Human Digital Identity and AI

id191831
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HUMAN DIGITAL IDENTITY AND AI
BERTA FITÓ CASAS
Thesis supe iso
ULISESCORTÉSGARCÍA(BSC)
Thesis co-supe iso
ATIACORTÉSMARTÍNEZ(Ba celonaSupe compu ingCen e )
Deg ee
Mas e 'sDeg eeinA i icialIn elligence
Mas e 's hesis
School o Enginee ing
Uni e si a Ro i a i Vi gili (URV)
Facul y o Ma hema ics
Uni e si a de Ba celona (UB)
Ba celona School o In o ma ics (FIB)
Uni e si a Poli ècnica de Ca alunya (UPC) - Ba celonaTech
27/01/2025
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Acknowledgmen s
I would like o exp ess my deepes g a i ude o all he people and o ganisa ions who ha e
accompanied me h oughou his jou ney. Fi s , my supe iso s, Ulises Co ´es, o his insigh ul
and challenging iews, and A ia Co ´es Ma ´ınez, o he aluable eedback —and o bo h o
hem o hei in aluable guidance and suppo in comple ing he signi ican unde aking o his
hesis esea ch.
I would also like o hank he Uni e si a Poli `ecnica de Ca alunya, Uni e si a de Ba celona,
and Uni e si a Ro i a i Vi gili o making i possible o me o en ol in his Mas e ’s P og amme.
Addi ionally, I ex end my g a i ude o he Ba celona Supe compu ing Cen e – Cen o Nacional
de Supe compu aci´on (BSC–CNS) o p o iding he esou ces and acili ies ha enabled me o
comple e and sus ain p og ess on his p ojec ; speci ically, o he CS@BSC depa men o he
g an o cu icula c edi s.
Finally, I would like o con ey my hea el g a i ude (and sligh apology) o my amily,
iends, and e e yone who endu ed my endless an s abou my la es eadings on iden i y o
he poin ha we all became a uned o inding i e e ywhe e. Special hanks o hose who
p o ided books and a icles hey hough migh con ibu e o his hesis —and o he ew who
pe se e ed in eading i h ough o he end.
i
ii Con en s
Con en s
Acknowledgmen s i
Abs ac
1 In oduc ion 1
1.1 De ini ion and e ymology o iden i y ......................... 2
1.2 Wha is an Au onomous Agen ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Mo i a ion ....................................... 10
1.4 Hypo heses and Objec i es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Documen s uc u e .................................. 13
2 Analy ical Iden i y 17
2.1 Leibniz’sLaw...................................... 20
2.2 Rela i eiden i y .................................... 25
2.3 Composi ionasiden i y ................................ 33
2.4 Con ingen iden i y................................... 39
2.5 Iden i yac osswo lds ................................. 41
2.6 Iden i yac oss ime .................................. 44
2.7 Vagueiden i y ..................................... 48
iii
i Con en s
2.8 TheFlee o Theseus.................................. 50
3 Pe sonal Iden i y 53
3.1 B ain duplica ion agains pe sonal iden i y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Wha memo y says abou us . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4 Ou place among he animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4 Cul u al Iden i y 103
4.1 Social and poli ical iden i y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 Thes o yo ou li es.................................. 117
4.3 A imi a esli e..................................... 121
5 Legal Iden i y 131
5.1 Legisla i e iangula ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.2 The ne o iden i y legisla ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3 Biome ics, anonymi y, and obo igh s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.4 Digi alescala ion.................................... 155
6 Agen Iden i y 163
6.1 Wha is he digi al wo ld? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.2 The double-edged swo d o online anonymi y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.3 De ini ion o digi al iden i y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7 Conclusions 179
7.1 Fu u ewo k....................................... 186

Abs ac
This hesis aims o es ablish whe he he adi ional iew o iden i y —speci ically, pe sonal
iden i y— can be applied o Au onomous Agen s based on he BDI (Belie -Desi e-In en ion)
model. I s pu pose is o p o ide a heo e ical pla o m ha may se e as a ounda ion o
u he discussions on he ole in elligen machines migh occupy in he u u e, as he digi al
wo ld becomes inc easingly embedded in o ou daily li es. Wi h A i icial In elligence sys ems
in eg a ing in human social and legal amewo ks, de ining hei iden i y holds signi ican e hical
and p ac ical implica ions.
To his end, he hesis p esen s a comp ehensi e o e iew o he his o ical discou se on iden-
i y ac oss ou in e wo en a eas o p og essi e abs ac ion: analy ical philosophy, philosophical
discou se on pe sonal iden i y, sociocul u al s udies, and legisla ion. I p oposes a no el ame-
wo k ha syn hesises insigh s om hese disciplines. Each ield p o ides ools o o ming a
ulle and mo e in o med conclusion on he subjec , which a e ul ima ely applied o a p oposed
de ini ion o iden i y capable o accommoda ing bo h human and non-human en i ies. A key
concep in his discussion is he dis inc ion be ween sel and iden i y, e ms ha ha e o en
been con la ed o con used.
i Con en s
Chap e 1
In oduc ion
Ou iden i y is some hing we deal wi h and ade in on a daily basis, om using
plas ic ca ds o bo ow books o hi e mo ies o nume ical ep esen a ions o ha
iden i y in PINs o he p oduc ion o o mal ce i ica ion o ou iden i y.
(Jon Aus in in Cul u e & Iden i y, Iden i y & Iden i y Fo ma ion)
Iden i y has ne e known consensus. Wes e n and non-Wes e n doc ines ake seemingly
i econcilable iews: one ocuses on he one, he o he on he many. Each side, in u n, is deeply
con lic ed om wi hin. In Wes e n discou se, some ejec he e e en being a need o deba ing
on he ma e a all, wi h oices such as Pe e Thomas Geach’s, who led he mo emen denying
he exis ence o an absolu e accoun o iden i y (i.e., a ma ch in all possible cha ac e is ics o an
objec ) in a ou o ela i e iden i y ela ions. Da id Kellogg Lewis, one o he mos impo an
analy ical philosophe s o he 20 h cen u y, hough o i as an u e ly unp oblema ic no ion,
a guing ha no philosophical p oblems conce n iden i y (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). Willa d
Van O man Quine saw iden i y as such a basic concep ha we do no ha e a de ini ion o i ,
so i becomes ough o ackle challenges ha may a ise om i s s udy.
De ining iden i y is a global challenge. Wes e n hinking, deeply in luenced by Judeo-
Ch is ian ideologies, ocuses mo e on he indi idual, which has na owed i s sea ch o a de ini-
ion o iden i y o a pa icula objec , con as ing Eas e n hinke s’ mo e communal o socie al
ocus. This leads o opical issues such as he ha monisa ion o A i icial In elligence legisla ion,
1
2Chap e 1. In oduc ion
he bounda ies o which should be in luenced by he di e en de ini ions o a pe son’s iden i y
acco ding o each cul u e and p e ailing philosophy.
To a emp o minimise a mo e han p obable Wes e n bias and os e an as uni e sal as
possible iew on he ma e a hand, his wo k will examine he de ini ion o iden i y h ough ou
laye s (analy ical iden i y, philosophy on pe sonal iden i y, cul u al iden i y, and legal iden i y)
be o e e en ually eaching a p oposal on he unde s anding and de ini ion o agen iden i y — he
ul ima e ocus o his hesis. Al hough he analysis o he i s wo laye s will hea ily ea u e
Wes e n ideas, hey should be con as ed wi h as many non-Wes e n p oposals on he same
opic as possible.
1.1 De ini ion and e ymology o iden i y
When hinking o iden i y, one’s mind will mos o en go o he concep o pe sonal iden i y.
Ou side philosophy, acco ding o Olson [2023], i encapsula es he quali ies o which we eel
he mos a ached, which we conside o de ine us as a pe son o make us he pe son we a e.
F om his ollows wha migh be cons ued as cul u al iden i y, in which a pe son achie es ull
humani y in an accep ed con ex o symbols, alues and beha iou s wi hin a communi y. This
is one o he mos signi ican con empo a y challenges o many Wes e n philosophical claims
abou he pe son and socie y (Loughney [1998]).
Howe e , he no ion o iden i y is also p esen in analy ic philosophy and ma hema ics.
In logic and me aphysics, iden i y and sameness mean he same —o , in o he wo ds, hei
meanings a e iden ical. Howe e , he e a e nuances o conside . A dis inc ion is usually made
be ween quali a i e and nume ical iden i y. Things wi h quali a i e iden i y sha e p ope ies
so ha hey can be mo e o less quali a i ely iden ical. In con as , nume ical iden i y is a
ela ion be ween a hing and no o he (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). Th oughou his hesis —and
especially in §2— we will ocus on nume ical iden i y, which is usually de ined as he equi alence
ela ion ha sa is ies Leibniz’s Law (see §2.1), as long as wha is ue o xis unde s ood o
include being iden ical o x—o he wise, Noonan and Cu is [2022] asse , he claim would be
oo weak.
1.2. Wha is an Au onomous Agen ? 9
coun e ei people: a i icial a a a s which pass o eal people in digi al en i onmen s.
These coun e ei people a e he mos dange ous a i ac s in human his o y, capable
o des oying no jus economies bu human eedom i sel .
(Daniel C. Denne in The P oblem Wi h Coun e ei People)
Like Go˜ni, Denne [2023] sounds he ala m abou ou na u al endency o ea as a pe son
any hing ha seems o i ou unde s anding o a human being —ci ing he abili y o “ alk
sensibly”. He ea s ha hese eplicas’ capabili y o con use us and exploi ou ea s and anxie ies
will lead us in o emp a ion and, om he e, in o yielding o ou subjuga ion. He suppo s
philosophe and his o ian Yu al Noah Ha a i’s call o A i icial In elligence o be obliga ed o
disclose ha i is A i icial In elligence.
Though no ye s ained by i s -hand d ead o he u u e, his kind o discussion o e he ca-
pabili ies and limi a ions o A i icial In elligence is no new. Sea le [1980] a gued ha compu e s
could a bes simula e, bu ne e possess in elligence —machines could ne e uly unde s and
na u al language no ha e p oposi ional a i udes, such as belie s, e en i hey we e e en ually
able o pass he Tu ing Tes . This would seem o complica e he endea ou o his hesis, bu
i is an a gumen ha elies hea ily on he in insic na u e o wha ixes an iden i y, which
he eade will ul ima ely ind con es ed in hese pages. Sea le [1980] p esen ed an a gumen
known as he Chinese Room, which posi s ha a compu e p og am ha ollows ins uc ions o
espond o messages does no eally unde s and he language in which hey a e w i en, jus as
Sea le himsel would no unde s and Chinese by ollowing a manual o ma ch inpu cha ac e s
wi h app op ia e esponses. In esponse, Cole [1991] de eloped he no ion o i ual pe son.
He hough Sea le [1980]’s a gumen was logically in alid because i lacked a o m o pe sonal
iden i y heo y inspi ed by he likes o John Locke, De ek Pa i , John Pe y and Da id Lewis,
all o whom will ea u e p ominen ly in his hesis. Cole [1991] admi s ha Sea le [1980] suc-
cess ully p o ed ha no compu e will e e unde s and any na u al language bu ge s en angled
in de ending a so o eme gen sel wi hin bo h minds and machines:
[M]inds and pe sons a e no he same as he machines, biological o elec onic, ha

10 Chap e 1. In oduc ion
ealize hem.
(Da id Cole in A i icial In elligence and Pe sonal Iden i y, Abs ac )
He a gues ha he machine i sel no being able o unde s and na u al language does no
show ha no hing does, and hus ha Sea le [1980] ailed o es ablish any limi a ions on A i-
icial In elligence. Acco ding o Cole [1991], Sea le’s ac i i y in ecei ing he no es in Chinese,
ollowing he ins uc ions o answe hem, and sending back hose answe s, e en hough he could
nei he unde s and no exp ess any hing abou himsel on hem, could ealise a i ual mind,
as i a machine we e emula ing ano he one. As he hesis un olds, his p oposal will be en iched
and con es ed by many o he s.
1.3 Mo i a ion
Humans ha e always been conce ned wi h de ining ou own iden i y. Fi s , we unde s ood us
as di e en om hem —o he o ms o li ing beings, animals o o he g oups o people. Then
we began indi idualising, looking o ways o iden i y me agains you. And ye , he isola ion o
human po ai s will ne e be ound in a ca e pain ing —i is much newe . The same can be seen
in li e a u e, wi h he peppe ed use o he i s pe son as a na a i e ool in legenda y wo ks
like he Epic o Gilgamesh (c. 2000 BCE3) and Home ’s Odyssey (8 h cen u y BCE), al hough
i did no become commonplace un il he 16 h cen u y wi h no els like Daniel De oe’s Robinson
C usoe (1719) and Jona han Swi ’s Gulli e ’s T a els (1726). The inc easing wi hd awal om
he many is e iden in he de elopmen o a —which may be due o a dwindling iden i ica ion
wi h he su ounding na u e and ou ibe.
We ind he i s eco ded abs ac e lec ion on iden i y mo e han wo housand yea s ago,
du ing A hens’ democ acy, commonly known as i s Golden Age (5 h-4 h cen u ies BCE). Ba nes
[1977] obse es ha some schola s belie e ha Leibniz’s Law, a concep ha will be discussed
ex ensi ely as we del e in o his wo k, is due o A is o le’s ema ks on nume ical equali y in
Topica, w i en du ing ha ime. Al hough i is impossible o know wha ea lie hough on
3Be o e Common E a. I is a secula e m used o deno e yea s be o e he s a o he Common E a (CE),
which co esponds o he yea s adi ionally coun ed om he bi h o Jesus Ch is .
1.3. Mo i a ion 11
iden i y may ha e been los o ime, we can ollow he blossoming o he analy ical, philosophical,
cul u al, and legal deba e on iden i y ha has sp ung om hese i s obse a ions o he p esen
day.
Some (bu by no means all) no able Wes e n names include Pa menides, He acli us, Pla o,
John Locke, Ren´e Desca es, Geo g Wilhelm F ied ich Hegel, Da id Hume, Hannah A end ...
who we e ei he ema kably close in some espec s (such as Hume o Vasubandhu, as Hansen
[2016] poin s ou ) o di e ed signi ican ly om non-Wes e n hinke s. Siddha ha Gau ama
(also known as he Buddha, he Enligh ened One) s ands ou among he la e —he augh a
doc ine in ol ing he sel abou wo cen u ies be o e A is o le and was oughly coe aneous wi h
He acli us. A no able chasm sepa a es Wes e n om non-Wes e n hough : he o me clasps
a kind o indi idualism ha aspi es o de ine he pe son by i sel . A he same ime, he la e
sees he indi idual as an ex ension o he in ica e web o ela ionships wi hin a communi y. As
we will mo e p ominen ly see in §4, his undamen al di e ence has led o wo unde s andings
o iden i y ha ha e so a e y a ely in e sec ed.
As lis ed by Noonan and Cu is [2022], ecen wo k on he ma e o iden i y has been
conce ned wi h he no ion o a c i e ion o iden i y4and he p ope analysis o iden i y o e
ime (in pa icula , he disag eemen be ween ad oca es o pe du ance and endu ance), among
o he opics which we will b ie ly in oduce h oughou hese pages. O he a eas o s udy conce n
he de ini ion o pe sonal iden i y, which has been so a domina ed by Wes e n deba e o e he
exis ence o a key componen o pe sonhood —whe he i may be he b ain, he mind, memo y,
consciousness, o he soul. The e ec o communi y and cul u e is being analysed in an a ea ha
has begun o see mo e con e gence be ween Wes e n and non-Wes e n oices in ecen decades.
One wo d can summa ise he s a e o he ield o iden i y: agmen ed. The e is li le o no
acco d be ween heo ies and p oposed solu ions on he polemical issue o i s de ini ion —which
is o be expec ed, gi en ha i is some hing ha is e y much a ma e o conce n o us all.
This wo k does no aspi e o mend i , as i has been a kaleidoscope in he making o millennia.
4The e m c i e ion o iden i y is ambiguous. In an epis emological sense, i is a way o saying whe he an
iden i y p oposi ion is ue o a way o ecognising whe he an indi idual Ais iden ical o an indi idual B.
Howe e , i also has a me aphysical in e p e a ion, acco ding o which i is a se o (non- i ial) necessa y and
su icien condi ions o he u h o an iden i y p oposi ion (Mackie and Jago [2022]).
12 Chap e 1. In oduc ion
Ins ead, he mo i a ion o w i ing he ollowing pages comes om he i up ion o a new en i y
ha may need i s own meaning o iden i y. I is no longe he case ha humans a e he only
ones in need o a cha ac e isa ion —Au onomous Agen s, which he ield o A i icial In elligence
has designed o emula e us, aise he ques ion o whe he he human de ini ion o iden i y should
be expanded o include hem i a new one ough o be issued... o i hey need no be included
in he discussion a all.
This wo k will a emp o link oge he he ideas on human iden i y discussed so a o c ea e
a cohe en , gene ally accep able de ini ion o iden i y ha is capable o sa is ac o ily p o iding
a heo e ical amewo k o he analysis o digi al iden i y, which (b oadly s a ed, see §6 o a
mo e in-dep h discussion) encompasses a digi al use and all hei online ace s. Said use may
ei he be a human being o an Au onomous Agen . The p ojec aims o de e mine whe he
hese i ual iden i ies could be added o his philosophical deba e and wha his would look
like.
1.4 Hypo heses and Objec i es
The ollowing hesis is buil a ound one cen al ques ion, which b anches ou in o h ee o he s:
Q0 Wha is he de ini ion o iden i y?
Q1 Is iden i y an in insic quali y o i s objec ?
Q2 Is iden i y a phenomenon exclusi e o humans?
Q3 Is iden i y a ele an issue in he ield o A i icial In elligence?
The de ini ion o iden i y (Q0) becomes he objec i e o his hesis: ou mo i a ion, as
s a ed in §1.3, is o p o ide a comp ehensi e explana ion o iden i y ha migh include ha o
Au onomous Agen s as well as ha o humans. The o he h ee ques ions (Q1, Q2, Q3) we will
en a i ely answe he e, in he shape o hypo heses:
H1 Iden i y is no an in insic quali y o i s objec . Ra he , i is a cons uc ion o all he
1.5. Documen s uc u e 13
exp essions o a pe son’s li e ha may be in e p e ed bo h by he indi idual and by all
hose a ound hem.
H2 Iden i y is no exclusi ely human. A he e y leas , i may be assigned ex e nally, possibly
wi hou he subjec unde aking he necessa y in ospec ion o in e p e hei own li e
expe ience. I is, he e o e, mo e akin o a social p oduc .
H3 As he wo ld becomes inc easingly digi al, he need o a clea and comp ehensi e de ini ion
o iden i y becomes mo e ele an —especially one ha encompasses he digi al ealm.
This leads o a p o ound discussion abou a pe son’s digi al p o iles and oo p in , as well
as hei in e ac ion wi h an en i y ha may also lea e a digi al ail: Au onomous Agen s.
Conce ns abou e hics, esponsibili y o an agen ’s ac ions, and, wi h he ise o A i icial
In elligence a , au ho ship a e among he cu en issues ha a e se e ely unde mined
by he lack o a clea consensus on he iden i y o hese en i ies. Acknowledging his, i
ollows ha iden i y is a ele an issue in his ield.
1.5 Documen s uc u e
The ollowing chap e s will se e as an exhaus i e o e iew o he his o ical and cu en dis-
cussion on he opic om ou di e en pe spec i es, all e ec ing sca olding o sus ain he
cons uc ion o a i h iew, he objec i e o his hesis:
1. Analy ical iden i y: This chap e ocuses on he ma hema ical side o iden i y. I dis-
cusses he no ion in a e y comp ehensi e manne , ques ioning he sameness o whiche e
wo objec s om a logical s andpoin . Deba es o e he absolu ism o iden i y, as well as
i s answe o changing imes and wo lds, a e cen al o i . I is he basis o all subsequen
discussions, and he s a ing poin o answe ing Q1.
2. Pe sonal iden i y: F om his poin on, iden i y is es ic ed o ha o a hinking being,
mos commonly deemed a pe son. I is usual in his ace o he discussion o conside
iden i y an in insic no ion a ached o an a bi a y objec (e.g., he b ain, he soul) whose
unc ion is o main ain a con inui y in a pe son’s iden i y. As a esul , psychology and
14 Chap e 1. In oduc ion
philosophy a e closely in e wined, as is he discussion o wha i means o be human.
Thus, he deba e adds nuance o Q1, while unde aking Q2. I is in his chap e ha a
no able issue eme ges: he p oblem o iden i y5is ea ed indis inc ly o he p oblem o
he sel 6, hus muddying all deba es on he ma e .
3. Cul u al iden i y: In his chap e , iden i y becomes a b oade concep , aking in o
accoun no only he social in luences on iden i y bu also he cul u al no ms o which i
adhe es. Q1 and Q2 gain dep h. Finally, he indi idualism o Wes e n hough pa s and
allows non-Wes e n oices o be hea d, c i iquing and expanding he concep o iden i y
no only as an indi idual phenomenon bu as a communi y-wide one. One o he a bi a y
objec s o which iden i y (o he sel ) has been a ached in pe sonal iden i y is pa icula ly
impo an in he discussion o cul u al iden i y: indi idual and collec i e memo y. To
illus a e he pe asi e p esence o iden i y in ou e e yday cul u al li es, a sample o
some wo ks o pop cul u e is examined.
4. Legal iden i y: Once he heo e ical backg ound o he de ini ion o iden i y has been
es ablished, i s cu en p ac ical applica ion is examined. In doing so, Q3 begins o ake
shape. Legisla ion p o ides a clea de ini ion o iden i y in a p agma ic sense: so ha
i s ules on ci izenship and au ho ship, o i s c iminal law, can be applied. This chap e
uses he di e en app oaches o he Eu opean Union, he Uni ed S a es o Ame ica, and
he People’s Republic o China o illus a e he lack o a hegemonic de ini ion, e en in
p ac ice. I also in oduces discussions on A i icial In elligence egula ion, democ acy,
and iden i ica ion.
5. Agen iden i y: Finally, Q0 is answe ed and a de ini ion o iden i y is p esen ed which
includes bo h human beings (in he eal and digi al wo lds) and Au onomous Agen s. In
i s elabo a ion, i s p e iously in oduced in luences a e delimi ed, so ha he pa h owa ds
he objec i e o his hesis is clea and p o ides an easily aceable genealogy o ideas.
6. Conclusions: A su ey o he esea ch o his hesis is conduc ed, and i s conclusions a e
5The p oblem o iden i y conce ns ha which makes an objec he same as ano he . In pe sonal iden i y, i is
b oadly he s udy o he sameness o one pe son o ano he in a di e en ime and space.
6The p oblem o he sel conce ns ha which makes an objec an in insically unique and con inuous being.
I may be limi ed o pe sonal iden i y, al hough he e a e discussions, da ing back a leas o he P esoc a ics,
abou he na u e, o essence, o objec s.

1.5. Documen s uc u e 15
e iewed in o de o e i y ha i s objec i e has been achie ed, as well as ha ing seen i s
hypo heses ei he p o ed o disp o ed.
The sho ime ame o his p ojec and he complexi y o he issue ha e made i impossible
o include a comple e accoun o he discussion on iden i y in his documen . Fo his eason,
each pe spec i e se es as a sample o a b oade opic —ye e en i some oices a e excluded,
he o e all con es ed s a e o he ield anspi es as in ended and pain s a pic u e ha allows
he conclusions o his hesis o be eached.
Chap e 2
Analy ical Iden i y
Iden i y only becomes an issue when i is in c isis, when some hing assumed o be
ixed, cohe en and s able is displaced by he expe ience o doub and unce ain y.
(Kobena Me ce in Welcome o he Jungle: Iden i y and Di e si y in Pos -
mode n Poli ics)
A comp ehension lis o p oposed de ini ions o iden i y and gene al simila i y will be con-
as ed h oughou his chap e . Acco ding o logical adi ion, Deu sch [1997] w i es, bo h
iden i y and gene al simila i y a e educible o ela ions o s ic iden i y —i.e., iden i y as
ea ed in s anda d logic. On he o he hand, pe sonal iden i y is a b anch o analy ical me a-
physics (Cole [1991]). Rela ions o iden i y can be exp essed as x and y a e he same so al
concep , while ela ions o gene al simila i y may be ead as x and y a e (o ha e) he same
p ope y (Deu sch [1997]). Con en ionally, iden i y has been ega ded as a pu ely logical no-
ion, while gene al simila i y has no . This chap e p o ides a b ie in oduc ion o each p oposal
and some o he con o e sies in which hey a e in ol ed. Al hough no he ocus o his hesis,
as i s o e a ching aim is iden i y as applied o a subjec (human o o he wise), hese a e he
subs a es o ools wi h which heo ies o pe sonal iden i y a e buil .
The classical (and mos conse a i e) de ini ion o iden i y is known as absolu e iden i y. I
makes i so o one objec o be iden ical o ano he , all i s p ope ies and ela ions mus be he
same (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). This idea o en leads o he conclusion ha he only hing an
17
18 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
objec is iden ical o is i sel . The mos widely used exp ession o iden i y in he logical sense was
explici ly o mula ed by Go ied W. Leibniz in his Discou se on Me aphysics (Leibniz [1686],
Leibniz [1714a]). Leibniz buil upon wha he called indi idual subs ance, which was o be he
subjec o which p edica es we e a ibu ed bu could no be a ibu ed o ano he subjec .
Leibniz conside ed a pe son o be a subs ance since one can a ibu e p edica es such as hones y
o i , bu no hones y. Howe e , one could asc ibe a ibu es o i since i can be a ibu ed o
some hing else.
This is subsc ibed by Deu sch [1997], who p o es ha gene al simila i y espec s s ic
iden i y. Al hough s ic ly dis inc objec s may sha e he same p ope y, s ic ly iden ical objec s
necessa ily possess all he same p ope ies. Objec s, being on ologically dis inc om p ope ies,
canno hemsel es be p ope ies, hough hey may ins an ia e hem. Thus, s ic ly iden ical
objec s canno di e in hei p ope ies, no because hey ail o be p ope ies, bu because hey
a e no p ope ies a all. The dis inc ion be ween iden i y and gene al simila i y is a di ec
applica ion o Leibniz’s Law.
[...] all ue p edica ion is ounded in he na u e o hings. When a p oposi ion is
no iden ical, ha is, when he p edica e is no explici ly included in he subjec , i
mus be implici ly included in i .
(Go ied W. Leibniz in Discou se on Me aphysics, Sec ion 8)
The concep o sepa a ion is c ucial in A is o le’s Me aphysics: i exempli ies how wo objec s
migh hold he same o m ye be dis inc om each o he (Be i [2019]). Fo ins ance, wo chai s
a e he same in ha hey a e chai s, bu dis inc in ha hey a e wo sepa a e en i ies. This
is echoed in Deu sch [1997]’s logical s udy o he sameness o shape be ween wo objec s —how
hey a e indis inguishable wi h espec o ce ain p ope ies— in p o ing ha , hough educ ion
o s ic iden i y yields ha gene al simila i y is an equi alence ela ion, he indisce nibili y
p ope ies o gene al simila i y emain unaccoun ed o : o say ha wo objec s a e ound
and ha hey ha e a smoo h bounda y should be he same, bu a smoo h bounda y is no a
pa icula shape. He ul ima ely places he di e ence be ween iden i y and gene al simila i y in
he dis inc ion be ween subs ance and a ibu e, again echoing A is o le.
2.2. Rela i e iden i y 25
Lukasiewicz con inues, he p inciple o iden i y is s e ile, useless.
2.2 Rela i e iden i y
Rela i e iden i y con ends wi h wo o mo e objec s being iden ical in some ela ion bu di e en
in ano he ela ion, hus opposing absolu e iden i y. I sp ou ed om an a emp a add essing
he imp ac icali y o he classical doc ine on iden i y when applied o he Ca holic doc ine o
he Holy T ini y, in which h ee en i ies a e he same bu di e en om each o he —Fa he ,
Son and he Holy Spi i a e all conside ed o be one God (Tuggy [2021], Van Inwagen and
Howa d-Snyde [1998]). I was i s discussed by Pe e Thomas Geach and Ge ude Elizabe h
Ma ga e Anscombe in Th ee Philosophe s (Geach and Anscombe [1950]) and u he de eloped
by Geach in The Vi ues (Geach [1977]). I is no a pa icula ly popula p oposal.
Despi e a numbe o ca e ul and c ea i e exposi ions [. . . ], his no ion o “ ela i e
iden i y” is widely iewed wi h suspicion.
(Ha y Deu sch in Iden i y and Gene al Simila i y)
John Pe y, o ins ance, assumes ha any ela ion o iden i y, p ope ly called, mus sa is y
an un es ic ed indesc ibabili y schema —i.e., Leibniz’s Law. He uses his supposi ion in his
a gumen s agains ela i e iden i y (Deu sch [1997]). Al hough i emains con o e sial and has
aced c i icism om philosophe s who a gue ha i may be unin ui i e o po en ially incohe en ,
Deu sch [1997] w i es ha ela i e iden i y is cohe en and no inhe en ly lawed. He sugges s
ha ela i e iden i y can be unde s ood as a logically sound concep , especially in con ex s whe e
objec s may sha e ce ain p ope ies while di e ing in o he s, which allows o a new pe spec i e
on change ac oss ime (§2.6) and con ingen iden i y (§2.4). Wi h his, he is esponding o
adi ional objec ions, pa icula ly hose based on he necessi y o Leibniz’s Law —which equi es
ha i wo objec s a e iden ical, hey mus sha e all p ope ies (§2.1). Deu sch [1997] d aws on
he no ion o gene al simila i y (§1) as a way o o malize ela ionships whe e objec s a e simila
bu no s ic ly iden ical. In pa icula , he belie es ha ce ain en i ies, such as allog aphic
objec s (e.g., a wo k o a o musical composi ion), equi e a mo e lexible iew o iden i y ha

26 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
allows o mul iple objec s o be he same in di e en con ex s o ins ances wi hou iola ing
he p inciples o iden i y.
Bu how does ela i e iden i y de end such a de ini ion o iden i y? A i s co e, i hinges
on so al concep s, a nomencla u e coined by John Locke (Kau man [2015]): coun able e ms
(e.g., ho se, pe son) h ough which objec s and hei p ope ies may be classi ied. They can be
di ided in o wo ypes: phase and subs ance so als. A phase so al, such as a child o puppy, is
a concep unde which some hing can no longe all wi hou ceasing o exis —e.g., a child will
e en ually become an adul . Con e sely, i some hing is o be conside ed a subs ance so al, i
mus always be so: e.g., a abbi a one ime is he same abbi a a di e en ime, and ha
mus be because he so al abbi applies o bo h. This, o cou se, is no comple ely hegemonic.
Robinson and Wei [2024] ollow Wiggin’s s ong opposi ion o he concep , which led him o
p opose so alism, a dis inc idea o iden i y which hinges on so als as well.
So alism upholds adi ional logic and Leibniz’s Law. Wiggins main ained ha iden i y is
absolu e and ha di e en p ocedu es o indi idua ion mus yield he same answe ega ding
he coincidence o wo objec s (Noonan [2017]). So alism is based on he idea o subs ance
and essen ial p ope ies, while ela i e iden i y ocuses on he ela i i y o iden i y s a emen s.
Acco ding o Noonan [2017], so alism holds ha iden i y s a emen s always equi e speci ying
a so al concep (e.g., same pe son, o same animal), while ela i e iden i y sugges s hey a e
always ela i e o a so al concep . In o de o iden i y an objec , a so alis mus use a so al
e m ha answe s same wha ?. Wiggins’ p oposal has also ecei ed i s ai sha e o c i icism.
Robinson and Wei [2024] p esen Michael R. Aye s’ c i icism o his aking he no ion o he
body oo loosely, because “he classi ies as ‘lump-mass e ms’ e e y hing om ba s o soap and
pa s o bu e o pools o wa e and po s o s ew” (Aye s [1974]). Bu le us go back o he
ela i is case. Any e lexi e, ansi i e and symme ic ela ion may be seen as an equi alence
ela ion. F om he e, one could in e ha iden i y is an equi alence ela ion sa is ying Leibniz’s
law —bu his is no always he case (e.g.,xand ybeing he same size o shape, as Deu sch [1997]
exempli ies). Howe e , Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] concede, in a su icien ly ich language, he
di e ence be ween indisce nibili y and iden i y is minimal o he poin ha he o mulae o
each coincide. A p oo o i can be ound in Eps ein [2001]. The = symbol may be ea ed as a
2.2. Rela i e iden i y 27
cons an o iden i y o ep esen a speci ic o mula o be me by each se —which would make
i language ela i e.
Rela i e iden i y, like many o he p oposals in he ollowing sec ions, can be di ided in o a
weak and a s ong e sion. In i s weak o m, absolu e iden i y is p ese ed and o ced o coexis
wi h ue ins ances o ela i e iden i y (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]). Ad oca es o his a ian
o ela i e iden i y hold ha o dina y iden i y ela ions conce ning he wo ld o con ingency
and change a e equi alence ela ions co esponding o es ic ed o ms o Leibniz’s Law; and
ha he exac na u e o he es ic ion depends on he ela ion. This allows absolu ely di e en
objec s o ha e he same p edica e bu denies absolu ely iden ical objec s o ha e di e en ones
(Deu sch [1997]). One o i s de ende s is Gup a [1980], who con ends ha iden i y comes in
wo o ms: i ial (o absolu e) and non- i ial (o ela i e). I ackles he Ca holic T ini y
(Tuggy [2021]) by p oposing wo p edica es o ela i e iden i y o he c eed —i.e., being he
same pe son and being he same being (o God).
Weak ela i e iden i y can deal wi h se e al pa adoxes conce ning iden i y. The Pa adox o
Change, which lies a he hea o he Ship o Theseus puzzle (§2.6, §2.8) may be one o he
mos no o ious issues iden i y aces and one o he ocal poin s o his wo k. We encoun e i in
e e yday li e wi h a simple ques ion, mos o en bound o ime: am I he same ha I was? The
changes an objec unde goes h oughou ime iola e Leibniz’s Law in ha i ceases o sha e
all p ope ies. The main ime-based solu iosn will be u he discussed in §2.6. Deu sch and
Ga bacz [2023] explain ha he weak e sion o ID conside s an objec in wo sepa a e imes
as he same objec , bu absolu ely di e en hings (i.e., di e en logical objec s). The ea lie
ins ance is wholly p esen du ing i s ime and possesses he simple, non- ela ional p ope y o
no ha ing he e ec s o ageing p esen in he olde ins ance o ha objec .
Deu sch [1997] p esen s us wi h he example o Fido he dog, which has seen some ime pass
and is now conside ed Fido he old dog. He p oposes sol ing i on he basis ha he iden i y
exp ession is ocused on one p ope y (in his case, being a dog), and all o he p ope ies which
a e no subsc ip ed o i should no be conside ed in hinking Fido he dog and Fido he old
dog no indisce nible.
28 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
In doing his, he consen s o alling a he hands o all philosophe s who deal wi h he issue
o objec mul iplici y, which wa ns o he in ini e supe posi ion o ins ances o he same objec ,
due o he unce ain y o when one empo al pa o i cedes i s place o he nex —mee Lucky
and Pa ch in §2.6. To answe he Fido mul i ude (o empo al pa s), he simply con ends wi h
conside ing only one o hem (one o i s p ope pa s) uly a dog and hus applicable o he
iden i y ela ion a hand. Acco ding o Deu sch [1997], empo al pa s and ela ions o ime a e
no a e ac s o ex ensional logic, while indi iduals a e.
Ch ysippus, a S oic philosophe om III BCE, ske ched a puzzle on iden i y ha would go on
o esu ace in Michael Bu ke’s Dion and Theon: An Essen ialis Solu ion o an Ancien Puzzle
(Bu ke [1994]). In i , a human called “Dion” is in oduced alongside “Theon”, he p ope pa
o Dion ha includes e e y hing bu Dion’s le oo . A e Dion loses his le oo , Ch ysippus
asks whe he Dion o Theon su i e a e he ampu a ion. I bo h su i e he loss, Deu sch and
Ga bacz [2023] obse e ha wo dis inc physical objec s occupy he exac space simul aneously.
Assuming ha is impossible and ha , as commonsense demands, Dion su i es he ampu a ion,
i ollows ha Theon does no su i e. This conclusion is pa adoxical because i appea s ha
no hing happens o Theon in ha in e al ha would cause i o pe ish (Deu sch and Ga bacz
[2023]).
The puzzle in ol es wo igid e ms, which do no see hei e e ence (Dion and Theon)
change wi h espec o pa ame e s such as ime (i.e., he momen in which Dion had bo h ee
and when he no longe does) o possible wo ld. This composes a necessa y ela ion, which in
u n links he puzzle o Necessa y Iden i y and Necessa y Dis inc ness (Deu sch and Ga bacz
[2023]). Necessa y Iden i y holds ha i wo e ms a e equal, hen he equa ion is necessa ily
ue; con e sely, Necessa y Dis inc ness s a es ha i wo igid e ms a e di e en , hen he
dissimila i y is necessa ily ue. Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] ema k ha he necessa y u h o
ei he ela ion does no imply he necessa y exis ence o he e e ed objec s: one migh assume
ha wha a igid e m deno es a a possible wo ld (o momen o ime) need no exis in i .
A hand ul o solu ions ha e been p esen ed h oughou he yea s o Dion and Theon’s
si ua ion. Acco ding o Philo o Alexand ia, Ch ysippus himsel claimed ha “Dion mus emain
while Theon has pe ished” (Long and Sedley [1987]). Howe e , he opposi e may also be a guable
2.2. Rela i e iden i y 29
— ha Dion died and Theon ook his place i i did no exis be o e (Deu sch and Ga bacz
[2023]). Then, h ee main ca ego ies o esponses may be ound. Fi s , one can deny he e
is such hing as “Theon”, easoning ha non-sepa a ed p ope pa s o objec s do no exis
(Van Inwagen [1981]). Ano he op ion is o claim ha nei he Dion no Theon exis s, hus
de ending a educ ionis iew (e.g., a guing only elemen a y pa icles exis ). A hi d p oposal
would en ail emb acing con ingen iden i y (see §2.4) in a i ming ha objec s o di e en kinds
(a human and a p ope pa ) can occupy he same space simul aneously. This migh ha e been
Locke’s answe o he p oblem, had he a emp ed o sol e i (Kau man [2015]). Acco ding o
Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023], weak ela i e iden i y adhe es o he hi d ca ego y o esponses
in asse ing ha Dion and Theon su i e he loss. A bo h imes (be o e Dion loses his oo ,
and a e ) hey a e he same pe son, bu hey a e dis inc logical objec s a i s . This implies
(by Necessa y Dis inc ness) ha Dion and Theon a e dis inc logical objec s e en a e he
ampu a ion. Hence, one mus allow ha dis inc logical objec s may occupy he same space a
he same ime, which is unp oblema ic o his p oposal: hey a e simply dis inc logical objec s
ha a e physically coinciden .
A simila puzzle can be ound in Sea le [1980]’s Chinese Room a gumen , which was in o-
duced in §1.2. In b oad s okes, i p esen s a scena io in which Sea le is alone in a oom wi h
ins uc ion manuals, pen and pape ; messages w i en in Chinese a e slipped unde he doo ,
which Sea le, who does no know Chinese, mus answe acco ding o he ins uc ion manuals,
and hen slip his eplies back ou o he oom. In i , Cole [1991] a gued ha a second indi idual
may eme ge om Sea le’s ac i i y as an igno an ansla o —we will call hem Polo, o honou
Maloney [1987]’s ha sh c i ique o he hough expe imen . Acco ding o Maloney [1987], Polo
sha es Sea le’s senso y and mo o sys ems and goes whe e e Sea le goes, ye is dis inguishable
om him. In esponse, Cole [1991] igh ly asks how can Polo be dis inc om Sea le and answe s
wi h psychological in eg a ion: he unde lying unique psychology o an indi idual pe o ming a
ask. Sea le’s psychology will no be e lec ed in Polo’s pe o mance, Cole [1991] a gues because
Sea le has no access o he seman ic con en o he Chinese cha ac e s —e en i he we e o lea n
he manuals by hea . Sea le [1980] had al eady no ed ha he could si in an emp y oom,
dep i ed o all manuals, ha ing p e iously memo ised e e y ins uc ion, and, a med only wi h
30 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
pen and pape , w i e he ou going s ings o symbols —all he while he would s ill no know
Chinese. Nigel Richa ds, he i e- ime English, wo- ime F ench and one- ime Spanish cham-
pion o Sc abble, is a pe ec example o his phenomenon: Richa ds speaks only English and has
memo ised he en i e F ench and Spanish ocabula y wi hou lea ning he language (Mi chell
[2024]).
Ano he pa adox becomes ele an : he Pa adox o he 101 Dalma ians, which p esen s he
case in which housands o p ope pa s could appea supe imposed on he same dog. Fo each
de ail o he Dalma ian, e en o each s and o u , one would ob ain ano he p ope pa o
he dog. Applying his pa adox o Dion and Theon, one inds ha Theon is bu one o he
my iads o p ope pa s o Dion ha esul om he sub ac ion o e e y bi o Dion’s body,
in e e y possible combina ion. This pape has al eady es ablished ha he weak e sion o
ela i e iden i y is no pa icula ly conce ned wi h physically coinciden bu logically dis inc
objec s (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]). Bu he Pa adox o 101 Dalma ians c owds a pe son
wi h housands o people.
A maximal iew o he issue would say ha no p ope pa o an objec is an objec . Then,
Theon is no a pe son. Bu Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] poin ou ha issues quickly a ise.
They ask: when Dion speaks, do all he pa s speak in unison? When he hinks, do all pa s
hink he same? I becomes appa en ha Theon canno ac wi hou Dion, jus as Maloney
[1987]’s Polo could no ac wi hou Sea le. The e a e wo possible ways ou o his junc ion: one
mus ei he deny ha he many a e people o ha he people a e many. Weak ela i e iden i y
chooses nei he : i does no suppo maximali y. I ejec s he idea ha no p ope pa o a
pe son is a pe son and suppo s conside ing all pa s o people (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]).
Now conside a ball o clay (Clay) om which a s a ue (Da id) is made, which is des oyed
he nex day o make a second s a ue (Golia h). On he hi d day, pa o Golia h is aken away
and ebuil wi h a di e en piece o clay (Claymo e). This is a a ia ion o Gibba d [1975]’s
puzzle, and i will ea u e p ominen ly h oughou his hesis. One migh hink he ela ionship
be ween he pieces o clay and he s a ues hey o m is iden i y, bu Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]
no e ha his conclusion con adic s Necessa y Iden i y: i Clay is iden ical o Da id on he
i s day, hen i ollows ha on he second day, Da id is Golia h (since Clay is iden ical o

2.2. Rela i e iden i y 31
Golia h on he second day) and he e o e Da id exis s hen, which i does no . So one could
ei he conclude ha he cons i u ion is no iden i y o ha Necessa y Iden i y is alse. Gibba d
[1975] o iginal case a gues o con ingen iden i y (§2.4). I s esponses ange om a guing ha
Clay and Da id a e no eally iden ical since one exis ed be o e he o he , and he la e can
be des oyed by becoming a ball while he o me canno , o de ending o al coincidence as a
plausible claim o con ingen iden i y (sep-iden i y- ela i e). In e ms o weak ela i e iden i y,
con ingen iden i y is ega ded as absolu e iden i y — he ela ion o Da id and Golia h o Clay
is conside ed absolu e. Since hey a e di e en s a ues, Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] eason,
Da id and Golia h a e di e en , bu hey a e he same piece o clay (Clay), so his is a ela ion
o iden i y. I ollows ha no name o Clay can be a igid designa ion in he s anda d sense;
only ela i ely, since i can always e e o he same piece o clay.
The same is a gued in Cole [1991] o machines. A physical machine has an in insic se
o ins uc ions h ough which i has he capaci y o pe o m ce ain ope a ions. This physical
ope a ion may s o e a p og am which can emula e a di e en machine — hus c ea ing a i ual
machine, a simula ion o ano he in insic se o ins uc ions. Bu Cole [1991] no es ha hose
a e di e en machines: hey di e in p ope ies. While he physical machine is unning he
emula ion p og am, he i ual one may be unning an applica ion; hey also p esen di e ging
in insic ins uc ion se s and may ha e di e en speeds. He adds, e en, ha he i ual machine
is dissimila o he emula ion p og am, as he p og am may be long o sho , w i en in a
language, con ain commen s o be copy igh ed. In con as , he i ual machine has none o
hese p ope ies. In A is o elian e ms, Cole [1991] adds, a p og am could be bu he o m o
some ma e —i holds he powe o an ac ion, bu wi hou an unde lying subs ance, i does
no hing.
Acco ding o he s ong e sion o ela i e iden i y, he e a e (many) ue ins ances o ela i e
iden i y, bu no such hing as absolu e iden i y. I is di icul o de end, which has pushed mos
philosophe s owa ds he weak e sion —mo eo e , Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] add, i aken
li e ally, i is alse. Geach de ends his iew (Geach [1991]). Geach’s a gumen s i mly es
on he imp ecision o language, albei changing in he cou se o his de ence o s ong ela i e
iden i y. Geach [1967] con ains he ea lie , lawed a gumen ha claims ha he sameness o
32 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
u h condi ions o a heo y leads o he sameness o he en i ies whose p edica es mus be ue
i he said heo y is o be ue —i.e., on ological commi men s. Bu Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]
p o e i w ong in no ing ha a heo y is no on ologically commi ed o wha mus be in he
uni e se o i o be ue, bu only o wha mus be ue. Thus, he e is no a gumen o he
equi alence o u h condi ions o he equi alence o on ological commi men s.
In Geach [1973], he la e a gumen , he ela i i y o language sugges s ha iden i y is
indisce nibili y, om which i ollows ha iden ical objec s ela i e o one domain may be
di e en ela i e o ano he . Geach claims ha ela i e iden i y in ol es mo ing om a limi ed
pe spec i e o a mo e in o med one (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]). The ela i i y o language has
led Geach, along wi h many o he s, o hink ha no domain is p ede e mined o be desc ibed.
S ill, heo ies shape he wo ld, making hings dis inc o indis inguishable acco ding o hei
desc ip i e esou ces. I hus elies on he P inciple o Iden i y o Indisce nibles o say ha
indisce nibili y implies iden i y. This migh seem o go hand in hand wi h ela i e iden i y. Bu
Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] wa n ha linguis ic ela i i y is no eally a kind o ela i i y o
iden i y a all —i one poin o iew is able o de ec a di e ence ha ano he does no , and
e en i one is comple ely bound o he mo e es ic ed iew, one mus know ha a di e ence
exis s.
F om Geach’s ini ial s ance, o he s ha e aken he o ch on adap ing and de ending ela i e
iden i y. The p oposal has aced many ials and ebu s. One is he Passenge P oblem, in
which one pe son (A a) may be coun ed wice as a passenge , so hey would be wo di e en
passenge s (A i and E a). I o say ha A i and E a a e he same pe son is o say ha A i and
E a a e pe sons and a e absolu ely iden ical and o say ha A i and E a a e passenge s and a e
absolu ely dis inc , a con adic ion is ound (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]). One in e p e a ion
by Gup a [1980] ies o mend he p oblem by s a ing ha he same pe son ela ion sa is ies
Leibniz’s Law. S ill, he same passenge ela ion is no s aigh o wa dly an equi alence ela ion.
Bu his is incompa ible wi h he P inciple o Iden i y o Indisce nibles, Deu sch and Ga bacz
[2023] no e, since i A i and E a a e di e en passenge s, hen he e mus be some p ope y
ha A i has ha E a does no ha e.
Al hough all he a o emen ioned pa adoxes seem o be se led wi h ela i e iden i y, doub s
2.3. Composi ion as iden i y 33
quickly eme ge. Mos o i s de ende s claim ha while iden i y ela ions a e equi alence ela ions,
hey do no sa is y Leibniz’s Law in gene al. Bu he ad oca e o ela i e iden i y canno simply
ejec any o m o Leibniz’s Law. The p oblem is ha o o mula ing and mo i a ing es ic ed
o ms o Leibniz’s Law ha a e none heless s ong enough o bea he bu den o iden i y claims.
Ye Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] poin ou ha li le sys ema ic wo k has been done in his
di ec ion. Rela i is heo ies o iden i y ha e ecei ed minimal suppo . The e is no enough
con idence ha hey eally add ess nume ical iden i y, can be in e nally consis en , and a e
su icien ly mo i a ed. P oponen s a gue, howe e , ha enough d i e can be ound in he many
pa adoxes and answe s discussed in he li e a u e. Mo eo e , no opponen o ela i e iden i y
has p o ided e idence o inconsis ency, and he weak iew emains eliable by ha ing a model
wi hin he heo y o simila i y ela ions (Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]).
When an iden i y ela ion sa is ies only a es ic ed o m o Leibniz’s Law (i.e., p ese ing
some p ope ies bu no all), one is le wonde ing how o de e mine which p ope ies indi idua e
he objec s. Simila i y ela ions hemsel es only con o m o es ic ed o ms o Leibniz’s Law,
which is no a alid objec ion o equi e an iden i ica ion o which p ope ies a e p ese ed. A
p ope y is gene ally kep by an equi alence ela ion i i sp eads wi hin an equi alence class
de e mined by he ela ion —i.e. i one membe o he class possesses he p ope y, hen all
membe s do. This is wha deu sch-simila i y a gues a he beginning o his sec ion.
2.3 Composi ion as iden i y
Composi ion as iden i y add esses he ques ion o whe he an iden i y can comp ise o he iden-
i ies. I is mo i a ed by he obse a ion ha he e is a pa icula ly close ela ionship be ween
he whole and i s pa s (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). Nowadays, he discussion sees mo e c i -
icism han de ence: i is no a popula ield, al hough i has seen a sligh e i al wi h Megan
Wallace in he wo-pa se ies o a icles Composi ion as Iden i y (Wallace [2011a] and Wallace
[2011b]), along wi h Co noi [2013]. The main eason o i s ejec ion lies in he s eep p ice i
seems o demand: by accep ing ha many pa s a e iden ical o one, we mus gi e up Leibniz’s
Law. The e ha e been many a emp s o igh agains his g im conclusion, anging om a gu-
ing o he disce nibili y o iden icals in Bax e [1988a], o a mo e classical plea by Wallace o
34 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
keep Leibniz’s Law in ac while ad oca ing an amendmen o i s -o de logic o include plu al
language and a hyb id singula /plu al iden i y p edica e (Wallace [2011a]).
Bu le us no ge ahead o ou sel es. Fi s , he landscape o he ba le. The ew de ende s
o composi ion as iden i y can be g ouped in o wo main ac ions, one o which is in u n di ided
in o wo sides. Following he nomencla u e in Wallace [2011a], we will call hem he Weak Com-
posi ion Thesis (WCT), he S ong Composi ion Thesis (SCT), and he S onge Composi ion
Thesis (RCT). They a gue espec i ely ha he composi ion ela ion is only analogously ano he
o m o he iden i y ela ion (WCT), ha i is li e ally ano he o m o iden i y (SCT), and ha
i is ano he o m o iden i y, as well as saying ha iden i y does no obey he Indisce nibili y
o Iden icals (RCT) we in oduced in §2.1. Bax e , o one, would all unde he RCT umb ella.
Wallace de ends SCT, while mos o he o he hinke s in ol ed in his deba e ha e p e e ed
WCT.
SCT akes he composi ion ela ion o be s ic ly he same as he iden i y ela ion — he
pa s a e collec i ely iden ical o he whole. Al hough i would be g ossly anach onis ic o claim
ha Pla o’s Pa menides (Pla o) di ec ly discusses composi ion as iden i y, since i s mode n
o mula ion is mo e closely associa ed wi h con empo a y analy ic me aphysics, we may be able
o ind a i s s ep owa ds SCT in i . The dialogue deals wi h he hough o he homologous
ounde o Elea icism’s, who de ended ha he mul iplici y o exis ing hings, hei changing
o ms and mo ion, a e bu an appea ance o a single e e nal eali y —which he called Being
(o Encyclopædia B i annica [2024]). In Pla o, i s Soc a es and hen A is o le deba ed Pa -
menides on he na u e o ideas. While discussing anscenden al ques ions such as exis ence and
he one and he many, he subjec o sameness is aised:
Pa menides: I one is, he one canno be many?
A is o le: Impossible.
Pa menides: Then he one canno ha e pa s, and canno be a whole?
A is o le: Why no ?
Pa menides: Because e e y pa is pa o a whole; is i no ?
A is o le: Yes.
2.5. Iden i y ac oss wo lds 41
2.5 Iden i y ac oss wo lds
One o he cen al deba es in iden i y heo y conce ns whe he iden i y can be a con inuous
concep ac oss di e en wo lds o possibili y, each ep esen ing a ce ain way in which objec s
migh ha e been a anged o ha e had di e en cha ac e is ics. This opic go conside able
a en ion in he 1960s and 1970s, la gely due o de elopmen s in modal logic. Two main heo ies
( hough by no means he only ones) ha e been deba ed ex ensi ely up o he p esen day:
coun e pa heo y and answo ld iden i y heo y. T answo ld iden i y de ends ha iden i y
migh sp ead h oughou di e en wo lds while keeping i s de ining p ope ies —Mackie and
Jago [2022] cla i y ha i should mo e app op ia ely be e e ed o as in e wo ld iden i y o
e en ansmodal iden i y. I s ad oca es can be oughly di ided in o wo schools: one seeks
o na ow down wha a e he essen ial p ope ies o an iden i y, a he han i s acciden al o
changeable ones (i.e., con ingen ); he o he a emp s o spli an objec in o pa s and hen
examine how many o hose can change be o e i loses i s o iginal iden i y. Bo h con as wi h
haeccei ism, which main ains ha e e y indi idual en i y possesses a unique, in insic quali y
(haeccei y o hisness) ha makes i , unlike any o he en i y, ega dless o i s p ope ies o
ela ions o o he hings (Mackie and Jago [2022]).
The basic ene o answo ld heo y is ha an en i y can exis in mo e han one possible
wo ld (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). When modal discou se is iewed h ough his lens, i becomes
na u al o in e p e s a emen s a ibu ing modal p ope ies o indi iduals as asse ing hei
iden i y ac oss hose wo lds (Menzel [2024]). Modal s a emen s abou wha migh o could ha e
been he case, wha could no ha e been o he wise, and so on, a e o en cha ac e ised wi hin
he possible-wo lds amewo k. Mackie and Jago [2022] exempli y his wi h he exp ession
Be and Russell migh ha e been a playw igh ins ead o a philosophe , which is in e p e ed
as “ he e is some possible wo ld in which Be and Russell exis s and is a playw igh a he
han a philosophe ”. Acco ding o Lewis [1986], he e is no objec i e di e ence in on ological
s a us be ween he ac ual wo ld and o he possible ones. We e e o ou wo ld as ac ual simply
because we inhabi i ; he inhabi an s o ano he wo ld may, wi h equal igh s, ega d hei
wo ld as ac ual. In o he wo ds, ac ual in he ac ual wo ld is bu an indexical e m (like he e
o now). Mackie and Jago [2022] go on o ex end he possible-wo lds in e p e a ion o de e

42 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
modal s a emen s, which in ol es a commi men o he idea ha some indi iduals exis in mo e
han one possible wo ld, leading o he concep o iden i y ac oss possible wo lds, o answo ld
iden i y.
A common example o his is he u e ance Sa ah migh ha e been a millionai e, which
can be unde s ood as asse ing ha he e is a possible wo ld in which an indi idual iden ical
o Sa ah is a millionai e. Con e sely, Sa ah could no ha e been a millionai e implies ha in
e e y possible wo ld in which an indi idual iden ical o Sa ah exis s, ha indi idual is no
a millionai e (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). The di e ence be ween de e and de dic o modal
u e ances becomes cen al o his discussion. A no able p oblem p esen s i sel when conside ing
he iden i y o complex a e ac s ac oss possible wo lds. Noonan and Cu is [2022] exempli y
his wi h a bicycle, o which i seems easonable o assume i could ha e been made o a numbe
o di e en pa s. Howe e , i does no ollow ha he same bicycle could ha e been cons uc ed
om a comple ely di e en se o pa s. In a sequence o possible wo lds s a ing wi h ou s, each
con aining a bicycle sligh ly di e en om he one in he p e ious wo ld, he las wo ld migh
con ain a bicycle made en i ely om di e en pa s o he one in ou s. I would be inco ec o
say ha each bicycle is iden ical o he one in he neighbou ing wo ld bu no iden ical o he
one in a dis an wo ld, gi en ha iden i y is a ansi i e ela ion.
The no ion o he same objec exis ing in mo e han one possible wo ld, wi h he ac ual wo ld
being ea ed as one o hem, is a cen al issue in he deba e abou iden i y ac oss wo lds (Noonan
and Cu is [2022]). Opinions ange om deeming iden i y be ween objec s in di e en possible
wo lds so p oblema ic ha i is unaccep able o de ending i as comple ely uncon o e sial. This
deba e is u he complica ed by he in oduc ion coun e pa heo y, which eplaces he claim
ha an indi idual exis s in mo e han one possible wo ld wi h he idea ha each indi idual
exis s in only one wo ld —bu has coun e pa s in o he wo lds. Coun e pa hood, based on
simila i y, does no ollow he logic o iden i y.
Going back o he bicycle example, Noonan and Cu is [2022] concedes ha since simila i y
is no ansi i e, i allows one o a gue he bicycle could ha e had some di e en pa s wi hou
implying ha i migh ha e been o ally di e en . This scena io leads o he concep o coun-
e pa s, as de eloped by Lewis o e mo e han wen y yea s in Lewis [1971], Lewis [1986] and
2.5. Iden i y ac oss wo lds 43
Lewis [1993]. A i s co e, he heo y a gues ha an indi idual does no exis in mo e han one
wo ld bu has coun e pa s in o he possible wo lds —en i ies ha esemble hem in ele an
ways. This is, Mackie and Jago [2022] w i e, he al e na i e o answo ld iden i y: ins ead o
saying ha an objec (in whole o in pa ) inhabi s mo e han one wo ld, coun e pa heo y,
wi h Lewis as i s maximum ep esen a i e, holds ha i belongs o one wo ld ( he ac ual one)
and has coun e pa s in he o he s. I is hose coun e pa s who expe ience he a o emen ioned
changes in p ope ies.
Bu le us go back o answo ld iden i y. The heo y e ol es a ound he concep o
answo ld p ope ies, which would se e as a so o ancho o ix an indi idual’s iden i y
as one and he same, albei exis ing in mo e han one wo ld (O ilia and Paolini Paole i [2022]).
They aise impo an ques ions, Mackie and Jago [2022] no e. Fo example, do p ope ies hem-
sel es ha e essen ial cha ac e is ics ha allow hem o be iden i ied ac oss wo lds? Is he iden i y
o a p ope y ac oss wo lds ied o i s causal o nomic ole9? Al e na i ely, do p ope ies ha e
ba e iden i ies? Causal essen ialism posi s he e is no hing o he iden i y o a p ope y be-
yond i s causal ole. De ende s o his p oposal a gue ha a p ope y’s essence is de ined by
i s causal and nomic ela ions (Gibbs [2018]), while o he s ollow Fine [1994] in unde s anding
essence as a mo e undamen al, p imi i e no ion han modali y, hus e e sing hei p io i ies.
In con as , Mackie and Jago [2022] add, quiddi ism claims ha p ope ies ha e ba e iden i ies,
hus becoming he haeccei ism o p ope y iden i y. Among o he au ho s, Lewis [1986] goes
on o de end a e sion o i , al hough i is no ee om c i icism. Rela ional modal p edica ion
conside s p ope ies as ela i e o he wo ld in which hey exis .
Ano he p oblem in he deba e on answo ld iden i y is whe he di e en objec s a e me ely
added oge he o pa adoxically supe imposed. Mackie and Jago [2022] in i e us o conside his:
i a cow has ou legs bu could ha e had h ee, does i ha e se en legs when one adds oge he
bo h possible wo lds, o does i ha e ou legs and h ee legs a he same ime? P oponen s o
ex eme ealism migh a gue ha he cow has a ou -legged pa in ou wo ld and a h ee-legged
pa in some o he wo ld — hus adhe ing o coun e pa heo y. Rela ional modal p edica ion
posi s ha he cow has ou legs in one wo ld and h ee in ano he . I s ad oca es a gue ha an
9The law ul o law-like ela ionships and beha iou s a p ope y o en i y exhibi s wi hin a sys em o na u al
laws.
44 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
indi idual can ha e bo h ou legs and h ee legs wi hou con adic ion, p o ided he p edica ions
a e ela i e o di e en possible wo lds. Yagisawa [2010], ollowing in Lewis’ oo s eps, ex ends
his idea o sugges ha conc e e en i ies such as ees, ca s and cows a e ex ended ac oss wo lds
by ha ing s ages (o pa s) ha exis in each o hem. Known as s age heo y, his no ion will
esu ace h oughou his hesis, s a ing wi h he ollowing sec ion on iden i y h ough ime
(§2.6). Acco ding o his iew, o dina y en i ies consis o spa ial, empo al and modal s ages,
all o which a e equally eal and me aphysically equi alen o empo al and spa ial s ages. This
is known as Fou Dimensionalism, which we b ie ly saw in §2.3.
Fu he mo e, i is c ucial o dis inguish be ween essen ial and acciden al p ope ies, a e mi-
nology ha has p e ailed a leas since A is o le (Mackie and Jago [2022]). Essen ial p ope ies
a e hose an objec mus ha e in o de o be he objec i is, while acciden al ones a e hose i
can lack. Fo ins ance, he cow’s species, biological s uc u e, and gene ic code may be essen ial
p ope ies, while i s numbe o legs is acciden al. This dis inc ion is impo an when conside -
ing iden i y ac oss possible wo lds since an objec ’s iden i y can be p ese ed ac oss wo lds i i
e ains i s essen ial p ope ies, e en i i s acciden al p ope ies a y. Ye Mackie and Jago [2022]
wa n ha he e is no consensus on which ones a e uly essen ial, and whe he p ope ies a e
ixed o can a y wi h con ex o pe spec i e.
Finally, he deba e be ween endu ance and pe du ance heo ies o iden i y o e ime (§2.6)
also in o ms discussions o answo ld iden i y. Endu an is s belie e objec s a e ully p esen
a e e y momen o hei exis ence, while pe du an is s a gue hey pe sis by ha ing di e en
empo al pa s a di e en imes. This pa allels he deba e o e whe he objec s exis in mo e
han one possible wo ld (endu an ism) o whe he hey ha e di e en modal pa s in di e en
possible wo lds (pe du an ism). The mo e han s iking simila i y o hese wo deba es will
con inue o mani es i sel in he ollowing sec ion.
2.6 Iden i y ac oss ime
The p oblem o iden i y h ough ime inds i s g ea es enemy in change. Accep ing he as-
sump ion ha he e is change seems inconsis en wi h emb acing Leibniz’s Law, which s a es
2.6. Iden i y ac oss ime 45
ha a hing canno be one and he same be o e and a e he change. S ic ly speaking, hen
no hing would ha e eally changed: one hing would wholly become ano he . This e lec ion is
also applicable o A i icial In elligence. In he case o a Neu al Ne wo k, he unde lying sys em
ha adjus s he weigh s and p obabili ies o he model is cons an ly changing as i lea ns (Cole
[1991]).
Nume ous hinke s ha e aken up his challenge wi h a ying deg ees o success. The discus-
sion e en p eceded A is o le, who dis inguished be ween acciden al (e.g., a ca whose y es ha e
been eplaced, hus p ese ing i s iden i y e en a e he change) and essen ial (e.g., a ca ha
has been u ned in o sc ap me al in a junkya d, wi hou p ese ing i s iden i y) changes (Ba nes
[1977]). Acco ding o A is o le, a hing can be one and he same a e unde going acciden al
changes. A is o le [2018] himsel c i icises some o his p edecesso s’ p oposals on iden i y ac oss
ime:
And u he , obse ing ha all his inde e mina e subs ance is in mo ion, and ha
no ue p edica ion can be made o ha which changes, hey supposed ha i is
impossible o make any ue s a emen abou ha which is in all ways and en i ely
changeable. Fo i was om his supposi ion ha he e blossomed o h he mos
ex eme iew o hose which we ha e men ioned, ha o he p o essed ollowe s o
He acli us, and such as C a ylus held, who ended by hinking ha one need no say
any hing, and only mo ed his inge ; and who c i icized He acli us o saying ha
one canno en e he same i e wice, o he himsel held ha i canno be done
e en once.
(A is o le in Me aphysics, Book Gamma, 1010a 7 - 1010a 16)
Many ha e ollowed him, a small g oup o whom we will mee h oughou his sec ion.
The discou se on iden i y ac oss ime ansla es he wo lds p oblem o ime i sel , ponde ing
whe he an iden i y can wi hs and he passage o ime. The p esen can be hough o as he
ac ual wo ld, while bo h he pas and he u u e a e possible wo lds. Al hough ich in p oblems
o i s own, i is pe haps mos ecognisable by one o he mos amous iddles o iden i y: i s
46 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
in oduced by Plu a ch in Chap e XXIII, Sec ion 1 o Li e o Theseus (Plu a ch [1914]) and
expanded by Thomas Hobbes in O Iden i y and Di e ence (Hobbes [1656]), i ollows he li e
cycle o he ship o Theseus as i is disman led and ebuil . The Ship o Theseus is a symme ical
ission case. Iden i y ac oss ime p oblems can be classi ied in a oughly bina y ashion and
hough o as being ei he abou ission (i.e., spli ing an objec ) o usion (i.e., joining objec s).
In symme ical cases, he e is some ela ion ha each o band cs and in o a, whe e s anding in
ha ela ion is wha makes each one heo e ically iden ical wi h a. Con e sely, in asymme ical
cases, he e is a ce ain ela ion ha makes b heo e ically iden ical o a, while cis heo e ically
iden ical o abecause i s ands in a di e en ela ion o a(Gallois [2016]).
As wi h he wo lds p oblem, iden i y ac oss ime hos s a my iad o heses. B addon-Mi chell
and Mille [2020] lis h ee s anda d heo ies o pe sis ence o ca ego ise hem: endu an ism,
pe du an ism and exdu an ism, which a gue espec i ely o con inuous nume ical iden i y, Fou
Dimensionalism (o wo m heo y) and objec -s ages. In pe du an ism and exdu an ism, which
will some imes appea me ged unde he umb ella o pe du ance heo y, an objec pe sis s in
ime by ha ing empo al pa s o he same objec exis ing a di e en imes (Gallois [2016]). The
changing p ope ies we migh obse e on an objec would each be assigned o di e en empo al
pa s. Among o he p oposed a ia ions, s age heo y, p oposed by Hawley [2001] and Side
[2001] may help be e unde s and pe du ance. S age heo y p oposes a change in seman ics,
now conside ing each empo al pa o an objec an ins ance o ha objec . Gallois [2016] wa ns
ha one mus be ca e ul o dis inguish whe he one is coun ing based on absolu e iden i y o
no when adhe ing o his heo y —i.e., coun ing objec s ac oss ime (e.g. someone who says
hey ha e had h ee ca s in hei li e) o objec -s ages (by which hose h ee ca s could be one
and he same ca ).
Ch is ophe Conn a gues ha ou -dimensionalis on ology bes cap u es wha migh be
going on in Locke’s hinking abou pe sis ence and he ela ionship be ween pe sons (o o gan-
isms) and ini e in elligences. O ganisms, Kau man [2015] w i es, acco ding o Fou Dimen-
sionalism, a e pe sis en a he han endu ing en i ies —a dis inc ion whose locus classicus is
Lewis [1986]. I wo m- heo e ical pe du an ism is co ec , hen he same pe son ela ion holds
be ween pe son-s ages by i ue o hose s ages being pa s o he same pe son. I s age heo y

2.6. Iden i y ac oss ime 47
(i.e., exdu an ism) is co ec , hen he same pe son ela ion holds because one pe son-s age is a
empo al pe son-coun e pa o he o he (B addon-Mi chell and Mille [2020]).
Endu ance heo y s a es ha an objec has spa ial pa s ha a e ully p esen a he di e -
en imes i exis s, a he han empo al ones (Gallois [2016]). The objec endu es and changes
h ough ime bu only ex ends h ough space — hus, hese mus be sha ply dis inguished om
e en s o p ocesses which do ex end h ough ime. Objec s ha e di e en (modal) p ope ies
om he summa ions o objec -s a es wi h which pe du ance heo y iden i ies hem. §2.5 in o-
duced he concep o modal p ope y. Conside ing he close ela ionship be ween he deba es on
iden i y ac oss wo lds and iden i y ac oss ime, i is o no su p ise ha modal p ope ies should
be ea u ed in his sec ion as well. Jus as a pe son migh be alle in ano he wo ld, so a child
migh be alle in a ew yea s. The issue is ha , in ime, a p ocess o change is necessa y, ye
we may see o he wo ldly al e a ions as a simple, somewha s a ic al e na i e.
A c ucial dis inc ion is made be ween iden i y a a ime and iden i y ac oss ime (Gallois
[2016]). Synch onic iden i y e e s o iden i y a a single poin in ime: he book I am eading is
(now) iden ical o he one nex o me. On he o he hand, diach onic iden i y e e s o iden i y
holding be ween some hing exis ing a one ime and some hing exis ing a ano he : he book
nex o me is iden ical o he one I acqui ed six mon hs ago. Geach add essed bo h synch onic
and diach onic iden i y by denying he exis ence o a single absolu e ela ion o iden i y, ins ead
posi ing a a ie y o ela i e ela ions o iden i y. We ha e e iewed his p oposal in §2.2, which
in ol es he so al concep s Fand Gunde which aand b all; amay be he same Fas b,
bu no he same Gas b(Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023]). Con inuing wi h he examples in his
pa ag aph, i he book I am eading is iden ical o he one nex o me, hen he e mus be a
subs ance so al ( he concep o a book) in bo h he book I am eading and he book nex o
me sha e. Mo eo e , Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] add, a subs ance so al is said o accompany
a c i e ion o iden i y —which is, among o he hings, a c i e ion o some ea lie Sbeing he
same Sas some la e Sassocia ed wi h subs ance so al S.
One way he ela i i y o he answe o an iden i y ques ion can help deal wi h he sho -
comings o he classical app oach o diach onic iden i y akes us back o he Pa adox o he 101
Dalma ians, which we examined when we objec ed o ela i e iden i y in §2.2. In i , we ound
48 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
a Dalma ian, which migh ha e had as many p ope pa s as he e we e s ands in i s u , each
o which encapsula ed he whole dog bu one hai . We will simpli y his example so ha only
wo en i ies a e obse ed: he Dalma ian (which we will call Lucky) and a p ope pa (Pa ch).
Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] ask us o suppose ha no hing is a dog i i is a p ope pa o a
dog. Then Pa ch does no quali y as a dog when i is a p ope pa o Lucky. In his case, a
ela i e iden i y heo is migh say ha a a la e ime, Lucky is he same dog as Pa ch. Since
Pa ch was no a dog a i s , nei he Lucky no Pa ch was he same dog a a la e ime as Pa ch
a he beginning. So, i seems ha iden i ying Lucky wi h Pa ch as he same dog la e on does
no equi e iden i ying Lucky wi h one o i s p ope pa s, Pa ch, a i s .
C i e ia o iden i y can hus be applied synch onically o de e mine whe he wo coexis ing
objec s a e pa s o he same objec o a so o diach onically o de e mine iden i y o e ime.
The same en i y may exis a mo e han one ime, which means i is possible o a hing exis ing
a one ime and a hing exis ing a ano he ime o be nume ically iden ical (Noonan and Cu is
[2022]). He acli us amously a gued (o a leas o he s w o e ha he did) in Pla o’s dialogue
C a ylus (Sedley [2003]) ha one could no ba he wice in he same i e because new wa e was
always lowing, and nei he could he same one. This sec ion has ea u ed A is o le c i icising
he no ion explici ly (A is o le [2018]). Da id Hume, on he o he hand, a gued ha iden i y
o e ime is a ic ion we eplace wi h a collec ion o ela ed objec s (Speaks [2006]). Bu his
b ings us back o he appa en inconsis ency wi h Leibniz’s Law: a pe son a di e en imes will
no sha e, a leas , he p ope y o age.
2.7 Vague iden i y
The impossibili y o ague iden i y, simila o he impossibili y o con ingen iden i y, seems o
ollow di ec ly om he classical concep o iden i y (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). I a gues ha
he iden i y ela ion be ween objec s need no explici ly ma ch, hus ejec ing he absolu eness
o iden i y —simila ly o wha ela i e iden i y did in §2.2. Such ela ion can be ound when
one o bo h e ms lanking he iden i y ela ion a e imp ecise designa o s (i.e., inde e mina e
o ambiguous e e en s). I s impossibili y is easily illus a ed by Noonan and Cu is [2022]’s
example in ol ing a, which is only aguely iden ical o b. Then some hing is ue o a—i.e.,
2.7. Vague iden i y 49
ha i is only aguely iden ical o b— which is no ue o b. So, by Leibniz’s Law, ais no
iden ical o ba all. So, i would seem ha his kind o agueness is only possible, a mos , i
one o bo h o he e ms lanking he iden i y sign a e imp ecise designa o s10.
Howe e , i could be a gued ha his is oo blun . E en iden i y s a emen s wi h p ecise
designa o s may be inde e mina e in some cases. To ake a well-known example, conside Moun
E e es and a well-de ined snowy geological o ma ion —which we will call Rock. Whe he he
bounda ies o Rock coincide wi h hose o E e es is inde e mina e, so, as emp ing as i is
o hink ha bo h a e p ecise designa ions, he iden i y s a emen E e es is Rock emains
inde e mina e (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). Ye he p oposal has known less de ende s han
de ac o s. Te ence Pa sons’ book Inde e mina e iden i y: me aphysics and seman ics (Pa sons
[2000]) p o ides he mos ho ough de ence o he heo y while, mos no ably, E ans [1978] and
Salmon [2005] objec o i on he g ounds ha i iola es Leibniz’s Law —as seen in aand b’s
example.
This deba e has been going on o decades and has in ol ed names we ha e become qui e
acquain ed wi h in his chap e , such as Lewis and Van Inwagen. Hawley [2001] p esen s a a ian
o E ans [1978]’s a gumen on he impossibili y o ague iden i y. Hawley [2001] p esen s an
example in ol ing Van Inwagen [1990]’s iendish cabine , which dis up s all ea u es ele an o
pe sonal iden i y (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). In Hawley [2001]’s example, an indi idual called
Alpha en e s he cabine , and ano he indi idual, Omega, e en ually exi s. I is inde e mina e
whe he Alpha s eps ou o he cabine , and Alpha is such ha i is inde e mina e whe he she
s eps ou o he cabine . Con e sely, i is no inde e mina e whe he Omega s eps ou o he
cabine and Omega is no such ha i is inde e mina e whe he she s eps ou o he cabine .
Hence, Hawley [2001] concludes ha Alpha is no iden ical o Omega.
E ans [1978] had loca ed he inde e minacy in language, inding i oo imp ecise o con ey
wha was needed o a icula e iden i y une ingly. Noonan and Cu is [2022] illus a e he
alidi y o his conclusion in cases o synch onic iden i y (§2.6) wi h a s uc u e which consis s
o wo halls: Be a and Psi, connec ed by a scan y co ido . Alpha is in Be a, while Omega is
in Psi. The na u e o he s uc u e makes i inde e mina e whe he he iden i y s a emen The
10A e m o exp ession ha does no uniquely o p ecisely pick ou a pa icula objec o en i y.
50 Chap e 2. Analy ical Iden i y
building in which Alpha is loca ed is he building in which Omega is loca ed is ue o alse, since
i is unclea whe he Be a and Psi a e wo sepa a e buildings o me ely pa s o a single one.
Shoemake and Swinbu ne [1984] ag ee in ha he e m building is oo ague in his case o
se le he issue.
In Hawley [2001]’s example, one could a gue ha mul iple en i ies a e p esen : one ha exis s
be o e and a e wha e e happens in he cabine , one ha exis s only be o e and one ha exis s
only a e . This would be consis en wi h wha an adep o pe du ance like Quine [1960] would
say, who would be willing o ea any spa io- empo ally disconnec ed egions as con aining a
physical objec . On he o he hand, a pe sis ence heo is may choose o accep he p oblem
as one o genuine agueness, ejec ing he mul iplici y o en i ies posi ed by pe du ance and
ins ead disca ding E ans [1978]’s a gumen agains ague iden i y (Noonan and Cu is [2022]).
This posi ion is mo e closely associa ed wi h common-sense iews o iden i y.
2.8 The Flee o Theseus
The Ship o Theseus is one o he mos amous iden i y puzzles in His o y. No only has i been
discussed ex ensi ely by many philosophe s o e he yea s, bu i is o en used o illus a e he
di icul y o de ining iden i y in e e yday li e. I has appea ed in pop cul u e ime and again. I
is a symme ical ission p oblem ela ing o iden i y ac oss ime (Noonan and Cu is [2022]). I s
main ocus is o es i h ough he applica ion o he Pa adox o Change (§2.2), which Noonan
and Cu is [2022] de ine as s a ing ha an objec ha changes pa s iola es Leibniz’s Law on
he g ounds ha i no longe e ains all o i s o iginal p ope ies and is hus no longe iden ical
o wha i was. Al hough i ep esen s only a iny ace o he challenges o iden i y, i will se e
as an illus a i e compa ison be ween he my iad o answe s humani y has come up wi h o one
ques ion: whe e does he ship o Theseus’ iden i y lie?
The se ing akes us o a new ship, made en i ely o wooden planks, called he A iadne. The
A iadne se s sail, and as i a e ses he seas, i s planks a e g adually eplaced, one by one, by
new ones ha a e desc ip i ely iden ical o he o iginal ones. The old planks a e aken asho e
and s o ed in he po o ancien A hens, Pi aeus. A e all he planks ha e been eplaced, he
57
Wi h his c ash cou se in Locke’s heo y o iden i y, le us now b oaden ou ho izons. We
mo e o wa d close o a cen u y. Hume admi s o ha ing no clue wha a soul migh be o he
han a bundle o pe cep ions, which a e clea ly changeable and bound o a mo al body. In On
he Immo ali y o he Soul (Hume [1777]), he denies us ha ing any idea o he sel since i is
ne e sepa a e om pe cep ion. Thus, Speaks [2006] ema ks, we ne e know a sel beyond he
men al e en s ha compose ou mind in a chain go e ned by cause-e ec . Hansen [2016] poin s
ou ha , cu iously, his ema k is e y close o wha Vasubandhu, an Indian philosophe and
Buddhis monk, ad oca ed in he c. 5 h cen u y: ha he sel is a con inuum o agg ega es,
which a e he physiological elemen s which make up he indi idual pe son.
Hume concludes, a he b u ally, ha he subjec o pe sonal iden i y can ne e be decided.
I may seem odd o include him in he ield o pe sonal iden i y, bu he e y much discusses i .
Acco ding o Speaks [2006], Hume’s cen al idea is his: we con use he ideas o iden i y and
di e si y (o dis inc ness). He a acks he age-old issue o change o e ime, pa icula ly a a
g adual pace: we end o mis ake quali a i e (o , as he pu s i , speci ic) iden i y and nume ical
iden i y (which is he one ha is los in change) —a dis inc ion we saw when in oducing
Leibniz’s Law in §2.1. And o y and ix ou mis ake, we in en some aspec ( he mind, soul,
sel , o subs ance) which has somehow emained unchanged h oughou , hus se ing as an
ancho o so s o he objec ’s iden i y. He enounces his ix and modula es objec s no o be
iden ical h oughou ime, bu me ely ela ed. The same, he says, applies o people.
Hume’s heo y o pe sonal iden i y, Robinson and Beauchamp [1978] asse , he e o e, holds
ha he sel is en i ely educible o a collec ion o pe cep ions and ha i is no cha ac e ised
by s ic iden i y in he sense o sameness o subs ance. The e is no hing simple in he collec ion
o pe cep ions, and bo h iden i y and simplici y a e asc ibed o he sel because o he causal
ela ions and simila i ies be ween he pe cep ions which uni e hem. Con e sely, he e a e no eal
connec ions o ela ions be ween hese pe cep ions ha uni e hem (Robinson and Beauchamp
[1978]). Al hough we saw simila conclusions in Locke, i is no able, Speaks [2006] poin s ou ,
ha he la e does no seem o be azed by objec s being nume ically iden ical o change. He
also se s memo y (o ex ended consciousness) as a key ing edien o pe sonal iden i y, which
Hume does no — he causal ela ions be ween men al e en s a e wha makes memo y possible,

58 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
which he conside s oo agile o keeping as impo an a link be ween a pe son and his u u e,
maybe mo e o ge ul, sel (Speaks [2006]). Thus, he sameness o pe sons is explained in e ms
o psychological cha ac e is ics and ela ions, a he han ma e ial iden i y o pe sis ence o an
imma e ial soul. Vasubandhu, on he o he hand, belie ed ha one’s memo y o an objec is
awakened when a special unc ion o he mind connec s wi h ea lie occu ences and iden i ies
i s objec (Hansen [2016]). Bo h Hume’s and Locke’s iews enjoy a con empo a y ollowing
ha s ill de ends a ia ions o hei a gumen s wi h unwa e ing con ic ion. Bu hey a e by no
means he only ones on he ield.
Joseph Bu le , an English Anglican bishop, is known o his c i ique o Locke’s heo y o
pe sonal iden i y. In O Pe sonal Iden i y (Bu le [1736]) he a gues agains Locke’s iew ha
pe sonal iden i y is cons i u ed by consciousness o memo y. His main c i icism is ha Locke’s
heo y is ci cula : he holds ha consciousness o pas ac ions p esupposes, a he han con-
s i u es, pe sonal iden i y. Bu le [1736] main ains ha Locke made a wonde ul mis ake in
ailing o ecognise ha he ela ion o consciousness o pe sonal iden i y is one o e idence, no
cons i u ion. Bu le [1736] does no ocus on he con inui y o consciousness in he way ha
Locke does, no does he explici ly ad oca e a Ca esian dualis concep ion o he soul. Ins ead,
he emphasises he logical p oblems wi h Locke’s accoun , claiming ha we ha e an in ui i e
unde s anding o ou own iden i y ha goes beyond me e consciousness o ou pas ac ions. He
sugges s ha pe sonal iden i y is some hing simple and indi isible ha canno be educed o o
cons i u ed by a se ies o conscious expe iences. Fu he mo e, Bu le [1736] a gues ha Locke’s
heo y ails o accoun o he uni y o consciousness o e ime. He con ends ha i pe sonal
iden i y consis ed o consciousness alone, as Locke sugges s, we would ha e a new pe son wi h
each new conscious hough . This, Bu le [1736] holds, goes agains ou in ui i e unde s anding
o pe sonal iden i y as some hing ha pe sis s ac oss ime.
On ano he side o he galaxy, Jacob Be ge w o e A Dilemma o he Soul Theo y o Pe sonal
Iden i y (Be ge [2016]). He s ayed a li le a he om Locke and in o he sys em o soul heo y,
o which Bu le adhe ed. Soul heo y explains, acco ding o Be ge [2016], he pe sis ence o
pe sonal iden i y wi h non-physical souls ha appea o occupy he space le by he mind.
An example o a soul in he sense he discusses would be he Hindu concep o ¯
A man: an
59
e e nal spi i ual co e o a pe son, independen o he body and pa icula ised in e es s —i is
also close o he Pla onic soul. Among o he p oposals, Richa d G an ille Swinbu ne’s idea o
indi isible, unchanging souls ha may ake on di e en p ope ies o e ime no only echoes
Pla o’s Phaedo’s (Chu ch [1954]) immu able and me aphysically simple souls (wi hou pa s):
i mi o s he idea we saw wi h Clay, Da id and Golia h (§2.2): in his case, he soul is always
Clay, simply aking on di e en shapes. Be ge [2016] con ends wi h i h ough a dilemma:
i souls change o e ime, hen he cen al ques ion o pe sonal iden i y emains unsol ed. I
hey emain impe ious o ime, hen soul heo y can, a bes , deal only pa ially wi h pe sonal
iden i y since i would be unable o explain why souls ela e o pa icula bodies o e ime. He
concludes ha i is no be e han bodily o psychological heo ies o con inui y, such as hose
o Bu le o Locke.
A hough expe imen by Locke [1689] o illus a e ha he body (and he soul) is no he
p ope c i e ion o pe sonal iden i y may be wo h con as ing he e. He p esen ed us wi h a
p ince and a cobble whose minds adically change un il he p ince’s body beha es like he
cobble and ice e sa. A common in ui ion is ha he p ince is now inhabi ing he cobble ’s
body, Be ge [2016] w i es —les we hink he cobble has simply gone mad. On op o ha , i
he soul o he p ince emains in he p ince’s body, as one migh assume, hen he soul heo y
would seem o deli e he w ong esul — hus, Be ge [2016] no es, he soul is no a p ope
c i e ion ei he . This is suppo ed by Leibniz’s King o China example, in which mos would
e use o ans e hei soul o ano he body, which would keep all i s physical and psychological
capabili ies. Shoemake explains i by saying ha ou p ac ical conce ns ypically ack ou
psychological o bodily ea u es, no wha e e soul ea u es we may ha e.
Bu ou in e s ella a els a e a om o e —le us now mo e on o ano he cons ella ion
o issues. In §2.3 we encoun e ed he p oblem o he many, o which we ook he wo ds o
Bax e (Bax e [1988a]) and Wallace (Wallace [2011a], Wallace [2011b]). In Ma e ial Beings
(Van Inwagen [1990]), ci ed as one o he mos in luen ial wo ks on me aphysics o he la e
20 h cen u y, Van Inwagen es ic s he special composi ion ques ion —when some indi iduals
compose a complex objec — o li e o o ganisms. In doing so, he a oids he usual iden i y
pi alls, such as he Ship o Theseus (§2.8). The solu ion is simple: ships do no exis , so he e
60 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
is no p oblem. The issue is ha o he cases o o ganismal ission ha e been o mula ed, such as
b ain-duplica ion scena ios (see §3.1). His easoning has been challenged by o he heo is s such
as Eklund [2002], who inds uncon incing his almos agg essi e de ensi e s u abou being he
only non-a bi a y mode a e solu ion —as opposed o adically conside ing ha no simples e e
compose complex objec s, o ha any simple could. Mo eo e , while he ocuses on jus i ying
o ganisms exis , she poses he should be conce ned wi h why, i no o he complex objec s exis ,
o ganisms do. Van Inwagen’s solu ion o he p oblem o he many is uzziness. He claims ha i
is an on ologically ague ma e which indi iduals make up a gi en li e —one is composed o a
uzzy se o simples, membe ship o which is a ma e o deg ee. Eklund [2002] p omp ly knocks
i down wi h a sweep: he e a e many sligh ly di e en uzzy se s, bu Van Inwagen does no
ge us a ound he absu d conclusion ha he e a e many li es whe e we hough he e was only
one. P oblems wi h his e usal o accep con ingen iden i y (§2.4) p omp ly ollow.
We a e now app oaching he i s des ina ion o ou a els in his chap e —a s a known as
B ain Duplica ion (§3.1). Eh ing [1987] discusses he explana ions o e ed by he o bi ing plane s
we will isi in §3.2 and §3.3: men alis ic accoun s o pe sonal iden i y and, mo e speci ically,
memo y-based a gumen s o psychological con inui y. As wi h mos hings in hese discussions,
in ui ion causes ou headaches. A e all, i we spli a b ain in wo and somehow manage o
implan one hal in o a co esponding body, which o he wo esul ing en i ies (which sha e all
pas memo ies) is now he o iginal being? I hey bo h a e, ha would mean hey a e also each
o he , which is in ui i ely absu d. Eh ing [1987] se s ou o b ing his meddling in ui ion o heel.
Usually, he w i es, he e idence ha poin s in he di ec ion o belie ing he e a e wo people
a e he p ocedu e is he lack o a sha ed consciousness and a common body and he causal
independence o he duplica es. On he assump ion ha one pe son can possess only one mind
a a ime, we conclude ha he wo new en i ies a e wo pe sons. The same goes o bodies.
Ye Eh ing [1987] p oposes a scena io ha aims a showing hese condi ions a e no su icien .
We a e p esen ed wi h John, a man in his hi ies who hops in a ime machine and goes back
in ime o hold a con e sa ion wi h his ou -yea -old sel : is John alking o himsel ? Eh ing
[1987] says yes —mo eo e , he sees i as he mos na u al desc ip ion o he scene. He a oids
di icul obse a ions, such as he incompa ibili y o hei cha ac e is ics, by conside ing hem
61
s ages o a pe son, hus adhe ing o pe du an ism.
Bu ha lea es us wi h he hi d piece o e idence: physical-causal independence be ween
duplica es. The ime a el example does no cu i , gi en he causal ela ion be ween bo h
s ages (wha e e happens o ou -yea -old John will be e lec ed on hi y-some hing-yea -old
John) —bu we ind ha in b ain-duplica ion cases, once hey a e nes led in hei espec i e
bodies, he duplica es a e independen . To add ess i , Eh ing [1987] inally goes o he memo y
heo is s, wi h whom we will become mo e acquain ed in §3.3, and claims ha , h ough hei
sha ed h ead o memo ies (albei i e en ually bi u ca es), he spli b ains can be conside ed
s ages. An al e na i e iew can be ound in P io [1957], which u ns us in o an amoeba. He
p esen s himsel and he eade as being he wo esul ing amoebas a e asexual ep oduc ion.
Aside om he no doub complica ed na u e o his scena io’s in e p e a ion, P io [1957] has no
issue wi h simply conside ing each amoeba a dis inc indi idual, wi h he pa icula i y ha hei
li es can be d awn in a Yshape ha sha es a pedes al du ing which hey bo h we e hemsel es
and each o he .
Humans a e, almos om bi h, imi a i e c ea u es.
(Tony E. Jackson in Imi a i e Iden i y, Imi a i e A , and AI: A i icial
In elligence)
In he ield o A i icial In elligence, one could app oach his discussion om he pe spec i e
o imi a ion, which Jackson [2017] desc ibes as a pu pose ul c ea ion ha looks o sounds like
some hing else ha is no an imi a ion. Tu ing [1950] himsel used he e m in desc ibing
wha would come o be known as Tu ing’s Tes : his imi a ion game. Imi a ion is so pe asi e in
humans and animals alike, Jackson [2017] w i es, ha e en A is o le in e ed ha i is some hing
like an ins inc o ou na u e: we imi a e acial exp essions, oices, mo emen s, and emo ional
s a es. Ou disposi ion o imi a e is so s ong, so au oma ic o unconscious, ha no doing i
is he excep ion, and i becomes an unconscious cons i uen o ou conscious iden i ies. Human
iden i y is, e en on he le el o neu obiology, an imi a i e iden i y. The his o y o much o
Wes e n a has ba elled owa d pho og aphic ealism, which Jackson [2017] hinks is ela ed
o ou inna e ascina ion wi h s o ies in ol ing wha he calls o e -imi a ion.
62 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
So, i should come as no su p ise ha we ended up d eaming o c ea ing some hing ha
would imi a e us pe ec ly, e en a he isk o misbelie —a pe il ha Jackson [2017] links wi h
i s enjoymen . This is he same eason we like o wa ch magic shows. Humani y began by
sculp ing ealis ic humans, kep he d eam ali e wi h anima onics, and is now eaching o he
p omise o A i icial In elligence. Bu his pu sui comes wi h a h ea . Jackson [2017] wa ns o
he possibili y o being so success ul ha we canno ell i is an imi a ion. This is a p o ound
dange , he w i es, no jus a he le el o psychology, bu a he le el o on ology: he s a us o
ou being as en i ies in he wo ld.
These a e, o cou se, jus a ew o he many p oposals on his opic. We will explo e addi ional
pe spec i es in he ollowing sec ions.
To conclude he in oduc ion o his chap e , I d aw upon he cha ac e s om John Pe y’s
A Dialogue on Pe sonal Iden i y and Immo ali y (Pe y [1977]): G e chen Wei lob, a a ally
wounded philosophy p o esso , engages in con e sa ion wi h Sam Mille , a chaplain and iend,
and Da e Cohen, one o he o me s uden s. Wei lob, a seasoned ealis , bo h encou ages and
en e ains Mille ’s a emp s o pe suade he o he possibili y o an a e li e. Thei discussion will
se e as a summa ion and inal expansion o he ideas in hese pages as we p epa e o di e in o
he i s sec ion o he chap e . The i s wo nigh s ocus on he philosophe and he chaplain,
while he hi d ea u es a speci ic case o a b ain ansplan discussed by all h ee cha ac e s. I
is no un il he end o he second nigh ha Cohen akes he loo . Wei lob gi es ye ano he
de ini ion o pe sonal iden i y as he dialogue akes ligh : i is a ela ionship ha encompasses
bo h he an icipa ion o a u u e sel who will con inue o expe ience li e and he memo y ha
p ese es and accoun s o he pe son one was in he pas . This may ing a Lockean bell i
we unde s and his empo al s e ching as a consciousness eaching o bo h he u u e and he
pas . I will also come back in he nex chap e , on Cul u al Iden i y (§4).
Mo eo e , as we saw wi h Deu sch [1997] in §2, a dis inc ion is made be ween iden ical in he
sense o simila i y (howe e exac ) and iden ical in he sense o sha ing an iden i y. A pe son
being mo e han a body is hen discussed —and amongs he soul, sel , o mind, consciousness
a ises, as i Locke we e uly being esu ec ed. His same a gumen is used by Wei lob (a.k.a,
Pe y) on he insu iciency o he soul (Ca esian imma e ial subs ance) in ma e s o iden i y.

63
Wi hou ce ain y abou he co ela ion be ween a body and a soul (he e comes he dilemma we
saw wi h Be ge [2016]), i canno be es ablished as ac . This seems o ha e a s ong la ou
o expe imen alism1. Though i is suppo ed by he subjec i e expe ience o ha ing he same
iden i y (and soul), which is hen gene alised, he issues do no seem o be add essed. No is an
obse able link es ablished be ween body and soul: he simila i y o psychological cha ac e is ics
(a pe son’s a ibu es, belie s, memo ies, p ejudices), he esponsibili y o which is laid on he
soul o mind. Bu jus as a i e ’s wa e can be di e en while i s simila s a es a e enough o
iden i y he same i e , he di e en s a es o mind do no equi e he iden i y o he mind. So
he objec ion s ill s ands: whe he hey exis o no , Pe y [1977] w i es Wei lob, clinching he
a gumen ha imma e ial souls a e i ele an o pe sonal iden i y.
To u he complica e hings, composi ion as iden i y (see §2.3) is b ough o he mix: iden-
i y s a emen s o an objec o a ce ain kind in ol e judgmen s as o hei pa s being connec ed
in a ce ain way. So, he iden i y o pe sons is no jus he body, he soul o he mind —i is a
whole composed o s e ches o pe son-s ages, o consciousness. Wi h his, we ha e mo ed o he
e i o y o Fou Dimensionalism (§2.5), which was somewha p eceded by Locke’s s e ching
consciousness. In he end, Pe y [1977]’s cha ac e s ind hemsel es los in he mode n issue
o ci cula i y —which we will u he discuss in §3.1. This leads o Cohen (who has inally
a i ed) de ending ha pe sonal iden i y can be explained in e ms o memo y, which we will
discuss u he in §3.3. Memo y, howe e , is no su icien i duplica es canno be iden ical o
he o iginal pe son. And e en i one we e o a gue ha i would be su icien as long as he e
was only one con inua ion, hen iden i y would be based on uniqueness, which is ex insic o he
pe son. We will sa e Pe y [1977]’s hi d nigh o §3.1.
Bu be o e we go any u he , he e is a disclaime . This chap e p esen s many ideas and
examples ha we migh e en ind absolu ely p epos e ous, in o de o p o e a p omising heo y
w ong. This is a p oduc o he ex emely high expec a ions philosophe s ha e o he concep
o pe sonal iden i y: i is no ha hey wan i o i ou cu en unde s anding and possible
edge cases o iden i y, bu ha hey wan i o be a uni e sal concep . Uni e sali y implies
1Expe imen al philosophy, which emphasised empi ical obse a ion and con olled expe imen s, was gaining
g ound as an app oach o na u al science in Locke’s ime. Locke himsel was an ad oca e o his app oach, hough
his iews on he ma e had hei own dis inc ions. Fo example, he emphasised senso y expe ience as he sou ce
o all ideas (Go don-Ro h [2020]).
64 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
blanke applicabili y, whe he he ecipien is a Ma ian, a ime a elle , a clone, o hal a b ain
in an alien body. As such, an a gumen ha migh ee in o many-wo lds discou se (§2.5) o
s aigh -up science ic ion will be commonplace, pe haps e en di icul o ollow a imes, and
no o be aken ligh ly.
3.1 B ain duplica ion agains pe sonal iden i y
Pe y [1977] p esen s us wi h a di icul scena io on he hi d nigh , aken om Ba ba a Ha is’
1977 book Who is Julia?. Julia No h and Ma y F ances Beaudine a e bo h anspo ed o he
hospi al in opposi e ye equally a al condi ions, and Julia’s heal hy b ain is aken ou om he
w ecked body o be ansplan ed on o Ma y F ances Beaudine’ heal hy body, which had been
le wi h a w ecked mind. When ha pe son wakes up hinking she is Julia No h, a dilemma
a ises. Ei he Ma y F ances su i ed wi h d as ic psychological changes, o Julia su i ed wi h a
new body. The o me would hold wi h bodily iden i y; he la e , wi h psychological con inui y
o memo y heo y. Though he wo ld concedes ha i is Julia who e en ually wakes up, nei he
Ma y F ances’ husband no Wei lob does. Wei lob hinks Ma y F ances has simply woken up
deluded, hinking she was someone else due o ha ing memo ies ha a e no he s.
Bo h o Pe y [1977]’s o he cha ac e s, Mille and Cohen, disag ee. Memo y heo y, hey
de end, explains how i is possible o judge as o one’s own iden i y, wi hou ha ing o examine
one’s body. Also, i explains he impo ance o pe sonal iden i y. Bu , o hink he memo ies o
he new pe son we e he ones om Julia, we need o cling o he ac ha i is he b ain. I no ,
hey could simply be ake, deluded, he esul o hypnosis. Bu ha b ings us back o bodily
iden i y. O he s ha e a gued, alongside Pe y [1977], o he necessi y and su iciency o bodily
con inui y o pe sonal iden i y, such as Penelhum [1971], who holds ha i p o ides a public
s anda d o de e mining whe he some hough o eeling o ac ion belongs o he biog aphy o
a pa icula pe son.
The e is a simila con lic o c i e ia as in he Ship o Theseus (§2.8) in pe sonal iden i y,
o en illus a ed by he b ain duplica ion scena ios. Pa i [1984] o Wiggins [1967] a e good
examples o his. They sugges ha i is logically possible o one pe son o spli in o wo bodies,
3.1. B ain duplica ion agains pe sonal iden i y 65
each wi h an equal claim o be he o iginal pe son. As we saw in §2.8, some heo is s will claim
ha i bo h claiman s o compe i o s, ha e equal claim o be he o iginal ( he A iadne), hen
nei he is. On his side, Pa i [1984] a gues ha i one compe i o is in e io , hen he o he will
win and be coun ed as he o iginal. Bu Wiggins [1967] is con inced ha he emodeled ship
is he be e op ion —i exhibi s, he main ains, a g ea e deg ee o spa io- empo al con inui y
wi h he o iginal. Howe e , i is unclea why he p ese a ion o iden i y h ough spa io em-
po al con inui y ( he Aegean Ship) should ake p ecedence o e he p ocess o disassembly and
eassembly ( he Pi aean Ship).
In Naming and Necessi y (K ipke [1980]), Saul Aa on K ipke a gued ha an objec made ou
o a pa icula ma e ial composi ion could no ha e been made ou o a o ally di e en ma e ial
composi ion. So, on he ma e o he Ship o Theseus, i he e could be a wo ld in which he ship
was buil o di e en planks ( he Aegean Ship), ha he A iadne was no dependan o , hen i
ano he ship was made o he o iginal planks ( he Pi aean Ship) he Aegean Ship would no ha e
he claim o be he A iadne. This kind o easoning will be common h oughou his chap e —a
p ope y which could be di e en unde al e na i e ci cums ances o in di e en possible wo lds
is a con ingen p ope y (§2.4). I we g an ha he Aegean Ship and he A iadne canno be he
same ship, we seem o ha e he solu ion o he pa adox. By he K ipkean a gumen , only he
Pi aean Ship has any claim o being he o iginal ship. Bu Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] poin s
ou ha he success is sho -li ed, as i lea es us wi h an addi ional pa adox: suppose ha he
Aegean Ship e en ua es om he A iadne by eplacing one pa o he A iadne one day a a
ime. The e seems o be a widesp ead ag eemen ha eplacing jus one pa o a hing wi h a
new, exac ly simila pa p ese es he iden i y o he hing. I so, hen, by he ansi i i y o
iden i y, he Aegean Ship and he A iadne mus be he same ship. I ollows ha ei he K ipke
[1980]’s a gumen is inco ec , o eplacemen o e e y single pa (o small po ion) does no
p ese e iden i y —which b ings us back o me eological essen ialism, which we saw in §2.3.
K ipke [1980] lees he scene by denying ha his a gumen s appliy o he case o iden i y o e
ime, deeming change i ele an in his case.
Howe e , Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] add, one may suspec ha , i applied o i , K ipke
[1980]’s easoning will yield an a gumen o me eological essen ialism —which b ings us back
66 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
o §2.3. Le us e iew he p oblem once again. Two ships a e made a he same ime: one
sails, and he o he s ays o se e as he piece s o age o when he i s one has o be epai ed.
Which one is he ship? Nei he ? No acco ding o K ipke [1980]. I almos seems as hough he
p ocess o “ epa ing” he A iadne is eally jus an elabo a e plo o disman le and eassemble
i —le us call he eassembly A ianna. And he A ianna and he Aegean Ship a e he same
ship, hen since he A iadne and he A ianna a e dis inc , he A iadne and he Aegean Ship
canno be he same ship. Howe e , his iew is no ee o c i icism: Salmon [2005], o ins ance,
a gues in a ou o he ma e ial o an objec being able o be o ally eplaced wi hou a ec ing
i s iden i y, while o he s, among which s ands Wallace [2011a], igh me eological essen ialism.
Deu sch and Ga bacz [2023] emphasise ha he Weak e sion o Rela i e Iden i y (which
we saw in §2.2) d aws a en ion o he idea ha wo hings may be equal ela i e o a hi d.
The basic idea is ha iden i y h ough change is no a ma e o iden i y h ough successi e,
accumula ed changes — his no ion is a odds wi h bo h in ui ion and he K ipkean a gumen :
h ough successi e changes, objec s can e ol e in o o he objec s. The h ee-place ela ion
o iden i y does no sa is y Leibniz’s Law and is consis en wi h he iew o a ela i is like
Gup a [1980]. Some ha e seen Locke [1689]’s p ince and cobble example as suppo ing he
idea o ela i e iden i y. Shoemake [2008] inds he no ion inde ensible and would p e e no
o ois he no ion on o Locke. He posi s ha Locke’s iew needs coinciden en i ies and ha
neo-Lockean iews need hem as well. Bu Shoemake [2008] sees men un i o being en i ies
dis inc om bu coinciden wi h pe sons. The e is non-iden i y as well as iden i y, and o a oid
ela i e iden i y, he e mus be some en i y coinciden wi h he p e- ans e p ince ha is non-
iden ical wi h some en i y coinciden wi h he pos - ans e cobble -body pe son. Neo-Lockeans
see no issue he e: each pe son is coinciden wi h a human body, and he pe son and hei body
a e non-iden ical because hey ha e di e en pe sis ence condi ions (Shoemake [2008]). Cole
[1991] sides wi h hem o simila easons, as we saw wi h Sea le and Polo, o he case o physical
and i ual machines (§2.2).
A pe son is an a ibu e o a body.
(Da id Cole in A i icial In elligence and Pe sonal Iden i y)
3.2. Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed 73
scandalous (and known) heo ies —i.e., psychoanalysis— hin a his ambi alence. Howe e ,
no o ious as he was, F eud is a ely ci ed in mode n wo ks on iden i y. This may be due o
his ocus and aspi a ion ha psychology be conside ed a na u al science, based on an o ganic
subs uc u e ( he b ain), a he han on iden i y pe se. O maybe i is his pe cei ed disc edi
among he au ho s who succeeded him. S ill, we will begin his sec ion by gi ing Gunde sen
[2023]’s de ence o F eud’s pe spec i es on consciousness, he mind-b ain p oblem, and he na u e
o psychological explana ion a chance.
The mind-b ain p oblem is one o philosophy’s mos deba ed p oblems. Though he was
explici we do no ha e a me aphysical solu ion o i , F eud seemed o belie e ha he mind
and he b ain we e iden ical o mos o his li e and saw he exis ence o consciousness as being
so appa en he e was no need o cha ac e ise i (Gunde sen [2023]). This is a posi ion we will
quickly ind o be con es ed. His o iginal opog aphical model o he mind dis inguishes be ween
conscious, p econscious (unconscious un il gi en a en ion), and subconscious s a es. He poses
ha conscious hinking is he same as inne speech — hus, p econscious and unconscious s a es
become conscious when e balized in his o m. This is a undamen al aspec o psychoanaly ic
he apy.
F eud ne e doub ed he b ain is he subs ance o he mind. Mo eo e , acco ding o Gun-
de sen [2023], he implici ly subsc ibed o a kind o ma e ialism o iden i y heo y which claimed
men al s a es o be iden ical o b ain s a es —mind and b ain as a uni y o be desc ibed and
in es iga ed om bo h a psychological and neu oscien i ic pe spec i e. Consciousness is he
subjec i e side o one pa o he physical (b ain) p ocesses in he ne ous sys em, namely o he
pe cep ual p ocesses — hough, in a Kan ian2 i , he conside ed beyond human unde s anding
why some physical e en s mus be accompanied by conscious expe iences. Bu e en hough
consciousness canno be explained by e e ence o b ain p ocesses, Gunde sen [2023] a gues i
does no ollow ha he mind is no iden ical o he b ain. Iden i y is an on ological ela ion
and does no imply explainabili y, jus as non-explainabili y does no imply non-iden i y. In
his, F eud again shows his a ini y o Kan ian epis emology: pe cep ion does no necessa ily
each he inne na u e o physical objec s. Gunde sen [2023] obse es ha he seemed o back
2In sho , he Kan ian iew on na u al knowledge s a es ha he e is an essen ial limi o ou knowledge o
physical eali y.

74 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
he dual-aspec heo y, which di e s om he Ca esian dualism in ha i does no p esuppose
in e ac ing subs ances bu con ends ha consciousness is an in insic and insepa able aspec o
some physical p ocesses.
Famously, Desca es was adically suspicious o he e aci y o all objec s o expe ience.
Only he sel was exemp om his p oblem, as he hough i was no an objec o any ex-
pe ience. Some compu e scien is s, such as Paul Smolensky, ha e iewed consciousness as a
i ual machine (Cole [1991]), s o ed and emula ed in ha dwa e. Al hough no a dualis , he
does no iden i y he sel wi h some subs ance o he han one’s body, Cole [1991] would ag ee
wi h Desca es ha one migh exis while one’s (p esen ) body did no . Rubin [2003], on he
o he hand, hinks we would be jus i ied in calling a machine conscious he momen i is capable
o esponding o s imuli in a way ha is indis inguishable om human esponses; while Se ano
[2024] a gues ha A i icial In elligence will ne e o m a consciousness o human in en ionali y,
ende ing i a me e algo i hmic ool, dependan o i s c ea o s.
Hume, wi h his unde s anding o he soul, shows a mo e nuanced p oblema ic o appe cep-
ion3 han a simple dicho omy o inne and ou e — he sel is nei he o ex e nal no in e nal
expe ience, as i is no an objec o expe ience a all (Rosenbe g [1981]). In he same ein, Robe
Nozick’s Ana chy, S a e, and U opia (Nozick [1974]) o e s a hough expe imen o disp o e he
claim ha he pu sui o pleasu e and he a oidance o pain a e he only ac o s ha con ibu e
o a pe son’s well-being. Nozick w o e ex ensi ely on many subjec s, and al hough his ci ed
wo k in his hesis ocuses mainly on poli ical hough , —his con ibu ion se es as a kind o
wa m-up o §4, whe e poli ics become mo e p e alen . Now, he p esen s us wi h an expe ience
machine ha eeds sensa ions and imp essions in o people’s b ains. I s use s may choose wha
hey a e o be induced wi h, and when hey a e plugged in o i , hey may expe ience any hing
hey wan , bliss ully unawa e ha he expe iences a e no genuine. He hen asks whe he people
would be inclined o accep o spend hei li e ime loa ing away, ied o an a ay o elec odes.
Nozick [1974] asse s ha mos would say no, and he lis s h ee easons o i . The i s is ha
we wan o do ce ain hings and no jus ha e he expe ience o doing hem. The second one
is ha we wan o be a ce ain way, o be a ce ain pe son. He w i es:
3In psychology, becoming conscious h ough he subsequen e lec ion o an al eady expe ienced pe cep ion.
3.2. Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed 75
Someone loa ing in a ank is an inde e mina e blob. The e is no answe o he
ques ion o wha a pe son is like who has been long in he ank. Is he cou ageous,
kind, in elligen , wi y, lo ing? I ’s no me ely ha i ’s di icul o ell; he e’s no
way he is.
(Robe Nozick in Ana chy, S a e, and U opia)
Thi dly, plugging in o an expe ience machine limi s us o a manu ac u ed eali y. And ye ,
Nozick [1974] poin s ou , he immense pleasu e he pe son would eel o he es o hei li e
in he expe ience machine would be a g ea e han he amoun o uneasiness ha hey would
eel be o e being subme ged. Nozick is showing ha many people ha e he desi e ha hei
expe iences ac ually be eal. And his is, in ac , a desi e ha is comple ely independen o he
no ions o pleasu e and pain. He explo es his in The Examined Li e (Nozick [1989]), whe e he
a gues:
Wha we wan and alue is an ac ual connec ion wi h eali y. [...] To ocus on
ex e nal eali y, wi h ou belie s, e alua ions, and emo ions, is aluable in i sel no
jus as a means o mo e pleasu e o happiness.
(Robe Nozick in The Examined Li e)
Bu le us go one s ep u he . We ha e begun o mo e owa ds ou expe ience o eali y and
o ou sel es in i , which Nozick [1989] says we mus inhabi in o de o be someone. In ha ein,
we ind A end ’s ep esen a ion o he wo ld as inne dialogue (T¨ommel and d’En e es [2024])
and he asse ion ha only hose who ac ualize he di e ence be ween he wo ld and i s inne
ep esen a ion in hei iden i y allow conscience o eme ge as a by-p oduc o consciousness. We
will now ocus on appe cep ion, which is men al pe cep ion o in ospec i e sel -consciousness.
This is no o say ha sel -consciousness is a widely accep ed no ion. As we ha e seen ime
and ime again, he landscape o discussion is so splin e ed i almos seems ac al in na u e.
Beha iou is s, who ocus on obse able beha iou as he p ima y objec o psychological s udy,
end o deny he phenomenon al oge he (Rosen [1974]). Thei jus i ica ion is ha in he p e-
analy ic s a e, we su e om he illusion ha we a e sel -conscious o ha e an inne expe ience.
76 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
They see he sou ces o beha iou as ex e nal (en i onmen al) a he han in e nal (men al),
and u ge ha men al concep s be ansla ed in o beha iou al ones, o elimina ed i no ans-
la ion is a ailable. Bu , Rosen [1974] c i icises, i is no possible o make a comple e o e en
minimally sa is ac o y ansla ion om an in e nal language o an ou e language, so he mos
i accomplishes is o make i illuso y.
Pla o accep s he phenomenon o sel -consciousness ye denies he possibili y o sel -
knowledge (Rosen [1974]) —he ound conund ums in his way he deemed insu moun able. To
Hegel, sel -consciousness is a p ocess o de elopmen which culmina es in sel -knowledge, an in-
e p e a ion bene i ed om pos -Pla onic hough (e.g., A is o le, Spinoza, Kan ). S ill, a leas
some o he Pla onic conund ums con inue o be p esen in Johann Go lieb Fich e4—bo h hold
he e is no knowledge o he sel , bu in Fich e’s sel -consciousness is a i s p inciple om which
o he de e mina ions can be deduced. A he same ime, in Pla o, i is some hing ha may be
in e ed in pa om he ac ha in ellec ual in ui ion g asps o ms, no he sel (Rosen [1974]).
Pla o does no de ine he mind in a echnical sense because, o him, i has no o m o
i s own. A is o le comes close o a sense o o m as ac i i y, bu his noe ics5s ain o keep
dis inc he o m and he mind which has assumed said o m in hinking i . In Pla o, he
mind, e en hough open o ecep i e o, is ne e heless dis inc om he o m i sees o knows
(Rosen [1974]) — he soul (o mind) canno know i sel because in he decisi e aspec ( he
capaci y o knowledge) i is no knowable. Much close o ou ime, and as a eminde o
he in e wining o hough on pe sonal and cul u al iden i ies, we ind E ns Cassi e 6 u he
de elops his idea, emphasizing he symbolic na u e o human cogni ion and how i shapes ou
unde s anding o eali y. Heidegge [1927, 2012]7shi s he ocus o he exis en ial s uc u e o
human unde s anding, a guing ha ou being-in- he-wo ld p ecedes and shapes ou cogni i e
ac i i ies. The e o e, one’s iden i y bo h exp esses one’s ai s and is undamen ally shaped by
one’s in e ac ions wi h he wo ld and o he s.
4Fich e (1762-1814) was a Ge man philosophe and a key igu e in he de elopmen o Ge man idealism, known
o , among o he hings, emphasising he ole o sel -consciousness and subjec i i y in unde s anding eali y. He
was Hegel’s (1770-1831) senio by eigh yea s.
5Noe ic means o , ela ing o, o based on he in ellec .
6E ns Cassi e (1874-1945) was a Ge man philosophe who de eloped he philosophy o symbolic o ms,
emphasising he ole o symbolic sys ems in human cogni ion and cul u e.
7Ma in Heidegge (1889-1976) was a Ge man philosophe known o his exis en ial and phenomenological
explo a ions o he ques ion o being, mos amously in his book Being and Time (Heidegge [1927, 2012]).
3.2. Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed 77
On Hegel’s side, he ini ial disco e y o sel -consciousness in he s uggle o ecogni ion is
con inuously being los , acqui ed, and los again un il he indi idual achie es sel -knowledge.
Bu i sel -consciousness is he esul o iden i y-wi hin-di e ence o he subjec and objec , i
would seem ha i mus also p ecede ha esul . The subjec mus i s see i sel in o de o
gi e an accoun o i sel as an objec , which is he p ocess o iden i ica ion be ween subjec and
objec (Rosen [1974]). I i sees i sel as an objec , as Pla o leads o, hen i is ini ially sepa a e
om i sel as a subjec , and no explana ion can be gi en o he ac o sel -consciousness; i
one ollows Fich e and he subjec sees i sel as a subjec , hen i p esupposes i sel , and again,
no accoun is gi en o he o igin o sel -consciousness. The e o e, Rosen [1974] no es, he ac
mus ha e been comple ed be o e i akes place; o he wise, he e would be no subjec o he
app op ia e kind o be disco e ed. In Hegel, sel -consciousness is he sel bo h opposed o and
comp ehending i sel , and i s s uc u e is he iden i y o he indi idual and he Absolu e.
Jean-Paul Sa e de ends ha all consciousness is consciousness o some hing: i anscends
i sel o each an objec and exhaus s i sel in he p ocess (Rosenbe g [1981]). This is a heo y
o non-sel -iden i y, which en ails ha he sel is no iden ical o i s own appea ance (Jo dan
[2017]). Acco ding o Rosenbe g [1981], any objec o Sa e’s consciousness is necessa ily posi ed
as some hing o he han he consciousness ha is di ec ed owa ds i . I can no mo e ake i sel
as i s objec han a mi o can ake i sel —a consciousness ha is aimed a sel -consciousness
as an objec o e lec ion would be analogous o a map wan ing o ep esen i sel as a map. Bu
a map ha could ep esen i sel as a map would ha e o be bo h a map and i s own e i o y
(Rosenbe g [1981]). Sa e c i icizes he idea, no ing ha i would lead o an in ini e eg ess.
The concep o in ini e eg ess ge s h own a ound a lo . Taking e lec ion8in he comp ehen-
si e sense, Rosen [1974] asse s, i seems clea ha i s p esence is enough o deba sel -knowledge.
Phenomenologis s, linguis ic analys s, and ma e ialis s a i m ha one canno be immedia ely
conscious o onesel because he e o o g asp he sel leads o an in ini e eg ession o p e i-
ous s a es o he sel . I , howe e , a pe son emembe s wha hey we e once like, hey mus
ecognise hemsel es in hese memo ies and hence mus be acquain ed wi h he sel hey a e
in he p ocess o iden i ying — hus, Rosen [1974] concludes, e ospec ion is a special case o
8A cen al concep in Fich e. Re lec ion is p esen ed by Kan as a condi ion o he o ma ion o concep s in
gene al (de Figuei edo [2020]).
78 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
e lec ion. Bu he e lec ion p oblem has only begun o o m be o e ou eyes: discou se, e en as
i iden i ies i sel , is su icien ly di e en om he o m wi h which i iden i ies o con adic he
u e ance. Rosen [1974] claims ha we equi e he elemen o dimension o sel -consciousness
in addi ion o he o m e e ed o as de ining he sel in o de o accoun o he e e ence o
iden i ica ion. Bu his means ha in o de o accoun o sel -consciousness, sel -consciousness
mus be p esupposed. A gumen s like his demons a e he impossibili y o concei ing he sel
as a o mal s uc u e.
The belie ha he mode o being o a sel is an ac i i y —cogi a ione, acco ding o
Desca es— is one ha Sa e sha es wi h he scholas ic-Ca esian adi ion (Rosenbe g [1981]).
As a gued hus a , he exis ence o consciousness mus p ecede i s essence, since conscious-
ness canno exis p io o being. S ill, i s being is he sou ce and condi ion o all possibili y.
Thus, Sa e concludes ha any posi ional (i.e., anscending i sel ) consciousness o sel mus
necessa ily es on a ounda ion o non-posi ional (p e- e lec i e) consciousness. I is a sel -
consciousness wi hou being a consciousness o he sel . T his is wha he calls nihila ion: he
pe pe ual ac i i y o cons i u ing he objec o noe ic consciousness as o he han he cons i u -
ing consciousness. To cons i u e a consciousness as o he han i s objec s is a condi ion o he
po en ial o such noe ic ac i i y, ha is, o he po en ial o a consciousness o i sel as o he
han i s objec s. Bu Rosenbe g [1981] challenges his concep , inding Sa e’s a gumen lawed
in i s assump ion ha a consciousness lacking sel -awa eness would inhe en ly be igno an . He
a gues he e is no e iden absu di y in he no ion o a posi ional consciousness o an objec ha
is no simul aneously consciousness o being conscious o ha objec .
Jo dan [2017] o e s Sa e a hand in his ega d wi hou o e ly escuing him. She a gues
ha an implici a gumen by Sa e claims ha consciousness is non-iden ical —i.e., i lacks sel -
iden i y. Sa e does no simply in end he diach onic claim ha I, he sel -conscious subjec ,
am no iden ical wi h my pas o u u e consciousness —bu also he synch onic claim ha
consciousness ails o sa is y he p inciple o iden i y: ∀x(x=x). Bu his explici a gumen o
i seems weak, as we ha e begun o see wi h Rosenbe g [1981] and Jo dan [2017] ea i ms and
does no explain how p e- e lec i e sel -consciousness ela es o he expe ience i app ehends.
I e a i e p e- e lec ion sees he subjec awa e o i s expe ience and awa e ha i is awa e;

3.2. Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed 79
non-i e a i e p e- e lec ion inds he subjec awa e o i s expe ience bu unawa e ha i is
awa e. I e a i e heo is s de end he e is an iden i y be ween p e- e lec ion and p e- e lec ion’s
appea ance i sel and o i sel — hey a e he e o e commi ed o he s ic sel -iden i y o he
subjec . Since Sa e holds ha p e- e lec ion is non-sel -iden ical, acco ding o Jo dan [2017],
Sa e is a non-i e a i e heo is .
Sa e’s a gumen o non-sel -iden i y has h ee p emises. The i s one is ha subjec i i y
is jus p e- e lec i e sel -consciousness, and con e sely. The second is he mos con o e sial one:
he e canno be a s ic iden i y linking consciousness wi h i s appea ance i sel and o i sel .
I e a i e heo is s a e commi ed o denying i (Jo dan [2017]). Finally, he hi d p emise s a es
ha a subjec mus somehow appea o i sel —g an ing he i s p emise, one can say a subjec
mus , in some sense, be i s sel -appea ance. A non-sel -iden ical subjec , hough i will no be
iden ical wi h i s sel -appea ance, i mus in some way be i s sel -appea ance. Bu Jo dan [2017]
obse es ha he explici a gumen is oo concise o con ince. I seems no o in o m us abou
he na u e o his non-sel -iden ical subjec o he han saying i is non-sel -iden ical: i only ells
us ha consciousness canno be iden ical wi h i s sel -appea ance.
The implici a gumen ound by Jo dan [2017] sees he second p emise changed o sel -
consciousness is non-i e a i e, a posi ion he o iginal one al eady alluded o. Acco ding o i ,
he consciousness o an expe ience canno be conscious o i sel as a consciousness o expe ience.
This has wo impo an consequences. Fi s ly, he non-i e a i e consciousness o he expe ience
canno be iden ical wi h he expe ience. Then, i ollows ha he non-i e a i e consciousness o
he expe ience canno be sel -iden ical. I we assume ha sel -consciousness is non-sel -iden ical,
hen we mus say ha I am my consciousness o he expe ience in a sense ha acknowledges
ha he subjec is somehow dual, in some sense up u ed om i sel . In his, we ha e ound
Hegel again. Jo dan [2017] w i es ha he consciousness o he expe ience canno , as a ma e
o s uc u e, dis inguish i sel om he expe ience — he non-i e a i e subjec canno app ehend
he expe ience as dis inc om i sel . So, he non-i e a i e subjec mus be he expe ience. Tha
is, be wha I am no .
Sa e is bu one o he many who ha e ied o pinpoin he na u e o consciousness agains
F eud’s bes wishes. This b ie ou line o his heo y (and implici heo y) is in ended o p e ace
80 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
he u e complexi y o he discou se on sel -consciousness, which is jus one o he c u ches
philosophe s ha e leaned on o hun down pe sonal iden i y. As his sec ion p og esses, we will
be looking a a ew mo e ep esen a i es on he ba le ield, s a ing wi h a ip back in ime
o §2.6. To ee ou sel es om sel -in e es and ea o dea h, Penelhum [1971] no es Pa i ’s
sugges ion ha we hink o ou li es no as one uni bu as di ided in o he li es o successi e
sel es, he passage om one o ano he ma ked by signi ican di e ences in li es yle o cha ac e ,
o by loss o memo y: a lessening o wha he calls psychological connec edness. Me icks [1999]
opposes Locke, posing ha i pe sons endu e (as he de ends), hen i canno be ha pe sonal
iden i y o e ime should be analysed in e ms o psychological con inui y. He me i s Locke
o his almos comple e hegemony o i in con empo a y analyses, mos o which unde s and
pe sonal iden i y o e ime in e ms o psychological con inui y because o he con ic ion ha
o be a pe son undamen ally in ol es ha ing some a ay o psychological ai s.
Psychological con inui y is he ances o o psychological connec edness, which en ails a pe -
son a one ime sha ing psychological s a es (e.g., memo ies, belie s, desi es, and in en ions) wi h
a pe son a ano he ime in o e lapping chains. This aligns wi h Pa i ’s concep o he p ese -
a ion o pe sonali y, empe amen , belie s, alues, and goals h ough disc e e connec edness
(Penelhum [1971]). I also in ol es a pe son a one ime ha ing memo ies, appa en memo ies,
o quasi-memo ies (Q-memo ies) o a pe son’s expe iences a an ea lie ime. Inciden ally, hese
concep s could also apply o BDI-based Au onomous Agen s, which, as es ablished in §1.2, a e
designed o eplica e human easoning and decision-making p ocesses. Thei ep esen a ions
o knowledge abou hei en i onmen (belie s), goals (desi es), and commi men s o cou ses
o ac ion (in en ions) closely pa allel he psychological s a es in ol ed in human psychological
con inui y. Thus, i is concei able ha a o m o psychological con inui y could be modelled in
hem, po en ially allowing o a compu a ional ep esen a ion o pe sis en iden i y o e ime.
Le us ecall Wallace’s wo m-like objec s (§2.3, Wallace [2011b]), Yagisawa’s s age- idden
conc e e en i ies (§2.5, Yagisawa [2010]) and Lewis’ Coun e pa Theo y (§2.5, Lewis [1991]).
All o hem in ol e Fou Dimensionalism (pe du an ism, he iew ha a pe sis ing objec a any
one momen is no he objec as a whole), which inds pe son s ages in people as i hey we e
empo al pa s. Those pe son s ages a e conside ed ela ed as i hey we e links in a chain, so
3.2. Psychologis s a e also ge ing in ol ed 81
pe sonal iden i y may be sp ead o e ime and hold i s uni y and dis inc ness. Acco ding o Fou
Dimensionalism, a pe son’s exis ence a a ime is jus hei ha ing a p ope pa , a pe son s age,
ha exis s wholly p esen (no sp ead ou in ime and wi hou empo al pa s) a ha ime. In
endu ance on ology, Me icks [1999] w i es, psychological con inui y would mean ha a pe son
exis ing now is ela ed o a pe son a a u u e ime by saying hey ha e ce ain psychological
s a es now, and hose s a es a e ela ed o he s a es he pe son exis ing a he u u e ime will
ha e. So, i is no ha he pe son is ela ed o hemsel es, bu a he he way a pe son is a
one ime o ano he . An endu an is like Me icks [1999], unlike he ou -dimensionalis , holds
ha a pe son’s exis ing a a ime jus is hem ( he pe son hemsel es) exis ing wholly p esen
a ha ime.
So, bo h doc ines ag ee ha pe sonal iden i y o e ime is analysed as a ela ion be ween
some hing ha exis s wholly p esen a one ime and some hing ha exis s wholly p esen
a ano he . Howe e , he endu an is hinks ha he ela ion in his analysis is nume ical
iden i y and ha i ela es o a pe son and hemsel es —while he ou -dimensionalis denies
i . Bu we ha e s a ed ha he endu an is would accep an accoun o psychological iden i y
be ween non-iden ical psychological s a es... so i canno be ha pe sonal iden i y o e ime
jus is said ela ion. The only hope o econcilia ion, Me icks [1999] hinks, will be in a so
o psychological con inui y ha holds be ween a pe son and hemsel es. So he endu an is
makes a mino co ec ion o he ela ion hey de end, and suddenly, a pe son exis ing now
is (unb anchingly) psychologically con inuous wi h a pe son exis ing a a la e ime only i a
pe son’s cu en psychological s a es a e ela ed o hose ha a pe son exis ing a said ime has
a ha ime. Bu his, e en when holding be ween a pe son a one ime and ha same pe son
exis ing a ano he , is some hing o he han nume ical iden i y. I pe sons endu e, no a ack on
he alue o any unb anching ela ion should cas any doub on he alue o pe sonal iden i y
o e ime —and psychological con inui y o e e y so is a ela ion, no ma e wha he de ails
o he sugges ed con inui y a e. This a gumen he eby equi es, Me icks [1999] a gues, ha
pe sonal iden i y o e ime is dis inc om bo h nume ical iden i y and iden i y o e ime.
Me icks [1999] ginge ly dis up s nea ly e e y hing we ha e commen ed on so a and will go
on o o e iew. He ejec s in one ell sweep Ca esian subs ance-based con inui y: i implies, he
82 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
asse s, ha psychological con inui y is necessa y and su icien o pe sonal iden i y o e ime,
bu his does no imply ha pe sonal iden i y is educed o psychological iden i y. He hen
ocuses on he cons i u ion (§2.4), which could se e o explain he ela ion be ween pe sonal
iden i y and psychological con inui y (we u n, again, o Clay and Golia h) as amoun ing o
some hing o he han necessa y and su icien condi ions. Bu his some hing o he is much
oo unde e mined o Me icks [1999]’s com o . Me e necessa y and su icien condi ions o
pe sonal iden i y do no , he concludes, amoun o a genuine educ ion.
To close he a gumen , Me icks [1999] akes a s ab a Pa i ’s a ack on he claim ha
iden i y ma e s in su i al and ende s i unsuccess ul. A s Pa i himsel ecognises in Pa i
[1984], he iew ha pe sonal iden i y does no ma e in su i al is coun e in ui i e and e y
di icul o belie e. Wei lob, Mille and Cohen al eady explo ed o us in Pe y [1977]: i I we e
o be des oyed and a duplica e o me ook my place, should I be pu ing all my a ai s in o de ,
in p epa a ion o an un imely dea h? I iden i y does no ma e in su i al, hen he answe
o his ques ion does no ma e . Pa i [1984] says ha , e en i he duplica e we e no iden ical
o me, i would s ill ha e wha ma e s —psychological con inui y— and I should an icipa e i s
expe iences jus as I would an icipa e my own. As we saw in §3.1, Pa i [1984] de ends ha i
one we e o be subjec ed o a case o ission, bo h p oduc s would be psychologically con inuous
o ha pe son. I one we e o a oid ission, hen one would be psychologically con inuous o one
pe son in he u u e. Bu would his show ha i is psychological con inui y and no pe sonal
iden i y ha ma e s? Me icks [1999] answe s ha only i pe sonal iden i y is jus unb anching
psychological con inui y. Howe e , he has shown ha an analysis o educ ion o pe sonal
iden i y o e ime in e ms o unb anching psychological con inui y is simply no possible gi en
he hesis ha pe sons las o e ime by endu ing. I pe sons endu e, hen Pa i ’s a gumen is
alse.
F ancesco i [2010] ollows a e y simila line o Me icks [1999], bu ocuses on a di e en
di icul y. He shows ha he psychological con inui y app oach —as bo h endu an is s and
pe du an is s ame i — con lic s wi h he doc ine o he Necessi y o Iden i y9, which we saw
in §2.2. F ancesco i [2010] no es ha memo y ela ions a e no enough o link wo bodies ac oss
9The idea ha ue iden i y is ne e con ingen (see §2.2).
3.3. Wha memo y says abou us 89
o memo y bu a cons i uen o i as well. Then, memo y would be a complex men al s a e
consis ing o a concep ion o a pas e en in which one was ei he a wi ness o agen and a
belie ha said e en happened. This in e p e a ion is be e han he las , Coppenha e [2006]
g an s, as i explains why memo y ep esen s e en s as ha ing he special quali y o being in he
pas — he o me explains why we belie e ha e en s we emembe a e in he pas , bu canno
explain why memo y ep esen s hese e en s as pas because i does no ega d he belie ha
e en occu ed as cons i u i e o memo y.
Bu has his las sho back i ed? Does his no ion o p ese a ion no appeal o he s o e-
house me apho , which e en Locke a emp ed o bypass wi h his no ion o mind? Mo eo e , like
Locke, Reid holds ha memo y is pa ly cons i u ed by belie ... ye Reid manages o dodge his
own bulle by insis ing ha memo y is no a cu en app ehension bu a he a p ese ed pas
one: i is no di ec ed owa ds any p esen o pas pe cep ions o e en s, s o ed o o he wise.
Ra he , Coppenha e [2006] explains, memo y is di ec ed owa ds he e en s p esen ed in p e-
ious pe cep ions —because pe cep ions (app ehensions) a e ne e he objec s o memo y; hey
need no be s o ed o use as an objec o memo y. Likewise, he belie ha is an ing edien
in memo y is no a belie abou any p esen o pas pe cep ions o app ehensions. I i we e,
Reid’s heo y would be jus as ci cula as Locke’s, Coppenha e [2006] asse s. The o ce o his
heo y is bes illumina ed by con as o he heo y o ideas, which he so u hlessly iddled wi h
bulle s.
Bu le us now pan ou o his s and-o and ake an o e iew o he whole ield o memo y
heo y. Mi i [1973] explo es Shoemake ’s insis ence ha wi hou he special access a o ded by
memo y o one’s pas , no pu pose ul beha iou (which is cen al o he no ion o a pe son)
would be possible. Mo eo e , o him, he obliga o iness o a pe son wi nessing an e en o
emembe i and he causal na u e o memo y leads o he na u al conclusion ha memo y is
cons i u i e o pe sonal iden i y. Bu i ha means ha i is a necessa y condi ion o pe sonal
iden i y, Mi i [1973] ponde s, hen amnesia seems o inc ease i s le el o dange om li e-al e ing
o sel -ex inc ion: would one, aced wi h he knowledge ha hey we e abou o lose all hei
memo ies, hink ha hey would cease o exis ? I would be ho i ying, she admi s, bu some
semblance o hope o ebuild hei li e would emain. Fu he mo e, he issue o memo ies being

90 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
ue o alse, which we saw wi h he mode n p oblem o ci cula i y (3), gi es wake o he no ion
o a c i e ion p io o memo y, which would judge whe he a po en ial memo y could happen o
no . One could a gue ha he exis ence o a causal chain beginning a he ime o he expe ience
could be enough o know ha someone is po en ially capable o emembe ing some hing. The
issue is, Mi i [1973] no es, he possibili y o memo y implan a ion obli e a es he necessi y o a
pe son ha ing access o hei , and only hei , pas — hus u ning his c i e ion con ingen (3.2).
In a s udy on he isk o using ad anced AI-based sys ems in police in e iews by Chan
e al. [2024], i was ound ha in e ac ions wi h a gene a i e cha bo signi ican ly inc eased
alse memo y o ma ion, as he subjec s we e misled h ough he in e ac ion, hough a less
signi ican (bu s ill e ec i e) esul can be achie ed h ough p e-sc ip ed cha bo s o e en jus
a su ey mined wi h decei ing ques ions. E en mo e oubling, Chan e al. [2024] ound ha
hey no only pe sis bu also main ain hei pe cei ed c edibili y o e ime. This conce n is
exace ba ed by AI-based models’ known ye un esol ed endency o hallucina e o gene a e alse
in o ma ion, ei he in en ionally o unin en ionally. The e is a oubling dange in sycophan ic
AI (i s endency o p o ide esponses ha align wi h use belie s a he han he objec i e
u h), which c ea es an echo chambe e ec whe e use s’ exis ing biases o misconcep ions
a e alida ed and ein o ced. I hus becomes a eal-li e example o wha we ha e ea ed as
me e hypo he ical. This p oblem could be sol ed wi h he exs inc ionis d eam o exchanging
biological li e o coppe and silicon, which would d ama ically expand memo y and change i s
cha ac e o non-deciduous (Rubin [2003]) —bu his would be a he cos o a hos o mo e
complica ed ques ions abou he con inui y o he sel om one’s body o a so wa e ecep acle.
Wiggins [1967] con ends ha o be a pe son is o be capable o belie ing and disbelie ing
hings on e idence, which in u n equi es he possibili y o memo y o expe iences. Shoemake
[1966] adds ha a c ea u e ha lacked he abili y o ha e his knowledge o i s own pas his o y
would be incapable o knowledge o any kind. Bu could a pe son’s memo y o such expe iences
be immune o misiden i ica ion, as i would need o be i i we e o lead o knowledge? Fi s o
all, Mi i [1973] a gues ha no hing is inconsis en in supposing ha a being can emembe an
expe ience wi hou necessa ily emembe ing hemsel es expe iencing i , as he expe ience migh
ha e been someone else’s. Ye , hey could ha e a s anda d p ocedu e o inding ou whe he he
3.3. Wha memo y says abou us 91
expe ience was hei s o someone else’s. I Shoemake ’s memo y heo y is co ec , o emembe
an e en is a leas o loca e i wi hin a ce ain unique spa io- empo al a ea: he one occupied
by one’s own his o y —assuming one has a body and ha body sha es ha his o y. Bu he
claim ha in memo y one necessa ily has an in allible access o one’s own iden i y canno be
co ec , Mi i [1973] concludes, as he e could be wo lds in which o emembe would be o
speci y a ce ain mo e o less limi ed a ea aced by he causal ace —also, he e would be e y
good empi ical g ounds o belie ing ha wi hin his limi ed a ea, no eduplica ion o hings
and places occu s, which would make iden i ica ion o any hing in he pas impossible. S ill,
he e seems o be absolu ely no eason why pu posi e beha iou should be impossible. Sel -
consciousness, knowledge o any kind, and in en ional ac ion depend on memo y. And i is a
leas p ima acie e idence o pe sonal iden i y (Mi i [1973]).
In §3.2, we encoun e ed he ba le be ween psychological and bodily con inui y. Now, we ind
one be ween memo y and bodily con inui y. Fo ha , we go back o Shoemake ’s B ownson:
B own’s b ain in Robinson’s body. Whe e we le hem, B ownson had e ained B own’s pas
expe iences, as well as his pe sonali y ai s. Bu wha i he ins ead kep Robinson’s manne isms,
in e es s, likes and dislikes? I pe sons a e whe e memo ies a e, Mi i [1973] no es, B ownson
should s ill be iden i ied as B own —a memo y heo is would p esumably die on his hill e en i
B ownson we e composed o hal each man’s b ain. Bu he may only eel aguely amilia wi h
he e en s now in his head, and wi h he people ha B own knew, wi h no s ong belie , hose
memo ies a e his —i he e ains Robinson’s ways, Mi i [1973] hinks his o be plausible. Fo he
sake o a gumen , Mi i [1973] sepa a es memo y om cha ac e o ma ion, allowing Robinson
o iden i y as B own while ha ing unde gone a pe sonali y change.
Bu le us suppose some o Robinson’s memo ies c eep in. Wouldn’ i be a bi a y o s ill
go wi h B own, who s ill has mos o his memo ies in B ownson? Memo ies a e supposed o
be uniquely and exclusi ely o he indi idual, as we ha e seen. Mi i [1973] challenges: would
i no be mo e logical o go wi h Robinson, wi h whom B ownson sha es body? And, wha
i B ownson su e ed om comple e amnesia? E en i he g adually gained pe sonali y ai s
simila o B own’s, bodily con inui y heo is s s ill would side wi h Robinson. One could a gue
ha B ownson can be iden i ied as B own because Robinson has in him e e y hing causally
92 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
necessa y o he e en ual egaining o B own’s memo ies. Bu Mi i [1973] asse e a es ha a
memo y heo is could no hold ha because he physical condi ions o memo y a e ye o be
speci ied and, o hem, i is memo y and no jus b ain iden i y, ha is he c i e ion o pe sonal
iden i y. This is an a gumen ound in Pe y [1977] as well.
E en i he we e o egain some o B own’s con ic ions and he e o e belie e he was B own,
Mi i [1973] makes he case ha B ownson could be ed ake memo ies o ano he indi idual
and be con inced he was ha indi idual in he same way. One migh say ha his could be
sol ed by e i ying B own’s memo ies agains eali y, bu he deg ee o his assu ance may be he
same wi h bo h eal and ic i ious memo ies. This migh emp us o bypass belie en i ely, bu
Mi i [1973] wa ns ha we would be misplacing pe sonal iden i y, since i B ownson’s memo ies
need no be accompanied by he belie ha hey a e memo ies, and ha hey a e memo ies o
expe iences o his pas li e, doub would emain. Any hing could be ed o B ownson, as long
as i was based on a ac ual occu ence.
Mo eo e , i memo y heo y had o allow he con e se (bo h allowing and gi ing equal
weigh o mo e han one non-iden ical memo y claiman ), hen i would iola e he ansi i e,
symme ic and e lexi e ela ion o iden i y (§1). Shoemake , o ins ance, ollowing Williams
and Nozick (Nozick [1974], Nozick [1989]), discusses he possibili y o a de ice which eco ds he
s a e o one b ain and imposes i on a second b ain by es uc u ing i so ha i has exac ly
he s a e he i s one had a he beginning o he p ocedu e, he eby ans e ing bo h memo y
and cha ac e ai s (Noonan [1998]). Thus, he genuineness o memo y could no gua an ee
pe sonal iden i y, no could subjec i e belie . This, Mi i [1973] poin s ou , is a e y se ious
sho coming o memo y heo y, which ul ima ely ende s memo y unsui able as a c i e ion o
pe sonal iden i y — hough Wiggins [1967] belie es his could be o e come by a due ecogni ion
o he ac ha memo y is causal no ion. Mi i [1973] concludes ha ou judgemen o pe sonal
iden i y would no be impai ed i ou c i e ion o iden i y was bodily con inui y.
3.4. Ou place among he animals 93
3.4 Ou place among he animals
The e a e wo majo s ands o he his o y o pe sonal iden i y: Locke’s ac ion, building on
psychological con inui y, and ejec ions o Locke and neo-Lockean iews, which ga he soul
heo y (e.g., Bu le [1736]), bodily iden i y (e.g., Pe y [1977]) and animalism. Shoemake
[2008] a gues ha hese eac ions exis only as opposi ion o Locke and ha he ideas would
ha e been conside ed old e en back when hey we e p esen ed.
Animalism, he dominan posi ion in he an i-Lockean mo emen , holds ha pe sons a e
human animals and ha he pe sis ence condi ions o pe sons a e biological a he han psy-
chological (Shoemake [2008]). Thus, i a gues ha pe sons a e en i ies dis inc om animals,
wi h which hey a e me ely coinciden —wi hou denying he possibili y o e en he ac uali y
o non-animal pe sons. I de ends ha we a e essen ially animals, Noonan [1998] adds, which
implies ha o each o us, he e is a ce ain animal, he condi ion o whose su i al is he
condi ion o ou su i al. This posi ion opposes ha o Locke and his ipa i e on ology (§3).
Wi h his no ion o hinking subs ance nowadays widely ejec ed, neo-Lockeans only obse e he
heo e ical possibili ies o a human pe sis ing while di e en pe sons may inhabi i a di e en
imes and he in e se case, which sees a pe son pe sis (Noonan [1998]). As pe Shoemake
[2008], animalism is no a special case o he issue be ween ma e ialis and dualis accoun s o
he mind, which we saw in §3 —neo-Lockeans, hough mos o hem ma e ialis s, admi ha
he men al s a es o a ai s hey de end cons i u e pe sonal iden i y a e physically ealised. We
ha e ollowed a no o ious neo-Lockean in his chap e :
I ha e long been, and emain, a neo-Lockean.
(Sydney Shoemake in Pe sons, animals, and iden i y)
A i s co e, he discussion e ol es a ound he simple obse a ion ha whe e he e is a pe son,
he e is su ely a human animal o human o ganism. The sepa a ion o e ms (pe son and human
animal) is neo-Lockean, hus supe imposing hem —animalis s a e mo e decisi e and claim ha
he pe son is he human animal. This, in u n, p e en s body-swi ching scena ios. Shoemake
[2008] posi s ha Locke [1689] was hinking o men as ha ing he pe sis ence condi ions o
94 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
animals in his denial ha he cobble -bodied pe son was he same man as he p ince. Rejec ing
ha pe sons a e iden ical o human animals is pe haps no as coun e in ui i e, Shoemake [2008]
de ends, as denying ha hey (a leas he males among hem) a e men. Bu i is s ill, he admi s,
p ima acie coun e in ui i e.
One las ime, we go back o B ownson’s case in Mi i [1973], whe e he animalis will claim
ha no human animal su i es he p ocedu e which akes Robinson’s body and B own’s b ain o
c ea e B ownson because he iden i y o an animal is no de e mined by he iden i y o i s b ain
— he same animal can ecei e a new b ain, jus as i can ecei e a new hea , and, as Noonan
[1998] a gues, he p ese a ion o an animal’s b ain is no mo e an amoun o he p ese a ion
o he animal han he p ese a ion o i s hea . They will a gue ha , i neo-Lockeanism we e
o be co ec , i would be logically possible ha one should ha e a his o y dis inc om ha o
any animal. Tha is, Noonan [1998] cla i ies ha no all pe sons ha a some ime coincide wi h
animals would be necessa ily animals, which would ollow ha one would no be an animal.
Bo h Pa i and Van Inwagen [1990] a gue ha neo-Lockeans a e no commi ed o such
a possibili y. Ins ead, hey simila ly claim ha he iden i y o human animals is cons i u ed
by ha o hei b ains, as he b ain go e ns mos o he body in se e al ways (Noonan [1998]).
Mo eo e , Pa i holds ha , in he case o a disembodied b ain, sus ained in a a o nu ien s and
connec ed o a compu e which eeds i , expe iences indis inguishable om hose o a no mally
embodied pe son10, he animalis migh ind di icul ies. Ei he hey deny ha p ese ing he
b ain in ol es conse ing a conscious being, o hey accep ha i does bu deny ha i is an
animal. I he b ain is ansplan ed in o a new skull, Noonan [1998] ollows Pa i ’s challenge,
he esul an en i y will be an animal. Bu i he e was no animal p esen be o e, ei he he
conscious being ha was he e has disappea ed, o i s ill exis s and sha es i s hough s wi h an
animal. Mo eo e , wha i B own and Robinson we e dogs? I could no be said ha B ownson
was he same pe son as B own. As he same wha , hen, would one be emp ed o iden i y
B ownson and B own?
So, i seems plausible ha neo-Lockeanism can also be animalis . In ac , Noonan [1998]
obse es ha he Lockean accoun o pe sonal iden i y (agains Locke’s will) can be hough o
10Commonly known as he b ain in a a hough expe imen .

3.4. Ou place among he animals 95
as an explana ion o he Lockean no ion o iden i y o li e, which, acco ding o Locke, is wha de-
e mines animal iden i y. Pa i goes on o a gue ha in cases whe e i is inde e mina e whe he
a pe son su i es (b ain s a e ans e s, comple e cessa ion o all psychological con inui y), i
is also inde e mina e whe he pe sonal iden i y di e ges om animal iden i y. Al e na i ely,
Shoemake sugges s ha neo-Lockeans should accep pe sons a e no animals, in he sense ha
hey a e no iden ical wi h animals, bu insis ha hey a e animals none heless in he sense
ha hey sha e hei ma e wi h animals. Bu Noonan [1998] poin s ou ha his seems o
imply ha animals, e en hose ha coincide wi h pe sons, a e no hinking in elligen hings,
bu me ely sha e hei ma e wi h hinking in elligen hings —ye animals, and in pa icula
human animals, a e ou pa adigm o wha i is o hink.
As we began o see in §3.3, Shoemake [2008] a gues ha he no ion o pe sonal iden i y
closely ela es o he cha ac e isa ion o he unc ional oles o men al s a es, which gene a e
successo s a es on he same subjec , which will in u n do he same. This builds a chain
o men al s a es and accompanying beha iou s and includes he gene a ion o memo ies, hus
exhibi ing all he so s o psychological connec edness and con inui y ha ha e been hough o
cons i u e he pe sis ence o men al subjec s. O cou se, he concedes, i would seem ci cula o
de ine psychological con inui y in e ms o unc ional oles and hen de ine pe sonal iden i y in
e ms o psychological con inui y. So, he p oposes o simul aneously de ine a numbe o s a es in
e ms o hei ela ions o one ano he and o synch onic and diach onic uni y, which can hen
be used o de ine pe sonal iden i y.
Then, assuming ha men al s a es a e ealised in he ce eb um11, Shoemake [2008] holds
ha we e i o be ansplan ed o ano he body, he ecipien would be he same pe son as he
dono due o he psychological con inui y ound in he e-s a ioned ce eb um. This, we al eady
saw in §3.3. Bu allowing his does no elie e he neo-Lockean om he obliga ion o accep
ha pe sons a e coinciden wi h non-pe sons: i emains ue ha hey coexis wi h hei bodies
and wi h biological animals ha a e no iden ical wi h hem (Shoemake [2008]).
11The choice o e e o he ce eb um a he han he whole b ain ollows Olson’s poin ha he lowe b ain is
he biological con ol cen e o he human body and is compa ible wi h his animalis iew ha he ansplan o he
whole b ain would b ing he pe son in o he new body, no because i would p o ide psychological con inui y, bu
because i would yield biological con inui y ca ied by he b ains em. I only he ce eb um was o be ansplan ed,
he pe son would s ay behind as a human ege able.
96 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
Simila ly, he oo many minds (o , he hinking animal) p oblem a ises in he case o non-
human animals (Noonan [2010]). The denial ha a b ain ansplan , o e en a g adual eplace-
men o o ganic subs ance wi hou loss o consciousness, main ains he same a ional conscious
being applies o humans as well as dogs o wha e e o he animal. Faced wi h his p oblem,
Cole [1991] does no hink i possible o p o e ha he e is ac ually a pe son (Polo,§2.2) who
unde s ands Chinese in Sea le [1980]’s Chinese Room a gumen . In psychia ic e ms, Cole
[1991] admi s ha wha he is p oposing is e y close o a case o mul iple pe sonali ies, which
he desc ibes as ha ing he essen ial ea u e o he exis ence o wo o mo e dis inc pe sonali ies
aking con ol o he indi idual who hos s hem a di e en imes. His iew is close o he neo-
Lockean (mo e p ecisely, he unc ionalis ) in claiming ha pe sons o minds a e mo e abs ac
han he dualis ’s pe son wi h a body —a posi ion implici ly held by Locke [1689].
Bo h animalis s and neo-Lockean a e ulne able o i , Shoemake [2008] obse es. The la e ,
in holding ha animals a e pe sons and ha hey also sha e men al s a es wi h a pe son, lea es
he body oo c owded. Locke [1689] had also sugges ed ha a single subs ance could be he home
o mo e han one pe son i he e is no psychological con inui y —al hough his e e s mo e o a
kind o sequen ial pa ade o pe sons as i hey we e he mi c abs inhabi ing a shell, a he han
a coinciden c owd. In de ending ha sha ing he same physical p ope ies en ails sha ing he
same men al p ope ies, he o me ge s he undesi ed esul ha he body sha es he pe son’s
men al p ope ies, so i hos s oo many minds. Noonan [2010] w i es ha , acco ding o he
psychological con inui y heo is o pe sonal iden i y, pe sons a e no human beings. I human
animals, in addi ion o pe sons, a e hinke s, hey mus be pe sons as well since hei hough s
ha e wha e e complexi y and sophis ica ion any o dina y de ini ion o a pe son would equi e.
Noonan [2010] a gues ha only pe sons a e objec s o i s -pe son e e ence and ha all pe sons
a e psychological con inue s. Thus, he de ines a pe son as simply meaning “objec o i s -pe son
e e ence”. To be a psychological con inue is o ha e a ce ain kind o his o y: o pas , p esen
and u u e. Ano he way o a oid he oo many minds p oblem, pu o wa d by Shoemake
[2008], is o deny ha coinciden en i ies mus sha e all he same physical p ope ies, and so
hey will be en i ies ha ha e di e en pe sis ence condi ions.
This b ings us back o Gibba d [1975]’s example o Golia h and Clay and he pa adoxical
3.4. Ou place among he animals 97
obse a ion ha wo en i ies which a e iden ical in ma e ial cons i u ion a all imes may be
dis inc on he g ounds o hei being modal p edica es ue o one and no o he o he .
Leibniz’s Law (§2.1) appea s o ha e come back o haun us... un il Noonan [1998] whips ou
Abela dian p edica es, which a e p edica es whose e e ence can be a ec ed by he subjec e m
o which i is a ached, and claims ha he con lic wi h Leibniz’s Law is me ely appa en . Lewis
[1971] may be he mos no able de elopmen (bu no he only one; i.e., Gup a [1980] desc ibes
ano he ) o he idea ha modal p edica es a e Abela dian, hus becoming lexible enough o
i Leibniz’s Law wi hou b eaking i . This allows o Clay possibly being squished in o a ball
bu Golia h no being able o, since each singula e m di e s in a sense, and hence he e is
no such hing as he p ope y, which is he p ope y o being a hing which migh ha e been
squeezed in o a ball and no des oyed (Noonan [1998]). Acco ding o Lewis [1971], he p ope y
deno ed by he p edica e in he ue sen ence is has a coun e pa unde he lump coun e pa
ela ion which is squeezed in o a ball and no des oyed, whe eas he p ope y deno ed in he
alse sen ence is has a coun e pa unde he s a ue coun e pa which is squeezed in o a ball and
no des oyed. This could also be use ul o Cole [1991]’s physical and i ual machines (§2.2).
In a simila ashion, he neo-Lockean can answe he animalis by a guing ha , gi en ha
he e is a possible u u e in which a pe son is he dono o a se o ans e ed b ain s a es,
i ollows ha hey a e no essen ially animals. Howe e , i does no ollow ha hey a e no
animals12, any mo e han we may conclude ha Golia h and Clay a e dis inc (Noonan [1998]).
Acco ding o Lewisian coun e pa heo y, is essen ially an animal will deno e he p ope y has
no coun e pa unde he pe sonal coun e pa ela ion which is no an animal when a ached
o he pe son bu will deno e he p ope y has no coun e pa unde he animal coun e pa
ela ion which is no an animal when a ached o his animal he e —and hese a e di e en
p ope ies, Noonan [1998] adds, since he animal and pe sonal coun e pa ela ions inco po a e
di e en coun e pa ela ions. This allows he neo-Lockean o consis en ly main ain bo h ha
pe sonal iden i y is cons i u ed by b ain iden i y and ha each o us speaks co ec ly, claiming
o be iden ical wi h an animal. All hey ha e o do is ejec ha each o us is essen ially an
animal, bu his is en i ely consis en wi h holding ha all ac ual pe sons a e animals.
12No e he di e ence be ween being essen ially an animal and being an animal. The o me deno es a unda-
men al and necessa y aspec o one’s na u e ha canno be sepa a ed om one’s iden i y, while he la e simply
desc ibes a cu en s a e o classi ica ion wi hou implying i as a co e, immu able cha ac e is ic o one’s being.
98 Chap e 3. Pe sonal Iden i y
Pa i holds ha he no ion o pe sonal iden i y does no , o need no , ha e he impo ance
philosophe s ha e assumed i o ha e. In e y b oad s okes, we ha e ound ha he combina ion
o physical p ope ies wi h he expe ience o conscious s a es has adi ionally been deemed
enough o be conside ed a pe son. Howe e , Penelhum [1971] poin s ou ha hese condi ions
ail o dis inguish pe sons om o he sen ien and delibe a i e o ganisms and omi men ion
o cha ac e is ics ha a e dis inc i e o pe sons —physical p ope ies and conscious s a es a e
necessa y bu may e y well de e mine he iden i y o animals. Wiggins [1967] challenges he
Lockean concep ion o a pe son and i s dis inc ion agains animals, which a e ega ded simply
as li ing bodies. He w i es:
Pe son in my use is ce ainly a (non-biological) quali ica ion o animal.
(Da id Wiggins in Iden i y and Spa io-Tempo al Con inui y, Appendix,
5.4)
Wiggins [1967] ea s animal as a so al hype nym ha allows o a less indi idua ed e e ence
han pe son o ho se does. The la e would amoun o a so al c oss-classi ica ion — hen, pe son
may be a concep which only becomes ully de e mina e when one is old wha so o pe son,
h ough u e ances like man-pe son o e en dolphin-pe son, e c. In e es ingly, Olson [1998] ells
us ha E. J. Lowe main ains ha dogs and dolphins a e, o ha e, sel es, e en hough hey
a e no people —a e y compelling example o he a bi a iness o mos p oposals on pe sonal
iden i y. This may be a esponse o wha Jackson [2017] calls ou inna e Theo y o Mind, which
is he mos udimen a y, ounda ional human psychology as s udied in he cogni i e sciences;
ou in ui i e knowledge ha o he human beings ha e in en ional s a es like ou own. I is
he psychological ounda ion o he human animal’s uniquely social iden i y. This Theo y loses
i s balance in explo ing imi a ion (§3) and, pa icula ly, mi o neu ons (i.e., mo o neu ons
which only ac i a e in mi o ing an obse ed ac ion) sys ems, which ha e been p oposed as he
biologically-based in e indi idual mechanism ha enables i o ope a e.
Ha y F ank u a gues ha i is dis inc i e o pe sons o ha e wha he calls second-o de
oli ions, a so o ee will — o wan one’s ac ions o be de e mined by one’s desi es (Penelhum
[1971]). Thus, eedom is some hing ha an animal canno ha e, and only a pe son can. In
105
wha di e en ia es one om o he s. In many ways, Aus in [2005] ponde s, hose cha ac e is ics
a e wha om some pe spec i e cons i u e cul u e. Nowadays, cul u e has de eloped in wo
signi ican di ec ions: on he one hand, as an o ganic and in ica ely en i y connec ed o social
cons uc ion p ocesses; on he o he , as mic o social g oupings, such as s ee gangs o he
ou ing ock band (Aus in [2005]).
As we saw in Aus in [2005]’s quo e in §1, he e is a e y no able issue in he ield o iden i y:
he con usion be ween iden i y and iden i ica ion. This is no a phenomenon con ained in social
o cul u al iden i y — he chaos we ha e od h ough in §2 and §3 could be explained in a simila
ashion, an obse a ion o which Olson [1998] al eady alluded in §3.2 wi h his a gumen on he
non-exis ence o he p oblem o he sel . Philosophe s ha e had he ambi ion o me ge (o a
leas ha e no wan ed o see he dis inc ion be ween) he concep s o iden i y and iden i ica ion,
and his has gi en ise o he ac al ac ions o he deba e, as i a mi o was b oken in o so
many pieces i became li le mo e han shiny dus .
The plas ic ca ds, PINs and o mal iden i ica ions a e bu supe icial ma ke s o an assumed
iden i y: ea u es o cha ac e is ics ha o he people ake o mean we a e such-and-such, Aus in
[2005] poin s ou . They a e wha could be called acciden al (in an A is o elian ashion, in o-
duced in §2.5), o non-in insic, o whiche e e minology coun less au ho s ha e chosen be o e
us. One hing is o ce ain, as we ci ed a he s a o §3: iden i y only becomes a p oblem
when i becomes unce ain.
Aus in [2005] places us in he e a o pos mode nism, which began a ound he second hal
o he 20 h cen u y and is s ill ongoing. I has c ea ed a wo ld o mul iplici ies, di e si y and
change, demolishing he monoli hic ancho poin s o unde s anding he sel and o he s ha
uled in he pas . The pe iod is cha ac e ised by he b eakdown o he g and na a i es, such as
he con inual imp o emen in he condi ions o human li e h ough p og ess. The disin eg a ion
o he no ion o p og ess om he o ex o hope o he human species has c ea ed a oid a
he cen e. Yin [2018] p emises pos mode nism on plu ali y and di e ence —on i s a emp
o ake all p i ileges down and seek a mo e equal ep esen a ion o gende , ace, class, sexual
o ien a ion, cul u e, e c. Bu we ough o be wa y o i s g and banne s, she ie cely a gues:
i s celeb a ion o di e ence does no necessa ily lead o he empowe men o he ma ginalised.

106 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
Plu ali y is only meaning ul when pa icipan s ha e equi alen ep esen a ion, access o esou ces
and oppo uni ies, and a easonable deg ee o equali y in e ms o powe . Howe e , i is e iden
ha hese condi ions a e no cu en ly me . While plu ali y is celeb a ed, i is no ac ed upon
in a manne ha aligns wi h i s p inciples, lea ing i as a oid ges u e.
Pos mode nism eme ged as a challenge o he dominan Wes e n concep o he sel as ixed,
cohe en , and au onomous. Ins ead, i emphasizes i s agmen ed, di e se, and plu alis ic na-
u e. In he pos mode nis iew, subjec i i y is con inuously shaped and eshaped h ough
he dynamic in e ac ions o discou se and language (Yin [2018]). Howe e , while his discou se
o goes he a ionali y, o de , and s uc u e associa ed wi h mode ni y in a ou o a mo e em-
po al and p ocess-o ien ed unde s anding o he sel , i emains deeply oo ed in Wes e n alues.
Pa adoxically, Yin [2018] ha shly c i iques, i elies on he e y me hodologies o he adi ion
i seeks o disman le, which limi s i s abili y o es ablish a uly new epis emology.
Aus in [2005], deeply en enched in Wes e n hough , is also c i ical o pos mode nis e hos.
He si ua es he gene al malaise o his e a in he sense o no belonging, o un eali y, isola ion
and being undamen ally ou o ouch. The ading o he absolu is alues o he Wes e n En-
ligh enmen , along wi h he collapse o ounda ional my hs, adi ional sou ces o au ho i y and
iden i y and poli ical consensus, has led o i . Acco ding o him, in he pos mode n wo ld iew,
he e is no such hing as an essen ial me, no cen ing sel -iden i y, and no in-bo n cha ac e .
The indi idual assumes an iden i y and claims i o hemsel es based on a eeling o pe -
cep ion o commonali y wi h o he s whose essen ial cha ac e is ics can be iden i ied, named and
compa ed, and ul ima ely gi en alue. This p ocess is la gely unconscious, which is why Aus in
[2005] en u es ha he inc eduli y ha o en g ee s a pe son’s coming ou likely de i es om
he pe cei ed audaci y o someone consciously iden i ying and assuming a p e e ed iden i y.
The e is a ocus on psychological consequences o iden i ica ion, which speaks o he in e con-
nec edness o cogni ion and emo ion —Howa d [2000] exempli ies i h ough p ejudices, which
may shape no only one’s own iden i ica ions bu also one’s ca ego isa ions o o he s acco d-
ing o e e yday commonsensical c i e ia, o en linked o dicho omic ela ionships o belonging
o no belonging. Da is e al. [2019] obse e ha iden i y and ela ed emo ional a achmen s
can be a mo i a ing o ce o social mo emen pa icipa ion, d i ing indi iduals o con ibu e
107
o collec i es. C oss-cul u al esea ch has ound di e ences in he pe cep ion, exp ession, and
desi abili y o di e en disc e e emo ions based on cul u al di e ences in he sel -concep and
ela ed cul u al no ms (Coleman and Williams [2013]). This sugges s ha cul u al no ms e-
ga ding sel -cons ual o en p esc ibe wha an indi idual should eel, hough disc epancies a ise
be ween he no ma i e s a e and he ac ual el emo ion. In Hancock [2024], i is claimed ha :
[T]he e is a psychological and social pa which is key: i is us who gi e iden i y o
his combina ion o sensa ions. [...] Ou iden i y is buil om many examples which
may seem weak i isola ed and sc u inized, bu oge he show a ame which will
gene ally no gi e us p oblems.
(Jaime Rubio Hancock in Mocedades, el Pa ido Republicano y el ba co de
Teseo; my ansla ion, om o iginal Spanish)
Aus in [2005] sees social expec a ions as a disciplining mechanism a emp ing o o ce clea
and clean iden i y choices. I also wo ks o cons ain he eme gence o new iden i ies —i is
wi hin he unce ain space o blu ed ha new iden i y possibili ies a e o mula ed. New o ms
and uses o language need o be d awn up o name hem, and so language i sel becomes a si e
o con es a ion and s uggle. Bu his is a ecu si e p ocess, Aus in [2005] no es, since much o
how we see ou sel es is me ely a e lec ion o he ways in which he es o he wo ld sees us.
Iden i ying equi es he simul aneous ac o no iden i ying: o ep esen he sel , one needs o
p ojec he o he . This means ha iden i y is in a cons an s a e o lux and eme gence and
ha i is no absolu e. This i s he conclusions o his hesis and allows o a p ac ical solu ion
o he p oblem, which will be discussed a leng h in §6.
Joseph [2012] de ines iden i y as mani es ed in language in h ee ways: as he ca ego ies
and labels ha people a ach o hemsel es and o he s o signal hei belonging, as he indexed
ways o speaking and beha ing h ough which hey pe o m hei belonging, and as he in e -
p e a ions ha o he s make o hose indices. E e yone has a se o combined na ional, e hnic,
eligious, gene a ional and gene al iden i ies. Acco ding o Joseph [2012], iden i ies, whe he o
an indi idual o o a communi y, a e no a gi en — hey mus o ged ex ually and semio ically2.
2Th ough signs.
108 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
Language is he ul ima e semio ic sys em, and e e y iden i y ideally wan s i s own language. Fo
e e y iden i y, a ime comes when a new gene a ion wan s i upda ed. New wo ds, signs, and
ex s a e admi ed, o en by hyb idiza ion wi h some mo e ecen and ib an iden i y (Joseph
[2012]). Pos mode nis heo is s like Jacques De ida and Michel Foucaul concu wi h him in
asse ing ha social p ac ices a e discu si e since no social p ac ice can ake place ou side he
domain o meaning (Yin [2018]).
Pos mode nism does no do away wi h sel es and iden i ies bu a he di ec s a en ion o
how hey a e cons uc ed, Howa d [2000] ci es. Achie ing au hen ici y and meaning becomes
a challenge when mos human ac o s simul aneously expe ience a mul iplici y o ela ionships
and iden i ies. She desc ibes a concep ion o he sel ha is mul idimensional and uni ied,
emo ional and cogni i e, indi idual and social. Ye cul u al iden i y poses he p oblem o how i
is ha e en indi iduals who a e no dissen e s wi hin hei cul u al iden i y ne e heless possess
agency and make choices hey pe cei e o be ee while a he same ime ecognising ha
hose choices a e pa ly shaped by he cul u e o which hey a e a pa (Joseph [2012]). This
sense o cul u al iden i y can, he e o e, lead o classic de e minism, which is o en de ended
by en o cing a sense o au hen ici y (a e y popula concep in he age o pos mode nism),
which leads o a ull accep ance o one’s psychological and social loca ion wi hin a speci ic
g oup o people, hus ully unde s anding onesel and one’s in e p e a ion o li e in e ms o
he pa icula ci iliza ion ha con ains hem (Loughney [1998]). The no ion o sel has long
been concei ed as he au onomous, so e eign and sole locus o o igin o expe ience, emo ion
and ac ion in Wes e n cul u es (Yin [2018]). The indi idual’s au onomy is a he e y cen e o
he concep ualisa ion and popula consciousness o pe sonal iden i y. In p e ious chap e s, we
ha e epea edly discussed he idea ha ue sel -knowledge can only be gained h ough pe sonal
hough and expe ience. In hese, he sea ch and de ence o an immu able sel ha con ols
ou e beha iou s ac oss di e se si ua ions becomes appa en h oughou Wes e n adi ion. I
has become he ounda ion o psychological li e a u e, popula consciousness, and indi idual
sel -exp ession in Wes e n cul u es. Howe e , his is no hegemonic.
Hegel ecognised ha sel -consciousness in ol es o he human beings and is media ed h ough
social alue sys ems. Yin [2018] ci es Ca l Jung, a c i ic o F eudian psychoanalysis, as an
109
ad oca e o he sel as a p oduc o in e ac ions wi h o he human beings and he en i onmen .
In §4.1, we will encoun e Hannah A end and he speech-based disclosu e o iden i y. Many
phenomenologis s and cul u al an h opologis s alike side wi h his heo y. O he s ha e accep ed
he no ion o he sel as a p oduc bu s essed o he sou ces. Ka l Ma x’s ma e ialism, Yin [2018]
w i es, in e s he idealism in Hegel’s wo k by a ibu ing iden i y p oduc ion o he economic
base. Nowadays, as he ad ancemen o echnology sh inks he wo ld in o a global illage
and b ings people om di e en cul u es in o mo e con ac , i pa adoxically highligh s cul u al
di e ences and social dispa i ies and heigh ens he undamen al need o human connec ion
beyond echnological connec i i y. Yin [2018] pushes non-Wes e n peoples and cul u es o go
beyond Wes e n pa adigms and emb ace hei own cul u al adi ions in hei ques ion o sel -
unde s anding, sel -de ini ion, and sel -asse ion.
Yin [2018] challenges Eu ocen ism and Wes e n domina ion in discou se, highligh ing he
necessi y o communica ion in he ealisa ion o he sel . This way, she says, he wo ld can
o m solida i ies in hei sha ed s uggles o e iden i y and sel -de e mina ion. Indi idualism
is he unde lying assump ion and de ining cha ac e is ic o Wes e n philosophy and mode ni y
— he indi idual’s main conce n is o keep hei iden i y in ac by sepa a ing om o he s and
p ese ing bounda ies a all cos s. Bu se ing bo de s ine i ably leads o neighbou ly dispu es,
which c ea es a i al men ali y agains o he s ha , o ins ance, places indi idual libe y as a
highe p io i y han mo al o de . Pos mode nism wan ed o e adica e he no ion o he so e eign
sel in Wes e n mode n hough bu is s ill e y much d inking om i . No only ha , bu i o e s
seemingly in ini e op ions o indi iduals o dis inguish and sepa a e om o he s, acqui ing new
iden i ies and c ea ing uni e ses o eali y o sa is y hei endless ques o meaning, iden i y and
belonging. This hois s he indi idual’s desi e and pu sui o au hen ici y, which b ings us all he
way back o he so e eign subjec . Acco ding o Yin [2018], he ocus on he indi idual has made
i impossible o concep ualise a sel -concep ha is sensi i e o social solida i y, communal good,
equi y and jus ice. I sus ains and ein o ces he adi ional and mode n Wes e n indi idualis
on ology ha assumes he i econcilabili y be ween he indi idual and he social.
The assump ion ha he indi idual is p io o socie y is unique o Wes e n cul u es (Yin
[2018]). This impedes a Wes e n unde s anding o he non-Wes e n cul u es whe e he pe son is
110 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
hough o be bo n in o a ne wo k o human ela ionships, and uni y o holism is a concep cen al
o he unde s anding o he sel , human ela ions and social o ganisa ions —i assumes a o ali y
(o cosmos) in which di e se and dis inc human, na u al and spi i ual beings a e in e connec ed
and in e ela ed. The pe son does no de ine hemsel es by sepa a ing hemsel es om o he s
bu by being pa o a ne wo k o ela ions in o ali y. Ra he , he unique quali y o he pe son
is endowed by he uniqueness o he ne wo k o ela ions. This p oblem, howe e , has no gone
o e he heads o all Wes e n hinke s. Loughney [1998] deems cul u al iden i y in he sense
ha a pe son achie es he ulles humani y wi hin an accep ed con ex o adi ional symbols,
judgmen s, alues, beha iou and ela ionships wi h speci ic o he s who sel -consciously hink
o hemsel es as a communi y, a g ea con empo a y challenge o many Wes e n philosophical
asse ions abou he pe son, socie y, meaning and u h.
Fo non-Wes e n cul u es, his o ical memo y p o ides a sou ce o cul u al iden i y, social
cohesion, a sense o pe manence amid change and a means o in igo a ing he p esen and
shaping he u u e (Yin [2018]). This is being ipped apa by pos mode nism, which has
sha e ed his o y and memo y in o a non-con inuous expe ience. His o ical memo y is also
impo an in he Wes e n wo ld in ha i shapes poli ics. In §4.2, he signi icance o a egis e o
ounda ional e en s o con empo a y cul u e will be explo ed in mo e de ail. Cul u al adi ions
a e no de ined in a ixed, ancien , o pu e sense. No cul u e can exis wi hou any in luence om
he ou side in he long un. Cul u al adi ions a e p ese ed and en iched h ough cons an
in acul u al and in e cul u al communica ion (Yin [2018]).
4.1 Social and poli ical iden i y
Ea lie in his o y, no es Howa d [2000], iden i y was less o an issue; when socie ies we e mo e
s uc u ed, iden i y was la gely assigned a he han chosen o adop ed. In he p esen day,
howe e , he concep o iden i y ca ies he ull weigh o he need o a sense o who one
is, oge he wi h an o en o e whelming pace o change in he su ounding social con ex s.
On ha no e, le us s a his sec ion wi h pe haps one o he mos o iginal con ibu ions
o he 20 h cen u y poli ical hough . T¨ommel and d’En e es [2024] make a compelling case
o Hannah A end ’s dis inc ion o ac ion (p axis) om ab ica ion (poiesis) by linking i o

4.1. Social and poli ical iden i y 111
eedom and plu ali y, and he showing i s connec ion o speech and ememb ance, h ough which
she a icula es a concep ion o poli ics in which ques ions o meaning and iden i y a e newly
add essed. A end p oposes h ee ac i i ies necessa y o comple e human li e, each con ibu ing
in i s dis inc i e way o he ealisa ion o ou capaci ies: labou , which ca e s o ou biological
needs o consump ion and ep oduc ion; wo k, which builds and main ains a wo ld i o human
use, and ac ion, which discloses he iden i y o he agen , a i ms he eali y o he wo ld,
and ac ualises ou capaci y o eedom —i is a mode o human oge he ness. T¨ommel and
d’En e es [2024] obse e ha A end akes ac ion o be ha which dis inguishes human beings
om bo h he li e o animals (who need o labou o sus ain and ep oduce hemsel es as well)
and o he gods (wi h whom humans sha e, in e mi en ly, he ac i i y o con empla ion).
In he case o Au onomous Agen s, Jackson [2017] ema ks on he impo ance o u ili y. I
he imi a ion human is no de eloped o p ac ical use, we isk de ol ing in o wha he calls e y
anxious sel -in es iga ion—which migh accu a ely desc ibe he ocus o his hesis. Ques ions
quickly a ise ega ding he s a us, ca ego isa ion, and iden i ica ion o Au onomous Agen s as
en i ies, as well as hei legal, mo al, sexual, e hical, and gene al esponsibili ies —especially i
we dep i e A i icial In elligence o i s ole as a me e p ac ical o p o i able ool o as a scien i ic
endea ou . The p ac icali y o his camou lage, as Jackson [2017] pu s i , has none heless been
se aside in his wo k in o de o add ess hese challenging ques ions.
Acco ding o A end , ac ion is p ima ily symbolic: he web o human ela ionships is sus-
ained by communica i e in e ac ion. Thus, speech a icula es he meaning o ac ions and
coo dina es agen s’ ac ions. Con e sely, speech implies ac ion, no only in he sense ha speech
i sel is a o m o ac ion o ha mos ac s a e pe o med h ough speech, bu ha ac ion is how
we check he speake ’s since i y (T¨ommel and d’En e es [2024]). One o i s cen al unc ions is
he disclosu e o he agen ’s iden i y. In ac ion and speech, A end main ains, indi iduals e eal
hemsel es as unique indi iduals and e eal hei dis inc pe sonali ies o he wo ld. One o he
main d awbacks o ac ion is i s agili y, i s suscep ibili y o he e osion o ime and o o ge -
ulness. Bu ememb ance alone, he e elling o deeds as s o ies, can sa e he li es and deeds
o ac o s om obli ion and u ili y, hus enabling hese ac s o become sou ces o inspi a ion o
he u u e — ha is, models o be imi a ed, and, i possible, su passed. This e lec ion we will
112 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
see mi o ed in §4.2. The unc ion o he s o y elle is hus c ucial no only o he p ese a ion
o he doings and sayings o ac o s bu also o he ull disclosu e o he ac o ’s iden i y (T¨ommel
and d’En e es [2024]).
Iden i y heo y s udies how indi iduals o ganise iden i y meanings, enac hem in social
si ua ions, and espond o iden i y- ele an eedback (Da is e al. [2019]). Iden i ies, which
Da is e al. [2019] desc ibe as in e nalised meanings a ached o he sel as a unique pe son,
a ole, and a g oup membe , a e placed in o h ee o e lapping bases: pe son, ole, and g oup
and social. G oup iden i y e e s o membe ship in a communi y, while social iden i y poin s o
s a us ca ego ies, placing one wi hin he b oade social s uc u e. T¨ommel and d’En e es [2024]
w i e ha one o he c ucial issues a s ake in poli ical discou se is he c ea ion o a collec i e
iden i y o appeal o when aced wi h he p oblem o choosing be ween al e na i e cou ses o
ac ion. Since he e is always disag eemen on ha on , he iden i y o he communi y ha is
going o be c ea ed h ough each al e na i e becomes cen al. In his espec , poli ical ac ion
and discou se a e essen ial o he cons i u ion o collec i e iden i ies —a s uggling p ocess o
cons an enego ia ion, in which ac o s a icula e and de end compe ing concep ions o cul u al
and poli ical iden i y. A end ’s pa icipa o y concep ion o ci izenship is pa icula ly ele an
in his con ex since i a icula es he condi ions o he es ablishmen o collec i e iden i ies
(T¨ommel and d’En e es [2024]). Once ci izenship is iewed as he p ocess o ac i e delibe a ion
abou compe ing iden i ies, i s alue esides in he possibili y o es ablishing o ms o collec i e
iden i y ha can be acknowledged, es ed, and ans o med in a discu si e and democ a ic
ashion. Acco ding o A end , one’s e hnic, eligious, o acial iden i y was i ele an o one’s
iden i y as a ci izen and should ne e be he basis o membe ship in a poli ical communi y.
Iden i y is a key mechanism h ough which social mo emen s ope a e. In he wo ds o Da is
e al. [2019], ad ances in digi al me hods a e pa icula ly ele an o he social psychology o
inc easingly complex social mo emen s —social media can p o ide a ga eway o ac i ism and
collec i e iden i y o ma ion. Social iden i y heo y is conce ned wi h iden i y p ocesses h ough
dynamics wi hin and be ween g oups, wi h a en ion o s e eo yping, con lic , con o mi y, cohe-
sion, leade ship and o ganisa ional beha iou . Da is e al. [2019] see building b idges be ween
iden i y heo y and social iden i y heo y as a key s ep in cons uc ing a gene al heo y o he
4.1. Social and poli ical iden i y 113
sel . Collec i e iden i y is a special case o social iden i y heo y, which ocuses on iden i y as i
ela es o social mo emen s. Bo h iden i y heo y and collec i e iden i y heo y ecognise social
s uc u es, si ua ions, and ne wo ks as in eg al o iden i y p ocesses.
Social cogni ion and symbolic in e ac ion a e wo o he adi ional p e ailing pe spec i es
in sociological social psychology —a heo y o how we s o e and p ocess in o ma ion. I has
oo s in psychology and he eliance on expe imen al labo a o y me hodologies, unde lining
social cogni i e heo ies o iden i y (Howa d [2000]). Cogni i e schemas, which a e abs ac and
o ganised packages o in o ma ion, a e he cogni i e e sion o iden i ies, and hey can be o
onesel o o g oups (analogous o s e eo ypes, hey include o ganised in o ma ion abou social
posi ions and s a i ica ion s a u es). They allow us o summa ise and educe in o ma ion o
key elemen s, bu hey also en ail losing po en ially aluable in o ma ion. Mo eo e , hey end
o be accompanied by means o quali a i e ca ego isa ion and se e as explana o y se ices
and jus i ica ions o social ela ionships — hus, social iden i ies a e embedded in sociopoli ical
con ex s.
Cogni i e p ocesses a e also implica ed in cons uc ing, main aining, and changing iden i ies.
A ibu ion p ocesses (judgemen s o blame, causali y, esponsibili y) a e pa icula ly ele an —
and also biased based on in e g oup iden i ica ion and allegiances. Howa d [2000] ci es a heo y
by which knowledge s uc u es would be collec i ely sha ed, hus inc easing he emphasis on
social p ocesses and opening he doo o a con inuing ecas ing o social schemas as mo e lexible
and mo e g ounded in social in e ac ion. This highligh s he in e winemen o cogni i e and
in e ac ional p ocesses, which leads o he use o iden i y managemen s a egies o manipula e
g oup compa isons o pu poses o social iden i ica ion. Coleman and Williams [2013] de ine
he sel as a unique, iden i y- ele an se o a i udes, beha iou s, and belie s ha p o ide
in o ma ion abou wha o do in enac ing ha iden i y, as well as speci ic disc e e emo ion
p o iles ha , in u n, p o ide in o ma ion abou wha o eel. Social iden i ies a e aspec s
o he sel -concep de i ed om knowledge s uc u es con aining ai s, a i udes, beha iou s,
and goals ele an o a social ca ego y. These iden i ies p o ide cohe ence and allow people’s
e e yday ac ions o be unde s ood and uni ied. Indi iduals, Coleman and Williams [2013] asse ,
may possess a cons ella ion o disc e e social iden i ies. They emphasise he sel ha eme ges
114 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
om g oup membe ship adop ion o g oup cha ac e is ics in o he sel -concep , consis en wi h
he social iden i y adi ion, and speci ically link social iden i ies wi h emo ion p o iles.
Da is e al. [2019]’s hypo heses, which a e consis en wi h wha iden i y heo y p edic s, and
hey la e p o e, is ha iden i y eedback ha de ia es om he no m elici s nega i e emo ion
and ac i e beha iou al esponse. In con as , iden i y e i ica ion e okes posi i e emo ions and
a enua ed beha iou al esponses. Indi iduals seek o e i y iden i y meanings h ough in e ac-
ion, Da is e al. [2019] w i e. This p ocess has ou main componen s in a cybe ne ic eedback
loop: he iden i y s anda d ( he se o meanings a ached o an iden i y), pe cep ual inpu s
( e lec ed app aisals), compa a o (which con as s he inpu s agains he iden i y s anda d),
and beha iou al ou pu s (and cogni i e esponses). Iden i y e i ica ion p ocesses ini ia e when
pe sons expe ience iden i y- ele an eedback. When e lec ed app aisals align wi h he iden i y
s anda d, iden i y e i ica ion is achie ed; i he e is a signi ican dis ance, non- e i ica ion is
expe ienced. Iden i y e i ica ion, acco ding o Da is e al. [2019], elici s posi i e emo ion, while
non- e i ica ion b ings dis ess —which is hen in ended o be minimized h ough cogni i e and
beha iou al esponse: in ensi ying iden i y- ele an pe o mances, al e ing cogni i e pe cep ions
o eedback, and when iden i y non- e i ica ion is pe sis en , changing iden i y meanings (Da is
e al. [2019]).
Howa d [2000] asse s ha symbolic in e ac ion is ounded on he p emise ha people a ach
symbolic meaning o objec s, beha iou s, hemsel es, and o he people, and ha hey de elop
and ansmi hese meanings h ough in e ac ion. Because meanings a e de eloped h ough in-
e ac ion, language plays a cen al ole. The in e ac ionis li e a u e on iden i y o mula es he
cons uc ion, nego ia ion and communica ion o iden i y h ough language —a he mos basic
le el, people ac i ely p oduce iden i y h ough hei alk. This, as we ha e seen, bea s some
esemblance o A end ’s heo y o iden i y. Language hus links he cogni i e and in e ac i e
adi ions (Howa d [2000]). Iden i ies loca e a pe son in a social space by i ue o he ela ion-
ships ha hese iden i ies imply and a e hemsel es symbols whose meanings a y ac oss ac o s
and si ua ions. The e a e wo main app oaches: he concep o ole iden i ies, which ocuses
on he cha ac e o ged in pa icula social posi ions, and iden i y cons uc ion and nego ia ion,
which u ns iden i ies in o s a egic social cons uc ions c ea ed h ough in e ac ion. Howa d
4.3. A imi a es li e 121
4.3 A imi a es li e
Iden i y has been a ecu en opic in all human hough —no only academic, bu a is ic, oo.
As p e aced in §1.3, i has helped us sepa a e us om he animals (albei wha animalis s migh
say in §3.4) and o he g oups o human beings, up un il we eached enough g anula i y in ou
assessmen o know me om you o hem. I is only i ing ha his sec ion begins wi h a
legenda y wo k which we al eady men ioned: Home ’s Odyssey (Home [2019]). The ancien
unde s anding o a pe son’s iden i y is glimpsed h oughou he poem in a e y pa icula cus om
shown epea edly: o ge o know a gues , hey ask o hei name, hei bi hplace, and who
hei pa en s we e.
Bu le us ocus on he Odyssey’s p o agonis . When Odysseus inally eaches I haca, he
does so disguisedly: he wan s o e alua e he s a e o his land be o e seizing i back, know allies
om ai o s. A e a bloody massac e in which Penelope’s sui o s and hei accomplices a e
de ea ed, all ha is le o do is e eal his ue iden i y o his wi e. Bu o he s ha e ied o
ick Penelope be o e, and Odysseus has had a knack h oughou his a els o in en ing new
iden i ies o himsel . One o hem, when i s euni ed wi h Penelope. When she inds him
a e he ba le, d enched in blood, hey s udy each o he . She ecognises his ace, bu no
his clo hes, a ed; he cas le’s nu semaid, Eu iclea, had con ided ha he s ange be o e he
ba es he same sca on he leg he husband did om a childhood wound. Bu s ill, she doub s.
Odysseus ge s us a ed and asks Eu inome, he cas le’s housekeepe , o p epa e a bed in a
di e en chambe han Penelope’s. Then, Penelope ies Odysseus one las ime: she o de s o
he own nup ial bed o be mo ed o he oom his supposed husband is asking o . Odysseus is
ho i ied: he made ha bed om a li ing oli e ee and buil he cas le a ound i . I canno be
mo ed. Only hen is Penelope con inced: his is some hing only Odysseus would know. And
so, hey a e euni ed.
This scene, which akes place in Chan XXIII, he penul ima e o he epic poem, p esen s us
wi h a ew examples o Home ’s (whome e , and howe e many, hey migh ha e been) no ions o
iden i y. We ind ha Penelope does no hink bodily iden i y is enough: nei he he husband’s
ea u es no his elling sca (which was enough o con ince Eu iclea, his nu semaid) con inces

122 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
he o his iden i y. I is memo y, o , mo e p ecisely, a e y exclusi e knowledge, ha con inces
he .
We see di e en ideas on he essel o one’s iden i y as we look a o he cul u es. Fo
ins ance, in Ng˜ug˜ı wa Thiong’o 1980 Kikuyu language no el De il on he C oss (wa Thiong’o
[1980]), which ocuses on poli ically challenging he ole o in e na ional money and cul u e in
Kenya, we encoun e he idea ha i is he hea which s o es he soul o a pe son and hus, hei
iden i y. In he Kikuyu language, he wo d hea means many hings: soul, spi i , conscience,
mind, inne man, essence, e c. Back in he ancien Egyp ian Keme ic philosophy, ib deno ed
bo h he hea and he mind, conscience and consciousness, Yin [2018] w i es. I signi ied he
human capaci y o a ionali y and mo al sensi i i y. Though i did no lou ish in he same
con inen , Con ucianism sha es simila ideas, Yin [2018] obse es: he xin is he hea -mind
and bo h conscience and consciousness, he a ec i e and cogni i e aspec s o human awa eness
—and wha makes one uly human. This goes o show ha he hea as he nucleus o he sel
is a concep ion ha has oo s in mo e han one place in he non-Wes e n wo ld (Yin [2018]).
In wa Thiong’o [1980], which I encou age he eade o ead in ull, he main cha ac e s
discuss he p o ound idges hei coun y’s colonisa ion and pos -independence co up ion has
c ea ed in hei cul u e, philosophy, class s uggles, na u e... One o hose issues is he ma e
o iden i y, which bo h in ol es he indi idual and he communi y hey pa icipa e in. This
e lec s bo h Keme ic and Con ucian ideas o he sel , which a e diame ically opposed o he
dominan Wes e n indi idualis ic no ion o he isola ed, embedded, con ingen and ul ima ely
alone sel , as we lea n om Yin [2018] —ins ead, hey see he sel as a cen e o ela ionships,
he indi idual in ela ionship o he pe son in communi y.
’The human hea is lesh and i is no lesh. The hea makes a man and i is made
by man. The hea is bo n by he body and in u n becomes he body. The e is in
man an o gan called he hea . Tha o gan is a kind o engine ha pumps blood
in o he a e ies and eins ha ca y ood o all he cells o he body and emo e he
was e om all pa s o he body. The o gan co-ope a es oge he o make a human
being see, ouch, hea , smell, as e, alk, swing his a ms, walk, s a building his li e.
4.3. A imi a es li e 123
’Wha he himsel builds is he o he hea . Tha o he hea is he humani y we
ashion wi h ou hands, aided by ou eyes, ou ea s, ou noses, ou mou hs. Tha
o he hea is he p oduc o ou wo k and ou ac ions, which a e guided by ou
mind - he wo k and ac ions in ol ed in modi ying na u e o make hings o mee
ou needs, like shel e o keep ou ain, clo hes o keep ou cold and sun, ood o
make he body g ow and many o he deeds.
’Tha humani y is in u n bo n o many hands wo king oge he , o [...] a single
inge canno kill a louse; a single log canno make a i e las h ough he nigh ; a
single man, howe e s ong, canno build a b idge ac oss a i e ; and many hands
can li a weigh , howe e hea y. The uni y o ou sea s is wha makes us able o
change he laws o na u e and ha ness hem o he needs o ou li es ins ead o ou
li es emaining sla es o he laws o na u e. [...]
’Tha humani y, ui o he wo k o ou hands and minds s i ing oge he o subdue
na u e, is wha dis inguishes a human being om a beas , a ee and all he o he
c ea u es in na u e’s kingdom.
[...] ’Tha humani y is he hea o a man because he hea o a man is linked
i e ocably wi h he g ow h o his na u e as a man. [...]’
(Ng˜ug˜ı wa Thiong’o in De il on he c oss)
Keme ic hough and con empo a y A ican unde s anding o pe sonhood ega d sociali y
o human ela edness as one o he mos undamen al sou ces o sel . Acco ding o Yin [2018],
hey a e cha ac e ised by i e dimensions: collec i i y (sel -unde s anding and sel -de elopmen
as a communal p ocess de ined by ac i i ies in and o he communi y), mo ali y ( o es ablish,
p ese e and en ich he common good in he communi y, socie y and humani y; i is cen al in
he concep ion o he sel ), sensi i i y (each indi idual mus hold a ecip ocal sensi i i y and be
esponsi e o o he s and he communi y: eelings a e he basis o mo al ac ion), ans o mabili y
(a pe son is eachable, malleable, capable o mo al cul i a ion which leads o one’s highe sel ;
his is inhe en in he e y exis ence o he human pe son) and inclusi i y (all o none o humani y
is chosen). In ha ega d, Hall [1990] w i es:
124 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
We all w i e and speak om a pa icula place and ime, om a his o y and a cul u e
which is speci ic.
(S ua Hall in Cul u al Iden i y & Diaspo a)
Vi ginia Wool once said ha ic ion was likely o con ain mo e u h han ac . Iden i y is no
he excep ion o his end, appea ing mo e o en han one would hink. B andon Sande son’s
The Ry hm o Wa (Sande son [2020]), he ou h ins almen in an epic an asy saga, pain s i
as an ine i able o passi e o ce which compels e e yone o do wha is expec ed o hem. The
ollowing agmen inds a di ini y-adjacen c ea u e which embodies he s o m:
“Take me cy upon hem,” Dalina said. “Tempe you u y, S o m a he .”
I is no u y. I is me.
“Then p o ec hem,” Dalina said as he s o mwall hi , plunging he ill a ed men
in o da kness.
Should I p o ec all who en u e ou in o me?
“Yes.”
Then do I s op being a s o m, s op being me?
“You can be a s o m wi h me cy.”
Tha de ies he de ini ion and soul o a s o m, he S o m a he said. I mus blow. I
make his land exis . [. . . ] I am a s o m. I canno –
You a e no me ely a s o m!, Dalina bellowed, his oice changing o umbles o
hunde . You a e capable o choice! You hide om ha , and in so doing, you a e a
COWARD!
(B andon Sande son in The Ry hm o Wa )
I is in e es ing how elemen s o he ea lie discussion can be disce ned in his dialogue
exce p . Fi s o all, i e e s o he exis ence o an essence o soul o he sel which de e mines
he ac ions one can pe o m. So a we ha e discussed Ca esian dualism and soul heo y as he
4.3. A imi a es li e 125
wo main schools o hough which a gue o a somewha in angible subs ance which ancho s
he sel o an iden i y. A i s co e, he ex ques ions he ine i abili y o wha he so al concep
en ails o he sel —in his case, being a s o m. So al concep s we e pa icula ly conspicuous
in §2.2, al hough hey kep making appea ances while deba ing, as hey did in §3.4 wi h he
Abela dian p edica es. Sho ly a e his exchange, a b ie exce p ouches ano he ace o he
discussion o iden i y:
“Can we go inside?” Dalina asked as hey app oached.
You may, he S o m a he said. I canno go inside [.. . ]. When a piece spli s o , i
is no longe me.
(B andon Sande son in The Ry hm o Wa )
This seems o e u n us o he me eological essen ialism in oduced in §2.3 and §3: he
unde s anding ha an objec canno e ain i s iden i y i i loses any o i s pa s. Bu his is
no exac ly wha he ex aims o : i allows he la ge sel o e ain i s con inui y, while he
smalle agmen is s ipped o i . This no ion b ings o h a hos o logical p oblems, s a ing
wi h he a bi a iness o choosing which pa o he being e ains i s iden i y, which ha e been
discussed h oughou his hesis.
Ano he an asy s o y by Ma k Law ence, en i led The Book Tha Wouldn’ Bu n (Law ence
[2023]), o e s new hough on iden i y. The i s agmen ollows i s p o agonis as she s udies
a mechanical a en wi h an ab asi e pe sonali y ha se es as he guide h ough an in ini e
lib a y:
[...] we e deba ing i he Ra en was s ill he Ra en o simply a collec ion o i s pieces,
de oid o he eis y, a gumen a i e spi i ha had p e iously anima ed [. . . ]
(Ma k Law ence in The Book Tha Wouldn’ Bu n)
The agmen li s wi h me eology and he possibili y o an in angible ela ionship be ween
he pa s ha makes he whole some hing else han i s collec ion. I he e o e ee e s on he
126 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
edge o he deba e abou composi ion as iden i y (§2.3). This pa icula conside a ion echoes
A is o le’s Book Z in his Me aphysics (A is o le [2018]), in which he S agi i e a gues ha he
subs ance o a hing is i s o m o essence, a he han i s ma e o he composi e o ma e
and o m. He hus posi s ha o m is cons i u i e o wha he subs ance is in i sel , no me ely
a p ope y i happens o possess. I is in his asse ion ha he o m inhe en in he ma e o
which he subs ance is composed is he undamen al eali y o he objec , ha A is o le’s ocus
on inding he subs a e o subs ance ha binds all beings in o a whole culmina es.
“Almos e e y hing abou you changes each ime I mee you. You clo hes, you
hai ... you heigh ... bu i you e e s opped he lood o ques ions, I’d know i
wasn’ you e en i you looked exac ly he same.”
(Ma k Law ence in The Book Tha Wouldn’ Bu n)
This second agmen e u ns o he popula no ion o psychological con inui y —pa icula ly,
on ai o e bodily con inui y. The co-p o agonis o he book is no ing he p ominence o he
p o agonis ’s endency o ask abou e e y hing, a all imes. Howe e , he commen is made in
an endea ing way and is no in ended o e lec deeply on he p o agonis ’s iden i y. I i we e,
we would ha e o discuss he con ingency o his cha ac e ai , and whe he she would e ain
he iden i y i she s opped asking ques ions.
The acclaimed ilm E e y hing E e ywhe e All a Once (2022) explo es iden i y ac oss wo lds
(§2.5). In i , bo h E elyn (Michelle Yeoh) and he daugh e Joy (S ephanie Hsu) jump h ough
a mul i e se o possibili ies ha b anch ou om e e y decision e e made, as well as di e gen
ci cums ances —such as a wo ld in which e e yone’s inge s a e made o sausages, o ano he
in which hey a e me e ocks. This leads o hem mee ing coun e pa s o hei husband and
a he , Waymond (Ke Huy Quan), as well as expe iencing he ways in which hei own li es migh
ha e gone di e en ly. Though a an as ic ilm ouching a my iad o anscenden al hemes, i is
pa icula ly ele an o his hesis he ac ha no once do hey doub he con inui y o hei
iden i y as hey jump om wo ld o wo ld, no ma e how di e en hei bodies, o his o ies, o
su oundings migh be. Thei s seems o be a e y s ong de ence, whe he in en ional o no , o

4.3. A imi a es li e 127
he no ion o psychological con inui y. The ecu ence o his heo y o e all o he s may be due
o i s in ui i eness.
An in e es ing con as a ises wi h he 2023 ilm D eam Scena io, which ea u es Paul
Ma hews (Nicholas Cage), an unassuming college p o esso o e olu iona y biology un il, all
o a sudden, people s a d eaming o him — hey migh know him o hey migh ha e ne e
seen him, bu s ill he appea s in hei d eams wi h an unsu e walk, aloo and ou o place. Paul
goes wi h i , blinded by his new ound ame. Bu he d eams shi o nigh ma es, wi h Paul’s
d eam e sion as he pe pe a o o iolen a acks agains he d eame s, and he wo ld begins
o u n on him. No ma e how much he ies o dis ance himsel om he nigh ma e who bea s
his exac likeness, Paul is unable o sepa a e himsel om a pe cei ed iden i y he had ini ially
emb aced. The ilm walks on a igh ope in ma e s o iden i y: when i i s sui s him, Paul
iden i ies himsel wi h his d eam e sion, hough he has no psychological o any o he kind o
con inui y wi h i , aside o i s likeness —which is no co po eal ei he . When he no longe can
accep his d eam e sion’s ac ions as his own, he ebu s i ; bu i is oo la e, he wo ld al eady
pe cei es bo h e sions as pe aining o one iden i y. The ex e nali y o iden i y alloca ion is
cen al o he conclusions o his hesis (§6, §7), and will begin o come o he o e wi h he nex
chap e ’s (§5) o e iew o legisla ion.
In The Ten Pe cen Thie (Lakshmina ayan [2020]) he issue o iden i y and iden i ica ion
in he In o ma ion Age5is di ec ly add essed. The book anspo s us o a me i oc a ic co -
po a e au oc acy which manages i s ci izens by moni o ing hei pe cei ed P oduc i i y and
keeping ack o hem h ough a comp ehensi e social ne wo k which uni e sally iden i ies each
indi idual.
I becomes he BE-moji P ojec ’s highes p io i y o und a uni e sally accep able
iden i y ma ke o each social media po al, and o de ise a symbol o i .
(La anya Lakshmina ayan in The Ten Pe cen Thie )
The BE-moji p ojec aspi es o be he only ue exp ession o one’s cu en s a e o mind,
5The In o ma ion Age e e s o he cu en e a, s e ching om he mid-20 h cen u y onwa d, cha ac e ized
by he inc easing digi iza ion o he wo ld and he apid shi om adi ional indus ies o an economy cen ed
on in o ma ion echnology.
128 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
communica ing on one’s behal a all imes. Lakshmina ayan [2020] c ea es a e y in e es ing
cha ac e isa ion o i s incep ion, whe e conce ns abou use p i acy and con ol o e hei in-
o ma ion a e quickly dismissed in a ou o wha he cha ac e s pe cei e as a u u e wi hou
communica i e es ic ions: all is sha ed, all he ime. This bypasses consen , o cou se, bu is
jus i ied by he misguided ideal o a wo ld in which one’s iden i y is known o all and in eg a ed
in o a mo e e icien , o e all be e socie y. In doing ha , he BE-moji P ojec becomes an
example o iden i y being based on one’s consciousness, as well as ex e nal ac o s like one’s
ac ions (see A end in §4.1) and social s a us.
As expec ed, he mani es a ions o iden i y discussion in a a e u he muddied by he
in oduc ion o non-human ac o s. Fo he pu pose o his wo k, we will ocus on obo ic
en i ies and A i icial In elligence. Se e al examples come o mind: om He (2013), a ilm ha
ollows Theodo e, a lonely man who de elops a oman ic ela ionship wi h he emale oice o an
A i icial In elligence model named Saman ha, o 2015’s Chappie, abou an A i icial In elligence
obo ha is s olen and gi en new p og amming ha allows i o hink and eel like a human.
Bo h challenge he de ini ion o pe sonhood and whe he a i icial minds migh be conside ed
hos s o au onomous iden i ies, as well as b ushing complica ed opics like consciousness (§3.2).
Among he mos no able is S e en Spielbe g’s A.I. A i icial In elligence (2001), which is he
s o y o Da id, a biocybe ne ic child capable o expe iencing lo e. A e being ejec ed by his
assigned amily, he emba ks on a Pinocchio-esque jou ney o become a eal boy. Du ing his
ad en u e, he i s becomes awa e o he chasm ha sepa a es biological obo s like him om
humans, only o lose his sense o indi iduali y when he disco e s ha he is me ely a copy o a
mass-p oduced p oduc . In he end, howe e , housands o yea s a e he e en s o he ilm, he
is eac i a ed as he las wi ness o humani y and allowed o li e o one day wi h a clone o his
assigned mo he .
A ew hings s and ou om his. The i s is he conund um i imposes o animalis s
(§3.4), wi h Da id being a sen ien , hal -o ganic being, which decidedly s esses he de ini ion
o animal. He may be an example o wha he ex inc ionis s a e a e (Rubin [2003]). Da id
bea s memo y, he same body ( hough no comple ely o ganic, i expe iences change). He has
a consciousness, a sense o uniqueness which is sha e ed when he lea ns o his o igins. On
4.3. A imi a es li e 129
op o ha , he amilial ela ionship Da id i s es ablishes wi h his assigned amily in ol es
him in hei socio-cul u al wo ld; hen, when he is ejec ed and le alone in he woods, he
lea ns abou he li es o o he biocybe ne ic people, becoming an ou side o bo h wo lds. His
iden i y is agmen ed, a odds wi h a lo o wha his hesis has discussed so a . Then, o
he oubles his ilm mus cause o iden i y academics, we mus add Monica’s clone, Da id’s
assigned mo he , whom he iden i ies as Monica he sel , hough his is a one-day li espan clone
o he , c ea ed some wo housand yea s a e he dea h, and ha ing Monica’s own memo ies
and consciousness only o a deg ee.
The ocus on p ac icali y we b ie ly men ioned in §4.1 appea s in Da id’s c ea o ’s ini ial
discou se, in which he ci es he eason o his c ea ion as se ing he human ace in all he
mul iplici y o daily li e. Ano he jus i ica ion o his in en ion ollows:
To c ea e an a i icial being has been he d eam o man since he bi h o science.
(Alan Hobby (William Hu ) in A.I. A i icial In elligence)
Acco ding o Bajema [2019], science ic ion plays an impo an ole in shaping ou unde -
s anding o he implica ions o science and echnology and helping us o cope wi h wha he
u u e holds. Ha a i [2024] ema ks on he G ea Robo ic Rebellion o which he gen e has
wa ned us ime, and ime again. Gunkel [2023] claims i has al eady happened, albei in a
mo e mundane way han he ma ch o obo a mies. Bajema [2019] iden i ies h ee ho i ying
A i icial In elligence mons e s, hough admi s ha he wo s -case scena ios a e s ill qui e a :
au oma ion, supe machine and da a. The au oma ion mons e o esees a u u e in which humans
ha e been comple ely eplaced by obo s. I is a ea ha s ems om Czech playw igh Ka el
Capek’s 1920 play Rossum’s Uni e sal Robo s, which coined he wo d obo o c ea ions o ced
o pe o m he mos undesi able ac i i ies and ends (spoile ale ) wi h a obo up ising and he
ex e mina ion o mos humani y. Mo e widely known is Isaac Asimo ’s I, Robo (1950), which
p edic s ha humani y will e en ually be unable o an icipa e all he unin ended consequences
o ule-based sys ems and will lose con ol o obo s as au oma ed sys ems become mo e com-
plex (Bajema [2019]). S anley Kub ik’s HAL 9000, a supe compu e designed o au oma e mos
o he Disco e y spaceship’s ope a ions in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) is pe haps he mos
130 Chap e 4. Cul u al Iden i y
known cau iona y ale agains seemingly oolp oo au oma iza ion: a e i makes a mis ake, he
c ew decides o disconnec i , bu HAL disco e s he plo and manages o kill mos o hem.
In Wa Games (1983), a young hacke succeeds in launching a nuclea a ack simula ion in a
supe compu e o which he mili a y has gi en con ol o he nuclea a ack plan. The si ua ion
escala es un il he ensemble o he main cha ac e s succeed in eaching he compu e he concep
o mu ually assu ed des uc ion, a scena io in which he e a e no winne s. Bajema [2019] is e y
pessimis ic owa ds an au oma ed u u e: she p edic s massi e job loss, socie al un es , iolen
con lic . She hen goes on o explo e he e i ying momen when machine in elligence could
ma ch and su pass human in elligence, gi ing ise o supe machines. The Te mina o (1984)
and The Ma ix (1999) a e g ea , i mly secu ed in he pop cul u e sphe e, exp essions o ha
ea . The o me p esen s a machine in elligence u ned sen ien called Skyne which iden i ies
humani y as a h ea in he nea u u e and se s o o elimina e i . The la e imagines a u u e
in which machines won he wa and humani y was educed o o ganic ba e ies.
Bu Bajema [2019] ea s he da a mons e he mos : a h ee-headed beas composed o he
In e ne , digi alisa ion, and algo i hms. She c i icises he ecen end o poli ical spin, ou igh
lies, and allega ions o ake news, which has only wo sened since she w o e he ci ed chap e . She
wa ns abou moni o ing, su eillance, and su ende ing ou own da a —and how his leads o
p edic i e con ol. The ilm (and he 1956 book o he same name by Philip K. Dick) Mino i y
Repo (2002) is a g ea example o such a p ac ice aken o an ex eme ha now seems less
and less a - e ched: a wo ld in which c ime is p edic ed and no esponded o, so ha c iminals
a e a es ed be o e hey commi any c ime. This, as he s o y goes, is a lawed sys em —we
need only look a a scena io ha alls close o e e yday li e, wi h online shops sc ambling o
p edic ou e e y need jus om p e ious ac i i y. We migh all ag ee ha mos o he ime
his au oma ed cu a ion misses he ma k. S ill, Bajema [2019] is s ill hope ul: she p edic s ha
human adap abili y, ingenui y, and esilience may be able o slay hem be o e hey g ow oo
much in powe . The ollowing chap e isi s one o he longes -s anding ba le on s in his
s uggle: egula ion.
5.1. Legisla i e iangula ion 137
The law, known as Unlaw ul P oduc ion O Dis ibu ion O Ce ain Sexually Explici Videos,
speci ies he scope o he penal y i egula es by s a ing:
A pe son commi s an o ence i , wi hou he e ec i e consen o he pe son appea ing
o be depic ed, he pe son knowingly p oduces o dis ibu es by elec onic means a
deep ake ideo ha appea s o depic he pe son wi h he pe son’s in ima e pa s
exposed o engaged in sexual conduc .
(Tex. Pen. Code §21.165)
A he ede al le el, he Deep ake Task Fo ce Ac (Homeland Secu i y and Go e nmen al
A ai s, Sena e: [2021]) and o he p oposed egula ions e lec g owing conce n abou he na ional
secu i y implica ions o deep akes.
China has aken a unique app oach in add essing he challenges o he In o ma ion Age: i has
implemen ed a comp ehensi e app oach o digi al iden i y h ough hei Real-Name Regis a ion
laws (Lee and Liu [2016]), which equi e indi iduals o link hei online ac i i ies, including social
media accoun s and mobile se ices, o hei legal iden i ies. Al hough his g ea ly educes online
anonymi y, China is p io i ising collec i e secu i y and social ha mony o e indi idual p i acy
in he digi al ealm. This app oach is consis en wi h China’s b oade go e nance philosophy,
which o en places socie al in e es s abo e indi idual ones. The digi al iden i y amewo k is
pa o a b oade s a egy ha includes he Social C edi Sys em (Kobie [2019]), which u he
in eg a es pe sonal da a in o s a e go e nance. The sys em aims o p omo e us wo hiness
and in eg i y in socie y by incen i ising posi i e beha iou s and discou aging nega i e ones.
China has implemen ed a comp ehensi e app oach o digi al iden i y h ough i s Real-Name
Regis a ion laws (Lee and Liu [2016]), which equi e indi iduals o link hei online ac i i ies,
including social media accoun s and mobile se ices, o hei legal iden i ies. I e lec s China’s
p io i iza ion o social s abili y and na ional secu i y in i s go e nance model: he go e nmen
signi ican ly educes online anonymi y, emphasizing collec i e secu i y and social ha mony o e
indi idual p i acy in he digi al sphe e. This app oach aligns wi h China’s b oade go e nance
philosophy, which o en p io i izes socie al in e es s o e indi idual igh s.

138 Chap e 5. Legal Iden i y
The digi al iden i y amewo k is pa o a la ge s a egy ha includes he Social C edi Sys-
em (Kobie [2019]), which u he in eg a es pe sonal da a in o s a e go e nance. This sys em
aims o p omo e us wo hiness and in eg i y in socie y by incen i izing posi i e beha iou s
and discou aging nega i e ones, e lec ing China’s emphasis on social o de and collec i e e-
sponsibili y. This app oach o digi al go e nance ep esen s China’s unique pa h in add essing
he challenges o he in e ne age, balancing echnological ad ancemen wi h social s abili y in
a way ha e lec s i s cul u al and poli ical con ex .
Howe e , in 2021 he Pe sonal In o ma ion P o ec ion Law o he People’s Republic o China
(PIPL) (People’s Republic o China [2021]) was enac ed. I g an ed e e y ci izen he igh o
manage hei own pe sonal in o ma ion, wi h clauses gua an eeing he igh o add, amend o
dele e hei own da a on hei own ini ia i e. I also con ains p o isions on he igh o be
in o med by o ganisa ions abou he use o one’s da a and he ans e o he igh o access
a e he dea h o a na u al pe son. T he a icle mos ele an o his hesis, as p esen ed in
People’s Republic o China [2021], s a es:
An indi idual has he igh o know and make decisions abou he p ocessing o
his/he pe sonal in o ma ion and he igh o es ic o e use o he s’ p ocessing o
his/he pe sonal in o ma ion unless o he wise p o ided o by laws and adminis a-
i e egula ions.
(Pe sonal In o ma ion P o ec ion Law o he People’s Republic o China,
A icle 44)
In he Gene al P inciples o Ci il Law o he People’s Republic o China People’s Republic
o China [2017], a na u al pe son is de ined as a ci izen —a pe son o indi idual. This is in line
wi h he EU and US in e p e a ions o he e m. A dis inc ion is made, as in o he egula ions,
om a legal pe son, which is mo e p ecisely de ined:
A icle 36.
Legal pe sons a e o ganiza ions wi h ci il capaci y, a e compe en o pe o m ci il
ac s, and, acco ding o law, independen ly enjoy ci il igh s and assume ci il du ies.
5.1. Legisla i e iangula ion 139
The ci il capaci y o a legal pe son and i s compe ence o pe o m ci il ac s a ise
when he legal pe son is es ablished and cease when he legal pe son e mina es.
A icle 37.
A legal pe son mus sa is y he ollowing condi ions:
1. Be es ablished in acco dance wi h law;
2. Possess he necessa y p ope y o unds;
3. Possess i s own name, o ganiza ional s uc u e, and p emises;
4. Be able o assume ci il obliga ions independen ly.
(Gene al P inciples o Ci il Law o he People’s Republic o China, Chap e
3, Sec ion 1)
F om his, one can in e ha legal pe sons a e co po a ions and o he non-human, human- un
en i ies. Only na u al pe sons a e included unde he umb ella o online eal-name egis a ion
policies, which use a ious me hods: e.g., go e nmen egula ion o In e ne Se ice P o ide s
(ISPs) o echnologies embedded in communica ion in as uc u e, o acking he iden i y o he
speake . On he o he hand, bo h na u al and legal pe sons a e obse ed in he implemen a ion
o he social c edi sys em, which is a mix o ini ia i es aimed a egula ing he inancial c edi
indus y, easing da a sha ing be ween go e nmen agencies, and p omo ing s a e-sanc ioned
mo al alues, al hough he la e goal emains somewha ague (Yang [2022]). Financial c ed-
i wo hiness is a amilia concep in Wes e n socie ies —i documen s he inancial his o y o
indi iduals o companies and p edic s hei abili y o epay u u e loans. Because China’s ma -
ke economy is ela i ely young, he coun y lacks a eliable sys em o accessing he inancial
eco ds o o he indi iduals and companies. De eloping such a sys em is a i al and la gely
uncon o e sial goal.
The oad o deciding wha can be included in he social c edi sys em has no always been
s aigh o wa d, some imes mixing he wo concep s. Acco ding o Yiqing [2019], in 2019,
he Na ional Heal h Commission (NHS) published a documen encou aging local au ho i ies o
explo e he inclusion o olun a y blood dona ion. I was c i icised na ionwide, showing ha he
140 Chap e 5. Legal Iden i y
coun y seems o p e e o keep bo h domains mos ly sepa a e —as e idenced by he d a law
published in 2022 (C eeme s [2014]), which ea s hem wi h di e en se s o ules. Howe e ,
some local go e nmen s ha e a emp ed o blu he lines — o example, in Augus 2022, he
Liaoning p o ince announced i was ne e heless explo ing how o ewa d blood dona ions wi hin
he inancial c edi sys em (Canales and Mok [2022]).
Al hough he go e nmen has la gely esol ed he inancial aspec , egula ions on he social
c edi side ha e been inconsis en and ambiguous. To da e, a sys em has been de eloped ha
ocuses p ima ily on en e p ises a he han indi iduals —i agg ega es da a on co po a e com-
pliance om se e al go e nmen agencies. I s ou pu is a ailable o any Chinese ci izen h ough
a po al con aining eco ds on indi iduals and o he o ganisa ions. The po al se es as a cen al
hub o mo e han h ee dozen (o en highly speci ic) da abases, including lis s o people who
ha e ailed o pay cou judgmen s, legi ima e Chinese uni e si ies, companies app o ed o build
obo s, and hospi als ound guil y o insu ance aud. Ye he compila ion seems so a bi a y
ha i is ha d o see how people could use he po al as a comp ehensi e da a sou ce.
China’s app oach o iden i y he is in e wined wi h i s igh con ol o e digi al iden i ies.
The Real-Name Regis a ion sys em educes he isk o iden i y he by linking all online ac i i y
o a e i ied iden i y. Howe e , he cen alised na u e o his sys em means ha any b each o
misuse o da a by he s a e o hacke s could ha e se ious consequences. The go e nmen has
enac ed se e al A icles in i s C iminal Law o he People’s Republic o China (People’s Republic
o China [1997]) ha se e ely punish iden i y he wi h jail ime and he y ines, illus a ing
he go e nmen ’s s ong emphasis on main aining con ol and secu i y in he digi al wo ld (Ning
and Wu [2023]). One o hem ollows:
Whoe e o ges, al e s, buys, sells, s eals, o cibly seizes, o des oys he o icial
documen s, ce i ica es, o seals o a S a e o gan shall be sen enced o ixed- e m
imp isonmen o no mo e han h ee yea s, c iminal de en ion, public su eillance, o
dep i a ion o poli ical igh s; i he ci cums ances a e se ious, he shall be sen enced
o ixed- e m imp isonmen o no less han h ee yea s bu no mo e han 10 yea s.
(Gene al P inciples o Ci il Law o he People’s Republic o China, A icle
5.2. The ne o iden i y legisla ion 141
280)
China has passed laws ha explici ly p ohibi he c ea ion and dis ibu ion o deep ake con-
en wi hou consen . The go e nmen is pa icula ly conce ned abou hei po en ial o dis up
social s abili y and has in eg a ed he issue in o i s b oade In e ne go e nance s a egy, which
aims o con ol i wi hin i s bo de s (Huang and Ku lan zick [2020]). The Cybe space Admin-
is a ion o China (CAC, Lee [2022]), oge he wi h he Minis y o Indus y and In o ma ion
Technology and he Minis y o Public Secu i y, adop ed he P o isions on he Adminis a ion
o Deep Syn hesis In e ne In o ma ion Se ices in 2022 (T ansla e [2022]), which ook e ec
in 2023. The egula ions equi e deep ake (also e e ed o as deep syn hesis) con en o be
clea ly labelled as such. Se e e penal ies a e imposed o using i o p oduce, copy, publish o
dissemina e in o ma ion banned by laws and egula ions o o ailing o comply wi h use egis-
a ion and iden i y e i ica ion sys ems, among o he hings (Finlayson-B own and Ng [2023]).
The ules apply o indi iduals who use deep akes and legal en i ies o pla o ms ha hos such
con en wi hou p ope da a managemen and disclaime s.
5.2 The ne o iden i y legisla ion
The no ion o pe sonali y igh s is cen al o he upcoming discussion. Acco ding o Nee hling
[2005], hese ecognise a pe son as a physical and spi i ual-mo al being and gua an ee hei
enjoymen o hei own sense o exis ence. Nee hling [2005] lis s he speci ic pe sonali y igh s
he hinks should be g an ed. The lis is headed by he igh o li e, a pe son’s mo e aluable
asse ; o he s include he igh o physical libe y o p i acy, which will be pa icula ly impo an
in his sec ion. The las one is he igh o iden i y, which is in inged when any o hese ace s a e
used in a way un econcilable wi h one’s ue iden i y, h ough alsi ica ion o misiden i ica ion.
The wo d p i acy, o which bo h Hill [2024] and Kulha i [2018] no e he di icul y in de ining
i , was mos amously desc ibed in a Ha a d Law Re iew a icle in 1890 by lawye s Samuel
D. Wa en II and Louis D. B andeis (who would e en ually join he Sup eme Cou ). Thei
p oposal was succinc , and i called o he igh o p i acy o be p o ec ed by law in a way ha
has no ma e ialised o his day. To hem, p i acy was:
142 Chap e 5. Legal Iden i y
[T]he igh o be le alone.
(Samuel D. Wa en II and Louis D. B andeis in The Righ o P i acy)
¨
Un e [2018], on he o he hand, de ines i as:
[F] eedom om unau ho ised in usion.
(H. Akin ¨
Un e in Poli ics o Digi al Su eillance, Na ional Secu i y and
P i acy)
Roge Cla ke o goes he monoli hic na u e o p i acy in a ou o dis inguishing ou ca -
ego ies: o he pe son, o beha iou , o da a, and o communica ion; hus allowing each kind
o p i acy o be p o ec ed di e en ly (Kulha i [2018]). His hesis discusses p o ec ing pe sonal
da a in he con ex o ensu ing p i acy, sugges ing a na u al ( hough con o e ed) link be ween
he igh o p i acy and he igh o da a p o ec ion. Kulha i [2018] cha ac e ises one ace o
i s polemic na u e h ough he EU’s ambiguous decision o oo ing he igh o p i acy in i s
Cha e o Fundamen al Righ s while seemingly ea ing da a p o ec ion as an economic ma -
e . Bu o y and di e en ia e be ween he wo on hese g ounds, she a gues, is bu a ed
he ing. Ano he a emp o se e one om he o he comes om he way he GDPR (Eu opean
Union [2016]) is wo ded: i does no e e ence he igh o p i acy, bu Kulha i [2018] main ains
ha he igh o da a p o ec ion is nuanced and builds on he p emise ha da a p ocessing is
inad e en . Acco dingly, i ollows ha he GDPR con ains de ailed p o isions ega ding he
obliga ions o he da a con olle and p ocesso . The emphasis on how and when pe sonal da a
can be legi ima ely p ocessed is a co olla y o he igh o p o ec one’s pe sonal da a.
Iden i y is ine i ably linked o he p o ec ion o p i acy he momen i is dis inguished om
iden i ica ion. Nee hling [2005] no es he di e ence in iden i ying a pe son’s name, image, o
any o he ace o hei iden i y wi h ue pe sonal ac s. Those pe sonal ac s a e pa o
he p i a e ac s o p o ec , while con e sely s eadily becoming an essen ial enable o oday’s
digi al socie y, Kulha i [2018] w i es. She obse es ha he GDPR (Eu opean Union [2016])
does no include a dis inc igh o iden i y, so sa egua ding iden i y equi es he exe cise o he

5.2. The ne o iden i y legisla ion 143
a ailable ools wi hin he concep o law ul p ocessing. The issue wo sens, Kulha i [2018] goes
on, wi h a ibu es such as pe inence o a g oup. Then, he p o ile is no in e ed solely om
he pe sonal da a o he p o iled pe son bu uses a la ge amoun o da a ela ing o many o he
people, which may o may no be anonymised. Mo eo e , he p ocess esul s in a ibu ing
ce ain cha ac e is ics o an indi idual de i ed om he p obabili y ha hey belong o a g oup
and no om da a communica ed by hem.
When Nee hling [2005] was w i en, he igh o iden i y had been ecognised in coun ies
such as I aly, F ance, Swi ze land and Sou h A ica. In he US, he c imes o public de ama ion
and app op ia ion o he de endan ’s name o likeness a e examples o he p o ec ion o iden i y
a he han p i acy (The S a e o Cali o nia [2019], The S a e o Texas [2023], Homeland Secu i y
and Go e nmen al A ai s, Sena e: [2021]). Simila ly, in Ge many, he o ences o alsi ying o
dis o ing a pe son’s image and he economic misapp op ia ion o a pe son’s name o likeness
a e sanc ioned. S ill, he igh o iden i y has ye o be gene ally ecognised by he cou s.
In England, iden i y is no explici ly p o ec ed bu may be implici in o he o ences such as
malicious alsehood and passing o . Al hough publica ion o alsehood is, in p inciple, unlaw ul,
in ingemen o iden i y may be jus i ied by eedom o exp ession, as wi h de ama ion. In 2024,
i een mino s we e condemned o a yea o p oba ion and gende equali y and social-a ec i e
cou ses in Badajoz (Spain) o c ea ing and dis ibu ing a i icially gene a ed pic u es o some
o hei emale classma es o acquain ances (Ricou [2024]). They we e collec i ely cha ged wi h
wen y coun s o child po nog aphy and agains mo al in eg i y. They had been sho ly p eceded
by he one-yea inca ce a ion o an eigh een-yea -old o doing he same o wo o his high-school
classma es in Na a a (Spain). Nee hling [2005] no es ha in, o example, Ge many o F ance,
he igh s o a name, image, and w i en and spoken wo d a e ega ded as sepa a e pe sonali y
igh s.
In 2007, Sou h Ko ea became he i s na ion o implemen eal-name In e ne . The sys-
em equi ed use s o e i y hei iden i ies by submi ing hei Residen Regis a ion Numbe s
(RRNs) be o e pos ing commen s o uploading con en on ce ain websi es (Ca agliano [2013]).
In 2020, Na e , a Sou h Ko ean online pla o m which o e ed, among o he p oduc s, a sea ch
engine, email hos ing, blogs, maps, and mobile paymen , decided o disclose he online commen
144 Chap e 5. Legal Iden i y
his o ies o all i s use s (Lee e al. [2024]). Thei goal was o alle ia e he social p oblems caused
by malicious online commen s on hei news websi e by allowing anyone o iew he commen
his o y o o he use s. The announcemen was issued om one day o he nex , so use s did no
ha e su icien ime o ind and dele e any commen s hey did no wan o be shown o he pub-
lic. Lee e al. [2024] explains ha he new sys em disclosed a sue ’s commen his o y, including
hei sc eened ID, nickname, lis o commen s and he a icles on which hey we e pos ed, eac-
ions o o he use s o ecen commen s (e.g., likes and dislikes), and he commen -managemen
measu es (e.g., numbe o dele ed commen s).
Howe e , in 2021, he law was uled uncons i u ional and abolished, wi h lawmake s a guing
i unde mined he eedom o anonymous exp ession and he use s’ igh o sel -de e mina ion
in disclosing pe sonal in o ma ion (Lee e al. [2024]). In 2024, he Na ional Assembly in Sou h
Ko ea passed he Ac on he De elopmen o A i icial In elligence and Es ablishmen o T us
(AI Basic Ac ). I is he second na ional egula ion es ablished o go e n his ma e , ollowing
he Eu opean AI Regula ion. The Ac includes a ious measu es o suppo he de elopmen
o AI, such as p omo ing esea ch and de elopmen , acili a ing access o academic da a, and
es ablishing an a i icial in elligence da a cen e.
In 2021, a China-A ica ini ia i e o pu sue “common de elopmen and secu i y, join ly
building a communi y wi h a sha ed u u e in cybe space” (Cybe space Adminis a ion o China
[2021]) was launched. In i , China called on Chinese and A ican go e nmen s, In e ne compa-
nies, echnical communi ies, social o ganisa ions and indi idual ci izens o wo k oge he o build
a cybe space o common de elopmen —upholding he philosophy o “achie ing sha ed de el-
opmen , ensu ing common secu i y, ealizing join go e nance, and enjoying bene i s oge he ”
(Cybe space Adminis a ion o China [2021]). Some o he p oposed poin s included imp o ing
In e ne access and p omo ing connec i i y, ad ancing in o ma ion in as uc u e cons uc ion,
s eng hening s a egic mu ual us in cybe space, imp o ing da a secu i y managemen and
p o ec ion o pe sonal in o ma ion, ein o cing in e na ional coope a ion o comba cybe c ime
and cybe e o ism, p omo ing capaci y building on cybe space go e nance, s eng hening sup-
po and assis ance o ulne able g oups and lea ing no one behind, and con ibu ing o he
implemen a ion o he 2030 Agenda o Sus ainable De elopmen (Uni ed Na ions - Depa men
5.2. The ne o iden i y legisla ion 145
o Economic and Social A ai s [2015]).
China had high hopes o he ini ia i e, closing i s s a emen by saying ha “[ ]he In e ne
is a sha ed home o mankind” Cybe space Adminis a ion o China [2021] and ea i ming i s
willingness o wo k wi h A ican coun ies o seize oppo uni ies and mee challenges “ o join ly
build a close communi y wi h a sha ed u u e in cybe space o a be e u u e o mankind”
(Cybe space Adminis a ion o China [2021]). Fo i s pa , A ica s udied cybe space’s ise o
many yea s be o e he China-A ica ini ia i e. As ea ly as 2000, he A ican Union’s Con en ion
on Cybe Secu i y and he P o ec ion o Pe sonal Da a discussed he h ea o cybe c ime and
d ew up a documen , A ican Union [2014], o es ablish mechanisms o comba i , s a ing wi h
he s eng hening and mode nisa ion o c iminal law, while seeking “a balance be ween he use
o in o ma ion and communica ion echnologies and he p o ec ion o he p i acy o ci izens in
hei daily o p o essional li es, while gua an eeing he ee low o in o ma ion” (A ican Union
[2014]). F om he e, each coun y has ollowed i s own ajec o y owa ds 2025.
In 2013, he Sou h A ican Pa liamen passed he P o ec ion o Pe sonal In o ma ion Ac
(POPIA) (Pa liamen [2013, 2020]), which came in o o ce in 2020. I co e s a e y b oad
spec um o da a managemen , om egula ing big da a o banning he collec ion o child en’s
digi al in o ma ion, including issues as di e se as cookies, consen , limi a ions on he ules
go e ning he use o in o ma ion in he media, and he igh o be o go en. I is o e seen by he
In o ma ion Regula o o Sou h A ica, an independen body empowe ed, among o he du ies,
o moni o and en o ce compliance by public and p i a e en i ies ((Sou h A ica), In o ma ion
Regula o [2013]).
Bu Sou h A ica is no ee o he se ious mis akes ha can be made wi h he in oduc ion o
new echnologies: by 2022, ala ms we e sounded as su eillance companies ou numbe ed police
s a ions by mo e han 10 o 1, ins alling came as ha could be equipped wi h acial ecogni ion
so wa e unde he umb ella o p i a e o ganisa ions ha would p o ile and ack ci izens wi hou
o icial ju isdic ion (Hao and Swa a chi e [2022]). Mo e ha shly, Zimbabwe’s p esiden since
2017, Emme son Mnangagwa, un eiled in 2018 an ambi ious Sma Ci ies ini ia i e he assu ed
would deli e digi ally connec ed ci ies ha would ans o m people’s li es and ebuild oads,
b idges, schools, clinics and homes (Ndlela [2020]). The mode nisa ion p ojec would equi e
146 Chap e 5. Legal Iden i y
“high-le el secu i y sys ems”, he esul o a pa ne ship wi h China’s Cloudwalk Technology
Co, an o ganisa ion asked wi h de eloping a acial ecogni ion sys em ha would see i s i s
s one laid when Huawei ins alled a ne wo k o public su eillance came as in 2020 (Ragazzi
e al. [2020]). Pe haps mo e wo yingly, he Zimbabwean go e nmen had o hand o e la ge
amoun s o pho og aphic da a o Cloudwalk so ha he so wa e could be ailo ed o he Black
popula ion.
This aised conce ns abou p i acy and da a p o ec ion. Mnangagwa’s go e nmen has been
accused o d i ing owa ds au ho i a ianism, Ndlela [2020] epo s, and now he echnology o
digi al su eillance is being inc easingly pe ec ed, nea ing he poin whe e i can be used o
unde mine ee speech and poli ical opposi ion. While he go e nmen claimed ha su eillance
came as a e common in se e al coun ies and ha e been used o comba c ime and p omo e
secu i y in public spaces and on oads, human igh s de ende s a gued ha Zimbabwe does
no ha e obus p i acy and da a p o ec ion laws o p e en abuse o misuse o he da a col-
lec ed by acial ecogni ion came as. Some, among which s and Ndlela [2020] and o Sou he n
A ica [MISA], ha e aised conce ns abou he choice o China o his pa ne ship, while o he s
(Ragazzi e al. [2020]) ha e oiced ese a ions abou he ans e o acial da a om go e nmen
hands o a p i a e company. This highligh s he cu en lack o laws egula ing he c oss-bo de
ans e o Zimbabweans’ da a om Zimbabwe o o he coun ies, al hough he e a e sec ions in
he Zimbabwean Cons i u ion ha p o ec ci izens’ pe sonal in o ma ion (o Sou he n A ica
[MISA]).
C ossing he A lan ic, we ind ou sel es in Sou h Ame ica. In his sec ion, we will discuss
B azil and i s ban on EU-based Me a om aining i s AI models on B azilian pe sonal da a
(Wea he bed [2024]). Su ice i o say his is no he only example o da a p o ec ion policies
being en o ced in he egion. In 2024, B azil’s Na ional Da a P o ec ion Au ho i y (ANPD) ci ed
“ isks o se ious damage and di icul ies o use s” (Wea he bed [2024]) in Me a’s p i acy policy
upda e, in which he company ga e i sel pe mission o use public Facebook, Messenge and
Ins ag am da a o AI aining. I had been poin ed ou ha one o he la ges image cap ion
da ase s used o such pu poses con ained pe sonal, iden i iable pho os o B azilian child en,
pu ing hem a unaccep able isk o being used o deep akes and o he non-consensual uses o