing pa ( om he
beginning o he maximum o he con ibu ion) has a posi i e Spea man co ela ion,
which is signi ican a he
p≤
0.05 le el. The dec easing pa has a nega i e Spea man
co ela ion, which is signi ican a he p≤0.05 le el.
•
V-shaped con ibu o s: he con ibu ion schedule s a s and ends high, bu dec eases
in he middle. The dec easing pa ( om he beginning o he minimum o he
con ibu ions) has a nega i e Spea man co ela ion, which is signi ican a he
p≤
0.05
le el. The inc easing pa has a posi i e Spea man co ela ion, which is signi ican a
he p≤0.05 le el.
•
Condi ional coope a o s: he con ibu ion is always a leas as high as he o he s’ a e age
con ibu ions. The bo om igh panel in Figu e 1shows a condi ional coope a o .
•
Condi ional ee ide s: he con ibu ion is a mos as high as he o he s’ a e age con i-
bu ions. The bo om le and bo om cen e panels in Figu e 1show condi ional ee
ide s.
•
Condi ional con ibu o s: he Spea man co ela ion be ween he o he s’ in es men s
and he con ibu ion o he ocal playe is posi i e and signi ican a p≤0.001. Some
in es men s a e abo e and some a e below he o he s’ a e age con ibu ions.
•
Nega i e condi ional con ibu o s: he Spea man co ela ion be ween he o he s’ in es -
men s and he con ibu ion o he ocal playe is nega i e and signi ican a
p≤
0.001.
•
O he s: i he con ibu ion pa e n does no i in o any o he abo e ca ego ies, i is
labeled as “o he s”.
The o de ing o ca ego ies makes he ule a bi simple . Fo example, we ca ego ized
any con ibu ion pa e n an “uncondi ional ee ide ” i i was consis en ly below 25%.
Howe e , he pa e n in he le panel o Figu e 4also ul ills he condi ion o “condi-
ional ee ide s”. Simila ly, he pa e ns in he middle and igh mos panels o Figu e 4
co espond o uncondi ional coope a o s, albei hey ul ill he condi ions o condi ional
coope a o s and nega i e condi ional con ibu o s, espec i ely.
The mos equen s a egy ype is Pe ec condi ional coope a o (Table 2), ollowed by
Condi ional ee ide s and Uncondi ional ee ide s.
The ca ego ical changes we sugges ha e wo mo i a ions. One is o showcase some
mino a ian s ha eme ge in a la ge da ase . They ha e low equencies, bu i we wan o
map he ue s a egic di e si y o con ibu ion ypes, hen we need o iden i y hese. The e
migh be o he meaning ully dis inc s a egy ypes ha a e cu en ly s ill being elega ed o
he “o he s” ca ego y. The second mo i a ion is he necessa y change in language. Fo me
s udies mos ly wen wi h he no ion ha anyone willing o con ibu e any non-ze o amoun
is a coope a o . Some au ho s (de Oli ei a e al.,2015;G andjean e al.,2022;Naga su e al.,
2018) ha e al eady ex ended he de ini ion o ee ide s o include low con ibu o s. O he
au ho s ha e dis inguished low ecip oca o s (Teyssie ,2012) o own-maximize s (Fallucchi
e al.,2019) among hose con ibu ing some bu no as much as he o he s. We sugges
labeling anyone a ee ide who consis en ly con ibu es less han o he s. Fu he mo e,
we only conside someone a coope a o i hey consis en ly con ibu e a leas as much as
o he s (bu po en ially mo e in some cases). In ou new ca ego iza ion scheme, he e is an
Games 2025,16, 22 15 o 21
Appendix A
Games2025,16,xFORPEERREVIEW15o 23
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
compe i iona oidance(ADCA);sel -de elopmen alcompe i i eo ien a ion(SDCO);and
ea o losingcompe i iono ien a ion(FOL).
Indi idualdiffe encesinpe cei ed esou cea ailabili ywe eassessed h ough h ee
ques ionsabou  hepe cei edsocioeconomics a usinchildhoodand h eeques ions
abou  hep esen /nea  u u epe cei ed esou cea ailabili y(G iske iciuse al.,2011a,
2011b).
Bo hques ionnai eshad u he i emsassessingo he pe sonali y ai saswellas
a i udes owa dclima echange ha a eno analyzedhe eanddidno o e lapbe ween
heques ionnai es.All henon-demog aphicques ionscamea e  hemainques ions o
a oidp iming.
Supplemen a yMa e ials:The ollowingsuppo ingin o ma ioncanbedownloadeda :
h ps://www.mdpi.com/a icle/doi/s1,TableS1:Reco ded esponses;Tex S1:Theques ionnai e.
Au ho Con ibu ions:ini ia ionandconcep ualiza ion,Á.K.;ques ionnai ede elopmen ,A.K.and
Á.K.;da acollec ion,K.S.;da acu a ion,K.S.andÁ.K.;s a is icalanalysis,A.K.andÁ.K.;w i ing—
o iginald a p epa a ion,Á.K.Allau ho scon ibu ed o heedi ingand inaliza iono  hemanu-
sc ip .Allau ho sha e eadandag eed o hepublished e siono  hemanusc ip .
Funding:Thiswo kwassuppo edbyHUN-REN(g an numbe ELKHSA-50/2021).
Da aA ailabili yS a emen :The esponsesa ea ailableinSupplemen a yTableS1.
Con lic so In e es :Theau ho sdecla enocon lic so in e es .The unde shadno olein he
designo  hes udy;in hecollec ion,analyses,o in e p e a iono da a;in hew i ingo  hemanu-
sc ip ;o in hedecision opublish he esul s.
AppendixA
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Figu e A1. Con .

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Figu eA1.All265condi ionalcon ibu ionpa e n om he esponden s.Eacho  hesubplo shas
x-andy-axesgoing om0 o10,000,wi hxbeing hea e agecon ibu iono  heo he playe s’and
ybeing he esponden ’scon ibu ion.Subplo sa eshadedacco ding o heca ego iza ionby
(Fischbache e al.,2001,2012):condi ionalcoope a o s—yellow; ee ide s—g ay;uncondi ional
coope a o s—g een;ando he s—whi e.
Re e ences
(Abele &Nosenzo,2015)Abele ,J.,&Nosenzo,D.(2015).Sel -selec ionin olabo a o yexpe imen s:P o-socialmo i es e sus
mone a yincen i es.Expe imen alEconomics,18(2),195–214.h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10683-014-9397-9.
(Ad ese al.,2016)Ad es,E.,Vashdi,D.R.,&Zalmano i ch,Y.(2016).Globaliza ionand he e ea o ci izenpa icipa ion
in collec i eac ion:Achallenge o publicadminis a ion.PublicAdminis a ionRe iew,76(1),142–152.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/pua .12424.
(Ahmed&Salas,2009)Ahmed,A.M.,&Salas,O.(2009).Is hehando Godin ol edinhumancoope a ion?In e na ionalJou nalo 
SocialEconomics,36,70–80.
(Aimonee al.,2013)Aimone,J.A.,Iannaccone,L.R.,Makowsky,M.D.,&Rubin,J.(2013).Endogenousg oup o ma ion ia
unp oduc i ecos s.TheRe iewo EconomicS udies,80(4),1215–1236.h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/ es ud/ d 017.
(Alenca e al.,2008)Alenca ,A.I.,deOli ei aSiquei a,J.,&Yamamo o,M.E.(2008).Doesg oupsizema e ?Chea ingand
coope a ioninB azilianschoolchild en.E olu ionandHumanBeha io ,29(1),42–48.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.e olhumbeha .2007.09.001.
(And eozzie al.,2020)And eozzi,L.,Plone ,M.,&Sa al,A.S.(2020).Thes abili yo condi ionalcoope a ion:Belie salonecanno 
explain hedeclineo coope a ioninsocialdilemmas.Scien i icRepo s,10(1),13610.h ps://doi.o g/10.1038/s41598-020-70681-
z.
(A echa e al.,2018)A echa ,A.A.,Gäch e ,S.,&Molleman,L.(2018).Conduc ingin e ac i eexpe imen sonline.Expe imen al
Economics,21(1),99–131.h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10683-017-9527-2.
(A anasioe al.,2009)A anasio,O.,Pelle ano,L.,&Reyes,S.P.(2009).Building us ?Condi ionalcash ans e p og ammesand
socialcapi al.FiscalS udies,30(2),139–177.h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2009.00092.x.
(Ballie e al.,2014)Ballie ,D.,Wu,J.,&DeD eu,C.K.W.(2014).Ing oup a o i ismincoope a ion:Ame a-analysis.Psychological
bulle in,140(6),1556–1581.h ps://doi.o g/10.1037/a0037737.
(Ba e al.,2014)Ba ,A.,Packa d,T.,&Se a,D.(2014).Pa icipa o yaccoun abili yandcollec i eac ion:Expe imen ale idence
omAlbania.Eu opeanEconomicRe iew,68,250–269.h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.eu oeco e .2014.01.010.
Figu e A1. All 265 condi ional con ibu ion pa e n om he esponden s. Each o he subplo s has
x- and y-axes going om 0 o 10,000, wi h x being he a e age con ibu ion o he o he playe s’
and y being he esponden ’s con ibu ion. Subplo s a e shaded acco ding o he ca ego iza ion by
(Fischbache e al.,2001,2012): condi ional coope a o s—yellow; ee ide s—g ay; uncondi ional
coope a o s—g een; and o he s—whi e.
Re e ences
Abele , J., & Nosenzo, D. (2015). Sel -selec ion in o labo a o y expe imen s: P o-social mo i es e sus mone a y incen i es. Expe imen al
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Ad es, E., Vashdi, D. R., & Zalmano i ch, Y. (2016). Globaliza ion and he e ea o ci izen pa icipa ion incollec i e ac ion: A challenge
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Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2009). Is he hand o God in ol ed in human coope a ion? In e na ional Jou nal o Social Economics,36, 70–80.
[C ossRe ]
Aimone, J. A., Iannaccone, L. R., Makowsky, M. D., & Rubin, J. (2013). Endogenous g oup o ma ion ia unp oduc i e cos s. The Re iew
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Alenca , A. I., de Oli ei a Siquei a, J., & Yamamo o, M. E. (2008). Does g oup size ma e ? Chea ing and coope a ion in B azilian school
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