SUB VER TING THE C ONSTI TUTION AND CUR T AILI NG CIVIL SOCIETY . ANGOLA ’S NEW LA W ON NGOS. 1
C MI INS IG H T
SEPT EMBER 20 23
NUMBER 2
Po ste r , c all ing f or d em ons tr ati on s on th e 1 7 J un e 2023 . Mo st c al ls we re m ad e by so cia l me dia . So ur ce: L A B.
Su b v er ti ng th e C on stit uti o n
an d Cu r t a il in g C iv i l Soc ie t y
Ang ola ’ s Ne w L a w on NGO s
In A ngola, t he gov er nment is in th e p rocess of ma king a n ew l a w on
th e NG Os, a law th at is d eeme d unco nstit utional , unn ecess ar y , and a
bre ach of p eop le ’ s fun dame ntal right s and fr eedo ms of asso ciation .
Like in many ot her au thor ita rian re gimes , “te rrorism fina ncing ” and
“resist an c e of intern ational dono rs to comp ly wit h natio nal laws” a re
use d to legi timate th e law and it s f ur th er res tr ic tions an d contro l of
c i v i l s o c i e t y, N G O s , a c ti v i s t s , a n d d e m o c r a c y. C i v i l s o c i e t y h a s m o b i l i s e d
a g a i n s t t h e l a w, b u t p r o t e s t e r s h a v e b e e n m e t w i t h v i o l e n t g o v e r n m e n t
supp ression.
A UT HORS
Catarina Antunes Gomes
La bo ratóri o de Ci ênc ias S ocia is
e Humanidades ( L AB)
Cesaltina Abreu
La bo ratóri o de Ci ênc ias S ocia is
e Humanidades ( L AB)
Margareth Nangac ov ie
Ce ntro d e Es tudo s
Africanos ( CEA )
Inge Amundsen
Ch r . M ich else n Ins tit ute (CMI)
2 CMI INSIGHT NUMBER 2, SEPTEMBER 2023
K ey Messages
• Non- Govern ment al Or ganis ations (NGO s ) are fun dame ntal a ctor s in a dem ocr acy – a s a channe l
for citizen voice, in ho lding t he go vern ment account abl e, and for t he gener al contro l o f power in
soc iet y – throu gh the su per v ision o f t he ac tions of th e g overnm ent and t hrough t he exercise of
th e free doms of informati on, ex pressio n, and as sociation .
• Th e propos ed new L aw on th e Non-G overnme ntal O rg anisatio ns (NGOs) is uncons titutio nal and
emb odie s a will to control, t y pic al of auth orit arian re gimes . The bill d emons tr ates the p olitic al
obje cti ves of the gov er nment to re str ic t and contro l civil so ciet y , and it v iolates th e Angola n
Cons titu tion whic h guar antees t he fun dament al r ights a nd fre edoms of ass ociation.
• Th e propos ed law is anoth er set back wit h a negati v e imp ac t on the d emocr atic pr incipl es and
ru le o f law of in An g ola , as it will re str ic t social en gageme nt o f citizens in p ublic , collec tive, an d
asso ciative ac tions.
• Som e go vern ment control of NG Os is recom mend ed in c ases of tr ansf er of public f unds fr om
gov er nment to NG Os, bu t apar t f rom this , intera cti on bet ween t he gov er nment an d NGOs s hould
be b ased on coo per ation, m utual ag reeme nt, an d rule s es tab lished by bot h par tie s in common –
and n ot b y pre sidentia l decre es, illi ber al laws, an d g overnm ent res tric tio ns.
• Whil e prese r ving t he pr inciple of au t on omy o f civ il societ y or ganis ations , associatio ns, and N GOs
that sh ould govern civ ic life, onl y judicial sup er v is ion is a n appro priate me chanism to overcome
diver g en ces in the governa nce o f N GOs.
Angola n Au thor i ta rianism
W h i le f or ma l ly a mu l t ipar t y democ rac y , A ng o l a is no t
considered to b e fre e o r democ rat ic becau se of i ts p oor record
on huma n a nd polit ica l r igh t s. The r u l ing p ar t y Popu lar
Movem ent for the Liberation of Angola ( MPL A) has b een in
pow er since i ndependence i n 1 9 7 5, and for mer President
dos Sa ntos wa s A fr ica’ s long est ser v i ng president ( 38 y ea rs )
when he stepp ed dow n in S eptember 2 01 7 leav i ng t he office
to hi s hand- pick ed succe ssor . A ngol a is cl as si fied as ‘not fre e’
in t he F r eedom in the W o r ld 2 022 inde x (Freedom House
2 023 ), and it is a n ‘a ut h or i ta r ia n reg ime’ a ccordi ng to t h e
Democ r ac y I ndex of 202 2 ( IEU 2 022 ) .
Since f ormal democratisation in 1991, Angola has held
four general elections, in which the r uling part y MPLA
gained the absolute majorit y with 84, 72, 65 and 51 per cent,
in 2008, 2012, 2017, and 2022 respectiv el y (By e et al 2022:
26). The governance sy stem is firmly presidential with the
ruling par ty MP L A in a dominant position in politics and
administration (Am undsen 2014: 178, 2021: 4).
In addition to political authoritar ianism, Angola also
characterised by high rates of pover ty . Extreme poverty grew
from 35% to 44% fr om 2019 to 2022, according to cr edible
sources (Afr obarometer 2022 and W or ld P overt y Clock 2023).
The Human Development Index score is o nl y 0.586, making
Angola number 148 of 153 countries, and this low level of
development is accompanied b y a high level of inequality (a
Gini Coefficient of 0.51) (UNDP 2022: 274, W or ld Bank
2018). Angola ’ s score on the H uman Capital Index (HCI)
is one of the lowest in the w or ld (0.36; W or ld Bank 2020),
which means that each child born in Angola is only 36%
likely to reach its potential in terms of human achievement.
F urthermore, Angola is ver y corrupt, with an overall score
of 33 (on a scale from totally corr upt: 100 to totall y clean:
0) and a countr y rank of 116 of 180 countr ies, according to
T ransparency Inter natio nal’ s Cor r uption P erceptions Index
(CPI 2022). These high scores on corruption means that
corruption is not only entrenched in the state bureaucracy ,
it also an essential part of the power base of the regime
as corruption enables the r uling elite to extract fr om the
economy and to r einvest in their hold o n power (i.e., political
corruption) (Amundsen 2014: 175-176, 179-182).
In our view , this highly problematic economic context
reflects an exclusionar y and non-democratic exercise of pow er .
SUBVER TING THE CONSTITUTION AND CURT AILING CIVIL SOCIETY . ANGOLA ’S NEW LA W ON NGOS. 3
Angola has seen r epeated violations of human rights and the
use of repr essive and violent means, for example excessive use
of force, teargas, arrests, and ar bitrar y detention to suppr ess
youth pr otests (Amnesty Inter natio nal 2019 and 2020, H R W
2020 and 2023a, D W 2022).
It also reflects and incr easingly
restrictive legal framework. One example
is the constitutional amendments
in 2021, made in a process that was
strongly criticised by the opposition as
top-down with no r eal par ticipatio n
of citizens or civil societ y . It had the
effect that the r uling party ’ s dominant
position was reinfor ced, and the already
omnipotent pr esidenc y was further
strengthened (Am undsen 2021).
Af ter the former president dos Santos stepped down in
2017 af ter 38 y ears in power , there were gr eat expectations
in his hand-picked successor , João L ourenço . The fraud and
embezzlement charges raised against the for mer pr esident ’ s
family was one reason for optimism, but it has been argued
that the much-hyped clamp-down on corruption was a
c leansing of his pr edecessor ’ s influence than a real check
on corruption (Roque 2021: 186). The manipulations of
the August 2022 electio ns (Bye et al 2022: 33) – where the
incumbent president and ruling part y wer e re-elected with
51% – and the heavy securit y and militar y presence in the
capital af ter the election are other r ecent indicators of an
illiberal regime.
Like many other non-democratic regimes, the MP L A
regime in Ang ola has alway s limited the spa ce for civil
society and non-governmental organisations (Amundsen
and Abreu 2016). W or ldwide, the repr essive methods range
from the draco nian Russian methods of having NGOs, media
outlets, activists, and bloggers with links to the outside wor ld
labelled as ‘ foreign agents’ and/or having their leaders killed
(Russell 2022: 3, 8), to more subtle legal
restrictions on their activities.
Angola has always done the latter ,
and the regime r ecently strengthened
its control of NGOs and civil society
by a dopting se v eral additional laws
and decrees, of whic h the bill on the
Statute on the Non-Governmental
Organisations ( Lei do Estatuto das Org aniza çõ es Não-
Governamentais (ONG) ), now cons iderabl y limits fundamental
freedoms and shrinks civic and democratic space (ISHR 2023;
Associação KU T AKE SA 2023).
The New Law on NGO s
T he new bi l l o n t he Statute of the NGOs is t he lates t
e xa mp le. It ca me on the i niti a t ive of t he p re siden t a nd was
int roduced to pa rl ia men t by t he MPL A cauc us, w it h the
offic ia l just i ficat i on t hat the pre v ious
reg u l a t io n w as “ i neffec tiv e and c reates
complex sit uat io ns , ei t her by the
d i fficu lt y of control by st a te a gencie s,
or by t h e re sista nce of do nors a nd
these, especial ly in te rnatio nal o nes ,
to com ply w ith t he law s in force in
ou r count r y on t he matter ” ( MPL A
2 023 : 2 ) .
More specificall y , accor ding to
the MPLA, the objectives of the law were to secur e a) the
conformation of the NGOs to the normative-constitutional
framework; b) organic-formal adequacy ; c) compliance
with obligations to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing; d) coordinatio n between government work and
NGO inter ventions, and e) S tate engag ement in the financing
of NGOs recognised as partners (ibid.: 1, 3, 10).
F urthermore, in the presentation of the proposal, the
Angolan Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Marcy
L opes, said that regarding the activity of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), it had become “ essential to create legal
instruments to guar antee the organisatio n of these institutions
[…] due to the difficulty of super vision b y S tate ag encies, as
well as some resistance fr om donors and the organisations
themselves, especiall y internatio nal ones, in comply ing with
the laws in force in the countr y ”. He added that donors, “ in
many cases, reach the point of determining the places where
a given NGO should spend resour ces and with whom and
when to do it ” (LUSA/VE R ANGOL A 2023).
Accor ding to the Ame rican Bar Association , the Angolan
government introduced the bill also under the auspices
of addressing terr orist financing and
money-laundering r isks in the non-
prof it sector (AB A 2023: 2 ). This
is in line with how other illiberal
governments have justified r estrictions
on civil society and NGOs. Heiss, for
instance, w rites that anti-NGO law is
part of a larger global trend of c losing
civic space in authoritarian r egimes, and that “ autocrats
have turned to anti-NGO legislation […] for multiple
reasons, inc luding increased natio nalism and xenophobia,
[and] counterterrorism policies (Heiss 2018: 1, 15. See also
Glasius et al. 2020).
In Angola on the 26 to 28 of June 2023, the Minist r y of
Justice and Human Rights , through the S ecr etar y of S tate for
The new S t at ut e of t he
Non -Gov ernment al
Organisations limits
fundamen t al fre edoms
and shri nks civic and
democr atic space.
The anti - NGO l aw is part
of a l arge r global t rend
of c lo sing c ivic s pace i n
aut horit arian re gimes.
4 CMI INSIGHT NUMBER 2, SEPTEMBER 2023
Justice (a staunch suppor ter of the NGO Law), held a
seminar on the new law , together with the UN Office on
Dr ugs and Crime (UNODC), ostensibl y
with the intention of listening to the
public, but there was no publicity or
invitation to civil society organisations
or to the organisers of the national
demonstrations. 1
On 3 August 2023, quoting F A TF
(the Financial Action T ask F orce , FAT F ,
is a global money laundering and
terrorist financing watchdog), Radio
An gola reported that “ many governments
around the w or ld, inc luding in Ang ola, use counter terr orism
as a pretext to intr oduce restrictive measures on civil society ”
(Rádio Angola 2023).
On 29 August 2023, an Open Letter was sent to the
P resident of Ang ola by three UN Special Rapporteurs , 2
commenting on the new law on the NGOS , requesting
specific information from the Ang olan government, and
stating that the bill was in violation of international human
rights standards and “in its current form, the law fails to
address these risks and instead imposes arbitraril y harsh
regulator y , super visor y , and disciplinar y measures that will
greatly restrict the independence and autonomy of Angolan
civil society organisations (CSOs)”. The letter ended by
encouraging the Angolan government to r efrain from
approving the bill (F riends of Angola 2023).
The proposal was appr oved, in general terms, by the
par liament o n 25 May 2023, with 105 votes in favo ur (MPLA
votes), 69 against (UNIT A votes) and 2 abstentions (PRS
and FNLA) (L USA/V er Angola 2023). Af ter this general
par liamentar y appr oval, the law will undergo a possible
revision b y a special par liamentar y committee before being
reappr oved by the P ar liament, and subsequently it will be
sent to the P resident for prom ulgation (AB A 2023: 2).
There was no parliamentar y plenar y discussion of the
proposal, and the law proposal was for warded without any
consultation pr ocess and without any invitation b y par liament
for a hearing involving the NGOs concerned. A par liamentar y
debate on it had been scheduled for 26 June 2023, but then
it was removed fr om the agenda and postponed without a
new date. W e c an o nl y speculate wh y : to avoid the escalation
of social tensions, which were alr eady intense, to give time
to let the dust settle, or to reconsider the entire law pr oject.
1 A lt hou gh L A B r u ns a d a il y Ne ws O bs er v ator y, we c ou ld fi nd no ne w s rep or t s on th is s em in a r . A cco rd in g to r um ou rs c i rcu l at in g, a not he r sem in a r is b ein g
pr epa r ed , w ith t he s am e org a ni se rs , on t he sa me l aw, but not h in g ha s be en ma de pu bl ic an d no NG Os h ave b ee n inv it ed .
2 Sp ec ial R a pp or teu r on th e Right s to F reed om of Pe ac ef ul A sse mbly a nd of A sso ci ati on , Clement Nya letsossi V ou le; Spe ci al R ap po rte ur o n the S itu at ion o f Hum an R ights
Defende rs , Ma r y L aw lor, an d Spe ci al R ap po rte ur o n the P ro mot ion a nd P rote cti on of H uma n Righ ts an d Fu nda me ntal F ree dom s wh ile C oun ter ing T er ro ri sm , F ionn ua l a
Ní Ao laín ) .
Accor ding to an anal ysis of the bill by the Americ an Bar
Association , the bill is unnecessar y , because Angola alrea dy
has a stro ng legislative framework
to address mo ney launder ing and
terrorism financing , but it will
“ indiscriminately restrict Non-
Governmental Organiz ations (NGOs)
access to funding and resour ces, and
their freedom of operations and trade”.
It further notes that the c laim that the
law will guard against institutions with
‘ dubious purposes’ that are ‘ detr imental
to the securit y of the State ’ and
‘ engaged in mer cenar y activit y ’ are “vague and unnecessar y ”,
and “wil l unjustifiably label NGOs as vessels of unlawful
activity ”. It states that
i f pas sed i n its c ur re n t for m, it w il l i mpo se a rbitr a ri ly
ha r sh reg u l ator y a nd supe r v is or y mea su re s, a nd w i l l a l low
for in appropr iate i n ter ve n t ion by t he gover n ment into
NGO op er ations (inc lud in g g ra n t in g st rong ad m in ist rat iv e
po wer s f or su sp ension a nd ter mi nat ion of NGO s ) . Th is
w i l l f u r the r rest r ic t the i ndep endenc e and autonomy of
A ng o l an c iv i l so ciet y org a ni zat ions , whic h a re a l re ady
ope rat ing i n a h igh ly repr ess ed env i ronm en t (A BA 2 023:
2).
The l aw pro p osa l ha s a lso b een f und amenta l ly re jecte d by
A ngola n c iv i l soc i et y org an isat i ons a nd h u ma n rights g roups ,
as w i l l b e seen.
Once Op ening Up …
A f ter ye ar s of civ i l wa r a nd soc ia l ist one- pa r t y r u le in
A ngola , a pa r t ia l democ rat isation took place i n 1 9 90 -
1 991 th at introduc ed mult ipa r t y ism ( i.e., a n ag reement
t hat a l lowed t he U N IT A g uer i l la to fo r m as a p o l itica l
pa r t y ), f unda menta l f reedoms a nd rights a nd the ba sic
pr inciples of t he ma rket economy , a ls o made pos sible the
format io n of NGOs i n A ngola . A r tic le 24 of t he re v ised
Cons tit ution ( Const it u t iona l Law no. 12 /91 o f 6 May 1 991 )
ensh r ined f reedom of a ssoc iat i on in t he fol l ow i ng ter ms ( i n
ou r tr an slat io n ):
Ther e wa s no
parli ament ar y pl enar y
dis cus si on of t he
propo sal, and t he bill
w as t abled w it hout an y
con sul t ation wi th t he
NGOs c oncerned.
SUBVER TING THE CONSTITUTION AND CURT AILING CIVIL SOCIETY . ANGOLA ’S NEW LA W ON NGOS. 5
The f ree doms of e xp res sion, as sembly , demons tr ation ,
a sso ciat ion, a nd a l l ot her form s of ex pre ssion a re
g uarant eed.
The sa me a r tic le of the re v ise d const i t ution ga ve the s tate
t he ri gh t to reg u late t he exerc ise of t hese r ights on ly o n
some sp eci fic g rou n d s. I t stated t hat :
Group s and a ss oci ation s, whos e pu r pos es or ac t iv itie s a re
cont ra r y to t he con st i t ut iona l order, cr i mi na l l aws , a nd
t hose t hat p ur sue , ev en ind i rec t ly , pol itic a l objec t ive s
t hro ugh org a ni zat ions of a mi l ita r y , pa r a - m il ita r y or
m il ita r iz e d nat u re, a r e prohibited .
On May 11 , 1 991 , on ly a few d ays
a f ter the re v ise d co nst it ution ca me
into fo rce , the L aw on Associ ation s (Law
No. 1 4 /9 1 ) w as publ ished , whic h ag a in,
u nequ ivo ca l l y , ensh r ine d t he pr inc ip le
of au tono my of NGOs. It ad mit ted
accou ntabi lit y to its member s, stat in g
in A r tic le 9 t hat:
The a sso ci ations f re ely a nd autonomousl y pur sue t he
end s, enjoy i ng for th is pu r p ose leg a l , adm i nis tr ati ve, a nd
fi na nci a l autonomy . A sso ci ation s may not be e x t ing u ished
or hav e the ir a ct iv it ies su spen ded e xcept i n acc orda nce
w ith t he l aw .
In 2 012 , the re v ise d Priv ate As soc iations L aw (De cre e
No . 6/1 2 ) protec ted A ngola n c i t iz ens’ r igh t to const i t ute
as soc iations f reely a nd inde pendentl y , w it hou t inter ference
f rom the author i t ies, w it hi n the c o n fi n e s o f t he law (A BA
2 0 2 3 : 3).
In 2010, the revised (and current) Constitution of the
Republic of Angola again co nstitutionall y enshrined freedo m
of association and organisation. Ar ticle 48 states that
1. Ci t iz en s have t he r ight, f re ely a nd w itho ut depe ndence
on a ny ad mi ni st rat ive aut hor iz at ion, to form a ss oc iat ions,
prov ide d th at t hey a re org a ni z ed on t he ba sis of democ rat ic
pr inc iples , in ac corda nce w it h t he law .
2 . As so ciat ions sh a l l pu rs ue th eir p ur p ose s f reel y , w it hout
inter fe rence f rom publ ic aut horit ies , and m ay not be
d iss olved or t hei r ac ti v i t ies s usp ended , ex cept i n the c as es
prov ide d for by law .
3. No one sha l l b e compe l led to b e pa r t of an a sso ci ation
or co erced b y any me an s to rema in i n it.
4. A ss oc iat ions or a ny gr ouping s who se pu r po ses or
ac t iv itie s a re contr a r y to t he const it ution a l order , i ncite a nd
pra ct ice v iole nce, p romote tr ib a li sm, r aci sm, d ic tators hip,
fa sc ism, a nd xenopho bia, a s we l l as a sso ci ation s o f
a m il ita r y , pa r am i l i t ar y or m il ita r iz e d t y p e sha l l be
prohibited .
In ot her words, t he pri nciples of aut onomy o f NGO s and
c iv il s ociet y orga n isations a nd o f t he n on -in ter ference of
publ i c author i t ies in t he org an isat i on a n d f u nct io n ing of
a ss oc iat ions a nd org a ni sat ions (inc lu d in g in t he sus pe nsion
or d issolution of thei r orga n isations , whic h cou ld o n ly be
done by judic ia l inter v en t io n ) is fi r m ly
es tabl ished, by t he Const it ution
of A ngola a nd by t he Law on
As sociatio ns.
Besides, with the resumption of
the civil war and for the next decade
or so , most NGOs and civil society
organisations (CSOs) in Angola w ere
prior itising humanitarian assistance,
in various for ms. Ther efore, the
inter ventions and activities of NGOs and CSOs wer e
tolerated (had some space), f or so me time.
… An d R eigning In
Howev er , in momen ts of pol itica l ten si on, t he open ing s t hat
had b een es tabl ished by t he Const i t ut i on a nd the l aw were
se en as u nwa r ra n ted by t he reg ime i n power , wh ich s et in
motion va r ious mec ha nisms to reig n i n th is spac e o f ac tion
t hat civ i l so ciet y or ga nis a t io ns a nd NGOs h ad been g r anted.
At the same time, the power of civil society had been
growing in its capacity of ‘ supplementar y action ’, i.e., in
addition to pr oviding social ser vices CSOs and NGOs were
also able to mobilise and organise people, to get support from
the international community , and to f ormulate criticism of
the regime and its policies.
In 1998, this mobilisation of and criticism by civil societ y
groups triggered the r egime to create the T echnical Unit for
the Coordination of Humanit arian A id (Unidade T écnic a de
Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária, U TC AH), established
by pr esidential decree (Decr ee No . 30/98 of 11 S eptember
1988). According to the pr ovisions of the decree, U TC AH
is a public institution (Artic le 1) whose objective is to:
ra is e aw ar enes s of the n ation a l and i nter nat iona l
com mun it y for t he col lec t io n of non- rei mbu rsa ble
donat ions , as we l l as t he mon i tor in g, cont rol,
co ordi nat ion, a nd ev a luat ion of a l l hum an ita r ia n
a ssis ta nce prog ra ms to t he p opu lat ions (A r t icl e 2 ) .
The Con stitutio n and
the l aw o f Angol a
guar an t ees t he free doms
of e xpress ion, as sembly ,
demonstr ation,
and ass oci ation.
6 CMI INSIGHT NUMBER 2, SEPTEMBER 2023
Th is wa s a fi rst move i n t he di rec t i on of ‘ coord in a t in g’ NGO
a ctivi tie s wi th g o v ern m e n t p ri o ri ti es.
Published in the year of the end of the civil war , in 2002
(but only implemented in 2004), another presidential decree
(Decree N o . 84/02 of 31 December) c ame to r egulate even
more rigorously the relativ el y open spa ce that had been
created b y the 1991 Constitution and Law on Associations.
This decree intended to “discipline” NGOs directly and
specificall y (although, for the time being, it lef t out the other
ty pes of associative life and non-state actors like co mmunity
organisations, trade unions, etc.).
The Decree 84/02 established the obligation of NGO
‘ accountabilit y ’ before the institutions of the state . The decr ee
aimed at restricting NGO membership , finances, and politics.
The decree conditio ned the employment of expatriates, it
requir ed NGOs to submit annual activity and financial
reports to U TC AH, inc luding a list of do nations from abr oad,
and it even banned NGOs from taking a ‘ political role’.
Artic le 21, paragr ap h 1 of the decree stated that NGOs are
obliged to “ refrain from the practice of actions of a political
nature”.
In addition to hurting the right
of free association, the 2002 decree
intentionally limited the space of NGOs
even fur ther , by establishing NGOs in a
subordinated assisting r ole: the NGOs
were to be ‘ partners’ of the state and
its institutions, and their activities
were to assist in pr ojects and activities
determined by the state.
In short, Decree 84/02 established g overnmental
super vision of NGOs, exercised b y the Ministr y of Assistance
and Social Reintegration, through the U TC AH, in direct
contradiction of the right of free association guaranteed b y
the 1991 Constitution and granted b y the 1991 Law on
Associations. U TC AH became the g atekeep er , a politic al
instrument of control and repr ession.
F or instance, in Apr il 2007, P edr o W alipi Kalenga, the
then director of the U TC AH, publicl y announced that the
government would soon be closing down the activities of
more than 500 NGOs “ whose projects had ha d no impact
on the lives of the population ” (FI DH 2015: 17).
In July 2007, on the eve of the 2008 general elections,
during a radio inter vie w , Kalenga confirmed his threats
when he accused four major human rights organisations, the
Association Justice P eace and Democr acy (Associação Justiç a,
P az e Democracia, AJPD), Mãos Livres , the Angolan branch
of the Open So ciety Initiative for Souther n Af rica (OSISA),
and the local housing r ights organisatio n SOS-Habit at , of
c laiming human rights abuses to justify their activities while
at the same time carr y ing out actions co ntrar y to the law .
He also accused them of inciting violent rea ction against
government institutions and authorities and threatened to
ban their activities (ibid.).
This happened at the same time as Angola was accused
of several human r ights violatio ns, the enf or ced evictions
and demolition of houses in the Luanda municipalities of
Kilamba Kiaxi and Bairro Cambamba I and II, in March 2006
in particular (and at the same time as Angola was elected as
a member of the UN Human Rights Council (sic)).
In May 2008, the UN Office of the H igh Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Luanda was e ven closed
down after t he A ngolan authorities decided not to renew
the Memorandum of Understanding on the promotio n and
protection of human rights in Angola (OHCHR 2008). In
late 2008, the Angolan authorities then initiated concrete
actions aimed at closing down some of these human rights
organisations or threatening their sustainability .
The organisation Mpalabanda (Civic Association of
Cabinda) had alrea dy been banned and had its offices c losed
in 2006, fol lo wing a decision by the Cabinda P rovincial Court,
due to its alleged involvement in politics and for “incitement
to violence”. Mpalabanda had been
created in 2003 b y repr esentatives
of the Catholic Church, students,
university professors, peasants, local
government leaders, etc., with the aim
of promoting pea ce and respect for
human rights in the Cabinda region.
It had since its creatio n published
reports and documents denouncing the human rights abuses
perpetr ated during the conflict between the government ’ s
armed forces and members of the F ront f or the Lib eration of
the Enclave of Cabinda (FL EC).
Since its f ormation, Mpalabanda members had been
subjected to intimidation and persecution, inc luding arbitrar y
arrests, death threats, and the seizure of passports. Some of
the members have alleg ed ly been victims of torture or mur der
( The N ew Humanitar ian 2006).
Thus, in our opinion, Decree 84/02 is unconstitutional.
F or instance, Ar ticle 4 stipulates that NGOs “ ar e subject
to the super vision of the Ministr y of Assistance and
Social Reintegr atio n ”, Ar ticle 6 stipulates that U TC AH
shall “ monitor , control and super vise the activities of No n-
Governmental Organizations”, and Ar ticle 16 require s NGOs
to be “ author ised to operate” by “the coordinating body ”
(U TC AH). Like wise, it is directly unconstitutional when
NGOs are , according to Artic le 21, obliged to obtain the
approval of its projects b y relevant government ministries and
to be accountable to the provincial governments at the end
of their projects, and not least when NGOs are to “ refrain
from the practice of a ctions of a political nature”.
The pres iden tial decr ee
obli ged N GOs t o
ref rain fr om “ actions
of a po litical na tur e ” .
SUBVER TING THE CONSTITUTION AND CURT AILING CIVIL SOCIETY . ANGOLA ’S NEW LA W ON NGOS. 7
By the same decree , the government also requires full
oversight of domestic fundraising and foreign donatio ns
to NGOs. That is, the NGOs were fr om then on obliged
to “ obtain prior approval fro m the Ministr y ” (through the
U TC AH) in order to “ raise funds or other suppor t fr om the
national and international comm unit y ”,
and to report annuall y on funds r eceived
and future funding forecasts (Artic le 21).
Already in 2009, the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultur al Rights
(CESCR, a body of 18 independent
experts that monitors implementation
of the International Covenant on
Economic, S ocial and Cultural Rights
by its state parties), raised concerns
that Angolan NGOs wer e under strict
super vision and subject to inspections
and coordinati on carr ied out b y the government ag enc y
U TC AH, and that human r ights defenders wer e subject
to various legal and ‘ de facto ’ restrictions. CESCR “ urged
[Angola] to establish the legal guarantees necessar y for NGOs
to continue their activities to pr omote and protect econo mic,
social and cultural rights without ar bitrar y interference and to
guarantee that those responsible for attacks on human rights
defenders are brought to justice” (ISH R 2015: 2).
Likewise, in 2012, the Af r ican Commission on H uman
and P eople’ s Rights (A CHPR) was also concerned about
allegations of persecution of human rights defenders and
recommended that A ngola “ adopt legislative measures to
guarantee freedom of association and ensur e the protection
of human rights defenders” (A CHPR 2012).
In 2013, the UN Co v enant on Civil and P olitical Rights
(C CPR) expressed concern about “ reports of intimidation
and harassment of some non-governmental organisations,
which prevents them from carr ying out their activities” and
recommended that A ngola “take measures to support [the
associations’ activities] and to collaborate with them and to
protect non-g overnmental organisations and their members
from r eprisals” (CCPR 203: 22).
In a report on Angola, the Amer ican Bar Association
(AB A) also finds Decree 84/02 to be “ deeply problematic” as
it provides for excessively bureaucratic r egistration procedures,
excessive state interference, excessive reporting requirements,
and excessive discr etion for the Public Prosecutio n S er vice
to suspend NGOs (AB A 2023: 4).
In 2015, Decree 84/02 was revoked b y another NGO
Regulation, namely the Presidential Decr ee (No . 74/15 of
23 March). This regulation still contained many of the same,
problematic issues (such as bureaucratic r egistration processes,
the compulsor y association of NGOs with the executiv e,
limitations on fr eedom of expression, excessive oversight
powers b y a super visor y body , and excessive discretionar y
grounds for suspension and termination of NGOs b y
administrative order) (AB A 2023: 4). In 2017, this decree was
revoked b y the Constitutional Court on the basis that it had
been passed unconstitutio nall y b y P residential Decr ee, not by
the National Assembly , but the Cour t
dec lar ed that Decree No . 84/02 would
remain in effect until the passing of
specific legislation on NGOs (R FI
2017, T ribunal Constitutional 2017).
The new bill on the Statute of the
NGOs is therefore only the latest
revision of legislation that r estricts
the freedo m of association and shrinks
civic and democratic space in A ngola,
largely by the same legal constraints.
The content of the St atute of the N GOs
law is, with slight changes, the same as that of Decree 84/02
and Decree 74/15 (T r ibunal Constitutio nal 2017).
Unconstit utional
In ou r a na ly sis, t he Statute of the NGO s law i l lust rates t wo
per p et ua l problems of interac tion bet we en the e xec u t ive
bra nch a nd t h e NGO s in A ng o la .
The first is legal, linked to the regime’ s motivation for
proposing and appr oving the law , which reveals both the
intention (political will) to contradict the Constitution of the
Republic and the demonstrated willingness (political action)
to contradict the constitution. The r egime is intentionall y
violating the constitutional pr ovisions of freedom of
association, provided for in Artic le 48 of the Constitution,
which enshrines “the citiz ens’ right to constitute themsel v es
freely and without administrative dependence” and “ without
interference from public authorities”.
The new law contradicts these constitutional granted
freedoms as it pr ovides a state agenc y “the power of
super vision and monitoring ” of NGOs. This administrative
body will be appointed by the P resident of the Republic.
Thus, it introduces a system of administrative super vision,
subjecting NGOs to the discretio n of a body of presidential
nominees (y et unknown). In addition, the law bestows this
agency the power to suspend the activities of any NGO.
Accor ding to its Ar ticle 32:1,
“ Th e act iv it y of NGO s may be s usp ende d by ad mi ni st rat ive
ac t ( ... ) w henev er t here is s tron g ev id ence of i l leg a l ac ts
or ha r m f ul to t he so verei gnt y , s ec ur it y , or integ r it y of t he
Re publ ic of A ngol a ” .
The new b ill on t he
S ta tu t e o f the N GOs is
only t he lat es t v ersion
of l egi sl ation tha t
restr icts the fre edom o f
ass ocia tion and shri nks
civ ic and democr atic
spac e in Ang ola.
8 CMI INSIGHT NUMBER 2, SEPTEMBER 2023
Sus pension by a mere adm in ist rat ive proce ss is
u n const it utiona l be cause it v iolates t he pr inciple of judic ia l
protect ion and re d uce s the g u a ra n tee s o f acc ess to jus tice.
The law also establishes bureaucratic requir ements that
are v er y burdensome for the NGOS , and it introduces a
vague concept of “ sub v ersive action ” which may criminalise
and lead to the suspension of NGO a ctivities, when deemed
“ subversive” by a state administrative agency . Ar ticle 19 of
the law states that NGOs must r efrain “ f rom the practice
of sub v ersive actions or actions likely t o be confused with these” ,
without defining or indicating the cr iteria for what will
constitute “ subversiv e actions”.
The second problem illustrated b y the new law is politic al
and concerns the culture of pow er and control b y the regime
and by the MPLA. The ruling par ty MPLA has its origins in
socialist ideolog y (where the party superseded the state), and
its culture has further been formed in the context of several
internal power struggles (of which 27 May 1977 purges were
the most spectacular , see for instance Roque 2021: 25-27) as
well as by the militarisation and securitisation of the state
and the part y due to the prolo nged civil war .
T ied to the ex ercise of governmental power , which the
MPLA has exercised for mor e than 45 years, the political
attitude of the MPLA has been an unequivocal str uggle
for the maintenance and continuity of its hold on power .
Thus, it has been attacking, by violence as well as by judicial,
financial, and administrative processes, anyo ne – individuals
or organisations – consider ed as a “threat to pow er ” (see for
instance Abreu 2023, Roque 2021:220).
Since 2015, with the worsening of the social and
economic crisis, tr igg ered b y the abr upt fall in the price of
oil, demonstrations and public protests have beco me more
frequent, as well as cr itical public positions of civil society
actors. Increased pr essure compelled the regime to r ethink
how much openness it can tolerate in its legal frame w ork.
Now , in the beginning of João L ourenço ’ s second term,
the regime has r eturned to the same rationale, i.e., the old
strateg y of controlling civil society , at the same time as
(and because) civil societ y in Ang ola has been more active
and able to collaborate in collective action, thus generating
greater impa ct. Despite the restrictions that w ere being
imposed, the NGOs began to pay attention to other areas of
inter vention, such as citiz enship , development, human rights,
assuming their agendas increasingly politicized contours,
in the sense of imply ing debates on r ealit y , identifying
problems and advancing solutio ns. Their incr easing capacit y
has also allowed these actors to pla y a role in monitoring
public policies, contributing to a higher le vel of demand in
terms of ser vice deliver y , transparenc y , and accountability .
P lease note that in our analysis, we ar e distinguishing
between the non-governmental organisations that ar e
aligned with the interests of the state (and the ruling part y),
and those that are not. This distinction makes it possible to
identify the politicall y co-opted and submissiv e organisations
from those that a ct with autonomy and critical c apacity , and
to understand the political culture of power and contr ol.
This is because the distinction is also employ ed by non-
democratic regimes (including in Angola) who perceive ever y
‘ non-submissive’ organisation as being ‘ against the state ’, and
therefore these r egimes are harassing, restricting, and even
criminalising them.
O ur analy sis is in line with the American Bar Association ’ s
analy sis of the law proposition o n the NGOs. The AB A says
that the bill is ‘ stigmatizing ’ NGOs and contains unnecessar y
and vague provisions that may be subject to abuse (AB A
2023:5).
The Bi l l w i l l se ver ely u nder mi ne t he abi lit y of A ngol an
hum an r ig h ts d efender s and c iv i l so ciet y org a ni zat ions to
org a ni ze t hem selv es a nd ope rate f ree ly a nd indep endent ly
in t he de fence of hum an r ig h ts (A BA 2 02 3 : 1 4 ) .
Prot es ting the Law
The suppre ssive mec ha n isms of ha ras smen t , lega l control s,
a nd rest ra ints, a nd ev en the c ri mi na l isin g o f NGO s and c iv il
soc iet y org a nisat ions a re wel l k now n in A n gola. Th e lega l
a nd polit i c a l rest r ict io ns we re docu mented in a 2 0 0 6 st udy
(A m u ndsen a nd Abreu 2 0 0 6 ). Accord ing to prel im ina r y
fi ndi ngs of ou r su r v ey on c iv il s ociet y org an isat ions in A ngol a,
t he cle a r majo r it y ( 6 1 % ) o f t he orga n isat i ons a sked b el ieved
t here were no or ver y sma l l d i fferences b et we en the pre v ious
( dos Sa ntos ) reg ime a nd the fi rs t Lou renço gover n m ent,
43% sa id th a t t he space for c iv i l soc i et y had b ecome a bi t
more rest r icted , and 54 % felt that t he pa r t i c i pat io n of ci v il
soc iet y ( g roups, org a nisat ions and movements ) w as not
va lued by t he gover nment ( w it h anot her 42% say i ng t he
Co ns titu tio n of An gola .
SUBVER TING THE CONSTITUTION AND CURT AILING CIVIL SOCIETY . ANGOLA ’S NEW LA W ON NGOS. 9
gover n men t v a l ued it ‘a l i t t le’ , a nd onl y 4% say i ng ‘y es’ it
wa s va lued) (L A B 202 3 ) .
The recent St atute of the NGOs law has been met with
massive condemnation and pr otests, both when it was
tabled as a bill and af ter it was appr oved (in principle) by
the P arliament in May 2023.
F or instance, on 1 June, a public debate on the law was
organised by the A ngolan CSO umbrella organisation
OMUNGA (entitled “ The F uture of NGOs in the face of
the new proposal for their regulation ”, see OMUNGA 2023),
and the W orking G roup for the Monitoring of Human Rights
(Grupo de T rabalho de Monitoria dos Direitos Humanos,
G TMDH, which is made up of several Angolan org anisations
that work in the pr omotion and defence of human rights)
prepar ed a petition addressed to P ar liament (D W 2023b).
Guilherme Neves, president of the Mãos Livres organisation
and coordinator of the G TMDH said he was suspicious of
an “unconfessed interest ” on the par t of the g overnment and
called the bil l “ another mechanism to silence uncomfortable
voices” (ibid.).
In July 2023, 100 civil society organisations, both Angolan,
regio nal, and international organisations, signed a declar atio n
and started a c ampaign called “Pr otect civic space in Ang ola
– Stop the ne w NGO law ” (CIVIC +264 2023). In additio n
to all of this, there were also other initiativ es taken – such
as engagement with the press, preparations of legal analy sis,
and other advocacy mechanisms to stop the final adoption
of the law .
Some street manifestations also took place in June and
July 2023. Among these w ere a Call for Social Solidarity at the
National Leve l , an appeal for national peaceful demonstrations
to protest against the pr oposed Law on the S tatute of NGOs
(and in protest against the incr ease in fuel prices and the
prohibitio n of zunga (str eet vending)), in 16 of the countr y ’ s
18 provinces on 17 June 2023. This call considered the risk of
seeing imposed “ a ne w NGO law that will r epress, asphyxiate
and eventuall y extinguish the m ultiple civic organizations that,
in Angola, work in places where the ex ecutive resigns fr om
its responsibilities and obligatio ns” ( V oA P or tugês 2023a).
Once again, the 17 June demonstrations were violently
repr essed, with the police using bullets and tear gas,
intimidation and detention and post-dispersion persecutio ns.
A number of protesters wer e arrested in Luanda, Bi é , and
in Benguela, eight y-seven people wer e detained (according
to the Angolan N ational P olice spokesman), and these “ are
expected to be summaril y tried for crimes of r ioting and
disobedience” ( V oA P ortugês 2023b , D W 2023c, Expresso
2023). In Cabinda and L unda the police used pr eventive
detention of activists (L USA 2023a).
In Huambo activists wer e arrested over the days following
the demonstrations. One of them, a young man named Joseph
Ezekiel, stated that his house was invaded b y more than 20
agents who fired shots and thr eatened him with death (D W
2023d). There were several other c lashes between pr otesters
and the police in the af termath of the pr otests, and the media
reported eight people dead, eight wounded, and 135 arrested
(D W 2023a, LUSA 2023b , AngoN oticias 2023).
Human Rights W atc h reported “ grave police abuses against
activists”, c laiming that Ang olan securit y forces have a ctuall y
carr ied out mor e than a doz en unlawful killings and numer ous
other serious abuses against politic al a ctivists and peaceful
protesters since Januar y 2023 (HR W 2023b).
In an inter view on the 2 Jul y 2023, Godinho Cr istóvão ,
a jurist, human rights defender , and executive director
Sta tut e on the Non-G o vernmen tal
Or ganisations (NGOs)
Lei do Es t at ut o das Or g aniz ações Não-
Gov ernament ais ( ONG)
Th e con tent s of t he p rop ose d law t hat have b ee n mo st
cr itic ise d are :
• Th e es t abl ish men t of an ad min is tr ative “ Su pe r vis or y
Bo dy ” w ith t he “p ower of s upe r vi sion a nd
mo nito ri ng ” of NG Os, c ri ticis ed fo r be ing a n
ad min ist r ative b od y of pre sid enti al no min ee s wit h
wide-ranging discretionar y powers th at may b e
su bje ct t o abu se.
• Th is bo dy w ill h ave the p owe r to sa nc tio n NG Os if
th er e is evi den ce of “il leg al ac t s o r har mfu l to th e
sove rei gnt y , se cur it y , or i nteg rit y of t he Re pub lic of
A ngol a” , le avi ng it to t he s t ate ad min ist ra tive ag enc y
to d efin e what t he se “sub ver sive a cti ons ” are , and
th us to c rim ina lise a nd su sp end a ny NG O an d NGO
ac ti viti es o n vag ue al leg atio ns an d wi tho ut following
judic ial processes .
• Th e im pos itio n of seve ra l anti-m one y lau nde ri ng an d
cou nte r -ter ror ism p rovis ion s, in clu din g th e obl iga tion
of ci tizens t o rep or t N GO s “ su spe c ted of m one y
la und er ing o r fina nci ng of te rro ris m” , w hic h will a lso
s tigm ani se an d pos sib ly cr im inal ise N GO s.
• Th e es t abl ish men t of vag ue “duti es” fo r NG Os , like
ref r aini ng fr om su bver sive a c tio ns an d even “ac tio ns
th at cou ld b e pe rcei ved as s uch” a nd “pa r tici pati ng ”
in t he “i mpl eme nt atio n of eco no mic a nd so cia l
pr ogr am s” of th e gover nme nt .
• Re st ric ti ng th e hir in g of per so nn el by hav ing t o
“inf or m ” t he NG O Su pe r vis or y B od y ab out t he h iri ng ,
tr an sf er , a nd d ismi ss al ex pat riat e st aff .
• Th e re qui red b ure au cr atic a nd fin anc ial r equ ire men t s
(reg is tr atio n pro ced ure s, a c tivi t y and fi na ncia l
repor ting requireme n t s on th e or igin a nd us e of
funds/ financial r esources , a udi t s, t ax p aym ent s ,
over sig ht of im po r ted a nd do me sti ca lly a cqu ire d
goo ds , an a cti on p lan fo r th e fol lowi ng yea r ,
as ses sme nt s of pa r tn er shi ps es t ab lish ed , etc .),
cr itic ise d for b ein g unn ece ss ar ily d et ail ed an d
bu rde ns ome , whi ch may p oss ibl y imp ed e so me NG O
operations.
