Why do paratransit operators resist participation in bus rapid transit? Case evidence from Bogota, Mexico City, Johannesburg and Lagos [original]

Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng, Dirk Heinr ichs
Wh y do paratransit operator s resist par ticipation in
b us rapid transit? Case e vidence fr om Bogota,
Me xico City , Johannesb ur g and Lagos
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Asimeng, E. T ., & Heinrichs, D . (2020). Why do par atransit operators resist par ticipation in b us rapid tr ansit?
Case e vidence from Bogota, Me xico City , Johannesburg and Lagos . In T ranspor t Re views (V ol. 41, Issue 1, pp .
115–135). Informa UK Limited. https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2020.1818872.
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Why do paratransit operators resist participation in bus rapid transit? Case e vidence
from Bogota, Mexico C ity, Johan nesburg, and Lagos
Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng 1 ; Dirk Heinrichs 2
1 I nstitute of Urban and Regional Planning, Technische Universität Berlin
2 KfW De velopment Bank, Frankfurt am Main
Abstract
Public transport in cities of the Global South is m ainly provided by paratransit operators who
self-re gulate their services in the absence of ad e quate fo rma l transport supply and due to
weak or no fo rmal regu latory framework and e nfor cement . Paratransit op era tors compete
with each other for p assengers as every passenger translates into profit. Governments in the
Global S outh have sought to reform public transport services through B us Rapid Transit
(BRT) to address the negative externalities associated with pa ratra nsit p ractices. Pa ratransit
operators have been cons ider ed as one of the barriers to public transport reforms such as BRT
without much considerat ion for their style of operations. This n eglec t contributed to their
resistance and low int ere st in pa rticipating in BRT and has even led to opposition.
Consequently, non-consideration of incumbent ope rators in the implementation of transit
reforms h as b ee n one important reason for d elay or failure in their introduction. In this study ,
we identify reasons why para transit opera tors res ist and show low interest in BR T even in
situations where public i nstitutions have opted not to replace th em but r ather invite them to
participate in the reforms. The basis is a case s tudy ana lysis of four cities with different
character istics and different BRT implementati on strategies where paratransit operators
showed resistance and low interest to partic ipate. We identify (1) loss of autonomy,
flexibility, and e stablished practices/routines, (2) f inanc ial and economic r i sk avoidance, and
(3) lack o f trust in government s who ini tiate reforms as a basis fo r their resistance and low
interest. These findings are theoretically substan tiated by org anisational management and
social psychology concepts that explain resistan ce to change. Understanding and recognising
these reasons may help planners in designing more a ppropriate strat egies for paratransit
reforms.
Introduction
Public transport in ci ties of the Global South is mainly provided by priva te individuals who
self- re gulate their servic es in the absence of inadequate formal transport supply and due to
weak or no formal re gulatory frameworks and e nfor cement. These priva tely-owne d public
transport service providers are mainly composed of fleet owners, drivers, and
associations/unions (Cerve ro, 2000). The fleet owners are responsible for the provision of the
fleet, while drivers rent vehicles from the ow ners and take responsib ility for the daily
operations. Fleet owners sometimes work as drivers. The asso ciation/union regulates entry
into the service and routes. Th is kind of transport service is known to be demand responsive,
unscheduled in operation, and func tions through t he services provided by informal operators
hence the term “ informal transport ” (Cervero & Golub, 2007). I n thi s article, we refer to this
type of transport service as “ paratransit ” , a te rm used by Behrens, Mccormick, & Mfinanga

(2016) to refer to the operation of small- to -medium-sized buses, and to dist inguish our case
cities from other info rmal transport s ervices that are not recognised by publi c officials and
therefore illegal. However, most paratransit o pe rations commence as i llega l transport
services.
Paratransit service provi ders often serve areas n eglec ted by formal transport service s and
provide low cost service s without subsi dy from government (Cervero, 2000). With weak to
no regulation or enfor ce ment from public officials and moneta ry gain as their focus,
paratransit operators ofte n aggressively compete for passengers causing fatal accidents in the
process. Para tr ansit opera tors neither maintain formal acc ounting and savings to be
creditworthy for loans to renew their fleet, nor do they follow routine maintena nce. In
consequence, fleets are in a dilapidated state, contributing to low safety and comfort for
passengers and high levels of air pollution (Cervero & Golub, 2007; Venter, 2013).
In recent t imes, following the exa mple of Curitiba and Bogota, public officials have sought to
reform p ara tr ansit public transport by introducing bus ra pid transit ( BRT ) . BRT is a form o f
mass transit which appli es the speed and reliability as sociate d with r ail transport but benefits
from the lowe r cost o f implementation a nd flexi bility of bus services (Deng & Nelson, 2011).
Public officials have used BRT with the objective to regulate , address the problems and
negative externalities associated with paratransit operations, and ensure efficiency in publi c
transport within their jurisdiction (Cerve ro, 2 013; H. Schalekamp & B e hrens, 2010) .
However, reforms with BRT implementation have encountered planning, implementation a nd
operational challenges related to institutional, fina ncial, legal, and political concerns (Hidalgo
& Graftieaux, 2008; Lin dau, Hidalgo, & Lobo, 2 014; Poku -Boansi & Marsden, 2018; Wood,
2015).
In pursuit of these reforms, one planning dilemma public of ficials face is whether to include
or exclude incumbent pa ra transit operators. Non -inclusion of incumbent paratransit ope ra tor s
may result in faster implementation, allow for competitive bidding and selection of operators
with the required capital investment who can offer efficient s ervic es at a lower cost.
However, non-inclusion may result in incumbent operators grinding the city to a halt
provided they have th e numbers as observed in Quito (Chrustie et al. , 2006). I n
Johannesburg, gunmen opened fire on a BRT bus thre e d ays a fte r opening to express
disapproval of the BRT opera ti ons while negotiations on former operators participation w ere
on-going (Ve nter, 2013). While it is recommended to include incumbent o pera tors to ensure
political fea sibility of BRT implementation (Ardila-Gome z, 2004; A rdila, 2005), there is also
the position that they should not be given veto power over aspects of reforms that might
ultimately escalate c ost or affect service quality ( IT DP, 2017).
To e nsure successful implementation of BRT , some public officials support incumbent
paratransit operators to participate in the BRT. Despite the support for incumbent operators
for bidding processes or making them overt ope ra tors without bidding, r esistance and low
interest in participating i n BRT has been observ ed across th e Global Sout h (Dode ro, Casello,
Molinero, & Vazque z, 2 013; Paget -Se ekins, Flores Dewey, & Munõz, 2015; H. Schalekamp
& Behrens, 2010; Wijaya , I mr an, & Mcneill, 2017). An official of Mexico City is reported as
saying, “ about 95% o f the BRT project was spent on negotiations with inc umbent paratransit

operators while the rest was business as usual like any project” ( Flores, 2016 p26 ).
Experience to-date shows that simply involving pa ratransit operators in BRT has not curtailed
resistance. Th e gen era l ly low interest in for mal op era ti on can be surprising as the ac tivities of
informal workers such as paratransit service providers are characterised by long working
hours, unreliable in comes, limited access to legal protection and lo w social standing
(Andrews, Sanchez, & Jo hansson, 2011). On the contrary, formal services largely provide job
security, regular income, and other benefits.
While there are seve ral studi e s on paratransit operations and BRT, those that have
particularly examined the interests of paratransit operators rel a tive to BRT and the underlying
reasons are few. Thes e studi e s have focused on the attitude of pa ratransit operators to reforms
in the city of Cape Town (H. Schalekamp & M cLac hlan, 2016; H. V. Schaleka mp, 2015) ,
incumbent operators willi ngne ss to participate in transit im prove ments in Mexican cities
(Dodero et al., 2013), and using the life-cyc le analogy to analyse reasons behind successful
participation of incumbe nt operators in Johannesburg (Venter, 2013). This limited attention is
surprising since paratransit operators ’ resistance and low interest in BRT have been widely
reported in cases where they have been included or excluded in reforms with BRT .
In this study , we id entify common explanations for pa ratransit operators’ resistance and low
interest in BRT to know whether paratransit operators are inherently against participating in
reforms such as B RT. We systematically exam ine BRT implementation in four cities in a
retrospec tive manne r. T he selection of c a ses i s based on cities whe re public officials
supported incumbent paratra nsit operators to participate in a new bus o perating company
(BOC) for the BRT and not attempted to replace them. The s elec tion o f cases consulted th e
BRT planning guide ( IT DP, 2017) which provides a selected list of cities and their
corre sponding BRT operator ownership type as shown in table 1.
Table 1: selected BRT operator ownership types and cities where incu m bent paratransit operators were supported (ITDP,
2017 p551)

BRT city and country

Operator ownership type

Lite BRT, Lagos-Nigeria
Metrobus, Mexico City lines I and II-M exic o
Guayaquil-Ecuador
Rea Vaya, Johannesburg - South Africa

Former mini-bus operators formed into companies

Transmilenio, Bogotá-Columbia
Guadalajara-Me xico
Perreira-Colombia
Mio, Cali -C o l o mbia

Former mini-bus operators formed into companies
+
Mixed former mini-bus and private investors

MiCiTi, Cape Town-South Africa

Former mini-bus operators formed into companies
+
Former private bus companies under new contract

Metrobus line III-Mexico
Transjarkata, Jakarta-Indonesia

Former mini-bus operators formed into companies
+
Outside investor, tru c k, or intercity bus operator

Metrobus line IV and V-Mexico

Mixed former mini-bus and private investors

We focus on two Latin American cities (Bogotá and Mexico City) and two cities in Africa
(Johannesburg and Lagos). These cities differ in size, socioeconomic char ac teristics, services
of paratransit op era tors before reform and the BR T implementation strategy. Nevertheless,
they all had a substantia l number of paratransit opera tors prior to reform and their publi c

officials opted to suppo rt the incumbent operators during the BRT implementation. The
analysis considers both the ch a racteristics of services provided by p a ratransit operators before
the introduction of BRT as well as their function within the B RT. Data for the city cases
come from published English reports and articles desc ribing (1) operators and servic es of
public transportation before reforms (2) overview of refor ms with the inclusion of incumbent
operators (3) incumbent operators’ reasons for re sistanc e and not joining reforms. We then
identify similarities and differences betw ee n the cases with e mphasis on the causes of
paratransit operators ’ resistance and low interest in BRT ac ross the cases. This int e rpretation
is guided by organisational management and social psychology conc epts that explain
resistance to change and low interest in re forms.
Theoretic c onsiderations for r esistance to change
Resistance to c hange has long been considered as critical for the success or otherwise of any
reform e ff ort. Subsequen tly, several studies have been conducted to understand why people
resist c hange and wha t can be done to alleviat e resistance to change. Coch & Frenc h (1948)
identified that resistance emanate from the context in which change takes place , an d
encoura ging participation in decision making o f people who will be affected by c hange
significantly reduces resistance. Festinger, (1957 ) later sought to underst and how and why
resistance arises and de ve lop ed the theory of cognitive dissonance. The theory states that
people try to be consistent in their attitude and behaviour and therefore when they sense
inconsistency, they feel frustrated and un comfor ta ble with the situation (A cha rya, Blackwell,
& S e n, 2018; Edd ie Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019). Thus, pe ople will acti vely resist situations
and information likely to increase discom for t or diss onanc e (Burnes, 2014) . Therefore if an
organisation ini tiates a c ha nge that clashes with the attitude, belie fs and pra ctices of those
concerned, it will meet resistance unless those c once rned change their att itude (Burnes &
Jackson, 2011; Burnes & James, 1995).
Since participation is known to reduce resistan c e, Miles & Schmuck, (19 71) showed in their
work that the level of inv olvement is re lated to the psychological impact of the change. Later,
Huse (1980) exploring the relations hip between involvement and ps yc hological impact
revea led that the g rea ter the depth of the i nterve ntion, the more it im pa cts on the
psychological makeup and persona lity of the individual, and the greater the nee d for the full
participation for the a cceptance of change. To support this, another study s howed that people
who experienced high le ve ls of pa rtic pation tended to report higher readiness and acceptance
of change, and considered change as less stressful and exhibited overall support for the
change (Ore g, Vakola, & Armenakis, 2011).
Further findings on resistance to change show that individuals differ in t heir acceptance or
resistance to change (Oreg, 2003, 2006) . Oreg’s work on dispositional resistance contends
that individuals who are less likely to initiate change are also li kely to re sist any form of
change. To this end, the resistance to change sc ale was deve loped to measure personality
factors that influence r esistanc e to change wh ich was validated in different situations,
cultures, continents and countries ( Or eg, 2006; Oreg et al., 2008). The resistance to change
scale comprises of routine see king, e motional re action, short -term focus, and cognitive

rigidity. These personality traits are known to predict resistance to change better than age,
gender a nd work experience (Laumer, Maier, Eckhardt, & Weitzel, 2016).
Recent findings on control of decision rights have shown that people largely value their
decision rights a nd under risk uncertain conditions some people a re willing to lose money to
retain their decision rights (Bartling, Fehr, & Herz, 2014; Bobadilla -Suarez, Sunst e in, & Tali,
2017; Owens, Grossman, & Fac kler, 2014). E arlier, (Conner, 1992) had asserted that the loss
of control of d ecisions was the primary cause o f resistance to ch a nge. In situations where
people have power and control of their decisions, a later reallocation or sharing of decision
rights becomes a reason for re sistance.
Case studies with inclusion of incumbent paratransit operators in BRT
Bogotá, Colombia
Public transport before reform (operators and services)
Prior to operation of the BRT system Transmilenio in 2000, over 22,000 r egistere d vehicles
for urban public transport operated privately in Bogota under 64 differe nt bus companies
(Ardila-Gomez, 2004). The bus companies had route concessions granted by the city
government though they were not required to o wn the entire bus fleet. The fleet could be
considered obsolete as the average age was 14 years (Hidalgo, 2004). Most of the buses were
owned by independent investors requi re d to affiliate with a bus company , so they could use
the route assigned to the bus company. The bus companies de rived their i ncome from the bus
owners who then derived their income from the bus drivers who rented t he buses. The bu s
drivers generated their revenues directly fr om pas senge rs. This c hain re sult ed in competition
among drivers even from the same company as they tr ied to make their daily rent of th e
buses. To increase revenues, the bus companies designate d more vehicles than passenger
demand required on the routes assigned to them by the c ity government (A rdila, 2007;
Gilbert, 2008; Rodriguez, Peralta-Quirós, Guzman, & Cárdenas Reyes, 2017). The inability
of the city government to regulate the supply of buses led to oversupply increasing
congestion and the “penny war”

.
Reforms with inclusion of incumbent operators in BRT
Reforms with BRT w ere initiated in 1999 by Bogota’s Mayor who sought to address the
safety of commuters concerning the penny war which is due to bus- to -bus competition,
ensure transport efficiency and reduce transpo rt-related emissions (UNDP , 2008). The plan
for the introduction of the BRT wa s to reform city-wide public transportati on on a corridor by
corridor b asis through a n open bidding process with priority to incumbent opera tors in th e
form of local experienc e on bus operations in B ogotá as on e crite rion for bidding (H idalgo &
Graftieaux, 2008; S a ndoval & Hidalgo, 2004). Capital commitment and international
experience in bus operation were additional requirements. When the first t wo corridors were
crea ted, the incumbent companies initially resisted the reforms because they were not used to

Penny war: the situation where p ara transit drivers aggressively compete for passengers as
each potential pa ssenger adds to their daily revenue.

compete in bidding processes, to sign concession contracts and to take risks involving large
investments required for bus operating companies (BOCs) as required for BRT (Hidalgo &
Graftieaux, 2007). Eventually, some managers of the existing companies opted to collaborate
and to form new companies to participate in the BRT, either as shareholders or as ope rators
of the newly created com pa nies. Others challenged the reforms legally whi le some continued
their old way of operation (Ardila, 2007). Opposit ion also came from incumbent flee t owners
as th ey did not have the opportunity to participate due to their inability to meet the capital
demand. To address thi s, subsequent corridors required the new BOCs to include a
perce ntage of incumbent bus owners (Ardila-Gomez, 2004).
The implementation of Transmilenio brought seve ral changes to public transport service and
transit in general (Ardila - Gomez, 2004; A rdila, 2 005). The incumb ent companies were first
required to form larger companies and own all the bus es th e y operate which was different
from their previous experience of owning only about 10% of the bus fleet. Old buses were to
be scrapped for ev e ry n ew bus put on the BR T corridor. The new bu s companies w er e
required to incorporate and train incumbent paratransit bus drivers on customer care and
institute routine skil ls development which was not the case for th e old op erations. Wh erea s in
the old system routes were assigned to bus companies, Transmilenio developed new routes on
a trunk-and-feeder basi s. The companies were paid based on kilometres covered. A n
electronic payment syst em was installed for all Transmilenio buses to reduce leakages in
revenue and operators were paid monthly as w a s required with formal jobs.
Reasons for resistance and not joining the BRT
There are several reasons for the reluctance of incumbent opera tors to joi n Transm ilenio.
First, the paratransit companies in their previous experie nce were only re quired to be certified
as public transport companies without enforced l imitations on years of operating and
therefore limited concession contracts b ecame an obstacle to BRT (Ardila-Gomez, 2004 ) .
Secondly, joining Transmilenio meant th at the incumbent companies had to meet the require d
capital investment through merging with other companies or private inve stors resulting in a
loss of their original autonomy. Moreover, the companies fe ared the risk of investing a large
amount of money for bus acquisition and the political risk that the gov ernment might fail
with it s commitment of involving incumbent operators (Ardila-Gomez, 2004; Hidalgo &
Graftieaux, 2007). A third reason for the incumbe nt company reluctance w as the loss of high
revenue s obtained from the possi bility to increase supply capacity by introducing new buses
in their traditional operation. Transm ilenio’s setup wa s su ch that the BOCs could not
introduce new buses as before and therefore los t this extra source o f rev e nue when join ing .
Some incumbent companies had the perception that public officials were n ot going to enforce
regulations on limi ting the introduction of new bu ses and adopted the “wait and see” attitude .
Ardila (2007), argues that some bus companies expec ted a weaknesses of city officials to
enforce legislation whereas the incentives in paratransit operations w ere too strong for man y
incumbent operators. This reinforced paratra nsit o pe rators’ low interest in reforms with BRT.
The BRT reform required new buses and large r fleet sizes for its oper a tion. Most of the
vehicles used in the in cumbent oper a tion were most ly procured and owned by p rivate
investors while the reform required BOCs to own 100% of the flee t (Ardila-Gomez , 2004;

Gilbert, 2008). Since the incumbent fleet owners did not have the financial investment and
the B OCs were not re quired to incorporate the former fleet o wners and their fleet, t his group
w as not recognised by some of the BOCs at the initial stages and was therefore ex cluded.
Thus, some of the incumbent fleet owners could not join the re forms due to their lack of
capital and non-recognit ion by the BOC s resulting in protests (Hidalgo, 2004; Hidalgo &
Graftieaux, 2007).
Mexico City, Mexico
Public transport before reform (operators and services)
Public transport in Mexico Cit y prior to B RT implementation could be c hara ct erized by an
increasing numbe r of po orly regulated vehicles and high average tr ave l times due to traffic
congestion (Hidalgo & Graftieaux, 2006) . Though a state-regulated publ ic transport supply
had existed for d ecades (metro a nd bus), decreasing investment and weak regulation led to a
deteriora tion of the system resulting in the rise of a paratransit bus-based public transport to
meet the g rowing demand and urban expansion. This para transit service, which only emerged
to provide parallel servi ce s to the state-sponsor e d public transport, increased its share of
vehicle trips from 3.3 % to 54% between 1972 to 2000 (Rogat, Dhar, Jos hi, Mahadevia, &
Mendoza, 2015). C ity o fficia ls provid e d permits and concessions to the paratransit servic e
providers organised through routes or syndicates but operated in a self-regulated manner
except fixing the fares, which was regulat e d at the national level. The route organisation
leaders represented the i ntere sts of owner-drivers , the fleet owners who lease their vehicl e s,
and drivers who rent ve hicle s. Low barriers to join route associations, fairly lower cost of
operations compared to formal operations coupled with high economic incentives on the part
of route associations le d to an oversupply of the paratransit fleet (Hidalgo & Graftieaux,
2006). Thus, paratransit operation became abund ant. While it me t transpo rt demand without
government subsidy, it was simultaneously polluting, inadequately maintained and unreliable
(Flore s, 2016).
Reforms with inclusion of incumbent operators in BRT
BRT was perceived by the Mayor and his team in 2002 as a means to regulate the ubiquitous
paratransit a nd to address the prevailing problems associated with paratransit opera ti ons
including air pollution in Mexi co City (Flores, 2016; Hidalgo & G raftieaux, 2006). M e trobus,
a new public agency w as formed to take responsibilit y for overall planning and regulation of
BOCs on the proposed BRT corridors. The plan was to incrementally implement the BRT on
a corridor by corridor basis with the inclusi on of incumbent p ara tr ansit operators as
mandatory participants. Public officials opted to commence with the BRT on a corridor
dominated by one paratra nsit route organisation with over 200 one - man-one-bus operators
(H idalgo & G raftieaux, 2006) . Previous unf ulfilled promises of governm ents had m ade the
paratransit operators scepti ca l of new promises resulting in ini tial resistance. Negotiations
with the route organisation for the first BRT corridor lasted over a year mainly due to internal
negotiations between the different owner-drivers. Their main conce rns we re (1) the
substantial investments they would be expected to contribute , (2) the possibility of reduced
income, and (3) the possibility of losing control of th e new BRT company (Flores, 2016) .

Only later when issues of the BRT im pleme ntation were clarified did they embrace the
reforms.
City authorities assuaged their fears by ensuring that the incumbent rout e organisation w as
the only BOC involved in the reforms without tender. RT P, the public bus company on the
corridor was not permitted to increase its share of vehicles to more than 25%, and the price
per kil ometr e of the new servic e paid to eac h stakeholder included a monthly fixed payment
equivalent to their previo us ave r age income as paratransit operators (Flores , 2016). A vehicle
substitution sche me w as used to scrap about 180 para transit vehicles and the money was used
as down-payment for the BRT buses. Since the implementation and operation of BRT on the
first corridor in 2005, other corridors have been implemented. The city officials adopted a
marginally diffe rent app roa ch to subsequent implementations by a pplying a measure of fo rc e
and reduced financial incentives compared to the first corridor because it was expensive to
offer similar be nefits ( F lores & Zegras, 2012).
BRT implementation brought changes to public transport operation and pu blic transportation
in general. Inc umbent paratransit operators were required to fo rm B OCs before they could
operate on the BRT corridors. Thus, the previous route -based paratransit o rganisations either
merged with other route organisations or with private investors to form a BOC except for the
first corridor wh ere only one route organisation formed the BOC. Severa l incumbent fleets
were scrapped, reducing the overall number o f minibuses as they were r eplac ed with a new
larger fleet ( Va rela, 20 15). Th e incumbent operators were involved i n different forms
depending on the corridor. The first two corridors had only paratransit operators who fo rmed
companies. The BOC of the third corr idor was composed of incumbent operators and an
intercity bus operator, whereas th e four th , fif th and six th corridors had a mix of incumbent
operators a nd private investors (I TDP, 2017).
Reasons for resistance and not joinin g the BRT
Reasons for resistance and not joining differed for each corridor. For the first and second
corridors, the concerns of paratransit operators were the high financial investment
requirements, a possible lower income compared to their paratransit ope ra tion, a nd a possible
loss of c ontrol of ope ration to another operator (Flores, 2016). During imp lementation of the
third corr idor, incumbent opera tors were required to contribute more of their funds to support
the purchase of BRT bus es and to accept lower guaranteed payments compared to the first
and second corridors. T his beca me a ca use for resistance and opposition to the reforms
though they eventually acce pted the terms and joined. Incumbent operators again threatene d
not to joi n during the four th corridor when it became obvious they could not m ee t the
investment requirements and therefore had to partner with an intercity bus operator (Flores,
2016). They perceived the presence of the private bus opera tor , wh o had the required
financial investment, as a first step towards an outside company displacing them throughout
the city.
Although some of the d rivers of the incumbent pa ra transit services were employed as drivers
of the BRT , some had to leave and c ontinued as paratransit drivers or work in other func tions

of the BRT. Since BRT thrives on efficiency and therefore results in a reduction in th e
number of paratra nsit ve hicle s, not all drivers of paratransit could participate.
Johannesburg, South Africa
Public transport before reform (operators and services)
Paratransit services eme rge d around the l a te 19 60s and gr e w to a shar e of about 75% of
public transport trips in Johannesburg prior to publi c transport reforms with BRT (Allen,
2013). Woolf & Joubert (2013) report ed that the service em erge d after year s of segregation in
South Africa had resulted in extreme congestion at train stations for potential black
commuters who had less space in th e train cabins despite their larg e nu mbers compared to
white commuters. Bla ck pe ople who had private c ars begun to tr a nsport s trande d p assengers
for a fee and th e n many minibus e s started to ope ra te illegally in unse rve d rural areas. Aft er
failed attempts to end mi nibus operation, they were recognised by l aw and permitted to
operate on a limi ted ba sis. Later, the transport deregulation Act of 1988 a nd the road traffic
Act of 1989 resulted in dere gulation of entry into the public transport service s resulting in a
surge in number of p e rmits by over 1000% (Khosa, 1991). The de re gulation Act gave local
authorities the responsib ility of regulating the indus try through byelaw s (Boudreaux, 2006;
Woolf & Joubert, 2013). Area-permits were issued to commercial operators of minibuses.
The new gove rnment est ablished after the apartheid regime sought to organise the fr a ctured
minibus industry int o one entity to lower the internal competition (Barr ett, 2003; Woolf &
Joubert, 2013). First ly , the area permits were changed into route -ba sed p ermits. Secondly, a
democratic stru cture was adopted where le ade rs were vot ed for a 4 -year renewable term at
the local, regional, pro vincial, and national l evels. The n ational bo dy that facilitates
negotiations with the government is the South African National Taxi Council ( SANTACO)
made up of most of the minibus associations with democratically elec ted executives.
Historically, since the minibus business is what black people could en gage in be fore and
during apa rtheid, it is seen as a symbol of re sistance to the period of oppressi on. The minibus
service re mains individual or family-owned entrepreneurial enterprise. To enter the business
is easy and simply requ ire s a minibus, a pe rmit, and an arrangement with an unemployed
person, mainly a family member to drive. There are two main salary structure s relate d to
mini-bus operation (Woolf & Joubert, 2013). Firstly, the owner estimates the daily revenue
from operating a minibus excluding fuel and requests weekly check-in earnings from the
driver of which the driver keeps 30% as salary . Since there are no me asures to verify the
exact earnings of the driver, the extra earning remains with the driver. Secondly, the owner
prices the check-in amo unt higher than the estimated weekly av era g e r ate and the driver i s
required to bring in the amount without a claim to any portion early in the wee k . Th e driver
then keeps the amount made in the remaining da ys of the week. This provi des in centives for
extreme competition between drivers to generate more revenue and to meet daily or weekly
rent of the fleet resulting in protection of routes as it literally translates into profits. Numerous
armed conflicts hav e ensued between d rivers and associations for territorial control resulting
in deaths (Barrett, 2003; Dugard, 2001; Khosa , 1991).
Reforms with inclusion of incumbent operators in BRT

The re for ms to introduce B RT are d riven at the national level mainly by two instruments
(Boudreaux, 2006; H. V . Schalekamp, 2015) . One instrument is the Ta xi Recapitalisation
Programme introduced in 2000 but became oper ational in 2006 seeks to replace old vehicles
with new ones suitable for public tra nsport . The other instrument is the conversion of old
area-base d lic ense s to route-based permits through the National Land Transport Transition
Acts introduce d in 2000 and 2009 . The idea i s to limit incumbent paratransit opera tors to
specific routes to avoid viol e nt clashes on lucrative routes wh ere there are no clearly d e fined
boundaries of op e rations. To ensure that the implementation of the BR T syst em in
Johannesburg, called R ea Vaya, is successful, city officials in mi d-2007 entered into a
dialogue with 18 route associations of paratransit operators who were to be affected by the
first corridor (McCaul & Ntuli, 2011). The plan was that incumbent operating associations
would withdraw their v ehicles fr om th e BRT corridor and in return become operators of the
new system through the formation of a B OC. Un ce rtainty of incumbe nt p ara transit ope rators
on the impli ca tions of the withdrawal of their operation on the corridor resulted in resistance
and violence. Eventually, operation of the BRT commenced in 2009 with the drivers of the
paratransit and others no minated by the p ara transit owners who had receiv e d training for thi s
purpose. How ever, the s ervic e was m anage d by a private company a s the city officials were
still in ne gotiations wit h the paratransit a ssociations representatives. Affected incumbe nt
operator asso ciations finally formed a BOC and took over management of BR T buses in
February 2011 (Allen, 2013; McCaul & Ntuli, 2011).
Displaced incumbent dri vers were either employ e d in the new services or compensated to
leave th e BRT corridor. 313 paratransit fleet owners became shareholders of the new
company in a trunk-and -feeder network with a 12 -ye ar service contract (Venter, 2013) . Each
incumbent fleet owner on the BRT corr idor wa s required to submit the old fleet under the
reca pitalisation prog ra mme for an amount of money and invest the allow a nce in th e BOC as
working capita l. As part of the BRT scheme, incumbent opera tors were entitled to receive
compensation comparabl e to their paratransit operation in the first four years of the BRT to
commensurate with their earlier ear nings. The city government assumed the risk of demand
as the operators we re paid per kilometre of service offered (McCaul & Ntuli, 2011).
Reasons for resistance and not joining the BRT
Paratransit operators’ mistrust of government intentions to support them has been a major
reason for the ir low acce ptanc e of BRT. Governments in the past had tried to eliminate them
while their resistan ce enabled their survival . Therefore, the operators were averse to any form
of government reform. Furthermore, incumbent p ara tr ansit operators perceive their services
as a symb ol of power that withstood the period of apartheid. The operators consider
themselves as black entr e preneurs who we re able to create the ir priv ate b usiness during the
oppressive period of apartheid and do not unders tand why the post -aparth eid regime shoul d
try to remove them a lthough by including them in the BRT. The feeling of incumbent
operators as legitimate p rovide rs of the service is exacerbated by the rem oval of paratransit
fleet on BRT corr idors.
Furthermore, the paratransit operators believe th at public officials consider their services a
problem for which BR T is the cure (Woolf & Joubert, 2013). The approach adopted by the

government to consider paratra nsit reforms as a national agenda w as perceived by the
operators as a grand agenda to eliminate them while the non-involvement of the national
association, SANTACO in the local negotiations in Johannesburg for the first corridor was
considered a thr eat to their operations. Paratransit drivers and fle e t owners operat e in
Johannesburg through different route associ ations which protect their daily reve nue by
ensuring that no foreign operator ope ra tes on their rout e, sometimes through violence
(Venter , 2013 ). The fear of losing this individual advantage when merging into a larger BOC
could be a reason for opposing the BRT.
Lagos, Nigeria
Public transport before reform (operators and services)
Following the gradual collapse of state-o wned pu blic transport, the existin g privately owned
and self-regulated services took over the provisi on of mot orised public t ransport be for e the
BRT implementation with 82% mini and mi d i -buses, 13% taxis and 5% motorcycles
(Olukoju, 2004; The World Bank, 2011). Lagos had about 75,000 mini and midi-buses with
most of them in a state o f ill -repair due to the nature of op eration which fa vours profits at the
expense of maintenance and safety (Agbiboa, 2017). The paratransit operators typically
favour short journeys to make more money as their revenue is based on the number of people
per trip and therefore wit h short journeys, more people transfer (Mob ereola, 2009). As a
result, Ibitayo (2012) reports that 65% of commuters surveyed in a study made more than 3
transfers from origin to destination. The paratransit operation is generally characterised by
drivers picking up or dro pping passengers in the mi ddle of the road, driving against the traffic
to pick up passengers, vehicle breakdowns and accidents. W eak regulation from public
officials coupled with high revenue through a driver’s ability to attract more passengers had
resulted in extreme com pe tition on the road in the absence of an efficient mass transport
system.
The National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) which represents the int erest of
drivers and workers is the dominant organisation in urban paratransit public transport
services. The NURTW i s a national body organised at the lo cal level with administrative
functions. The day- to -day operation is managed by the NURTW at the terminals where
drivers pay re gistration fee s and for eac h terminal departure on a fill-and-go basis
(Mobereola, 2009). I n L agos, t he local NURTW exercise less control once the vehicle has
left the terminal. Most of the fle et used for paratransit ope ration are leased by owne rs to the
drivers who p ay an agreed daily rental fee. The owner is responsib le for maintenance, major
repairs and covers fixed costs such as li ce nse an d insurance. The driver, on the other hand,
covers operating costs such as hiring a conductor, fuel and minor repairs (Mobereola, 2009).
Reforms with inclusion of incumbent operators in BRT
The Lagos BRT-lite at its inception opera t ed on a 22km road with 65% segre gated roadway,
20% road markings and 15% mixed traffic. The BRT was commenced in March 2008 to
reduce th e ne gative consequences of the fragment e d , costly, unsafe and unreliable paratransit
system (Mobereola, 2009; Otunola, Kriticos, & Harman, 2019). This B RT d id not have
scheduled tr ave l time but move d as -a nd-when it got full. LA MATA, the institution

responsible for public tra nsport reforms with BRT in Lagos, from an e arly time of the
reforms onwards opted to support the incumbent para transit ope ra tors in the BRT as a
previous public transport reform had failed at I koy i/Victoria due to ineffective engagement
with incumbent paratransit operators. Moreover, an ea rlier study had show n that the
incumbent operators wer e not op en to regulatory control and could frustrate reforms. Thei r
participation was considered mandato ry and therefore LAMATA decided to support the m
through the p ara transit u nion, NURTW (Otunola et al., 2019). The leade rship of NURTW
w as further tasked to identify vehicle types suitable for BRT operations considering road and
transport conditions in Lagos, and affordable for incumbent fleet owners (Mobereola, 2009).
Generally, the BRT in Lagos required the contribut ion of the incumbent para tr ansit Union
and fleet owne r’ s financial investment in acquiring a ne w fleet, and tra ining of incumbent
drivers to operate the new fleet. NURTW was a ble to procure 100 buses to operate in the
BRT and later lea sed 120 buses from LAGBUS (a state bus company) to satisfy the
additional demand as it could not ra ise credit for the additional buses (Mobereola, 2009;
Otunola et al., 2019). The leadership of NURTW assumed commercial risk for payment of
the buses but were confident of meeting the cost due to expec ted high patronage due to
relative low er transport fares and reduced travel time (Mason-Jones & Cohen, 2012;
Mobereola, 2009; Otunola et al., 2019). Unli ke most B RTs, the invol vement of incumbent
paratransit operators did not happen in the form of managing a limited liabilit y BOC . Rather,
the existing transport U nion wa s recognised as owning buses with incumbent paratransit
drivers as drivers of BRT whiles LAMATA manages, controls, and reg ulate s the system.
After im plementation, pa per tickets we re issued at terminals for commuter s before boa rding .
Digital fare collection w a s established in 2018 (Amiegbebhor, Ak ara kiri, & Dickson, 2016;
Soyombo, 2018). There was no form of dir ec t removal of vehicl es in Lagos like in the
previous cases. As resul t, most of the existing p aratra nsit operators ran parallel to the B RT.
However, they were forb idden to use the d edica ted BRT lane (Mobereola, 2009). The d rivers
of the BRT were not paid per passenger as done in para tr ansit service s.
Reason for resistance and not joining
There was no direct res istance to the BRT. Public officia ls had realised from a previous
reform experience that in cumbent paratransit ope rators were not will ing to change their styl e
of operations and therefore opted to wholly support them to participate in the BRT w ithout
relocation of paratransit fleet from the corridor. Alt hough paratra nsit operator’s lack of
formal savings and non-bookkeeping affected their ability to access credit to acquire more
BRT vehicles, public officials further addressed this by lea sing vehicles to them so they coul d
have adequate buses for the BRT (Mobereola, 2009). Publi c officials ensured that paratransit
operators who could not participate in the BRT were able to op era te as before without any
changes except that they were not allowed to use the dedica ted right-of-way of the BRT
lanes. This meant that many incumbent drivers who could not find em ploym ent or did not
want to be part of the BR T we re able to continue their paratransit operation on the s ame
corridor. Not much changed for the p ara t ransit fleet owners as w ell. They could offer their
fleet to drive rs either on the BRT route or on a different route. While th ose who wanted to
join the BRT did, it remained business as usual for those who preferred not to join. It has

been reported that para tr ansit fleet operating parallel to the BRT occasionally encroach on th e
BRT dedicated lane aff e cting the reliability of the BRT (Banjo & Mobereola, 2012; Orekoya ,
2010).
Discussion
The four cases demonstrate that indeed the three groups – company/association/union, fleet
owners, and drivers – c ollectively referred to as para transit operators were responsible fo r
more than 50% of public transport s ervices in thei r respective cities prior to reforms. It is the
company/association/union group that public officials engaged with when introducing the
BRT. As demonstrated in table 3, drivers in all four cities competed for passengers making
unsafe driving one of the key reform target. P ublic officials in all studie d cities enabled the
incumbent operators to g et involved in operating the BR T, either by invitin g them to operate
or (in the case of Bogotá) by offering fa vourable conditions to them in the compet itive tender
processes. The approach differed to some extent. Planners in Bogotá and Johannesburg
adopted an inc re mental corridor-by-corridor implementation in a trunk a nd feeder
arra ngement. In Mexico Cit y, a mi x of trunk only and trunk and feeder systems w ere
implemented. Lagos concentra ted on the imple mentation of trunk opera tion along a new
corridor. Except for Lagos where paratransit operators were p e rmitted to continue their
service as b efore , the reforms forced incumbent operators to substantially change their
operation model.
All paratransit operators who joined the BRT gav e up their self-regulation and therefore the
flexibility associated wi th their incumbent opera tions. Apart from Lagos, the incumbent
operators on the B RT corridor were r equire d to g ive up their paratransit operation to join the
BRT which resulted in resistance . The removal o f the old fleet from the BRT corridor took
more than a year o f negotiations before incumben t operators could a gree t o participate in the
BRT except for Lagos. Furthermore, the long period spent on negotiations was due to
resistance from the incumbent operators a nd an overall low interest to participate in reforms
with BRT. Despite resistance in B ogota, M e xico City and Johannesburg, some incumbent
operators joined the BRT. Although some paratransit operators joi ned the B RT on the
corridor in Lagos, the po ssibility to continue their paratransit operation co upled with limited
capital investment for the BR T re sulted in many of them operating competitively parallel to
the BRT.
As summarised in table 2, the cases offer several explanations for the decision of para tr ansit
operators to objec t to the BRT im plementation. Th ey can be clustered under the following
categories:
• Loss of autonomy, flexibility, and established pra ctices/routines
• Financial and ec onomic r isk avoidance
• Lack of trust in government

Table 2 : Synopsis of case cities.

Bogotá

Mexico City

Johannesburg

Lagos

Paratransit
service prior
to reform

Share of paratransit in
public transport

100%

54% in year 2000

75%

82%

Mode of self-regulation
and entry

Bus companies with unlimited
contracts and introduction of
new fleet

Route associations with ease
of entry

National Union managing
transport terminals with ease
of new minibus entry

Fleet ownership

Bus companies and private
individuals

Mainly privately owned by
individuals

Family or individually private
owned

Privately owned by
individuals

Revenue generation

Drivers compete for
passengers

Reforms
with BRT

Reason for reform

Address extreme competition,
ensure safety, and reduce
GHG S

Regulate the service, address
pollution and negative
paratransit externalities

Regulate the service, prevent
violent clashes, and ensure an
efficient mass transport
system

Reduce negative
consequences of the
fragmented, costly, unsafe,
and unreliable service

Reform procedure

Corridor by corridor through
open bidding with priority for
existing operators

Corridor by corridor with
inclusion of existing operators

Measures to encourage
participation

Local experience on bus
operations in Bogotá as one
criterion for bidding

Incumbent operators were
mandatory inclusion for all
BRT corridors

Only incumbent operators
were to form BOCs for the
BRT

Mandatory participation of
incumbent operators

Changes with BRT

New larger BOC; removal of
older fleet; revenue based on
distance travelled

BOC; removal of older fleet;
revenue based on distance
travelled

Revenue based on number of
passengers but verifiable
through tickets

Reasons for
resistance
and low
interest

Company, Associations
and Union

Limited contracts; loss of
autonomy by merging with
other companies; loss of
revenue from introducing new
buses

Inclusion of outsid e o perat o rs;
reduced guaranteed payments

Perception of government
national agenda to remove
operators; opinion of minibus
taxis as a symbol of black
power after apartheid;
mistrust of government due to
past experiences; fear of
losing individual autonomy
and benefits of self-regulation

The option to continue
paratransit operations on the
same corridor as before led to
no resistance but low interest
in participating in reforms.

Fleet owners

Lack of capital to invest in
new buses leading exclusion

Increase in required capital
investment

Same as above

Drivers

No reported resistance

Loss of jobs

Same as above

Loss of autonomy, flexibility and established practices/routines

One of the objectives and implication of all four BRT initiatives was to change the r egulatory

regime fr om an informal socially self - controlled one to a formal contract-based one. The loss

of self-regulation of public transport by incumbent paratra nsit operators to public institutions

has in all cases been perceived as a major threa t to established practices that had guaranteed

flexibility and autonomy of decisions.

The company/asso c iation/union - as shown in all the cases - durin g their paratransit

operations could introdu c e an unrestricted number of fleets w hich t ranslates int o profits. The

fleet owners, depending on their level of investment had control ove r the type and size of the

fleet. They also had control over the p ercentage of their revenue spent on maintenance of th e

fleet. Paratransit drivers generally d id not have a strict daily routine of working ti me but

rather flexible working condition s . Revenue depends on a driver’s own ability to attrac t

commuters when they are out of the terminal , as shown for example by the eme rge nce of the

“penny war” in Bogotá. A driver manage d to ha ve money daily and did not nee d to wa it until

the end of the mont h. Te ntative age limi ts did not exist and there was no stringent adherence

to taxation in comparison to formal ope ration.

With the decision to partic ipate in BRT, the formal regulatory syst em also affe cted the

organisational autonomy that existed along with the decision rights of in cumbent paratransit

operators. In Bogotá for example, t he loss of paratransit bus company autonomy when

merging with other companie s resulted in re sistance. Similarly, the inclusion of outsid e

operators in Mexico City occasioned resistance to participating in the BRT . I n Johannesburg,

the nationally planned reforms were considered as a national agenda to eliminate incumbent

paratransit opera tors fro m public transport servic es since they are organised at the local level .

The operators also feared the loss power as th e mi ni-bus taxis are considered as a symbol of

black power after apartheid.

The pe rceived loss of these privilege s and the opportunity to apply them through autonomous

decisions not re gulated by the government and fle xib il it y to generate income and profit

results in resistance and low interest in BRT. In line with the theo re ti c asser tions outlined

above in this paper, the perce ived inconsist e ncy between their paratransit opera ti ons and the

expected regulatory fr a mework associated with BRT ope ration initiated by a third pa rty

explains the opposi tion to this change. Pa ra transit opera tors are not passive onlookers waiting

for governm e nt intervention but ra ther have aspirations of their own (H. V. S c halekamp,

2015) and therefore government-led changes tha t are expected to signi ficantly affect these

aspirations are likely to encounter resistance.

Risk avoidance

The change in the operational rule s for paratransit operators when shifting from their

incumbent practice to BRT does not alone a ffect flexibility and autonomy with respect to

organisational and operational decisions. I t also comes with s evera l risks caused for example

by significant investment require d for new buses, the potential loss of business a nd revenues

because of new competitors or the necessity to acquire new skills or competences.

BRT implementation presents restrictions to the participation of all three paratra nsit groups

(company/associa tion/un ion, flee t owners, d rive rs ) when they opt to join. First, a paratra nsit

company/association/union must assume more r esponsibility when it evolves to a formal

company compared to th eir pre vious operation. This prese nts a challenge where competence

for formal operations is lacking. Moreover, a re quirement for a paratransit

company/association/union to participate in BRT is to sign contracts to be rene wed

depending on their perfo rma nce. This is contrary to the unrestricted p rovision of services in

their incumbent operation. Secondly, paratransit fleet owners often find it difficult to meet the

revenue r equire ments for large quality fleet required for BRT operation presenting a

limitation to join. Finally, beyond competence and capital requirements serving as physi c al

barrier s, there is a psychological aspec t in which the depth of change poses to incumbent

operators. Huse (1980) maintained that the grea ter the depth of int erve nti on, the more it

impacts the psychological makeup and persona li ty of the individual affecting their level of

acceptance of the ch ange. These findi ngs affirm H. V. Schalekamp 's (2015) paratransit study

in Cape Town which shows that larger paratr ansit businesses may be more eligible to

participate in BR T in compar ison to smaller holders. This is due to larger paratransit

businesses organisational competence and fina ncial capacity to meet BRT requirements.

Paratransit operators h ave routine p ra ctices tha t lead to their profits. The long-standing

practice of daily and weekly earnings , for instance, is likely to provoke resistance to any

change that seeks to alter this routine practice to monthly earning. Incumbent paratransit

operators in South Africa particularly h ave an emotional attac hment to their operation since it

is the only business blac k pe ople could own duri ng apartheid. Owner-driv ers ge nerally have a

strong attac hment to paratransit opera ti ons than other operators since they enjoy the benefits

of both owners and driv ers and therefore endure the pain of cha nge that comes with joining

BRT. Dodero et al. (201 3) a ff irm that it is diffic ult for owner -drivers to t ransition to formal

operations when the legal right to operate is modified in a way that seems to affe ct their

previous style of operations.

Lack of trust in government

A third aspect that contr ibuted to paratransit operators not the engage in the BRT reforms is a

lack of confidence and trust in the government and its capabilities to succeed with the

reforms.

Trust or mistrust in th e public institutions a ffects participation (Oreg & Sverdlik 2011) .

Across the cases, incu mbent operators have q uestioned the legitimacy of government to

initiate the reforms be cause it had be e n largely absent in the task of providing publi c

transport services. On the contrary, operators perceived themselves as the legitimate

providers that had f illed the void for many decade s.

Aside from legiti mac y, operators across the c a ses fea red that government had hidden ag enda s

like in the case of Johannesburg where the reforms were perceived as a national agenda to

eliminate operators. Mis trust in government also can be explained by pa st experiences, for

example, pr evious unfulfil led promises of gov ernments made paratransit operators s ce ptical

of the BRT promises in Mexico.

Conclusion

Involving p e ople who will be affected by reforms is known to lead to acceptance. Most

paratransit operators, although being invited to participate, have particularly resisted and

showed low interest in participating in reforms through BRT . B a sed o n analysis of BRT

implementation in Bogota, Mexico City, Johanne sburg, and Lagos where incumbent

paratransit operators were involved, we have re ve aled that they are not inherently against

participating in BRT. The re sistance and low interest are rather a result (1) loss of autonomy,

flexibility, and e stablished practices/routines, (2 ) financial and economic r isk avoidance, and

(3) l a ck of trust in government s who initiate reforms. These empirical findings are further

supported by resistance to change theories of cognitive diss ona nce, dept h of int erve nti on,

dispositional resistance, and loss of dec ision rights.

The implementation of the reforms and the findings suggest that publi c officials have

overestimated how mu ch change they can en force on p ara tr ansit operators. This has

implications for future practice of refor m implementation that careful consideration needs to

be given to addressing these underlying causes o f resistance . The finding s also demonstrate

that a differentiated actor perspective is require d when ana lysing paratransit opera tors. As

shown, the concerns may vary between a ssociations, owners, and drivers.

While it is generally ea sier for people to ac cept change through reforms when there is crisis

than its a bsence (Burnes, 2014; Lora & Olivera, 2004), paratransit ope rators do not perceive

any form of crisis that require public officials to intervene signi fic antly in their opera tion

through re forms such as BRT. An improved understanding of paratransit operators and thei r

operation is a precursor to any form of reform public officials might seek to implement. As

this paper sho ws for all the cases, publi c officials who se ek to include inc umbent paratransit

operators should not limit this to only a certain group but all the groups

(company/associa tion/un ion, fleet owners, and drivers) for acceptance and mi nimal or low

resistance . Whereas a strong politi c al will and comm itment are critical factors for any top-

down reform success, publi c off icials ’ ability to identify the benefits gained through self -

regulation and the limitations posed by the reform intervention approach will be use ful fo r

attracting paratra nsit operators interest in any kind of r eform.

Although cognitive and behavioural concepts have b e en applied in formal organisation

reforms, these have unfortunately not been conside red in paratransit ref orm leading to the

negative assertions about them. Beyond the recent upsurg e in mapping and making

paratransit opera tors and their operation technologically visible (Klopp & Cavoli, 2019;

Saddier, Patterson, Johns on, & C han, 2016), futur e studies aim ed at understanding paratransit

operators shoul d consider behavioural concepts that underpin their acc eptance and resistance

to reform.

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Why institutions use Plag.ai for originality review, entry 65

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