Bus rapid transit implementation with the inclusion of incumbent paratransit operators in African cities: lessons from Accra [original]

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Urban, Planning and Transport Research

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Bus rapid transit implementation with the

inclusion of incumbent paratransit operators in

African cities: lessons from Accra

Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng

To cite this article: Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng (2021) Bus rapid transit implementation with the

inclusion of incumbent paratransit operators in African cities: lessons from Accra, Urban, Planning

and Transport Research, 9:1, 534-548, DOI: 10.1080/21650020.2021.2000485

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21650020.2021.2000485

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ARTICLE

Bus rapid transit implementation with the inclusion of

incumbent paratransit operators in African cities: lessons

from Accra

Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng

Institute of Urban and Regional Planning, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

ABSTRACT

Bus rapid transit (BRT) is considered the cheapest and fastest to

implement mass transportation system compared to rail and tram.

However, the implementation of BRT becomes complicated where

there are incumbent paratransit service providers. In African cities, it

has become mandatory to include these operators because they are

the most extensive public transport service providers, employ many

people, and make governments unpopular when excluded. In

Accra, the government sought to implement BRT with the inclusion

of incumbent paratransit operators but could only implement

a conventional bus service. This article analyses the approach

adopted to examine the reasons behind the inability to execute

the planned BRT and draw lessons from the Ghana experience. This

article adopted informal transportation and BRT characteristics

based on the African experience to analyse the incorporation of

incumbent paratransit operators in Ghana. The findings show the

challenges the implementing agency encountered, resulting in

a shift from BRT to a conventional bus. The underlying reason for

the difficulty is the depth of change required by both paratransit

operators and government institutions. Given the depth of change

for capital investment, capacity, and governance reforms required,

the paper recommends a more gradual BRT implementation

approach in African cities.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 27 June 2021

Accepted 27 October 2021

KEYWORDS

Approach; bus rapid transit;

depth of change; paratransit

service provider; public

transport reform

1. Introduction

Paratransit operators are the primary public transportation providers in most African cities

(Kumar & Barret, 2008). Paratransit has been described as a public transport system that

operates with small to medium-sized vehicles in a flexible non-scheduled manner (Behrens

et al., 2016). Operators of paratransit services are known to be demand-responsive, providing

low-cost services, serving as a source of employment, and operating without subsidy from

governments (Cervero, 2000). Paratransit services have expanded over the years due to several

reasons, including rapidly uncoordinated urban growth, weak to no local government

regulation, and inadequate provision of formal public transit. Despite the benefits of their

services, dependence on fares coupled with weak regulation has contributed to making them

CONTACT Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng [email protected] Institute of Urban and Regional

Planning, Technische Universität Berlin, Strasse des 17. Juni 135, Berlin 10623, Germany

URBAN, PLANNING AND TRANSPORT RESEARCH

2021, VOL. 9, NO. 1, 534–548

https://doi.org/10.1080/21650020.2021.2000485

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/

licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly

cited.

competitive on the road resulting in accidents, road rage, and sometimes lethal conflicts

among operators. Due to the nature of their operations, they ignore routine maintenance and

reinvestment in acquiring larger new vehicles (Kumar et al., 2021; Tun et al., 2020). Such

conduct has affected the quality of paratransit services, which has been largely regarded by

some commuters as unsatisfactory (Agyemang W., 2013; Schalekamp & Behrens, 2010).

Many city authorities have resorted to implementing a bus rapid transit (BRT) system to

regulate, provide an efficient mass transportation system and simultaneously eliminate short-

comings associated with paratransit. BRT is a mass transport system that uses large buses and

dedicated busways for rapid and scheduled transit (Cervero, 2013; Deng & Nelson, 2011).

Following the successful busway implementation in Curitiba-Brazil in 1974 and subsequent

modern BRT in Bogotá in 2000 (Deng & Nelson, 2011), BRT operations have been recorded

in 170 cities (Global BRT Data, 2021). The expansion in BRT technology worldwide is

attributed to its comparatively low implementation cost to rail and tram, rapid implementa-

tion, high performance and positive impact on commuters (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2013).

Public institutions overseeing transportation reforms have adopted different

approaches with BRT implementation where there are existing paratransit operators.

Incumbent operators are either supported to be part of the BRT or excluded from

the reforms. The advantages of supporting incumbent operators are that it enables

acceptance and avoidance of standoffs, as happened in Quito, where military inter-

vention was required (Chrustie et al., 2006). However, the demerits of supporting

incumbent operators include increased cost of implementation (Flores & Zegras,

2012) and possibly hijacking the reform process without forming a company for

formal operations (ITDP, 2017). Concerning supporting incumbent paratransit

operators, Schalekamp et al. (2016) identified four reform approaches; (1) incor-

poration into operating companies (2) a stepped process of paratransit operational

improvements and corporatisation to become future conventional bus or BRT

operator (3) operator consolidation and competition regulation through franchising

or concession (4) incremental upgrade of incumbent paratransit services not neces-

sarily leading to corporatisation or formalised bus service.

Another aspect of the approach is the implementation timescale. Transport reform

institutions have adopted two main time scales – the abrupt or ‘big bang’ and the incremental

corridor-by-corridor approach. The abrupt approach where all the BRT corridors are devel-

oped simultaneously across the city was adopted in Santiago de Chile (Hidalgo & Graftieaux,

2007), while the incremental approach has been adopted in Mexico City (Hidalgo &

Graftieaux, 2006). The incremental approach allows operators and commuters to adjust to

the new transport system while public authorities learn from each corridor implementation

strategy. The incremental approach also allows for the implementation cost to spread over

a while. The abrupt approach ensures a functioning city-wide reform within a short period.

The main shortcoming of the abrupt approach is that transportation in the entire city might

come to a standstill when an aspect such as an electronic payment system fails. Moreover, the

abrupt approach requires a high initial investment in comparison to the incremental

approach.

BRT implementation has been tortuous in African cities where informal transport

operators provide the primary means of public transportation. Lagos pioneered BRT in

Africa in 2008 on a 22 km corridor with a 60% segregated busway (Otunola et al., 2019).

The planned extension of the BRT stalled until a 13.5 km extension in 2015. In 2009, the

URBAN, PLANNING AND TRANSPORT RESEARCH 535

first full BRT commenced transportation services in Johannesburg on a 25.5 km corridor.

Before implementation, the implementation agencies assumed that negotiations with

incumbent operators would take a month but eventually took 3 years (McCaul & Ntuli,

2011). Although the BRT route has increased by 18.5 km, this is lower than initially

planned. Despite not meeting the planned extensions, ridership is lower than expected,

meaning the government must subsidise the BRT for a more extended period (Scorcia &

Munoz-Raskin, 2019). In Accra, the plan was to incrementally implement BRT on

a corridor-by-corridor basis, starting with a pilot by 2012. After years of delays, public

officials in Accra could not implement BRT, but a conventional bus service in 2016

branded Aayalolo on a 22 km corridor. The new bus service experienced low patronage

and subsequently collapsed in 2018 after incurring losses and drivers complaining of

unpaid salaries. The Aayalolo bus service commenced operations again in 2019 on

a different corridor with a changed operational mechanism.

The aim of this article is to analyse the approach adopted, examine the reasons behind

public officials’ inability to implement the planned BRT and draw lessons from the Accra

experience. This article analyses the changes government institutions and paratransit opera-

tors were required to go through. The approach adopted for BRT implementation can be as

important as the technical infrastructure development. The approach can result in unantici-

pated high cost (Flores & Zegras, 2012), violence from incumbent operators (Venter, 2013), or

smooth transitioning of incumbent operators into the new service (Gilbert, 2008). The

approach did not result in BRT in Accra, nor did the incumbent paratransit operators wholly

embrace the new service. The unsuccessful BRT implementation in Accra and slow imple-

mentation in other African cities has led to some scholars questioning the intentions of

international bodies that support BRTs in Africa (Rizzo, 2015; Wood, 2015). The lessons from

Accra are useful for African cities in pursuit of public transport reforms with BRT aimed at

involving incumbent paratransit service providers.

Participation of people who are likely to be impacted by a change in the change process is

known to reduce resistance to change (Coch & French, 1948). Most organisations, therefore,

involve employees or groups that are likely to be impacted by the change. In practice, the

participation of people in the change process has not always led to participation in the project.

The depth of change has been identified as one reason for resistance to change even after

participation (Huse, 1980). Huse (1980) argued that the greater the depth of change, the more

it impacts the psychological makeup and personality, requiring full participation if the

individual affected accepts the changes. There are two main types of change, evolutionary

and revolutionary. Evolutionary change is gradual and often encounter less resistance,

whereas revolutionary is drastic and often encounter strong resistance (Burke, 2018). It,

therefore, suggests that of the two main types of organisational change – revolutionary and

evolutionary – the revolutionary type require more participation due to the depth of change.

People who experience high levels of participation have reported higher readiness and

acceptance of change and considered change as less stressful (Oreg et al., 2011).

The following section describes the methodology. Section 3 describes the planned

approach, characteristics of what was eventually realised, aspects of the approach that

enabled the paratransit operator’s participation, and then disagreements. Section 4 dis-

cusses the lessons that can be learnt based on the merits and demerits of the approach. In

conclusion, section 5 reflects on the challenges of BRT implementation with the inclusion

536 E. T. ASIMENG

of incumbent paratransit operators as a revolutionary change that exposes their lack of

financial and competencies for such changes and therefore recommends an evolutionary

approach for cities with similar settings like Accra.

2. Methodology

The method adopted to analyse the BRT implementation approach was two-fold. The first

part was to develop a framework of characteristics of paratransit operations and BRT.

Paratransit operations have specific characteristics that make the operators extremely com-

petitive on the road resulting in undesirable outcomes such as accidents, road rage, and lethal

conflicts. BRT, on the other hand, has features that facilitate a shift from these undesirable

characteristics. Public officials, therefore, introduce BRT to exercise regulatory control, ensure

mass transportation and address the undesirable outcomes. BRT implementation with the

inclusion of incumbent paratransit operators changes their operational characteristics. Based

on city cases where public officials opted to support incumbent paratransit operators to

transition to BRT, a framework depicting the main characteristics between paratransit and

BRT was developed (Table 1). The characteristics associated with paratransit services are from

African city cases in Accra (Addo, 2002; Saddier et al., 2016), Johannesburg (Venter, 2013),

Cape Town (Schalekamp & Behrens, 2013), Lagos (Mobereola, 2009), and Dar es Salaam

(Ka’bange et al., 2014). The characteristics associated with BRT were derived from Deng and

Nelson (2011) and the BRT planning guide (ITDP, 2017).

The second part of the method used the framework in Table 1 to inform the design of

qualitative interviews in a deductive manner. Interviews as a qualitative method were chosen

to gather stakeholder views and opinions and to obtain an extended understanding of these

views (Mayring, 2014). The interview questionnaire was designed to elicit information on the

implementation approach based on paratransit services before the BRT and their expected

role in the BRT. Table 2 shows the main topics from which specific questions were developed

for the interviews. Each topic had several sub-questions that were used to understand the

approach and the implementation process. The depth of change for transitioning from

paratransit to BRT was central in the specific interview questions in Table 2. The personnel

interviewed were from the Accra metro assembly (AMA), the Greater Accra Passenger

Transport Executive (GAPTE), academia, paratransit association executives, drivers and

owners. Whereas the personnel from the AMA, GAPTE, Academia and paratransit

Table 1. Characteristics of paratransit operations and expected change with BRT.

Paratransit characteristic BRT characteristic

Self-regulated transport by union/

association/company

Regulated by public/private authority and formation of bus operating

company (BOC) by paratransit association/company

No exclusive dedicated bus lanes and no

scheduled operation

Exclusively dedicated bus lanes and scheduled operations

Mainly individually owned mini and midi

buses

Large buses owned/leased by the bus operating company(ies)

No direct removal of old paratransit fleet Some or all existing paratransit fleet may be removed or relocated

from the BRT corridor

No distinctive operations of trunk and feeder

arrangement

New trunk and feeder, or trunk only arrangement

Revenue depends on the number of

passengers and cash-based collection

Revenue depends on distance travelled per bus, and fare collection is

either electronic-only or with cash collection

URBAN, PLANNING AND TRANSPORT RESEARCH 537

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